Download Muslims` Pre-Westphalian “International Relations”

Muslims’ Pre-Westphalian “International Relations”
Najibullah Lafraie
(Department of Politics, University of Otago, New Zealand)
Paper to be presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress in Madrid, July 2012
This is a draft, not to be used for quotation and citation.
The author welcomes any feedback, comments and criticism.
(email address: [email protected])
Muslims’ Pre-Westphalian “International Relations”
Abstract
The main aim of this article is to assess how Muslims’ international relations prior to their
integration into European international system differed from the post-Westphalian
international relations. Based on classical division of the world by Muslim jurists into the
territories of peace and war, original notion of Islam’s international relations is generally seen
as a permanent war between Muslim and non-Muslim states. Given the fact that war was “an
ever-present feature of the ancient and medieval worlds”, Muslim states being engaged in
continuous wars is not surprising. But did “permanent war” mean that they lacked diplomatic,
commercial and other types of peaceful relations with non-Muslim states? This question is the
focus of the first section of the article. Second and third sections chart the division of one
unitary Islamic state into several and examine their relations among themselves and the impact
of the division on the lives of general Muslim populations. Section four uses the English
School approach to compare Muslims’ pre-Westphalian international relations to modern
international relations. The study finds some similarities and differences. Muslim states were
territorial based sovereigns who actively engaged in war and diplomacy and resented outside
intervention. Sovereignty and its associated concepts had somehow different connotations,
though. Moreover, the Muslim world formed an international society in the domains of
transnational society and interhuman society, but not in the domain of interstate society.
The origin of the contemporary international system and international relations is traced to
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which “legitimized a commonwealth of sovereign states” and
established “the European international society,” paving the way for the current “global
international society” by slowly expanding to various parts of the world. 1 The first Muslim
state to be incorporated into the new international society was the Ottoman Empire in the mid
19th century, followed by others mostly through the process of decolonisation in the 20th
century. How did Muslim states conduct their relations with non-Muslim states and among
themselves prior to their inclusion into the new system and society? The aim of this article is
to investigate this question. Based on the classical division of the world by scholars of
Islamic jurisprudence into the territories of peace and war (dar al Islam and dar al harb
respectively), the original notion of Islam’s international relations is generally seen as a
permanent war between the Muslim and non-Muslim states until the former establishes ‘Pax
Islamica’ by bringing the whole world under its domination. 2 The fact that the Muslim states
were engaged in continuous wars either for expansion or self-defence is not surprising
because “[w]ar was an ever-present feature of the ancient and medieval worlds.” 3 But did
“permanent war” mean that they lacked diplomatic, commercial and other types of peaceful
relations with non-Muslim states? This question will be the focus of the first section of the
article. The second section will chart the division of one unitary Islamic state into several and
will examine their relations among themselves. The third section will explore the impact of
that division on the lives of the general Muslim populations. Based on the other three
sections, section four will use the English School approach to assess how Muslims’
“international relations” prior to Muslim countries’ integration into European international
1
Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (New York:
Routledge, 2009, 1st published in 1992), chapters 17 and 22.
2
See, for example, Majid Khadduri, “The Islamic Theory of International Relations and its Contemporary
Relevance,” in J. Harris Proctor (ed.), Islam and International Relations (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965); and
David George, “Pax Islamica: An Alternative New World Order?” in Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan
Ehteshami, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).
3
Philip de Souza and John France, “Introduction” in Philip de Souza and John France (eds.), War and Peace in
Ancient and Medieval History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 4.
system differed from the post-Westphalian international relations. Finally the conclusion will
sum up the findings of the study.
Muslims’ relations with non-Muslim states before Westphalia
Islam rose in a world dominated by two superpowers, the Roman and the Persian empires,
“everlastingly at war” with each other. 4 Thus, it was perhaps inevitable that war would
characterise the foreign relations of the Islamic state for a long time to come. The aim of this
section is not to challenge this fact of history. What I want to do is, rather, to investigate why
Muslims engaged in war and to see if Muslims were always prone to war or opted for peace
as well.
Early period
Muslims’ early wars can be seen as wars of self defence. After the establishment of the
Islamic state in Madina, “The Meccans were much angered with the Medinites for sheltering
Mohammed and his disciples, whom they considered as revolutionaries, and a conflict
between them and the people of Medina was unavoidable.” 5 That is why the Quran declared:
“Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged” (22:
39). Muslims were able to successfully defend themselves and overcome their enemies
against all odds. Soon Islam spread from the Arabian heartland to the east and the west
among the Arab tribes loyal to the Persians and the Romans, bringing them in contact with
those empires. Initial clashes and raids soon escalated into fully fledged wars. The first clash
with the Roman Empire took place during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad when the
Muslim army that he had sent to take retribution from a certain Arab tribe for killing his
emissary encountered a well prepared, and much larger, Byzantine army. 6 The origin of the
war with Persia goes back to the “work of pacification in the north-east of Arabia [which]
brought the Moslems into collision with the wandering tribes subject to Hira, a semi-Arab
kingdom which at that time acknowledged the suzerainty of Persia.” 7 It is interesting to note
that after the initial Persian defeat, a peace treaty was concluded “by which the Persian range
was made the boundary between the two empires; and the Caliph [Omar] now issued
peremptory injunctions that the Saracens were under no circumstance to go beyond that
limit.” 8 Only after continuous breaches of the treaty by the Persian monarch, earnest pleas by
his generals, and the testimony of a converted Persian, “It now became clear to Omar that the
ban against an advance towards the east must be withdrawn.” 9
Self defence may count as part of the reason for Muslims waging war against the Roman and
Persian empires. Muslims were also inspired by the new universal revolutionary message of
Islam. They believed that Muhammad was sent as “a mercy to all people” (Quran, 21: 107)
and wanted to make his teachings available to all. A Muslim scholar describes Islam as “an
imperial faith” and argues that it actually means “‘Islam as liberating religion’ since Muslims
interpret their chronicle of conquests as the world’s emancipation from the darkness of
4
David Levering Lewis, God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, 570-1215 (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2008), p. 4.
5
Syed Ameer Ali, Short History of the Saracens (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1953, first published in 1889),
p. 12.
6
Michael Fishbein, trans., The History of al-Tabari (Volume VIII): The Victory of Islam (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1985), pp. Xviii, 152-60. For the first battle leading to further war, see Ameer
Ali, Short History of the Saracens, op. cit., pp. 34-42.
7
Syed Ameer Ali, Short History of the Saracens (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1953, first published in 1889),
p. 24.
8
Ibid., p. 30.
9
Ibid., pp. 31-32.
paganism and the corrupted monotheism of Judaism and Christianity.” 10 If initially that
“emancipation” meant sending emissaries to various regions, as in the case of the Prophet
Muhammad’s delegation to the Arab tribes allied with the Romans mentioned earlier, soon it
was used as an excuse for expansionism, especially after the end of the Righteous Caliphs’
era—described by some as “the Republic”— 11and its transformation into dynastic
monarchies. Some of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs and the autonomous rulers under
them, as well as some Ottoman sultans later on, may have sincerely wanted to promote the
cause of Islam through their expansionist policies, but undoubtedly many others undertook
those policies for their self aggrandisement. In general those policies were not much different
from those of other rulers of the time, resorting to war when they felt strong and confident
and opting for peace when it suited them. However, the treatment of the subjugated people
was vastly different in most cases. 12
An exhaustive historical survey of diplomatic and commercial relations between the Islamic
and non-Muslim states is beyond the scope of this article, and details of such relations for the
Umayyad and Abbasid periods are not readily available. There is ample evidence, though,
that such relations did exist, peace treaties were signed and embassies were exchanged. The
peace treaty with the Christian Nubia, located in today’s northern Sudan and southern Egypt,
can be one example of peaceful coexistence of Muslim and non-Muslim states in early Islam.
It was concluded as early as 651 AD without any time limit and lasted for several hundred
years. 13 Early Muslims also had cordial relations with Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and refrained
from any hostility against it due to a narration attributed to the Prophet.14 As for relations
with the Roman Empire, one Muslim historian discusses at least four wars between Abbasids
and Byzantine—interestingly blaming the wars on the latter—followed by peace
agreements. 15 According to another source, “Diplomatic relations between Byzantine and the
Abbasids were conducted on a more regular basis than they had been with Umayyads and
were sometimes cordial. ... [T]he existence of embassies is a sign that the Abbasids accepted
that the Byzantine empire was a power with which they had to deal on equal terms.” 16 The
author also notes the interesting case of exchange of emissaries and gifts between the
Frankish Emperor Charlemagne and the illustrious Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid. 17 The
initiative seems to have come from Charlemagne, but the fact that Harun al-Rashid
reciprocated demonstrates that Muslim rulers were open to friendly relations with nonMuslim states even at the height of their power.
