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THE INTERNATIONAL, INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIETY DEVOTED TO OCEAN AND MARINE ENGINEERING, SCIENCE, AND POLICY VOLUME 38, NUMBER 3, FALL 2004 Marine Technology Society Officers EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE President Ted Brockett Sound Ocean Systems, Inc. President-Elect Jerry Streeter JP Kenny, Inc. Immediate Past President Andrew Clark Maritime Communication Services VP-Technical Affairs Daniel Schwartz University of Washington Secretary-Treasurer John Head Prevco Subsea Housings Director-Budget & Finance Jerry Boatman COMNAVMETOCCOM Director-Publications Jerry Wilson Fugro Pelagos, Inc. Director-Public Affairs Richard Butler Aanderaa Instruments SECTIONS VP-EASTERN REGION Robert Winokur Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy Canadian Maritime Ferial El-Hawary B.H. Engineering Systems, Ltd. New England James Case SAIC Washington, DC Barry Stamey Mitretek Systems VP-SOUTHERN REGION Sandor Karpathy Stress Subsea, Inc. Florida Mark Luther University of South Florida Gulf Coast Laurie Jugan Planning Systems, Inc. Houston John Whites, III Submar, Inc. VP-WESTERN REGION Brock Rosenthal Ocean Innovations Hawaii William Friedl CEROS Los Angeles James Edberg Consultant Monterey Bay Mark Brown MBARI Puget Sound Edward Van Den Ameele NOAA Pacific Hydrographic Branch San Diego Kim McLoy Ocean Sensors, Inc. Japan Toshitsugu Sakou Tokai University PROFESSIONAL DIVISIONS & COMMITTEES ADVANCED MARINE TECHNOLOGY Autonomous Underwater Vehicles Justin Manley Mitretek Systems Dynamic Positioning Howard Shatto Shatto Engineering Ocean Energy Tony Jones oceanUS consulting Oceanographic Instrumentation Kim McCoy Ocean Sensors, Inc. Manned Underwater Vehicles William Kohnen SEAmagine Hydrospace, Inc. Remote Sensing Richard Crout CNMOC Remotely Operated Vehicles Drew Michel TSC Holdings, Inc. Underwater Imaging Donna Kocak Green Sky Imaging, LLC MARINE RESOURCES Porter Hoagland WHOI Marine Geodesy Open Position Marine Living Resources Open Position Marine Mineral Resources John C. Wiltshire University of Hawaii Oceanographic Ships Open Position Ocean Pollution Open Position Physical Oceanography and Meteorology Open Position OCEAN & COASTAL ENGINEERING Captain Diann Karin Lynn NFEC Buoy Technology Walter Paul WHOI Cables and Connectors Thomas Coughlin Tomas Coughlin and Associates Diving William C. Phoel Phoel Associates Inc. Marine Archaeology Brett Phaneuf Texas A&M University Marine Materials Open Position Moorings James Cappellini Mooring System, Inc. Offshore Structures Open Position Ropes & Tension Members John F. Flory Tension Technology International, Inc. Seafloor Engineering Herb Herrmann NFESC MARINE POLICY & EDUCATION Coastal Zone Management Open Position Marine Education Sharon H. Walker University of Southern Mississippi Marine Law and Policy Myron Nordquist University of Virginia Marine Recreation Open Position Marine Security Open Position Merchant Marine Open Position Ocean Economic Potential Open Position Ocean Exploration Paula Keener-Chavis NOAA Coastal Services Center STUDENT SECTIONS Florida Atlantic University Counselor: Douglas Briggs Florida Institute of Technology Counselor: Eric Thosteson Massachusetts Institute of Technology Counselor: Alexandra Techet Roger Williams University Santa Clara University Counselor: Christopher Kitts Texas A&M University—College Station Counselor: Robert Randall Texas A&M University—Galveston Counselor: Victoria Jones U.S. Naval Academy Counselor: Cecily Natunewicz University of Hawaii Counselor: R. Cengiz Ertekin University of Rhode Island Counselor: Chris Baxter University of Southern Mississippi Counselor: Stephan Howden HONORARY MEMBERS The support of the following individuals is gratefully acknowledged. Robert B. Abel †Charles H. Bussmann John C. Calhoun John P. Craven †Paul M. Fye David S. Potter †Athelstan Spilhaus †E. C. Stephan †Allyn C. Vine †James H. Wakelin, Jr. †deceased Volume 38, Number 3, Fall 2004 FRONT COVER: The sinking tanker USS Mississinewa AO-59. Ulithi Lagoon, November 20, 1944. The vessel started leaking in 2001. The US Navy removed 1.8 million gallons of oil in March of 2003. Photo courtesy of Simon (Sid) Harris. BACK COVER: Common Murre oiled by SS Jacob Luckenbach, Dec. 2001 (Steve Hampton, CA Spill Prevention and Response) Plate VIII. Oil wells in Summerland California. (G.H. Eldridge. Now held in NOAA Photo Library) New England’s most sought after and mysterious wreck, the SS Portland. All 192 passengers and crew were lost in the Nov. 27, 1898 storm. The wreck is located within NOAA’sStellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary. (NOAA) Blue Whales transiting through the SS Jacob Luckenbach lightering. (Daniel Shapiro) Underwater Pollution Threats to Our Nation’s Marine Resources In This Issue 4 26 Underwater Pollution Threats to Our Nation’s Marine Resources Lisa Symons Abandoned Vessels: Impacts to Coral Reefs, Seagrass, and Mangroves in the U.S. Caribbean and Pacific Territories with Implications for Removal 8 Christine Lord-Boring, Ian J. Zelo, Zachary J. Nixon IOSC 2005 Examines Potentially Polluting Wrecks in Marine Waters 36 Commentary by Paul Albertson, Bob Pond, Lisa Symons and Robin Rorick on behalf of the 2005 International Oil Spill Conference Program Committee 9 12 15 Potentially Polluting Wrecks Warrant Further Dialog Commentary by LCDR Paul Albertson, U.S. Coast Guard 17 The Pollution Threat Posed by Sunken Naval Wrecks: A Realistic Perspective and a Responsible Approach Commentary by Richard T. Buckingham Copyright © 2004 Marine Technology Society, Inc. Quantified Oil Emissions with a Video-Monitored, Oil Seep-Tent 54 MTS Journal design and layout: Michele A. Danoff, Graphics By Design Marine Technology Society Journal 5565 Sterrett Place Suite 108 Columbia, Maryland 21044 44 Commentary by Daniel J. Basta and David M. Kennedy, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commentary by J. Arnold Witte, President, Donjon Marine Co., Inc. and Past President, American Salvage Association POSTMASTER: Please send address changes to: John A. Lindsay, Robert Aguirre Ira Leifer, Ken Wilson Wreck Survey, Oil Detection and Removal to Protect the Coastal Zone and the Marine Environment MTS members can purchase the printed Journal for $25 domestic and $50 foreign. Non-members and library subscriptions are $120 domestic and $135 foreign. Postage for periodicals is paid at Columbia, MD, and additional mailing offices. Global Offshore Hazardous Materials Sites GIS The Need for a Proactive Approach to Underwater Threats Corroding barrel from freighter Alcoa Puritan, sunk in 1942 in the Gulf of Mexico. (MMS/NOAA) The Marine Technology Society Journal (ISSN 0025-3324) is published quarterly (spring summer, fall, and winter) by the Marine Technology Society, Inc., 5565 Sterrett Place, Suite 108, Columbia, MD 21044. Guest Editor: Lisa Symons 21 European Experience in Response to Potentially Polluting Shipwrecks Michel Girin Science for Stewardship: Multidisciplinary Research on USS Arizona Matthew A. Russell, Larry E. Murphy, Donald J. Johnson, Timothy J. Foecke, Pamela J. Morris, Ralph Mitchell 64 Methodologies for Removing Heavy Oil as Used