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On the Origins of Rosenzweig's "Metaethics": Kant, Hegel and Goethe Josiah Simon University of Oregon I n his "Notes on the Baroque," written in 1908 but first published just recently, Rosenzweig argues that the 18th century was exemplified by a central problem in the life of the young Goethe: "the division of personality and life." 1 "[A]ll his restless searching," he declares of Goethe, "was no searching at all, but rather an unceasing discovery; what must have appeared to him as failed attempts to harmonize the I and the world, were moreover positive stages upon the infinite path towards the realization of these two."2 In the following paper, I show how the origins of Rosenzweig's "metaethics" provide a picture of his own "unceasing discovery" of life and personality. I argue that a constellation can be formed around the idea of "individuality" within Rosenzweig's intellectual biography, connecting his first published book, Hegel and the State, to the "Urzelle" or "Germ Cell," to Part I of The Star of Redemption. By tracing the lines of this constellation, I show how the emergence of Rosenzweig's "metaethics" is revealed through his encounters with the historical personalities of Kant and Hegel, and in a different sense entirely, the figure of Goethe. In his essay on "metaethics", with the informative title "Constructing a Perfect Solitude", Ernest Rubinstein playfully simplifies Rosenzweig's view of the Ever-Enduring Proto-Cosmos laid out in Part I of The Star: "things are not really other things: the world around us is not really God, God is Rosenzweig, Franz. "Notizen zum Barock (1908/09)". In Rosenzweig Jahrbuch/Rosenzweig Yearbook 4, (2009): 295. 2 Ibid. 297 1 Proceedings of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft not really us, and we are not really either God or the world."3 Who or what are we then? Or to ask more personally: Who am I? What is my "true existence"? 4 This "ever-enduring" question of self-identity accompanied Rosenzweig from his earliest engagement with German culture to his life as a practicing Jew. Throughout his writings, an urgent curiosity surrounding the concepts of individuality and personality emerge, finally culminating in his notion of the "self" in The Star. One cannot help but think that the referent of this "self" is often none other than Franz Rosenzweig. Thus, by examining the origins of Rosenzweig's "metaethics," we are not only examining his theory of the "self," but also implicitly exposing the contours of his own biography. Within Part I of The Star, the first reference towards the origins of "metaethics" is a brief allusion to Immanuel Kant's notion of the "intelligible character" of mankind. Underlying this notion, which is contrasted to our "empirical character," is Kant's transcendental unity of apperception introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason; this "pure, original, unchanging consciousness" 5 is captured in his argument, that each thought we think, must be accompanied by an 'I think' preceding the thought itself. This precludes any knowledge of what lies behind this 'I think,' corresponding to Rosenzweig's claim that we know "nothing" of mankind. Kant's "intelligible character" and Rosenzweig's "metaethics" converge in the fact that we cannot know what lies behind the unity of selfconsciousness; that we cannot point to it as a thing in the world. This "unity of self-consciousness" also grounds our "empirical character," by way of which we act under the laws of the world of appearance. Our transcendental self, however, is not subject to these same laws. Rather, as Kant states in his Critique of Practical Reason, our "intelligible character" is "determinable only through the laws that [one] gives himself by reason."6 For Kant, this is the ethical seat of freedom within the individual. For Rosenzweig "the self-consciousness of man" is ultimately the awareness of Rubinstein, Ernest. "Constructing a Perfect Solitude: Metaethics in Franz Rosenzweig's Star of Redemption." In "The Spirit of Poesy", Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000. 226 4 Rosenzweig, Franz. The Star of Redemption. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970. 63 5 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. A 107 6 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 5:98 3 144 Josiah Simon its "finite essence." In its Kantian abstraction, our "free will" becomes the "defiance" of the self against this mortality. But paradoxically, this "freedom" requires that our "intelligible character" stand in opposition to an "empirical" world. This led to Kant's famous claim, repeated in various forms throughout his writings, that 'man is a citizen of two worlds.' For Rosenzweig, this claim must be qualified. Indeed, through our birth as distinct and unique individuals we form meaningful relationships with greater entities that give our lives meaning, for example, as citizens belonging to a state or as worshipers belonging to a temple; however, this relation of particular to universal does not capture the self, it is rather an expression of the "metalogical" individual. As free "intelligible characters" we are not really in the world at all. We are free from the world and its relations, free to follow our own ethos, the "metaethical" self. These 'two worlds' of individuality and self can be traced back to Rosenzweig's first published book, Hegel and the State. 