Download FRIENDS IN NEED JAPAN’S IMPERIAL LEGACY WITHIN THE 1970S SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION

FRIENDS IN NEED
JAPAN’S IMPERIAL LEGACY WITHIN THE 1970S SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Mariah Shan Zhong
Fitzwilliam College
Supervisor: Professor Barak Kushner
Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
University of Cambridge
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy
8 August 2022
Word Count: 14,327 words
In Loving Memory of
Pu Pu 噗噗
? – 25. 03. 2020
You’ll always be my Purrfect friend.
ii
Declaration
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the
outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text.
It has not been previously submitted, in part or whole, to any university or institution
for any degree, diploma, or other qualification.
In accordance with the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies guidelines, this
dissertation does not exceed 15,000 words, including footnotes but excluding titles and
quotations from primary sources in the original languages.
iii
Abstract
This dissertation is a historical investigation of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation
during the 1970s. Despite the Cold War divide, trade relations between Japan and China in the
postwar period developed at a relatively stable pace. After the normalisation of diplomatic
relations in 1972, Japan and China, besides deepening trade relations, embarked on large-scale
cooperative developmental projects, with Japan providing capital and investment, as well as
human capital development and technological support. Moreover, the CCP adapted the
“developmental state” model pioneered by Japan for its own reform and opening up beginning
in 1978, initially with Japanese advisors. On the Japanese side, these developments were driven
by state and non-state actors with transwar experience. They built a transnational network with
China after the war, and were endorsed by the CCP as “Chinese people’s old friends.” Drawing
on digital archives, memoirs, autobiographies, and newspaper and magazine articles in Chinese,
Japanese, and English, I illustrate the factors and motivations that drove the two countries to
converge on economic cooperation. I argue that their respective national development goals,
Japan’s postwar reconstruction and China’s “four modernisations,” both of which were
underpinned by nationalism, brought the leaders together. By examining their critical
experience as imperial Japanese bureaucrats and their postwar visions for Japan and views
towards China, I also argue that Japanese leaders who survived the war and dominated politics
and business in the postwar period reimagined the Japanese Empire through economic
cooperation and cultural exchange instead of military expansion. In doing so, they renewed the
Japanese sphere of influence to diversify their access to natural resources, raw materials, and
overseas markets.
Keywords: Sino-Japanese relations, economic cooperation, developmental state, nationalism,
trasnwar history, transnational history
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Acknowledgements
First, I would like to acknowledge the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation and Japan &
the World at Cambridge for their financial support. It has been an honour to be the recipient of
their scholarship programs and I am indebted to the donors for funding this research.
My path to be at FAMES Cambridge has been a long and winding one, and I am deeply
grateful to the many individuals who have supported me along the way. Words cannot begin
to express my gratitude to my advisor Professor Barak Kushner for his invaluable guidance,
enlightenments, feedback, but especially all the great food. This journey could not have begun
without the degree committee, who granted me this opportunity. Additionally, I would like to
express my appreciation to Dr John Nilsson-Wright, for his helpful advice on my project.
My eternal gratitude to Dr Matthew Stavros, for having profound faith in me and
guiding me through many difficulties. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to
Professor Jocelyn Chey, for her important contributions that inspired this project and her
mentorship along the way. Extended thanks to Professor Han Jing and Dr Matt Shores, for their
unwavering support and nurturing. Deepest gratitude also to Leora Frocht and Jason Frocht,
this endeavour would not have been possible without their encouragement and support.
I am grateful to my cohort members, my senpai, and my Fitzwilliam College friends,
especially Jonathan Yeung, Tom Booth, Guy Pinnington, Samantha Edwards, Rose Dryzek,
Yoana Dancheva, Laurel Bayless, and William Baker, for their feedback and moral support.
Thanks are also due to the librarians, Dr Kristin Williams, and Miki Jacobs, who helped me in
gathering sources. I very much appreciate my friends Zhang Jing, Jin Xin, and Wang Yu, for
many years of friendship and their unconditional belief in me. Special thanks also go to James
Kerr and Caprice Villeza, for their emotional support. I would like to extend my sincere thanks
to Dr Yang Yan, Dr Huang Zhe, Okumura Waka, and Jason Hu, for their kindness and
generosity in times of need. Last but most certainly not least, this endeavour would not have
been possible without Mizuno Takanori, I thank him for always being so supportive and
helping me every step of the way.
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Author’s Note
Foreign words from the Japanese and Chinese languages have been indicated in italics,
followed by English translations in square brackets. Word-to-word translations of foreignlanguage titles in footnotes and the bibliography have also been presented in this way. All
quotations from texts in foreign languages are my translations unless otherwise identified.
The Hepburn system of romanisation is adopted throughout for Japanese terms, with
long vowels indicated by macrons, except for words that have been appropriated into the
English language, such as “Tokyo”.
Throughout the main body of this dissertation, the Japanese and Chinese convention
that the surname precedes the first name is respected with regard to Japanese and Chinese
authors who publish primarily in Japan and China. Uncertainty may be resolved by referring
to the bibliography, in which all authors are listed by their surnames, regardless of their cultural
heritage.
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Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1
Literature review ........................................................................................................ 2
1 Japan’s Postwar Reconstruction and China’s Four Modernisations................ 7
Sino-Japanese Relations 1949–1970 ....................................................................... 8
Sino-Japanese Relations 1971–1980 ..................................................................... 11
Japanese Friends ..................................................................................................... 16
Summary ................................................................................................................... 19
2 Japan’s Transwar Generation Leaders and Their Postwar Visions ................ 20
The Japanese Wartime Empire 1931–1945 and the Transwar Generation ......... 20
Ōhira Masayoshi and His “Jidai Ninshiki” ............................................................ 23
Ōkita Saburō and “A Japanese Marshall Plan” .................................................... 28
Summary ................................................................................................................... 29
3 Japan’s Resource Security and China’s Development .................................... 31
Inayama Yoshihiro and the Japanese Steel Empire ............................................. 33
Sino-Japanese Oil Cooperation .............................................................................. 36
Japan as Asia’s “Lead Goose” ............................................................................... 39
Summary ................................................................................................................... 42
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 43
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 45
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Introduction
On 18 December 2018, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and openingup (改革开放), Chinese President Xi Jinping (习近平) awarded ten non-Chinese nationals the
“China Reform Friendship Medal” (中国改革友谊奖章) in recognition of their significant
contributions to China’s grand strategy over the past forty years.1 Among the ten recipients of
this award, two were Japanese—Ōhira Masayoshi (大平正芳), a former Japanese Foreign
Minister during the Tanaka Kakuei ( 田 中 角 栄 ) administration (1972–1974) and former
Japanese Prime Minister (1978–1980); and Matsushita Kōnosuke (松下幸之助), a Japanese
industrialist who founded Panasonic, a major Japanese multinational conglomerate corporation.
Despite frequent turbulence in their relations during the 2010s, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) officially acknowledged that Japan, more specifically, two Japanese leaders in politics
and business, had played an influential and commemorable role in China’s development and
integration into the world economy, demonstrating that there was an important facet of postwar
Sino-Japanese relations at large, besides the disputes and controversies.2
The CCP proclaimed its reform and opening-up in December 1978, signifying China’s
adoption of the developmental state model pioneered by Japan, which is believed to be
instrumental to China’s rise.3 In the context of postwar Sino-Japanese relations and East Asian
regionalisation during the Cold War, the 1970s was a critical decade marked by several major
1
‘Wei Fazhan He Jinbu, Yu Zhongguo Xieshou Tongxing—Zhongguo Gaige Youyi Jiangzhang Huodezhe
Qunxiang [为发展和进步, 与中国携手同行—中国改革友谊奖章获得者群像] [Walking Hand in Hand with
China for Development and Progress—China Reform Friendship Medal Recipients]’, XinhuaNet, 18 December
2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-12/18/c_1123872219.htm; ‘10 Foreigners given Medals for
Roles in Reform, Opening-Up’, The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China, 19
December 2018, http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2018-12/19/content_74291157.htm.
2
‘Tensions in the East China Sea’, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 May 2022, https://www.cfr.org/globalconflict-tracker/conflict/tensions-east-china-sea.
3
Mark Beeson, ‘Developmental States in East Asia: A Comparison of the Japanese and Chinese Experiences’,
Asian Perspective 33, no. 2 (2009): 5–39; Björn Jerden and Linus Hagström, ‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy:
Japan as an Accommodater in the Rise of China, 1978-2011’, Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 2 (2012):
215–50.
1
developments: the normalisation of diplomatic relations in September 1972, the beginning of
crude oil export from China to Japan in 1973, the signing of a formal trade agreement in January
1974, the conclusion of a long-term trade agreement (1978–1985) and a treaty of peace and
friendship in 1978, frequent high-level visits which culminated in Deng Xiaoping’s visits to
Japan in October 1978 and February 1979, and Ōhira’s visit to China in December 1979.4 Ōhira,
as I will demonstrate in this dissertation, among several other actors, was primarily responsible
for driving these developments on the Japanese side. By examining their critical experience as
imperial Japanese bureaucrats and their postwar visions for Japan and views towards China, I
argue that Japanese leaders, who survived the war and dominated politics and business in the
postwar period, reimagined the Japanese Empire through economic cooperation and cultural
exchange instead of military expansion. In doing so, they renewed the Japanese sphere of
influence to diversify their access to natural resources, raw materials, and overseas markets.
Literature review
Scholarly accounts of postwar Sino-Japanese relations stress the predominance of
fluctuations in the overall bilateral relationship due to history problems that stemmed from the
war and its politics. History problems emanate from contentious interpretations of the Tokyo
War Crimes Trial, official apologies, and compensation for non-Japanese victims of Japanese
aggression, prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the distorted narratives of the
war in Japanese history textbooks. Saito attempts to answer the questions of why the problem
has become so intractable, and how it can be resolved, if even possible. He argues that the
history problem can be solved if people in Japan and China embrace a cosmopolitan approach
4
Tomozo Morino, ‘China-Japan Trade and Investment Relations’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political
Science 38, no. 2 (1991): 87; Robert Hoppens, ‘Deng Xiaoping Visits Tokyo, October 1978 and February 1979’,
Wilson Center, 18 May 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/deng-xiaoping-visits-tokyo-october1978-and-february-1979.
2
that mourns the victims of the war equitably regardless of nationality or ethnicity. 5 Rose
considers the various war-related problems through the lens of reconciliation and argues that
their inability and failure to agree on a shared memory are due to domestic political constraints.
She concludes that reconciliation between Japan and China will be difficult to achieve unless
the two governments cease to build their national identity based on “the glories and heroes of
past wars.”6 Similarly, Buzan and Goh contend that the history problem in Northeast Asia stems
from the selective and manipulated memories of the shared history by China, Japan, and South
Korea. An edited volume by Liu, Mitani, and Yang, published concurrently in Chinese and
Japanese, focusses on a set of political and historiographical controversies that have steered
and stymied Sino-Japanese relations from the mid-nineteenth century to the postwar period.
The volume offers comparative studies of perceptions on the contentious historical
interpretations, and brings to light the different views and narratives in Japan and China that
have contributed to the history problem.7 These works help us conceptualise the nature of the
history problem being a legacy of the war, and examine how it affects postwar Sino-Japanese
relations to provide a solution on the path to reconciliation.
Economic and trade relations between Japan and China developed on a relatively
substantial and constant level from the 1950s and onwards. Soeya’s research, which
concentrates on the Japanese perspective on trade relations between 1945 and 1978, shows that
trade continued at a relatively stable pace and seemed to have its own momentum despite
political tension. He points out that postwar Japan followed three distinctive foreign policy
orientations, first, to seek “collaboration” with the US, second, to emphasise diplomatic
5
Hironobu Saito, The History Problem: The Politics of War Commemoration in East Asia (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2016).
6
Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? (RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).
