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History - 6.2.3
THE
EASTERN
QUESTION:
THE
PROBLEM
AND
ITS
BACKGROUND
In the 19th century, Tsarist Russia had embarked on a
policy
of
aggrandisement
domestic problems.
Europe,
proved
despite
having
numerous
Russian imperialism in south-eastern
pivotal
in
shaping
the
trajectory
of
European international relations particularly in the second
half of the 19th century.
Russian expansionism in the
region was fed by the progressive weakening of the
centuries-old Ottoman Empire, and the prospect of the
lengthening shadow of the Tsarist regime on East and
Central Europe alarmed quite a few states.
In course of
the 19th century, accordingly, a number of European
powers became interested in maintaining the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire.
In the arena of international
relations in 19th century Europe, the problem pertaining to
the future of the Ottoman Empire is known as Eastern
Question.
The background
From the 15th century, the Ottoman Turks had built up a
huge empire in the Eastern Mediterranean region.
The
empire spanned across the Mediterranean coast of Africa
(viz. Egypt and Libya), Levantine Asia (viz. Anatolia, Syria,
Palestine and Mesopotamia), and south-eastern Europe
(the Dalmatian Peninsula and the Balkans).
The nerve-
centre of this huge empire lay in the capital of the
erstwhile Byzantine Empire, Constantinople, which the
Turks renamed Istanbul after they took it in 1453.
It was virtually impossible to control the transcontinental
empire from Istanbul. Hence, as the empire grew in size,
the Ottoman rulers had given considerable power to the
regional governors.
Hence, the Ottoman Empire was a
multi-national empire in the true sense.
Although the
principal elements of the military elite in Anatolia and
Egypt were of Turkish descent, in south-eastern Europe
governance continued to be vested in the hands of the preTurkish Balkan Christian aristocracy.
However, to ensure
loyalty, the Ottomans had devised a novel mechanism in
the region. They used to take a handful of the children to
Istanbul from the conquered regions, particularly from the
aristocratic or elite families and convert them to Islam.
They were then given the best possible military and
administrative training and constituted into the Janissari
corps, and sent to various parts of the empire as
representatives of the central authority. Representatives of
Istanbul, the Janissaries invariably ran into trouble with the
regional ruling elites on whom they were meant to hold in
check – hence the Janissaries tended to be fiercely loyal.
And as the Janissari corps were drawn from all parts of the
empire, the Ottoman military and administrative elite had
representation from almost all the component speechgroups of the empire – Turkish, Arab, Greek, Bulgar, Serb,
Croat, Albanian, etc.
Leaving aside the misfortunes of the prisoners of war and
those enslaved, the Ottoman rulers did not interfere much
in matters of faith of their subjects. The Ottoman judicial
system instituted Islamic law as the law of the empire, but
allowed the various component confessional groups to be
under their own religious laws.
This was known as the
Millet system where jurists of each of the religious
communities (Millet) were considered to be their respective
representatives.
This peculiarity of the Ottoman structure had its impact on
Ottoman social life as well. Despite a general domination,
the Turkish warriors did not have any monopoly over the
Ottoman military – the navy remained the preserve
principally of the Greeks; the Serbs, Bulgarians and
Romanians also played an important role in the armed
forces.
Arab and Armenian merchants were the driving
forces behind Ottoman economy; the predominantly Arab
cities of Damascus and Cairo were commercial and cultural
nerve-centres every bit as Istanbul.
This vast multi-national empire began to lose its dynamism
from the beginning of the 18th century. The reverse at the
gates of Vienna in 1683 had marked the end of Ottoman
expansion. Thereafter, the principal pre-occupation of the
Ottomans in Europe was to preserve rather than expand
their empire in the face of the Hapsburg ascendancy. The
loss of Hungary in 1699 revealed the extent of Ottoman
weakness.
relentless
Although in course of the 18th century, the
conflicts
among
powerful
states
for
the
domination of Central Europe left the Ottomans by and
large unmolested, nevertheless attempts by Istanbul to
regain control over the empire caused some long-term
problems.
In 1740, in a bid to preserve their military
prowess the decadent Ottomans concluded a treaty with
France, whereby in return for French domination of
Levantine commerce, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire
would be guaranteed by France.
This marked the
beginning of Ottoman dependence on foreign powers for
the preservation of its empire.
The Nature and Origins of the Eastern Question
The prospect of disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in
south-eastern
Europe
had
alarmed
various
European
powers at different points of time, and interestingly most
major European powers have at one point of time or
another tried to shore up the weakening empire.
