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Bill Hogan
Essay 1
1/23/16
Mr. Morgan
Word Count: 1466
Perhaps no other philosophical tradition offers more complex questions of the conception of
the self more than the Indian religious tradition. Both Buddhism and Hinduism traditions teach
the fundamental concepts of the belief of the self. While disputed, which conception of the self
truly follows most in line with reason? The exact nature of the human self has been characterized
historically by three views: the Buddhist view of Anatta or “no self ”, Hindu non-dualist view of
Advaita “absolute” view, and the Hindu view Vishista the advaita view of Ramanuja (Morales
1999). Based upon Indian tradition one can conclude that the self-conception view of Ramanuja
is most consistent with reason. In the first half of this paper I will explain and present the first
two conceptions; and in the latter why the third conception follows reason most accurately.
The Buddhist theory of the mind focuses on the not self-doctrine, “which postulates that
human beings are reducible to the physical and psychological constituents and processes which
comprise them” (Coseru 2012). Buddha had many complex observations but one is particularly
puzzling: we have no soul. This core teaching is called “anatta” (Prothero 184). Buddhists also
go on to explain that the human person has “no self” (Prothero 184). In essence we who call
ourselves I and myself is just a conventional name that is attached to an ever changing set of
separate parts called the Skhandas. The Skhandas make up: matter, sensations, perceptions,
thoughts, and consciousness to create the illusion of I and me (Prothero 184).
The Buddha declares that when we experience any of the five Skhandas, sensations,
consciousness, etc. they are only forms of manifestation and what they actually perceive to be is
not of oneself, they are not yours, they are not yourself (Coseru 2012). Further Buddhists
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scholars went on to say that we are only self-witnesses of our consciousness. Buddhists claim
that our sense of ourselves is “ as an autonomous being imputed, and our attribution of inherent
existence to it is habitually acquired” (Coseru 2012). Overall Buddhists have come to believe in
the notion that the self is not your true identity, and that through enlightenment and wandering
you can find independence and self-subsistence and become selfless.
The Buddhists believe the Skhandas exist so what exactly do they think doesn’t exist? It is
simple Buddhists believe we have no soul and no self. If we search for our self in the five
skhandas and cannot find it, then there is no self in there. There is nothing we can identify that is
the self. So if you search for something and cannot find it then it doesn’t exist. This principle can
be applied to objects, ideas, and the soul. This principle is used in Buddhism to show that entities
of the self and soul do not exist in any way we can conceive them.
The Hindu non-dualist view of Advaita or “absolute” view was introduced by the Indian
philosopher Shankara from the Advaita School. Advaita means non-dualist and vaita is dualist.
He pointed out one of the first inconsistencies with the Buddhist conception. One flaw he points
out about Buddhism revolves around the concept of Karma. The problem that Shankara points
out with the Buddhist view is that, “if there is indeed no enduring being – if the being who
experiences the reaction of karma is, in principle, a different being from the one who caused the
initial action, thus creating the karma – then is it not the case that an innocent being is suffering
for the crimes of another” (Morales 1999)? Such a view is not in line with the Hindu tradition,
Shankara further points out “If there is no being who is performing an action, there can certainly
be no being to experience the results of that action” (Morales 1999). If we truly have no self like
the Buddhists state, then why are there outcomes and results from the actions of that particular
being?
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Shankara also offers another two arguments about the Buddhist no-self theory, one on the
existence of the soul and another on demonstrating the continuity of the soul (Morales 1999).
The self is a logically undeniable fact and if one denies the actual existence of themselves, then
through that denial they are actually portraying the existence of the self who is doing the denying
(Morales 1999). Buddhists might respond by saying that they do not deny their physical body
and makeup but deny that their physical body occupies a soul and self. Through this argument,
Shankara succeeds in weakening the Buddhist theory of there being no continuity of being, and
“reestablishing the ontological integrity of the self” (Morales 1999). In realization only a selfconscious being can make that assessment.
