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Reviews Assessing the Civil War’s Most Notable Military Commanders Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian. Edward H. Bonekemper III. Praeger Publishers. 437 pages; maps; charts; index; $49.95. By Col. Cole C. Kingseed U.S. Army retired G en. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. Robert E. Lee emerged from the American Civil War as the North’s and South’s premier military commanders. While each general-in-chief has attracted his share of admirers and detractors, few biographers have made a comprehensive comparison of the two leaders over the span of their seemingly separate 1861–63 campaigns, as well as their more familiar head-to-head contests in Virginia during 1864–65. Subtitled Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian, Grant and Lee reinforces Edward H. Bonekemper III’s previous works: How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War and A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant’s Overlooked Military Genius. In each book, Bonekemper makes a compelling case for Grant’s tactical and strategic superiority to Lee. The Grant who emerges from these pages is an astute military commander who, through “dexterity and cunning,” achieves complete success less than a year after launching his Overland Campaign against Lee in the spring of 1864. Bonekemper does not disguise his obvious admiration for Grant. As the subtitle indicates, Grant pursued a national strategy that was consistent with the North’s superior resources and the country’s offensive-minded President. From 1861–65, Grant’s “aggressiveness in three theaters was consistent with the Union need for [total] victory,” while Lee’s “aggressiveness in a single theater was inconsistent 90 ARMY ■ April 2008 with strategic and tactical defensiveness the Confederates needed to preserve their limited manpower and force the stalemate that was sufficient for Southern victory.” Grant and Lee contains a provocative, albeit highly biased, analysis of the casualty rates that each commander suffered throughout his battles and campaigns. Again Bonekemper is anything but impartial, as Grant’s excessive casualties on the battlefield, which Bonekemper claims were always “militarily tolerable,” are offset by contrasting them with the numbers of Confederate prisoners captured at Fort Donelson, Tenn.; Vicksburg, Miss.; and Appomattox Court House, Va. In his direct confrontations with Lee in the war’s final year, for example, Grant actually incurred a far higher casualty rate than Lee, but when the South’s prisoners are included following Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, the casualty ratio appears relatively even. Bonekemper actually bases his controversial assessment of Lee’s tactical and strategic inferiority on the highly debatable premise that the Union, not the Confederacy, had the burden of winning the war. Bonekemper contends that all the South had to do to win independence was to pursue a defensive strategy until the Confederacy achieved international recognition or the North tired of the war. Such an assertion fails to take into account President Abraham Lincoln’s implacable desire to conduct offensive operations to force the Southern states to renounce their self-proclaimed independence. The only way for the South to have won the war, posits Bonekemper, was for Lee to pursue a strategic and a tactical defensive. To Lee, such a course was both militarily and politically unacceptable, since the North’s superiority in resources would eventually prevail. Bonekemper contends that Lee’s penchant for the offensive and his “Virginia myopia” played into the Union’s hands and resulted in the loss of Vicksburg, “the fall of Atlanta, the reelection of Lincoln and the loss of the war.” Somehow, Bonekemper also attributes the destruction of the Confederate Army of Tennessee at Franklin and Nashville to Lee since Gen. John Bell Hood, “a protégé of Lee’s,” needlessly sacrificed his army in a series of frontal attacks. Strange logic indeed! Grant and Lee does make a significant contribution to our understanding of these complex commanders in Bonekemper’s analysis of the careers of both generals over the entire course of the Civil War. He traces how each sought to achieve victory by offensive operations, but Bonekemper concludes that Lee’s reliance on the tactical offensive was misplaced because of in- ferior resources and that he should have dispatched portions of his army to the Mississippi Valley to counter Union gains in the Western Theater of the war rather than invading Maryland and Pennsylvania in 1862 and 1863, respectively. In Grant and Lee’s final chapter, Bonekemper compares his subjects in myriad general military and military managerial skills. Contemporary military officers and noncommissioned officers will find this analysis particularly illuminating. Not surprisingly, Grant holds the upper hand in virtually every field, including tactics, strategic vision, use of staffs and other resources, maneuverability, and clarity of orders. Again, Lee falls short in virtually every category. Only in moral courage does Bonekemper assign Lee equal marks. Given Lee’s consistent substandard ratings, one wonders how Lee achieved any military success or how he held the Union Army of the Potomac at bay for three years. T o his credit, Bonekemper cites a number of prominent historians to lend credence to the various schools surrounding the merits of Grant’s and Lee’s generalship. Readers will find the detailed appendices and notes well