For
instance all through the 17th century the Hapsburgs were
deadliest among the adversaries, yet in the 1870s they
were desperate to prevent Ottoman disintegration. Again
in 1770, Britain had assisted the Russians against the
Ottomans, yet in 1854-56 they went to war against Russia
to save the Ottomans. Even Russia, which had consistently
tried
to
expand
southwards
at
the
expense
of
the
Ottomans from the second half of the 18th century,
emerged as its saviour in the 1890s. In fact, the Eastern
Question was not so much the question of Ottoman
survival in Europe, as it was a diplomatic and political crisis
in the arena of European international relations, triggered
by the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
In the 19th century, the Eastern Question lay rooted in the
'warm water policy' of the Russian Empire. Russia had no
major ports that did not freeze up in the winter; hence the
principal objective for Russia's imperial expansion was to
acquire
such
regions
that
would
remain
navigable
throughout the year – hence the term 'warm water.' The
pursuit of this policy led Russia to embark on expansion
gradually into the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the
Caspian.
Of the three, only the Caspian was within the
ambit of the Persian Empire; the Ottomans presided over
the other two.
Russian
concern
about
the
future
of
the
European
provinces of the Ottoman Empire was purely geopolitical.
Russia meant to ensure navigation for Russian vessels from
the Black Sea to the Mediterranean so that commercial
exchanges with the rest of Europe could be carried out all
through the year.
Passage from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean, requires passage through the straits of
Dardanelles and Bosphorus, which were under Ottoman
control. From the end of the 18th century, Russia began to
toy with several options to ensure unstinted access to the
Mediterranean.
Their
preferred
alternative
was
to
dismantle the Ottoman Empire and establish direct rule in
the Mediterranean region. In 1787 Tsarina Catherine even
proposed to the Hapsburg emperor the partition of the
Ottoman realms between the two.
Not merely the
Hapsburgs, no European power ever wanted Russian
domination of the Danubian region by virtue of its
domination of the Balkans.
Thus despite repeated military triumphs, Russia failed to
establish direct control over the European provinces of the
Ottoman Empire.
This brought Russia to the second
alternative of establishing indirect control over the region.
From the 1770s, Russia tried to establish its influence in
the region initially citing the misery of Orthodox Christians,
and then Christians in general under Muslim rule.
In the
19th century, as nationalism began to surface in Europe,
Russia stood forth as the patron of Christian and Slavic
nationalist forces.
They hoped that in the event of the
emergence of such nation states, the states would accept
Russian influence in return for her patronage, thereby
guaranteeing Russian access to the Mediterranean.
Russian intervention in the Ottoman Empire in the name of
religion began properly speaking in the latter half of the
18th century. After the victory over the Ottomans in 1774
and establishment of military presence over a large area
(the Greek archipelago, Bessarabia and Wallachia), Russia
was forced to pull out as per the terms of treaty of Kuchuk
Kainarji.
Nevertheless the treaty allowed Russia to
establish herself in the Crimean region, and accorded her
the guardianship of the Orthodox Christians of Greece,
Bessarabia and Wallachia.
Russia insisted on the latter
provision to pre-empt any punitive measures against those
Greeks and Romanians who had taken up arms against the
Ottomans, but they subsequently utilised this provision to
interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state.
Hence, the rigours of the Ottoman state began to relax
somewhat in the region, allowing the subjects' aspirations
towards freedom to germinate – the first manifestation of
this was in Greece.
The Greek War of Independence
On the whole, the Ottomans did not much disturb the
status quo of Greek society, hence the powerful landed
elite, the Phanariot families, did not find it much difficult
accepting Ottoman rule.
By the 18th century, the Greek
Phanariots had established considerable influence over
Ottoman foreign policy and bureaucracy. Besides, officials
of the Greek Orthodox Church used to be appointed the
regulators of the Rum Millet, i.e. community of all Orthodox
Christians.
But by early 19th century, a political opposition began to
emerge in Greece against Ottoman domination. From the
very beginning of Ottoman rule, some marginal social
groups like the Klephts refused to accept the Ottoman
social and political order.
Towards
the
Ottomans
closing
began
years
to
fall
of
foul
the
of
18th
century,
another
the
important
component of the Ottoman Greek society – the merchants.
The
Greek
merchants
had
flourished,
courtesy
their
domination of the empire's European commerce.
But
increasing weakening of the empire had its impact on its
economy as well, occasioning in its turn a crisis of
confidence
in
the
Ottoman
order.
The
educational
institutions that grew up with mercantile patronage began
to see the germination of ideas of nationalism that came
from Western Europe, particularly France.
