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ERICE_ PMP Terrorism_ 2010
Global One Science Contributions
to Mitigation of Terrorism
Friedrich STEINHÄUSLER1, Annette SOBEL2, Diego BURIOT3
1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to underscore the interrelatedness and similarity of
transnational activities in this domain and provide a basis for scientific collaboration. We
recognize that threat assessment and countermeasure development / employment require a
comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach to be optimal.
2. EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS
In view of the growing threats to international terrorism the scientific community in European
countries has reacted to the issue of terrorism and mitigation both, at the individual national
level and the multinational level of the European Union (EU).
2.1.
National Scientific Research Programmes
The initial reaction in Europe after the terror attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 was
dominated by taking stock of available scientific capabilities at the national level:


National scientific associations and Think Tanks assessed to what extent they could
contribute to threat- and risk assessment, as well as providing scientific support to
Government organisations in mitigating the consequences of terror attacks (e.g., in
radiation protection or engineering);
National Governmental institutions assembled expert groups, tasking them with
assessing the security situation in the country (e.g., working groups supporting
National Security Councils and the national Armed Forces).
Subsequently individual countries initiated their own national security research programmes.
The first such programme in Europe was started by Austria in 2005, named KIRAS.4
1
University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri USA
3 Independant Consultant, formerly Special Advisor World Health Organization
2
1
A special aspect of KIRAS is the integration of the humanities, social sciences and cultural
studies (HSC) that scrutinize the possible effects on society and the basic rights of the
citizens already in the planning phase of every project. Since KIRAS is obliged to security
policy, not only the needs of the security-politically relevant institutions are specified, but the
public consumers are involved into every R&D project. Thus not only the security-political
specifications are taken into account, but it is also ensured that research is done according to
the market's needs.
2.2 Coordinated European Approach
The national activities in several European countries lacked any significant coordination
between the scientific actors or agencies involved. This was inter alia the main reason for the
EU Commission to start security related research with a Think Tank-approach equivalent in
2003, i.e., the establishment of a Group of Personalities (GoP) comprised of EU officials and
Europe's largest weapons- and IT companies.5 The GoP, a 25-member advisory body,
published a report on Research for a Secure Europe in 2004. The group had evaluated the
scientific and technological infrastructure available in the EU at the time in comparison to the
needs based on estimated security threats. Major research deficits in security were revealed
in general, and in responding to a terror attack in a coordinated manner in particular. This
provided the basis for issuing comprehensive recommendations on how to fill the multiple
gaps in EU scientific capabilities dealing with terrorism and mitigating its effects.
The report also emphasized the potential synergies between defence technologies and those
required for non-military security purposes. A comparison of the European security research
spending with that of the US Department of Homeland Security, shows that an EU-funded
European security research programme (ESRP) should be started already in 2007; minimum
funding should be € 1 billion per year, additional to existing funding). Also, the GoP
recommended that a European security-industrial complex should be developed to compete
with that emerging in the USA.
From the GoP-membership the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) was
formed. ESRAB advised the Commission on the strategic goals and priorities for security
research, the exchange of classified information and intellectual property rights, and the use
of these publicly owned research/evaluation infrastructures. EU industry has a strong
representation on ESRAB. 6
Subsequently a key report was prepared by the European Security Research and Innovation
Forum for the Commission on the European Security Research and Innovation Agenda
(ESRIF). 7 ESRIF analyzed the medium and long-term challenges that Europe faces. After
two years of study it identified a large number of topic areas which needed to be addressed
in EU security, terror threats and mitigation of such acts, focusing on ethical, societal and
economic issues:



Relationship between security and private life and data protection
Need to reinforce the "ethical scrutiny" of projects reviewed under the FP7 Security
and make the results of on-going R&D projects in the area of security as widely
Identify the possibility to bring the most innovative security sectors into the Lead
Market Initiative;
4
Its name originates from ancient Greek and reflects a combination of the words "kirkos" (circle) and "asphaleia"
(security). The circle is representing the holistic concept behind as in KIRAS all disciplines and dimensions are to
be included.
5 BAe Systems, Diehl, EADS, Ericsson Finmeccanica, Indra, Siemens and Thales
6 14 of the 50 seats; seven of the eight major European defence corporations on the GoP are represented on
ESRAB. The EU Commission is only represented by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Europol.
