Download The value creation through Mergers and Acquisitions on bidder

The value creation through Mergers and Acquisitions on bidder
banks share prices in China
Master thesis, Department of finance
Ni Chen
ANR: 181488
MSC FINANCE
Supervisor: Mina Vlachaki
Second reader: Fabio Castiglionesi
Date of completion: November 28th, 2016
- 2015/2016
Abstract
This thesis investigates whether the mergers and acquisitions can have a significant and
positive effect on stock returns in Chinese bidder banks during the period from January
2006 and December 2014. The main purpose is to measure the change in shareholders’
value for bidders using several event windows, by performing cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAARs) around the announcement date.
According to the results of the event study, M&A announcements do not have a
statistically significant influence on CAARs over the 41-day event window. In the
second step, we examine the cross-border versus the domestic M&As. According to the
results, cross-border events have a positive significant return during the whole event
window, while M&As do not increase the shareholder’s value on the domestic side.
Moreover, this thesis takes into account diversification M&As activities and focus
M&As activities. According to the results, focus activities lead to a significant positive
impact on cumulative abnormal returns and add value to the shareholders. In order to
account for the special characteristics of the Chinese market, a big difference between
big State-owned banks and the other Joint-equity banks is found. Specifically, big SOC
banks can create a statistically significant impact on bidders. The evidence suggests
that an association between M&As announcement and stock performance of Chinese
bidder banks exists in some events, especially during the post-announcement period.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ - 1 2 Literature review and hypothesis development ..................................................... - 5 2.1 Selected literature and evidence ...................................................................... - 5 2.1.1 European market evidence ........................................................................ - 5 2.1.2 US market evidence .................................................................................. - 7 2.1.3 Emerging market evidence ........................................................................ - 8 2.2 Hypothesis development................................................................................ - 10 2.2.1 M&As activities and stock returns .......................................................... - 10 2.2.2 Geographic diversifying M&As and stock returns ................................. - 11 2.2.3 Activities diversifying M&As and stock returns..................................... - 12 2.2.4 SOC Banks M&As and stock returns ...................................................... - 13 3 Data and Methodology......................................................................................... - 15 3.1 Data selection and Sample design ................................................................. - 15 3.2 Research Methodology .................................................................................. - 16 4 Results .................................................................................................................. - 20 4.1 Analysis results of all bidders ........................................................................ - 20 4.2 Analysis results of geographical diversification ............................................ - 22 4.3 Analysis results of Activity focus and diversifying....................................... - 25 4.4 Analysis results of SOC banks and Joint-equity banks ................................. - 28 4.5 Conclusion on Empirical ............................................................................... - 31 Reference ................................................................................................................ - 34 Appendix ................................................................................................................. - 38 -
1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions are first overserved in the United States in the 18th century,
as an important strategy to improve the firm size and enhance market competition.
Recently, due to a number deregulation and technological innovations, emerging
countries experienced an increasing number of mergers and acquisitions. M&As occur
in waves, due to economic conditions at the firm level (Viswanathan, 2004) and the
industry level (Harford, 2005). After the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent
economic reforms, a high number of M&As transactions has been carried out in the
banking industry of Asian market. Especially in the Chinese banking sector, which has
the biggest number of M&As in the Asian market during this period (figure 1),
Figure1: Numbers of deals
Banking industry M&As in Asia market during 1996-2014
Vietnam
Thailand
Sri Lanka
South Korea
Singapore
Philippines
Papua N Guinea
Pakistan
Malaysia
Indonesia
India
China(incl HongKong & Taiwan)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Source: Thomson Reuters
Over the past twenty years, with the development of Chinese economic growth, the
financial institution sector has experienced several big reforms. For instance, China
joined the WTO (2001), after considering the potential benefits of such action, such as
the reduced cost, the decreased risk and the creation of synergies. More foreign
financial institutions are allowed to come into the Chinese market. By the end of 2012,
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China had one of the largest banking sectors in the world in terms of total assets. Due
to changes in the Chinese government policy, the corporate restructuring is more and
more popular. As an important corporate restructuring strategy, the volume of mergers
and acquisitions have a rapidly increase (figure 2),
Figure 2
Deal value in China
700000
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
Bank M&A value
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Aggregate deal value(mil USD)
The stock price changed and the stock market seems to have an immediately reflect on
the M&A transactions for the shareholder value creation (Gasper et al., 2005). The
value creation from merger and acquisition may differ over different regions, due to
differences in the financial systems across countries (Barth et al., 1997). A large number
of recent papers studies the effect of merger and acquisition in European and US
banking sectors. However, very limited theoretical or empirical work has been done on
how stock markets changed via deals announcement in the Chinese banking industries
(Haleblian et al., 2009). In general, both the financial figures and the stock performance
can reflect the influence of mergers and acquisitions activities. The main research
method evaluating the M&As events is value effect.
Traditional findings from early literature suggest that there have no statistically
significant for bidders’ wealth value during M&As activities, either in the European
market (Lepetit et al, 2004; Beitel et al, 2004; Karceski et al, 2005; Hernando, 2006
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and Hagendorff et al, 2007) or in the U.S. market (Dodd, 1980; Houston and Ryngaert,
1994; Anderson et al, 2004). Especially, M&As are reported to loss bidder values in
the U.S. market, such as Piloff and Santomero,1998; Cornett et al,2003; Anderson et
al,2004; Knapp et al,2005; Crouzille et al,2006. In particular, cross-border M&As
activities are often find to have a negative impact on bidder shareholders values in
developed markets (Gubbi et al, 2009; Amihud et al, 2002, Campa and Hernando,2004;
Aw and Chatterjee,2004; Conn et al, 2005. In contrast, Goddard et al. (2012) and Wu
et al. (2016) argue that cross-border M&As have a positive wealth effect in the
emerging counties. Diversifying M&As activities are reported to add shareholders
wealth (Cybo-Ottone and Mugria, 2000; Lepetit et al, 2004 and Ekkayokkaya et al,
2009). Otherwise, Delong (2001a, 2001b), Ismail and Davidson (2005) find higher
CAARs in bank-to-bank than diversifying activities.
This thesis studies the effects of M&As activities focus on Chinese banking industries
and the impact of M&As announcement on the share price. It contributes to the extant
literature in three ways. First, as far as we aware this study is the first time to research
M&As conducted by Chinese banks. Our data include all M&As transactions in the
banking sector of China A-shares stock exchange during the period of 2006 and 2014.