8 In this work, the elements so distinctly held apart in Part I of The Star are set in relation within a biographical, narrative stream. Read closely and with an eye towards the future, we can find in this stream a primary source on the origins of Rosenzweig's "metaethics." Hegel and the State, mostly finished in 1913, but first published in 1920, critically unfolds Hegel's idea of the state using a method of narrative biography. Within this work, Rosenzweig's concept of "individuality" first emerges. Beginning with Hegel's earliest writings on religion and politics, Rosenzweig introduces a problem he will trace throughout the entire book: the relation of the individual to the state. Following the trajectory of Hegel's own development, Rosenzweig juxtaposes the particularity of the individual to the universality of the state. This contrast, by way of which Rosenzweig measures the ethical health of Hegel's state, leads from Hegel's firm defense of the rights of the individual in his youth, to a complete sacrifice, in Rosenzweig's reading, of the freedom of the individual to the "will" of the state in The Philosophy of Right. By exposing the limits of Hegel's view of "individuality" Rosenzweig was already undermining Hegel's claim to totality and foreshadowing his own understanding of the "metalogical" in The Star, namely, that "the unity of the philosopher's view" is "personal, experienced, philosophized."9 7 Rosenzweig, Star, 67 Rosenzweig, Franz. Hegel und der Staat. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010 (1920). 9 Rosenzweig, Star 52 7 8 145 Proceedings of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft In writing his book on Hegel, Rosenzweig had hoped to show how Bismarck's state was partially made up from the fragments of Hegel's ideal. With the end of the First World War, however, Rosenzweig's dream of a renewed political order was buried under the rubble of the past. What endured, I would like to argue, was not only the conceptual pieces of Rosenzweig's "metalogical" critique of Idealism, but the very beginnings of his "metaethical" understanding of the self. Hegel and the State is not only a meditation on the development of "individuality" in Hegel's thought, but also a biography of Hegel's life. As a biography, Hegel and the State prefigures Rosenzweig's concern for the life of the individual in The Star. While it is easy to get lost in the historical details of the Hegel book, Rosenzweig always brings his readers back to the life in question. In this sense, he is following the lead of his teacher Meinecke, and Dilthey before him, who believed that history could best be told through the lives of 'world-historical individuals.' Thus, as much as Hegel and the State is a critique of Hegel's philosophy, it is perhaps just as significantly a critique of a historical personality. This is most apparent in Rosenzweig's "Frankfurt" chapter, where Hegel's life and thought come together in proximity to Hölderlin to form the "turning-point" of his view on the state. Rosenzweig writes that while in Frankfurt, Hegel developed a notion of "the necessary isolation of the inner person,” which he termed the "highest subjectivity." 10 Rosenzweig interprets this "highest subjectivity" as Hegel's "tragedy"11 of personal life. Already here, traces of Rosenzweig's "metaethics" can be found. However, Hegel's personal "tragedy" is soon swept up into his mature view of the state. Where once the fate of the individual was to be found in the particularity of personal life, Hegel later looks for this same fate in the universal life of the state. Shortly before the turn of the 19th century, Hegel thought that in order for Germany to become a state of its own, it had to acknowledge "the power of the universal over the individual." 