7
Daqing Yang, Jie Liu, and Hiroshi Mitani, eds., Kokkyō o Koeru Rekishi Ninshiki: Nitchū Taiwa No Kokoromi
[国境を越える歴史認識: 日中対話の試み] [Toward a History Beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino–
Japanese Relations] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai [University of Tokyo Press], 2006).
3
“autonomy” vis-à-vis the US, and third, to aspire to “independence” from the system controlled
by the US. Soeya argues that the activities of Japan’s non-governmental pro-China actors gave
rise to a pluralistic structure in Japan-China trade, which produced relative stability and
continuity in the bilateral trade relations.8 Wan considers how and why Sino-Japanese relations
have changed since the late 1980s, with the passing of the “friendship generation” who
contributed to establishing economic and diplomatic ties in the previous decades. He argues
that the present relationship is more dispute-prone but manageable politically, and that the two
countries are more integrated economically than in prior years.9 Their research tells us that the
generation, who dominated politics and business in Japan and China before the 1980s, despite
postwar political turbulence, made conscious efforts to deepen economic ties, which laid
foundations for growing interdependence even after their passing.
A few recent studies delve deeper into the bilateral economic and trade relations and
provide further details on the role which Japan played in China’s postwar modernisation and
industrialisation during the Mao era. King explains that the CCP leaders saw Japan as a symbol
of a modern, industrialised nation, and Japanese goods, technology and expertise as crucial in
strengthening China’s economy and military.10 She attempts to answer in what ways China’s
political and economic concerns and perspectives informed and shaped its foreign policy
towards Japan. Hirata examines the industrial legacies of imperial Japan in Manchuria,
specifically the steel industry and the case of Anshan Iron and Steel (鞍山钢铁), and how they
facilitated China’s transition to a Soviet-style planned economy under Mao’s leadership.11 He
8
Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China: 1945-1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Washington, D.C: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2006).
10
Amy King, China-Japan Relations after World War II: Empire, Industry and War, 1949-1971 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016); Amy King, ‘China’s External Economic Relations during the Mao Era’, in
The Cambridge Economic History of China. Volume II, 1800 to the Present, ed. Debin Ma and Richard Von
Glahn (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
11
Koji Hirata, ‘Steel Metropolis: Industrial Manchuria and the Making of Chinese Socialism’, Enterprise and
Society 21, no. 4 (2020): 875–85; Koji Hirata, ‘Made in Manchuria: The Transnational Origins of Socialist
Industrialization in Maoist China’, American Historical Review, 27 October 2021, 1–30.
9
4
argues that the transnational spread of state developmental visions influenced China’s socialist
industrialisation, demonstrating the interconnectedness of capitalism and socialism in the
twentieth century.
Political and historiographical discord and relatively stable economic and trade
relations are two sides of the same coin in the context of postwar Sino-Japanese relations. The
findings of King and Hirata reveal that the CCP purposely utilised the industrial experts and
technicians who remained in China after Japan’s defeat, and convincingly demonstrate that the
industrial legacies of the Japanese Empire facilitated China’s modernisation during the Mao
era. Their work, however, does not tell us the full story that Japanese leaders were also eager
to re-establish links with Communist China, because they saw the mutual benefits of the
bilateral trade relations. Moreover, not only were the complex legacies of the Japanese Empire
utilised in China but also in Japan. In the context of Sino-Japanese relations during the 1970s,
the legacies manifested in the active participation of the Japanese leaders in China’s economic
and industrial development projects. Through the investigation of Sino-Japanese economic
cooperation during the 1970s and joining the views and perspectives of both countries, I will
shed light on the ways in which the legacies of the Japanese Empire were repurposed by both
Japan and China for their respective goals during the 1970s, which also facilitated economic
regionalisation in East Asia during the Cold War.
I aim to identify what motivated the individuals on both sides and discuss how they
achieved a consensus in the 1970s, despite the recent history of war and the ongoing Cold War
divide between the two countries, on normalisation of diplomatic relations, and more important,
on the large-scale mutually beneficial economic cooperation which includes: China’s transition
from the Soviet-style state-planned economy to the Japanese model of developmental state,
5
and Japan’s diversification of its sources of energy and raw materials for its own high-speed
development and access to the emerging market in China.
In the following chapters, I will present the story of Sino-Japanese economic
cooperation during the 1970s, and demonstrate how Japanese leaders with transwar experience
reimagined the Japanese Empire through economic expansion. In chapter one, I will illustrate
how the respective national developmental goals of China and Japan drove the leaders of the
two countries to eventually converge during the 1970s. Chapter two will illuminate the ways
in which the Japanese leaders carried the complex legacies of the Japanese Empire into the
1970s and implemented their visions through the economic and cultural engagements with
China. Finally, in the third chapter, I will elucidate that the Japanese government-business
nexus attempted to incorporate China into the Japan-led postwar Asian reconstruction and
industrial development as a solution to Japan’s crisis.
6
1 Japan’s Postwar Reconstruction and China’s Four Modernisations
Economic development was central to the visions of the Japanese state and the Chinese
state throughout the twentieth century.12 The underpinning of their developmental goals was
the rise of nationalism. Economic development was chosen, by both states, as a prescription
for combating Western imperialism and ensuring national survival. In the postwar period,
economic development in Japan was a recipe for its postwar reconstruction (戦後復興).13 In
his analysis of Japan’s postwar economic reconstruction, Johnson coined the term
“developmental state” to describe strong interventionist policies implemented by Japan that led
to sustained, rapid industrialisation and long-term economic development. 14 The Japanese
model was later adapted by China for its own reform and opening beginning in 1978, initially
with Japanese advisors such as Ōkita Saburō (大来佐武郎) and Inayama Yoshihiro (稲山嘉
寛). How did the leaders of Japan and China, despite the recent history of war and the Cold
War divide, reach a consensus on the rapprochement and large-scale economic cooperation
throughout the 1970s? In this chapter, I will illustrate the factors and motivations that drove
the two countries to converge. I argue that their respective national developmental goals,
Japan’s postwar reconstruction and China’s four modernisations (四个现代化), which were
underpinned by nationalism in both countries, brought the leaders together.
Setting and achieving national goals was core to the nationalism of the postwar period
in Japan and China.15 For Japan, the pull of nationalism was correcting status inconsistency
12
Chalmers Johnson, ‘The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept’, in The Developmental State, ed.
Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 32–60.
13
Johnson.
14
Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, M.I.T.I. and
the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982).
15
Meredith Woo-Cumings, ‘Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development’,
in The Developmental State, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 8;
Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs?: The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1995), 10.
7
with the United States and the European countries (the so-called West), which was the driving
force for the Japanese developmental state.16 In the case of postwar China, nationalism is an
important part of the foundation for the legitimacy of the CCP and its authoritarian rule.17
Recent Chinese nationalism has emphasised the national humiliation imposed by foreign
invaders including Japan, and the lack of recognition by the West.18 In the Mao era (1949–
1976), however, anti-Japan nationalism was dismissed in China as Kuomintang (KMT)
ideology. 19 First proposed by Mao in 1954, the national developmental goal of “four
modernisations,” which focused on four target areas of industrial modernisation: agriculture,
industry, science, and national defence, although disrupted by the Cultural Revolution (1966–
1976), remained the priority during the Deng era.20
Sino-Japanese Relations 1949–1970
Before the war, Japan and China had fostered close economic ties.21 During the 1930s,
China was Japan’s largest export market, and its third-largest source of imports. 22 In the
postwar period, as the two countries belonged to two hostile camps, they had to cautiously
manage their political relations. The economic aspect, however, evolved with its own
momentum.23 For the demilitarised Japan, the primary national goal was economic recovery
16
Woo-Cumings, ‘Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development’, 10.
Bruce J. Dickson, Mingming Shen, and Jie Yan, ‘Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China:
Legitimation and the Local Legitimacy Deficit’, Modern China 43, no. 2 (2017): 123–55.
18
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign
Relations, Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2012); Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, ‘What the West Gets Wrong About China’, Harvard Business
Review, May 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china.
19
Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations.
20
‘Xin Zhongguo Dang’an: Sige Xiandaihua Hongwei Mubiao de Tichu [新中国档案: 四个现代化宏伟目标
的提出] [New China Archives: The Proposal of Four Modernisation Goals]’ (The Central People’s Government
of the People’s Republic of China, September 2009), http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-09/16/content_1418992.htm.
21
Ryo Sahashi, ‘Japan’s Strategy Amid US-China Confrontation’, China International Strategy Review 2, no. 2
(2020): 232–45.
22
Chalmers Johnson, ‘The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982’, Pacific Affairs 59, no. 3
(1986): 402–28.
23
Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1992).
17
8
and postwar reconstruction, with a focus on rebuilding infrastructure and key industries, such
as iron and steel manufacturing.24 To realise reconstruction, resource-poor Japan needed to
import raw materials. Communist China had both political and economic considerations.
Politically, although China had to lean towards the Soviet bloc, under the American policy of
containment, the Sino-Soviet alliance would not last due to Chinese nationalism. The CCP
leaders aimed for economic development and industrialisation, independent from the Soviet
influence.25 In his famous speech “On the Ten Major Relationships” (论十大关系) in 1956,
Mao Zedong (毛泽东) asserted that the CCP’s policy was to learn the strengths of all nations.26
Zhou Enlai (周恩来) was in charge of the daily administration of Chinese foreign policy. Every
aspect of Sino-Japanese negotiation and the creation of bilateral documents were under his
purview.27 Zhou considered trade relations with Japan as a channel that would eventually lead
to political dialogue with the US, and a doorway to trade with the Western bloc.28
Japan and China needed to trade with each other to achieve their goals despite the
geopolitical rivalry. They soon found an opportunity for dialogue at the Moscow International
Economic Conference in 1952, where the Chinese delegate Nan Hanchen (南汉宸) invited
three Japanese Diet members, Kōra Tomi (高良とみ), Hoashi Kei (帆足計), and Miyakoshi
24
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo (ODA) Hakusho: Koramu 9 Nihon no Sengo Fukkō
[政府開発援助(ODA)白書: コラム日本の戦後復興] [Official Development Assistance (ODA) White Paper:
Column 9 Japan’s Postwar Reconstruction]’, 2004,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hakusyo/2004.html.
25
Fei Xia, ‘Xin Zhongguo Chengli Hou Zhou Enlai Cong Zheli Rushou Gaishan Zhongri Guanxi [新中国成立
后周恩来从这里入手改善中日关系] [Where Zhou Enlai Started to Improve Sino-Japanese Relations after the
Founding of New China]’, Zhou Enlai Jinianwang [周恩来纪念网] [Zhou Enlai Memorial Website]
(Renminwang, 30 October 2020), http://zhouenlai.people.cn/n1/2020/1030/c409117-31911698.html; King,
China-Japan Relations after World War II: Empire, Industry and War, 1949-1971; King, ‘China’s External
Economic Relations during the Mao Era’.
26
Zedong Mao, ‘Lun Shida Guanxi [论十大关系] [On the Ten Major Relationships]’, 25 April 1956,
https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19560425.htm.
27
Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach (Hong Kong;
London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 124.
28
Xia, ‘Xin Zhongguo Chengli Hou Zhou Enlai Cong Zheli Rushou Gaishan Zhongri Guanxi [新中国成立后周
恩来从这里入手改善中日关系] [Where Zhou Enlai Started to Improve Sino-Japanese Relations after the
Founding of New China]’.
