Download Nuclear Nonproliferation in the East Asia

Nuclear Nonproliferation in the East Asia
(Nam Sung Wook, President of Institute for National Security Strategy)
Today, Asia now accounts for over 40 percent of global consumption of steel, and China
is consuming almost half of the world’s available concrete. Asia’s rise has been sustained by a
remarkable period of regional peace, international stability, the spread of democracy
throughout the region, and the expansion of regional economic integration through Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) and a general liberalization of trade laws. In 2007, Richard
Armitage and Joseph Nye wrote, “With half the world’s population, one-third of the global
economy, and growing economic, financial, technological, and political weight in the
international system, Asia is key to a stable, prosperous world order that best advances
American interests.”1) This phenomenon has driven several academics and strategists,
including noted retired Singaporean diplomat and scholar Kishore Mahbubani, to proclaim
“the end of Western domination and the arrival of the Asian century.”
As the Republic of Korea look forward to the 21st century, the international system is
growing increasingly complex and interdependent as American uni-polarity gradually gives
way to an emerging multi-polarity. Regionally, rapid economic growth in most of Northeast
Asia (combined with perceptions of American distraction in the greater Middle East) has driven
pundits and analysts to declare the 21st century the Age of Asia.
In the Asia-Pacific region we will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to
foster prosperity, keep the peace, and improve the daily lives of the people of the region. We
believe that open societies and open economies create prosperity and support human dignity,
and our nations and civic organizations will promote human rights, democracy, free markets,
and trade and investment liberalization in the region. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific, our
governments will advocate for, and take part in, effective cooperative regional efforts to promote
mutual understanding, confidence and transparency regarding security issues among the
nations of the region.
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Our governments and our citizens will work closely to address the global challenges of
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, organized crime and narcotics,
climate change, poverty, infringement on human rights, energy security, and epidemic disease.
We will also strengthen coordination in multilateral mechanisms aimed at global economic
recovery such as the G20. We aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula,
establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the
principles of free democracy and a market economy. We will work together to achieve the
complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs, as well as ballistic missile programs, and to promote respect for the fundamental
human rights of the North Korean people.
In 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but
Pyongyang has continued to pursue nuclear weapons. In the late 1980s, Since then, the U.S.
has pursued a variety of negotiating tactics in order to denuclearize the DPRK. While some
have achieved moderate successes in slowing North Korea’s nuclear program, ultimate
success remains distant. North Korea’s consistent inclination to proliferate weapons
technology endangers East Asia's interests and those of the inter-national community.
Combating and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies is perhaps
the most obvious traditional security issue where major powers would most likely have
shared interests. Yet, specific international collaboration and cooperation is still lacking. China and
the United States need to engage in close conversations about the impact of a commitment to
nuclear disarmament on deterrence and mutual security interests. The Six-Party Talks is such
a forum, it is focused on dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program. Washington should
work with its Six-Party partners to cultivate and an official dialogue on security issues among
the five major parties (China, Japan, the ROK, Russia, and the United States). While all sides
should ensure that this development does not undercut momentum for resolving the North
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Korea nuclear issue, solidifying this body will be essential to coordinate efforts towards
mutual interests or issues of mutual concern.
History indicates that North Korea’s agreement to the principle of denuclearization
means little without a detailed plan for how to get there. Limited agreements have exacted a
commitment to denuclearization in principle and a few initial movements in that direction, but
they left the harder negotiations and more difficult steps for later. This approach entails too
much uncertainty about the parameters of a final settlement and whether it will come to
fruition at all. Without fundamental changes to this approach, it is unlikely Pyongyang will
eliminate its entire nuclear program.
An agreement that is divided into smaller steps is a structure preferred by the DPRK.
History shows that North Korea tries to divide and separate issues in a method that has
become known as “salami tactics.” These tactics involve partitioning a large package into
small pieces. This approach allows North Korea to extract a higher total price by demanding
per-unit costs instead of allowing the United States to achieve its goals at a single negotiated
price. Once a limited deal of this nature is made, the cost of offering additional concessions to
continue securing modest steps seems lower.