Second, the cross-border and focus M&As activities can add shareholders value during
announcement windows. Meanwhile, our outcome shows that the M&As
announcement has value creation during the post-announcement period in stock market,
which supports the idea that M&As announcement can create positive influence in the
Asian emerging banking system. Moreover, due to the fact that many bank M&As
transactions in emerging markets have been initiated by governments (Goddard et al,
2012), I use State-owned banks as a group and find that the bidder shareholders have a
wealth value if they belong to SOC banks.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 briefly dwells on the present previous
empirical study in the different market and the hypothesis development. Chapter 3
focuses on the sample selection and present the data. In chapter 3 the event
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methodology used to measure the stock performance is explained. Chapter 4 shows the
empirical results and the analysis. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes and concludes.
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2 Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1 Selected literature and evidence
The empirical evidence on mergers and acquisitions effect on financial institution has
been investigated for the European market and the US market. It is commonly known
that mergers and acquisitions is a major measure to strengthen and consolidate the
financial markets and improve banking value creation. However, whether M&As
improve a bank’s performance and how it affects the shareholders’ value is a debatable
question in the current literature. Yet, current research shows varying results on the
stock market reaction after the M&As announcements on different markets.
2.1.1 European market evidence
Regarding the European market, some event studies documented that M&As activities
have a positive impact on targets shareholders and no impact at all on bidders
shareholders. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) examine the stock market valuation of
the largest M&As in 14 European economies, using 54 large European banks during
the period 1989-1997. According to their findings, the stock abnormal returns for
bidders around the announcement date are significantly positive, when using the
general market index. However, neither the bidder nor the target have a positive and
significant market reaction around the announcement date, when the bank sector index
is used. Bietel and Schiereck (2001) study the merger activities of 98 European
acquiring banks in over 24 countries across the whole world. Their results are partially
consistent with those reported in Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) since they document
a significant positive return for the combined entity of 1.2% around the merger
announcement, however the bidder banks return is insignificant.
Lepetit et al. (2004) investigate the expected gains of M&As transactions in European
banks between 1991 and 2001. According to their finds, there are positive and
statistically significant abnormal returns for the target group in a 15- and 31-day event
window around the announcement date. Additionally, the deals with geographic
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specialization and activity diversification are significantly positive at the 5%-level.
However, the bidder group has insignificant abnormal returns in the same event
windows. In order to investigate the excess returns to shareholders of the targets, the
bidders and the combined entity of the bidder and the target. Beitel et al. (2004) use 98
large M&As of European bidder banks from 1985 to 2000. They find that the
shareholders of targets have a significant positive cumulative abnormal returns.
Regarding the combined entity of bidders and targets, they find significantly positive
CARs for the whole samples. Meanwhile, there is no significant CARs to bidder
shareholders in various event windows. Finally, targets can achieve more value in
cross-border deals whereas bidders can get value in geographically focused transactions.
Karceski et al. (2005) estimate the stock price reaction of banks around merger
announcements. Their results vary, when taking into account the different bank size
and strategic focus. Specifically, the target banks have positive abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal returns, while acquiring banks have insignificant CARs. Campa
and Hernando (2006) analyze the magnitude of value creation with merger deals
between 1998 and 2002. According to their results, targets experienced a positive
excess return around the announcement. However, for acquirers, the average excess
return are insignificant.
Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) analyze the value gains to the acquirer in the
European bank M&As wave of 1996-2004. The sample includes 75 publicly traded
banks from 19 European countries. Their found reveals that bidders’ CAARs value are
significantly positive for [-5, 5], [-10, 10] and [-20, 20] while they are statistically
insignificant for three-day event window. Additionally, bidders’ CAARs for crossborder and no diversifying M&As are statistically significant positive for [-10, 10] and
[-20, 20].
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2.1.2 US market evidence
Turning to the US banking industry, the impact of M&A transactions is not clear and it
varies across studies. Some early research shows the M&As have a negative impact on
bidders and that shareholders suffered wealth losses, which means there are
significantly negative abnormal returns (Piloff and Santomero, 1998). Dodd (1980)
investigates a sample of 151 takeovers in both cancelled and completed mergers
between 1970 and 1977. According to the results reported, there is a significant
negative abnormal returns of -7.22% and -5.5% at the [-1, 0] event window. Houston
and Ryngaert (1994) examine the stock market’s perception of bank mergers in the
period 1985-1991. They demonstrate that overall the weighted average of gains of the
bidders and targets are insignificant. They further reveal that for the five-day event
window the cumulative average abnormal return for bidders is -2.32%, and statistically
significant.
Cornett et al. (2003) conduct an event study on average abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of acquisitions for a sample of
423 banks sample during the period 1988-1995. When taking into account the whole
sample of their research, the results point out significantly negative results. Specifically,
the average cumulative abnormal return is -0.74% for a three-day window [-1, 1]. In
addition, they also report that both the interstate and activity diversifying acquisitions
experience significant negative CARs in this window. Their figures indicate that,
around the announcement date, diversify leads to significantly lower abnormal returns
compared to those from the focus activities. Anderson et al. (2004) use a sample of 97
bank mergers from 1990-1997. Following the standard event study, they estimate the
wealth effects for bidders in the seven-day window [-5, 1]. The result reveals
insignificant average cumulative abnormal returns around the initial announcement
date. Similar results are found in Knapp et al. (2005). Their findings reflect negative
returns to shareholders in large bank deals between 1987 and 1998, and moreover, there
is a decrease in post-merger profits, credit quality, and fee income.
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In a more recent strand of the literature, several papers find significant and positive
cumulative abnormal returns for bidders following M&As announcements in U.S.
market. Jarrell et al. (1991) use 663 successful tender offers covering the period 1962
to 1985, and according to their results, the stock return around the announcement dates
are small but with a significant growth over time. Olson and Pagano (2005) indicate
that acquiring banks shareholders can expect to have wealth gain in long-run. DeLong
and DeYoung (2007) reveal positive abnormal returns to bank merger announcements,
which disappear very quickly. More importantly, they document that there is a positive
relationship between both stock market reactions (short-term) and financial
performance (long-term) with the number of mergers that took place in the years prior
to the event announcement.