Fatimids
The Fatimids, who established their rule in North Africa at the beginning of the 10th century
and moved to Egypt a few decades later, “despite occasional show of confrontation, ... signed
ten-year non-belligerency treaties with Byzantium and regularly renewed them till the
10
Shabbir Akhtar, Islam as Political Religion: The future of an imperial faith (London: Routledge, 2011), p.
170.
11
Ameer Ali, Short History of the Saracens, op. cit., pp. 20-54.
12
See, for example, Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), p. 47.
13
Masri, The Classical Conceptions Of Treaty, op. cit. pp. 273. See also Khadduri, War and Peace, op. cit. pp.
259-61.
14
Masri, The Classical Conceptions Of Treaty, op. cit. pp. 266-9; Khadduri, War and Peace, op. cit. pp. 253-8.
15
Ameer Ali, Short History of the Saracens, op. cit., pp. 233, 246, 272 and 285.
16
Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the
Eleventh Century (London and NY: Longman, 1986), p. 147-8.
17
Ibid., p. 148. See also Khadduri, War and Peace, op. cit. pp. 246-7. Both authors note that some scholars have
doubted that such exchange took place; but they themselves seem to find the story credible.
coming of the Crusades.” 18 The 1027 treaty is particularly important not only because the two
sides recognised the territorial gains of each other, but also for its provision on religious
matters. In return for the reconstruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem by
the Fatimids, the Byzantine emperor agreed “to permit the invocation of [caliph’s] name in
the prayers at the mosque in Constantinople, to provide for the repairs of the mosque and to
recognize the appointment of a muezzin.” 19 Not all the treaties were for 10 years, though. The
term of the 1038 treaty was 30 years. “Economically it was foolish to be on poor terms, as
each empire was a major trading partner of the other. Politically, a Fatimid-Byzantine
alliance created an enormous power with complete control of the Mediterranean and further
bolstered each empire’s defences.” 20
Mamluks
The termination of the Fatimid caliphate by Salahuddin Ayubi (Saladin) towards the end of
the 12th century and the collapse of the Abbasid state in the hands of Mongols in 1258
resulted in the establishment of several Muslim states. Those in the west, particularly the
Mamluk Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire, developed close interrelationships with the
European powers. Mamluks have been described as “the principle trading partners of the
Venetian Republic during its rise to commercial supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This fragile but remarkably durable cooperation exploited the particular assets of each,
transferring huge quantities of valuable merchandise between Asia and Western Europe.” 21
Interestingly, while Muslims did not see any problem in trading with the Christians, except
for export of military equipments and import of Sharia-prohibited goods such as pork, the
Pope was not only against such a trade but totally banned it in 1320. Going even further, “in
1326 a bull of Pope John XXII imposed excommunication on anyone who violated the
prohibition”—though it was softened some two decades later. 22 Mamluks and Venetians
signed several trade agreements, the last one only ten years before the demise of the Mamluks
at the hand of the Ottomans. 23
Mamluks conducted active diplomatic relations for other purposes as well. In his book on
Early Mamluk Diplomacy, Peter Holt presents the text of 11 treaties between two successive
Mamluk monarchs and the Christian rulers of Levant, Genoa, Aragon and the Byzantine
Empire signed between 1267 and 1290. Most of the treaties are for a limited period with
limited scope—mainly concerning truce. However, they also include a treaty, the 1290 one
with Aragon, which has no time limit and aims to establish “amity, concord and friendship
[between the two sides] throughout the coming years.” The two parties also undertake not to
help each other’s enemies, and even go to the extent of stating that “This amity and
friendship shall continue perpetually and continuously between the two parties.” 24 Another
treaty, signed in 1281 with a Byzantine emperor, mutually commits the two parties “to
continue friendship and to establish pure love towards [each other] ... [and to] never
18
Abbas Hamdani, “Examples of Fatimid realpolitik,” Domes 7: 4 (1998), p. 4.
Ibid., p. 6.
20
K. E. F. Thomson, “Relations between the Fatimid and Byzantine empires during the reign of the caliph alMustans ir bi’llah, 1036–1094/427–487,” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 32 No. 1 (2008), p. 54.
21
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, Venice and the Islamic World, 828-1797 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007), p. 73.
22
Ibid., p. 75.
23
See Ibid., pp. 75-80 and John Wansbrough, “A Mamluk Ambassador to Venice in 913/1507,” Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1963), pp. 503-530.
24
Peter Malcolm Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 1260-1290: treaties of Baybars and Qalāwūn with Christian
rulers (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 132-138.
19
undertake hostilities against [each other] nor [to] move another to hostilities against [the other
side].” 25 It also provides for the protection of merchants and tax exemption of commodities. 26
Ottomans
The Ottoman Empire owed its origins to “Ghazi Sultans” who justified their rule, at least
partially, by their “jihad against the infidels”. Nonetheless, from the very beginning it entered
into political and commercial deals with its non-Muslim neighbours; and once firmly
established it engaged in extensive relations with many European powers, including the
Byzantine, Venice, Genoa, Habsburg, Hungary, France, England, and Poland. An evidence of
Ottoman rulers’ political deals is their marriages to European noble women in order to
“consolidate or extend their power." 27 An early example of such marriages is that of Orhan I,
the second Ottoman Sultan, to “the daughter of a pretender to the Byzantine throne, John
Cantacuzene, and receiv[ing] the strategically vital Gallipoli peninsula to boot.” 28 Orhan’s
son, grandson and great-grandson all married European nobility for territorial and political
gains. 29
Before the consolidation of the Ottoman state, its rival Turkish rulers in Asia Minor had
signed trade agreements with the Latin states—agreements which became models for similar
treaties with the Ottomans. As early as 1220, Venice had signed a commercial treaty with the
Saljuk sultan of Konya, the text of which has been preserved. 30 Extant are also two account
books belonging to the Genoese comune in Pera in the 1390s, clearly showing the
considerable amount of diplomatic exchange between the Ottomans and the Genoese. “The
Venetians too sent ambassadors to the Ottoman ruler to negotiate agreements, as in 1387 ...
[to] Murad I and ... to the court of Bayezid in 1390.” 31 Such trade agreements of the
Ottomans and other Anatolian principalities set out the level of taxation, guaranteed freedom
of movement of merchants and merchandise, and dealt with “the conditions under which a
resident foreign merchant community could function.” 32 The Muslim Anatolian states also
allowed the establishment of Latin consul which, inter alia, settled “within Latin jurisdiction”
the Latin-Latin disputes. 33
That tradition was followed by the Ottoman sultans when they voluntarily granted ahdnāmas
to European powers. “Ahdnāma” literally means “pledge,” but it is known in the West as
“capitulation,” an interesting example of differing cultural perceptions! It was granted
voluntarily when the empire was strong and was forced on Ottoman sultans when it became
weak. “A capitulation meant that all subjects of a foreign monarch and citizens of republics
such as Venice remained under the laws of their own king or republic once the capitulation
favor had been granted.” 34 Capitulation was first granted to France in the mid sixteenth
25
Ibid., p. 123.
Ibid., p. 126.
27
Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700—1922, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
p. 26.
28
Ibid.
29
See Ibid. and Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, op. cit., p. 103.
30
M. E. Martin, “Notes and Documents: The Venetian-Seljuk treaty of I220,” English Historical Review, Vol.
95, No. 375 (April 1980), pp. 321-30.
31
Kate Fleet, “Turkish-Latin Diplomatic Relations in the Fourteenth Century: the Case of the Consul,” Oriental
Moderno, vol. 83, No. 3 (2003), p. 606.
32
Ibid. For the text of an extant 14th century treaty see, Kate Fleet, “The Treaty of 1387 Between Murad I and
the Genoese,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 56 (1993): 13-33.
33
Fleet, “Turkish-Latin Diplomatic Relations in the Fourteenth Century,” op. cit., p. 611.
34
Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700—1922, op. cit. p. 79.
26
century and slowly extended to most other European powers. Originally it was valid only
during the lifetime of the Sultan who had granted it, and subject to renewal by the new sultan;
but it was made permanent in the mid 18th century. In granting capitulation, Ottoman sultans
expected reciprocal rights for their merchants. 35 According to many Western scholars, the
capitulation concept is “based on the idea that each state possessed its own laws too exalted
for others to enjoy”. 36 This opinion stems from a lack of proper understanding of Islam’s
view of other religions and laws. According to the Quran, God appointed a different “law and
way of life” to all the Messengers before Muhammad, as He did to him (Quran, 5: 48).
Followers of each prophet should apply their own God-given law. 37 Therefore, both Ottoman
ahdnāmas and the provisions letting the Latin powers’ consuls to apply their jurisdiction in
the Turkish territory seem to be based on the teachings of the Quran, rather than the rulers’
hubris.