9
Kisuke (宮腰喜助) to Beijing. Having a consensus on the mutual benefits of bilateral trade,
Kōra and Nan signed the first private trade agreement.29 The primary exports from China to
Japan included coal, iron ore, soybeans, and salt, in exchange, Japan would export steel
products, among others.30 Although trade volume remained small, Japan and China concluded
several private trade agreements before 1970.31
In summary, before 1972 Japan traded simultaneously with mainland China, Taiwan,
and the United States, under the camouflage of “separation of politics and economy” (政経分
離). The key strategy was the use of pro-China members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) to open separate channels to Beijing, while having the leaders of the party take proTaiwan positions to placate the Americans.32 Friendly firms were also selected by the proChina group to engage in the Sino-Japanese trade network. 33 China managed this delicate
bilateral relationship under the guiding principle of “promoting diplomatic relations through
fostering people-to-people ties” ( 以 民 促 官 ). Therefore, normalisation and large-scale
29
Tadao Ishikawa, Masaru Ikei, and Mineo Nakajima, Sengo Shiryō Nicchū Kankei [Postwar Documents:
Japan-China Relations] (Tokyo: Nippon Hyōronsha, 1970); Commercial Section of Chinese Embassy in Japan,
‘Zhongri Jingji Maoyi Fazhan Licheng Jianyao Dashiji [中日经济贸易发展历程简要大事记] [A Brief
Chronology of Economic and Rrade Developments between China and Japan]’, Ministry of Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China, 9 April 2019,
http://jp.mofcom.gov.cn/article/about/fzlc/201709/20170902645148.shtml; Oleg Hoeffding, ‘East-West Trade
Possibilities: An Appraisal of the Moscow Economic Conference’, The American Slavic and East European
Review 12, no. 3 (1953): 350–59; Xun Zeng, Yiyidaishui: Zhongri Youhao Xiehui Chengli [ 一衣带水:中日友
好协会成立] [Separated by A Strip of Water: The Establishment of the China-Japan Friendship Association]
(Changchun: Jilin Chuban Jituan [Jilin Publishing Group], 2010); Guifang Shi, ‘Yimin Cuguan’ Yu ‘Qiutong
Cunyi’: Zhongri Guanxi Fazhan de Licheng Yu Jiben Jingyan [“以民促官”与"求同存异"——中日关系发
展的历程与基本经验] ["Promoting Diplomatic Relations through Fostering People-to-People Ties" and
‘Seeking Common Ground While Preserving Differences’— The History and Basic Experience of the
Development of Sino-Japanese Relations] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2019); Xia, ‘Xin
Zhongguo Chengli Hou Zhou Enlai Cong Zheli Rushou Gaishan Zhongri Guanxi [新中国成立后周恩来从这里
入手改善中日关系] [Where Zhou Enlai Started to Improve Sino-Japanese Relations after the Founding of New
China]’.
30
Ishikawa, Ikei, and Nakajima, Sengo Shiryō Nicchū Kankei [Postwar Documents: Japan-China Relations],
24.
31
Ryosei Kokubun et al., Japan-China Relations in The Modern Era, ed. Keith Krulak (London and New York:
Routledge, 2017); Mayumi Itoh, ‘The Origin of the LT Trade Agreement’, in Pioneers of Sino-Japanese
Relations: Liao and Takasaki, ed. Mayumi Itoh (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012), 95–125.
32
Johnson, ‘The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982’.
33
Sahashi, ‘Japan’s Strategy Amid US-China Confrontation’.
10
economic cooperation in the 1970s did not happen in a vacuum. Rather, they were the outcome
of both countries’ efforts in achieving their respective national developmental goals.
Sino-Japanese Relations 1971–1980
1971 was “the year of the shock” for Japan.34 As is well-known, the two major “shocks”
from Washington, among several others, were: the “Nixon Shock” when US president Richard
Nixon, after Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China, announced that he would visit China in
1972, and the “Dollar Shock” after Nixon announced that the US would end the convertibility
of the dollar to gold, effectively ending the Bretton Woods System.35 Despite the shock, Japan
used the US-China rapprochement as an opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with
China. In 1972, the newly elected LDP leader Tanaka Kakuei and his administration quickly
realised the normalisation after securing Washington’s approval.36 1971 was also a significant
year for China, as the PRC replaced Taiwan (ROC) as the only legitimate representative of
China to the United Nations. These changes in the international political and economic systems,
along with domestic ones in Japan and China, which I will elaborate in the following
paragraphs, meant adjustments to their respective national goals.
Japan achieved high-speed economic growth in the 1960s, indicative of remarkable
progress in its postwar reconstruction goal. In 1960, Ikeda Hayato (池田勇人), the then
Japanese prime minister, initiated a long-term economic development plan—the Income
Doubling Plan (所得倍増計画). The Ikeda administration implemented the Plan in response
34
Lee W. Farnsworth, ‘Japan: The Year of the Shock’ 12, no. 1 (1972): 46–55.
‘Nixon and the End of the Bretton Woods System, 1971–1973’, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service
Institute, United States Department of State, accessed 5 July 2022, https://history.state.gov/milestones/19691976/nixon-shock; Farnsworth, ‘Japan: The Year of the Shock’; Akira Iriye, ‘Chinese-Japanese Relations,
1945–90’, The China Quarterly 124, no. 124 (1990): 624–38.
36
Masaya Inoue, Nicchū kokkō seijōka no seijishi [日中国交正常化の政治史] [Political History of JapanChina Normalisation of Diplomatic Relations] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai [Nagoya University
Press], 2010); Ryūji Hattori, China-Japan Rapprochement and the United States: In the Wake of Nixon’s Visit to
Beijing, trans. Graham B Leonard (New York: Routledge, 2022).
35
11
to the massive Anpo protests against the US-Japan Security Treaty, partly in an effort to divert
Japan’s national attention away from political struggles and toward forging a consensus around
the pursuit of rapid economic growth.37 In less than twenty-five years after the WWII, Japan
emerged as the world’s third-largest industrial economy. By the early 1970s, the popular image
of Japan, particularly in the US, had changed from being a struggling country in desperate need
of US aid to that of a challenger to the economic status of the US. Further, Japan succeeded in
changing its role in international trade from being primarily a producer of labour-intensive
products to a major exporter of capital-intensive products such as consumer electronics and
steel.38 The Income Doubling Plan, therefore, was widely viewed as a success in achieving both
its political and economic objectives, including by the Chinese reformers in the 1970s.
As a resource-poor economy, however, Japan depends heavily on imports of resource
goods—foodstuffs, energy resources, and raw materials, which is partly reflected in the private
trade agreements with China before the normalisation. Such dependence has been increasing
over time, making Japan vulnerable to supply shocks.39 In the early 1970s, Japan’s extreme
vulnerability to the oil crisis led to an intensified search for alternatives to the Middle East for
oil.40 Diversifying the supply of natural resources and raw materials became a major theme of
discussion on Japan’s foreign policy among Japanese leaders, for the consolidation and
advancement of its economic success and industrialisation.41
37
Nick Kapur, Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 2018), 98–105.
38
The Brookings Bulletin, ‘Review: Understanding the Japanese “Economic Miracle” Reviewed Work(s):
Asia’s New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works by Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky’, The Brookings
Bulletin 13, no. 1 (1976): 4–7.
39
Kazuo Sato, ‘Japan’s Resource Imports’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 513, no. 1 (1991): 76–89.
40
R.P. Sinha, ‘Japan and the Oil Crisis’, The World Today 30, no. 8 (7 June 1974): 335–44.
41
Saburō Ōkita, ‘Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 52, no. 4 (27
May 1974): 714–24.
12
Cultural diplomacy was also on the horizon. Japanese leaders saw cultural influence as
an important tool to address their status inconsistency with the West. Foreign minister Ōhira
emphasised the importance of cultural influence in his speech on Japan’s foreign policy to the
Diet. After discussing the political and economic aspects of Japan’s foreign policy, he pointed
out that Japan “[…] must now broaden our horizons and promote more active cultural exchange
with other countries, especially in a wide range of fields of human exchange.”42 The goal of
cultural diplomacy, which Ōhira indicated by referring to the establishment of the Japan
Foundation in October 1972, was to “improve the image” of Japan through cultural exchange
that revolved around “people-to-people exchange” and “Japanese Studies.”43
Being recognised as the only legitimate China was a breakthrough in postwar Chinese
history. Compared to Japan’s high-speed growth, the CCP, however, had not yet succeeded in
achieving the “four modernisations.” Moreover, the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) failed,
and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) crippled the economy and thrust China into ten years
of turmoil and stagnation. The majority of the people still lived in poverty. This imposed a
great challenge on the legitimacy of the CCP, which is based on a combination of nationalism,
prosperity, and the fear of instability.44 China desperately needed economic growth. The CCP
leaders believed that prosperity would provide support for the party and its authoritarian
system.45 As the Cultural Revolution came to an end, China ushered in the Deng era. China’s
national goal, as articulated by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平)—the “chief architect of China’s
reform and opening up” ( 中 国 改 革 开 放 的 总 设 计 师 ), was to become a “moderately
42
Masayoshi Ōhira, ‘No Title’ (Database ‘The World and Japan’, 27 January 1973),
https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/fam/19730127.SXJ.html.
43
Ōhira.
44
Dickson, Shen, and Yan, ‘Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China: Legitimation and the Local
Legitimacy Deficit’.
45
Mitter and Johnson, ‘What the West Gets Wrong About China’.
13
prosperous society” (小康社会) by the end of the twentieth century, which was inspired by
Ōhira during his visit to China in December 1979.46
Legitimacy anxiety among the CCP drove the party to shift its focus onto
developmental goals in the 1970s, and onto models of capitalist countries, which became
possible after China had established links with the US. In 1972, Zhou commented in a report
on visiting Eastern Europe and importing their technical equipment, “Why not send people to
London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, and Tokyo to learn about industrialisation of Western Europe,
US and Canada, and Japan? Why are we after the next best thing?”47 In 1975, after returning to
power, Deng led a State Council Theory-Oriented Meeting for Planning (国务院计划工作务
虚 会 ), discussing important policies and measures the CCP would take to realise the
developmental goal of “four modernisations.”48 CCP Planners began to work on a Ten-Year
Plan for 1975-1985, in which importing industrial plant and embodying the latest foreign
technology were at the centre of the discussion.49 Development strategy would comprise high
investment and technological borrowing. 50 In 1978, as soon as they rectified the Cultural
Revolution, the CCP put economic development back on the table again, and this time, as its
first priority. Having fostered good relations with Chinese leaders in the 1950s and 1960s,
Inayama Yoshihiro, director of Nippon Steel (新日本製鉄), as the signatory of Japan, signed
46
‘Deng Xiaoping Yu Daping Zhengfang de Tanhua [邓小平与大平正芳的谈话] [A Dialogue between Deng
Xiaoping and Ōhira Masayoshi]’ (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 20 August 2004),
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bi/200408/20040800266895.shtml.
47
Mu Gu, Gu Mu Huiyilu [谷牧回忆录] [Memoirs of Gu Mu] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,
2009), 290.
48
Gu, 291.
49
Barry Naughton, ‘The Chinese Economy in the Reform Era’, in The Cambridge Economic History of China.
Volume II, 1800 to the Present, ed. Debin Ma and Richard Von Glahn (Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2022).
50
Gu, Gu Mu Huiyilu [谷牧回忆录] [Memoirs of Gu Mu], 310–20.
14
a long-term trade agreement with China in February 1978, providing a framework for the
export of Chinese coal, coking coal, and oil in return for advanced Japanese machinery.51
Twenty high-level missions visited fifty-one countries in 1978, pioneered by the Vice
Premier Gu Mu’s official visit to Western Europe, the first in PRC history.52 After returning to
China, Gu briefed top CCP leaders, galvanising them to support economic reform. “The
capitalists were eager to do business with China,” Gu reported, “and were willing to provide
cheap credit.”53 Gu also commented that the key to successful economic reform was centralised
state planning.54 In October, Deng visited Japan for a first time, two months after the conclusion
of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Between October and November, a group of twentythree CCP economic planners went on a mission to Japan to learn corporate management. The
mission was lead by Yuan Baohua (袁宝华), the deputy director of the State Economic
Commission, with Deng Liqun (邓力群), the vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) being the chief consultant. They were astonished by what they discovered in
Japan, which had seen sustained high-speed growth for thirty years, was orderly, affluent,
modernised, and extremely productive.55 Deng Liqun and his group members were particularly
impressed with Ikeda’s Income Doubling Plan and its achievement, attributing the success in
part to state intervention and centralised planning.56 Ma Hong (马洪), economist, founder and
director of the Industrial Economic Institute, in his discussion of why Japan sustained its highspeed growth, wrote that the first reason was “since the late 1950s, Japan’s political
51
Commercial Section of Chinese Embassy in Japan, ‘Zhongri Jingji Maoyi Fazhan Licheng Jianyao Dashiji
[中日经济贸易发展历程简要大事记] [A Brief Chronology of Economic and Rrade Developments between
China and Japan]’.
