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Historically Speaking Library of Congress World War I at 100 A ugust 1 marks the 100th anniversary By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown Some thought gigantic wars could no U.S. Army retired of Imperial Germany’s declaration of longer happen because the economies and war on Czarist Russia. One thing led to cultures of the great powers were interwoanother, and within a week, most of Europe and much of ven and interdependent. A generation of Europeans was the world was at war, and history’s most titanic battles to well into middle age without having seen the horrors of date were underway. Thus ended the Belle Époque, a re- war. Unfortunately, national rivalries, military anxieties, markable era of peace, prosperity, global integration and sci- lethal technologies, Balkan crises and out-of-control nonentific advance. state actors combined, creating a potential for catastrophe. Statesmen had already put out a number of sparks before they could set off the European powder keg, but their luck ran out in August 1914. Trouble Brewing Library of Congress France and Germany had been at odds since the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. With Paris besieged and starving, and relief efforts by increasingly raw French conscripts defeated, France capitulated. Peace terms included the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, a 5 billion franc indemnity, and a newly emergent Second Reich. The course of the war and nature of the peace embittered the French. Germany was concerned that France might seek vengeance and solicit Russian help to achieve it. In 1882, Germany, AustriaHungary and Italy negotiated the Triple Alliance, a secret agreement that promised they would provide each other military support in the event of war. Russia had conflicting Above: German soldiers fire a cannon while others on horseback move a wagon during World War I. Right: U.S. soldiers leave the protection of their trench following the call to charge. August 2014 ■ ARMY 85 Library of Congress interests with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and proved amenable to a military alliance with France in 1892. Thinking beyond Europe, the German Reichstag passed the five Naval Laws for the purpose of building a worldclass navy. The British suspected German naval expansion was directed at them, and the resulting arms race rendered Germany and Great Britain rivals. The British abandoned their earlier “Splendid Isolation” policy to seek allies on the European continent. In 1904, the Entente Cordiale agreement resolved their lingering imperial issues with France, and in 1907, the Anglo-Russian Entente similarly resolved their concerns with Russia. Collaterally, Great Britain had been committed since 1839 to preserving the neutrality and independence of Belgium—a logical German invasion route in the case of a war with France. The Triple Entente now stood as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance, and Europe had become two armed camps. In the several wars that culminated in the Franco-Prussian War, the Germans provided stunning tutorials about the role of a highly professional General Staff, rapid mobilization of a trained conscript army, artful exploitation of well- A 1916 poster solicits help for soldiers and civilians who fled to Albania after Serbia’s defeat by the Austro-German army in winter 1915. 86 ARMY ■ August 2014 designed railroad and telegraph networks, and modern breech-loading rifled artillery. Their ideas caught on, most notably in France and Russia. Nations great and small trained mass conscript armies and designed meticulous war plans to speed them into battle over more capable railroad systems. The most famous of the plans were the German Schlieffen Plan (envisioning a lightning right hook through Belgium into France) and the French Plan XVII (envisioning a lightning right hook through Alsace-Lorraine into Germany). Each of the potential combatants developed schemes requiring rapid action and sustained momentum. This rendered them sensitive to the knowledge that their opponents had such plans as well. Accepted military wisdom held that an army could not afford to wait once others mobilized. War plans became so time-constrained that mobilizations were likely to lead to war rather than any given nations risking the forfeit of an advantage. Burning Bridges As advanced as the technologies supporting war seemed at the time, the lethalities of the Franco-Prussian War were a quantum removed from those of 1914. Machine guns had proliferated and leaped ahead in sophistication. Rifles and artillery had evolved through several generations of modernization, and the lines distinguishing ubiquitous (yet small) field guns and rare (yet mammoth) siege guns had blurred. Recognizably modern battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines had made their debut, and not-quite-somodern airplanes and armored vehicles were on the verge of making their presence felt. Toxic chemicals were a known extension of contemporary industrial processes, capable of being weaponized by those who would choose to do so. Soldiers were more numerous, and the means to support them were more capable than