The first Ottoman “capitulation” is believed to have been granted by Suleiman the
Magnificent to Francis I, king of France, in 1536. 38 That was the occasion of a friendship
treaty between the two monarchs as well. The French had first approached Sultan Suleiman
in 1525 and subsequently had sent several missions until the final agreement was reached.
Because of the timing of the initial approach, after Francis’ defeat at the battle of Pavia, and
the timing of signing the treaty, when Charles V of Spain was busy in North Africa, it is
generally believed that Francis was seeking an alliance against the common Habsburg enemy.
That may very well have been the case. However, it has been argued that the interest of the
two parties was much wider than just dealing with Charles V.
The French were certainly aware of the concessions long enjoyed by Venice and
Ragusa through their favored nation treaties with the Turks. In fact, France too (along
with the Catalans) had acquired commercial privileges in parts of the Mediterranean
as a result of its previous agreements with Egypt. These agreements were recognized
by Sultan Selim I following his conquest of the Mameluk kingdom and were
confirmed by Suleiman in 1528. ... The Turks too might gain from a commercial
agreement through its stimulating effect upon the Levant trade.39
The treaty that was signed focused on commercial cooperation between the two sides. It
guaranteed freedom of commerce, provided for the establishment of French consuls at the
Ottoman capital and some other cities, exempted French merchants from any new taxes, and
allowed French subjects to freely practice their Christian faith in Ottoman territory. 40 “The
military and political terms were secret and oral only. The idea was to attack Charles V in
Italy: France from the north and the Ottomans from the south and east.” 41
35
A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” in A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed.), Ottoman
Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 28.
36
Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700—1922, op. cit., p. 78.
37
See, for example, the Quran, 5: 43 and 5: 47.
38
De Lamar Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy,” The Sixteenth Century
Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter, 1985), p. 456. Some other scholars see the 1453 decree by Sultan Mehmed II to
allow foreigners to live in the Genoese Galata as the first case of capitulation (see, for example, Goffman, The
Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, op. cit., p. 183).
39
Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy,” op. cit., p. 453.
40
Ibid., p. 456. For military cooperation of the two sides based on the friendship treaty, see Christine Isom
Verhaaren, “‘Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us’: Ottoman and French Views of Their
Joint Campaign of 1543–1544,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 395-425.
41
Thomas Naff, “The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson
(eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 146. Naff also
presents a detailed account of the background of the treaty and its significance (pp. 145-8).
The peace agreement with France also resulted in the establishment of that country’s
permanent embassy in Istanbul. 42 Venice was the first European state with a resident
ambassador at the Ottoman court. It used to have an embassy in Constantinople during the
Byzantine rule, and Sultan Mehmed II allowed it to continue after the conquest of the city in
1453. France was followed by the Dutch Republic and England. By the early 17th century,
the Ottoman court was so busy with diplomatic missions that the English Ambassador there
reported, “Here are many ambassadors, all experienced and tried in other parts, before they
arrive at this trust. Here is a concourse of all nations, great and many varieties, important to
Christendom.” 43 The Ottomans themselves, however, did not establish a permanent embassy
in any European country—or anywhere else for that matter—until the end of the 18th century.
Their reluctance to do so is attributed to their “unshakeable sense of superiority to the entire
Christian world” resulting from Islam. 44 This view has been challenged by some Turkish
scholars who attribute the attitude to the imperial nature of the state and the general practice
of the time. 45 Whatever the reason, Ottomans’ lack of resident embassies did not diminish
their role in the emerging renaissance diplomacy. In fact, it has been argued that “the
formulating of some of the most essential elements of the modern world’s diplomatic system
– permanent missions, extraterritoriality, and reciprocity – drew upon the experience of the
directors of Florentine, Genoese, and Venetian settlements in the Ottoman domain.” 46
Absence of Ottomans’ permanent embassies did not mean that they were always at the
receiving end of diplomatic missions. On the contrary, they were very active in sending
ambassadors to European courts on ad hoc basis. “Between 1384 and 1600, 145 temporary
envoys were sent by the sultan to Venice alone.” 47 The purposes of sending such envoys
included “informing or greeting accessions to the throne;” “delivering ratified peace
agreements (ratification);” “conveying Sultans’ letters (credential)”; “peace talks and
discussion of truces;” “frontier demarcations;” “reciprocating a foreign envoy;” and “the
establishment or continuance of peaceful and friendly relations.” 48 The envoys consisted not
only of Muslims but of Christian and Jewish subjects of the Ottoman as well. 49 However,
“There was no special class of professional diplomats during the ad hoc period. ... The sultans
distinguished envoys according to destination, the nature of the mission and the importance
of the receiving country. Knowledge of a foreign language was determinant factor in
selection.” 50
Both receiving and sending embassies by the Ottoman sultans is evidence of their favourable
attitude towards diplomacy. Their diplomacy is described to have been characterised by “a
synthesis of abstract Islamic principles with Ottoman realpolitik.” 51 Islamic discourse played
42
Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy,” Op. cit., pp. 456-7.
G. R. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” in Yurdusev (ed.), Ottoman
Diplomacy op. cit., p. 117.
44
M. S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993), p. 9 quoted in
Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” op. cit. p. 7. Yurdusev also discusses similar views
expressed by several other Western authors (see pp. 6-10).
45
Ibid., pp. 21, 26, 30; Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration” op. cit. pp. 118-24.
46
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, op. cit. p. 186.
47
Ibid., p. 116.
48
Ari, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy,” op. cit. p. 48.
49
Ibid., p. 44.
50
Ibid., p. 48.
51
Bulent Ari, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” in Yurdusev (ed.), Ottoman Diplomacy, op. cit., p.
37.
43
an important role in sultans’ courts. “In theory, they always tried to observe Islamic rules via
fetva, the declaration that whatever was done was compatible with the rules of Islam, issued
by the Grand Mufti, Sheik ul-Islam.” 52 The classical division of the world into dar al-Islam,
dar al-harb and dar al-sulh (abode of peaceful arrangement) featured prominently, and their
grants of safe conduct and “capitulation” were based on amān and ahdnāma. 53 However,
rather than seeing the Islamic jurisprudent as inflexible, “the Ottomans followed Muslim
jurists who elaborated a series of interpretations.” 54 That might have been due to their
adherence to the Hanafi School of Law, which “[u]ses reason, logic, opinion (ray), analogy
(qiyas), and preference (istihsan) in the formulation of laws [and its legal] doctrines are
relatively liberal.” 55
Realpolitik
Evidence of Ottoman realpolitik is the sultans’ alliances with some European powers against
others for political and territorial gains. Some examples were mentioned above, but numerous
other examples can be found. In the mid 14th century the Ottoman rulers sent “armed forces
into Europe at the behest of Byzantine factions eager for aid in the civil wars that
distinguished imperial politics in that period.” 56 In 1414 Ottoman and Polish rulers signed a
peace agreement which was seen as an alliance against Hungary; and in 1478 “the Ottomans
sent envoys to Poland with gifts and a proposal of combined action against Hungary.”57
European powers also approached Ottoman sultans in their rivalries against each other.
Naples and the Pope sought Ottoman help against Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494,
and the Sultan’s ambassador was present when the Holy League was signed in 1495. 58 “In the
ensuing sporadic war (1495-1502) the Empire attained the status of a major naval power with
newly aroused interest in the western Mediterranean.” 59 On other occasions as well “the
Italian city-states would threaten to call on the Ottomans against their enemies when in dire
straits.” 60 That provided the Ottoman Empire the opportunity to become “an active
participant” in the balance of power system that was emerging in Europe. 61
Finally another feature of not only the Ottoman but other pre-Westphalian Muslim rulers’
foreign relations evidence of realpolitik is their alliances with non-Muslim powers again their
Muslim rivals. The early Ottomans used their non-Muslim allies and vassals in their
campaigns to subjugate their Muslim rival rulers and consolidate their power in Anatolia. 62
Once consolidated, however, they did not see much need for the help of non-Muslims.
Instead, they became subject of attempted alliances by their Muslim rival the Persian
Safavids and European powers. The first Safavid monarch, Shah Ismael, sent a letter to the
Venetian Doge which “commenced with lengthy declarations of friendship and brotherly
52
Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” op. cit. p. 14.
Ari, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy,” op. cit. pp. 40-41.
54
Ibid., p. 42.
55
John L. Esposito, ed. Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford University Press Inc. 2003), “Hanafi School of
Law.” Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Otago University. 23 November
2011 <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t125.e798>
56
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, op. cit. p. 42.
57
Krzysztof Wawrzyniak, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations in the Sixteenth Century, MA thesis (Ankara:
Bilkent University, 2003), pp. 24 and 26. The source also discusses several other attempts of alliance between
the Ottoman and Poland against common enemies (see pp. 30-34).
58
Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” op. cit. p. 22.
59
Naff, “The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,” op. cit., p. 145.
60
Ari, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy,” op. cit. p. 38.
61
Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” op. cit. p. 22.
62
See, for example, Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 14.
