Download Forging the Volksgeist: Herder in Hungary, then and now

Forging the Volksgeist: Herder in Hungary, then and now
Chris Hann, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle
(paper for the workshop ‘Herder and Anthropology’, University of Oslo 29-30 May 2006;
not for citation)
Abstract
Even in his lifetime, Herder was widely read in eastern Europe. His ‘organic’ conception
of the nation was influential for the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century,
especially among Slavs, for whom Herder showed special sympathy. This paper will
focus on the case of Hungary, where his reception was complicated by a sentence in the
Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit in which he concludes his survey
of Hungarian history with the observation that they now form a minority in their own
country ‘und nach Jahrhunderten wird man vielleicht ihre Sprache kaum finden.’ (XVI,
II; 1989: 688)
More than two centuries later the Hungarian language is still going strong in a
nation-state that has been highly homogenized and currently appears to be one of the
more successful cases of postsocialist transformation. The paper will explore why Herder
got it so wrong. It will also ask how far organic notions of Nation and Cultur (sic) can
help us to theorize ‘cultural minorities’ inside contemporary Hungary as well as state
policies towards ethnic ‘kin’ who live outside the country’s borders.
‚Jede Nation hat ihren Mittelpunkt der Glückseligkeit in sich wie jede Kugel ihren
Schwerpunkt.’
Herder 1774, (V, 509)
ein zahlreiches, fremdes, heidnisches, unterirdisches Volk fast in allen Ländern Europa's,
die /Zigeuner/.
Herder, 1784, (XVI, V. ; 1989: 703)
‘Like all important ideas, that of culture was the realization of many minds, and it
developed gradually.’
Kroeber 1952, p. 118
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Herder, anthropology and the concept of culture
Herder has long been viewed as a pivotal figure in the Counter-Enlightenment, leading a
reaction against the universalism of Paris and Königsberg and pointing towards
romanticism, relativism and populism, to name just three pertinent –isms. The
sympathetic commentary of Isaiah Berlin (2000 (1965)) is probably still the most
influential assessment in English, though the level of his scholarship is hardly
comparable to the recent study by John Zammito (2002). Of course there is room to argue
about what is genuinely counter and what is encompassed in the whole. Berlin draws
attention to what Herder had in common with his Christian humanist predecessors as well
as contemporary Weimar cosmopolitans, and yet concludes that his works, though ridden
by contradictions, constitute “perhaps the sharpest blow ever delivered against the
classical philosophy of the West” (2000: 238-9).
My impression is that, at least in Germany, Herder is not taken seriously as a
major philosopher. He is, however, taken seriously by the leading historians of popular
culture in Europe (Burke 1978) and by at least some anthropologists. There is an obvious
connection here. Herder’s pioneering role in the ‘discovery of the people’ paved the way
for those who set out to document the life of the people all over the world over the
following two centuries. For some anthropologists, such as my Leipzig colleague
Bernhard Streck, Herder is the founding father (1997: 27), because he marks the crucial
shift towards philosophical and cultural relativism. Certainly such a position is at least
implicit in much of his writing. When I searched in his writings for Kultur in the plural I
could not find it. Nations (Nationen) and peoples (Völker) were his usual categories, and
2
he only pluralizes Cultur when it comes to distinguishing the Kultur des Volkes from the
Kultur der Gelehrten. But the famous image of the Kugel and the concept of the
Volksgeist are surely enough to make Herder’s position clear and they provide support for
those of a relativist persuasion, and those who like to define anthropology as the study of
“the other”. As Berlin stresses, he had no Favoritvolk.