52
Gu, Gu Mu Huiyilu [谷牧回忆录] [Memoirs of Gu Mu], 293.
53
Gu, 299.
54
Gu, 302.
55
Liqun Deng, ‘Fangri Guilai de Sisuo [访日归来的思索] [Reflections after Returning from Japan]’, in Fangri
Guilai de Sisuo [访日归来的思索] [Reflections after Returning from Japan] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue
Chubanshe, 1979), 1–19.
56
Deng.
15
environment has been stable.” He added, “Although administrations have changed frequently,
[...], Japan’s economy has barely been affected, because the ruling party has always been the
LDP. [...] A political environment with stability and unity is an important condition for
economic development.”57
Overall, in the post-Mao era, the CCP has relied on performance legitimacy, which
primarily means the realisation of the “four modernisations” and economic development
through the reform.58 Economic growth, or “common prosperity” (共同富裕), is both a key
performance indicator and a source of performance legitimacy. Moreover, it is no surprise that
the CCP emphasised that national unity and political stability were “prerequisites for the
national developmental goals,” which, as we can see from the analysis of Deng and Ma, the
CCP leaders had utilised this preference for stability as a justification for the one-party rule.59
Japanese Friends
Economic relations post normalisation can be seen as a continuation of developments
in the previous two decades.60 These developments were made possible because state and nonstate actors in both countries strove to build a transnational network which enabled further
engagements during the 1970s. Although contentious history problems have been haunting
East Asia in the recent decades, in the first three decades postwar, to maximise their respective
economic interests, both Chinese and Japanese leaders, gradually built trust and developed a
cooperative relationship with the willingness to make tradeoffs. Trust, being essential to a
functioning relationship, makes tradeoffs more straightforward and warrants future
57
Hong Ma, ‘Riben Zibenjia Shi Zenyang Guanli Gongye Qiye de [日本资本家是怎样管理工业企业的] [How
Japanese Capitalists Manage Their Industry and Corporations]’, in Fangri Guilai de Sisuo [访日归来的思索]
[Reflections after Returning from Japan] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1979), 20–21.
58
Dickson, Shen, and Yan, ‘Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China: Legitimation and the Local
Legitimacy Deficit’.
59
Mitter and Johnson, ‘What the West Gets Wrong About China’.
60
Iriye, ‘Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945–90’.
16
cooperation.61 Japan’s general principle was the “separation of politics and economy,” whilst
China’s was “seeking common grounds while preserving difference” (求同存异).62
“Japanese people in general are our true friends, except for the pro-American monopoly
capitalists and the militarists.”63 In order to understand how the CCP built trusting relationships
with Japanese elites from the 1950s and quickly achieved rapprochement in 1972, it is essential
to understand how the CCP leaders perceived and defined the Japanese during those decades,
which was different from the more recent discourse focusing on Japanese perpetration. It was
common to refer to Japanese who had close ties with the PRC as “Japanese friends” and
“Chinese people’s (old) friends,” including Ōhira Masayoshi, Ōkita Saburō and Inayama
Yoshihiro, among many others, even long after their passing.64 In fact, the Chinese state-media
has commonly adopted “Chinese people’s old friends” to describe non-Chinese figures who
the CCP believe have made contributions to China during and after the war. Research by a
Chinese journalist shows that 111 Japanese had been endorsed as “Chinese people’s old friends”
by the People’s Daily before 2011, making Japan the country where Chinese have most “old
friends,” twice as many as their American “friends”—the second most on the list.65 Both sides
61
PON Staff Harvard Law School, ‘Use Tradeoffs to Create Value in Integrative Negotiations’, Program on
Negotiation (PON), Harvard Law School, 5 May 2022, https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/win-win-daily/getoff-on-the-right-foot/?amp.
62
Shi, ‘Yimin Cuguan’ Yu ‘Qiutong Cunyi’: Zhongri Guanxi Fazhan de Licheng Yu Jiben Jingyan [“以民促
官”与"求同存异"——中日关系发展的历程与基本经验] ["Promoting Diplomatic Relations through
Fostering People-to-People Ties" and ‘Seeking Common Ground While Preserving Differences’—The History
and Basic Experience of the Development of Sino-Japanese Relations].
63
Zedong Mao, ‘Maozhuxi Yulu [毛主席语录] [Quotations from Chairman Mao]’, Cankao Xiaoxi [参考消息]
[Reference News], 27 July 1971, https://cn.govopendata.com/cankaoxiaoxi/1971/7/27/1/.
64
Liqun Deng et al., Fangri Guilai de Sisuo [访日归来的思索] [Reflections after Returning from Japan]
(Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1979); Saburō Ōkita et al., Riben Pengyou Dui Woguo Jingji
Gongzuo de Kanfa He Jianyi [日本朋友对我国经济工作的看法和建议] [Views and Suggestions from Our
Japanese Friends on Our Economic Development], trans. Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao Bianjibu (Zhongguo
Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1981); Gu, Gu Mu Huiyilu [谷牧回忆录] [Memoirs of Gu Mu]; Baohua Yuan, Yuan
Baohua Huiyilu [袁宝华回忆录] [Memoirs of Yuan Baohua] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daixue Chubanshe,
2018).
65
Kecheng Fang, Zhongguo Renmin de Laopengyou [中国人民的老朋友] [Chinese People’s Old Friends]
(Beijing: Renminribao Chubanshe [People’s Daily Publishing House], 2013), 303.
17
have also used “separated by a narrow strip of water” (一衣带水) to describe each other as
“friendly neighbours” who have shared two thousand years of history and culture. 66
What is special about this network consisting of “Chinese people’s old friends” is that
many of them were once imperial Japanese bureaucrats dealing with China affairs, such as
Ōhira and Ōkita. They were by no means Chinese people’s friends during the war. Instead of
creating contentious narratives of them with an emphasis on Japanese wartime aggression and
Chinese victimhood, the CCP purposefully embraced past aggressors and established
cooperative relationships with them during the 1970s. This is because these “friends” were
helpful to the developmental goals set by the CCP, which contributed to the legitimisation and
consolidation of the CCP’s authoritarian rule. “Chinese people’s old friends” in this context
meant “the CCP’s friends.” By conflating the use of language, the CCP claimed its status as
the legitimate representative of the Chinese people and their assumed collective interest.
It was economic interest that brought the leaders together. Economic interest alone,
however, was not enough to create the trusting and cooperative relationship. Influential actors
also played an essential role. Zhou Enlai’s charisma and diplomatic skills, for example, helped
him win the hearts and minds of many Japanese counterparts and build a favourable
transnational network of his own.67 Inayama wrote that meeting Zhou was a great pleasure in
his life. He described Zhou as a charming, visionary and charismatic leader, who impressed
66
Masayoshi Ōhira, ‘Shinseiki o Mezasu Nicchūkankei: Fukasa to Hirogari Wo Motomete [新世紀をめざす日
中関係: 深さと広がりを求めて] [Japan-China Relations in the New Century: Seeking Depth and Breadth]’, 7
December 1979, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1980/s55-shiryou-10208.htm; Zeng,
Yiyidaishui: Zhongri Youhao Xiehui Chengli [ 一衣带水:中日友好协会成立] [Separated by A Strip of Water:
The Establishment of the China-Japan Friendship Association].
67
Shū Onrai Kinen Shuppan Iinkai, ed., Nihonjin No Naka No Shū Onrai [日本人の中の周恩来] [Zhou Enlai
among the Japanese] (Tokyo: Ribun Shuppan, 1991); Saburō Ōkita et al., Zhou Enlai Yu Riben Pengyoumen
[周恩来与日本朋友们] [Zhou Enlai and His Japanese Friends], trans. Taiping Wang et al. (Beijing:
Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992).
18
him the most among all the world leaders whom he had met.68 Ōkita respected Zhou’s ability
to discuss a wide range of topics and charm others through banter.69
Summary
China and Japan approached each other immediately after the war as a result of their
national developmental goals—China’s “four modernisations” and Japan’s postwar
reconstruction—which were fuelled by nationalism in both countries. During the 1970s, the
growing legitimacy anxiety, especially in the post-Cultural Revolution era, propelled the CCP
to prioritise its industrialisation and developmental goals. Japan, having achieved high-speed
economic growth in the 1960s, renewed its national goal to gain more regional and global
influence through economic cooperation and cultural influence. The two countries eventually
embarked on large-scale economic cooperation after rapprochement.
68
Yoshihiro Inayama, Watashi no tekkō shōwashi [私の鉄鋼昭和史] [My Showa History of Iron and Steel]
(Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha [Toyo Keizai Inc.], 1986), 118.
69
Saburō Ōkita, Keizai Gaikō ni Ikiru [経済外交に生きる] [Living for Economics and Diplomacy] (Tokyo:
Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha [Toyo Keizai Inc.], 1992), 160.
19
2 Japan’s Transwar Generation Leaders and Their Postwar Visions
The crucial experience of war in East Asia shaped the worldview of the influential
personalities who dominated Japanese politics, bureaucracy, and business in the postwar period.
“Men born in the middle to late Meiji era who virtually all survived the war and continued to
work for the government as if they were uniformed military officers.”70 When considering
Japan’s model of state-led economic development—the developmental state, Johnson contends
that Japan is the case of “an economy mobolized for war but never demoblized during
peacetime.” 71 It was the goal of creating the Japanese sphere of influence to advance its
economic development that led to Japan’s imperial expansion. The war between Japan and
China, and the complex legacies that persisted into the postwar period, facilitated
regionalisation of East Asia during the Cold War through economic ties. In the pages that
follow, I will demonstrate how Japanese leaders in the 1970s, who were officials dealing with
China affairs during the war, continued to play important roles in postwar Japan-China
relations. By looking at the key Japanese actors, primarily Ōhira Masayoshi and Ōkita Saburō,
as well as relevant figures within their network, I argue that the Japanese political leaders of
the transwar generation reimagined Japan’s wartime visions and implemented their visions
through fostering regional economic ties, to renew the Japanese sphere of influence.
The Japanese Wartime Empire 1931–1945 and the Transwar Generation
To understand the scope of the transwar generation in the context of Sino-Japanese
relations, and define the term, I will first explain the complexity of the war, as a term, because
disagreements remain concerning the time period that the war encompasses. The term “Pacific
War”, also referred to as the “Asia-Pacific War”, many historians argue, implies only the Asia-
70
71
Woo-Cumings, ‘Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development’, 9.
Johnson, ‘The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept’, 42.
20
Pacific theatre of World War II (1941–1945) without taking into consideration of the Second
Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Some Japanese historians suggest “the Fifteen-Year War”
(1931–1945) as an alternative to encompass the Mukden Incident in Manchuria (1931), the
Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Asia-Pacific war theatre. Others contend that “the Greater
East Asia War” (1941–1945) is historically applicable because Japan’s wartime government
propagated the term. Moreover, people outside Japan understand and define the historical
period differently.72 The Chinese, for example, adopt the term “War of Resistance against Japan”
(抗日战争) to refer to the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Mukden Incident signified the
beginning of the imperial Japanese control over the resource-rich Manchuria, which led to the
establishment of Manchukuo (1932–1945) and Japan’s further expansion in China, and
eventually, resulted in an all-out Sino-Japanese War. This dissertation refers to “the FifteenYear War” as described above because it encapsulates all critical periods of the war and its
legacies in the context of Sino-Japanese relations, as I will demonstrate in this chapter.