53
love. Safavids and Venetians were compelled to fight the Turks for the love of God [sic].
Ismael proposed that they launch a joined attack on the Ottomans.” 63 Venice’s response was
sympathetic, but it excused itself for being engaged in the war of the League of Cambrai. 64
Shah Ismael also positively received an envoy from the Hungarian King in the late 1510s and
through his ambassador, Father Petro, sent a letter to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V
inviting him to act together against the Ottomans. 65 Such efforts for alliances continued
throughout the 16th and early 17th centuries. In 1579 Pope Gregory XIII sent a delegation to
the Safavid court encouraging a war with the Ottomans and promising to provide military and
financial support. 66 In 1595 there was still another alliance, organised by the Habsburgs,
“forcing the Ottomans to fight a two-front war.” 67 In 1598 a 26 member delegation from
England, headed by Antony and Robert Shirley, reached the court of Shah Abbas I. The two
brothers stayed in Iran for many years, training and reforming the army, building artillery,
and serving as Persian King’s ambassadors to European courts. 68
Intra-Muslims relations before Westphalia
Many Muslims mourn the demise of the Ottoman Empire after the World War I as the end of
the Islamic state established by the Prophet Muhammad in Madina, and followed by the
Righteous Caliphs, in the 7th century. While it is true that the Ottoman Empire was the last,
and the longest lasting, state claiming the title of “caliphate”, that claim was never universally
acknowledged and the Ottomans had to always deal with rival Muslim states. In effect, the
unity of the Islamic state had ended as early as the mid eight century when the Abbasids
removed the Umayyad dynasty from power at the heartland of Islam and a member of the
latter established an independent state in Al Andalus (Muslim Spain). It is interesting that the
Umayyad rulers of Spain also adopted the title of Khalifa (caliph). That was followed by
another rival “caliphate” in Egypt under the Ismaili Shiite dynasty of Fatimid. In fact,
“[s]ince the Khalifa, the holder of Khilafat, had an inherent claim to the leadership of the
ummah [Muslim community], every Muslim monarch coveted this position.” 69 As we will
see later, despite the de facto existence of numerous Muslim states and the classical Islamic
scholars providing justifications for it, the claims and counterclaims of khilafat and
leadership of the ummah continued until at least the 18th century. 70
Early divisions
The Umayyad domain in Spain was separated from that of Abbasids by the Mediterranean
Sea, and therefore they did not have much official interaction with each other. 71 By the time
63
Sinan Kueralp (ed.), Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1987), p. 17.
Ibid., p. 18.
65
Abul Qasim Tahiri, Tarikh-e Seyasi wa Ijtima’i Iran az Marg-e Taimor ta Marg-e Saha Abbas (Iran’s
Political and Social History from the Death of Timor to the Death of Shah Abbas) (Tehran: Shirkat-e Sahami
Kitabhai Jaibi in cooperation with Franklin Publishers, 1970), pp. 169-70.
66
Ibid., pp. 271-4.
67
Naff, “The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,” op. cit., p. 148.
68
For the details of the two brothers’ activities and Shah Abbas’s relations with European powers see, David
Blow, Shah Abbas: The Ruthless King Who Became an Iranian Legend (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).
69
Naimu Rahman Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political and Diplomatic Relations between
Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556-1748 (Delhi: Idara-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1989), p. 174.
70
Space limitation does not allow discussion of these two important concepts. For a concise account of the
conceptual and institutional development of caliphate see Ibid., pp. 173-221; and for an analysis of the concept
of ummah see C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, “The Ummah: An Analytic Approach,” Studia Islamica, No. 10
(1959), pp. 5-22.
71
Subsequently some scholars spoke “in favour of the coexistence of two Khalifas simultaneously on the
condition that the Khalifas concerned must be far apart from one another” (Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations,
op. cit., p. 206).
64
the Fatimid caliphate was established, the Abbasids were in decline and numerous
autonomous rulers had established themselves all over the Islamic Empire; some of them
bringing even the capital Baghdad under their control and confining the caliph to his palace
with only a ceremonial role. It was due to such circumstances that the Fatimid dynasty was
invited by Egyptian nobles, after the outbreak of serious troubles there, “to take possession of
the country, and to give them peace and order.” 72 From Egypt, the Fatimids were soon able to
conquer Syria and Hijaz, bringing the holy cities of Makkah and Madina under their control.
Despite this, the Abbasids remained the legitimate caliphs for the majority of Muslims
because of their Sunni inclination. Again there is not much evidence of official interaction
between the Fatimid and Abbasid caliphs, except for some clashes and wars.
One of the first decrees of the Fatimids upon assuming power in Egypt was “to remove the
name of the Abbasid caliph from the khutbas (sermons) delivered in Egyptian mosques, and
to publicly proclaim the authority of the Fatimid caliph from the pulpit of [the capital’s
central mosque].” 73 Subsequently the Fatimid caliph’s name was pronounced from the pulpits
of the holy mosques in Makkah and Madina as well. 74 The practice of mentioning a ruler’s
name during the khutbas (sermons) of Friday Prayers and Eid Prayers was a symbolic act to
acknowledge the sovereignty of the ruler. 75 The other symbol was issuing coinage in the
name of the sovereign. The sultans and amirs of the Muslim world demonstrated their
allegiance to a particular caliph through these means. In return, in most cases they received a
credential letter and some symbolic gifts from the caliph. “A title of honour conferred by the
Khalifa was regarded a great honour and was deemed to have added to the dignity and
prestige of a ruler.” 76 As far away as in India, the Sultan of Delhi at the beginning of the 13th
century sought and obtained “a letter of investiture from the Khalifa of Baghdad.” 77 Even
after the collapse of the caliphate in Baghdad, the Delhi sultans continued to read the khutba
and issue coinage in the name of the Abbasid caliphs, although they themselves were
“powerful and domineering.” 78 This shows that the sultans’ motivation may have been more
to follow what they perceived a religious obligation than any political gain. By this time a
member of the Abbasid dynasty was declared “caliph” by the Mamluks and installed in
Cairo, but he lacked the slightest measure of power and authority, even losing the right to
have the khutba and coinage in his name. In many cases, though, political and material gains
did play at least some role.
The practical impact of sultans and amirs giving their allegiance to a caliph was minimal.
There were numerous cases of the same ruler changing his fealty from one caliph to another,
and sometimes reverting to the original one in matter of months. 79 Various rulers did not
impose any restrictions on Muslims travelling through their territories. Furthermore, “the
existence of Islamic state institutions throughout provide[d] a united political vision [because
72
Ameer Ali, Short History of the Saracens, op. cit., p. 599. Earlier the Fatimids had brought much of North
Africa under their control after finding a foothold in Tunisia.
73
Shainool Jiwa, Towards a Shi'i Mediterranean Empire: Fatimid Egypt and the Founding of Cairo (London :
I.B.Tauris, 2009), p. 19.
74
Ibid., p. 21.
75
For the political significance of khutba see Paul Walker, Orations of the Fatimid Caliphs: Festival Sermons of
the Ismaili Imams (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009), especially pp. 6-13.
76
Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, op. cit., p. 175.
77
Ibid., p. 186.
78
Ibid.
79
For some interesting cases see Walker, Orations of the Fatimid Caliphs, op. cit., pp. 3, 9-11.
the] Abbasid Caliphate monetary, administrative, cultural or legal institutions … provided a
template copied by the new regimes throughout the provinces.” 80
Mamluks and their neighbours
Mongol invasion of the eastern parts of the Islamic empire and the sacking of Baghdad left
the Mamluks of Egypt as the most powerful Islamic state. Large areas at the heartland of
Islam were occupied by Genghis Khan’s descendants, who converted to Islam towards the
end of the 13th century. At the same time, numerous small Muslim “states” existed in the
Indian subcontinent, Al Andalus, North Africa and Anatolia. Egypt under Mamluks enjoyed
commercial and cultural exchange with all, but its political relations were mostly with those
at its immediate vicinity. The principalities there valued their contact with Mamluks because
of their high esteem as hosts of the Abbasid caliph, protectors of the holy cities, and
defenders of the faith against the Crusaders and Mongols. 81 When the Mamluk Sultan entered
Anatolia to counter the Mongol invasion in 1277, he established suzerainty over several local
rulers as well as creating a sphere of influence that lasted for about a century and half, despite
occasional attempts by some rulers to gain independence. “The Mamluks assured their
control of this region by building relationship of vassalage with semi nomadic Turkmen
tribes in the region and by appointing their leaders as Mamluk governors.” 82
The Ottoman principality at the beginning of the 14th century was located in northwest
Anatolia, far from Mamluk’s sphere of influence; and its initial expansion was in Byzantian
and Balkan lands, posing no threat to the Mamluks. Thus, the early relations between the
Mamluks and the Ottomans, which coincided with Ottomans’ consolidation of their authority
against other Anatolian principalities in the last decades of the 14th century, were cordial and
friendly. Correspondence took place and envoys and gifts were exchanged. The situation
changed when, utilising political instability in Cairo, the Ottoman Sultan attacked and
occupied several principalities under the Mamluks suzerainty in Anatolia in the mid 1490s.