worth the cost of the book. Two appendices specifically address conflicting casualty rates in every major battle and campaign fought by Grant and Lee. In addition, superior maps throughout the text add to the reader’s compre- hension of the various campaigns. In the final analysis, Bonekemper has produced a highly readable, though flawed, assessment of the war’s most notable military commanders. Joining an increasing number of recent historians who believe that Lee has been consistently “overrated by romantic proponents of the Myth of the Lost Cause,” Bonekemper posits that “to Grant, along with Lincoln, must go the credit for Union victory, and to Lee, along with Jefferson Davis, must go the blame for Confederate defeat.” ■ COL. COLE C. KINGSEED, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer and consultant. Varied Fare Airborne Forces at War: From Parachute Test Platoon to the 21st Century. Robert K. Wright Jr., Ph.D. and John T. Greenwood, Ph.D. Naval Institute Press. 214 pages; photographs; maps; index; $39.95. In Airborne Forces at War, Robert K. Wright Jr. and John T. Greenwood present a comprehensive summation of the activities, organizations and combat operations that collectively spell out the history of the airborne forces of the U.S. Army. Almost every airborne unit, almost every combat action and almost every decision critical to the evolution of Airborne organization and doctrine are identified. But the mention of each is more in the form of a daily morning report that summarizes the facts of daily activities, with little explanation of why and how. There is only a smattering of anecdotal information in Airborne Forces at War. There are paragraphs on personalities, the design of the Parachutist Badge, Medal of Honor awardees and the like; however, although the coverage of each major segment of Airborne history reports what happened, any detailed explanations of the plans, purposes and actions that brought about the result are omitted. For example, a reader interested in the record of the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, will find “… the 3rd Battalion, 504th, was sent to the northern front [at Anzio] and attached to the British 1st (Guards) Division. … they helped stop the German offensive in difficult hand-to-hand fighting against repeated attacks … For its gallant stand from February 8–12, the 3rd Battalion received a DUC [Distinguished Unit Citation].” In the same vein, it is reported that Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory was an outspoken skeptic of the airborne operations planned for D-Day, but there is no detailed presentation of his argument. Similarly, “For his intrepid leadership and heroism in the fight for Altavilla and Hill 424, [thenCol. Reuben H.] Tucker was awarded the first of his two wartime DSCs.” There is no description of Col. Tucker’s specific actions, no further reference to Altavilla or Hill 424. The above is not meant as criticism. It is, instead, a forewarning to the reader who is looking for the what, why and how of his favorite unit’s participation in one of our wars that he will have to refer to the books and papers listed in the bibliography or other sources for the full story. Nevertheless, this is an excellent factual history of the Airborne, a more complete chronology of all wars and all theaters than I have seen previously. It will be a useful reference text that follows the development of today’s capabilities and identifies the inquiry, imagination and experience that energized generations of paratroopers to grow that 50-man Test Platoon of 1940 to the Airborne Corps and the special operations forces of toApril 2008 ■ ARMY 91 day. It identifies the soldiers who made that growth possible and others who proved the value and success of the concept and created the traditions, reputation and fame of the soldiers and organizations proud to call themselves “Airborne!” —Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret. How the South Could Have Won the Civil War: The Fatal Errors That Led to Confederate Defeat. Bevin Alexander. Crown Publishers. 338 pages; maps; index; $25.95. Was Union victory in the American Civil War inevitable? That question has intrigued historians for more than a century. Most explanations for Union victory and Confederate defeat lack what military historian James McPherson calls the dimension of contingency—the recognition that at numerous critical points during the war, things might have gone altogether differently. In How the South Could Have Won the Civil War, Bevin Alexander contends that the South most definitely could have won. 92 ARMY ■ April 2008 In exploring the feasibility of Confederate victory, Alexander reiterates the argument that he first articulated in Lost Victories: The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson. Alexander posits that Confederate Lt. Gen. Thomas (Stonewall) Jackson’s strategic insight was vastly superior to that of Confederate President Jefferson Davis and Gen. Robert E. Lee. According to Alexander, Jackson figured out almost from the outset how to win the war, but neither Davis nor Lee was willing to follow his recommendations. Recognizing the need to adapt to the new kind of war in which opposing armies were only an outward manifestation of enemy strength, Jackson proposed moving against the North’s industries and other means of livelihood. His strategy, in short, was to bypass the Union armies and win the war indirectly by attacking the Northern people’s will to prosecute the war. The course that Lee adopted, however, was costly frontal