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XXXIX ICMH CONGRESS, TORINO, 2013
“JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF WARFARE”
ABSTRACT
Dr. Efpraxia S. PASCHALIDOU (Greece)
Joint warfare across time; case studies from the Hellenic ancient history
Joint warfare across time; case studies from the Hellenic ancient history
Dr Efpraxia S. Paschalidou
Hellenic Commission on Military History
Having today’s priorities as our motive, we can light up new aspects of known events
in military history. The objective of the paper is to integrate the events of the past into
broader historical forms, using the joint warfare criterion as the framework to
illustrate them. In the wars of antiquity, requirement for the unity of efforts,
coordinated action, exploitation of the particular characteristics at the tactical level,
common perception of the theatre of operations and joint leadership, became
apparent. On the basis of the geomorphology of the Aegean region, the
implementation of joint warfare is imposed almost unconsciously, as a physical and
necessary strategic choice. Initially, looking back in history, the legend of the Argo
expedition underlies the existence of an actual geostrategic policy aiming to unite the
broader space of the Aegean. The expedition against Troy is the first historical case of
an amphibious mission, as we would classify it in today terms, involving the landing
of a force comprising thousands of men, against an enemy that was prepared to fight
according to an established tactical and technical process.
During the Persian wars the joint warfare conception that prevailed in the conduct of
operations, is clearly demonstrated in the parallel battle of Thermopylae and sea battle
of Artemision (480 B.C.), as well as in the landing operations in Salamis (480 B.C.)
and finally, in Mycale (479 B.C.) where the sea battle was converted into an infantry
one. During the period of the first Athenian Coalition, the critical importance of
controlling the Aegean, led to the development of the new strategy for the
independent action of the navy to obtain the control of the sea. The ship was used as a
weapon and not merely as a transporting means, assuming a joint action that served to
project its power on the land, without though the requirement for the parallel
movement of the army along with the navy.
In the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) the Spartans prevailed when they finally
succeeded in the balanced development of the infantry and navy, since during the
several years of war they maintained their superiority in the infantry while, in
collaboration with their allies, they developed a navy capable to face the Athenian
fleet. In contrast, the Athenians remained committed to their initial strategy, believing
that the dominance at sea would lead them to prevail.
The strategic vision of Alexander the Great was permeated by the joint warfare
orientation of conducting operations and that concept was evident in all the
manifestations of his strategic thought. The annihilation of the decisive points was
achieved by the conduct of joint warfare when necessary, through the dynamic
combination of the land and naval forces to generate a multiple joint fighting power in
concrete time and space.
The study of the ancient Hellenic military history offers guiding principles that can
lead us to comprehending and implementing the joint warfare, whereas coming to the
conclusion that in the present, joint warfare is not a recent copy of the modern allied
conception for the conduct of operations, but it is based on valid historical facts.
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