12 For Rosenzweig, Hegel's Frankfurt period represents his transition from the "riddles of personal life" 13 to his belief in the powers of history and eventually the establishment of his theory of ethical life. In this biographical episode, which stands at the center of the first volume of Hegel and the State, there is a curious overlap with Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, 107 Ibid. 121 12 Ibid. 122 13 Ibid. 102 10 11 146 Josiah Simon Rosenzweig's own intellectual biography. It is often recounted, that in 1913 Rosenzweig reached a turning-point in his development: his decision, despite a promise to convert to Christianity, to remain a Jew. In 1913, Rosenzweig was 26 years old, more or less the same age as Hegel in Frankfurt. In a letter to his childhood friend Gertrud Oppenheim from two years earlier, 1911, he describes the development of the Frankfurt chapter and his interpretation of Hegel's turning-point: "I could not write it out of subjective experience, for I do not think I am that far along yet; if it is correct, than it is "anticipation" in the sense it is discussed in Dichtung und Wahrheit."14 This is not the messianic anticipation of The Star, but rather the subjective feeling Goethe describes in his autobiography: "a longing for that, which we already quietly possess." Goethe continues: "Thus, a passionate grasping for the truly possible transforms into a dreamed reality."15 What Rosenzweig dreamed of in the Frankfurt chapter regarding Hegel's turning-point, he unknowingly already possessed: namely, that very defiance of the self he will later term the "metaethical." Yet while writing Hegel and the State, before he found in Judaism that calm "sea of faithfulness," 16 Rosenzweig's own "personality" and "life" remained in tension. If Hegel and the State can be understood as the workshop for Rosenzweig's own life and thought, then "metaethics" is one of its most unfinished projects. This is evident if we observe the elements that will later help limit and define Rosenzweig's understanding of the self. Individuality, personality, tragedy—they all lay strewn about without any apparent order and without a unified concept of the "self." But it is precisely this unfinished form that provides a clear view into the genesis of Part I of The Star. In order to understand the link between Hegel and the State and the finished form of "metaethics" in The Star, I would like to turn to Rosenzweig's letter to his cousin Rudolf Ehrenberg from 1917: the "Urzelle" or "Germ-Cell"17 of The Star of Redemption. Readers of The Star will easily recognize in Rosenzweig's "Urzelle" the architectonics of the finished work. In attempting to formulate a Rosenzweig, Franz. Briefe, ed. Edith Rosenzweig. Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1935. (28.9.1911) 15 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit. München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1985. 418. 16 Rosenzweig, Star 170 17 Rosenzweig, Franz. ""Germ Cell" of The Star of Redemption. In Franz Rosenzweig's "The New Thinking". Ed. Alan Udoff and Barbara E. Galli. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999. 14 147 Proceedings of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft concept of revelation for his cousin, Rosenzweig experiments with a symbolic logic, which would later help define the three hypothetical starting-points of human knowledge: "A=A" as the knowledge of God; "B=A" as the knowledge of the world; and "B=B" as the knowledge of man. If we continue to draw the line from Hegel and the State, then it is easily recognizable that the life of the individual is again at the center of the investigation. Yet in the "Urzelle" the individual—in this sense moving from the historical-philosophical towards the theological—stands as a "free personality" over and against the absolute. Rosenzweig first delineates the concept of the "absolute" in order to show how the symbol for "man," B=B, cannot be derived from it. At most, the absolute, or God as A=A, can call out to man, that decisive moment of revelation from the book of Genesis, "Adam! where are you? (Gen. 3:9): "only in this event that happened to it can [man] think another B=B, to which the same thing has happened, a neighbor, who is like You."18 In the "Urzelle," Rosenzweig is already developing "metaethics" as a precondition for what will appear as "revelation" in Part II of The Star. But the "Urzelle" just as readily reveals what is at stake in Part I. And here, with the notion of a "free personality," we return once again to Kant. With his understanding of freedom as "the miracle in the world of appearances," Kant is credited with first discovering what Rosenzweig calls, without further explanation, the "free personality." 