To compare the acquirer returns of bank announcement in the European and the US
market, Hagendorff et al. (2007) study a sample of 204 banks mergers between 1996
and 2004. According to their results, bidders have a significantly negative CAARs for
all samples during a three-day window, and the CAARs for the [-10, 1] and the [-2, 2]
windows are -0.18% and -0.32%, respectively. The main finding reveals that bidder
banks shareholders in Europe have not any statistically significant wealth losses
compared to US shareholders. In other words, bidders’ banks experienced higher stock
returns when targeting low protection economies (most European) than bidders
targeting institutions which operate under a high investor protection market (most US).
2.1.3 Emerging market evidence
However, there have been very limited empirical evidence on mergers and acquisitions
studies in Asian emerging market. Crouzille et al. (2006) investigate banks’ M&As in
eight Southeast Asian countries by using an event study to examine the relationship
between bank M&As and shareholder value for emerging markets during the 19972000(Asia financial crisis period), and their final results reported significantly negative
abnormal returns for both acquirers and targets during the crisis period. To assess the
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different stock reactions between M&As in the non-financial industries and banking
industries. Ma et al. (2012) study on completed bank mergers with announced between
1998 and 2005. They find that without controlling the firm size there have a
significantly positive CAARs both in non-financial and bank industries in short-term
event window. For example, the CAARs in the three-day window is 0.57% for the
banking sector and 1.43% for the non-financial sector. Meanwhile, the diversifying
bidders are not gain significantly increase in shareholders’ wealth. Also, large firms
have not obvious market reactions than small-medium firms. Du and Sim (2015)
investigate whether the effect of M&As on bank efficiency differs for both targets and
bidders in six emerging countries. By using DEA model, they documented that the
effect of M&As is insignificant if combined targets and bidders. They found that there
has a significantly positive effect of merger and acquisition on bank efficiency for
targets banks, but no efficiency improves for bidder banks.
Based on event study, Suresh et al. (2006) conduct a study to see whether there is wealth
impact on public announcements of Indian companies between 2004 and 2005. The
study conclude that the stock returns are negative surrounding the announcement,
though not significantly different from zero on the day. Also, the post-announcement
abnormal returns are lower than the pre-announcement period, which reflects erosion
in the firm value. Anand and Singh (2008) analyze the bank mergers announcement
impact of short-term shareholder wealth in Indian bank over the period 1999 to 2005.
The result reveal significantly increase in shareholders’ value for both bidder and
targets banks, also the CAAR of the pre-announcement period also significantly
positive. Wong et al. (2009) study the effect of M&As announcements on shareholders’
value of the Asian firms by using the Bloomberg Database and Reuters Business
Database during the period of 2000 and 2007. Their outcomes indicated that the
announcement is considered positive relations between for bidder shareholders but not
for targets. Moreover, they found that there has a positive abnormal returns during the
post-announcement period. Ma et al. (2012) discuss abnormal returns on bidder
shareholders around announcement for 10 emerging Asian markets during 2000-2007.
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They reported positive cumulative abnormal returns in 3 different event windows: [0,
1], [-1, 1], and [-2, 2] window. At the same time, the information leakages have a benefit
impact on shareholders’ value. Sehgal et al. (2012) analyze the abnormal returns used
completed M&A data in BRICKS countries from 2005 to 2009. Their results reflected
that there is a significantly positive in pre-announcement returns for sample countries.
Their results also reflected the leakage of information in the system which has an impact
on financial regulators.
2.2 Hypothesis development
Since 2001, and in order to comply with the world trade organization (WTO)
commitments, China implemented economic reforms, which improved significantly its
macroeconomic indicators and the financial sector. Although the number of mergers
and acquisitions have a steady increase due to the subsequent opening up of the Chinese
banking sector, there is no clear evidence about the relationship between M&As
announcement and stock returns in China.
2.2.1 M&As activities and stock returns
According to the literature discussed in the previous sub-section, when considering the
short term, M&As activities create zero or negative average abnormal returns for bidder
banks and positive abnormal returns for target banks on the announcement. As stated
by Piloff and Santomero (1997), there is no relationship between M&As deals
announcement and wealth creation. Houston et al. (2001) analyzed 64 large banks
acquisitions between 1985 and 1996, and they conclude that the average target achieves
a significant value creation, while gains for acquirers are negative. Similar results are
found in Crouzille et al. (2006), who advocate that a significant negative market
reaction to the M&A deals occurred during 1997-2000 in emerging markets. By
comparing and analyzing performance before and after the M&As announcement of
listing enterprises in China. Chi et.al. (2008) used 1,148 M&As deals in Chinese listed
firms and find positive abnormal returns for the acquiring firms.
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Due to pervious event studies, it is important to analyze bidders out of combined M&As
entities during event studies. Based on the hubris hypothesis, the net gains to a merger
is zero. As discussed previously, most empirical studies find that the acquiring bank’s
shareholders value is not significantly different than zero for the European and the US
banking industry. Firstly, I would like to test if this is the case for China, as well.
Hypothesis 1: M&A announcements are not expected to create an impact on stock
returns of bidders at conventional significance levels.
Hypothesis 1 is tested by examining if the bidders’ CAARs are not significantly
significant during the announcement windows. Hypothesis 1 will be rejected if the
stock returns experience significantly positive or negative CAARs.
2.2.2 Geographic diversifying M&As and stock returns
By the fifth mergers and acquisitions wave sweeping across the world, the cross-border
M&As are an effective way to boost international expansion. International M&As offer
the opportunity to the firms of an emerging economy to obtain resources that may not
be available in their domestic market, and thereby enhance their capabilities of
becoming competitive in the post-reform period (Gubbi et. al. 2009). On average, recent
studies documented a negative abnormal returns from geographical diversification in
developed markets. Amihud et al. (2002) find that cross-border M&As activities
achieve significantly negative CARs of acquiring banks. Campa and Hernando (2004),
Aw and Chatterjee (2004) & Conn et al. (2005) report that cross-border bidders gain
lower abnormal returns than domestic bidders. Lensink and Maslennikova (2008)
analyze value gains to acquirers based on a sample of 75 banks from 19 European
countries, they find that stock returns from diversifying cross-border deals are positive
and insignificant. However, Goddard et al. (2012) find that in emerging markets
geographical diversification creates shareholder value for acquirers. Wu et al. (2016)
document that Chinese firms’ overseas mergers and acquisitions achieve a significantly
positive wealth effect than domestic acquirers, therefore, cross-border deals can be
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more successful in the Chinese stock market. Wang and Peng (2016) evaluate the
financial accounting performance and their findings reveal that the financial
performance improves in the first year and declines in the long term. Overall, the crossborder M&As do not significantly improve the operating performance of Chinese firms.
