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Indonesia Summary Moody’s Baa3 / S&P BB+ / Fitch BBB-1 Economy: Agriculture 14%, Industry 41%, Services 45% Indonesia’s economy is the largest in Southeast Asia, and the country has strong growth potential given its size and abundant natural resources. Years of high growth have led to a tripling of GDP in US dollar terms during the past decade. Public finances are solid, with small fiscal deficits, low public debt levels, and manageable financing needs. Indonesia’s main weakness is the quality of current account deficit financing, which has contributed to an increase in external debt stock. However, a more flexible exchange rate has strengthened the balance of payments. The 2014 elections, which proceeded peacefully and fairly, consolidated political stability, although Indonesian institutions remain weak, with endemic corruption. Relative to other large emerging markets countries such as Brazil and Turkey, Indonesia’s political conditions are currently much more stable, and President Joko Widodo is gradually moving forward with important economic reforms. Economic Indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016F 2017F Population (Millions) 244.5 248.0 251.5 255.1 258.1 258.1 GDP per Capita (USD) 3,754 3,680 3,524 3,376 3,557 3,578 Nominal GDP (USD Billions) 917.7 912.4 886.3 861.1 918.2 923.4 Real GDP (%) 6.3 5.8 5.3 4.8 5.0 5.3 Year-End CPI (%) 3.7 8.1 8.4 3.4 3.6 4.2 Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -1.7 -2.2 -2.2 -2.5 -2.7 -2.6 Interest (% of Revenues) 6.8 6.9 7.6 8.2 8.5 8.5 FC Debt/Public Debt (%) 56.0 53.7 54.2 54.6 54.1 53.9 Government Debt (% of GDP) 22.6 23.3 25.8 29.2 29.4 29.7 145.8 155.3 176.8 224.0 200.0 199.3 Current Account (% of GDP) -2.7 -3.2 -3.0 -2.1 -2.0 -2.2 FDI (% of GDP) 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.4 External Debt (% of GDP) 27.5 29.2 33.0 36.1 35.5 35.8 Foreign Reserves/External Debt (%) 44.7 37.3 36.1 32.2 33.0 34.2 Foreign Reserves (Mo. of imports) 6.4 5.6 6.3 7.3 8.2 8.2 12.3 10.9 11.9 11.6 11.7 12.2 Government Debt (% of Revenue) Foreign Reserves (% of GDP) As of November 2016 Forecasted or estimated results do not represent a promise or guarantee of future results and are subject to change. Source: IMF, Haver Analytics, Indonesian Central Bank, Lazard 51 Lazard Emerging Markets Debt Rating History Below is a history of the country’s foreign and local currency ratings by the major agencies dating back to 2000. We have also included a chart of the country’s hard currency external debt spread and the JP Morgan EMBI Global Diversified Index spread for comparison. Rating History Hard Currency Local Currency BBB+/BBB BBB BBB- BBB-/BB+ BB+ BB/BB- BB BB- B+/B B+ B-/CCC+ B- CCC/CCCCC B 2000 2008 Moody’s 2016 S&P CCC+ 2000 2008 Moody’s Fitch 2016 S&P Fitch As of December 2016 Performance represents past performance. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Source: Fitch, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, Bloomberg Bond Spreads Local Yield 1200 24 1000 800 20 600 16 400 12 200 8 0 2008 2010 Indonesia 2012 EMBIGD 2014 2016 4 2008 2010 Indonesia 2012 2014 2016 GBI-EM Global Div As of December 2016 Performance represents past performance. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Source: JP Morgan 52 Indonesia Strengths Large, Diversified, and Resilient Economy Indonesia maintains promising growth prospects after years of high growth. The country is Southeast Asia’s largest and most closed economy; trade equals 45% of GDP, a factor that makes it less sensitive to global conditions. Growth has averaged 5.5% over the past 15 years, both before and after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, with some of the lowest volatility in emerging markets. It should continue posting similar growth in the years to come with the International Monetary Fund expecting growth to average 5.6% from 2017 to 2020. Domestic consumption from a large population and favorable demographics will continue to be key drivers of growth. Other big drivers include investment and a diversified export base. In the medium to long term, high investment and low GDP per capita should continue supporting Indonesia’s growth. A savings rate higher than 30% of GDP, versus 20% on average for emerging markets, has enabled the country to respond to shocks and grow without generating excessive imbalances. The resilience of Indonesia’s economy was evident during the global financial crisis-Indonesia was the only economy in the G20 that recorded positive growth in 2009 at 4.5%2-as well as during the more recent bout of emerging markets growth deceleration. Solid Public Finances and Low Debt Levels Indonesia’s public finances are another key strength and have improved significantly over the past decade. This gives the country an enviable fiscal position despite the recent widening of fiscal