In 1814, a
secret society called Hetairia Philike was set up by three
merchants
Nikolaos
Skoufas,
Manolis
Xanthos
and
Athanasios Tsakalov, with the objective of waging a militant
struggle for Greek independence. In 1820, the leadership
of the society passed on to a Phanariot commander serving
in the Russian army, Alexander Ypsilantis. In 1821, seizing
the opportunity provided by the Turko-Persian war, the
Greeks launched a militant campaign.
As the Ottoman presence in Greece came to the brink of
collapse, the Sultan sought assistance from his most
powerful provincial governor, Muhammad Ali Pasha of
Egypt. Hoping to acquire power over Crete, Cyprus and the
Peloponnesus Muhammad Ali sent his son Ibrahim Pasha at
the head of the Egyptian fleet in 1825.
After initial
breathtaking successes in 1826, a fierce Greek resistance
halted Ottoman advance, thereby changing the character
of the confrontation.
Public opinion in the various
European countries went in favour of the gallant Greeks,
pressurizing
the
European
governments
to
intervene
against the Ottomans.
The European powers were alarmed ever since the Greek
struggle assumed a violent form.
Although Ottoman
decline was accepted as a self-evident fact, none of the
states were quite prepared for the actual disintegration of
the empire.
It was in this context that a British Foreign
Office coined the term 'the Eastern Question' to refer to the
problem of Ottoman Europe.
In 1821, despite the
advocacy of the Russian Prime Minister of Greek origin,
Ioannis Kapodistrias in favour of Russian intervention in
the Greek struggle for independence, Austrian foreign
secretary Prince von Metternich and his British counterpart
Lord
Castlereagh managed
to
dissuade
the Tsar by
extracting concessions for the Orthodox Christians from the
Ottoman Sultan.
But with time public opinion in Europe
began to favour the Greeks, making the new British
Foreign Secretary George Canning apprehensive in 1822
about a unilateral Russian intervention. Thus in 1823, in a
bid to check growing Russian influence in the region,
Canning warned the Ottoman Sultan that if a whole nation
rose up in arms, it should not be dismissed as banditry,
and that future British relations with the Ottomans would
depend on Ottoman treatment of their Christian subjects.
This marked the beginning of Britain's tacit funding of the
Greek struggle for freedom.
The involvement of Ypsilantis, a Russian military official in
the Greek struggle proved somewhat embarrassing for
Russia, hence she tended to avoid any entanglement. But
the growing British influence in Greek circles since 1823
began to cause discomfort in St. Petersburg.
The
accession of Tsar Nicholas to the Russian throne in 1825,
ushered in a new era in this regard, as in 1826 he sent
Istanbul an ultimatum that the Ottomans should promptly
despatch an envoy to discuss the resolution of the Greek
situation. Britain too joined the Russian initiative, leading
to the St. Petersburg Protocols of April 1826.
Thereby
Britain and Russia agreed that their mediation would work
towards Greek autonomy, but within the Ottoman Empire.
Although the Greeks were willing to accept this, being on
the defensive with the coming of Ibrahim Pasha, the
Ottomans refused to abide by the terms.
Thus in July
1827 the Treaty of London was signed between Britain,
France and Russia, saying that the Ottomans would be
proposed mediation a second time, but should they refuse,
all options would be open to end the violence.
In 1827,
when Muhammad Ali's new fleet ignored British and French
warning against further advances, it was accordingly
severely crushed.
Emboldened by Ottoman defeat, the Greeks renewed their
campaign on land with a new ferocity, and eventually
declared an interim government under the leadership of
Capodistras.
On the other hand as Russia persuaded
Istanbul to accept Greek demand for autonomy, Britain and
France began to fear increase in Russian influence both in
the Turkish and Greek capitals.
Hence London and Paris
proposed to Russia that Greece would be set up not as an
autonomous Ottoman province, rather as an independent
state. There was however no easy solution to the question
as to who was to be the head of such a state. Accordingly,
at the London Conference of 1832 it was decided (without
consulting the Greeks) that the crown would be offered to
a prince from the Wittelsbach family of Bavaria.
Soon
after, Greek independence was acknowledged by Ottomans
in
the
Treaty
of
Istanbul,
in
return
for
monetary
compensation.
Ottoman Disintegration 1832-52
The alignment between Britain and France during the
Greek War of Independence to restrict Russian influence in
Ottoman Europe, became an important feature of the
Eastern Question over time. Paris used to believe that one
of
the
basic
preconditions
of
maintaining
French
commercial and diplomatic presence in the Ottoman lands
was to keep Russia beyond the frontier.