Many scholars see war characterising their relationship thereafter, until Mamluks’ collapse.
Looking closely at the details of the relations, however, a researcher notes, “as the two
Muslim Sunni powers in the region, the Ottomans and the Mamluks sustained a [sic]
communication for a period of slightly longer than hundred fifty years and were engaged in
active military conflicts at most for ten years.” 83 He mentions the common threat that both
the Mamluks and the Ottomans faced from the Timurid state in the first half of the 15th
century as an important factor bringing back the two parties close to each other. They
exchanged envoys and even corresponded to “share their concerns regarding the affairs of
[the Anatolian] principalities.” 84 However, Mehmed II, who fought and won against the
Byzantine Empire, adopted an expansionist policy in Anatolia as well, capturing
principalities in the Mamluks’ sphere of influence and challenging them in those under their
suzerainty. Despite reaching an agreement in 1472, the Ottoman challenge to the Mamluks in
Anatolia continued, leading to a six year war in the late 1480s. 85 In the first decade of the 16th
century, the Portuguese threat in the Red Sea and the rise of the Shiite Safavid state in Persia
again led to the warming up of the Mamluk and Ottomans relations. The exchange of envoys
80
Maya Shatzmiller, “Economic Performance and Economic Growth in the Early Islamic World,” Journal of
the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 54 (2011) pp. 163-4.
81
Emire Cihan Muslu, “Ottoman-Mamluk Relations: Diplomacy and Perceptions,” Ph. D. Thesis(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, 2007), pp. 28-9.
82
Ibid., p. 33.
83
Muslu, “Ottoman-Mamluk Relations,” op. cit., p. 25.
84
Ibid., p. 39.
85
Ibid., pp. 41-5.
and correspondence in this period was mostly concerned with these issues. 86 In 1510, the
Ottoman Sultan even sent his navy to Alexandria in support of the Mamluks against “the
approaching Portuguese threat.” 87 However, when a new Ottoman sultan came to power and
succeeded in defeating the Safavids in 1514, his next move was against the contested
territories of Anatolia. The war, which started in 1515, ended with the fall of the Mamluks’
capital Cairo in 1517. A researcher who has examined the diplomatic correspondence
between the two parties prior to the war comes to the conclusion that “attitudes and feelings
fluctuated between friendliness, cool formality, cautiousness, and suspicion. Finally the
tenuous association deteriorated to outright war.” 88
Ottoman-Safavid relations
Unlike the Mamluks, who were Sunni Muslims, the Persian Safavids were Shiites. Thus, in
addition to a political challenge, they posed a religious challenge to the Ottomans. The
presence and propaganda of pro Safavid Shiites within the Ottoman territory created an
internal risk factor too. Despite this, the initial Ottoman reaction to the emergence of the
Safavids was positive. After the early victories of Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid
state, the Ottoman Sultan sent an ambassador with gifts to his court to congratulate him. 89
The tone of his letter may not have been pleasant to Shah Ismail, though. The Ottoman Sultan
advised him to avoid killing too many people and forcing Shiism on them. Nonetheless,
several friendly letters were exchanged from 1504 to 1510. Only after Shah Ismail defeated
the Ottomans’ Uzbek ally and sent his head to the Ottoman Sultan did the relations
deteriorate. 90 That coincided with a rebellion by pro Safavid Shiites in southern Anatolia,
which was suppressed by the Ottomans with some difficulty. 91 After crushing the revolt, the
Ottoman Sultan sent another letter to Shah Ismail again advising him against bloodshed and
noting that “sending Shaibak Khan’s head would not frighten brave Ottoman Sultans.” He
further added,
The country of Iran is like a bridge linking two vast territories where Muslims reside.
This bridge needs a powerful guardian to stop the enemies of Islam when needed and
with the help of ghazis prevent the invaders from crossing the bridge to the other
territory. It seems God have chosen you for guarding that bridge.92
Shah Ismail seems to have disregarded the advice of the old, wise Ottoman Sultan. When
Sultan Selim assumed power in 1512, Shah Ismail ignored sending a delegation to
congratulate him. Worse yet, he killed all members of Salim’s delegation who had brought
his letter asking the return of his brother who had taken refuge in Iran. 93 That led to exchange
of several belligerent letters full of insults and finally to a war between the two parties. The
86
Ibid., pp. 46-7. For a list of envoys for this period as well as those before and after, see “Appendix”, Ibid. pp.
222-47.
87
Ibid., p. 74.
88
Yousif Ali Al-Thakafi, “The Diplomatic Relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Mamluk Empire
in the First Quarter of the Sixteenth Century,” Ph. D. Thesis (Michigan: Michigan State University, 1981), p. 3.
89
Ali Akbar Valayati, Tarikh-e Rawabet-e Khariji Iran dar A’ad-e Shah Ismail Safavi (Iran’s Foreign Relations
during Shah Ismail Safavid’s Rule) (Tehran: Daftar-e Mutale’at-e Siyasi va Bainulmilali Wazarat-e Umoor-e
Khareja, 1357 [1978]), p. 101.
90
Ibid., pp. 102-7.
91
Osman G. Özgüdenli, “Ottoman-Persian Relations i.Under Sultan Selim I and Shah Ismail I,” Encyclopaedia
Iranica (2006); available online: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ottoman-persian-relations-i-under-sultanselim-i-and-shah-esmail-i.
92
Valayati, Tarikh-e Rawabet-e Khariji Iran, op. cit., pp. 110-1. Persian to English translation of the quotations
by the author.
93
Ibid., pp. 113-7.
victorious Ottoman Sultan halted his advancement, but refused to sign a ceasefire treaty with
the Safavids. “By describing the clash of the Iranian and Ottoman armies at Childiran in 1514
as a struggle between religion and unbelief, Ottoman chroniclers began a long tradition of
portraying the Safavids as kuffar (infidels).” 94
The Ottoman anti Safavid and anti-Shiite propaganda intensified during the reign of Sultan
Suleyman, Selim’s successor. Not only religious scholars continued issuing harsh fitwas
(verdicts), 95 the Sultan himself wrote poetry reading which one “would conclude that he was
so obsessed with the extermination of the Shi’i heretics as to be willing to abandon all other
causes.” 96 However, initially he adopted a much milder policy towards the Safavids than his
father. He removed the trade embargo imposed by Sultan Selim, avoided any hostile actions
towards Persia, and focused his wars on European countries.
The last thing Suleyman wanted to see was the erection of a Berlin wall between
Sunni Anatolia and the kizilbas in neighboring Safavid Azerbaijan, or the
embroilment of Muslim states in a mutually destructive war in the Persian Gulf which
would hasten the triumph of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. 97
His policy made great Iranian religious scholars to deem an attack on the Ottomans
impermissible and to discourage Shah Ismail, who was always bent to revenge his defeat,
from doing so. 98 After Shah Ismail’s death, Suleyman sent a letter to the young Shah
Tahmasb inviting him “to renounce his adherence to Shi'i doctrine.” Understandably he
received an impolite reply, which led to the exchange of a number of insulting letters. 99 A
war followed many years later when Sultan Suleyman used some provocative acts by the
Safavid Shah as a pretext to launch an attack on Persian territory in 1533. After capturing
Baghdad and some other cities, Suleyman stopped his advancement. Two other campaigns
were launched in 1548 and 1551 without achieving much positive results, leading to
negotiations and the 1555 Treaty of Amasya, in which both parties recognised the existing
frontiers between them and the Safavid Shah agreed to stop the practice of cursing the first
three Righteous Caliphs of Islam. 100
The peace ensuing from the treaty lasted for more than two decades. Towards the end of
1570s, however, utilising the opportunity provided by instability in Persia, the Ottoman
Sultan started another war which continued for more than a decade and resulted in the
maximum expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Realising his inability to stop Ottomans’
incursions, the recently enthroned Shah Abbas I sent an embassy to Istanbul with expensive
gifts in 1590; agreeing to the “humiliating peace terms” set earlier by the Ottomans, “but with
every intention of resuming the fight once he was strong enough to do so.” 101 The Istanbul
treaty recognised all the Ottoman gains; obliged the Safavids to stop persecution of Sunni
94
Ernest Tucker, “The Peace Negotiations of 1736: The Conceptual Turning Point in Ottoman-Iranian
Relations,” The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 20 (1996), p. 17.
95
Ibid., p. 18.
96
Rhoads Murphey, "Suleyman's Eastern Policy," in Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar (eds), Suleyman the
Second and His Time (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993), pp. 229-248; available online, http://www.hnet.org/~fisher/hst373/readings/murphey1.html.