deficits. Strong economic growth and low fiscal deficits resulted in a dramatic decline in the public debt burden until 2012, and debt levels have registered only a mild increase since. As a share of GDP, public debt is expected to come in at around 29% of GDP in 2016, about one-fourth of the post-Asian crisis ratio of 100% in 2000.3 The government also made major improvements in the quality of expenditures by reducing subsidies, which peaked at close to 6% of GDP in 2008, giving more room to increase infrastructure spending that is urgently needed. On the revenue side, the government surprised the market on the upside with a tax-amnesty program that started in mid-July 2016 and ends in March 2017, with a goal to raise Indonesian rupiah (IDR) 165 trillion. A major anchor for fiscal responsibility is a constitutional limit on the fiscal deficit set at 3% of GDP.4 Additionally, investment expenditures typically undershoot targets. Relative Political Stability Indonesia is among the most diverse countries in the world, with around 300 different ethnic groups and languages.5 It is also a young democracy, where the first direct presidential elections occurred in 2004; there was military rule for most of the previous 30 years. There are still demands for independence in some provinces, where secessionists have been encouraged by East Timor’s 1999 success in breaking away. Considering these factors, and the presence of militant Islamist groups, the country is remarkably stable politically. Indonesia held parliamentary elections in April 2016, and a new president was elected in July 2014. Former Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo, affiliated with the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP), an opposition group running on an anti-corruption campaign, won. Widodo is making progress in reforming the economy, for example removing fuel subsidies and increasing the tax base. 53 Lazard Emerging Markets Debt Weaknesses Sharp Deterioration in the External Balance Indonesia has experienced a large reversal of its current account position since the prefinancial crisis period, with the current account shifting from a 2.4% of GDP surplus at the end of 2007 to a 3.1% of GDP deficit, which peaked in 2014 and declined to an estimated 2.2% of GDP in 2016. The current account deterioration has been almost entirely driven by a drop in exports, while imports remained relatively steady. Cyclical factors, namely slowing global demand and strong import demand, have been key drivers behind the deterioration. The current account deficit is not high, but financing remains a problem as foreign direct investment (FDI) is low at less than 1.5% of GDP. A large share of the financing comes from portfolio inflows, which could reverse quickly, or from external debt, which has increased substantially in recent years. External debt as a share of GDP is low at around 35%, but as a share of exports of goods and services, it has reached nearly 200%. Weak Infrastructure and Corruption Indonesia has significant infrastructure limitations. It is ranked 81st out of 142 countries in terms of infrastructure by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The quality of roads, ports, and electricity supply is low. Public investment is among the lowest in the region at around 3% of GDP, one-third that of Malaysia and India.6 Part of this is due to poor budget execution. Rapid investment growth seen in recent years has been driven by the commodity sector, but investment in public infrastructure remains poor. Corruption is another major issue in Indonesia, with the country ranking in the bottom third of most indices and the majority of Indonesians reporting rampant corruption among police, the judiciary, and political parties.7 Partially due to these factors, as well as a relatively inflexible labor market, Indonesia ranks poorly in ease of doing business indicators, near the bottom in areas such as starting a business and enforcing contracts.8 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy Inflation/Monetary Policy Bank Indonesia (BI), Indonesia’s Central Bank, has a single mandate: to maintain rupiah stability. This single objective in practice has two aspects: maintain price stability (the inflation mandate) and contain exchange-rate volatility. BI operates under an inflation-targeting framework. The inflation target range for 2015–2017 is set at 4.0% ±1%, measured as an average over the calendar year. The target range will decline to 3.0% ±1% starting in 2018. In addition to the monetary-policy objectives, BI is also tasked with maintaining financial stability. Policy decisions are carried out by the Board of Governors, consisting of the governor, senior deputy governor, and four deputy governors. All board members are appointed for a five-year term and cannot be removed unless they resign or under certain special