The international diversification hypothesis state that cross-border M&As exploit the
international market, and they provide the most valid measure to acquire strategic assets
including marketing, human& natural resources and technologies. Meanwhile, firms
can reduce the operating cost and shareholders can gain substantial returns on the
announcement. Combing all, I assume that cross-border M&As will receive positive
stock abnormal returns and higher than domestic bidders during the event window.
Therefore,
Hypothesis 2a: Cross-border M&As activities are expected to create a positive impact
on stock returns of bidders at conventional significance levels.
Hypothesis 2b: Domestic M&As activities are expected to create a positive impact on
stock returns of bidders at conventional significance levels.
Hypothesis 2a and 2b are tested by analyzing whether the bidders CAARs are
significantly positive in different event windows. It will be rejected if the cumulative
abnormal returns are not significantly positive or CAARs are significantly negative.
2.2.3 Activities diversifying M&As and stock returns
Pervious researches on the European market and the US market always take geographic
and activity diversification as an important factor to measure the stock performance.
Besides conducting the cross-border M&As returns, it is necessary to analyze the
activities diversifying returns. There have two different opinions in this question.
Delong (2001a, 2001b) argues that there is a significantly negative relationship between
market reaction and activity diversification around the M&As announcements. The
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paper further argues that mergers with both activities enhance the stockholders value
by 3%, whereas diversifying mergers do not create value. In contrast, Cybo-Ottone and
Mugria (2000) advocate higher gains in product-diversifying mergers. Lepetit et al.
(2004) state that market reaction towards cross-product diversification is positive and
significant, especially when cross-product diversification and geographic specialization
are combined together. Ismail and Davidson (2005) find higher abnormal returns in
bank-to-bank deals compared to cross-activity deals. When they take into account
evidence of abnormal returns in the diversifying and cross-border deals, they report that
diversifying M&As do not increase values for any of the event windows. Considering
the existing academic literatures, I hypothesize activities diversification as follows:
Hypothesis 3a: Activities focus M&As transactions are expected to create value on
stock returns at conventional significance levels.
Hypothesis 3b: Activities diversifying M&As transactions are expected to create value
on stock returns at conventional significance levels.
Hypothesis 3a and 3b are examined by conducting whether the bidders CAARs are
significantly positive. It will be rejected if the CAARs are not significantly or if they
are negative. If those hypotheses are rejected, while the null hypothesis will valid that
activities diversifying are not expected to create values to stock returns, also the crossborder and focus deals are not gain values for bidders.
2.2.4 SOC Banks M&As and stock returns
Commercial banks in China are classified into five types of banks: large State-owned
commercial banks, joint-equity commercial banks, urban commercial banks, rural
commercial banks and rural banks. Based on table 1, we can observe that big five Stateowned commercial (SOC) banks and Joint-equity banks are the two major components
of banks M&As.
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Table 1
BANK
Percentage
(%)
SOC
commercial
68%
Joint-equity
commercial
28%
Urban
commercial
4%
Rural
commercial
--
Rural
--
Compared to other financial markets, the Chinese market is different. Specifically, it
has higher macro efficiency than micro efficiency. As a result, the government has more
than 50% of the voting rights in 31.4% of the listed firms (Yuan, 1999). It is worth
noticing that most of the Chinese firms which participate in M&As are listed firms,
especially in the banking industry. Su et al. (2008) state that the principal–principal
problems increase due to the fact that the government may be opposite to value
maximization for individual shareholders. Because of political motivations, the authors
analyze the relationship between government ownership and stock returns and their
findings document a negative impact on bidders CAARs in a 2-day window during
cross-border M&As. Taking this into account, this thesis also analyzes the SOC bidder
banks stock returns during M&As, I suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Large SOC banks M&As activities are expected to create a negative
impact on stock returns of bidders at conventional significance levels.
Hypothesis 4 is examined by conducting whether the bidders CAARs in event windows
are significantly negative. It will be rejected if the CAARs are not significant or CAARs
are positive. If I fail to reject the null hypothesis, then the conclusion will be that SOC
banks M&As activities create values to stock returns.
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data selection and Sample design
The date on the characteristics of deals was collected by the bank’s annual report or
announcement during the period between 2006 and 2014. All the necessary stock
databases are obtained from the China stock market and accounting research database
(CSMAR), which include close price, adjusted the close price and market index. In this
study, bidders are limited to be China listed bank and sample data include cross-border,
domestic, activities diversifying and focus M&As in China. Meanwhile, only samples
in accordance with several criteria can be chosen: first, cross-border M&As transaction
should more than RMB 10 million Yuan. Second, the acquiring bank holds less than
50% of the target firm shares before the announcement. Third, M&As agreement should
be solely by the parent bank and make public announcements. Forth, excluding the
small target relative to the acquirer (< 1% of MV). Furthermore, samples which have
two or more deals and the announcement will be delated to avoid the heterogeneity on
CAARs. There are two different shares in China, one is called A-shares which shares
of RMB currency and traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange, while the
other is H-shares which traded on the Hong Kong stock exchange. In this article, we
only use A-shares and take Shanghai stock exchange composite index (SHCOMP: IND)
as the market benchmark, due to not all the Chinese domestic investors float their shares
simultaneously on both of these two stock exchanges markets. Since the market cannot
realize which deals will be completed at the time of the initial merger announcement,
we analyze both the completed and uncompleted merger agreements. Finally, there are
38 transactions and 11 banks engaged in this study, and the basic information is shown
in Table 2:
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Table 2
BANK
CODE
Domestic
M&As
Cross-border
M&As
Activities
focus M&As
Activities
Diversifying
M&As
SOC/
Joint-equity
600000
600016
600036
601398
601939
601988
4
1
1
-
1
2
1
12
4
3
2
1
9
1
1
1
4
4
3
2
Joint-equity
Joint-equity
Joint-equity
SOC
SOC
SOC
2
25
1
16
2
2
1
1
2
22
Joint-equity
Joint-equity
Urban-com
SOC
SOC
11
2
2
601288 1
601328 2
TOTAL 13
601998
601166
601169
3.2 Research Methodology
In terms of methodology, two major methods are used in the literature. Papers who
follow the first method compare pre- and post-M&As accounting figures, such as ROA,
ROE, and cost of capital etc. On the other hand, a parallel strand of articles uses the
event study to find if the stock prices change in a special market around the
announcement date (Yener and David, 2004).