ever. Unfortunately, this escalating potential for mayhem had not been particularly absorbed by military doctrine or popular culture. Doctrine, less perhaps that of the British—beneficiaries of hard lessons at the hands of the Boers—was inclined to the Napoleonic. Popular culture clung to a romantic image of war that approached militarism. The consequences would be horrific. Otto von Bismarck had cautioned against “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans,” and his premonition proved correct. As the Ottoman Empire weakened in the late 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire asserted rights to occupy and administer the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much of their population was Serbian, and the newly independent Kingdom of Serbia also aspired to rule them. Meanwhile, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia organized a Balkan League of Christian States committed to driving the Turks from the Balkans and apportioning Ottoman lands among themselves. In the First Balkan War (1912–13), the Balkan League drove the Turks to the outskirts of Constantinople but soon fell out over the apportionment of the spoils. In the Second Balkan War (1913), the Bulgarians attacked the Serbs and Greeks but in turn were attacked by the Romanians and Ottomans when decisively Library of Congress In a New York Evening Post cartoon circa 1915, President Woodrow Wilson gestures to a woman seated under a sign that reads “Humanity” and says, “Let her be heard.” engaged. The net result of the two Balkan Wars was that Bulgaria and Romania grew modestly, Greece and Montenegro grew appreciably, and Serbia almost doubled in size. Albania became independent, albeit on lands Greece, Montenegro and Serbia coveted. No one was satisfied. From Sparks to Full-Blown Holocaust The ferment in the Balkans lent itself to the proliferation of nonstate actors alongside the nascent national regimes. Agendas varied, but an addiction to violence was rife. Serbians aspired to acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina as a component of Greater Serbia, and secret societies committed to subversion and force sought to advance that purpose. The ArchBrig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in 1995. Author of Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005, he has a doctorate in history from Indiana University duke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was on an official visit to Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, on June 28, 1914. Ferdinand favored a program of national federalism within Austria-Hungary, which potentially might have eroded support for Serbian irredentism. An inchoate cell of seven young revolutionaries resolved to assassinate him. One, Gavrilo Princip, actually did. A dramatic diplomatic crisis ensued but initially seemed containable. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, but even this conflict could have been brief and local. Russia mobilized, as it feared its ally Serbia would be overrun if it did not intervene. Unfortunately, Russian general mobilization plans posed as much of a threat to Germany as to Austria-Hungary. Germany demanded that the Russians cease mobilizations proximate to her frontier. This did not happen. Austria-Hungary declared a general mobilization on July 31. France and Germany mobilized within five minutes of each other on August 1, and Germany declared war on Russia a few hours later. Although their professed provocation was Russia, the Schlieffen Plan called upon the Germans to invade France in the expectation that France could be knocked out before Russia could effectively intervene. Germany declared war on France and Belgium and subsequently invaded both. Great Britain declared war on Germany. Within the next few days, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, Serbia on Germany, and France and Great Britain on Austria-Hungary. On July 23, Japan honored a treaty with Great Britain and declared war on Germany, and a few days later on Austria-Hungary. Only the Americas thought themselves immune from the worldwide conflagration, and they would be proven wrong. No matter how belle an époque seems to be, it can carry within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Prolonged peace creates the illusion that peace is a perpetual state. Prosperity, scientific advance, education and economic interdependence encourage stability, but they do not guarantee it. National (or other) rivalries, military anxieties, destabilizing technologies, international crises and disruptive nonstate actors can combine to create catastrophe. Able and well-intentioned statesmanship can contain such risks; inept or malevolent statesmanship can aggravate them. Miscalculation can bring disaster. Statesmen should be ever mindful of the responsibilities they bear for the peaceful resolution of disputes, and soldiers should be ever mindful that statesmen may fail. ✭ Additional Reading Coffman, Edward M., The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998) Meyer, G.J., A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918 (New York: Delacourte Press, 2007) Tuchman, Barbara, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962) August 2014 ■ ARMY 87