drnous2
... Dummett’s verificationist claim. Then, where “[]” means “it is necessarily the case that,” we can formalize Dummett’s verificationist belief as Verificationism []X((X k1X) (~X k1~X)). Given some interpretations of the necessity operator, Dummett clearly intends this. A verificationist meani ...
... Dummett’s verificationist claim. Then, where “[]” means “it is necessarily the case that,” we can formalize Dummett’s verificationist belief as Verificationism []X((X k1X) (~X k1~X)). Given some interpretations of the necessity operator, Dummett clearly intends this. A verificationist meani ...
Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy Linda
... herself more than those she perceives to be epistemically equally well-placed. Let me stress that she is not committed to trusting them because she has evidence that they are trustworthy. She is committed to trusting them because there is no relevant difference between her grounds for trusting herse ...
... herself more than those she perceives to be epistemically equally well-placed. Let me stress that she is not committed to trusting them because she has evidence that they are trustworthy. She is committed to trusting them because there is no relevant difference between her grounds for trusting herse ...
Pascal`s Wager is a Lie: An Epistemic Interpretation of the
... rationality. However, this is not how Pascal intended the passage to be treated. As James Connor notes, Pascal makes no claims to metaphysical or mathematical compulsion (186). This is seen throughout the passage as the libertin (the interlocutor) makes several interjections, not one of which relate ...
... rationality. However, this is not how Pascal intended the passage to be treated. As James Connor notes, Pascal makes no claims to metaphysical or mathematical compulsion (186). This is seen throughout the passage as the libertin (the interlocutor) makes several interjections, not one of which relate ...
An Argument For A Neutral Free Logic
... this contrasts with the objectual interpretation in which existentially quantified sentences are true when some domain element satisfies the open sentence prefixed by the binding quantifier. So the objection goes, ‗something is identical to Powers‘ is true because the name ‗Powers‘ when inserted int ...
... this contrasts with the objectual interpretation in which existentially quantified sentences are true when some domain element satisfies the open sentence prefixed by the binding quantifier. So the objection goes, ‗something is identical to Powers‘ is true because the name ‗Powers‘ when inserted int ...
The Zombie Argument - Utrecht University Repository
... Philosophy of Mind is a discipline in philosophy, which is mostly concerned with the famous mind-body problem, brought forward by René Descartes in his Meditations. This problem is a fundamental one, as it is concerned with the question what we human beings consist of. Do we consist of two entities ...
... Philosophy of Mind is a discipline in philosophy, which is mostly concerned with the famous mind-body problem, brought forward by René Descartes in his Meditations. This problem is a fundamental one, as it is concerned with the question what we human beings consist of. Do we consist of two entities ...
DOC - Princeton University
... How are epistemic and instrumental rationality related? Here is a particularly radical suggestion: epistemic rationality just is instrumental rationality. More precisely: epistemic rationality is a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive o ...
... How are epistemic and instrumental rationality related? Here is a particularly radical suggestion: epistemic rationality just is instrumental rationality. More precisely: epistemic rationality is a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive o ...
The One Fallacy Theory
... deductive, it is because I conceive philosophy as deductive, not because of any requirement of my One Fallacy theory as such. But my definition of allowability does presuppose the One Fallacy theory. I thought of all the usually recognized kinds of "fallacy" and decided that only those involving amb ...
... deductive, it is because I conceive philosophy as deductive, not because of any requirement of my One Fallacy theory as such. But my definition of allowability does presuppose the One Fallacy theory. I thought of all the usually recognized kinds of "fallacy" and decided that only those involving amb ...
Scepticism with regard to Reason* David Owen, University of
... sometimes seen people make mistakes in such matters and accept as certain... things which seemed false to us.”10 The argument is similar to Hume’s first negative argument: since we are fallible, and make mistakes, we can’t accept as certain even the results of demonstrations. An awareness of the un ...
... sometimes seen people make mistakes in such matters and accept as certain... things which seemed false to us.”10 The argument is similar to Hume’s first negative argument: since we are fallible, and make mistakes, we can’t accept as certain even the results of demonstrations. An awareness of the un ...
Intuition, Belief, and Rational Criticisability
... in situations where we know they are not. It is therefore untenable. Interestingly, the considerations that show this are precisely parallel to those that show that attempts to reduce perception to belief fail (§6). One might have thought that an intuition that p is instead reducible to partial beli ...