97
Ibid, p.
98
Valayati, Tarikh-e Rawabet-e Khariji Iran, op. cit., pp. 209.
99
Murphey, "Suleyman's Eastern Policy," op. cit.
100
Colin P.Mitchell, New Perspectives on Safavid Iran: Empire and Society (Hoboken : Taylor & Francis,
2011), p. 65.
101
Blow, Shah Abbas, op. cit., p. 36.
Muslims, the practice of cursing the first three caliphs, and spreading Shiite propaganda in
the Ottoman territory; and made Shah Abbas’s nephew a hostage at the Ottoman court,
guaranteeing his good faith. 102 However, by reforming his army and exploiting Ottomans’
internal problems, Shah Abbas succeeded to regain the lost territories in less than 15 years.
Several embassies were exchanged, and both sides expressed a desire for peace. The
stumbling block was Ottomans’ insistence on vacation of all the territories recaptured by the
Safavids while Shah Abbas was ready to agree at most to the frontiers set in Amasya. Shah
Abbas’s response to the Ottoman Sultan’s assertion that the war between the two Muslim
rulers only benefited the enemies of Islam is interesting:
“The lamp of the Ottoman empire’s prestige has shone with particular brilliance as a
result of the holy war and the raids it has conducted against the infidel. In addition,
the Ottoman Sultans are the guardians of the holy places of Mecca and Medina, a fact
which distinguishes them among other Muslim rulers and makes it incumbent upon
all Muslims to assist them. ... If the Ottoman Sultan will relinquish his claim to this
[regained] territory, I am ready at any time to discuss peace for the benefit of all
Muslims.” 103
Finally Shah Abbas’s offer to pay an annual tribute of 200 bales of silk as “compensation for
the territories he had won,” opened the way for the 1612 peace agreement on the basis of
status quo. 104 It seems that neither side was serious and sincere in its commitment to the 1612
treaty, though. The Ottomans wanted a return to the 1590 boundaries, and the Safavids
dreamt of regaining Baghdad. Ottomans lost in their efforts to reverse Shah Abbas’s gains;
and after several exchange of envoys and gifts the two parties signed another treaty in 1619,
which granted more territory to the Safavid Shah and reduced his tribute to 100 bales of silk
per annum. 105 Soon thereafter Shah Abbas was able to realise his dream of conquering
Baghdad in January 1624 by exploiting the opportunity provided by palace coups and
rebellions in the Ottoman Empire. Ottomans’ counteroffensives, including a siege to the city
in 1625, failed miserably; and they gave up efforts to recover it during the lifetime of Shah
Abbas. 106 The next phase of the war was in the mid 1630, resulting in the capture of Baghdad
by the Ottoman Sultan in 1639. The treaty of Qasr-i Shirin (or Zuhab) “awarded Baghdad to
the Ottoman Empire, re-establishing the border between the Safavid and Ottoman Empires
that had been fixed at the Treaty of Amasya in 1555.” 107 Based on Amasya, and similar to the
treaties of 1612 and 1619, the treaty also banned the cursing the Prophet Muhammad’s
companions by the Safavids and committed the Ottomans to safe conduct of Iranian pilgrims
to the holy cities of Makkah and Madina. 108 With this treaty, the military conflict between the
two great Islamic empires of the second half of the second millennium came to an end,
although it did not mean development of close friendly relations between the two.
Ottoman-Mughal relations
Another great Muslim empire in the second half of the second millennium was the Mughal
Empire in India. Unlike the Safavids, the Mughals were Sunni Muslims and did not share any
borders with the Ottoman Empire to cause a conflict. Thus, one expects very amicable
102
Ibid.
Eskandar Beg Monshi, translated by Roger M. Savory, History of Shah Abbas the Great, Vol. II (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p.p. 986-7.
104
Blow, Shah Abbas, op. cit., pp. 97-8.
105
Ibid., p. 108.
106
Blow, Shah Abbas, op. cit., p. 132.
107
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650, op. cit. p. 82.
108
Tucker, “The Peace Negotiations of 1736,” op. cit., pp. 19-20.
103
relationship between the Ottomans and the Mughals. In effect, however, it was far from it. Of
course they did not engage in any war, and occasional exchange of embassies and gifts did
take place. But except for rare occasions, they never warmed up towards each other. Several
reasons have been suggested for this. One main reason may be Mughal’s animosity towards
the Central Asian Uzbeks, who had driven the Mughals from their ancestral land; and
Ottomans’ close relationship with the Uzbeks, who were also engaged in war with the
Safavids. Mughals relative friendly relations with the Safavids can be another reason.
Another factor may be a feeling of “rivalry and jealousy, peculiar to kith and kin.” 109 Both
dynasties originated from Central Asia and were racially close. Ottomans considered
themselves as descendents of sultans for many generations and saw their glory at its peak
when the Mughal Empire emerged. In contrast, Mughals believed that since their ancestor
Amir Timur (Tamerlane) had defeated the Ottomans in the early 15th century and had allowed
them to continue to rule, they owed them gratitude. Thus, they were not ready to
acknowledge Ottoman supremacy.
In Ottoman-Mughal rivalry the issue of caliphate became a bone of contention. As early as
the 1360s the Ottoman sultans had adopted the title of “Khalifa” among their titles. Their
claim was reinforced by the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and further legitimised by
the removal of the Cairo Abbasid caliphs and capture of Makkah and Madina in 1517. On the
other hand, the first Mughal Emperor Babur put his own name, along with the names of the
Righteous Caliphs, on the coins and called his capital city “Darul Khilafat” (the abode of
caliphate). His descendents all used the title of “Khalifa” in their correspondence with other
rulers. A few also acknowledged the Khilafat of the Ottomans but considered themselves as
their equal. For example, the second Mughal Emperor, Humayun, in his letter to Sultan
Suleyman calls him the “adorner of the throne of Khilafat,” and the “Khalifa of high qualities.” But
he adds that “he had also assumed the Khilafat in India.” 110 The fact that the Ottoman Sultan
“neither acknowledged Humayun’s letter nor sent a diplomatic mission” in return, 111 may be
an indication of his displeasure with the claim of Khilafat by the Mughals.
Mughal-Safavid relations
Mughals and Safavids were neighbours, shared a continuous border, and adhered to different
schools of thought within Islam. Nonetheless, overall they enjoyed cordial and friendly
relations, especially when both were at the height of their power and glory. Their relationship
started on a positive note, and early Mughal rulers’ losses to their rivals in Central Asia and
India played an important role in that. When Babur was fighting to regain his lost ancestral
territory from the Uzbeks, he appealed to Shah Ismail and received endorsement and support.
Likewise, when Humayun was ousted from his throne in India, he was welcomed by the
Safavid Shah and managed to regain his realm with his assistance. Both Babur and Humayun
continued their contact with the Safavids by exchange of embassies and gifts. 112
The situation changed somewhat when the next emperor, Akbar, lost Kandahar to the
Safavids upon assumption of power. He did not respond to the Shah’s embassy sent to
express condolence on the death of his father. Although he returned some subsequent
embassies from the Safavids, the relations remained cold. Despite this, Akbar refused to enter
into an alliance with the Uzbeks and Ottomans for a joint invasion of the Safavid Persia. In
109
Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, op. cit., p. xiii. All the reason mentioned are based on this book.
Ibid., p. 189.
111
Ibid., p. 17.
112
Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations: A Study of the Political and Diplomatic Relations Between the Mughul
Empire and Iran (Tehran: Iranian Cultural Foundation, 1970).