attacks aimed primarily against Union armies, a strategy that ultimately led to Confederate defeat. Though intriguing, Alexander’s argument does not bear up under serious scrutiny. Contending that Davis, Lee and Jackson, more than any others, determined the outcome of the Civil War fails to consider the critical role that President Abraham Lincoln and a host of Union generals played. Nor does Alexander provide sufficient analysis of the Western Theater of the war, in which the more successful Union generals emerged and in which serious errors by Confederate military leaders resulted in the loss of the Mississippi Valley to Union armies. In addition, Alexander pays insufficient attention to the less-than-successful aspects of Jackson’s generalship. Jackson’s frequent delays during the Seven Days Battles outside Richmond, Va., for example, repeatedly forced Lee to revise his plans and in large measure facilitated Union Maj. Gen. George McClellan’s escape to the safety of the James River. Where Alexander does succeed is in demonstrating that there is nothing inevitable about military victory. Though potential victory is seldom limited solely to an individual leader’s contribution, Alexander’s admiration of Stonewall Jackson notwithstanding, Alexander offers the reader an alternative interpretation of how weaker armies can overcome stronger opponents. It is in this respect that How the South Could Have Won the Civil War makes its greatest contribution. —Col. Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret. The Lost Battalion of TET: Breakout of the 2/12th Cavalry at Hue. Charles A. Krohn. Naval Institute Press. 171 pages; black and white photographs; maps; index; $23.95. In addition to being an honest, fair and balanced example of military writing, what marks The Lost Battalion of TET: Breakout of the 2/12th Cavalry at Hue for importance is author Charles A. Krohn’s uncanny ability to elucidate what went wrong during a sixweek period in January and February 1968 during the recapture of the city of Hue, when a U.S. infantry battalion was ordered to attack a North Vietnamese force of more than 2,000 without air or artillery support. The former lieutenant colonel’s conclusion: Steel is always cheaper than blood. During one of the initial battles of the Tet Offensive, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry (supported by Troop B, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment) prevented the enemy from driving free-world forces from the strategic Que Son Valley, terrain essential for control of Quang Nam Province. Although the battalion was encircled on February 4 by elements of the 6th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, the U.S. battle line could not be breached. In fact, that night U.S. troops exfiltrated enemy positions without being seen deep into the North Vietnamese lines of communication. Completely surprised, the enemy was interdicted. But out of a foxhole strength of 500, 81 American soldiers were killed in action and more than 250 wounded, a staggering casualty rate. In a Presidential Unit Citation prepared by Krohn for Richard Nixon and issued on August 11, 1970, the President stated that the troops “showed their gallant fighting timber during many days of sustained combat. Their outstanding bravery, determination, esprit de corps and devotion to duty blunted the enemy offensive and brought great credit on themselves, their unit and the U.S. Army.” Despite the high praise, considerable controversy continues among military experts over battle strategy during that tumultous combat period. “Based upon my experiences in Vietnam,” writes Krohn, who served two tours in Vietnam and retired from the Army in 1984, “I was convinced that conventional light infantry has little chance of surviving contact with a superior force without artillery support. This conviction was never challenged until 2002, when I learned that the 10th Mountain Division was deploying to Afghanistan without any organic artillery.” Wanting to find out why, contrary to Army doctrine and his experiences, Krohn was told by his political contacts that “the Army didn’t see the need to take artillery, while [his] military contacts said the political leadership set the rules. … In short, if soldiers were killed or wounded in Afghanistan because there was no artillery to support them, blame would inevitably fall on the shoulders of the person perceived most responsible. Air-delivered precision weapons are useful, but they have limitations, a function of weather, response time and availability.” There is nothing formal about Krohn’s part-diary, part-documentary, always instructional 33 chapters in which he portrays, with care and affection, men in ferocious close-encounter street fighting. That The Lost Battalion of TET is relentlessly accurate and impartial in its overall conclusions was recently borne out when the book was selected as an essential source for a 2006 analysis of the battle for Hue by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Published in cooperation with the Association of the U.S. Army, this revised paperback edition, with 16 pages of personal photos and six new appendices, arrives in time to commemorate Tet’s 40th anniversary. The Lost Battalion of TET will be welcomed by all readers, including urban battle historians and armchair generals, especially when Krohn’s recounted reactions are not only often impolitic but also are motivated by a drive to keep faith with his companions—alive or killed—his profession and his conscience. —Don DeNevi April 2008 ■ ARMY 93