Manchuria was a key component in the construction of Japan’s total empire.73 Although
historians in China dismiss Manchukuo as a “fake” state (伪满洲国), such an arbitrary label
blinds us to the understanding of its complex legacies. The military-led invasion of Manchuria
in 1931 was a result of multiple crises. First, the 1929 global financial crisis hit all industrialised
nations. Japan was confronted with the additional challenge of the multifaceted socioeconomic
crisis of the early 1930s, which included stagnation in agricultural production and mass
starvation in the Northeast, skyrocketing urban unemployment across the country, shrinking
exports to all of Japan’s crucial markets. Amid international trade wars and tariff conflicts,
Japan saw the Chinese market as its “imperial lifeblood” and used it as a justification for its
72
Yukiko Koshiro, Imperial Eclipse: Japan’s Strategic Thinking about Continental Asia before August 1945
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2013); Saito, The History Problem: The Politics of War
Commemoration in East Asia.
73
Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1998).
21
expansion. 74 In the next fifteen years, Japan embarked on military expansionism and the
construction of a new regional order in Asia—the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—
with Japan being the regional leader under the guise of “Asian liberation.”75 Central to the
Japanese imperial vision is regional autarky, “the yen bloc,” which promoted plans for
coordinated industrial development and the co-prosperity of trade within the bloc in an attempt
to bring Japan’s imperial objectives into line with those of anti-colonial nationalism in Asia.76
The transwar generation in Japan, therefore, refers to those who were born in the first
two decades of the twentieth century (late Meiji). Not only did they witness the rise and fall of
the Japanese Empire as young adults, but they also contributed their knowledge and expertise
to the empire-building. 77 After the defeat in 1945 and subsequent Occupation, Japan was
fumbling for a new identity in a postcolonial, Cold War world. The transwar generation began
to sketch a new image of Japan that would align with the ideal values of democracy, capitalism,
and peace.78 The visions of the wartime leaders, however, did not perish with the dissolution of
the Japanese Empire. Inversely, they survived with the transwar generation leaders, who
reimagined the imperial visions and incorporated them into Japan’s postwar policies. From
their interwar and postwar experiences of Ōhira Masayoshi (1910–1980) and Ōkita Saburō
(1914–1993), we can see how Japan’s war aims and the ideology of the wartime empire
74
Louise Young, ‘Rethinking Empire: Lessons from Imperial and Post-Imperial Japan’, in The Oxford
Handbook of the Ends of Empire, ed. Andrew Thompson and Martin Thomas (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), 248–230.
75
Jeremy A Yellen, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 206.
76
Takafusa Nakamura, ‘The Yen Bloc, 1931-1941’, in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945, ed. Peter
Duus et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 171–86; Louise Young, ‘Introduction: Japan’s New
International History’, The American Historical Review 119, no. 4 (12 July 2014): 1117–28; Young,
‘Rethinking Empire: Lessons from Imperial and Post-Imperial Japan’.
77
Richard K Beardsley and Takashi Nakano, Japanese Sociology and Social Anthropology: A Guide to
Japanese Reference and Research Materials (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970); Miriam
Kingsberg Kadia, Into the Field: Human Scientists of Transwar Japan (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 2020).
78
Kadia, Into the Field: Human Scientists of Transwar Japan.
22
influenced the visions of transwar generation leaders in the postwar period, and their policy
towards China.
Ōhira Masayoshi and His “Jidai Ninshiki”
Japan-China rapprochement in 1972 became opportune as Japanese transwar
generation leaders began to reconceptualise Japan’s role in Asia and the world in the early
1970s, in light of the changes in the international geopolitical and geoeconomic environment.
Although Tanaka Kakuei, being the prime minister whose administration realised the
normalisation, is often at the forefront of discourse. Swift rapprochement, however, would not
have been achieved without Ōhira.79 Suffering from premature death in June 1980, Ōhira’s
direct contribution to China’s reform and opening up, at first glance, appears to be short-lived.
It is Ōhira’s significant influence that shaped Japan’s relations with China in the 1970s and his
legacies that led to the CCP leaders’ continuous acknowledgement of him as the “Chinese
people’s old friend.” Therefore, to understand Japan-China relations in the 1970s, it is
important to understand Ōhira’s view of Japan, and the world, which he described as his “jidai
ninshiki” (時代認識) [understanding of the current times].80
Ōhira’s primary “jidai ninshiki” was that “Japan has reached a big turning point,” which
he emphasised throughout the 1970s in his publications and speeches.81 In January 1970, as the
minister of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (通商産業省, MITI), Ōhira
79
Ryūji Hattori, Nicchū Kokkō Seijōka: Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira Masayoshi, Kanryō-tachi no Chōsen [日中国交
正常化-田中角栄、大平正芳、官僚たちの挑戦] [Japan-China Rapprochement: Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira
Masayoshi, the Challenges for the Bureaucrats] (Tokyo: Chūōkōron Shinsha, 2011), 55.
80
Ōhira Masayoshi Memoirs Publication Commision, ed., ‘Shio No Nagare o Kaeyō [Let’s Turn the Tide]’, in
Ōhira Masayoshi Kaisōroku: Denkihen [大平正芳回想録-伝記編] [Ōhira Masayoshi Memoirs: A Biography]
(Tokyo: Kajima Shuppankai [Kajima Institute Publishing], 1982); Akio Watanabe, 21 Seiki o Tsukuru: Ōhira
Masayoshi no Seijiteki Isan o Tsuide [21 世紀を創る: 大平正芳の政治的遺産を継いで] [Creating the 21st
century: continue the political legacy of Ōhira Masayoshi] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūsho [PHP Institute], 2016).
81
Watanabe, 21 Seiki o Tsukuru: Ōhira Masayoshi no Seijiteki Isan o Tsuide [21 世紀を創る: 大平正芳の政
治的遺産を継いで] [Creating the 21st century: continue the political legacy of Ōhira Masayoshi].
23
published an article entitled “Challenges for the new MITI Policy” (新通商産業省政策の課
題) in a local magazine. Ōhira wrote that “Japan has finally achieved the national goal of
‘catching up with advanced economies in the West’ (欧米先進国へのキャッチ・アップ),
which has been the goal of Japan since the Meiji period.” He further explained that Japan had
become an advanced industrialised economy with high-speed growth and manufacturing
capacity. From then on, Japan needed to set up new national goals, which was to “shift to
creative development that opens up new areas on its own and follows its own unique path.”82
In September 1971, shortly after the two “Nixon shocks,” Ōhira, as the new president of the
Kōchikai (宏池会), delivered a speech during a Kōchikai workshop. His speech was entitled
“Raising the Curtain of Japan’s New Century: Let’s Turn the Tide” (日本の新世紀の開幕-潮
の流れを変えよう), which was inspired by John F. Kennedy’s book title “To Turn the Tide.”83
Ōhira referred to this “turning point” as “the end of the postwar” (戦後の総決算), affirming
that Japan had achieved the goal of postwar economic recovery.84 One of his early drafts shows
that Ōhira believed that Japan was ready to “break with the ‘postwar’” (「戦後」との決別),
and that “the postwar Japan, for the first time, has stepped into the international society, as a
grown-up and responsible actor.” (戦後の日本がはじめて、大人として、責任ある主体
として、国際社会に足を踏み入れた).85 Concerning Japan-China relations, Ōhira pointed
out that “I believe that the time is ripe to settle the China issue.” (中国問題に決着をつける
82
Watanabe.
Ōhira Masayoshi Memoirs Publication Commision, ‘Shio No Nagare o Kaeyō [Let’s Turn the Tide]’, 308–12.
84
Shunpei Kumon, Kōyama Ken’ichi, and Seizaburō Satō, Ōhira Masayoshi: Hito to Shisō [大平正芳: 人と思
想] [Ōhira Masayoshi: Personality and Thoughts] (Tokyo: Zaidanhōjin Ōhira Masayoshi Kinen Zaidan, 1990).
85
Masayoshi Ōhira, ‘Ōhira Masayoshi Genkō: “Shio No Nagare o Kaeyō” Genkō [大平正芳原稿: 「潮の流れ
を変えよう」原稿][Ōhira Masayoshi’s Drafts: Drafts of “Let’s Turn the Tide” ]’ (Japan Digital Archives
Center, n.d.).
83
24
時期がいよいよ熟してきたと判断する).86 In October 1972, a month after the signing of the
Joint Communiqué, Ōhira addressed the House of Representative during an extraordinary Diet
session. As the foreign minister, he asserted that “the future of bilateral relations, and by
extension peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, will depend to a great extent on the
future efforts of both countries.”87
Ōhira also pioneered Japan’s cultural diplomacy which had a lasting impact on the
transnational flow of Japanese culture and the rise of Japanese soft power in the following
decades. A month after Ōhira assumed office, he addressed the Diet, which was also a month
after the Chinese government announced its economic reform. In his administrative policy
speech ( 施 政 方 針 演 説 ), Ōhira communicated his visions for Japan’s near future by
emphasising again his “jidai ninshiki,” and political stance (政治姿勢), which he summarised
in his diary written on the same day:
We have decided to put forward our political stance and understanding of the
current times, and we have put a lot of energy to be successful. The era of
cultures rejects economic supremacy, but it does not disregard it. Rather, it
values the invisible power of culture to create the conditions for the economy
itself to flourish.88
86
Ōhira Masayoshi Memoirs Publication Commision, ‘Shio No Nagare o Kaeyō [Let’s Turn the Tide]’;
Yoshikatsu Suzuki, ‘Genten Ni Tachimodotte Kangaeru [原点に立ち戻って考える] [Going Back to the
Starting Point]’, Gaikō [Diplomacy] (Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], September 2012).
87
Masayoshi Ōhira, ‘No Title’ (Database ‘The World and Japan’, 28 October 1972),
https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/fam/19721028.SXJ.html.
88
Masayoshi Ōhira, ‘Dai87kai Kokkai Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai2gō Shōwa54nen1gatsu25nichi 004 Ōhira
Masayoshi [第 87 回国会衆議院本会議第 2 号昭和 54 年 1 月 25 日 004 大平正芳] [The 87th National
Assembly, House of Representatives, Session No. 2, January 25, Showa 54, 004 Ōhira Masayoshi]’ (Kokkai
Kaigiroku Kensaku Shisutemu, 1979), https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/108705254X00219790125/4; Masayoshi
Ōhira, ‘Ōhira Masayoshi: Shōwa54 (1979) Nen 1gatsu 25nichi No Nikki Yori [大平正芳: 昭和 54(1979)年 1
月 25 日の日記より] [Ōhira Masayoshi: From His Diary of 25 January 1979]’, National Diet Library, Japan,
1979, https://www.ndl.go.jp/nikki/citeid/oohira_19790125/.
25
Ōhira’s message was that the time which values cultural influence had come. The
emphasis on the importance of culture and economic development, however, were not mutually
exclusive. He believed that cultural influence was the soft power which would facilitate the
growth of Japan’s economy. In December 1979, during Ōhira’s state visit to China, Ōkita, the
then foreign minister, signed the Sino-Japanese Cultural Exchange Agreement (中日文化交
流协定) with China, to promote bilateral exchange of arts, culture, education and academic
research.89 The Japanese Language Teacher Training Course in China (中国日语教师培训班)
was inaugurated in Beijing, under this agreement, in 1980. To pay respect to Ōhira, students
and staff members have been referring to this training course as the “Ōhira Class” (大平班)
since its inauguration. The “Ōhira Class” was incorporated into Beijing Foreign Studies
University (北京外国语大学), the oldest and most prominent university in China for foreign
languages and cultures, and professional interpreters and translators, in 1985, and was turned
into the Beijing Japanese Studies Research Centre (北京日本学研究中心), providing graduate
level education. Many of the Centre’s graduates have also entered private sector with Japanrelated business.90 The Centre is a stellar example of Ōhira’s vision to promote the Japanese
language education and bilateral cultural exchange, and a living legacy of his vision.
