Download The `normativity of content` thesis is not about the normativity of

The ‘normativity of content’ thesis is not about the normativity of content
ABSTRACT. On the basis of some premises including the normativity of belief thesis, Paul
Boghossian (2003, 2005) argues for the normativity of mental content thesis to the effect that
‘oughts are constitutive of content attributions’. I argue that the thesis does not imply that
mental content as such is normative for what is subject to ought in Boghossian's argument is
merely the activity of belief formation rather than mental content as such. One implication of
this approach is to show that Alexander Miller’s (2008) objection against Boghossian's thesis
fails.
Key words: normativity, belief, desire, content, attribution
Boghossian (2003, 2005) argues for a thesis called 'the normativity of content’. He claims that
the thesis is a normativity thesis which applies to mental content (Boghossian 2003, p. 39), that
is, according to him thought content is normative as such (Boghossian 2003, p. 40). To draw
out the claims Boghossian argues that 'oughts are constitutive of content attributions’
(Boghossian 2003, p. 38). The notion of constitutive at issue relates to the conditions on
grasping content attributions. To say that fact B is constitutive of fact A is to say that a
condition on grasping what it is for A to obtain that one grasps what it is for B to obtain
(Boghossian 2003, p. 37). Thus the ‘normativity of content’ thesis holds that a condition for
grasping content attributions is to grasp ought attribution. I will call the thesis CUCA
(abbreviation for 'a Condition for Understanding Content Attribution').
A key point regarding the thesis relates to what 'ought' applies to. I will argue that what is
subject to 'ought' in the thesis is merely the activity of belief formation, not mental content as
such. Once the point is noted it follows that the name ‘normativity of content’ thesis is a
misleading label, the thesis is not a normativity thesis about content.
Boghossian argues for CUCA from a number of premises, including the normativity of belief.
For the purpose I have in this paper I will assume the cogency of the premises and then clarify
how CUCA follows from the premises. Along with doing so I will investigate what is constrained
by 'ought' in the thesis and then I will show that the widespread idea (see for example Gluer
and Wikforss 2009, forthcoming and Miller 2008) that the thesis is a separate normativity
thesis to the normativity of belief thesis is implausible1.
1
For example Gluer and Wikforss claim:
It should be stressed at the outset, that the content normativity thesis and the belief normativity thesis are
distinct …. The question of whether belief is essentially normative is therefore of interest quite
independently of whether content is normative” (forthcoming, p. 122).
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The normativity of belief is the first premise in Boghossian’s argument for CUCA. The thesis
holds that a condition for grasping belief attribution is to understand that belief formation is
subject to the truth norm of belief, namely,
(N): For any p: One ought to believe that p only if p (Boghossian 2005, p. 212)2.
Understanding a belief attribution requires understanding the concept of belief for the
attributor considers the attributed belief as belief. The normativity of belief thesis holds that a
condition for grasping the concept of belief, that is, a condition for conceiving of the attributed
attitude as belief, is to understand that forming the attitude is constrained by (N). The thesis, if
it is true, then shows that belief as such is normative for it is the very attitude whose formation
is subject to a norm. In other words, the thesis deserves ‘the normativity of belief’ for what is
subject to a norm is the activity of forming belief.
There are two main further premises in the argument for CUCA. The second premise
concerns the conceptual priority of belief to desire (and of course to the other cognitive
attitudes). That is, grasping the notion of desire requires grasping the notion of belief, but
grasping the notion of belief does not require grasping the notion of desire. The third premise
concerns the idea that the concept of a content just is the concept of whatever it is that is the
object of a mental attitude. This implies that a condition for understanding a content
attribution is to understand the concept of an attitude towards content.