circumstances (i.e., permanently incapacitated, convicted of a felony, declared bankrupt, absent for three consecutive months without reasonable cause, etc.). The members of the board of governors can serve no more than two consecutive terms in the same position. BI has several tools to implement monetary policy. During 2016, BI switched from the BI reference rate to the 7-day reverse repurchase (repo) rate as the main policy interest rate. The 7-day reverse repo rate is the rate relevant for open-market operations carried out by Bank Indonesia. At the same time, BI uses standing liquidity facilities for managing the overnight interbank market liquidity. They do so by setting the deposit and lending rates, thus defining 54 Indonesia the interest-rate corridor around the policy rate. Usually the lending rate defines the top of the corridor, and the deposit rate defines the bottom of the corridor. When evaluating the monetary policy stance, it is useful to take into account that a 1% real policy rate is considered neutral by the BI board. BI’s track record in meeting its inflation target has been mixed, but its commitment to the target has been strong. Since 2010, headline inflation has exceeded the target by 0.9% on average, i.e., at the upper end of the tolerance band. But this has not been consistent over time—in 2010 through early 2013, inflation was oscillating symmetrically around the central target, but in the aftermath of the taper tantrum, starting in May 2013 and through 2015, inflation exceeded the upper bound of the target, in large part due to pass-through from currency depreciation. Between May 2013 and December 2015, the rupiah depreciated by a cumulative 40%. Additional drivers of inflation volatility have been the food and energy/ utility components. However, the government’s decision in late 2014 to remove subsidies on fuel in order to reduce the fiscal burden on has been helping reduce inflation volatility because fuel prices are no longer adjusted in abrupt one-off moves, but on an ongoing basis, in line with global energy prices. BI’s response to the inflationary pressure from sustained depreciation of the currency was to hike rates 175 basis points in late 2013 and maintain this tight policy stance until late 2015. In this context, despite challenges in achieving the inflation target over 2013–2015 due to external shocks, BI demonstrated a clear commitment to the inflation-targeting regime. During 2016, BI was able to meet the inflation target and ease monetary policy. At the time of writing, headline inflation stands at 3.3% and core at 3.1%, both at the lower end of the inflation target range. The biggest driver for the drop in inflation was, once again, the currency. After the cumulative 40% depreciation in 2013–2015, the currency appreciated around 5.5% in nominal terms during 2016. This reversal from roughly 9% depreciation in 2015 to 5.5% appreciation in 2016 has reversed the exchange-rate pass-through as the chief driver of inflationary pressure. In addition, lack of demand-side inflationary pressure as growth remains close to trend and the reduced pressure from regulated prices have helped. In this context, BI was able to ease monetary policy by 125 basis points, unwinding the tight stance taken when the currency was under pressure. Looking ahead to 2017, we expect limited inflationary pressures and continued monetarypolicy easing. We expect inflation to remain subdued, at close to 3.5%–4.0% in 2017, with downside risks dominating. While growth is picking up, we do not expect demand-side inflationary pressure, as we expect the output gap to remain close to neutral. Meanwhile, the last stage of the program to remove energy subsidies, combined with the expectation of a modest rise in global energy prices, should provide slight upside to the currently low inflation. Given this benign backdrop for inflation we expect BI to cut rates to 4.5%. The main risk to this view is an upside inflation surprise, which would halt or reverse BI easing. 55 Lazard Emerging Markets Debt Inflation USD/IDR 14 14000 12 13000 10 12000 8 11000 6 10000 4 9000 2 8000 0 2000 2008 Inflation 2016 7000 2000 2008 2016 Reference Rate As of December 2016 Source: Bloomberg Exchange Rate Policy The IDR has traded in a managed floating exchange-rate regime since 1999. BI intervenes in the spot market and through derivatives, aiming to tame volatility and to prevent excessive real effective exchange-rate appreciation. Indonesia has limited foreign exchange controls, and the IDR is a nondeliverable currency, traded on a nondeliverable forward basis offshore. The IDR is best understood in the context of balance-of-payments dynamics. After peaking at a 2.8% of GDP surplus in 2006, Indonesia’s current account balance saw a major reversal, sliding to a deficit of 3.9% of GDP in the third quarter of 2013. The reversal was driven by the trade