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Arms Trade Treaty: Will it really be effective?
by Fergus Watt
Will the recently concluded Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) actually lead to meaningful limitations in the
international trade in arms?
Estimated at $45 billion annually, the arms trade fuels conflict and armed violence affecting millions of
people, and inhibits the UN from carrying out its mandate to maintain peace and security.
After numerous delays and years of campaigning by a great many civil society organizations around
the world, a majority of governments at the United Nations voted April 2 in the General Assembly to
adopt the ATT. There were 154 votes in favor, 3 against and 23 abstentions. The treaty enters into force
after 50 states have ratified it.
The ATT sets international standards for the trade in conventional arms. It covers exports of tanks,
armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre weapons, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships,
missiles and launchers, small arms and light weapons. Governments will now be required to publish
annual reports of their arms exports.
The treaty explicitly prohibits transfers that violate arms embargoes authorized by the UN Security
Council, or when a country “has the knowledge at the time of authorization” that the arms or items
would be used in the commission of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.
And in addition to these prohibitions, governments are required to conduct (and make available to the
public) an “assessment” of the transfer, to determine that there is not an “overriding risk” of weapons
being used to:
• undermine peace and security;
• commit or facilitate serious violations of humanitarian law or human rights law;
• commit or facilitate violations under international conventions relating to terrorism and to
transnational organized crime;
• commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women
and children.
Six years of negotiation among governments has yielded a treaty text that is far from perfect.
According to an analysis by Glenn McDonald, senior researcher for the Geneva-based Small Arms
Survey, some of the ATT’s weaknesses include the following:
• The treaty focuses on arms sales, and not on all the ways in which conventional arms are transferred,
including gifts, loans, leases and aid.
• Definitions of weapons systems covered don’t include the full range of military equipment present in
national arsenals, including transport, refueling, and command and control systems.
Further, provisions relating to ammunition, parts and components have one foot inside the treaty and
another foot outside of it; the export licensing obligations apply to these items, while most other
provisions, including those relating to import, transit/trans-shipment, brokering and diversion, do not.
The ATT requires states parties to submit annual reports on authorized or actual exports and imports.
Transparency is limited, however. These measures do not apply to ammunition or parts and
components. Export/import reports for conventional arms may also exclude “commercially sensitive or
national security information.”
Further, the ATT does little to advance the cause of weapons traceability. The treaty does not specify
that export records must contain sufficient information so as to allow for the unique identification of
conventional arms, indispensable for tracing.
In addition to these flaws, China, Russia and some of the other governments that abstained point to the
lack of an explicit prohibition on the supply of weapons to non-state actors that would, for example,
restrain the ability of Syria’s armed opposition from building up its stockpiles.
Will the treaty succeed?
According to McDonald, while important weaknesses remain in the final text, these do not call the
treaty as a whole into question. What impact it will have on the global conventional weapons trade —
and over what period of time — is a more difficult question.
The UK-based Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) believes the treaty will be largely ineffective.
CAAT points out that many of the largest arms exporters were quite comfortable to go along with the
treaty’s provisions. CAAT spokesperson Ann Feltham said: “This treaty legitimizes the arms trade. If
governments are serious about ending the trade in weaponry, with its dire consequences for peace and
human rights, they should immediately stop promoting arms exports.”
Although the treaty has no enforcement mechanism, it exposes the arms-trade process to new levels of
transparency that proponents of the treaty say could help limit illicit weapons deals by shaming
violators. Ernie Regehr, former executive director of Project Ploughshares considers this crucial to the
long-term likelihood of success for the ATT.
According to Regehr, “Adherence to the treaty’s export principles and restraints will depend heavily on
political considerations. And that, in turn, highlights the crucial importance of transparency.
Implementation is political for two primary reasons: one, there is no sheriff to issue an arrest warrant if
the treaty is violated; and, two, the treaty establishes broad international standards for regulating arms
transfers and those standards as well as the treaty’s key prohibitions are subject to interpretation.
Notably, if there is prior knowledge that a piece of military equipment is likely to be used in the
commission of crimes against humanity or violence against civilians, and so on, then an export is
prohibited. Well, that is all subject to lots of interpretation. No independent authority will sit in
judgment and hand down rulings.”
“But it is very important to force the interpretation process more into the open. That’s what reporting
helps to do. State reporting will now be subjected to critical attention, as well as verification by
independent gatherers of export information, particularly civil society organizations. In the process, the
debate about standards and exports will be elevated and particular exports and interpretations will be
subjected to heightened political censure. This treaty will not change things quickly or radically, but for
those of us working politically to restrain international arms transfer, there is an important new tool
available.”