110
response to the Uzbek ruler’s letter which mentioned their common adherence to Sunni Islam
and Safavids’ Shiism as a reason for that, Emperor Akbab wrote, “the (Persian) dynasty was
specially connected with the family of the Holy Prophet, and that on this ground he could not
regard a difference in law and religion as sufficient reason for conquest. He (Akbar) was also
withheld from such an enterprise by old and valued friendship.” 113 Not only this, he
responded positively to Safavid Shah’s appeal for help to overcome internal dissension and
tried to mediate among rival groups. When Shah Abbas sent an embassy upon assumption of
power, however, Akbar delayed the return of the envoy for four years until he was able to
regain Kandahar without a fight. Now it was the Safavid monarch’s turn to shelve the
contentious border issue. He warmly received the Mughal ambassador, who accompanied his
own returning embassy, and his “early dismissal of the Indian envoys [indicated] a desire to
improve relations with Akbar.” 114 It is interesting to note that similar to the Ottoman letters to
the Safavids, Akbar also urged religious tolerance and his letter gave “a closely reasoned
argument in favour of toleration.” 115 The returning Mughal embassy was accompanied by
another Safavid embassy, and the exchange of envoys and gifts continued during the rule of
Akbar. This changed somehow in the early years of Akbar’s successor, but it warmed up later
on when Jahangir decided to send a major embassy in a grand scale. His envoy stayed in
Persia for many years and was followed by further exchanges of envoys and gifts. Even the
conquest of Kandahar by Shah Abbas in 1622 did not affect the process. In the absence of
any resident ambassador, the practice of sending an envoy with the returning embassy meant
that there was almost always an envoy present at least in one side’s court. The relations
deteriorated, however, under the succeeding monarch, becoming “spasmodic and
inconsequential.” 116
Impact of Muslim World’s Division on General Population
Classical Muslim scholars had divided the world into dar al-Islam, dar al-harb, and dar alahd (the abodes of Islam, war, and treaty respectively). The terminology was not based on the
original sources of Islam and reflected the conditions of the time, that is, the early centuries
of the Islamic era. Although the terms are obsolete, 117 it is useful to apply the concept “dar
al-Islam” because of the high level of unity and interaction found throughout the Muslim
world. As Prof Marshall Hodgson puts it,
This society was not held together by a single political order or a single language of
culture. Yet it did remain, consciously and effectively, a single historical whole. ... It
was held together in virtue of a common Islamicate social pattern which, by enabling
members of any part of the society to be accepted as members of it anywhere else,
assured the circulation of ideas and manners throughout its area. Muslims always felt
themselves to be citizens of the whole Dâr al-Islâm. 118
The most important unifying factors were adherence to the Quran and the Sunna (tradition) of
the Prophet Muhammad and the application of Islamic law (Sharia). Despite the emergence
113
Ibid., p. 52 (the rest of discussion in this paragraph are also mostly based on this source). See also Farooqi,
Mughal-Ottoman Relations, op. cit., p. 21.
114
Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations, op. cit. p. 63.
115
Ibid., p. 62.
116
Ibid., pp. 98, 116, 135.
117
See, for example, Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), pp. 63-6.
118
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Volume
Two: The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 3.
of various schools of jurisprudence, the commonalities were much more than the
difference—even in the case of most Shiites. The sense of belonging to ummah Muslima
(Islamic community) was another factor. “This loyalty was not only a spiritual but a social
virtue, in one sense a political virtue.” 119 Thus, “for the most part, Muslims on the move ...
regarded the jurisdictions of states as a necessary imposition and gave them as little attention
as possible.” 120 Similarity of religious and political institutions – the mosques, madrasas
(religious schools), waqfs (pious endowments), sufi (mystic) orders, and
political/administrative institutions modelled on the Abbasid Caliphate – were among other
unifying factors. Equally important was the significance of travelling in Islam, not only for
hajj (pilgrimage to Makkah) but also to seek knowledge. Travel was also undertaken for
commerce, pilgrimage to other holy cities, and hijra (migration). Thus, it has been argued,
the Islamic civilization “owed its vibrancy to constant movement.” 121
Except for the problems caused by occasional wars between rival neighbouring rulers, there
does not seem to have been any obstacles for travelling Muslims from the territory of one
ruler to another. Unlike the non-Muslims entering dar al-Islam, Muslims travelling within
dar al-Islam did not need to acquire any special permission. Furthermore, the Muslim
travellers were provided hospitality in guesthouses and inns built by local rulers and mostly
financed, for their construction as well as maintenance, by pious endowments (waqf).122
Since the Holy Quran considers travellers entitled to receive zakat (“community tax”), they
also enjoyed the generosity of well-off Muslims. About the famous 14th century traveller Ibn
Battuta, it is said that he saw “his welfare assured, to one degree or another, by an array of
pious individuals who were moved to perform their Koranic duty.” 123 Travelling from his
homeland in Tunisia, he was not only welcomed by ordinary Muslims and rulers alike
everywhere he went, he served eight years as a judge in such a faraway land as India. 124
The length of Ibn Battuta’s journey, about 30 years, may be unusual; but the fact that
Muslims in various professions travelled from one political entity to serve in another one was
not unusual. A scholar observes that “the Persians accounted for a high proportion of
personnel in all branches of service in the Mughul Empire,” and considers it as one factor
contributing to the cordial relations between that Empire and the Safavid Persia. 125 Ottoman
Turks also served the founder of the Mughal Empire as a commander and a physician; and
several of them “held positions of considerable power and influence in the Sultanate of
Gujarat” before Mughals. 126 According to another scholar, “The relationship between the
Ottomans and the Mamluks was not only based upon conflicts and alliances, but also on the
individuals who circulated between these two geographies either of their own free will or
upon the orders of their rulers.” 127 He gives the example of three individuals either from
119
Ibid., p. 119.
Ross E. Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century (London and Sydney:
Croom Helm, 1986), p. 11.
121
Sam I. Gellens, “The search for knowledge in medieval Muslim society: a comparative approach,” in Dale F.
Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds.), Muslim Travellers: Pilrimage, migration, and the religious imagination
(London: Routledge, 1990), p. 51.
122
Yehoshu 'a Frenkel, “Muslim Travellers to Bilad al-Sham (Syria and Palestine) from the Thirteenth to the
Sixteenth Centuries: Maghribi Travel Accounts,” in Sarah Searight and Malcolm Wagstaff (eds.), Travellers in
Deserts of the Levant: Voyagers and Visionaries (CMEIS, University of Durham: ASTENE, 2001) pp. 109-20.
The author makes the point on Levant, but it was equally true for other parts of the Muslim world.
123
Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta, op. cit. p. 35.
124
Ibid., p. 3.
125
Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations, op. cit., p. 174.
126
Ibid., pp. 11 and 13.
127
Muslu, “Ottoman-Mamluk Relations,” op. cit., p. 26.
120
Egypt or studying there occupying the highest position reserved for a Muslim scholar in the
Ottoman Empire. In addition to government officials and diplomats, there were “merchants,
pilgrims, refugees, traveling mystics, prisoners of war, spies, students, scholars, and others”
who served as “agents of communication.” 128
In addition to occasional wars affecting the local people and creating logistic difficulties for
Muslim travellers, the division of the Muslim world had some other negative repercussions as
well; although overall they were few and more exceptions than the rule. In the mid 14th
century, for example, the Sultan of Yemen who claimed suzerainty over Makkah was arrested
over his claim during hajj. Once released, “the offended ruler took revenge by prohibiting all
trade with Mecca, which must have increased the perennial supply problems of the Holy
City.” 129 The Mughal Emperor Akbar did not claim suzerainty over Makkah, but his position
towards the ruler of that city created problems for members of his royal family. “It appears
that Mughal diplomacy regarded the Sherif of Mecca as a sovereign ruler with a multitude of
political contacts, who controlled a territory which in a sense was common to all
Muslims.” 130 That was probably one reason why the prolonged stay of two female members
of the Mughal royal family in Makkah created apprehension in the Ottoman court, leading to
an order to them to leave. 131 Animosity between the Ottomans and Safavids also created
problems for Muslim populations living in their territories. The enmity led to migration of
thousands of Safavid supporters from Anatolia to Persia. 132 The Ottomans placed restrictions
on the routes that the Persian pilgrims could take to proceed to Makkah. The Persians were
not allowed to enter the Ottoman territory even for the purpose of hajj, however, when the
two countries were engaged in war. Some sultans, for example Sultan Suleyman, also banned
the entry of Persians to Ottoman territories at times other than hajj even in the absence of an
on-going war. 133
Pre and post Westphalian international relations compared
The historical survey above is far from being comprehensive. Due to availability/scarcity of
data, I had to focus on some relationships—for example Muslims’ relations with the
Europeans—and ignore others—for example their relations with China. Space limitation
meant selection of more significant relationships—that is between major Muslim powers—
over the less significant ones—for example Central Asians’ or Moroccan relations with the
Ottomans. Nonetheless, the survey may be enough to at least tentatively answer the question
at the heart of this study: how did Muslims’ pre Westphalian international relations differ
from the post Westphalian international relations? In answering this question, I will use the
English School’s approach not only because unlike other International Relations (IR) theories
it takes a historical perspective in the study of IR; but also for the significance of culture, and
thus religion, in the theory.
Sovereignty is the first and foremost institution of the modern international society for the
English School. Its other “primary institutions”, according to Barry Buzan, include “non-
128
Ibid.
Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 29.
130
Ibid., p. 132.
131
Ibid., pp. 131-2.
132
Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300—1600, Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber
trans. (London: Weidenfeild and Nicolson, 1973), p. 33.
133
Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans, op. cit., p. 128.
129
intervention, territoriality, diplomacy, international law, war, balance of power and great
power management.” 134
•
•
•
134
Sovereignty is considered a defining characteristic of modern international society
because in the European international system in the 14th and 15th centuries the rulers
or states lacked sovereignty. They shared authority with vassals from below and with
the Pope or Holy Roman Emperor from above. This seems to have been different for
the Muslim “states” of the same period. There were two kinds of “states”, the imperial
ones which ruled over large territories directly in addition to serving as suzerain over
many others; and there were also smaller “states” controlling certain areas directly.