on the SS Jacob Luckenbach and Joint International Testing Programs Craig Moffatt 72 Resources and UnderSea Threats (RUST) Database: An Assessment Tool for Identifying and Evaluating Submerged Hazards within the National Marine Sanctuaries Michael L. Overfield 78 Undersea Pollution Threats and Trajectory Modeling Lisa Symons, Marc K. Hodges 83 Book Reviews Editorial Board Dan Walker Editor National Research Council John F. Bash Book Review Editor University of Rhode Island Kenneth Baldwin University of New Hampshire Scott Kraus New England Aquarium James Lindholm Pfleger Institute of Environmental Research Phil Nuytten Nuytco Research, LTD. Bruce H. Robison Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute Terrence R. Schaff National Science Foundation Edith Widder Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution Editorial Jerry Wilson Publications Director Dan Walker Editor Amy Morgante Managing Editor Administration Ted Brockett President The Marine Technology Society is a not-for-profit, international professional society. Established in 1963, the Society’s mission is to promote the exchange of information in ocean and marine engineering, technology, science, and policy. Please send all correspondence to: The Marine Technology Society 5565 Sterrett Place, Suite 108 Columbia, Maryland 21044 (410) 884-5330 Tel. (410) 884-9060 FAX Publications: [email protected] Membership: [email protected] Programs: [email protected] Director: [email protected] Online: www.mtsociety.org MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION may be obtained by contacting the Marine Technology Society. Benefits include: ■ Free subscription to the online Marine Technology Society Journal, with highly reduced rates for the paper version ■ Free subscription to the bimonthly newsletter, Currents, covering events, business news, science and technology features, and people in marine technology ■ Member discounts on all MTS publications ■ Reduced registration rates to all MTS and MTS-sponsored conferences and workshops ■ Member-only access to an expansive Job Bank and Member Directory ■ Reduced advertising rates in MTS publications ■ National recognition through our Awards Programs Individual dues are $75 per year. Life membership is available for a one time fee of $1000. Patron, Student, Emeritus, Institutional, Business, and Corporate memberships are also available. Judith T. Krauthamer Executive Director Emily L. Speight Membership Circulation Manager 2 Marine Technology Society Journal ADVERTISING Advertising is accepted by the Marine Technology Society Journal. For more information on MTS advertising and policy, please contact the managing editor. COPYRIGHT Copyright © 2004 by the Marine Technology Society, Inc. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by the Marine Technology Society, provided that the base fee of $1.00 per copy, plus .20 per page is paid directly to Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Dr., Danvers, MA 01923. For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged. The fee code for users of the Transactional Reporting Service is 0025-3324/89 $1.00 + .20. Papers by U.S Government employees are declared works of the U.S. Government and are therefore in the public domain. The Marine Technology Society cannot be held responsible for the opinions given and the statements made in any of the articles published. ABSTRACTS Abstracts of MTS publications can be found in both the electronic and printed versions of Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA), published by Cambridge Scientific Abstracts, 7200 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814. Electronic abstracts may be obtained through Geobase’s Oceanbase, Fluidex, and Compendex, which is published by Elsevier Science, The Old Bakery, 111 Queen Road, Norwich, NR1 3PL, United Kingdom. Microfishe may be obtained through Congressional Information Services, Inc., 4520 EastWest Highway, Bethesda, Maryland 20814 CONTRIBUTORS Contributors can obtain an information and style sheet by contacting the managing editor. Submissions that are relevant to the concerns of the Society are welcome. All papers are subjected to a stringent review procedure directed by the editor and the editorial board. The Journal focuses on technical material that may not otherwise be available, and thus technical papers and notes that have not been published previously are given priority. General commentaries are also accepted, and are subject to review and approval by the editorial board. Reader’s Comments... CROSSTALK J O I N T H E C O N V E R S A TION… Readers of the Marine Technology Society Journal have an opportunity to receive even more value from the papers and commentaries carried in each issue. Crosstalk, the readers’ comments section, gives you a forum to offer your opinion on a recent article, ask a question of an author (and get an answer!), or invite further contributions from your colleagues on controversial and cutting-edge subjects in marine engineering, science, and policy. All submissions to Crosstalk will be forwarded to the authors whose papers are being addressed. Every effort will be made to publish the authors’ responses along with readers’ comments in a timely manner. If you’ve got a comment or question, please limit it to 250 words or less. Send your contribution electronically to the MTS office at: [email protected] – and please include your name, affiliation, and contact information (telephone, fax, and e-mail address), and the paper and author to whom your comments are addressed. Comments submitted to this section are printed at the discretion of the MTS editorial board. We look forward to hearing from YOU! Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 3 FOREWORD Underwater Pollution Threats to Our Nation’s Marine Resources Lisa Symons Damage Assessment and Resource Protection Coordinator National Marine Sanctuaries Program National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration This issue of the Journal of the Marine Technology Society is dedicated to the examination of pollution threats from underwater sources. These threats range from vessels lost in military conflicts; to deliberate placement of explosive ordinance, radioactive and hazardous wastes in “designated” dumpsites, including deposits of VX and Sarin gas off of the Eastern coast of the United States; to the recently publicized hydrogen bomb lost in 1958 off the coast of Georgia. Over 150,000 ships are known to have been lost in U.S. waters. The Gulf of Mexico alone is home to at least 7,000 shipwrecks; of those, we think approximately 20% merit closer study due to their type and age. In fact, every conceivable manmade object has ended up on the ocean floor, including pipelines, wellheads, planes, tanks, building materials, vessels and their cargo. The potential for significant economic and environmental harm is of worldwide concern. Potential impacts include interference with navigation, habitat destruction, impacts to recreational and commercial fisheries, precluding both public and private use of coastal areas, and marring the aesthetic qualities of coastal areas. The current emphasis on prevention, preparedness, and response underscores our