In his second argument on the continuity of the soul, Shankara finds that through memory,
which is realized, there is a continuity of the experiencer. “There is only one individual who
experiences the events, persons, objects and thoughts of a particular life” (Morales 1999). We do
not remember the memories of some other person, but we remember our own experiences. Thus
there is a continuity of the experiencer. There is only one continuous experiencer, not many.
Shankara held ideals that the very essence of the self is pure and unadulterated consciousness
(Morales 1999). The self is limitless by factors of time and space and it cannot be measured, thus
he concludes that it is “one unitary entity”(Morales 1999). There are not many selves; there is
simply one self/being that exists in all people. Shankara believes that the self (Atman) and the
absolute (Brahman) are one unitary entity. His ultimate conclusion on the individual self is that
“there is no such entity in reality, when illusion is stripped away, all that is left is Brahman, and
we are that Brahman we are God” (Morales 1999).
The last conception is the Hindu view Vishista; the advaita view of Ramanuja. The term
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Vishista refers to “qualified non-dualism” and his philosophy by tradition has been labeled
Vishista. The label attempts to mark out Ramanuja's effort to “affirm the unity of the many,
without giving up on the reality of distinct persons, qualities, universals, or aesthetic and moral
values” (Ranganathan). Ramanuja suggests consciousness as “both the inherent nature, as well as
one of the distinguishing attributes, of the self” (Morales 1999).
According to Ramanuja we are ultimately the experiencers. When we are aware that our
minds and bodies are constantly adapting and changing we find ourselves. “This sense of ‘I’ is
not merely attributive of the self, but is the very essence of the self” (Morales 1999). The self is
what persists during the various transformations that take place in the material body. Human
beings inherently don’t have a soul or self that they are aware of. He further continues to argue
that the soul is the knowing subject, when we realize what we are then that’s how we come to
have a soul and essence of self.
Most of his views are very logical and within reason which enables him to exploit the
conceptions of Buddhists and Shankara. Ramanuja argues that the conceptions that his opponents
present for their position undercut their own views (Ranganathan). The logic in their ideas is
contrary to cognitive error. They are backward thinking and ideologically wrong. If the
conceptions of the self by Buddhist and Shankaras standards are so, then it follows that some
cognitions are not erroneous (Ranganathan). At the same time this is exactly what Buddhists and
Shankara rule out, the concept by them realizing consciousness is a cognitive error of the self.
In Ramanujas account of reality, there are three distinct reals: the Brahman (absolute), Atman
(the plurality of living beings), and Jagat (the world we experience around us) (Morales 1999).
Out of these three Jagat is incapable of understanding or feeling, and both Brahman and Atman
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are able to perceive or feel. But of Atman and Jagat, Ramanuja considers them to be parts of the
Brahman “in the limited sense that they are qualities or modes of the latter” (Morales 1999).
Jagat and Atman form the body of Brahman in the same manner in which the soul has a body. In
reason it follows along the lines that the soul has a body, which it is superior too and controls and
uses for its own higher purposes. Thus, a souls purpose is to lead and control the body in which it
is contained.
In contrast, the Buddha no-self theory is simply perceived as, we have no self and no soul.
Shankara perceives that there are not many selves; there is simply one self/being that exists in all
people. Lastly Ramanuja follows along with logic and reason most accurately and in essence
provides a more attractive easily followed approach.
Works Cited
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Morales, Frank. "The Ontology of Self in Three Systems of Indian Philosophy: A Comparative
and Veridical Analysis." Veda Academy. N.p., 1999. Web. 15 Feb. 2016. <http://vedenakademie.de/index.php?article_id=152&clang=1>.
Coseru, Christian. "Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford University, 03 Dec. 2009. Web. 15 Feb. 2016.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-indian-buddhism/>.
Prothero, Stephen R. God Is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World--and Why
Their Differences Matter. New York: HarperOne, 2010. Print.
Ranganathan, Shyam. "Ramanuja." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Feb.
2016. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/ramanuja/>.