Herder emphasized pluralism and had trouble reconciling this with any faith in
progress (Fortgang). Berlin argues that his notions of belonging to a group are central to
his thought: Herder pitied those who, for whatever reason, could not partake in the
elementary forms of human association (including “superfluous cosmopolitans”, those
who fed off the creativity of others). Language was not a mere vehicle to express thought,
it was the incarnation of collective experience. Herder was obsessively attracted by
origins, by the vitality of the primitive. He pioneered recognition of the ‘genius of a
people’, e.g. in his early publications of Volkslieder. I do not know whether he was the
first to introduce terms such as Volksgeist and Volksseele. As for Kultur, he often uses the
term in the standard universalist sense, e.g. when speaking of “der Fortschritt der Kultur”,
but this is hardly compatible with a strictly relativist position. Reimar Müller (1978: 38)
suggests that it must be viewed in a complex relation to Humanität.1 Herder himself
warns against loose use of this term in the Preface to the Ideen, where he asks ‘Welches
Volk der Erde ists, das nicht einige Kultur habe?’ His first English translator in 1802
rendered this as cultivation:
‘Is there a people on earth totally uncultivated and how contracted must the
scheme of Providence be, if every individual of the human species were to be
1 “Er greift zurück auf die dem Wort Kultur zugrundeliegende ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Ackerbaus,
die zur Metapher für jede menschliche Kulturleistung wird. Kultur ist „Anbau“ der Humanität, denn diese
realisiert sich in der kulturellen Entwicklung in immer neuen Gestalten.“
3
formed to what we call cultivation, for which refined weakness would often be a
more appropriate term? Nothing can be more vague, than the term itself; nothing
more apt to lead us astray, than the application of it to whole nations and ages.’
(1966: v)
It seems we need to recognize the kind of confusion that is common enough in
intellectual history. Herder’s ‘organic diversitarianism’ (Stocking 1982) did imply the
kernel of what came to be called cultural relativism, but he did not name it as such; and it
was to be more than a century before the word culture was adapted from its traditional
humanistic sense to serve this new purpose; indeed that adaptation has never been
complete, which is why so much confusion surrounds the term in the present day.
Boas’s basic conviction that a people must be approached as an ‘integrated
spiritual totality’ is generally viewed as a German legacy. But Stocking has drawn
attention to the many hesitancies and inconsistencies in Boas’ use of ‘culture’. It was his
students, particularly Ruth Benedict, who came after 1930 to push the ideas of integration
and relativism much further than he himself did; this was complemented and sealed by a
new division of labour with sociologists which Alfred Kroeber and Talcott Parsons
negotiated in the early 1950s, which basically gave the anthropologists prime rights over
the ideational dimension, quite in the tradition of the Kulturwissenschaften (Kuper 1999).
Zimmerman’s recent book (2001) demonstrates that the main paradigm in German
anthropology (Völkerkunde) when Boas was studying with Bastian in Berlin had very
little in common with the vision of the world as a mosaic of cultures, as later developed
by Boasians in the United States. Bastian analysed Völkergedanken and did not pluralize
Kultur. But the seed was there, notwithstanding the over-riding dichotomy between
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Kulturvölker and Naturvölker. Matti Bunzl, in the most comprehensive discussion of
these matters to date, concludes that Boas’s contribution was the one that mattered most
in the institutional consolidation of the discipline in the United States; and that this
contribution was:
‘grounded in a German anthropological tradition extending back through Bastian
and Ritter, through Steinthal and Waitz, to the brothers Alexander and Wilhelm
von Humboldt. It is in that tradition that one finds the roots of Boas’ critique of
evolutionism and its racialist concomitants, as well as of his linguistic relativism
and his cultural historicism. By this route, one may trace the later American
anthropological idea of culture back through Bastian’s Völkergedanken and the
folk psychologist’s Volksgeister to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Nationalcharakter –
and behind that, although not without a paradoxical and portentous residue of
conceptual and ideological ambiguity, to the Herderian ideal of Volksgeist.’ (Bunzl
1996: 73)
I am not sure if this bold genealogy has been confirmed in detailed research; and
perhaps it does not really matter whether Boas read Herder or not. His thought was
shaped in the age when Germany became a unified state, the most powerful state of
mainland Europe and increasingly an imperialist rival to France and Britain overseas. His
concept of culture reflects both the tradition of the Geisteswissenschaften and the
nationalist way of perceiving the world, in which he could not help but be immersed as a
citizen of Prussia and Germany.