need to examine underwater threats and to better understand the environmental, economic, and social tradeoffs of assessments, monitoring, and recovery efforts. We can gain some understanding of the potential scope of impacts from underwater threats by examining lessons from recent spills. This examination should include both those events that can be attributed to recent marine casualties such as the Erika and the Prestige, and recent underwater threat incidents such as the chronic oiling from the Luckenbach. The general public is not cognizant of the thousands of potentially polluting wrecks, literally underwater “timebombs” that surround our coastlines worldwide. If they were, the public pressure for more immediate action could prompt ill-conceived and expensive response and recovery options for a limited number of vessels but may not address the larger issue as a whole. Why should MTS examine this issue now? The Coral Reef Task Force, National Action Plan of 2000 identified abandoned vessels as a major concern. The 2003 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report, Oil in the Sea III, identifies abandoned vessels as a significant threat that merits further assessment and study. Several federal agencies have met with NAS to discuss a study on this issue. In 2003, the biennial International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) identified potentially polluting wrecks as the focus for the conference plenary session for IOSC 2005 in Miami, May 15-19, 2005. This issue of the Journal will serve as a springboard to the IOSC discussions, as well as bringing the topic to a broader audience than just the pollution preparedness and response community. This issue takes an interdisciplinary approach to the problem of underwater pollution, going beyond the Journal issue on nautical archeology published in the fall of 2002. We’ve attempted to combine a range of disciplines to address the breadth of underwater threats; to initiate thoughtful discussion between the marine resource management, the archeology, the pollution prevention, preparedness, emergency response and salvage communities. A demonstration of the interdisciplinary application of these discussions includes the use of remotely operated (ROV) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) to facilitate the assessment of underwater sites outside of SCUBA depths. To start examining this problem requires technical analysis from nautical archeologists, naval engineers, the salvage and response community, and agencies with trustee responsibilities for both the ecological and economic resources potentially impacted as well as the historical and cultural resources. 4 Marine Technology Society Journal FOREWORD The five commentaries in this issue range from providing us with a glimpse at the complexity of the issue from an international perspective, to those representing concerns of three of the many federal agencies that address spill response, to a statement from the salvage community as to their readiness to address the issue. The eight articles in this volume include: the European perspective on oil spill response and trustee issues; abandoned vessels in coral reef, seagrass and mangrove habitats; an overview of offshore hazardous materials dumpsites; the comparison of historically capped wells to natural seeps; the science used for stewardship of the USS Arizona; the methodologies used for the SS Jacob Luckenbach recovery project; the database developed by NOAA to inventory and assess underwater threats; and potential contingency planning and risk assessment tools. This issue serves as an introduction rather than a comprehensive assessment. To be truly comprehensive, other groups and subjects would need to be addressed. The petroleum industry, the property and indemnity (P &I) clubs, naval engineers and environmental groups, among others would all need to be more involved than was possible for this publication. An assessment of the legal authorities found in the United States and elsewhere is also needed. Hopefully, these aspects will be addressed in the IOSC plenary discussion paper and may be addressed by MTS in future issues. Commentaries This issue opens with commentary from members of the 2005 International Oil Spill Conference Committee, providing a short overview of the rationale behind their choice of potentially polluting wrecks for their plenary and how they envision the Journal of the Marine Technology Society informing that discussion. We then find commentaries from NOAA, a naval representative, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), three of the agencies most often involved in both spill response and in prevention, preparedness and response. Daniel J. Basta, Director of the National Marine Sanctuary Program and David M. Kennedy jointly advocate for a more proactive approach to the problem of underwater threats. They also state that NOAA, with both its trustee responsibilities and its unique scientific expertise, is in a unique position to take some leadership in this effort. J. Arnold Witte, President of Donjon Marine Co., Inc. and past President of the American Salvage Association (ASA), provides some historical context for salvage efforts in U.S. waters as well as an affirmation of the salvage community’s commitment and technological readiness to address the challenges embodied in underwater threats. LCDR Paul Albertson from the Office of Response, USCG, sketches the costs and challenges associated with the SS Jacob Luckenbach and USS Mississinewa responses. This commentary also provides an initial analysis of the domestic and international legal framework for pollution response within which the USCG operates. He suggests that this issue is ripe for an open dialogue. Richard Buckingham, the Assistant Supervisor of Salvage (Admiralty), Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV), U.S. Navy, provides us with his examination of the scope and scale of the issue; including his assessment of reasonable expectations given fiscal and environmental constraints and the lack of a domestic or international consensus as to responsibility particularly for war wrecks. Buckingham rightly cautions us against hyperbole about individual cases as well as the overall problem. He points out some of the recent technological advances such as the remotely operated lightering system (ROLS) as components of the responsible but conservative approach the Navy used in the Mississinewa response. This exemplifies the Navy’s policy in addressing each war wreck that may be a pollution threat, on a case-specific basis. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 5 FOREWORD Papers Following these commentaries, the first three papers outline the broad scope of this problem. The first paper by Michel Girin, the Director of the Centre de Documentation, de Recherche et d’Expérimentationtions sur les Pollutions accidentelles des Eaux (CEDRE) describes the recent European experience and subsequent development of response strategies for deepwater wrecks that were previously technologically limited. He details some of the new advances that are restrained now only by the fiscal capabilities of those funding the response. This raises the question of how to develop and balance response standards that address public and consumer concerns as well as those of industry, government, and the technical experts. The paper by Lord-Boring et al. examines habitat impacts to coral reef, seagrass, and mangrove ecosystems. They remind us that the impacts from these vessels are often more than just the pollution threats alone. The Lindsay-Aguirre paper addresses the inventory of the approximately 350 offshore hazardous material dumpsites in U.S. waters. The paper discusses the history of at-sea disposal of hazardous items, describing the locational accuracy (or lack thereof) as well as the quantities and types of materials dumped. The next series of papers address some specific examples of assessment, monitoring, and recovery actions and aptly illustrate the complexity of the issue. Leifer and Wilson address the impacts of the historic Treadwell oil wells off of Summerland, California. These were the first offshore wells ever driven and the technology used to plug and abandon those wells has not withstood the test of time. The authors explain their effort to quantify the difference in oil emissions from the abandoned Treadwell #10 oil well in contrast to natural seeps. All of us are familiar with the USS Arizona Memorial, but few are aware of the resource management challenges involved. The Russell et al. paper provides an introduction to the USS Arizona Preservation Project, a multi-year effort designed to minimize the environmental hazard from fuel oil releases, while providing the necessary information for long-term preservation of this important American symbol. The corrosion and deterioration studies on this site are providing a wealth of information that will inform resource management decisions elsewhere, regarding iron and steel vessels. The Moffat paper illustrates the technological challenges and adaptations necessary to address recovery of oil from the SS Jacob Luckenbach. The cold waters, uneven weathering of the oil and shifting of the vessel made for a technologically challenging recovery operation. This recovery was complicated by the designation of the Luckenbach as a historic vessel, and the fact it was within a marine protected area, the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary. The last two papers address NOAA’s attempt to start grappling with understanding the scope and scale of the issue. Michael Overfield’s paper on the Resources and UnderSea Threats (RUST) database, while initially focused on threats to national marine sanctuaries, details what will be the first comprehensive compilation of threats in U.S. waters. RUST attempts to address the full range of threats from dumpsites to shipwrecks. An inventory alone has limited utility. NOAA is also taking the first steps at developing a risk assessment algorithm that will allow resource managers to compare relative threats from a dumpsite to shipwreck. This information, particularly if combined with the modeling outputs addressed in the Symons-Hodges paper, will help identify priorities for monitoring and assessment as well as recovery. The modeling output provides probabilities about impact, but can only be generated where sufficient climatological records exist. While often available for nearshore and tidal areas, until the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) is built out, our ability to do this type of modeling for both response and planning purposes will remain limited. 6 Marine Technology Society Journal FOREWORD Conclusions True dialogue is often rather awkward and uncomfortable at first. That was certainly true as we sought contributions for this issue. I applaud those who were willing to step forward and provide thoughtful articles and commentaries. The potential scope and scale of this issue was somewhat overwhelming and requires a new set of paradigms to simultaneously address the social, environmental, and economic tradeoffs. We may need to change and adapt our current response methods to address our past actions. The scale of this threat, technological means, and fiscal realities are all components of the environmental tradeoffs discussion. For some this is not a question of the “sky is falling,” but a potential economic goldmine in finding new technological means to address the challenges. There remain many important questions, for which we don’t have immediate answers—but this journal and the forthcoming sessions at the International Oil Spill Conference can start the dialogue, and the development of new paradigms to address the protection of our marine environment from underwater threats. Acknowledgements This was my first opportunity to serve as a guest editor. Compilation of this special issue was both an honor and a challenge. I’d like to convey my appreciation to all those who contributed, whether in the form of a commentary, an article, or in furthering the dialogue on underwater threats. I’d like to thank the MTS staff and Dan Walker as Chair of the Editorial Board for their guidance, patience, and support in the development of this edition of the Journal. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 7 C O M M E N TA RY IOSC 2005 Examines Potentially Polluting Wrecks in Marine Waters AUTHORS On behalf of the 2005 International Oil Spill Conference Program Committee LCDR Paul Albertson Bob Pond United States Coast Guard Lisa Symons National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Robin Rorick American Petroleum Institute T his edition of the Marine Technology Society has been developed in part to inform the discussion in anticipation of a 3hour Special Session on the topic of Potentially Polluting Wrecks in Marine Waters to be presented at the 2005 International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) on Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Restoration. This biennial conference will be held May 15–19, 2005 at the Miami Beach Convention Center in Miami Beach, Florida. More than 2,000 people from 50 countries are expected to attend the technical sessions and view more than 250 exhibits. For each IOSC, the organizers select an issue of international import as a keystone topic. Their goal is to elevate public awareness and to establish a baseline consensus for public and private decision-makers to work from in achieving long-term resolution of significant but often intractable issues. To highlight the issue and frame the discussion, an expert writing team is contracted to produce a thesis on a topic, which defines the current state and recommends courses of action for resolution. This paper is made available to Conference participants a month in advance to facilitate an informed audience for the debate at the conference itself. It is presented at a Special Plenary Session, which opens the conference, and is the 8 Marine Technology Society Journal prelude to a facilitated debate between an international panel of government, private sector, and non-governmental organization representatives and conference attendees. The debate will allow panelists and conferees to offer their perspectives on various aspects of the topic, with the facilitator working the discussion toward consensus resolution of conflicting perspectives. The 2005 special session