7 ESRIF Group of Experts and its 64 members from 31 countries were assisted by more than 600 experts
2
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
How to speed up pre-commercial procurement in the security domain, certification,
validation, and, as appropriate, standardisation work ("European
Security Label")
How it can best respond to foreseeable new security missions and priorities,
and establish a forum to strengthen the competitiveness of the security industry active
in the field of research and innovation, such as a High Level Group with the
involvement of all public, private sector and civil society stakeholders.
ESRIF conveyed altogether nine key messages to the Commission and the Member States,
which should provide the basis for the future European Security Research and Innovation
Agenda (ESRIA): (1) Societal Security: Human beings are at the core of security processes;
(2) Societal Resilience: Certain risks cannot be catered for, nor avoided. Societies must
prepare to face shocks and must have the ability to recover; (3) Trust: Assuring security
implies nurturing trust among people, institutions and technologies; (4) Awareness raising
through education and training: Security is a common responsibility of all stakeholders, the
citizen is at the forefront; (5) Innovation: Europe can only rely on its own scientific,
technological and industrial competences; (6) Industrial policy: A competitive European
security industry is a prerequisite for future security. The EU must address the fragmentation
of its security markets; (7) Interoperability: A seamless approach to security is essential for
Europe; Interoperability is essential to allow security forces to work together; (8) A systematic
approach to capability development: The increasing complexity of security, demands
increasing sophistication of our response; (9) Security by design: Security features must
become integral part of any given system: Europe’s society needs a systemic approach to
security.
The European Commission in its Communication of February 2004 ("Enhancement of the
European industrial Potential in the Field of Security Research 2004-2006") announced that
a 65 million EURO budget line for "Preparatory Action for Security Research" (PASR,
duration 2004-06) had already been established, reflecting a certain lack of enthusiasm by
the Member States in supporting security research. The PASR budget line is also funding
ESSTRT (European Security: Threats Responses and Relevant Technologies), a strategic
planning project that is being led by the defence company Thales. The projects funded by the
PASR covered five objectives, including situation awareness and surveillance, protecting
against terrorism, network security, crisis management, and IT interoperability, including
tcross-border sharing of data.
In 2007 the Commission launched a full European Security Research Programme as
recommended, entitled EU 7th Framework Programme for "Security and Space" research
(FP7). The EU approach to security research can be characterized as follows:




Preservation of the EU values as an open society, including respect for fundamental
rights and freedom, while addressing the increased and diversified security thre
Focus on an integrated approach (All Hazards Approach), encompassing the fight
against terrorism and organised crime, the protection of the external European
borders, the need for preparedness in case of natural disasters and civil crisis
management
Provision of internal and external security requires the use of modern technology
prompting citizen concern.
Securing EU economy and its competitiveness against an increased threat of
disruption to its basic economic infrastructures, including industrial assets and
transport, energy and information networks.
The EU FP7 budget is foreseen as € 570 million per year. Additional FP7 funding will be
provided through the budget lines on "ideas", "people" and "capacities" (€ 26 billion from
2007 to 2013). Finally, FP7 will also provide an additional € 1.8 billion for security-related
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research by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), working with law
enforcement agencies and relevant EU services (e.g., FRONTEX). The proposed total
financial means provided for security reseacrh of approximately one billion EURO per year
for EU security research is almost treble that being made available by the EU for research
into the environment, including climate change, and the equivalent of 10 per cent of the
entire EU research budget.
A typical EU security research project addressing these deficits is CAST
(www.castproject.eu), in charge of developing a standardized training curriculum for
emergency- and security services in all 27 Member States, responding to major terror attacks
(catastrophic terrorism), large scale industrial accidents and major natural catastrophes.
3. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS
3.1 Threat Assessment
National intelligence estimates form the basis of prioritized threat assessments and allocation
of national resources. Such estimates are the keystone of designing national policy and
ideally, driving national research agendas.
The primary entities charged with the
responsibility of threat assessment and validation are the Department of Homeland Security
,a number of counterterrorism entities within the law enforcement, defense, national
laboratory, and intelligence communities. Organizations such as the JASONS and other
advisory scientific committees are responsive to the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative
branches of government and add scientific validity and translational capability for science to
policy implementation.
3.2 Countermeasures
Effectiveness and performance of countermeasures including personnel protection are
measured by characterization of threat and net effects of deployed assets.