... in situations where we know they are not. It is therefore untenable. Interestingly, the considerations that show this are precisely parallel to those that show that attempts to reduce perception to belief fail (§6). One might have thought that an intuition that p is instead reducible to partial beli ...
Govier`s Distinguishing A Priori from Inductive Arguments by
... self-evident that from an act’s involving ingesting something which has been in someone else’s body we may infer (ceteris paribus) that the act is one that no person can be compelled to perform, then the warrant is self-backed. It needs no further backing. This is not to say that all warrants used i ...
... self-evident that from an act’s involving ingesting something which has been in someone else’s body we may infer (ceteris paribus) that the act is one that no person can be compelled to perform, then the warrant is self-backed. It needs no further backing. This is not to say that all warrants used i ...
Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping
... go well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I wish to pursue an alternative view that purports to avoid this shortcoming. Turning back to the view we now considering, the suggestion would be that for any given belief B*, one has justification for B* only if one has other beliefs whose contents ...
... go well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I wish to pursue an alternative view that purports to avoid this shortcoming. Turning back to the view we now considering, the suggestion would be that for any given belief B*, one has justification for B* only if one has other beliefs whose contents ...
Parsimony Arguments in Science and Philosophy
... here. Rather, I am interested in a third naturalism. Like the second, it is methodological, but it is aimed at the practice of philosophy, not of science (hence the “p” subscript that I use to label it): Methodological Naturalismp: Philosophical theories should be evaluated by the same criteria tha ...
... here. Rather, I am interested in a third naturalism. Like the second, it is methodological, but it is aimed at the practice of philosophy, not of science (hence the “p” subscript that I use to label it): Methodological Naturalismp: Philosophical theories should be evaluated by the same criteria tha ...
Quining Naturalism
... words, Quine’s brand of ontological commitment differs little in tone from Carnap’s— while if it differs in application, in being restricted to the commitments needed in science, it thus rests on foundations that seem hard to defend, in the modest as well as in the ambitious version of the program. ...
... words, Quine’s brand of ontological commitment differs little in tone from Carnap’s— while if it differs in application, in being restricted to the commitments needed in science, it thus rests on foundations that seem hard to defend, in the modest as well as in the ambitious version of the program. ...
Foundationalism
... On the very idea of a basic belief Some philosophers find the very idea of a basic belief perplexing, so much so that they doubt there can be such a thing. In this section I assess three arguments to that effect. Argument 1. If your belief is basic, it is justified. In general, your belief is justif ...
... On the very idea of a basic belief Some philosophers find the very idea of a basic belief perplexing, so much so that they doubt there can be such a thing. In this section I assess three arguments to that effect. Argument 1. If your belief is basic, it is justified. In general, your belief is justif ...
Logic Notes 2006
... 6. The basic premises or assumptions of the argument, that is, the premises that are not supported within the argument, are statements 2, 3, and 5. Statement 4 is an intermediary conclusion, which is claimed to follow from 2 and 3. Let us say that an argument is in explicit form when each statement ...
... 6. The basic premises or assumptions of the argument, that is, the premises that are not supported within the argument, are statements 2, 3, and 5. Statement 4 is an intermediary conclusion, which is claimed to follow from 2 and 3. Let us say that an argument is in explicit form when each statement ...
Reid`s defense of common sense - Scholars Archive
... ch. §, p. ). There is a commitment in practice to the existence of an external world that contains many of the snares and pitfalls in which realists believe. Third, Reid notes that scepticism about the world can only arise after many years of living in the world; the doubt is only possible af ...
... ch. §, p. ). There is a commitment in practice to the existence of an external world that contains many of the snares and pitfalls in which realists believe. Third, Reid notes that scepticism about the world can only arise after many years of living in the world; the doubt is only possible af ...
Reasons and Beliefs
... things that are expressible via that-clauses (as premise 2 of OO says), and these are normally taken to be propositions, not states of affairs. Indeed, as we already pointed out, premise 3 is normally assumed to be true, perhaps even obviously so. To insist that reasons are what we believe, and yet ...
... things that are expressible via that-clauses (as premise 2 of OO says), and these are normally taken to be propositions, not states of affairs. Indeed, as we already pointed out, premise 3 is normally assumed to be true, perhaps even obviously so. To insist that reasons are what we believe, and yet ...