paper was directed to address the following issues: Recent catastrophic losses of several vessels, including the Prestige, Erika, Tricolor and Ievoli Sun, have produced tremendous pressure on vessel owners and governments to engage in extraordinary efforts to remove all pollutants from these submerged wrecks and at times remove the wreck itself. Removal is an issue, particularly when the wreck is causing ongoing physical harm to surrounding habitats from the fuel, cargo, or the vessel itself. Similarly, a number of vessels, which sank long ago (e.g., Jacob Luckenbach, Castillo De Salas and Mississinewa, among others), have begun releasing oil, fouling sensitive environmental habitats, stimulating criticism of insufficient de-pollution efforts (if any), and generating adamant demand for removal of all pollutants from those wrecks and at times removal of the wreck itself. These events, along with the potential for large numbers of similar incidents over the next several years demand that we (government and industry together) begin planning now for how best and most effectively to respond to future and potential future events. The “do nothing” option often preferred in the past (ex: Nahodhka) has now become hardly acceptable in new incidents. Public demand for de-pollution of old wrecks, including war casualties or other historic vessels, is expected to continue growing. As a precursor to the Special Sessions Panel at IOSC 2005, the issue paper will serve to educate people about what wreck pollution really means and to present a position on reasonable practices in weighing the problem of high costs associated with mitigation against the potential environmental benefits. Because the Conference in general, and the Special Session on Potentially Polluting Wrecks in Marine Waters in particular, will involve many of the world’s public and private sector decision-makers on the topic, the IOSC organizers hope that this session will serve as an impetus for development of an effective international regime for dealing with potentially polluting wrecks wherever they might occur. For further information on the conference agenda, readers are encouraged to visit the IOSC 2005 website at www.iosc.org. C O M M E N TA RY The Need for a Proactive Approach to Underwater Threats AUTHORS Daniel J. Basta Director, National Marine Sanctuary Program National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration David M. Kennedy Director, Office of Response and Restoration National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration T he need to evaluate environmental risks from underwater threats lying in the waters off our Nation’s coasts is very real. The issue becomes more apparent and more pressing as many aging submerged wrecks and other structures containing fuel or hazardous cargos deteriorate with time. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is taking a proactive role to address this issue because of the existing potential of significant threat for large releases, or cumulatively, from smaller releases, to impact coastal and marine resources. Preliminary data indicates that there are thousands of wrecks in U.S. coastal waters. The public is well aware of the devastation caused by recent wrecks such as the Prestige off of Spain, and there are concerns about similar impacts from much older sources in U.S. waters. As of yet the scope and scale of this potential threat is not well defined. NOAA is taking on part of that task. NOAA, part of the Department of Commerce, encompasses a broad range of trustee responsibilities and scientific activities. NOAA operates satellites to observe the oceans and atmosphere; develops forecasts for all types of weather; restores corals, seagrasses, and coastal ecosystems; and has expertise in polar sciences, oceanography, and fisheries biology. NOAA both charts and explores the depths of the world’s oceans. NOAA also provides the scientific expertise to assess and respond to emergencies whether caused by oil or hazardous chemical spills, forest fires or natural hazards. NOAA manages and protects trust resources including fisheries, fisheries habitats, and marine protected areas. NOAA provides the public with information about coastal and marine resources and the environmental factors that impact daily life. Because of its role as a natural resource trustee, NOAA needed to take a proactive role in correcting existing assumptions about pollution risks from underwater threats in U.S. waters. Underwater threats range from underwater dumpsites, to abandoned wellheads and pipelines, to ships lost because of storms or military conflict. The old adages “out of sight and out of mind” and “the solution to the pollution is dilution” don’t hold true. While these underwater threats are not visible, their impacts are felt on either a chronic long-term basis or as a result of a catastrophic failure. Prior to the SS Jacob Luckenbach analysis in 2002, there was no widely held perception that intermittent or mystery spills could result from static sources or that they could have significant natural resource impacts. The Luckenbach served as a wakeup call on both counts. Hundreds of thousands of dead birds and miles of beaches with tarballs over at least a 10-year period, but probably longer, were all attributable to one vessel that went down in 1953 with a full load of fuel. Resource managers started questioning how many more threats of a similar type existed in both national marine sanctuaries and U.S. waters, and what the potential scale of impact could be given the lessons of the Luckenbach. A quick survey of NOAA’s Automated Wreck and Information System (AWOIS) shows 12,400 sites in U.S. coastal waters. The AWOIS system isn’t set up to do a robust analysis of the types of vessels involved, and has no information on fuel amounts or cargo. That information must be obtained from other sources, whether estimates from historical records or on-site assessments. For example, the SS Jacob Luckenbach, fully fuelled and laden with cargo for the Korean War effort, sank in 1953, in 176 feet of water, 17 miles off San Francisco Bay in what is now the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary (GFNMS). The initial salvage effort recovered only railroad materials. Decades later, in the 1980’s, severe episodic mystery spills started plaguing the northern California coast during the winter months, with thousands of oiled birds and tarballs washing up on the beaches. Cumulatively, tens of thousands of seabirds and shorebirds were lost and hundreds of miles of beaches were oiled. In 2002, chemical analysis or “fingerprinting” determined that the oil matched that of several previous mystery spills, the earliest in 1992. It is posFall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 9 sible that the Luckenbach is responsible for earlier spills, but no verifiable samples remained for analysis and comparison. The Unified Command (UC), comprised of United States Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), and other state and federal agencies including NOAA, were faced with an unusual set of challenges. Finding accurate historical information about the vessel and its cargo, determining liability, and coordinating salvage