Countermeasures typically are characterized by agent, persistence, deployability, and standoff effectiveness. There is a broad spectrum of initiatives supported in both military and
civilian research environments.
3.3 Information-Sharing
Information-sharing initiatives have stemmed from access problems at the state and local
levels. A number of open source initiatives have been hosted by the US Government to
include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
In addition, there is a potential role of universities in assisting prompt and effective response
to catastrophic events due to terrorism. Our intent is to underscore the need to modify the
traditional role of universities to match the gaps that are presently known across the
response timeline.
The PMP-MTA has identified the role the academic networks may play in assisting first
responders to categorize and respond to specific catastrophic events. Specifically, WFS can
bring the scientific method and culture to the context of an emerging disaster. One science
is the overlay of reproducible methodology to actionable information and conversion of data
and information to knowledge. Professional academic networks may serve as one resource
to share validated information to the first responder community. This PMP has thus far
developed radiologic (“dirty bomb”) and biological scenarios that provide a baseline of
scientific data and associated recommended, data-driven courses of action and measurable
outcomes.
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4. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS
4.1 Threat assessment
Since national risk assessment should be considered the foundation for setting policy
priorities and resource allocation, no international organization has the specific mandate to
assess threat assessment globally.
Threat assessment remains national responsibility and therefore threat assessments vary
from country to country. Furthermore there is no accepted methodology to conduct such an
assessment.
At the global level the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) aims to ensure that no
state or nonstate actor is a source or beneficiary of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation (resolution UNSCR 1540). Under full implementation, the actions of each state
are intended to strengthen international standards relating to the export of sensitive materials
and to ensure that non-state actors do not gain access to nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, their means of delivery, or related materials.
An important result of these efforts is the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). At the
biological level the United Nations in general and the World Health Organization (WHO) in
particular are dedicated to fight the threat of biological terrorism. The Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) is the first treaty to ban an entire class of weapons.8 While it upholds a
strong moral norm, some nations have flagrantly disregarded it. This has led to an attempt to
create a verification regime, which failed in 2001. Many experts believe that, unlike nuclear
weapons, verification for biological weapons is not possible.
The WHO has developed the International Health Regulation (IHR), a legally binding
document. IHR was originally intended to minimize disruption of trade in times of disease
emergencies. In 2005, the WHO revised the IHR, transforming the agreement to serve as a
means of enhancing transparency about disease outbreaks among nations. Under the IHR,
nations are required to report to the WHO an event constituting a ‘‘public health emergency
of international concern.’’ This illustrates the challenge in this topic area having to
differentiate between a disease emergency caused by a natural agent and the impact due to
an intentional release of a weaponized biological agent.
The International Nuclear Energy Agency (IAEA) is at the forefront of assisting its member
states to assess the threat from nuclear terrorism and terror threats to the nuclear fuel cycle.
The strategy of the IAEA is based on the following pillars: 9 (1) Physical protection of all
nuclear materials, radioactive materials and facilities and transport systems based
on
national threat assessment; (2) Regulatory control of nuclear and radioactive material; (3)
Detection and interdiction of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials; (4)
Coordination of nuclear safety, security and safeguards systems for maximum benefits; and
(5) Preparedness to respond to emergencies. Although comprehensive from a technical point
of view, many of the IAEA´s efforts are hampered by their status of recommendations rather
than legally binding conventions. An important exception is the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is in a comparatively
stronger position, since its activities aimed at trheat assessment and mitigation are based on
8
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument
9
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2009/nuclsecurity.pdf
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a legally binding document, i.e. the Convention on the prohibition of the development of
chemical weapons. 10
The efforts of these UN organizations are substantially strengthened by the activities of the
Australia Group. The Australia Group is an informal arrangement which aims to allow
exporting or transshipping countries to minimize the risk of assisting chemical and biological
weapon (CBW) proliferation. The Group meets annually to discuss ways of increasing the
effectiveness of participating countries’ national export licensing measures to prevent wouldbe proliferators from obtaining materials for CBW programs. The effectiveness of their
cooperation depends solely on a shared commitment to CBW non-proliferation goals and the
strength of their respective national measures.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, Bruxelles, Belgium) has taken an active
role in a scientific approach to countering terrorism soon after the terror attacks in the US on
September 11, 2001.11 The results of multiple research contracts and dedicated meetings
can be found in the comprehensive publication series NATO AND TERRORISM.12 These
monographs cover a wide range of topic areas in the field of threat assessment and
mitigation, focusing frequently on practically applicable results for first responders and
specialized industry.