19 This corresponds to the convergence of Kant's "intelligible character" with "metaethics" in The Star: "the metaethical in man makes man the free master of his ethos so that he might possess it and not vice versa."20 In Hegel and the State, Rosenzweig showed how for Hegel, particular individuals find their highest expression of freedom within the universal state. As Hegel writes in §258 of Elements of the Philosophy of Right, "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth and ethical life."21 In the Urzelle, Rosenzweig shows how Kant opposes Hegel by looking for the freedom of the individual precisely in its separation from the world—his "intelligible character." What is fascinating in Rosenzweig's letter, however, is that with the notion of a "free personality" the concrete life of the individual takes precedence over Ibid. 56 Rosenzweig, "Germ Cell", 52 20 Star, 17 21 Hegel, G.W.F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 276 18 19 148 Josiah Simon the abstract thought of the philosopher. It is within this context that Rosenzweig calls Kant "personally the greatest of all philosophers," because "he alone has not forgotten through businesslike association with the truth how to be a child and a fool."22 This humanizing moment in Rosenzweig's letter brings out the biographical undercurrent in all of his thinking. Already in his youth, Rosenzweig formulated the now famous question: "Why does one philosophize? For the same reason that one makes music or literature or art. Here too, in the last analysis, all that matters is the discovery of one's own personality." 23 In Hegel and the State, Rosenzweig's biographical presentation overlapped with the discovery of his own personality. And in the introduction to Part I of The Star, where Rosenzweig sketches a collection of historical personalities—Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche—a biographical method again sets the tone. In the Urzelle, linking these two books, we again learn of an intrinsic piece of Rosenzweig's biography: the year 1800, "the unrest in my intellectual clockwork."24 For Rosenzweig, the year 1800 "means an absolute end, i.e. an absolute beginning: as Hegel discovered in himself the last philosopher, so Goethe discovered in himself the first Christian."25 In commenting on this passage from the "Germ Cell," Bruce Rosenstock points out that with Hegel, we find "a man who brings philosophy to its fulfillment in his own self-consciousness." "With Goethe," he continues, "a man chooses to shape his life as a classical work of art."26 What can be concluded, for both Hegel and Goethe, is summed up in Rosenzweig's own assessment of the year 1800: namely, that for him this epochal divide "revolves around the philosopher in contrast to the philosophy."27 But what implications does this fascination with the lives of Hegel and Goethe, and Kant as well, have for the development of "metaethics" in Part I of The Star? Paradoxically, that with "metaethics," which is supposed to capture the essence of man entirely free from the world, Rosenzweig has in mind a historical self endowed with a personality. It is first with Goethe, however, that Rosenzweig, "Germ Cell," 52 Rosenzweig, Briefe, (1.4.1906) 24 Rosenzweig, "Germ Cell", 47 25 Ibid. 63 26 Rosenstock, Bruce. Philosophy and the Jewish Question: Mendelssohn, Rosenzweig and Beyond. Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2010. 135 27 Rosenzweig, "Germ Cell," 63 22 23 149 Proceedings of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft Rosenzweig's finds something more than with Kant and Hegel. Again in his "Notes on the Baroque," Rosenzweig writes that Goethe "searched to no avail for a world, which was in tune with his I."28 It was rather in the "world of art," which for Rosenzweig is "no world at all,"29 but that realm that eternally preserves the self in its solitary isolation, that Goethe's "I" found solace. With Goethe, what is preserved for Rosenzweig in Part I of The Star, was not yet the historical personality of Part III, but a personality in the realm of literature: the tragic hero Faust. With Goethe's Faust, Rosenzweig breaks freely into the language of The Star. What was locked in the tension between life and personality is finally shaped into the "metaethical" self. The development of Rosenzweig's "metaethics" has led us from "individuality" in Hegel and the State to "personality" in the "Germ Cell" and now finally to the "metaethical" self in The Star. The outstanding quality of the "self" for Rosenzweig is its mortality; hence he begins Part I with a reflection on our knowledge of death. The essence of the self is captured in an image Rosenzweig borrows from Goethe: "What distinguishes gods from men?" asks Goethe, "[t]hat many waves walk before the former—us the wave lifts, the wave swallows and we sink away."30 Set as we are within this stream of time—as Rosenzweig showed for Hegel in his first book—faced with our own mortality, we grow defiant, the self wishes "to remain." For coupled with its mortality, the "self" has the desire for immortality. It is thus in the free act of defiance against its own fate that the self first encounters itself. This encounter, now in stark distinction from Kant, Rosenzweig terms "character." In Part I of The Star, Rosenzweig develops his notion of the "self" as "character" in opposition to the notion of "individuality" as "personality." As a 'citizens of two worlds,' the human being is both a self