Britain on the
other hand was driven by the objective of keeping their
passage through the Ottoman Empire secure. The Crimean
War of 1854-56 was largely the result of such calculations.
The Greek War of Independence left the weaknesses of the
Ottoman glaringly obvious.
The principal mainstay of the
Ottoman Sultan in the Greek War, Muhammad Ali Pasha
had been promised domination over Syria and Crete as a
price for his role, but upon not being appointed the Pasha
of Syria at the end of the war, he tried to militarily take it
over. In 1832 as Ibrahim Pasha ran over the land between
Aleppo and Damascus, and was virtually knocking on the
gates of Anatolia, Istanbul was forced to seek military
assistance from London.
When the
British Premier
Palmerston declined such assistance, the Sultan turned to
Russia instead. The swift arrival of 18,000 Russian troops
on the Bosphorus increased Russian influence on the
Ottomans virtually overnight. Alarmed, Britain and France
pressurised
the
Ottomans
to
affect
prompt
Russian
withdrawal, in return they proposed to mediate with
Muhammad Ali Pasha. Anglo-French mediation led to the
acknowledgement of Muhammd Ali Pasha as the hereditary
Pasha of Egypt and Crete, along with his appointment as
the Pasha of Aleppo, Damascus, Adana and Tripoli.
But Sultan Mahmud refused to reconcile with the loss of
the Arab provinces of his realm, nor was it possible for him
to rely on the British and the French.
Thus even as
Russian military withdrawal was being negotiated; he
opened discussions on strategic and military ties.
This
took shape in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, pledging both
powers into an offensive and defensive military alliance. In
return, by a secret clause, the Ottoman Sultan promised to
keep the Straits open to Russian fleet at all times, even
during war.
Muhammad Ali's determination to free himself of his
Ottoman connections forced Sultan Mahmud II to go to war
with him in 1839.
Russian
troops,
Apprehensive of reappearance of
Britain
volunteered
to
mediate
with
Muhammad Ali, and should that fail even to go to war on
behalf of the Sultan.
This culminated in the Straits
Convention of 1841, whereby Britain committed herself to
the defence of Ottoman interests, to ensure reduction of
Ottoman dependence on the Russians.
Muhammd Ali
Pasha had to forego his claim on Syria and Crete in return
for the confirmation of his hereditary claim on Egypt.
It
was further agreed that Ottoman control over the Straits
was to be paramount, and Istanbul was to retain the right
of closing the straits to other powers in times of war.
The last clause constituted a violation of the 1833 treaty,
as was to become clear during the Crimean War.
More
significant was Britain's changed position on the matter of
the Eastern Question.
The four decades after 1841 saw
relentless British support to the Ottomans, which in turn
resulted
in
progressive
deterioration
of
Russo-Turkish
relations – the Crimean War became its first manifestation.
The Crimean War
Speaking about the Ottoman Empire in 1853, Tsar Nicholas
I is supposed to have told the British Ambassador Sir
Hamilton Seymour that: “We have a sick man in our hands
– a man gravely ill. It will be a grave misfortune if one of
these days he slips through our hands, especially before
the necessary arrangements.”
Comparing the Ottoman
Empire to a dying man, the Tsar was hoping Britain and
Russia
together
disintegration
cooperation.
would
through
control
the
mutual
aftermath
consultation
of
its
and
Ambassador Seymour had replied that the
patient needed a physician, not a surgeon – i.e., Britain
was keener on preventing Ottoman disintegration to
safeguard her passage to India.
She was determined to
prevent the rise of a second imperial force in its vicinities;
hence she wanted to preserve the Ottoman state as a
buffer between British Empire in India and Russia.
The growing British influence in the Ottoman court in the
1840s, alongside the success of the British-backed reform
of the Ottoman state in preventing further decline in the
short run, made many believe that the sick man might be
getting an extra lease of life. But Russia was alarmed that
any decline in her influence in Istanbul would jeopardise
her freedom of navigation through the Straits, and that in
turn would jeopardise her “warm water policy.”
1850s,
Russian
diplomacy
began
to
Thus by
appear
more
aggressive.
The
problem
was
compounded
by
the
question
of
guardianship of Christians in the Holy Lands in particular,
and in the Ottoman Empire in general, which led to
frictions between France and Russia.
Bethlehem and
Jerusalem were the Holy Lands of the Christians, and some
of the most venerated churches of Christendom were
located here. In the post-Crusade era, Muslim rule in the
region had caused no impediments for Christian pilgrimage
to the Holy Lands.
When Palestine came under Ottoman
rule, the Ottomans distributed the revenues collected from
Christian
pilgrims
among
the
Catholic
and
Ottoman
churches. The 1740 treaty signed with France committed
the Ottomans to giving preference in allocation to the
Catholics.
