Download Doc XVIII n. 166 Summary

COM(2011) 651
On 27 June 2012 the Treasury Committee adopted a favourable opinion, with the following
recommendations:
1) clarify the notion of "inside information" and delete Art. 6(1)(e);
2) in relation to behaviour which is considered market manipulation, an assessment of the
effects of the behaviour of operators on the market should be given priority over the
intention of operators (or of the software). A penalty for traders should be introduced if a
certain level of quote stuffing is exceeded;
3) establish forms of cooperation between the financial markets authority and the authority
competent on stability and systemic risk prevention, in relation to the authorisation to delay
the public disclosure of information having a systemic impact;
4) enable Member States again to exempt certain market practices from complying with such
regulation (e.g. liquidity assistance operations or purchase of own shares), possibly in
conjunction with a specific role for the European Securities and Markets Authority (Esma);
5) extend the scope of reporting to entities controlling the issuer or holding over 10% of the
issuer's capital;
6) spell out that – in addition to the issuer – also a person acting on the issuer's behalf is
obliged to maintain an insider list, and include rating agencies among the entities having a
contract of employment, consultancy, and the like with the issuer;
7) envisage harsher sanctions for market abuse practices which may have an impact on the
government bonds market, even if such practices concern financial instruments which are
not government bonds but are related to these.
On 20 June 2012, the EU Policies Committee issued a favourable opinion with qualifications,
recommending:
1) making a distinction between the notion of "insider information" – which is at the basis of
market manipulation behaviour – and the information mandatorily made available to the
market by the issuing entity on important facts relevant to such entity;
2) that a decision to issue a tender offer should not be considered "insider information";
3) considering the list of behaviours considered market manipulation under Article 8(3)(c) an
incomplete one, in the expectation that ESMA provides appropriate guidelines to be
implemented in a uniform fashion by national supervisory authorities;
4) reviewing the scope of the exemption from the obligation to report transactions by
managers, so as to include also a shareholder holding a controlling interest or an interest
greater than 10% in an issuing entity's capital. Such transaction should be reported to the
issuing entity no later than the third market day after the transaction and the issuer should
inform the market and the supervisory authority within the next day;
5) adopting a simplified regulatory approach for issuers listed only in multilateral trading
facilities (MTFs).