balance, as both the non-oil and gas balance and the oil and gas balance shifted from surplus to deficit positions. Falling export prices, particularly for Indonesia’s key export commodities (coal, oil and gas, palm oil, rubber, and copper), as well as declining volume growth as Chinese demand weakened, have hurt the country’s export performance and pose challenges for its external and exchange-rate outlook. Meanwhile, strong domestic demand, thanks to accommodative fiscal, monetary, and credit policies, kept import demand strong in the post-crisis period and up to 2013. With FDI averaging 1.2%–1.5% of GDP since 2010, the large current account deficit in 2013 was not sustainable. This was exposed during the taper tantrum in mid-2013 and the subsequent decline of oil and gas prices in 2014–2015. As a result of those external shocks, the IDR depreciated by a cumulative 40% in the 2013–2015 period, and the economy slowed, weakening import demand. This combination of economic slowdown and currency depreciation helped steadily reverse Indonesia’s current account deterioration, with the deficit stabilizing at around -1.9% to -2.1% of GDP since the first quarter of 2015. Thus, Indonesia’s basic balance—the part of the current account shortfall not covered by FDI—is around -0.8% of GDP. While currently this is comfortably covered by portfolio and other investments, Indonesia remains vulnerable to an external funding shock. 56 Indonesia Looking ahead to 2017, we expect IDR stability with the risk of a mild appreciation. This outlook is driven by three factors: accommodative global financial conditions, continued recovery in commodity prices (especially energy), and portfolio investment inflows as investors take advantage of ongoing monetary policy easing and the growth recovery. REER 150 125 100 75 50 2000 2008 2016 REER Median since Dec 2000 Median last 5 yrs Median last 10 yrs As of December 2016 Source: JP Morgan, Lazard 57 Lazard Emerging Markets Debt Country Background Size 1,904,569 KM2 (15th) Capital Jakarta Population 258.3 Million Ethnic Groups Javanese 40%, Sundanese 16%, Malay 4%, Batak 4%, Madurese 3% Religion Muslim 87%, Christian 7%, Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, Other 3% Median Age 29.9 Years Literacy Rate 93.9% Independence August 1945 Political System Republic Presidents Joko Widodo (PDI-P) Legislative Elections 2019 Legislative Branch 560 Seats Economy Agriculture 14.0%, Industry 41.3%, Service 44.7% Labor Force Agriculture 38.9%, Services 13.2%, Industry 47.9% Merchandise Exports Palm Oil, Oil and Gas, Ores and Slags, Electrical Appliances, Plywood, Textiles, Rubber Export Partners Japan 12%, United States 10.8%, China 10%, Singapore 8.4%, India 7.8%, Korea 5.1%, Malaysia 5.1% Currency Rupiah (IDR) As of November 2016 Source: CIA 58 Indonesia Country Timeline Suharto comes to power 1965 Failed coup: In the aftermath, hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists are killed in a purge of leftists which descends into vigilantism. 1966 Sukarno hands over emergency powers to General Suharto, who becomes president in March 1967. 1969 West Papua formally incorporated into Indonesia, becoming Irian Jaya Province. 1975 Portugal grants East Timor independence. 1976 Indonesia invades East Timor and incorporates it as a province. 1997 Asian economic crisis: Indonesian rupiah plummets in value. 1998 Protests and rioting topple Suharto; B J Habibie becomes president. East Timor independence vote 1999 Ethnic violence breaks out in Maluku. Free elections are held in Indonesia. East Timor votes for independence in UN-sponsored referendum, after which anti-independence militia go on the rampage. East Timor comes under UN administration. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) becomes president. 2000 Two financial scandals dog the Wahid administration: Buloggate (embezzled funds from the state logistics agency), and Bruneigate (missing humanitarian aid funds from the Sultan of Brunei). The corruption case against former President Suharto collapses. Irian Jaya separatists become more vocal in demanding a referendum. 2001 Ethnic violence in Kalimantan as indigenous Dayaks force out Madurese transmigrants. Mass political demonstrations by Wahid's supporters and opponents. IMF stops further loans citing lack of progress in tackling corruption. Megawati sworn in 2001 July—Parliament dismisses President Wahid over allegations of corruption and incompetence. Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri is sworn in as his replacement, even as Wahid refuses to leave the presidential palace. Irian Jaya province granted greater autonomy by Jakarta, allowed to adopt locally-preferred name of Papua. 2002 May—East Timor becomes independent. 