Considering the difference between accounting performance and event studies, if stock
markets are efficient, then information about the potential synergies are fully
impounded into prices at the announcement date and M&As are clustered due to stock
market valuations (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Our target is to understand whether
M&As have any effect on shareholders’ value of Chinese bidder banks. Inspired by
Ahmad and Ian (2005), in this article, I will adopt the event study as the methodology
to measure whether mergers and acquisitions can create values on improving
shareholders’ value during the event window. In order to evaluate the stock reaction to
the mergers and acquisitions, the objective of this study is to find whether there have a
positive CAARs to shareholders of bidders around the announcement. Due to capture,
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the leakage of information and the reaction of the market may affect the abnormal return,
I will take a longer window in this study. The parameters for the market model are
estimated over the period -230 to -30 days before the announcement. Daily abnormal
returns for each bank are calculated over a 41 day event window, and regarding the
event windows, we will focus on 15 main windows: [-20,0], [-10,0], [-5,0], [-2,0], [1,0], [-20,20], [-10,10], [-5,5], [-2,2], [-1,1], [0,1], [0,2], [0,5], [0,10], [0,20]. The choice
of those windows is based on the method of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and the
standard market model is based on CAPM. Following Brown & Warner (1985), an OLS
regression is performed, in order to estimate the relationship between market index and
stock prices for each M&As activity, using the following equation:
Ri, t = αi + βiRm,t + εit
Where: Ri,t =the return of stock i at time t, Rm,t =return of market, at time t, α and β are
ordinary least squares (OLS) parameters estimated through the market model
regression coefficient and εit is a statistically error.
All stock returns used in this paper are daily log-returns, which are calculated in the
following way:
Ri, t = In (Pi, t+1/Pi, t)
In order to assess the stock price reaction to announcements of M&A, the abnormal
returns are calculated as the difference between the actual returns and the expected
returns:
ARi,t = Ri,t – E(Ri,t)
Where: ARi, t is the abnormal return of stock i at time t (in days). Ri,t is the realized
return of stock i at time t (in days), E(Ri,t) is the expected return of stock i at time t (in
days).
- 17 -
Further, the daily abnormal returns are averaged during the event windows.
AARi,t = (
𝑛
1
) ∑𝑖=1( ARi,t)
𝑁
Where: N is the number of banks in the sample and ∑ARi is the sum of each event
abnormal return in period t.
In order to make the individual sample reflect the general situation, the cumulative
average abnormal returns are calculated by summing the average abnormal returns:
𝑡2
CARi, [t1, t2 ]= ∑𝑡=𝑡1( AARi,t)
CAAR = (
1
𝑁
)∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝐴𝑅 i
In the end, the final step is to conduct a t-test to examine whether cumulative abnormal
returns are statistically significant from zero. The t-test for CAR (cumulative abnormal
return) was tested using the Dodd and Warner (1983) method.
𝑡=∑
𝑛
CAR/n
𝑖= σCAR
Where: CAR is cumulative abnormal return for period [t1, t2]
σCAR is the standard deviation of CAR based on the estimation window
Comparing the t-test results using the critical values at different significant levels, we
can conclude about the hypothesis in the following way:
H0:
µ(𝐶𝐴𝑅)
=0
𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝑅)
VS
µ(𝐶𝐴𝑅)
H1: 𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝑅)≠0
The significant level for 90%, 95% and 99% are P <0.1, P <0.05 and P<0.01
- 18 -
respectively. If the P-value falls inside the specific interval, it means significantly
different from zero and the null hypothesis is rejected. In this article, all the conclusion
will based on significant at the 90% level and P < 0.10.
- 19 -
4 Results
4.1 Analysis results of all bidders
Table 3 demonstrates the outcomes of cumulative abnormal returns with various event
windows for the whole Chinese bidder banks in the sample. These results are similar to
the ones presented in the literature for the US market. In 14 event windows, the CAAR
figures are not significantly different from zero. Based on the 14 event windows of
different length, we can conclude that the influence of the M&As on the stock return is
not significant at any conventional level. For example, the CAAR is -0.46% for the
three-day event window [-1, 1], 0.76% for the 11-day window and 1.83% for the 42day, but they are all insignificant. As an economic interpretation, these results reflect
the fact that shareholders of bidders do not have significant gain or loss compared to
the market return. This is partially similar to Bietel et al. (2004), who find no significant
CAARs to the bidder shareholders in any of the announcement windows.
This no value add to shareholders of bidder banks is further consistent with several
papers which investigate the European market, such as Bietel and Schiereck (2001),
Karceski et al. (2005), Campa and Hernando (2006) and Dimitris and Shuai (2015).
Also, these no significant figures support the Hubris Hypothesis. Only in the longer
pre-announcement window, the CAAR figure is statistically significant and positive at
the 90%-level which imply that the stock return of bidders higher than the market index
return. Thus, in my opinion, this significant positive window may reflect the
information leakages. But the significant level is lower.
- 20 -
Table 3: Cumulative average abnormal returns –all bidders
EVENT WINDOW
CAAR
t-statistics
[-20, 0]
2.40%*
1.75
[-10, 0]
0.80%
1.25
[-5, 0]
-0.27%
0.34
[-2, 0]
-0.63%
-1.20
[-1, 0]
-0.20%
-0.47
[-1, 1]
-0.46%
-0.86
[-2, 2]
-0.43%
-0.77
[-5, 5]
0.76%
0.61
[-10, 10]
1.33%
1.23
[-20, 20]
1.83%
1.11
[0, 1]
-0.42%
-0.76
[0, 2]
0.04%
0.06
[0, 5]
0.87%
1.12
[0, 10]
0.36%
0.46
[0, 20]
-0.74%
-0.63
t-statistics are obtained by using robust standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 3 present the shape of bidder CAAR changes during the whole announcement
period. The cumulative average abnormal returns are plotted between 20 days before
announcement and 20 days after the event date. We can find that there is a slightly
decline performance of CAAR in the pre-announcement period. Meanwhile, we can
find the lowest level of the CAAR is occurred in the day before the announcement date.