The majority of German anthropologists until the beginning of the twentieth
century did not accept the natural science perspective, epitomized by Darwinism, and
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clung instead to the dichotomy between Kulturvölker and Naturvölker. The latter were the
particular concern of the anthropologist/ethnologist, and they were located outside of
history and cultural change. Arguably, this was precisely the stereotype of der Wilde
which Herder’s philosophy of history had already transcended in the eighteenth century.
In any case, from the turn of the century onwards the contrast between the Kulturvölker
and the Naturvölker began to give way to the doctrines of Kulturgeschichte and
Kulturkreislehre (Zwernemann 1983). Whatever the deficiencies of the diffusionism
developed in these schools, it was not founded on a nationalist paradigm and not even its
more extreme variants reduce culture to ethnicity or nationality. Such racist reductionism
was specific to the Nazi period. Post-war German anthropology has struggled to regain its
high international profile. It is by and large still identified as a humanities discipline, a
branch of Kulturwissenschaft rather than a Sozialwissenschaft (see Gingrich 2005).
Others at this workshop are much better qualified to explore Herder’s
contributions to philosophy, to the philosophy of anthropology, to the philosophy of
history and to the history of anthropology. In any case I am less interested in his ideas as
such. The Herderian equation of language and Volk had political implications from the
very beginning, above all in Eastern Europe. His theories deserve attention in the context
of the rise of the nation-state and nationalism. I shall focus on the case of Hungary, but at
the same time raise more general issues. My conclusion is that Herder’s humanist
counterpoint to enlightenment universalism turned out to be a false trail. The
pathbreaking studies of the Kultur des Volkes became compromised by a vision of
humanity as divided into essentialist Kulturen. In anthropology it is more urgent than ever
to free ourselves of this legacy.
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Herder in Hungary
If the German speaking world was peripheral to the philosophes, East Prussia, where
Herder spent his formative years, was a periphery within the periphery. Had he grown up
like Karl Marx as a Rhinelander, it seems unlikely that he would have developed the
same Einfühlung for the “small peoples” of eastern Europe. Since this empathy for small
peoples everywhere was central to his entire work, we can state that there is a close link
between the life and the ideas.
German was of course the principle medium of communication in eastern Europe
and many of Herder’s works were widely read soon after their publication. Ironically they
contributed directly to the demise of German as a lingua franca among the upper classes
and the literati, for the local intellectuals responded promptly to Herder’s insistence that
language was at the core of the nation’s identity. Hence, in addition to the faithful
collection of folksongs and tales in dialect, they took seriously the task of formalizing a
literary language. On the one hand, folk poetry was supposed to express the authentic
Geist of the people, and it was a collective composition (“das Volk dichtet”); on the other
hand, living poets were inspired to emulate traditional styles using a language that had
been systematically standardized and purified of foreign elements.
Herder was read and his general message applauded in Hungary in very much the
same way as in other parts of Eastern Europe. A significant complication was his
pessimistic prognosis concerning the future of the Madscharen: surrounded by unrelated
peoples and outnumbered in their own areas of settlement by the speakers of German and
Slavic languages, Herder suggested that their language would eventually vanish, just as
other languages and the peoples that carried them had risen and fallen in the course of
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history. This sentence came to take on a life of its own and is still well known in Hungary
today, at least among the intelligentsia. It has influenced socialist cultural apparatchiks as
well as the messianic lyrics of generations of pre-socialist national poets. One might
therefore claim that, with this one sentence, Herder provoked a reaction which
contributed to falsifying his own prediction. However, I prefer to emphasize more
concrete mechanisms. Although the Hungarian case certainly has peculiar features, it also
exemplifies the reception of Herder’s message in eastern Europe.