and an individual. With his "two worlds," however, Kant ultimately failed to capture the essential quality of the self. "The fact is," writes Rosenzweig, "only one of them is world. The sphere of the self is not world, nor does it become world by being called world."31 With our natural births, "the great day of fate for individuality,"32 we are born into the world as individuals among other individuals. As individuals, we are already set in relation to higher communities—the Rosenzweig, "Notizen zum Barock," 296 Rosenzweig, Star, 81 30 Ibid. 63 31 Rosenzweig, Star, 70 32 Ibid. 71 28 29 150 Josiah Simon relation of particular to universal. It is from within this relation that our personalities are formed and expressed: "personality is man playing the role assigned to him by fate, one role among many in the polyphonic symphony of mankind."33 As opposed to this individual with personality, the "metaethical" self is not set in relation to other individuals at all: "It is alone; it is none of the "children of men"; it is Adam, Man himself."34 For Rosenzweig, "character" is not something that "becomes" or "forms", not something that plays itself out on the stage of the world as personality, rather, the self is alone with its "character", and it is through this "character" that it first recognizes itself as self: "[o]ne day the self assaults man [...] and takes possession of all the wealth in his property [...] [h]e has become quite poor, has only himself."35 Thus, the "character" of the self is not something derived from worldly experience, but precisely what distinguishes the self from the worldly individual: "The self is solitary man in the hardest sense of the word: the personality is the "political animal."36 This pairing of the "metalogical" view of the individual as "political animal" and the "metaethical" view of the solitary self, has caused trouble for some interpreters of Rosenzweig. Nathan Rotenstreich writes, for example, "when we place that which has to be seen as unique, and thus irreducible, within a context that shows, as it were, the continuity between that thing and a whole beyond it, we undermine irreducibility." 37 For Rosenzweig's methodology to work here, he must assume as Rotenstreich does, that the "metaethical" self is "meant to cut the basic tie between the human individual and the human whole or mankind."38 In order to achieve this radical break between the individual as personality and the individual as character, Rosenzweig uses an image of the "metaethical" self, borrowed from the realm of art and ultimately leading towards his appreciation of Goethe: the tragic hero. Within Rosenzweig's philosophy of language, what defines the self in "metaethics" is above all the concept of silence: "the seal of its greatness as well as the stigma of its weakness."39 If in Kant Rosenzweig found the philosophical inspiration for the solitary self, and in opposition to Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 35 Ibid. 71 36 Ibid. 71 37 Rotenstreich, Nathan. "Rosenzweig's Notion of Metaethics." In The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig. Ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1988. 73 38 Ibid. 82 39 Rosenzweig, Star, 77 33 34 151 Proceedings of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft Hegel he sharpened his distinction between individuality and self, then it is in the image of the silent tragic hero that the self as character is fully captured. Rosenzweig references Greek tragic drama—specifically that of Aeschylus—where the dramatic form, precisely as a visible art form, allows the quality of silence to be represented, to be shown: "Tragedy cast itself in the artistic form of drama, just in order to be able to represent speechlessness."40 Although even in Attic tragedy the hero will often find himself in a sort of dialogue, Rosenzweig writes that "[t]hey do not learn to speak, they only learn to debate."41 It is thus in the "great silences" and in the "lyric monologues" 42 of the tragic hero that the image of the "metaethical" character of man is captured. Yet while in The Star of Redemption Greek tragedy is one explicit source of Rosenzweig's reflections on "metaethics" and silence, underlying this classical reference is the relation to Goethe and his modern tragic drama Faust. "The life of the self", writes Rosenzweig, "is no orbit, but a straight line leading from one unknown to another." 