As demonstrated in Chapter One, economic development was central to the visions of
Japanese leaders throughout the twentieth century. Economic and trade relations with China
were important to Japan’s postwar reconstruction as China could provide Japan with access to
natural resources, raw materials and market. I have argued that their respective developmental
89
‘[Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo He Ribenguo Zhengfu Wei Cujin Wenhua Jiaoliu de Xieding] [中华人民共
和国政府和日本国政府为促进文化交流的协定] [Agreement to Promote Cultural Exchange between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Japan]’ (Embassy of the People’s
Republic of China in Japan, 6 December 1979), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cejp/chn/whjl/t62639.htm.
90
Beijing Ribenxue Yanjiu Zhongxin [Beijing Japanese Studies Research Centre], ed., [Daping Zhengfang Yu
Zhongri Guanxi] [大平正芳与中日关系] [Ōhira Masayoshi and Sino-Japanese Relations] (Beijing, 2011).
26
goals brought Japan and China together, unofficially, during the 1950s and 1960s. The gradual
shift of focus in Japan’s national goal during the 1970s encouraged the deepening of the
bilateral relationship from the 1970s and onwards. Ōhira’s articulation of his “jidai ninshiki”
demonstrates that his vision for Japan from the 1970s and onwards was to bring Japan back to
the world stage and create a new order in the Asia-Pacific with Japan being the regional leader.
Moreover, cooperation with China was necessary to realise his vision, as a Japanese sphere of
influence would be much less significant without the incorporation of China into the regional
ecosystem.
Ōhira’s interwar experience in China is believed to have shaped his vision for Japan, as
well as his view toward China, East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region.91 Moreover, his network
consisting of the transwar generation leaders continued to play important roles in postwar
Japan-China relations. In order to coordinate Japan’s China policy and manage the occupied
territories, the imperial Japanese government established Kōain (興亜院)—the East Asia
Development Board, in 1938. Ōhira was deployed to Zhangjiakou ( 张 家 口 ), a major
transportation hub in Northern China, in 1939, where he developed his transwar generation
network. Nine young officials from Kōain, including Ōhira, Itō Masayoshi (伊東正義), Sasaki
Yoshitake (佐々木義武), established the Kyūkenkai (九賢会), the Nine Wise Men’s Group.
Ōkita Saburō was not one of the Kyūkenkai’s nine affiliates, as Sasaki’s assistant, however, he
was heavily involved in the organisation’s operations. When Ōhira appointed Itō as the Chief
91
Hyong Cheol Lee, ‘Ōhira Naikaku to Ajia Gaikō [大平内閣とアジア外交] [The Ōhira Cabinet and Asian
Diplomacy]’, Nagasaki Kenritsu Daigaku Kokusai Jōhō Gakubu Kenkyū Kiyō[Journal of the Faculty of Global
Communication], no. 12 (2011): 137–48; Hong Jiang, ‘Ōhira Masayoshi No Chūgoku Ninshiki to Taichū
Gaikō: Nicchūaida No Shinrai Kankei No Kōchiku No Tameni [大平正芳の中国と対中外交：日中間の信頼
関係の構築のために] [Ōhira Masayoshi’s View of China and Foreign Policy toward China: To Build JapanChina Relations with Mutual Trust]’, Kokusai Bunkagaku Kenkyū: Kōbe Daigaku Daigakuin Kokusai
Bunkagaku Kenkyūka Kiyō, no. 38 (2012): 1–15; Kai Tian, Huan Taipingyang Liandai Gouxiang: Ri-Ao
Changyi yu Yatai Diqu Zhixu de Tansuo [环太平洋连带构想——日澳倡议与亚太地区秩序的探索] [The
Concept of Pacific Basin Community: Japan-Australia Initiative and the Exploration of the Asia-Pacific
Regional Order] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2018).
27
Cabinet Secretary, Sasaki as the MITI minister, and Ōkita as the foreign minister, during his
second tenure as the prime minister (November 9, 1979–June 12, 1980), the “Kōain naikaku”
(興亜院内閣) [the East Asia Development Board Cabinet] narrative was widely circulating
within the LDP.92 The members within “Kōain naikaku” also played important roles in shaping
the development of Japan-China relations and the evolution of Asian regionalisation.
Ōkita Saburō and “A Japanese Marshall Plan”
Known as the government economist (官庁エコノミスト), Ōkita was a key figure in
Japan’s postwar economic policies.93 Born and raised in Dalian (大连), a major port city in
North China, he became interested in China from a young age.94 In the 1980s, Ōkita proposed
“a Japanese version of the Marshall Plan,” which he explained that it was the “responsibility”
of Japan “to take the initiative in aiding the growth of the developing countries,” and that
Japanese investment would “contribute significantly not only to Asian development but also to
the global economy.”95 “A Japanese Marshall Plan,” in essence, meant providing Japanese aid
to facilitate developmental projects in developing countries in Asia. While the nomenclature
of a “Marshall Plan” may have been a new proposal by Ōkita in the 1980s, the ideas behind it
were not. In 1954, Japan, whilst still receiving US aid for its own postwar reconstruction, had
already commenced its own Official Development Assistance (ODA) after joining the
Colombo Plan. In its early years, ODA was primarily in the form of technical training programs
and the dispatch of technical experts. Transwar generation leaders such as Ōkita himself,
considered ODA as a means of establishing new trade relations and development cooperations,
92
Fumio Fukunaga, Ōhira Masayoshi: ‘Sengo Hoshu’to ha nani ka [大平正芳ー「戦後保守」とは何か]
[Ōhira Masayoshi: What is ‘Postwar Conservative’?] (Tokyo: Chūōkōron Shinsha, 2008), 42.
93
Naho Sugita, ‘Ōkita Saburō No Jinkōron: Keizai Hatten No Mottomo Kisotekina Yōken Ha Ningen No
Nōryoku Dearu [大来佐武郎の人口論-経済発展の最も基礎的な要件は人間の能力である] [Ōkita Saburō
on Population—the Most Fundamental Requirement for Economic Development Is Human Capacity]’,
Jinkōgaku Kenkyū 54 (2018): 43–55.
94
Ōkita, Keizai Gaikō ni Ikiru [経済外交に生きる] [Living for Economics and Diplomacy], 157.
95
Saburō Ōkita, Japan in the World Economy of the 1980s (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989), 230–32.
28
a tenet inherited from the imperial past, when Japanese intellectuals argued that Japan was the
most natural leader for the region. Japanese imperial expansion, however, was not intended to
be emancipatory in nature, and instead only inflicted oppression, atrocities, and devastation.96
Ōkita continued to believe in postwar Japan’s leadership role in Asian development and
economic regionalisation. During the Occupation, in 1946 and 1948, before the founding of
PRC, Ōkita had already envisioned a Japan-led industrialisation and developmental model for
East Asia.97 The underpinning of Ōkita’s vision was the integration of new regions into Japan’s
expanding economy through fostering economic interdependence, which, as I will elaborate in
the next chapter, had its roots in Akamatsu Kaname’s (赤松要) “theory of the flying-geese
pattern of development” (雁行形態論). Japan’s postwar reconstruction included but not
limited to economic recovery. The long-term goal was to create a post-imperial Japanese sphere
of influence, in which Japan would “recover the trust of the world” by facilitating economic
development and demonstrating democratic values.98 In the 1970s, Ōkita began considering a
new international economic policy for Japan, after having successfully delivered the Income
Doubling Plan in the 1960s as Ikeda’s Brain Trust. The cooperative regionalism became
possible because it would accommodate Japanese postwar economic expansion in East Asia
and Chinese nationalist aspirations as well as the CCP’s concerns over its legitimacy.
Summary
96
Yellen, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War, 87–88, 206–8.
Gaimushō Tokubetsu Chōsa Iinkai, Nihon Keizai Saiken No Kihon Mondai [日本経済再建の基本問題]
[Basic Issues of Japanese Economic Recovery] (Tokyo: Gaimushō Chōsakyoku, 1946), 10–11; Saburō Ōkita,
Nihon No Keizai Suijun [日本の経済水準] [Japan’s Economic Level] (Tokyo: Tōzai Shuppansha, 1948), 142–
44; Saburō Ōkita, Watakushi No Rirekisho[私の履歴書] [My Personal History] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai
Shinbunsha [Nikkei Inc.], 1977), 54–65.
98
Saburō Ōkita, Tightrope: Balancing Economics and Responsibility in Japanese Diplomacy 1979-1980, trans.
Katsuhiko Mōri, Hiroshi Tsushima, and Roger Buckley (Tokyo: Institute for Domestic and International Policy
Studies, 1992), I–3.
97
29
In the postwar era, Japanese transwar generation leaders reshaped and refined Japan’s
wartime visions in accordance with the changing geopolitical situation in Asia and the newly
adopted values of democracy and pacifism. The integration of economies within this region
remained the goal of postwar Japan nonetheless, which meant to create an ecosystem in which
economies would not easily withdraw due to the high-level of interdependence. During the
1970s, as Japan rose as an economic power, Japanese leaders, such as Ōhira and Ōkita,
envisioned new Japanese leadership over the expanse of a reimagined “empire.”
30
3 Japan’s Resource Security and China’s Development
Japan, the “fragile blossom,” despite its high-speed growth in the 1960s, was extremely
vulnerable to supply shocks of resources, due to its high dependence on imported fossil fuel
and commodities.99 Japanese policymakers have made efforts to diversify their supply sources
as they were conscious of their vulnerability. Their anxiety, however, reached unprecedented
heights during the first oil crisis in 1973. Stability and low cost, therefore, were essential to
ensuring Japan’s resource security. 100 By investigating Japan’s pursuit of diversification of
supply and its economic cooperation with China during the 1970s, I argue that Japanese
transwar generation elites within the government-business nexus attempted to incorporate
China into the Japan-led developmental Asia as a solution to Japan’s current crisis.
In the previous chapters, my analysis focusses on Japanese state actors such as Ōhira
and Ōkita. It is important to consider non-state actors as well, in particular the business
community, given the Japanese practice of intimate government-business cooperation.
Bureaucrats and industrialists, the majority of whom graduated from a small number of elite
universities such as the University of Tokyo, built a comprehensive network which allowed
information on market conditions and possible policy responses to flow smoothly in both
directions, resulting in a high-level of coordination between the private and public sectors.101
In the context of postwar Sino-Japanese relations, it was the business community that propelled
the development of economic ties on the Japanese side.
In 1949, numerous small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and some major
companies in Japan went bankrupt due to financial difficulties as a result of deflation. Even
99
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan (New York: Harper and Row, 1972);
Ōkita, ‘Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy’.
100
Ōkita, ‘Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy’.
101
Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975.
31
major mining firms such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi struggled to pay their employees on time or
at all, which led to industrial action.102 Japanese firms were seeking a solution to the financial
problems, the workers and trade unions were trying to defend their rights, and the public were
complaining of a low living standard due to shortages of goods. Slogans such as “Good
economy begins with Japan-China trade,” “Japan-China trade is the way to help SMEs,” and
“Let’s improve our lives with cheap Chinese commodities” were adopted.103 On the Chinese
side, Zhou Enlai considered trade relations with Japan as a channel that would eventually lead
to trade with the Western bloc.104 Therefore, resuming transnational business activities were
high on the agenda in both Japan and China.
In the 1970s, the Japanese industry was hit hard by a series of shocks, one of which was
the steel industry. After the ending the Bretton Woods System in 1971, the steel industry fell
into great difficulties in terms of exports as the yen rose significantly against the US dollar.
Moreover, as steel production relied heavily on oil, all steel manufacturers in Japan were unable
to run at full capacity, with Nippon Steel being the first to be affected. Major Japanese steel
firms, under these circumstances, were forced to shift from their previous development strategy
of facility expansion to a management strategy of diversification and internationalisation. The
Chinese market became a promising choice.105
102
Teisuke Shibuya et al., ‘Zadankai: Nicchū Bōeki Undō Ranshō No Koro [座談会 日中貿易運動濫觴のこ
ろ] [Round Table Discussion: The Roots of the Japan-China Trade Movement]’, Ajia Keizai Junpō [アジア経
済旬報], January 1965, 16.