and recovery operations were complicated by both historical and ecological trustee issues. Salvage efforts were scheduled for peak operational conditions, which coincided with the GFNMS’s most biologically active and sensitive season. The sanctuary has thousands of seals and sea lions, and is home to the largest concentration of breeding seabirds in the continental United States. The National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA) and the site-specific regulations for GFNMS required that special care be taken during the oil recovery operations. The NMSA has a general clause that applies to all sites (§ 306) that precludes harming any sanctuary resources. The NMSA regulations, 15 CFR Part 922.2(e), delineate NOAA’s responsibility for protection of historic resources under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). The GFNMS also has specific regulations (§922.82) prohibiting the discharge or deposit of any materials and prohibiting the removal or damage of any historical or cultural resources. Costs to the Navy of recovering fuel from the USS Mississinewa in Ulithi Atoll, and to the USCG’s Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) for the SS Jacob Luckenbach, as well as several recent events in Europe, have given us some insight into the potential expense in time, resources and personnel to respond to the oil removal process. The final cleanup and oil recovery of the Luckenbach was over $20 million, although some oil was left on board. The OSLTF funded the work, but without a viable responsible party or insurer, the fund will not be recompensed for those expenditures. Very few, if any, of the older underwater threats in U.S. waters will have viable re- 10 Marine Technology Society Journal sponsible parties or insurers to pay for cleanup. As these sites become pollution threats, this could lead to a drain on the OSLTF that could compromise the United States’ capability to respond to current events like the 1999 grounding of the New Carissa off Oregon. Nor can NOAA, as a resource trustee with limited appropriations, bear the costs for cleanup of threats in its sanctuaries or other protected areas. The USCG is working to ensure that current response efforts, whether for small vessels or large commercial vessels, do not leave a similar legacy of threats to the marine environment. To be proactive trustees of coastal and marine resources, trustee agencies need to have a functional understanding of the complex problem of underwater threats, especially in areas of environmental concern. This requires an inventory of underwater sites, an assessment of which sites are serious underwater threats, surveying and monitoring of those threats, risk-based modeling as to how those sites may impact sensitive resources, and research into response options. The amount of oil or hazardous chemicals on board may not necessarily be the most significant issue in determining risk from an individual site—the location, the degree of deterioration, prevalent weather and current patterns, as well as proximity to sensitive resources are all critical. For example, archeologists, maritime historians, metallurgists and biologists are all working together to understand the corrosion process and how water depths and other variables may affect corrosion rates. While previously thought to be primarily a metallurgical process, recent work on the RMS Titanic and in the Gulf of Mexico is shedding light on the biochemical aspects of the deterioration process. Understanding how depth may impact deterioration is as important as understanding what response options may be available. To date, response options have been limited: leaving a vessel in place, or attempting removal through a very finite number of technological options. Additional research is necessary into response alternatives and options, as this isn’t an issue that will disappear with time; in fact, just the opposite. All of this information is critical for resource man- agers to evaluate environmental tradeoffs associated with these options. Two of NOAA’s programs have partnered to address this national concern. They share a mandate to provide the best possible information to protect and manage NOAA’s trust resources, whether through daily management or through contingency planning and emergency response activities. NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration (ORR) has a strong expertise in oil spill preparedness, planning, and response work. This expertise includes the ability to use real-time oceanographic models to forecast where spills are likely to impact marine and coastal resources. Some of these models use climactic data to provide longer-term, probability based trajectories. There are coastal and deep ocean areas of the United States that are special enough to merit NOAA’s protection through designation as national marine sanctuaries under the NSMA, 16 U.S.C. 1431 et seq. Designation as a national marine sanctuary provides additional protection for sensitive ecological, historic, scientific, educational, cultural, archeological, recreational and esthetic resources and uses. Within these sites, as well as in U.S. coastal waters, there are hundreds of shipwrecks protected under the NHPA, 16 U.S.C.470 et seq. NOAA’s National Marine Sanctuary Program and ORR have initiated a database project to provide both baseline information on the broad range of underwater threats from vessels, and the information necessary to determine the potential environmental tradeoffs for areas of special environmental concern, such as marine protected areas. Quantifying that threat is no small task. Initially it was thought that a simple inventory would suffice. As the existing data sets were examined it was clear that no one source would provide all the information necessary, and that there were other types of threats beyond sunken vessels, such as aircraft, dumpsites, abandoned wellheads and pipelines. NOAA’s database is called Resources and Under Sea Threats (RUST) and covers all U.S. coastal waters, although the focus for risk assessment is initially on national marine sanctuary waters. This comprehensive database incorporates the broadest scope of information possible, including new information from fieldwork and surveys of opportunity. The database holds information about the potential hazards, whether fuel or cargo or dumpsite contents; the historical significance of each vessel in the inventory; and any relevant plans, surveys, or field assessment data. The data can be displayed geospatially in a variety of applications. This ability is critical for resource managers to be able to place these threats within a geospatial context for impact to sensitive resources and to start evaluating environmental tradeoffs. NOAA is taking a proactive role in exploring how best to evaluate the risk from underwater sources in order to make sound resource management decisions for its trust resources. These decisions may range from determining what potential sites need immediate assessment, ongoing monitoring, or what types of user activities such as certain types of commercial fishing, recreational diving, or commercial vessel traffic or anchoring should be limited within a specific area due to due their potential impact on underwater threats. This assessment is also important as NOAA evaluates which areas merit protection as marine sanctuaries or essential fish habitat. All of NOAA’s risk assessment decisions need to be made utilizing as much information as may be available—whether from site assessments, modeling, or trajectory based probabilities—to facilitate as rigorous an evaluation of the environmental tradeoffs inherent with trust resource responsibilities as possible. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 11 C O M M E N TA RY Wreck Survey, Oil Detection and Removal to Protect the Coastal Zone and the Marine Environment AUTHOR J. Arnold Witte President, Donjon Marine Co., Inc. and Past President, American Salvage Association INTRODUCTION M any countries around the world have recognized the environmental threat posed by the cargo and/or bunker oils and chemical cargoes remaining aboard shipwrecks located in their respective waters, and that the time had long since come when action must be taken to deal with those pollution threats. Examples of governmental action in this area of environmental protection include the pioneering wreck survey work of the United States led by the U.S. Coast Guard in 1967, as reported on below; the accomplishment of the Norwegians with the removal of oil from the war wrecks Blucher and Norvard, both on the bottom of Oslo Fjord; the more recent work of the U.S. Coast Guard in the case of the barge Cleveco located in Lake Erie; the work of the Finns in the case of the passenger/vehicle ferry Estonia, resting on the bottom of the Baltic Sea; the effort of the Canadians with the barge Irving Whale located off Prince Edward Island in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence; the work of the Koreans with the wrecks of the Yu-Il No. 1 and the Marine Fuel No. 2, both located off the coast of South Korea; the work of the Dutch in the case of the wreck of the Spyros Armenakis, submerged in the Westerschelde; the recent work of the French with the tankers Erika and Ievole Sun, both situated off their coast; the recent work of the U. S. Coast Guard to remove oil from the tanker Jacob K. Luckenbach, located off the coast of California; as well as the work of the U.S. Navy to remove oil from the USS Mississinewa, at Ulithi Atoll, Micronesia. 12 Marine Technology Society Journal Now, in light of the need to provide for a heightened level of marine environmental protection, and with the benefit of today’s capabilities, the United States must address the threat to the ocean environment posed by the aging population of shipwrecks located off its coasts. ■ ■ ■ American Salvage Association The American Salvage Association represents a group of fourteen of the leading professional salvage companies that have responded to the overwhelming majority of the most serious marine casualties that have occurred in North America over the course of the past two decades. While remaining independent and competitive, the individual companies making up the Association recognize a common interest in promoting the value of salvage; more importantly, by sharing information and experience, the group can together improve the national salvage, marine environmental protection, wreck removal, and harbor clearance response capability. The American Salvage Association Mission Statement perhaps best describes the reason for its formation, its vision for goals to be attained and its value to the United States. The role of the American Salvage Association is to: ■ Ensure that our membership is committed to standards of readiness, conduct and performance that provide the nation an adequate salvage response. ■ Educate the general public as to the role of the marine salvor in protecting life, ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ the environment and property from the consequences of the perils of water transportation. Promote cooperation among our members to assure a most effective, successful response in major incidents. Promote issues of salvage safety when working in a marine environment. Promote training for today’s response as well as anticipating and planning for the changes certain to evolve in the future. Provide standard contracting options for salvage and wreck removal in order to eliminate negotiating delays and thereby promote prompt casualty response. Promote preplanning among owners, underwriters, and regulatory agencies before the actual event. Promote and encourage a regulatory framework that will result in prompt, effective response. Promote communication and cooperation with all those potentially affected by the consequences of a marine casualty. Promote information exchange and cooperation with other national and international trade associations and regulatory agencies for the benefit of transportation by water. Vessel Deterioration, Oil Escape, and Marine Pollution The risk of a major pollution incident will exist as long as bunker and/or cargo oils or other petroleum and chemical cargoes are not properly removed from shipwrecks. Studies performed have demonstrated that among other possibilities plate perforation and oil escape can be expected from corrosive pitting, and that corrosion rates have been found to increase dramatically after the first 20 years of submersion; anodic welds in the marine environment can fail in as little as 17 years owing to dissimilarity of metals in weld areas, again resulting in oil escape; the wasting of rivets and the resulting opening or loss of individual plates or strakes of plates will result in the gross loss of oil; spontaneous opening of hatches can occur as a result of the failure of hatch dogs due to the wasting of dissimilar metals, or by removal due to the fouling of fish nets or the work of misguided sport divers; and the localized loading effects of hogging or sagging of the hull, and longitudinal or transverse racking resulting from a wreck’s unnatural position of rest on the bottom, can ultimately result in the loss of oil and other chemical cargoes. Wrecks Located Off the Coasts of the United States In 1967, following the grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon and the subsequent extensive pollution of the European coast, President Johnson directed the Secretaries of Interior and Transportation to undertake a study to determine how to best meet the national need to address the problem of oil pollution. As a part of that study, the Secretary of Transportation directed the Commandant of the Coast Guard to investigate one or more tankers sunk on the United States continental shelf by enemy action during World War II. The U.S. Coast Guard, with assistance from the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage, then conducted this limited investigation. The report of this work, entitled “Sunken Tanker Project Report,” is an interesting document for a number of reasons, including the facts that: 1) of the total population of vessels that have been lost off the coasts of the United States, with little exception only U.S. flag tankers lost in shallow waters (<200 ft) were considered, of which only four vessels were inspected; 2) an additional 37 years of vessel deterioration have passed since the time of this first and