However, the return reflects an obvious volatility around the announcement date in the
five-day period. To conclude, we can accept the hypothesis 1, according to which there
is no value add to shareholders during the whole event period.
- 21 -
Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns on all bidders (%)
Bidders CAARs over time
3
2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
0
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-0,5
-1
4.2 Analysis results of geographical diversification
Table 4 presents the results of bidder shareholder cumulative abnormal returns in
domestic and cross-border M&As activities.
In the cross-border deals side, Panel A shows the number of days in the event window
for which cross-border bidders have statistically significant CAARs. The trend of
CAARs shows the rising returns during the event period. For the pre-announcement
period, it peaks 20 days before the announcement date at almost 3.40%. Meanwhile,
there is a continued trend in CAARs after the announcement. However, the t-statistic
indicates that there are no significantly positive abnormal returns in the traditional
three-day window similar results are obtained for the three-day window and the fiveday window, as well.
Panel B shows that domestic M&A deals do not create a significant impact on
shareholders’ value. More importantly, we find in 20 days after the announcement the
CCAR is -4.83%, this result is consistent with European domestic studies, such as
- 22 -
Campa and Hernando (2006) report the abnormal returns are significantly negative,
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) state no statistically significant values to bidders.
Above all, the announcement of international activities has gain significant wealth for
bidder shareholders that started from 20 days before the announcement and sustained
20 days after the announcement. The maximum wealth for shareholders is obtained
during 41-day event window. In all sub-period windows, cross-border deals perform
better than national deals.
Table 4: Results of geographic diversifying
Panel A: cross-border M&A
EVENT WINDOW
CAAR
t-statistics
[-20, 0]
3.40%*
2.02
[-10, 0]
1.86%
1.62
[-5, 0]
1.11%
0.94
[-2, 0]
0.59%
0.77
[-1, 0]
0.63%
1.40
[-1, 1]
1.04%
1.63
[-2, 2]
1.26%
1.54
[-5, 5]
2.64%*
1.86
[-10, 10]
4.21%**
2.56
[-20, 20]
5.78%**
2.79
[0, 1]
0.90%
1.25
[0, 2]
1.15%
1.41
[0, 5]
2.01%**
2.44
[0, 10]
2.83%**
2.78
[0, 20]
2.80%*
2.07
t-statistics are obtained by using robust standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
- 23 -
Panel B: Domestic M&A
EVENT WINDOW
CAAR
t-statistics
[-20, 0]
1.25%
0.46
[-10, 0]
0.76%
0.51
[-5, 0]
-1.52%
-1.22
[-2, 0]
-1.37%
-1.27
[-1, 0]
-0.86%
-0.81
[-1, 1]
-1.45%
-1.04
[-2, 2]
-1.60%
-1.10
[-5, 5]
-1.65%
-0.72
[-10, 10]
-0.43%
-0.20
[-20, 20]
-2.91%
-0.92
[0,1]
-1.25%
-1.33
[0,2]
-0.89%
-0.82
[0,5]
-0.67%
-0.43
[0,10]
-1.85%
-1.11
[0,20]
-4.84%*
-2.69
t-statistics are obtained by using robust standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 4 depicts the shape of CAARs in the entire 41 days event window for both crossborder and domestic bidders. It is obvious that the CAARs have a big difference
between cross-border and domestic bidders in the post-announcement period. For the
cross-border bidders, the blue curve drops before announcement. The CAAR is less
than 1% just one day before the announcement, but still positive. After the
announcement, it reverts to increase. In contrast, the graph of domestic side (green line)
reflects a negative trend during event windows. There is a small gain before the
announcement and followed by a fall. Above all, we can infer that geographic
diversifying activities generated substantial positive returns for shareholders, which
support hypothesis 2a and consistency to Goddard et al. (2012) & Wu et al. (2016)
reported.
- 24 -
Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns on geographic diversifying (%)
Cross-border vs Domestic bidders
4
3
2
1
0
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
-1 0
5
10
15
20
25
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
Domestic CAAR
Cross-border CAAR
4.3 Analysis results of Activity focus and diversifying
The results in Table 5 report the outcomes for activities focus and diversifying M&A
by various event windows for bidders. The CAAR for the 3-day and 5-day event
window [-1, 1] and [-2, 2] are positive but not significantly different from zero.
However, these results are statistically significant at a 5% significant level for 11-, 21and 41-day event windows. Specifically, in the windows [-5, 5], [-10, 10] and [-20, 20],
the CAARs are 3.77%, 6.48% and 9.24%, respectively. The positive figures indicate
that bidder stock returns have a better performance than the market. M&A have a
positive effect on the stock value if they take focus activities. This results is consistent
with Cornett et al. (2003), who report that the product-focus has a significantly positive
impact on the value creation of US-bank mergers and acquisitions, thus hypothesis 3a
is accepted.
Turning to Table 6, the results show that diversifying M&A activities are not having a
statistically positive impact on abnormal returns, which is partially similar with DeLong
(2001) , according to which stock returns are not affected by the geographical or
- 25 -
product diversification deals, meanwhile the focused mergers significantly enhance
values for combined entity(bidders and targets). However, Beitel and Schiereck (2001)
document that geographically focused deals create more value for bidder shareholders
than cross-border deals, product diversifying deals have a wealth created, and our
results do not support this opinion. Due to the negative and insignificant CAARs in the
activity diversifying results, we cannot accept the hypothesis 3b.