2002 August—Constitutional changes are seen as a step towards democracy. For the first time, voters will be able to elect a president and vice president. Bali attacks 2002 October—Bomb attack on the Kuta Beach nightclub district on Bali kills 202 people, most of them tourists.Muslim Cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is arrested shortly after the bombings. He is accused of plotting to overthrow the government as the alleged spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the group thought to be behind the Bali bombing. 2002 December—Government and separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gam) sign peace deal in Geneva, aimed at ending 26 years of violence. The accord provides for autonomy and free elections in the Muslim oil-rich province of Aceh; in return the Gam must disarm. 2003 May—Peace talks between government and Gam separatists break down; government mounts military offensive against Gam rebels. Martial law is imposed. 2003 August—Car bomb explodes outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 14 people. 2003 August-October—Three Bali bombing suspects are found guilty and sentenced to death for their roles in the 2002 attacks. A fourth suspect is given life imprisonment. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is cleared of treason but jailed for subversion and immigration offences. The subversion charge is later overturned. 2004 April—Parliamentary and local elections: Golkar party of former President Suharto wins greatest share of vote, with Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P coming second. 59 Lazard Emerging Markets Debt 2004 July—First-ever direct presidential elections; first round narrows field to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri. 2004 September—Car bomb attack outside Australian embassy in Jakarta kills nine, injures more than 180.Former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins second round of presidential elections, unseating incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri. 2004 November—End of two-year process under which 18 people were tried by Indonesian court for human rights abuses in East Timor during 1999 crisis. Only one conviction - that of militia leader Eurico Guterres - is left standing. Tsunami; Aceh deal 2004 December—More than 220,000 people are dead or missing in Indonesia alone after a powerful undersea earthquake off Sumatra generates massive tidal waves. The waves devastate Indian Ocean communities as far afield as Thailand, India, Sri Lanka and Somalia. 2005 March—Court finds Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir guilty of conspiracy over 2002 Bali bombings, sentences him to two-and-a-half years in jail. He is freed in June 2006. A powerful earthquake off Sumatra kills at least 1,000 people, many of them on the island of Nias. The quake triggers tsunami alerts around the Indian Ocean. 2005 August—Government and Free Aceh Movement separatists sign a peace deal providing for rebel disarmament and the withdrawal of government soldiers from the province. Rebels begin handing in weapons in September; government completes troop pull-out in December. 2005 September—Airliner crashes on take-off from Sumatran city of Medan, killing more than 100 passengers and around 50 people on the ground. 2005 October—Three suicide bombings on the resort island of Bali kill 23 people, including the bombers 2006 January—East Timorese report accuses Indonesia of widespread atrocities during its 24-year occupation, holding it responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 people. 2006 February-March—Deadly protests at a major US-owned gold and copper mine in Papua province follow attempts to remove illegal prospectors from the site. 2006 May—A powerful earthquake kills thousands of people on Java. 2006 July—A tsunami, triggered by a large undersea earthquake, kills more than 500 people on Java. Aceh elections 2006 December—First direct elections held in Aceh province, consolidating the August 2005 peace accord. Former separatist rebel leader Irwandi Yusuf elected governor. 2007 June—Police capture the alleged head of the militant group Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Zarkasih, and the leader of the group's military wing, Abu Dujana. 2007 December—Alleged JI leader Zarkasih goes on trial in Jakarta. 2008 January—Former President Suharto dies. 2008 July—Final report by joint Indonesian-East Timorese Truth Commission blames Indonesia for the human rights violations in the run-up to East Timor's independence in 1999 and urges it to apologise. President Yudhoyono expresses "deep regret" but stops short of an apology. 2008 November—Three Islamic militants convicted of carrying out the 2002 Bali bombings are executed. 2009 July—President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins re-election.Twin suicide bomb attacks on the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta kill nine people and injure scores of others. Pressure mounts on militants 60 2009 September—Police shoot dead Indonesia's most-wanted Islamist militant Noordin Mohammad Top, thought to be responsible for a series of deadly attacks across the archipelago. 