The argument for CUCA then proceeds as follows: given the latter two premises,
understanding a content attribution has to go via understanding the concept of belief. This is
because understanding a content attribution (according to the third premise) requires
understanding the concept of a contentful attitude, say, the concept of desire. And
understanding the concept of a contentful attitude (according to the conceptual priority of
belief) requires understanding the concept of belief. So, understanding a content attribution
requires understanding the concept of belief, namely, understanding what it is to attribute
belief to a subject. In addition, understanding the latter (according to the normativity of belief
thesis) requires understating what it is to be for the subject's belief formation to be constrained
by N. This means, in short, that what the argument infers as CUCA is this:
CUCA: A condition for understanding content attributions is to
understand that adopting belief is constrained by the ought
implicated in N.
2
In (reference is deleted for anonymity) we have suggested another version of the norm. Dealing with the issue is
extraneous to my present purpose.
2
Boghossian calls the thesis ‘the normativity of content’. The name is misleading for it may
look like that what is subject to ought in CUCA is mental content as such rather than belief
formation, but it is not. Calling the thesis 'the normativity of content' has misled many
philosophers to think that the thesis is a separate normativity thesis to the normativity of belief
thesis. But as stated above CUCA merely holds that since there is no way to understand
content attributions other than understanding the concept of belief and also that a condition
for grasping the concept of belief is to grasp that belief formation is constrained by the norm of
belief, it follows that a condition for grasping content attributions is to understand that belief
formation is subject to the norm of belief. What is supposed to be subject to ought in CUCA is
belief formation, not mental content as such. Note also that norms are generally supposed to
govern activities. But content as such is not an activity. It is an object for the activity of forming
attitudes including forming belief. So content is not the right sort of thing to be constrained by
norms.
A benefit of this approach is to show that Miller’s (2008) objection against CUCA fails.
Miller thinks that CUAC is a separate normativity thesis about mental content and then objects
to the thesis by arguing against the second premise of the thesis (namely, that the concept of
belief is prior to the concept of desire). He claims that belief and desire are conceptually
interdependent. The interdependency thesis holds that understanding the concept of belief
presupposes understanding the concept of desire and understanding the concept of desire
presupposes understanding the concept of belief (Miller 2008, p. 236)3. Miller thinks, given
that the normativity of content thesis is based on the conceptual primacy of belief and that the
latter is implausible to the effect that belief and desire are conceptually interdependent, it
follows that the normativity of content is implausible (Miller 2008, p. 235).
I already argued that there is no normativity of content thesis at CUCA. What is subject to
ought in CUCA is not mental content as such but the activity of belief formation; that is, a
condition for grasping content attributions is to understand that belief formation is subject to
the norm of belief. Now I will argue that this account, even if it is the case that belief and desire
are conceptually interdependent, survives Miller’s attack. Suppose you attribute a content to
someone, say, via attribution of desire. By the attribution, given belief and desire are
conceptually interdependent, you understand what it is to attribute a belief to someone. The
latter implies, given the normativity of belief, that you understand that belief formation is
constrained by (N).
In short, regardless of whether the concept of belief and the concept of desire are
interdependent or whether the former is prior, given the normativity of belief and that grasping
content attribution requires grasping the concept of an attitude towards the content, it follows
3
The question the conceptual primacy thesis or the interdependency thesis is plausible is extraneous to the
purpose of this paper.
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that a condition for grasping content attributions is to understand that belief formation is
subject to the norm of belief. And that is all that Boghossian's argument ever showed.
References
1.
2.
Boghossian, P. 2003. The Normativity of Content. Philosophical Issues13: 31–45.
Boghossian, P. 2005. Is meaning normative? In Philosophy – Science – Scientific
Philosophy, ed. A. Beckermann and C. Nimtz. Paderborn: Mentis.
3. Reference is deleted for anonymity
4.
5.
6.
7.
Miller, A. 2008. Thoughts, oughts and the conceptual primacy of belief. Analysis68: 234–
238.
Gluer, k. and Wikforss, A. (forthcoming). Against Belief Normativity. In Timothy Chan
(ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Gluer, k. and Wikforss, A. 2009. Against Content Normativity. Mind 118 (469): 31 - 70.
Reference is deleted for anonymity.
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