Table 5: Results of activities focus bidders
EVENT WINDOW
CAAR
[-20, 0]
[-10, 0]
[-5, 0]
[-2, 0]
[-1, 0]
[-1, 1]
[-2, 2]
[-5, 5]
[-10, 10]
[-20, 20]
[0,1]
[0,2]
[0,5]
[0,10]
[0,20]
6.40%**
3.48%*
2.56%
1.41%
0.88%
1.60%
2.26%
3.77%**
6.48%**
9.24%**
1.06%
1.21%
1.56%
3.35%**
3.19%
t-statistics
2.98
1.85
1.70
1.26
1.22
1.47
1.64
2.50
2.75
2.91
1.04
1.26
1.43
2.28
1.78
t-statistics are obtained by using robust standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
- 26 -
Table 6: Results of activity diversifying bidders
EVENT WINDOW
CAAR
[-20, 0]
[-10, 0]
[-5,0]
[-2,0]
[-1,0]
[-1, 1]
[-2, 2]
[-5, 5]
[-10, 10]
[-20, 20]
[0,1]
[0,2]
[0,5]
[0,10]
[0,20]
0.45%
0.29%
-1.10%
-0.90%
-0.28%
-0.55%
-0.80%
-0.21%
0.47%
-0.73%
-0.28%
0.09%
0.89%
0.17%
-1.19%
t-statistics
0.27
0.40
-1.05
-1.24
-0.48
-0.75
-1.04
-0.12
0.35
-0.40
-0.38
0.10
0.81
0.15
-0.70
t-statistics are obtained by using robust standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The CAARs of the activity focus and diversifying are present in figure 5. As the 41day event window, the figure plotted the average abnormal returns before twenty days
before the announcement and 20 days after it. On average, the abnormal returns of
bank-to-bank M&As (green line) decreases fall to -1% before the announcement.
However, its recovery one day before the announcement and have an increasing trend
during the post-announcement period. There is a different trend happened in activities
diversifying bidders, the blue line reflects the stock abnormal returns decline 10 days
before the announcement and recovery 5 days before the announcement to 1% before
another decrease in 5 days after the announcement date. Also, the decline stock returns
are not significant. Thus we can conclude that, unlike the activity diversification
hypothesis, our results do not support the positive relationship between activities
diversifying and shareholders value created.
- 27 -
Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns on activity diversifying (%)
Focus on banks vs Diversification bidders
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
-1
0
5
10
15
20
25
-2
Focus on banks bidders
Diversification bidders
4.4 Analysis results of SOC banks and Joint-equity banks
Table 7 shows the results for SOC banks M&As activities. There is a significant
positive reaction, which is in support of the findings in Goddard et al. (2012), according
to which Government-instigated M&As transactions appear to create more value for
acquirer shareholders than privately instigated transactions. The average abnormal
return of the State-owned commercial banks is positive for 11 event windows, only 4
windows are negative but insignificant. The maximum CAARs, 5.26%, appears in the
[-20, 20] window, i.e., the longest event window. While it is not supported Crouzille,
Lepetit, and Bautista (2008) state that market reacted negatively to the M&As in
government led banks. For the Joint-equity commercial banks, we can see no
statistically significant in any event window. We can conclude that there is a value
creation for shareholders in State-owned commercial banks, which is not supported by
hypothesis 4.
- 28 -
Table 7: Results of State-owned commercial banks bidders
EVENT WINDOW
CAAR
t-statistics
[-20, 0]
2.94%*
2.02
[-10, 0]
1.20%*
1.96
[-5, 0]
-0.01%
-0.02
[-2, 0]
-0.18%
-0.31
[-1, 0]
-0.20%
-0.46
[-1, 1]
-0.03%
-0.05
[-2, 2]
0.70%
0.83
[-5, 5]
1.72%*
1.72
[-10, 10]
3.78%**
2.67
[-20, 20]
5.26%**
2.36
[0, 1]
0.01%
0.21
[0,2]
0.85%
0.95
[0,5]
1.70%*
1.99
[0,10]
2.54%**
2.48
[0,20]
2.28%*
1.78
t-statistics are obtained by using robust standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Results of the Joint-equity banks bidders
EVENT WINDOW
CAAR
t-statistics
[-20, 0]
2.36%
0.74
[-10, 0]
2.12%
0.89
[-5,0]
0.90%
0.36
[-2,0]
0.31%
0.20
[-1,0]
0.87%
0.85
[-1, 1]
0.85%
0.56
[-2, 2]
-0.24%
-0.16
[-5, 5]
0.55%
0.17
[-10, 10]
0.90%
0.32
[-20, 20]
-0.95%
-0.30
[0, 1]
0.42%
0.33
[0, 2]
-0.10%
-0.10
[0, 5]
0.10%
0.06
[0, 10]
-0.78%
0.42
[0, 20]
-2.87%
-1.09
t-statistics are obtained by using robust standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
- 29 -
The graphs in figure 6 plot the CAARs of the State-owned commercial banks and Jointequity banks. On average, the abnormal return decreases before the announcement date.
After announcement date, they meet each other at 0.42 (t=1). However, after this point,
this two line experienced by opposite trend. The State-owned banks (green line) enjoy
an increase CAARs during the post-announcement period. Otherwise, the blue line
shows stock returns decline before the announcement to approximately 0.3% and there
is a slight recovery two days before announcement date, and continued to decline in the
subsequent days.
Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns on SOC and Joint-equity banks (%)
SOCB vs Joint-euqity bidders
4
3
2
1
0
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
-1
0
5
10
-2
-3
-4
SOCB
Join-equity
- 30 -
15
20
25
4.5 Conclusion on Empirical
Chapter 4 analyze the results of M&As announcement on bidder shareholders abnormal
returns in various event windows and different M&As over the banking industry. In
general, for all bidder banks, the outcomes reflect that the merger and acquisitions have
no significant impact on shareholders’ value during the whole announcement period.
However, if we take pre-announcement as an example, we can find that all the CAARs
in a relatively longer event window are positive and most of them are statistically
significant which means shareholder can achieve values before announcement date
(t=0). For all bidders as an example, the CAAR is positive (2.70%) in the 20-day event
window and significant at the 10%-level. I think this phenomenon may explain by
leakages in information, such as media announcement before the public announcement
by the firm. Also, it is very common in emerging market (Sehgal et al. 2012). This will
influence short-term investors to make their investment decisions, due to investors may
overestimate banks future efficiency and it will create synergies after M&As activities.
Therefore, they enjoyed holding more stocks when they heard something before
announcement date. However, by more information publish in stock markets such as
the rules and conditions of merger proposals and financial status of firms engaged in
M&A activities, some stock investors change their minds. As the figures show, the
CAARs have a decrease trend before event date (t=0).