103
Hiroji Hirai, Nicchū Bōeki Kiso Chishiki [日中貿易の基礎知識] [Basics of Japan-China Trade] (Tokyo:
Tabata Shoten, 1971), 67.
104
Xia, ‘Xin Zhongguo Chengli Hou Zhou Enlai Cong Zheli Rushou Gaishan Zhongri Guanxi [新中国成立后
周恩来从这里入手改善中日关系] [Where Zhou Enlai Started to Improve Sino-Japanese Relations after the
Founding of New China]’.
105
Seiichirō Yonekura, ‘Tekkō [鉄鋼] [Iron and Steel]’, in Sengo Nihon Keieishi (Dai1maki) [戦後日本経営史
(第 1 巻)] [Postwar Japanese Business Management History (Volume 1)], ed. Shin’ichi Yonekawa, Kōichi
Shimokawa, and Hiroaki Yamazaki (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha [Toyo Keizai Inc.], 1991), 263–349; Shiko
Ryū, ‘Shinnittetsu No Chūgoku Senryaku: Hōzan Seitetsusho No Jirei o Chūshin Ni [新日鉄の中国戦略: 宝山
製鉄所の事例を中心に] [Nippon Steel’s China Strategy: The Case of Baoshan Iron and Steel]’, Kankyō to
Keiei: Shizuoka Sangyō Daigaku Ronshu [環境と経営: 静岡産業大学論集] [Environment and Management:
Journal of Shizuoka Sangyo University] 5, no. 2 (1999): 17–19.
32
Inayama Yoshihiro and the Japanese Steel Empire
Inayama Yoshihiro (1904-1987), a graduate of the University of Tokyo, the former
director of Yawata Steel (八幡製鐵) in the 1960s and Nippon Steel (新日本製鉄) in the 1970s,
was one of the notable figures within the transwar generation government-business network
that pioneered such development. Inayama set his foot in China for the first time in 1958, to
sign the fourth private trade agreement, also known as the long-term trade agreement on steel
(鉄鋼の長期貿易協定). Inayama’s tie with China began with Zhou Enlai’s invitation in 1956
through Suzuki Kazuo (鈴木一雄), a former Mitsubishi employee during the war and a
founding member of Japan’s Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT) in
the postwar period.106 Having gained permission from the US embassy after several rounds of
negotiation, Inayama was determined to establish connections with China after the 1957
recession. The board of directors of Yawata Steel, where Inayama served as a managing
director at that time, considered increasing exports, especially steel exports to China, as an
important solution to recession, because China was seen by the Japanese business community
as a promising emerging market and a less expensive source of commodities.107 Although trade
was fully suspended only a few months after the signing of this agreement due to the “Nagasaki
Flag Incident,” it showed that Japanese elites were eager to reconnect with China, despite the
postwar geopolitical divide. The Japanese Empire had fallen, but memories of the empire
remained vivid. Regional economic ties, during imperial expansion, would serve the cultivation
of a Japanese sphere of influence, in which all states would become interdependent and would
not easily withdraw. With the stable flow of capital and goods, ideally, “the yen bloc” would
coordinate industrial development and mutually beneficial trade in the region.
106
107
Inayama, Watashi no tekkō shōwashi [私の鉄鋼昭和史] [My Showa History of Iron and Steel], 100.
Inayama, 103.
33
The 1972 rapprochement enabled the Japanese business community to revisit and
materialise their vision of a transnational business and industry network with China, and also
allowed the Chinese to access advanced technology, human capital training and development,
as well as foreign capital and investment, which were highly desired by the CCP and necessary
for China’s developmental goals. Inayama was also able to visit China more frequently, at least
once a year, to discuss business cooperation and negotiate trade deals. In August 1972, one
month before the two governments signed the Joint Communiqué, Inayama led a delegation
consisting of Japanese industrialists and bankers to visit China, with the purpose of discussing
expanding Sino-Japanese trade after normalisation. A deal was made after two weeks of
negotiation with Zhou and other CCP leaders. Japan would export steel and fertilisers to China,
while China would export crude oil to Japan. Moreover, Nippon Steel would provide technical
assistance to Wuhan Iron and Steel (武汉钢铁厂).108 Trade would expand at a slow pace as
inflation in Japan after the 1973 oil crisis made it challenging to fulfil the deal at the agreed
price, and China’s developmental projects were still disrupted by the Cultural Revolution.109
The cross-border exchange of people, ideas, natural resources, products and technology
nevertheless proliferated and influenced Chinese policymaking in the years to follow.
After the purge of the Gang of Four in 1976, the second generation CCP leaders adopted
a new party constitution to prioritise the “four modernisations” goal set during the Mao era. An
important element was to elevate China’s output of high quality steel which was essential to
the modernisation of infrastructure and the manufacturing industry. The Japanese steel industry
was also eager to increase its market share in China. Therefore, despite the concerns over the
quality of Chinese crude oil, Japanese steelmakers insisted on the increase of oil imports from
108
109
Inayama, 115.
Inayama, 116.
34
China.110 In 1977, the Chinese government deployed a mission of CCP bureaucrats and experts
from the iron and steel industry to Japan, where they were received by Japanese steelmakers
led by Nippon Steel and Inayama. After spending nearly a month in Japan, visiting steel plants
and exchanging thoughts with their Japanese counterparts, they returned to China with a
documentary of how Japan built its postwar steel industry which was gifted by Inayama, and
reported their findings to the CCP leaders. 111 Eventually the CCP decided to seek Nippon
Steel’s cooperation and assistance for the construction and operation of Baoshan Iron and Steel
(宝山钢铁厂), often referred to as Baogang (宝钢), in Shanghai. Compared with West
Germany, from which China had also imported industrial plants and steel products, Japan had
more comparative advantages. Much more frequent exchange of people and technology made
the Japanese steel industry more familiar to the Chinese. The geographic proximity between
Japan and China could significantly cut the transportation cost. Moreover, the longstanding
cultural and linguistic interconnection between the two countries would facilitate not only the
extensive daily contacts between Chinese and Japanese personnel at Baogang but also the
training of Chinese technicians and managers in Japan. Finally, Japanese industrialists, such as
Inayama, had established a strong rapport with the CCP leaders by this time, and was widely
endorsed as a “friend.”112 Huang Jinfa (黄锦发), former deputy general and chief engineer of
Baogang, also corroborated the fact that Inayama was influential in the CCP’s decision.113
Inayama and the case of Baogang is a stellar example of how the government-business
network during the 1970s made collaborative efforts in solving problems and overcoming
challenges in the Japanese economy by integrating China into the regional ecosystem
110
Chae-Jin Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1984), 23.
111
Mingwu Zheng, Gangtie Juren: Baoshan Gangtiechang Kaigong Jianshe [钢铁巨人: 宝山钢铁厂开工建
设] [The Iron and Steel Giant: The Construction of Baoshan Iron and Steel] (Changchun: Jilin Chuban Jituan
[Jilin Publishing Group], 2011), 3–10.
112
Zheng, 11.
113
Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy, 35.
35
envisioned by the transwar generation elites. By investing in the Chinese steel and iron industry
with Japanese capital, machinery, and technology, as well as extensive personnel training, at
the dawn of China’s economic reform and opening to the world, Japanese elites established
themselves as advisors trusted by the CCP policymakers and Chinese industrialists. In doing
so, Japanese enterprises would gain market share as first movers in an emerging market that
had already attracted the attention of the world. Moreover, Japanese elites would directly
participate in Chinese policymaking in the early stage of China’s grand reform, exerting
Japanese influence on Chinese statecraft in ways that would encourage further economic
regionalisation in East Asia.
Sino-Japanese Oil Cooperation
Oil cooperation during the 1970s, including trade and joint exploration, was also an
important component of the development of interdependent relations between Japan and China.
Japan’s postwar overseas oil development began in 1965 as Japan’s oil consumption increased
rapidly in the 1960s. Prior to the oil crisis, imports from the Middle East, which made up 90.4%
of all imports, supplied the majority of Japan’s rising oil demand.114 China had become selfsufficient by the early 1970s, after the discovery of its largest oil field in Daqing (大庆) in 1959.
In 1972, the CCP decided to accommodate Japan’s repeated oil purchase requests to
commemorate the rapprochement. 115 The negotiation was executed by the Sinochem
Corporation, a state-owned multinational conglomerate primarily engaged in the production
and trading of chemicals and fertiliser and exploration and production of oil for civilian and
military purposes, and was overseen by Zhou Enlai. Zhou invited Kimura Ichizō (木村一三)
114
Masanari Koike, ‘Japan’s Overseas Oil Development and a Role of Technology’ (Tokyo, 2008),
http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GraSPP-DP-E-08-002-SEPP-DP-E-08-002.pdf.
115
Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy, 105; Tingyu Zhang, ‘Nanwang Daqing You Shouci
Chukou Riben [难忘大庆油首次出口日本] [The Unforgettable First Export of Daqing Oil to Japan]’, 21 March
2010, http://www.sinochem.com/s/1374-5306-9623.html.
36
to Beijing to discuss the details considering that Kimura, like Inayama, was an “old friend.”116
The first export in 1973 was fulfilled by Idemitsu Kōsan (出光興産), a Japanese petroleum
company and the second largest petroleum refiner in Japan.117 Idemitsu Keisuke (出光計助),
the director of Idemitsu Kōsan, was one of the delegates who visited China with Inayama in
1972 to discuss trade expansion, demonstrating the important role of Inayama in the SinoJapanese trade network during the 1970s.
In fact, in order to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil and diversify its source
of supply, Japanese firms had been negotiating with the former Soviet Union, through the
Japan-Soviet Economic Committee, from the mid-1960s, with a particular interest in the
Tyumen project, on the possibility of Japanese participation in the oil exploration projects in
the Tyumen region in West Siberia. Japan eventually abandoned the project in 1975 as they
were unable to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.118
The exports of Daqing oil became more substantial from 1975, which helped Japan
diversify the sources of supply and access the Chinese market. Moreover, China decided to
embark on a joint-development project with Japan in early 1978 to explore oil in the Bohai Sea
(渤海), around the same time that the Long-Term Trade Agreement was signed and the
announcement of the Chinese Ten-Year Plan. The joint-development agreement was signed in
December 1979, during Ōhira’s state visit to China.119 Under this agreement, both countries
116
Zhang, ‘Nanwang Daqing You Shouci Chukou Riben [难忘大庆油首次出口日本] [The Unforgettable First
Export of Daqing Oil to Japan]’.
117
Zhang.
118
Jeremy Russell, Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Saxon House for
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976); Rajendra Kumar Jain, China and Japan 1949-1980, ed.
Rajendra Kumar Jain, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981); Gerald L Curtis, ‘The Tyumen Oil
Development Project and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, in The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan,
ed. Robert A Scalapino (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2020), 147–74.
119
‘Hua Zongli Tong Daping Shouxiang Huitan Yuanman Chenggong, Zhongri Wenhua Jiaoliu Xieding Zaijing
Qianzi, Liangguo Qianshu Kantan Kaifa Bohai Nan-Xi Haiyu Shiyou Ziyuan Xieyishu [华总理同大平首相会
谈圆满成功 中日文化交流协定在京签字 两国签署勘探开发渤海南、西海域石油资源协议书]
[Successful Meeting between Premier Hua and Prime Minister Ōhira, China-Japan Cultural Exchange
37
would share the development cost, and China would repay the additional expenses incurred by
the production-sharing method, by which both countries share the oil output. The Bohai oil
project was mutually beneficial, as China would receive the necessary capital and technical
support for its largely underdeveloped offshore oil exploration, and Japan would be guaranteed
a return of stable supply on their investment.