A strong impact on Hungarian intellectuals can be traced back to the 1790s, when
Jakobiner revolutionaries were harshly suppressed by the Habsburg rulers (1794-5).
Three of those imprisoned, Ferenc Kazinczy, Ferenc Verseghy and János Batsányi, were
particularly indebted to Herder, translating him and of course Ossian into Hungarian, and
themselves producing significant literary work (Erdélyi 1978). These trends continued
following the end of the Napoleonic wars, the so-called Reform period after 1820, which
was the golden age of Hungary’s national revival. Ferenc Kölcsey, author of the national
anthem, expressed the bitter fear of a Hungarian Untergang in some of his most famous
verses. He refused to acquiesce and argued for the renewal of the national literature on
the basis of folk songs and folk poetry. Ossian and Homer were the twin sources of
inspiration for many others, including Mihály Vörösmarty and Sándor Kisfaludy. In the
1840s this impulse was continued in the lyrics of Sándor Petöfi and the epics of János
Arany, but also in the first systematic collections of folk poetry by János Erdélyi (Erdélyi,
ibid). All of this work conformed to Herderian aesthetics and much of it was directly
inspired by knowledge of his work.
If poetry was the main form of activity seeded by Herder and he himself seems to
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have taken little interest in non-literary mechanisms of resistance, the radical political
implications of his work were nonetheless clear to his readers. In the Hungarian case the
euphoria of the early 1790s turned out to be ephemeral but in the Reform period the
progressive demands implicit in Herder’s cultural philosophy were spelled out, above all
in the proposals of István Széchenyi to modernize the country through the abolition of
serfdom.2 In this generation there was a shift from the intellectual discovery of the nation
(or invention, as some would have it nowadays) to agitation for the cause of forming a
new, independent state: from stage A to stage B in the terminology of Miroslav Hroch
(1985). Arguably, the reason for the failure of the 1848 revolutions was that the peoples
of eastern Europe had not yet entered stage 3, in which the nationalist message is
disseminated by a mass movement throughout the population. Consequently, most of
eastern Europe remained under the domination of alien powerholders for the rest of the
century. Hungary was an exception. In 1867 magyar elites were able to negotiate a
compromise (Ausgleich) with Vienna and assume full control over home affairs in their
half of what became known as the “dual Monarchy”. At this point ethnic Magyars were
still a minority of the population of Hungary. Half a century later, when the dual
Monarchy collapsed, the Herderian diagnosis of the late eighteenth century was no longer
valid. The proportion of the population reporting Hungarian as the mother tongue and
professing Hungarian identity increased substantially, due at least in part to strongly
assimilationist policies, e.g. the refusal to permit the use of languages other than magyar
in the school system or in the state bureaucracy.
This thumbnail sketch is meant only to show how quickly the emancipatory
2 There was of course an ambiguity here: the proponents of bürgerliche reform drew on the work of a
scholar whose radical populism, as Berlin (1999) points out, often bordered on the anarchist.
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aspect of Herder’s message can lead to the opposite. The nineteenth century consolidation
of the Magyar Volk, in which ethnographers played an increasing part, was based on
systematic attempts to rid the language of foreign borrowings (especially
Germanisierungen) and the construction of pure népies (volkstümlich) standards in all
fields of culture, from music to cuisine and the fine arts (e.g. the romantic wilderness of
the puszta came to epitomize the national landscape). It also involved the coercive
assimilation of millions of non-Magyars, not only Slavs and Germans but also Jews. Of
course we can hardly blame Herder for this: as Berlin notes (2000: 16): “Men are not
responsible for the careers of their ideas: still less for the aberrations to which they lead.”