These “states” were sovereign because in general they exercised monopoly of
coercive force over a certain territory and, after the demise of the Abbasid Caliphate,
did not recognise any worldly authority above them.
It is questionable, however, whether the medieval Muslim territorial political entities
can be classified as “sovereign states” in the modern sense. There seem to have been
two main differences. Firstly, the loyalty of the people living in their territories was
more to the Islamic ummah in general and to their immediate city/region in particular,
rather than to the “states” where they lived. Secondly, despite the de facto internal
sovereignty and its practical recognition in dealing with each other from at least the
14th century, it is not clear when the de jure external recognition came about. For
example, looking at where the mid 16th century Amasya Treaty was archived by the
Ottomans, one scholar concludes that it shows “Another Muslim state was not legal
reality.” 135 This is different from the view of some other scholars who hold that “By
the Amasya treaty, the Ottoman Empire … finally recognized the Safavid Empire as a
State.” 136 As for developments in Islamic law, from the 11th century the law provided
for the existence of more than one caliphate if they were apart and far away from each
other. It was not until the 15th century, though, when a prominent jurist, who proposed
justice and implementation of Sharia as the defining characteristics of caliphate, “also
permitted, ipso facto, the existence of more than one Khalifa simultaneously. ... [T]he
doctrine became the standard exposition of the institution of Khilafat.” 137
Non-intervention for the pre Westphalian Muslim states was not absolute. Of course
they resented outside intervention, but they gave themselves the right to intervene in
other states’ affairs. This is evident from the Ottomans’ and Mughals’ “advice” to the
Safavid Shahs regarding the treatment of their people.
The territoriality of the Muslim states was also somewhat different. They were
certainly territorial based, but in most cases there were no defined frontier lines. For
example, the treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Persia “described
that strip of land in which the authority of both sultan and shah was weak and
disputed. Somewhere within that zone lay the boundary.” 138
Barry Buzan, “The Middle East through English School Theory,” in Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez
(eds.), International Society and the Middle East (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 27.
135
Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 1998), p. 93.
136
Mikheil Svanidze, “The Amasya Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Iran (June 1, 1555) and
Georgia,” Bulletin of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences, vol. 3, no. 1 (2009), p. 195.
137
Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations, op. cit., p. 179; see also Ibid., note (34), p. 206.
138
R. Michael Burrell and Keith McLachlan, “The Political Geography of the Persian Gulf,” in Alvin J. Cottrell
et. al. (eds.), The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1980), 122.
•
•
•
•
Muslim states actively engaged in diplomacy from the very beginning, both with the
non-Muslim states and later between themselves. However, it was mostly ad hoc
exchange of emissaries and gifts. Only the Ottoman Empire allowed European
resident embassies as early as the 15th and 16th centuries; but Muslim states
establishing residence embassies in Europe and among them was based on the
European model and came much later.
The question of “international law” is interesting, but not possible to be answered on
the basis of this research. The early “Islamic Law of Nations” dealt only with the
relations of the Muslim state and non-Muslims. It did not have any provisions on how
the Muslim states conduct their relations among themselves. Because of this, it has
been argued that the provisions of the Islamic law for rebels were used to regulate
Muslim states’ relations with each other. 139 While it is true that various Muslim rulers
claimed the title of “caliph” for themselves, to characterise their treatment of the rival
Muslim rulers as “rebels” is incredulous in the light of the discussions in the second
section above. Further research is needed to explore the developments in Islamic law
after it accepted simultaneous existence of several caliphs.
War is an institution common to all international systems from the very beginning.
Muslim rulers could easily justify their wars with non-Muslims, and there were
detailed discussions in Islamic law on how they should be conducted. As for the war
with other Muslims, it was strictly forbidden. Therefore, it was only in justification of
such wars that Muslim rulers called their Muslim opponents rebels or heretics.
The concepts of “balance of power” and “great power management” are clearly
modern European concepts. Although the Ottoman Empire actively contributed to
balance of power in Europe from a very early stage, it would be difficult to argue that
it was an attribute of Muslims’ pre Westphalian international relations. As for “great
power management,” it was totally absent from Muslims’ relations.
The classical English School distinguishes between “international system” and “international
society”. 140 Undoubtedly the pre Westphalian Muslim states formed a regional international
system among themselves, and many of them were part of other regional international
systems. Mamluks and Ottomans, for example, had “sufficient contact” with many European
states and had “sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at
least in some measure – as parts of a whole.” 141 As for the latter, it has been noted that, “the
Muslims world must be considered an ‘international’ society [in the 13th century] – several
loci of ultimate authority within a vast territory united by a shared cosmology and an
imperative set of norms and rules.” 142 There is much truth in this. However, if we take
“international society” to mean that “a group of states … have established by dialogue and
consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their
common interest in maintaining these arrangement”, 143 it would not be appropriate to apply
the concept to the pre Westphalian Muslim states. This is why the “neo” English School
terminology, proposed by Barry Buzan, comes handy. He proposes “three domains of society
139
See, for example, Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 92.
See, for example, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995; first published in 1977).
141
Quotations from Ibid., p. 9.
142
Martin Hall, “Essence of Mongol-Christian Diplomacy in the 13th Century,” Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the ISA's 50th Annual Convention, New York Marriott Marquis, New York City, Feb 15, 2009.
Available online http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa09/index.php?click_key=2, p. 8.
143
The Editors, “Introduction,” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1.
140
based on the type of unit that comprises them.” 144 “Interstate society” is the same as
international society as defined above. The second domain is “transnational society” which
“refers to social structures composed on non-state collective actors”; and the third one is
“interhuman society” referring to “social structures based on interactions among individual
human beings”. 145 It is in the second and third domains that the pre Westphalian Muslim
world constituted an international society.
Conclusion
Religion was one factor, among several, playing role in Muslim states’ relations with nonMuslims and among themselves before Westphalia. Islam was the dominant discourse almost
everywhere in the Muslim world. Muslim rulers sought to justified their war and peace with
non-Muslims and with Muslim rivals in religious terms. They tried to adopt policies that did
not go against the teachings of Islam, and many of them had to get the approval of top
religious scholars in support of their foreign policies. Islam also inspired some unique
policies; for example, the right of aliens to enjoy the protection of their own laws while in
Muslim territories. Muslims everywhere considered themselves part of the Islamic ummah,
which in many cases transcended dynastic rivalries and various schools of law and “sects”.
The Ottomans sent their navy in support of the rival Mamluks against the Portuguese. Even
archrivals such as the Ottomans and the Safavids sometimes appealed to Islamic unity and
solidarity in their mutual relations, knowing that it would be difficult for the other side to
dismiss such appeals out of hand. The Safavids, despite being in competition with several
Sunni Muslim states, considered religious affiliation as a cause of friendship. The great
Safavid monarch Shah Abbas is quoted as writing to King Philip of Spain, “There can be two
reasons for kings to be friends, either on account of belief if they profess to the same faith, or
for reasons of state.” 146
“Reasons of state” meant the use of realpolitik by the Muslim states. However, even in their
realpolitik religion played some role. Many of the Muslim states’ realist policies did not
contradict the teachings of Islam. For example, from a religious viewpoint there is nothing
wrong with Muslim rulers marrying Christian ladies for some political or territorial gains. It
is interesting that this research did not come across a single case of a Muslim ruler giving a
Muslim lady in marriage to a non Muslim for political gain. Such a marriage is considered
forbidden in Islam. Friendship with non Muslim states and having diplomatic relations with
them as well as a Muslim state forming alliances with some non Muslim states against some
other non Muslim states can also find religious sanction. However, a Muslim state forming
alliances with non Muslims against some other Muslim state runs counter to the teachings of
Islam. The same is true for Muslim states going to war with each other. Both such cases were
numerous, though the latter was more prevalent than the former.
Comparing Muslim states’ international relations before Westphalia to the modern
international relations, we find some similarities and some differences. They were territorial
based sovereigns who actively engaged in war and diplomacy and resented outside
intervention. However, the notions of sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy and
nonintervention were somewhat different from their modern definitions. The Muslim world
formed an international society in the domains of transnational society and interhuman
society, but not in the domain of interstate society. The pre Westphalian Islamic international
144
Buzan, “The Middle East through English School Theory,” op. cit., p. 26.
Ibid.
146
Blow, Shah Abbas, op. cit., p. 103
145
society seems to provide “an alternative path to world order” that needs to be added to those
considered by Hedley Bull in his classical work. 147 Unlike “Western Christendom in the
Middle Ages” which was “a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty”, 148 the
Islamic international society consisted of multiple sovereign entities with strong transnational
and interhuman relationships and multiple loyalty.
147
148
Bull, The Anarchical Society, op. cit., pp. 225-47; quoted phrase from p. 225.
Ibid., p. 245.