In accordance with its mandate the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD, Paris, France) concentrates on the economic aspects of countering
terrorism. Therefore, the OECD has published several documents addressing on countering
money laundering. Also, the OECD developed terrorist financing risks assessment
strategies. 13
EUROPOL.14 and INTERPOL 15, both dedicated to assembling security-related information
and sharing it with their member states, provide essential support in the area of threat
assessment. Databases and methodologies are under development to enable more efficient
terrorist information sharing. This initiative is intended to enable transnational pre-emptive
terrorist acts through early warning of either committed acts/networks or metadata consistent
with involvement in terrorist networks. Mega database sharing is an integral component of
prevention, mitigation and prosecution
4.2 Countermeasures and Information Sharing
Achieving effective global surveillance and response capabilities depends on cultural
acceptance of two key concepts: (1) Global mindsets, and (2) Global resources. These
concepts reflect the worldwide nature of the threat of emerging diseases and the erosion of
geographic, cultural, and social barriers that have historically functioned to deter the spread
of infectious diseases. If disease outbreaks of potential international public health importance
cannot be detected and contained in all places, it is likely that they will have an impact on
global health security and on global economic stability. The most compelling example of this
10
http://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/chemical-terrorism/
11
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_18843.htm?selectedLocale=en
http://www.springerlink.com/content/1874-6500/
12
13
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/23/40979091.pdf
http://legalift.wordpress.com/2009/04/29/europol-terrorism-report-for-2009-eu-terrorism-situation-andtrend-report/
15
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/pdf/bestprac-interpol.pdf
14
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is the global spread of HIV/AIDS in the past three decades. Containment of global disease
outbreaks will require all nations to work in partnership and to pool resources.
The main countermeasures and associated mitigation strategies (care for the sick, protect
those who are well, minimize social and economic disruption and assign attribution for
attack) are national responsibilities. However, mechanisms for Surveillance and Response of
natural, accidental and intentional have been developed by the international community. The
following section provides an overview of such tools.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) engaged early in its support of the global fight against
terrorism with multiple tools.16 International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) provide both
the legal framework and the requirements for all countries to be able to detect and report to
the WHO within 24 hours an event constituting a ‘‘public health emergency of international
concern’’, which include nuclear, chemical and infectious disease outbreaks, regardless of
where the emergency is located.
Several mechanisms to monitor diseases (mainly infectious diseases) of international
concern have been developed by the international community. Some infectious disease
surveillance programs monitor a disease over time (e.g., the WHO’s Global Influenza
Surveillance Network), while others attempt to detect and track specific diseases (e.g., the
U.S. Department of Defense Biological Threat Reduction Program). Still others report on
unusual clinical cases or disease clusters that are judged by experts to be of concern to the
infectious disease community. Some systems rely on case definitions and clinical
observations; others monitor laboratory test results (e.g., serology); some use analysis of
samples routinely collected by sentinel clinicians; some derive data from routine computerbased searches of patient or public health records; and some use media reports of disease
outbreaks.
The basic components of surveillance and response programs are defined as:

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
Surveillance: Systematic monitoring for a case (or cases) of an unusual disease
and/or an unusual cluster of diseases—the stimuli for the initial disease outbreak
report;
Reporting: An account of the initial disease outbreak; the report reflects an
assessment of credibility and of potential public health significance;
Verification: inquiry to affected country and the initial investigation to verify the
disease outbreak; and
Response: intervention and containment of the disease outbreak.
The Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) provides reports of disease
outbreaks primarily derived from news media sources to WHO, government and public health
leaders, and subscribers interested in global health. 17GPHIN was created in 1998 by Health
Canada’s Laboratory Centre for Disease Control in collaboration with WHO. It is a fee-based
electronic reporting service that searches electronic global media sources for reports of
public health importance and provides them to its subscribers. Each day, GPHIN scans
thousands of electronic media reports from news source providers. Factiva provides
coverage of news reports in English, French, Russian, Simplified and Traditional Chinese,
and Spanish, Arabic and Farsi.
PROMED-mail is an internet-based surveillance system that disseminates information on
outbreaks of infectious diseases and acute exposures to toxins based on media reports and
reports from subscribers.18 It reports on diseases that affect human health, including those in
animals and in plants grown for food or animal feed.