In the Hungarian case the “aberrations” intensified after 1918, when large areas of
territory were lost to Romania, Yugoslavia and the new Czechoslovakia. This
“mutilation” of the country was intrumentalised to maintain nationalist frenzy in
succeeding decades. In the village where I did fieldwork on the Great Plain the last
German and Slovak surnames were magyarised in the early 1940s and to all intents and
purposes this was ethnically speaking a fully homogenized community by the 1970s, in
which the only language spoken was Magyar.
The general model of Ernest Gellner (1983) is useful in theorizing the
transformation whereby the pluralism characteristic of Agraria, exemplified by imperial
formations such as the Habsburg Empire, gives way to the homogeneity that is necessary
for the efficient functioning of Industria. Hungary was still semi-feudal in the 1940s and
the Gellnerian congruence of polity and culture, to which Magyar elites had been aspiring
since the later nineteenth century, was only realized under socialism.
But this model has its limitations. Gellner’s hard-nosed, functionalist, sociological
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theory neglects what I shall call the Herderian dimension. Industrial modernity was
nowhere in sight in the Carpathian basin when Kazinczy, Kölcsey and their colleagues
read Herder and implemented key elements of his cultural programme. Even the later
dissemination of the new national identity owed more to changes in the education system,
in the means of communication, and to political diktat than to the requirements of an
industrial society for a single high culture, as set out by Gellner.
This theory is similarly unhelpful in addressing phenomena that have become
more conspicuous in the postsocialist era, but whose roots can be traced back to the
cultural politics of the later socialist era. National identity was, of course, played down in
the early, most ideological period of socialist rule. But the sentiments fostered over
several generations did not fade so quickly, and after 1956 the regime recognized this.
Whereas the leading communist of the Stalinist era had been a Jew (Mátyás Rákosi), this
mistake was not repeated. By the time of my fieldwork in the 1970s a low-key policy to
promote socialist national identity was in place. National colours and symbols became
increasingly prominent in the public sphere, and through the Dancehouse (Táncház)
movement a new generation was able to cultivate a quasi Herderian passion for folk
traditions. Now, the fact is that much of the richest heritage in music and dance is
associated with the Magyar groups of Transylvania, i.e. groups living in a foreign state
since 1918 (apart from 1940-4, when the northern part of the region, with Nazi
connivance, was re-annexed by Hungary). In the later socialist period, Romania under
Nicolae Ceaucescu experienced extreme nationalist policies. One instance of these
policies was found in the rewriting of history, and in particular the history of
Transylvania. Hungarian intellectuals were generally appalled by what they viewed as the
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crudest nationalism. In articles published around New Year 1977-78 the distinguished
poet Gyula Illyés invoked Herder’s bleak prophecy in a long article setting out the
Magyar point of view. Illyés was a veteran of the Republic of Councils with impeccable
communist credentials. Yet in extended articles in a leading newspaper, the Magyar
Nemzet, parts of which were published in English in 1987 in the New Hungarian
Quarterly, he was allowed to deplore publicly the fact that socialist humanism had not
found a solution to the problems faced by Magyars living outside the Magyar state.
But the relatively restrained celebration of national identity of the later socialist
era was always insufficient for some. The first postsocialist government was emphatically
nationalist in orientation and the Prime Minister József Antall declared that he considered
himself the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians (the country had barely 10 million
inhabitants – Antall’s figure is an estimate of the worldwide diaspora, of which
Tranyslvania forms the largest component. Later governments of all varieties have
continued to support the co-ethnics in neighbouring states, not only in the domain of
culture but also through opening up the Hungarian labour market. Right wing politicians
attempted to go further with the “Status law” of 2001, which eventually failed to gain
sufficient support among domestic Hungarians when put to a referendum (Stewart 2003).
The very notion of the “kin state”, which in the Transylvanian case would have led to the
granting to ethnic Hungarians of a set of rights denied to their Romanian co-citizens,
raises awkward issues which, at any rate given the present pace of European integration,
are going to be around for a long time. More generally, how do we account for the
persistence of strong national identities, such as that of the Hungarian minority in
Tranyslvania, when the Gellnerian model predicts a bland homogenization?
