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THE CASE FOR THE CENTRAL POWERS Montgelas, Count Max. (1925). The Case for the Central Powers (Part III, Section 15, 200-203). London, UK: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. I Germany pursued no aim either in Europe or elsewhere which could only be achieved by means of war. Austria-Hungary’s only aim was to maintain the status quo. Her first intention of rectifying her frontiers at Serbia’s expense was immediately abandoned at Germany’s instance, and even Sergey Sazonoff’s [Russia’s foreign minister] was convinced of her territorial désintéressement [disinterest] by her definite statements. France aimed at recovering Alsace-Lorraine, and many leading French politicians also hoped to annex the Saar Basin, whilst Russia aspired to possession of Constantinople and the Straits, both Powers knowing well that these aims could rot be achieved without a European war. II Germany’s preparations for war were on a considerably smaller scale than those made by France, having regard to the political constellation, her geographical position, the extent of her unprotected frontiers, and the number of her population. From 1913 onwards, even her actual numerical peace strength was less in respect of white troops, quite apart from the steadily increasing strength of the French coloured troops. As compared with Russia’s army, those of Austria-Hungary were absolutely inadequate. The Franco-Russian allies were far superior to the Central powers with regards to the amount of war material, as well as of manpower at their disposal. III It was a political mistake to construct a German battle fleet, instead of completing the naval defences, but even in London the proportion of ten to sixteen Dreadnoughts finally proposed by Germany was not regarded as a menace. IV Even after Bismarck’s time the German Empire repeatedly omitted to take advantage of favourable opportunities for a war of prevention. V The Russian suggestion of the first Hague Conference was not based on pure love of peace. All the Great Powers, without exception, were most skeptic as regards the question of reducing armaments; the Russian proposal of 1899 was unanimously rejected, and public opinion in France strongly opposed Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s [the British prime minister at the time] 1907 suggestion. Neither at the first nor the second Hague Conference was any proposal to adjust serious international conflicts, affecting the honour and vital interests of a nation, brought forward or supported by any Great Power. VI The world war was not decided upon at Potsdam on the 5th of July 1914. Germany merely assented to Austria’s going to war with Serbia. The possibility that Austria-Hungary would go to war with Serbia, like other wars—the Boer, Moroccan, Tripolitan, and Balkan wars—might lead to further complications, was well-weighed, but the risk was thought very small in view of the special provocation. VII After the publication of the Serbian reply; Germany no longer thought war advisable, even against Serbia and only favoured strictly limited military operations, which were considered justifiable, even in London. VIII It is true that Germany did not support the proposal to extend the time limit, and rejected the idea of a conference. She not only, however, accepted every other proposal of mediation which came from London, but proposed on her own initiative the two most suitable methods of negotiation, namely, direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and the idea of not going beyond Belgrade, which was adopted by Sir Edward Grey [the British foreign secretary]. IX An understanding had almost been reached by the methods Germany had been the first to propose, namely, direct discussions between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and limiting the military operations against Serbia, when the Russian mobilization suddenly tore the threads asunder. X The leading men knew just as well in Paris and St. Petersburg as in Berlin, that this mobilization must inevitably lead to war. Viviani telegraphed to London on the 1st of August that the one who first orders general mobilization is the aggressor, and he saddled Germany with this responsibility, knowing that the accusation was false. XI France did not advise moderation in St. Petersburg during the crisis. Finding that the first attempt to do so had annoyed Sazonoff, the French Government refrained from taking any further steps in this direction. XII France not only did not advise Russia against ordering general mobilization, but gave surreptitious advice as to how she could carry on her military preparations secretly without provoking Germany to take timely countermeasures. XIII Russia was the first Power to order general mobilization. France was the first Power to inform another Power officially of her decision to take part in a European war. XIV England was never as firm in advising moderation in St. Petersburg as Germany in giving this advice to Vienna. Unlike other British diplomats, Sir Edward Grey only realized the meaning of the Russian mobilization when it was too late, and St. Petersburg was no longer willing to put a stop to it. 2 XV Germany's premature declaration of war on Russia was a political error, which can be accounted for by the immense danger of the position on two fronts; her declaration of war on France was a pure formality. The decisive event was not this or that declaration of war, but the action which made the declaration of war inevitable, and this action was Russia's general mobilization. XVI England declared war on Germany because she did not consider it compatible with her interests that France should be defeated a second time. Belgian interests, and the treaty of 1839, which Lord Salisbury [the British prime minister at the time] had been prepared to sacrifice in 1887, were the reasons adduced to make it popular. Over and above this, the naval agreement of 1912 with France compelled England to abandon her neutrality before Belgium’s neutrality was violated. XVII Greater diplomatic skill was shown by the Entente than by the Triple Alliance Powers. By her false statements regarding Germany’s preparations for war, particularly regarding the alleged priority of the German mobilization, by magnifying insignificant incidents on the frontier into invasions of French territory, and by withdrawing her covering troops to a distance of ten kilometres from the frontier, France created the prior condition in London, which Count Alexander Benckendorff [Russian ambassador to Britain] had indicated, as far back as at the end of 1912, as necessary for England’s intervention. An impression was produced in London that “the opponents of the Entente were the aggressors.” 3