The European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS) collects clinical and virology data on
patients with influenza like illness from a network of sentinel physicians throughout Europe.
16
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0042-96862004000100018
17
www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/media/nr-rp/2004/2004_gphin-rmispbk_e.html
www.promedmail.org
18
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19
These data are used to track the characteristics of the annual flu season and to monitor the
circulating influenza viruses.
Global Influenza Surveillance Network is a surveillance system comprised of laboratories
and coordinating centers around the world that collect and analyze clinical data and
specimens from patients with influenza like illness during influenza season.20 Established in
1952, the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network monitors, collects, and analyzes the
influenza viruses that cause seasonal flu throughout the world. These data are used to
recommend vaccine strains for seasonal flu and to identify emerging strains of influenza A
virus with potential to cause a pandemic.
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) is a surveillance and response system dedicated
to prevention and control of polio.21 GPEI monitors pediatric populations for cases of acute
flaccid paralysis and vaccinates those who are at risk for polio.
Regional Immunization Programme of the Americas conducts clinical surveillance using
case definitions and confirmatory laboratory diagnosis to monitor the impact of national
immunization programs and to identify and vaccinate at-risk populations.22 In 1977, following
smallpox eradication, the Pan American Health Organization’s (PAHO) Expanded Program
on Immunization was reorganized into the Regional Immunization Program. It originally
targeted six vaccine-preventable diseases that were causing a high disease burden: polio,
measles, pertussis, tetanus, diphtheria, and tuberculosis. Today, the surveillance systems
and diagnostic laboratories established through the Expanded Program on Immunization and
Regional Immunization Program comprise the backbone of the national immunization
programs in the Americas
Global Disease Detection (GDD) Programme is a surveillance and response program that
identifies emerging microbial threats and responds to infectious disease outbreaks.23 The
program was established by CDC in 2005. The program consists of the GDD Response
Network, which has internationally based Response Centers, and a CDC-based Outbreak
Information Center. The GDD Response Centers, of which 18 are planned, strengthen
existing capacity through improved diagnostic testing capabilities, transfer of technology, and
scientific training both in national laboratories and in the WHO regional epidemiology
programs.
Global Emerging Infection Surveillance and Response System (GEIS) is a surveillance
and response system that links Department of Defense (DoD) laboratories, research
facilities, and the military health system to facilitate rapid recognition and response to protect
the health of the forces and national security. 24
Biological Threat Reduction Programme (BTRP), formerly the Biological Weapons
Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) Program, is a DoD surveillance and response program
designed to enhance biosecurity and biosafety at research facilities in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine.25
Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR) is a verification and response
program that monitors and facilitates effective response to outbreaks of 15 infectious
diseases: anthrax, avian influenza, viral hemorrhagic fevers (Crimean-Congo, dengue,
19
http://www.eiss.org
20
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/surveillance/en/
http://www.polioeradication.org
22 http://www.paho.org
23 http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/global/ieip/about.htm
24 http://www.geis.fhp.osd.mil/
25 http://cns.miis.edu/cns/dc/cbw_seminars/060328.htm
21
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Ebola, Lassa, and Marburg), Rift Valley fever, hepatitis, influenza, meningococcal disease,
plague, SARS, tularemia, and yellow fever.26
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) is a voluntary technical
partnership of approximately 140 institutions coordinated by WHO to support countries in
disease outbreak investigation and response, primarily through the deployment of
multidisciplinary teams.27 GOARN’s mission is rapid identification and/or confirmation and
effective response to disease outbreaks of international public health importance.
Preparedness and Response Unit is a multilateral surveillance and response program of
the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) that supports European Union (EU)
Member States in assessing, investigating, and responding to emerging threats in Europe;
the Unit is also a GOARN partner.28
5. CONCLUSIONS
The global community has taken multiple steps to assess the threats due to terrorism and to
identify ways of mitigating the aftermath of a terror attack. Both, at the national level and in
international collaboration scientific research plays a key role in identifying the threat as well
as selecting the optimal response to a terror attack. The result of interdisciplinary security
research is key for any decision maker to protect the public from the multiple security risks
associated with the terror threats of today and tomorrow.
26
http://www.who.int/csr/en/
http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/
28 http://ecdc.europa.eu
27
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