43 Between these two unknowns, birth and death, man moves from individuality to selfhood. The apex of this course and thus when we are most ourselves, is in "old age": The aged no longer have a personality of their own; their share in the common concerns of mankind has paled to a mere memory. But the less they are still individualities, the harder they become as characters, the more they become self.44 When Rosenzweig wrote The Star of Redemption, he had yet to attain this "old age" he speaks of with such authority, indeed, his life would be cut short before he ever could. It is rather from the literary figure of Faust that he draws his image of the "hardening" of the self into its own character. At the beginning of the second part of Goethe's Faust, "[Faust] has already forfeited all his rich individuality [...] and just for that reason appears at last, in the final act, as a character of consummate hardness and supreme defiance, really and truly as a self."45 And at the end of the second part, directly before his death, Faust is alone and blind, without Mephistopheles. Ibid. 77 Ibid. 77 42 Ibid. 77 43 Ibid. 72 44 Ibid. 72 45 Ibid. 72 40 41 152 Josiah Simon It is first now that he realizes "that to bring to fruit the most exalted plans, one mind is ample for a thousand hands."46 It is in this solitary moment that Faust finds "A land of Eden sheltered here within."47 For Rosenzweig, this image of Faust as a defiant tragic hero anticipates his notion of the "metaethical" self. Goethe's tragic drama Faust, and especially the second part, is not only an indispensible source for understanding the notion of "metaethics", but serves to show how this notion is assumed as the basis for the entirety of Part I of The Star. The last lines of the introduction to Part I, where the three meta-sciences were first sketched out, culminates in the pairing of Rosenzweig's project with a central scene from the journey of Faust: The Nothing of our knowledge is no single Nothing, but rather a triple Nothing. Thus, it contains in itself the promise of definability. And therefore we can hope, like Faust, to again find the "All" that we have to dismember in this Nothing, this threefold Nothing of knowledge. "Descend then! I could also say: arise!48 The "threefold Nothing of knowledge", which "contains in itself the promise of definability" corresponds in Rosenzweig's thinking to the silent, and thus pre-linguistic "ever-enduring protocosmos", the three metasciences. This "protocosmos" of thought is a play on the "realm of the Mothers" from Goethe's Faust. In the scene "Dark Gallery," after Faust has already experienced the depths and heights of earthly life, he must descend alone, without the aid of Mephistopheles, to a "solitary" realm without space and without time. For Goethe, this realm represents the solitary world of poetry and thought—the realm of "art"—and is accordingly where Faust is sent to look for a three-footed, glowing cauldron containing the spirit of absolute beauty. For Rosenzweig, this "realm of the Mothers" first corresponds to the "proto-cosmos" of the three meta-sciences. However, within the description of "metaethics" in the final book of Part I, we learn that these meta-sciences correspond to the "wordless understanding" of the realm of art. 49 "Prior to any real human speech," writes Rosenzweig, "art creates, as the speech of the Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Faust. A Tragedy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. (line 11509) 47 Ibid. line 11569 48 Rosenzweig, Star, 21/22 49 Ibid. 80 46 153 Proceedings of the Internationale Rosenzweig Gesellschaft unspeakable, a first, speechless, mutual comprehension, for all time indispensible beneath and beside actual speech. The silence of the tragic hero," he continues, "is silent in all art and is understood in all art without any words."50 As a work of art, Goethe's Faust—"a tragedy of the absolute man in his relation to the absolute object"51—provides its readers with a glimpse into that realm of the "unspeakable." For Rosenzweig, this realm, "the secret pre-history of the soul," 52 is captured in the ever-enduring silence of the "metaethical" self. In Kant, Rosenzweig found the inspiration for "metaethics", in Hegel, the opposition, which helped clarify its character. In the drama Faust, Rosenzweig found with Goethe a literary model for the "metaethical" itself. It is on the basis of this model, and thus from the notion of "metaethics," that Rosenzweig begins his own journey into The Star. Only by descending into the solitary and silent realm of the self, could Rosenzweig finally arise anew to language and life. In this sense, "metaethics" is to be carefully preserved as one marches through the pages of The Star. In Rosenzweig's own words: "Without the storms of defiance in the self, the silence of the sea in the faithfulness of the soul would be impossible." 53 This "defiance," as best expressed in Rosenzweig's decision to "remain a Jew" and throughout in his "unceasing discovery" of personality and life, reveals the true origin of the "metaethical:" Rosenzweig himself. His work of art, self-wrought from the irons of German thought and only then freely infused with the language of his Jewish soul, is The Star of Redemption. Ibid. 81 Ibid. 210 52 Ibid. 170 53 Ibid. 170 50 51 154