Limited agreements are costly and risky. By drawing out the timeline of a deal, the North
can continue to advance its nuclear weapons program. For example, Pyongyang may try to
delay denuclearization by distinguishing its plutonium reprocessing program from its
uranium enrichment program. This tactic would perpetuate the cycle since the bigger and
more complex its program becomes, the more the North can charge the United States for
disablement.
To date, the North Korean long range missile tests and nuclear tests have all been
relatively unsuccessful. However, presuming that North Korea is indeed focused upon its
stated goal of achieving “Great Nation” status (KangSongDaeGook) by the 100th
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anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in the year 2012, then North Korea can be expected to
continue its testing on its own internal schedule. There appears little opportunity for
Pyongyang to claim great nation status economically, diplomatically, or even with its
deteriorating conventional military. In its own domestic propaganda, the DPRK has
emphasized its missile (satellite) and nuclear programs as an integral part of its claim to
legitimacy. One possible explanation for North Korea’s recent “charm offensive” is that
after its long range missile and nuclear tests early this year it merely needs more time
to analyze the result of its previous tests. If so, then the timing of the next North
Korean tests is more likely to be driven by internal dynamics in North Korea than by
the U.S. holiday schedule.
Therefore, inter-Korean relations were often strained with North Korea launched
missiles and conducted nuclear tests. In other words, inter-Korean relations stand on an
uncertain and insecure trust that could easily become strained, cooled, and worsened at any
time. The Lee Myung-bak administration’s policy towards North Korea aims at building a
substantial foundation for a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. To this end, it
pursues to create a community for peace, economic prosperity, and happiness based on the
advancement of inter-Korean relations for mutual benefits and common prosperity. In this
regard, the basis of the government’s North Korea policy is ‘Mutual Benefits and Common
Prosperity,’ which results in a win-win strategy to the South and the North. There are two
meanings contained within the ‘Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity.’1)
The ‘Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity’, which puts special emphasis on the
denuclearization of North Korea, pursues to facilitate ‘North Korea’s openness and change’
through the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the increase of inter- Korean
exchange and cooperation. Therefore, the Lee administration is carrying forward the “Vision
3000 through Denuclearization and Openness” as a policy means and goal for advancement of
mutual benefits and co- prosperous inter-Korean relations. The “Vision 3000 through
Denuclearization and Openness” is strategically a win-win plan to pursue the denuclearization
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and openness of North Korea, and increase inter-Korean economic co-operation, to advance
the economy of the Korean Peninsula and pursue reciprocal humanitarian cooperation
between the South and the North Korea.1)
The denuclearization in the “Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness” implies neither
conditions nor the need for denuclearization first. In other words, the “Vision 3000 through
Denuclearization and Openness” is a policy to build a substantial foundation for
peaceful reunification by furthering Pyongyang’s denuclearization and its economic
development through promoting inter-Korean economic cooperation in accordance with
progress in the North Korean nuclear issue.
<Table 1> Structure of ‘Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity’ North Korea Policy
In order to build a substantial foundation for a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula: to create a community for peace,
economic prosperity, and happiness through the advancement of inter-Korean relations for mutual benefits and common
prosperity.
• Community for peace: denuclearize the Korean Peninsula; build military trust; reduce military tensions between the two
Vision
Koreas.
• Community for economic prosperity: to support North Korea’s economic development and its participation in the
international society; promote mutually beneficial inter-Korean economic cooperation.
• Community for happiness: to solve pending issues, including prisoners of war, abductees, and separated families; to improve
the quality of life for the South and North Koreans.
• Pragmatic and result-oriented attitude
Driving
Principles
• Firm principles, flexible approaches
• National consensus
• Balance between inter-Korean cooperation and international cooperation
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