Like other academic papers reported in emerging market, cross-border M&As have a
value effect on bidder firms and activities focus also have a significant increase of
bidder stock returns. At the same time, all the activities focus deals are the cross-border
M&A, thus we can indicate that bidder shareholders experienced value-enhancing by
the focus activities. Within China, due to the different characteristic of banks, the figure
shows that the investors can have wealth if they are the State-owned bank’s
shareholders during M&As announcement. In other words, it reflects that the market
does not reject the M&As executed by State-owned commercial banks, it may reveal
that there has a relationship between political connections and bidders share price.
- 31 -
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, focusing on value creation hypothesis to explain stock market reactions
to bidder banks when M&As announced. Compared with the empirical studies of
developed market, this study does not correspond with most US studies, which reveals
that the effect of M&A announcement on bidder shareholders values is significantly
positive or have a negative effect. Not like some European studies that the shareholders
have a statistically significant increase in the three-day window ([-1, 1]). The result
reveals that there has no significant relationship between M&As announcement and
bidder bank stock performance. The dataset covers all the mergers and acquisitions in
China banking sectors and divided bidders into six groups. However, by analyzing
bidder shareholders stock return via different types of M&As, I find that market can
have different reactions. Like other M&As activities in emerging market, the
announcement is “good news” in the cross-border and activity focus M&As, the CAAR
is 9.24% in 41-day event window provide evidence to support Amihud et al. (2001)
documented M&As does not add risk exposure and shareholders values are not reduced.
It is obvious that bidders with cross-border and activity focus create more values for
shareholders, also, there have an unexpected finding which is the abnormal return
experienced a significant increase during the post-announcement period. This is
consistent with Wong et al. (2009) find that the M&As announcement create a positive
effect in Chinese firms during the post-announcement period. There are two reasons
can explain this phenomenon, Chinese firms are facing with large numbers of loans and
asset impairment after the Asia financial crisis and IT bubbles, M&As is a good way to
bring synergies for bidders. Meanwhile, it reflects that the Chinese market is not an
efficiency market or the date is not precious. Like Seddighi &Wang (2004) document
that the Chinese stock price did not follow a random-walk process and stock market
cannot make an immediate reaction. Due to more information are come out after
announcement date, and the stock market can make a reaction.
- 32 -
Our study reveals some limitations as well. Firstly, compared to developed markets,
there have no authoritative databases about M&As transactions in emerging markets.
Also, the number of samples is not sufficient and only small M&As transactions
numbers can be used to research. Secondly, the Chinese market has some boundary
conditions. Although there have some reforms in recently, in fact, compared to the US
and the European market, the Chinese market is not an efficiency market. Furthermore,
there have different rumor date in the market during the public announcement date,
these may cause some information leakages or lags.
The future study we can enlarge our sample and analyze the M&As activities impact
on shareholders’ value in the whole emerging country. Next, we can employ different
measures to discuss the relationship between shareholders returns with other
explanatory variables, such as government policy, means of payment, and acquirers
with some financial figures. In terms of this article, for all the bidders M&As activities
there have not significant results. However, some evidence shows that the cross-border
and activities focus mergers and acquisitions can have a value creation in Chinese
bidder banks especially in the post-announcement period.
- 33 -
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Percentage of M&A
Total numbers of M&As
Geograghic
diversification
20%
39%
61%
80%
before 2006
domestic
after 2006
cross-border
SOC Banks
Activities diversification
SOC Banks
9%
42%
46%
58%
45%
activities
divesifying
Jonit-equity
Banks
Urbancommercial
bank
activities focus
Appendix 2: Window of M&A announcement
Estimation window
-230
-30
Event window
-20
0
20
Announcement date
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Appendix 3:
Volume of deals in Banking industry
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
2006
2007
2008
global deals
2009
2010
Asia & Oceania
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2011
US
2012
2013
European
2014
Appendix 4: Main M&A activities information
Event date
Name of Bank
20061215
Bank of China
20080918
Bank of China
20060824
China Construction Bank
20090302
China Construction Bank
20090810
China Construction Bank
20091229
China Construction Bank
20101227
China Construction Bank
20131101
China Construction Bank
20140829
China Construction Bank
20070829
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20070928
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20071024
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20071227
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20090604
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20090929
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20100810
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20101028
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20110121
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20110804
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20110827
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20121210
Industry Commercial Bank of China
20140129
Industry Commercial Bank of China
Name of Target
Singapore Aircraft Leasing
La compagnie financiere edmond de rothschild
Bank OF America(Asia)Ltd
Hefei xingtai investment Co.
AIG Finance limited (100%)
Pacific-Antai Life Insurance Company Ltd (50%)
Pacific-Antna Life Insurance Company Ltd
Banco Industrial e Commercial S.A.(BIC)
BIC bank 72%
SENG HENG BANK
Halim Bank
Standard bank
IEC investment company
The Bank of East Asia
ACL bank
ICBC(Asia)
AXA-Minmetals Assurance Co.,Ltd
The Bank of East Asia
Standard bank Argentina S.A.
ICBC CANADA 10%
International lease Finance Corporation
standard bank PLC
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20140429
20110211
20070608
20100128
20061231
20080303
20080602
20080818
20120928
20071109
20091120
20110201
20090508
20141223
20140305
20140318
20080403
20090911
Industry Commercial Bank of China
Agriculture bank of China
Bank of Communications
Bank of Communications
China Merchants Bank
China Merchants Bank
China Merchants Bank
China Merchants Bank
China Merchants Bank
China Minsheng Bank
Industrial Bank Co.,Ltd
Industrial Bank Co.,Ltd
China CITIC Bank
China CITIC Bank Corp Ltd
Shanghai Pudong Development bank
Shanghai Pudong Development bank
Bank of Beijing
Bank of Beijing
Tekstilbank
Jiahe life Insurance Co.,Ltd
Hubei International Trust & Investment Co.,Ltd
China CMG Life insurance Company Ltd.
China Merchants Fund Management Co.,Ltd
CIGNA&CMC Life Insurance Company Limited
Wing lung bank
Tibet trust company limited
China Merchants Fund Management Co., Ltd
United commercial bank
Haerbin xingtong city credit cooperatives
UnionTrust& Investment Limited
CITIC international Financial Holdings Limited
CITIC international Financial Holdings Limited
South Asia Investment Management Limited
Shanghai Intl Trust Co Ltd
langfang commercial bank
ING Capital Life Insurance Company Ltd.
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