The bilateral oil cooperation served China’s industrialisation programs more than
Japan’s interest in resource security. Japanese refining firms resisted significant imports of
Daqing crude oil due to its high wax content, heavy weight, low sulphur content, and high pour
point, because it would require investment in new refiners. Japanese industries, particularly
Japanese steelmakers, primarily supported oil imports from China to maintain trade balance
and gain influence.120 The oil trade, therefore, served the economic and political interest of
Japan more than the supply diversification goal. The joint oil development project was regarded
by the Japanese as an opportunity to demonstrate its competitiveness in international
cooperation and oil development technology. Inoue Makoto, the president of Japan-China Oil
Development Corporation (JCODC) referred to the Bohai project as “a victory of Japanese
science and technology.”121 China benefited from the cooperation in the following ways. First,
the oil exports provided China with guaranteed access to capital, especially foreign currency,
and advanced technology from Japan for its industrial modernisation programs. Second, before
the Bohai joint project, Chinese had little experience in offshore oil exploration as the majority
of China’s oil production was onshore. The Bohai project became an invaluable training
experience for the Chinese oil specialists in terms of technical knowledge and practices of
international cooperation.
Agreement Signed in Beijing, Two countries sign agreement to explore and develop oil resources in the
southern and western Bohai Sea]’, Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 7 December 1979.
120
Russell, Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy, 169.
121
‘Nihon Keizai Shimbun’, 12 April 1981.
38
Japan as Asia’s “Lead Goose”
When accessing postwar economic development in Asia, Ōkita commented that it
“followed a flying-geese pattern, with the United States and Japan leading the way.”122 As a
leading economist who blueprinted Japan’s postwar reconstruction and economic relationship
with other Asian countries, he advocated Akamatsu’s “theory of the flying-geese pattern of
development.” Initially developed in the 1930s, the name of the theory was tainted because it
was used to legitimise the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere during Japan’s imperial
expansion. The theory itself, however, became increasingly influential in Japan’s postwar
reconstruction and industrial policy, as it provided a clear framework for Japan’s catch-up with
the West through economic engagements with Asian countries. 123 Ōkita believed that both
Japan and its Asian neighbours would benefit from this model. Japan would successfully
restructure its industrial composition to create a trade surplus thus earn more foreign exchange
to finance its imports, whilst other Asian economies would modernise and increase production
capabilities. Through the process, Japan would help overcome Asian poverty and achieve
regional stability and peace. 124 Providing the region with affluence, industrialisation, and
development through planned economy was one of the two primary principles on which the
Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere established. 125 Evidently, the goal of creating a
Japanese sphere of influence with Japan being Asia’s “lead goose” through economic ties
continued to guide the transwar generation elites such as Ōkita in terms of postwar Japan’s
122
Ōkita, Japan in the World Economy of the 1980s, 226.
Pekka Korhonen, ‘The Theory of the Flying Geese Pattern of Development and Its Interpretations’, Journal
of Peace Research 31, no. 1 (1994): 93–108.
124
Saburō Ōkita, Nihon Keizai No Shōrai [日本経済の将来] [The Future of Japan’s Economy] (Tokyo: Yūki
Shobō, 1961); Ōkita, ‘Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy’; Ōkita, Japan in the World
Economy of the 1980s.
125
Yellen, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War, 87–88.
123
39
industrial and international economic policy. The demilitarised and democratised Japan,
however, adopted a different approach that would align with its democratic values.
The reinvented approach is demonstrable by examining Sino-Japanese engagements
during the 1970s, the mechanisms of which included policy advising and exchange within the
Sino-Japanese government-business network. Although China utilised economic advisors from
several countries to learn about various approaches to development, Japanese advisors were
particularly valuable sources of ideas to the State Council.126 Inayama and Ōkita were among
the key advisors trusted by the Chinese government. Inayama was appointed as the chairman
of the Japan-China Economic Association (日中経済協会), upon its establishment by MITI in
November 1972. The Association was founded to regulate Japan’s exports through
government-business coordination given the rising trade frictions between Japan and the US.
With Inayama’s successful implementation of the Association’s vision, it soon became a key
organisation that actively facilitated bilateral exchange by organising workshops and meetings
of economic policymakers from both countries. 127 Frequent semi-formal consultation and
exchange in the form of in-person meetings and written correspondence between Inayama’s
Japanese network and CCP officials during the 1970s also became important channels through
which Japanese elites attempted to condition Chinese policymaking. Their advice was
generally well-received by the Chinese side.128
126
Ōkita et al., Riben Pengyou Dui Woguo Jingji Gongzuo de Kanfa He Jianyi [日本朋友对我国经济工作的看
法和建议] [Views and Suggestions from Our Japanese Friends on Our Economic Development]; Gu, Gu Mu
Huiyilu [谷牧回忆录] [Memoirs of Gu Mu]; Wendy Leutert, ‘Reimagining the Chinese Economy Through
Sino-Japanese Engagement in the 1980s’, in Chinese Economic Statecraft from 1978 to 1989: The First Decade
of Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms, ed. Priscilla Roberts (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 209–34.
127
Lichen Chiu, Nihon No Taichū Keizai Gaikō to Inayama Yoshihiro: Nicchū Chōki Bōeki Torikime o Megutte
[日本の対中経済外交と稲山嘉寛: 日中長期貿易取決めをめぐって] [Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with
China and Inayama Yoshihiro: On the Long-Term Trade Arrangements between China and Japan] (Sapporo:
Hokkaidō Daigaku Shuppansha, 2010), 93–119.
128
Yuan, Yuan Baohua Huiyilu [袁宝华回忆录] [Memoirs of Yuan Baohua], 352–53.
40
Ōkita received an invitation from vice-premier Gu Mu in 1979 through Inayama to visit
Beijing, where he, along with another prominent economist Sakisaka Masao (向坂正男), gave
several presentations to high-level CCP economic policymakers and scholars. During Ōhira’s
1979 state visit to China, Deng Xiaoping informed Ōhira of his desire for Ōkita to serve as
China’s official advisor, although Deng knew that it could not happen as Ōkita had just been
appointed as Japan’s foreign minister. A year later, after Ōhira’s premature death, Ōkita
stepped down as foreign minister and accepted China’s invitation to serve as Gu’s advisor. Gu
and Ōkita immediately established the Sino-Japanese Economic Knowledge Exchange (中日
经济知识交流会), with Sakisaka and Ma Hong as chief representatives. Gu and Deng aimed
to borrow from Japan’s experience for China’s economic reform, and Ōkita intended to form a
deep understanding of China’s economic planning to inform Japan’s policymaking.129 Ōkita
later stated, “When accessing the future of the Asia-Pacific region, we must also carefully
evaluate China’s open-door economic policy, since this is one of the major variables affecting
the region.”130 Economic expansion usually occurs in the regions with maximum opportunities,
but the greatest opportunities depend as much on political security concerns as they do on
questions of profit.131 Japanese leaders, therefore, had to ensure themselves as much knowledge
as possible of the economic and political conditions in China. Although it is difficult to quantify
the degree of Japanese influence on Chinese policymaking through the bilateral exchange, it is
clear that Japanese participation was in large part driven by their vision to shape regional order
as the “lead goose” to serve its own national political and economic interest.
129
Saburō Ōkita, Tōhonseisō: Watashi no Rirekisho [東奔西走ー私の履歴書] [Always on the Move: My
Personal History] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Keizai Shinbunsha, 1981); Gu, Gu Mu Huiyilu [谷牧回忆录] [Memoirs of
Gu Mu]; Mengkui Wang, ‘Zhongri Jingji Zhishi Jiaoliuhui 30nian Huigu [中日经济知识交流会 30 年回顾]
[Reflections on 30 Years of the Sino-Japanese Economic Knowledge Exchange]’, Zhongguo Fazhan Guancha
[China Development Observation] 11 (2011).
130
Ōkita, Japan in the World Economy of the 1980s, 228.
131
John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History Review 6, no.
1 (12 July 1953): 1–15.
41
Summary
Japan experienced a series of “shocks” during the 1970s, whilst China gained
international recognition and eventually stabilised the domestic political environment in the
latter half of the decade. The normalisation of diplomatic relations created hospitable
conditions for the transnational government-business network to embark on large-scale
industrialisation and joint oil exploration programs, and further expand their trade relations.
Although Japan benefited less in terms of securing resource supplies, they nevertheless
officially participated in China’s developmental projects and state reform, which brought the
Japanese leaders closer to their vision of being Asia’s “lead goose.”
42
Conclusion
The complex legacies of the Japanese Empire and the war persisted decades after the
dissolution of the empire, and they contributed to the relatively steady development of postwar
Sino-Japanese economic and trade relations. Further, during the 1970s, they facilitated China’s
transition from the Soviet-style state socialism to the Japanese model of developmental state
under the CCP. What propelled the two countries, who not long ago fought an atrocious war,
to converge were their respective national developmental goals that had deep roots in
nationalism. Leaders of both Japan and China prescribed economic development and
industrialisation to rectify the power imbalance with the West. It was, therefore, nationalism
that fostered ties between the two countries and facilitated economic regionalisation and
reconstruction of East Asia after the downfall of the Japanese Empire. A close look at the key
Japanese actors, Ōhira Masayoshi, Ōkita Saburō and Inayama Yoshihiro shows that the
Japanese transwar generation elites, reimagined the visions of the Japanese Empire and
attempted to incorporate China into the Japan-led industrial and infrastructural development of
Asia through economic and cultural engagements instead of military expansion. They
accomplished a major goal inherited from the imperial past of diversifying Japan’s access to
natural resources, raw materials, and overseas markets.
The story of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation during the 1970s further expands our
understanding of postwar Sino-Japanese relations that is different from the more recent
contentious discourse focussing on history problems, Japanese perpetration, and Chinese
victimhood. It shows us that the CCP purposefully embraced the transnational network from
the Japanese side consisted of the transwar generation elites, who were once imperial Japanese
bureaucrats dealing with China affairs. During the 1970s, the CCP successfully established
trusting and cooperative relationships with past aggressors. Further, the CCP has continued to
43
acknowledge them as “Chinese people’s old friends” who made significant contribution to
China’s development. This demonstrates that despite divergent ideological commitments and
evolving national goals, the CCP has always adopted pragmatism by giving recognition to
those who have contributed to the legitimisation and consolidation of its authoritarian rule. By
endorsing the Japanese transwar generation elites as “Chinese people’s old friends” and
creating narratives of friendship around them, the CCP also reaffirmed its own status as the
legitimate proxy of the Chinese people and their assumed collective interest.
In broader terms, this dissertation highlights the ways in which the transnational flow
of ideas and technology, as well as the exchange of people transcended political and ideological
boundaries. Due to the scope of this project, however, this dissertation does not answer the
question of to what degree the CCP had adopted the Japanese model or how much of the
Japanese advice that the CCP had implemented helped achieve their goals. To provide an
answer, further research could consider investigating the Chinese statecraft as well as the
reform and restructuring of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1980s and the
1990s, particularly the ones in manufacturing and heavy industry, such as Baoshan Iron and
Steel and the automobile industry. In addition, future studies on Ōhira Masayoshi’s “Pacific
Basin Cooperation Concept” (環太平洋連帯構想), and Ōkita Saburō’s views and visions for
Japan’s economic and trade relations with the rest of the world, such as the “Ōkita’s Conception”
(大来構想), will broaden our view of how they envisioned a new Japanese sphere of influence
in which all economies would be interdependent, and attempted to renew the image of Japan
as a pacifist country through regional economic cooperation and cultural exchange.132
132
Saburō Ōkita, ‘Japan, China and the United States: Economic Relations and Prospects’, Foreign Affairs 57,
no. 5 (27 May 1979): 1090–1110; Ōkita, Tōhonseisō: Watashi no Rirekisho [東奔西走ー私の履歴書] [Always
on the Move: My Personal History]; Saburō Ōkita, [America No Ronri, Nihon No Taiō: Nichibei Masatsu
Nijūnen No Kiroku] [アメリカの論理 日本の対応ー日米摩擦二十年の記録] [US Logic, Japan’s Response:
Record of Two Decades of Japan-US Friction] (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1989).
44
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