2010 February-March—Several suspected militants are arrested in series of raids on alleged training camps of groups thought to be linked to Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Aceh province. Fourteen men are charged with plotting to launch terrorist attacks. 2010 March—Police shoot dead Dulmatin - an alleged leading member of JI and the last main suspect in the 2002 Bali bombings still at large - during a raid on a Jakarta internet cafe. Indonesia 2010 October—Indonesia admits that men seen torturing Papuan villagers in a video are members of the military.President Yudhoyono calls off a state visit to the Netherlands because of a threatened bid by separatists to have him arrested. 2010 November—US President Barack Obama visits, hailing Indonesia as an example of how a developing nation can embrace democracy and diversity. 2011 February—Two churches are set alight in central Java during a protest by hundreds of Muslims about blasphemy.Three members of the Ahmadiyah sect, a minority Muslim group, are bludgeoned to death in a mob attack in West Java. 2011 June—Radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir gets 15-year jail sentence for backing an Islamist militant training camp. 2011 December—Pay deal ends acrimonious three-month strike by 8,000 workers at copper and gold mine owned by US company Freeport-McMoran in the restive eastern province of Papua. Dutch government apologises for massacre of at least 150 people in the village of Rawagede, on the island of Java, in 1947, during Indonesia's war of independence. 2012 March—Court sentences Islamist militant Pepi Fernando to 18 years in prison for a parcelbombing campaign targeting Muslim leaders and police. 2012 June—Jakarta court sentences bombmaker Umar Patek to 20 years in prison for his role in the 2002 Bali attacks. He was extradited from Pakistan in 2011. The sentencing brings to an end the 10-year investigation into the bombings. 2013 February—Eight soldiers are shot dead in two separate attacks by armed men in Papua province. 2013 June—Parliament approves a major petrol and diesel price hike to cut the ballooning fuel subsidy, sparking violent protests. 2013 September—Via its ambassador in Jakarta, the Netherlands publicly apologises for summary executions carried out by the Dutch army in the 1940s. 2013 November—Major diplomatic row with Australia over allegations that Australia spied on the president. 2014 April—Opposition Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) comes out ahead in parliamentary election, but wins fewer votes than expected. 2014 July—Joko Widodo is declared the winner in the presidential election. 2015 January—Brazil and the Netherlands recall their ambassadors from Indonesia after the execution by firing squad of two of their citizens for drug trafficking. 2015 April—Australia recalls ambassador after Indonesia executes two Australian drug convicts, in a group also including three Nigerians, an Indonesian, a Brazilian and a Ghanaian. 2015 May—Indonesia and Malaysia agree to rescue and provide temporary shelter to Rohingya migrants fleeng Myanmar by boat, after weeks of mounting humanitarian crisis. 2016 January—Islamic State media claim responsibility for coordinated attacks near popular shopping centre in central Jakarta. 2016 October—Parliament approves harsher penalties including chemical castration, for child sex offenders. 2016 November—Indonesia agrees to help investigate the disappearance of three Dutch warships that were sunk in sunk in the Second World War. 2016 December—The Netherlands agrees to launch an inquiry into the conclusion of its colonial rule in Indonesia in the 1940s. Dutch troops are suspected of having killed tens of thousands of people during the war of independence. 2016 December—Deadly earthquake strikes off Indonesia’s Aceh province. Source: BBC 61 Lazard Emerging Markets Debt Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 62 As of December 2016. As of December 2013, Source: Haver, IMF. As of October 2016, Source: Haver, IMF. “Indonesia: Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report No. 13/362, December 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13362.pdf. “CIA World Factbook: Indonesia,” CIA, accessed on November 24, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html. As of October 2016, Source: Haver. “2014 Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency.Org, accessed on November 25, 2015, http://www. transparency.org/cpi2014/results “Economy Rankings,” Doing Business, accessed on November 24, 2016, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ rankings. Important Information Published on 24 February 2017. 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