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Even Hungary itself has become more “multicultural” in recent years. How are
we to explain the fact that, in the region of my fieldwork, a few activists are busy trying
to revive Slovak3 and sváb German traditions? Such cultural minorities are provided for
generously according to current Hungarian legislation, which allow for local selfgovernment, vernacular classes at school etc. I have argued that this liberalism is
deceptive (Hann 2006). It is possible only because the contemporary minority identities
are thin, shallow. As a result of the aggressive assimilation of the pre-socialist era and the
general homogenization which culminated under socialism, Hungary emerged as one of
the most monolithic of European states. The Magyar language dominates, the great
majority of the populace can communicate fluently only in this language and their prime
sense of belonging is to Hungary. None of this is threatened by measures allowing other
groups, previously suppressed, to step forward in a folkloric domain – on the contrary,
this whiff of diversity is no different from the support given to regionally specific Magyar
groups; both have the same welcome spin-offs for tourism, an important branch of the
national economy.
The real challenge will come not from the country’s German, Slav or Romanian
minorities, all nowadays well integrated, but from elsewhere. New migrants are not yet
very numerous in Hungary: Chinese are highly visible in certain branches of the economy
but they are not yet articulating demands for cultural recognition. The most serious
problem, as in most neighbouring states, is that posed by the Roma. It seems to me that
these people, viewed by some sociologists as an “underclass” in the new capitalist
economy, exemplify the underlying problems of the concept of (a) culture, as it has
3 Sándor Petöfi, the national poet and great hero of the failed revolution of 1848, was born Petrovics in the
nearby market down of Kiskörös, which in the eighteenth century was resettled mostly by Slovaks,
following the retreat of the Ottoman Turks.
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developed from Herder onwards. For him, the Roma too are a Kugel, albeit perhaps one
of the “unlucky” ones: when asked about their identity in the national census, few of
those who are labeled Roma (or more commonly Gypsy, cigány) by others are willing to
own up to this Volksgeist, profoundly stigmatized by the majority.4
Conclusion
Herder was a key figure in the transformation of the concept of culture from the
universalist sense in which only high/low differentiation counted to the modern relativist
sense of “all Kulturvölker now” (Hann 2002). I think the current usage, which
emphasizes the notion of ‘belonging’ to a culture, is pernicious. The case of Hungary
shows how intellectuals could play a crucial role in the construction of the nation:
building directly on Herder, this is how the foundations of the modern identity were laid
in the nineteenth century. However, the case of the Roma today highlights the problems
of implementing policies based on the rights of ‘cultures’. We have to struggle to free
ourselves from this concept of culture – this Herderian view of the world, radical in its
time, has become reactionary, and unfortunately anthropologists have helped to make it
so.
4 Ich übergehe die /Armenier/, die ich in unserm Welttheil nur als Reisende betrachte;
sehe aber dagegen ein zahlreiches, fremdes, heidnisches, unterirdisches Volk fast in allen
Ländern Europa's, die /Zigeuner/. Wie kommt es hierher? wie kommen die sieben bis
achtmal hundert tausend Köpfe hierher, die ihr neuester Geschichtsschreiber [14] zählet?
Eine verworfne Indische Kaste, die von allem, was sich göttlich, anständig und bürgerlich
nennet, ihrer Geburt nach entfernt ist, und dieser erniedrigenden Bestimmung noch nach
Jahrhunderten treu bleibt, wozu taugte sie in Europa, als zur militarischen Zucht, die doch
alles aufs schnellste disziplinieret 1989: 703).
(Footnote 14. Grellmann histor. Versuch über die Zigeuner 87. Rüdigers [Neuester]
Zuwachs zur Sprachenkunde 82.)
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But realistically, it is likely to take a long time before our discipline, not to mention the
wider public, loses the insidious habit of conceptualising ‘cultures’ as analogous to
peoples, ethnic groups, nations – or species.
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