With the steady weakening of France, and the
rise of Russia, the policy was reversed in favour of the
Russians in 1773.
In 1850, the new French Emperor
Napoleon III, solicitous of Catholic support, began to
pressurize the Ottomans for resumption of preferential
treatment to the Catholics in the Holy Lands. After initial
hesitation about the wisdom of offending the Russians,
Istanbul indicated that it was willing to oblige the French.
This diplomatic disaster for the Tsar was likely to have
domestic repercussions. Hence, in a bid to intimidate the
Turks, Russia began to mobilise along the Danubian valley
and Bessarabia, and Prince Menshikov was sent with the
express
mission
of
securing
from
the
Ottomans
an
acknowledgement of Russia as the guardian of all Orthodox
subjects of the Ottomans.
This implied that the Sultan
would have to henceforth consult the Tsar on all matters
pertaining to the Orthodox Christians, not merely religious
matters. If enforced, this would legitimise any subsequent
Russian intervention in matters internal to the Empire.
Thus the British Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen sent Lord
Stratford to advise the Sultan to reject Russian demands.
Istanbul obliged. Britain, France, Austria and Prussia alike
being averse to the possibility of a war just then, a
conference
was
proposed
at
Vienna
for
honourable
resolution of the crisis. But although the Tsar acceded to
the idea, domestic compulsions made the Sultan reject it.
Ottoman rejection was swiftly followed by Russian entry
into the predominantly Orthodox Danubian provinces of
Moldavia and Wallachia in 1853.
Britain and France
responded by sending gunboats to the straits. After initial
reverses Ottoman success in stalling Russia at Silistria with
British support compelled the Tsar to pull out, upon which
Austria
stationed
troops
in
the
Danubian
provinces
temporarily.
Although Russian pull-out satisfied the Ottomans, Britain
and France decided to press for a long-term solution to the
Eastern Question. Hence they put forward four proposals
before the Tsar:
1) Russia would renounce her guardianship of the
Danubian provinces
2) Russia
would
not
meddle
unnecessarily
in
Ottoman dealings with their Orthodox subjects
3) The Straits Convention of 1841 would be reevaluated
4) The Danube would be open to all.
Russia could not accept the first three of the proposals,
hence as talks broke down in 1854 Britain and France
declared war on Russia.
Danube
for
Hapsburg
Given the significance of the
economy,
even
the
Austrians
discarded their policy of neutrality and declared war on
Russia.
The Crimean War began with the Anglo-French siege of
Sevastapol, Russia's biggest maritime base in the Crimea,
in 1854, and it came to an end with its fall in 1856.
Despite confrontations on the Azov and Baltic seas, the
theatre of the war was principally Crimea (hence the
name), leaving behind a staggeringly high figure of nearly
350,000 dead and wounded among the 700,000 troops
who participated on both sides. Confronted with a decisive
defeat, the death of Nicholas I, gave the new Tsar
Alexander II the opportunity to stop the war upon an
ultimatum from Vienna in 1855.
In post-Napoleonic Europe, Crimea was the most decisive
defeat that Russia had to face. Accordingly, the conference
of Paris that followed it bore the stamp of this defeat very
clearly. The Paris treaty of 1856 was meant to ensure that
Russia dare not come within miles of the Straits in the near
future. This prompted the neutralisation of the Black Sea,
i.e. none of the powers would be allowed to maintain a
military base in the region. The principal military presence
in the region being of Russia, and since any Russian fleet
from Crimea headed for the Mediterranean had to go
through the Black Sea, the clause clearly meant to restrict
Russian movement in the Black Sea itself.
The second
important provision required the Ottomans to reform their
state structure, so that there could be no further concern
about their Christian subjects.
Since this was the stated
casus belli for Russia, it was meant as a face saver for the
Tsar. When developments of the next decade revealed the
failure of this provision, Russia obtained its justification for
intervention in Ottoman affairs yet again. But perhaps the
most momentous proviso of the treaty was the complete
withdrawal of Russia from the mouth of the Danube as per
Vienna's demand.
Russia had to pull-out from not only
Moldavia and Wallachia, but also the conquered region of
Bessarabia.
Although the provinces remained within the
Ottoman realm for the time, whether they would continue
to remain so remained to be resolved.
The three
provinces, which together would be known as Romania,
served as the stage of efforts by Vienna and St. Petersburg
to keep each other from the mouth of the Danube. It was
this thorny issue that shifted the vortex of the Eastern
Question from the Straits to the Balkans in the 1870s.