ON KNOCKDOWN ARGUMENTS 1. Introduction A
... about motion rationally permissible, and if, as I have argued, the arguments for the rotation of the earth presuppose that there is motion, then it would seem that the arguments for the rotation of the earth cannot be knockdown.11 More generally, if global skepticism is rationally permissible, there ...
... about motion rationally permissible, and if, as I have argued, the arguments for the rotation of the earth presuppose that there is motion, then it would seem that the arguments for the rotation of the earth cannot be knockdown.11 More generally, if global skepticism is rationally permissible, there ...
The `normativity of content` thesis is not about the normativity of
... (N): For any p: One ought to believe that p only if p (Boghossian 2005, p. 212)2. Understanding a belief attribution requires understanding the concept of belief for the attributor considers the attributed belief as belief. The normativity of belief thesis holds that a condition for grasping the con ...
... (N): For any p: One ought to believe that p only if p (Boghossian 2005, p. 212)2. Understanding a belief attribution requires understanding the concept of belief for the attributor considers the attributed belief as belief. The normativity of belief thesis holds that a condition for grasping the con ...
CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONALISM
... ad infinitum. If one is an inferential internalist, the regresses looming are even more intimidating. In addition to justifiably believing E1, we would need to justifiably believe that E1 makes likely P, which we would need to infer from some proposition F1, which we would need to infer from some p ...
... ad infinitum. If one is an inferential internalist, the regresses looming are even more intimidating. In addition to justifiably believing E1, we would need to justifiably believe that E1 makes likely P, which we would need to infer from some proposition F1, which we would need to infer from some p ...
Abstract expressionism and the communication
... This cannot be the end of their explanation. Astrological language also expands our expressive capacities and helps us to communicate astrological beliefs. Presumably expressionists will say that mathematical language differs from astrological language in that it helps us to communicate truths. Expr ...
... This cannot be the end of their explanation. Astrological language also expands our expressive capacities and helps us to communicate astrological beliefs. Presumably expressionists will say that mathematical language differs from astrological language in that it helps us to communicate truths. Expr ...
The Design Argument (Part 1)
... identified in it certain features. These have compelled us to ascribe the production of the watch to an intelligent designer. (So far, so good: we know from experience, independently of the argument, that watchmakers are indeed responsible for watches.) He has then argued that the natural world is ...
... identified in it certain features. These have compelled us to ascribe the production of the watch to an intelligent designer. (So far, so good: we know from experience, independently of the argument, that watchmakers are indeed responsible for watches.) He has then argued that the natural world is ...
On the Indispensable Premises of the Indispensability - Hal-SHS
... According to Colyvan, “the crucial first premise follows from the doctrines of naturalism and holism”6. Naturalism would be required in order to justify the onlydirection of the implication, which, as Colyvan himself acknowledge 7, is, in fact, redundant for drawing the conclusion, and confirmation ...
... According to Colyvan, “the crucial first premise follows from the doctrines of naturalism and holism”6. Naturalism would be required in order to justify the onlydirection of the implication, which, as Colyvan himself acknowledge 7, is, in fact, redundant for drawing the conclusion, and confirmation ...
Logical Fallacies (Adopted from Steve Richardson, George Mason
... ambiguity. For example, in 1997 the Commonwealth of Virginia proposed buying "probe kits" for every student to help in math. Regarding this ambiguity, C. R. Taft said, – "To be sure, there is the matter of 6,000 'probe kits,' or data-collection devices. What data these devices collect and how they d ...
... ambiguity. For example, in 1997 the Commonwealth of Virginia proposed buying "probe kits" for every student to help in math. Regarding this ambiguity, C. R. Taft said, – "To be sure, there is the matter of 6,000 'probe kits,' or data-collection devices. What data these devices collect and how they d ...
EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
... inconsistent with some theory T, Currie says: But if Popper’s view of the relation between experience and the acceptance and rejection of basic statements is that the relation is wholly causal (and that is what he says) the following is a consequence of his view. …The question of whether it is ratio ...
... inconsistent with some theory T, Currie says: But if Popper’s view of the relation between experience and the acceptance and rejection of basic statements is that the relation is wholly causal (and that is what he says) the following is a consequence of his view. …The question of whether it is ratio ...