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5.4 Attribution Errors
By the end of this section you will be able to:
Discuss the fundamental attribution error and self-serving bias.
Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE)
As we saw in the previous section laypeople, like some psychologists, favour
explanations of behaviour in terms of dispositional, rather than situational,
factors. So, if people behave kindly towards us (i.e., they greet us with a smile)
we conclude they have a kind personality. And if they behave in ways that seem
impolite to us (i.e., they do not greet us at all) we tend to think of them as mean.
Instead of acknowledging the important role played by situational determinants
we assume that other people’s behaviour reflects their dispositions. To the
extent that we do so we commit the fundamental attribution error (FAE;
Nisbett and Ross, 1983). This term refers to a bias to attribute other’s behaviour
to stable internal causes rather than external circumstances.
The FAE has been demonstrated in several studies. A classical experimental
demonstration of this error is described in Box1.
Box 1. A demonstration of the FAE: Jones and Harris (1967)
These researchers asked their participants to read essays written by fellow
students. The essays were about Fidel Castro’s rule in Cuba and were either
supportive or critical of Castro. The participants’ task was to guess the attitude
the writers of the essays really held towards Castro and his government. Half the
participants were told that the essayists were free to choose whether to take a
positive or a negative view about Castro in their essay (Choice Condition). The
other half were told that the essayists did not have any choice. The experimenter
had assigned them in the pro-Castro or anti-Castro role (No Choice Condition).
As expected, participants in the Choice Condition assumed that the essays
reflected the genuine attitudes of their writers. However, participants’ ratings
seemed to indicate that those in the No Choice Condition also thought that the
essays reflected the genuine views of their authors. So, despite the fact that it
was made clear that the essayists’ behaviour was severely constrained by the
situation observers still opted for an internal attribution.
1. Is it likely that participants in this study simply responded to its demand
characteristics?
2. How do you think you would have behaved as a participant in the No
Choice Condition?
An experiment by Gilbert and Jones (1986) went further by demonstrating that
participants would still hold speakers responsible for the views they express even
when it was the participants themselves that determined which side of the
argument the speakers were allowed to argue.
The FAE has been demonstrated in many studies (Jones, 1979). Yet, as
discussed below, there is evidence to suggest that dispositional attributions are
far from inevitable.
In a study by Fein et al. (1990) American students read an essay about a
character called Rob Taylor. In one of the conditions the participants were told
that Rob had been assigned to write either in favour or against some view. In
this condition the expected FAE was obtained. In a second condition,
participants were led to believe that Rob’s essay expressed views which were
very similar to those held by his professor and which, therefore, would be found
pleasing by his professor. In this condition no FAE was demonstrated.
Commenting on this and other similar studies, Fein (2001) argues that resist
making dispositional attributions in situations where we suspect actors may have
ulterior motives for their behaviours.
In their explanation of the FAE, Gilbert and Malone (1995) argue that the FAE
involves a two-step attribution process. When we observe some behaviour we
draw an inference, based on largely automatic and often unconscious
processing, that the behaviour has been caused by some disposition. The
second step is based on more controlled and conscious processing. During this
second step we enquire into whether perhaps, situational factors had an
influence of the behaviour we try to explain. We make the FAE as often as we
do, Gilbert and Malone explain, for a simple reason. Whereas the first step
always forms part of the attribution process, we only occasionally proceed to the
second step. In effect, the FAE happens either because we are involved in other
tasks and there are not enough cognitive resources to think deeply about how
best to explain some behaviour, or we believe that for the behaviour under
consideration the automatic step on its own can result in the right explanation.
Gilbert and Malone’s two-step explanation of the FAE has received considerable
experimental support (Gilbert and Malone, 1995).
Key fact: We often commit the FAE because we are mentally lazy.
Self-Serving Bias
Our attributions exhibit the self-serving bias (SSB) when we explain our
successes on the basis of internal, dispositional factors and blame our failures to
external, situational factors. Such biased attributions are viewed by many as
serving the interests of preserving or increasing self-esteem.
Take, for example, professional sport. As Lau and Russell (1980) showed,
professional athletes and coaches attribute 80% of their wins to internal factors
(e.g., ability, skill, professionalism). Losses are far more likely to be attributed to
external factors (e.g., bad luck or unfair refereeing). Studies with students have
obtained very similar findings. Bernstein et al. (1979) found that students tended
to attribute their good grades to their intelligence and hard work, whereas those
attaining bad grades tended to attribute them to bad teaching or bad luck.
An early experimental study of the SSB is presented in Box 2.
Box 2. A demonstration of the SSB: Johnson et al. (1964)
In Johnson et al.’s (1964) study psychology students taught, via a one-way
intercom system, two children how to multiply numbers by 10 and by 20. The
first phase involved teaching the children how to multiply by 10. In a second
phase the children were taught how to multiply by 20. The participants inspected
the children’s worksheets, made available to them by the experimenters, after
each phase to assess their learning progress. The worksheets were in fact
marked in such a way that in both conditions, pupil A gave the right answers to
all the questions on both worksheets. Depending on condition, pupil B either did
badly on both tasks, or did badly on the first worksheet but improved on the
second. The students, therefore, either failed or succeeded in teaching pupil B
the two tasks.
What Johnson et al. found was that in the condition where the pupil B’s
performance improved, the students explained the improvement as a success
based on their abilities as teachers. When the pupil B failed to improve, on the
other hand, they attributed this to the pupil’s lack of ability.
Although, like the FAE, the SSB is widespread there are exceptions. We are
more likely to rely on self-serving attributions when we fail in a domain in which
we cannot improve. However, as Duval and Silva (2002) demonstrated, we are
more likely to attribute our failure to internal causes if we believe we can do
something to improve the situation in the future.
The emotional state we are in also affects our reliance on the SSB as being in a
bad mood is likely to reverse the attributional pattern that characterises selfserving attributions (Forgas, et al., 1999). Furthermore, Abramson et al.’s (1978)
demonstrated that depressed people often rely on an attributional style that
attributes success to external, and failure to internal, causes.
How can the attributional style that defines the SSB to be explained? Zuckerman
(1979) reviewed a number of studies of the SSB and confirmed that the effect
depends on a desire to maintain self-esteem. Evidence from cross-cultural
studies is consistent with this interpretation. Heine et al. (1999), for example,
found that members of collectivistic cultures like Japan are far less likely to strive
for a positive self-esteem than individuals from individualistic cultures like the
North Americans. Consequently, the Japanese were found to be less likely to
make self-serving attributions than North Americans (Heine et al., 1999).
Miller and Ross (1975) proposed that several uses of self-serving attributions are
rational and not at all based on the need to enhance self-esteem. They argue
that what seem to be self-serving biases often arise because effort changes
together with success but not with failure. If trying harder does not improve
performance, then it is reasonable to conclude that something about the task is
presenting the obstacle. However, if trying harder does improve performance,
then success is logically attributable to your trying.
Exercise: Use Miller and Ross’s views on the SSB to offer an explanation of the
attributions made by participants in Johnson et al.’s study rational.
TOK link: If we can be so wrong about ourselves how can we have any
confidence when making knowledge claims in other domains?