last survey when limited inspection was conducted; 3) the United States has an altogether different level of concern for marine environmental protection now than it did; and 4) the United States now has a greater technological capability to survey and recover oil from wrecks. Beyond the larger population of war wrecks referred to but not considered by the USCG Sunken Tanker Project, there are numerous more recent merchant vessel losses worthy of consideration. Examples of shipwrecks located in the Northeast region of the United States capable of impacting the marine environment include the wreck of the Marine Electric resting on the bottom approximately 30 miles off the coast of Chincoteague Island, Virginia, and the stern section of the Stolt Dagali resting on the bottom approximately 17 miles off the coast of Seaside Heights, New Jersey. More specifically, the Marine Electric broke into three sections and went down in 120 feet of water off the coast of Virginia during a winter storm during February 1983. At the time she was carrying approximately 545 tons of bunker oil in two after bunker tanks. Based upon the extensive USCG and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and reporting of this casualty at the time, there is every reason to believe that the bunkers remain on board still today. The Norwegian tanker Stolt Dagali was cut in two as a result of a collision with the luxury liner Shalom which occurred off the coast of New Jersey in 1964. At the time, Stolt Dagali was en route from Philadelphia for New York, thence to Rotterdam. While her fore body remained afloat and was salvaged, her stern section, containing her bunker tanks, went down. No official American inquiry was conducted and no casualty report was issued in this case as no U.S. flag vessel was involved and the casualty occurred outside U.S. territorial waters. Nevertheless, owing to divers’ reports of her situation on the bottom, there is reason to believe that a substantial volume of bunkers remain on board. One of the war wrecks inspected and reported on in the “Sunken Tanker Project Report,” the British tanker Coimbra, is still thought to pose a hazard to the marine environment. Laden with a cargo of lubricating oil in support of the war effort, and while in a position approximately 20 miles south of Shinecock Inlet, Long Island, New York, the Coimbra was attacked by a German submarine and, after being struck by a well placed torpedo, was put down in three pieces. Notwithstanding the findings of the 1967 survey, this wreck has long since been recognized as a continuing source of oil pollution, one that has given rise to a number of beach remediation operations along the South Shore of Long Island. Beyond this, published accounts concerning this casualty indicate that there are as many as 28,500 barrels of lubricating oil remaining on board in eight cargo tanks that were not inspected during the 1967 survey. Required Action The Marine Electric, the Stolt Dagali, and the Coimbra are offered only as examples of a much larger population of shipwrecks deserving of consideration, survey and, as found to be necessary on a case by case basis, oil removal operations. The threat to the environment that these and similar wrecks represents is a most important issue for coastal and ocean protection; one of specific concern to the United States as well. The oil contained in these wrecks poses serious environmental risks. Degradation of the wrecks’ hulls and tank plating ultimately will cause the oil tanks to fail, allowing the oil to escape. Even today, these wrecks are known sites of oil leaking into the environment. These wrecks, among many others, appear to be environmental disasters waiting to happen. These potential disasters will become realities if no action is taken. The cost to the public of removing the oil from the wreckage now, while it is still contained, is significantly less than the costs will be if the oil is allowed to escape into the environment with the attendant destruction of natural resources, aquatic mammals, and fishery habitats, and significant economic losses suffered by seaside communities. Lest anyone think that these wrecks, or the greater population of wrecks located off Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 13 the coasts of the United States, do not pose a threat to the environment, all he or she need do is look at the case of the Jacob Luckenbach. A shelter deck type C-3 ocean freight vessel built of steel in 1944, the Jacob Luckenbach sank as a result of a collision in approximately 176 feet of water, 17 miles southwest of the Golden Gate Bridge, San Francisco, California on July 14, 1953. So serious was the result of the long persistent escape of bunker oil from the Jacob Luckenbach, that in a statement released on February 8, 2002, California Governor Gray Davis said, “I would like to thank the Department of Fish and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response and the U.S. Coast Guard for their tireless efforts in spearheading the search for the source of the oil spill that has depleted California’s offshore bird population over the last ten years. Now that the source of the oil has been identified and the team (government and industry) prepares for the oil recovery operation, I reaffirm my continuing support, and look forward to the day when this threat is finally eliminated.” With today’s capability and technology—including the availability of both moored and dynamically positioned (DP) project support vessels, work class and ‘eyeball’ remote operated vehicles (ROVs), proven surface and saturation diving capabilities, traditional “hot-tapping” and remote controlled offloading systems (ROLS), subsea oil heating systems, the noninvasive identification of oil and emulsions in ship’s hulls via POLSCAN, advances in oil/water separation capabilities and waste-stream minimization, a greatly expanded oil pollution response capability (OSROs), etc.—coupled with the project experience already gained here and around the world, the professional American salvage community’s ability to address the threat to the coastal and ocean environment posed by these wrecks has never been better. 14 Marine Technology Society Journal C O M M E N TA RY Potentially Polluting Wrecks Warrant Further Dialog AUTHOR LCDR Paul Albertson U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety, Office of Response Note: The comments, views, and conclusions in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Coast Guard. INTRODUCTION The Clean Ups n July 1953, the 468-foot freight ship SS Jacob Luckenbach collided with its sister ship, the SS Hawaiian Pilot, approximately 17 miles southwest of the Golden Gate Bridge. Shortly thereafter, the Luckenbach sank as a result of the collision, taking its cargo and fuel to the bottom. Fortunately for the crew, they were able to transfer safely to the Hawaiian Pilot, which limped into port. Nearly five decades later, oil fingerprint analysis identified the Luckenbach as the source of several mystery spills and tarball incidents responsible for oiling beaches and injuring or killing seabirds and other marine life over the course of ten years. In 2002, the Luckenbach still contained an estimated 132,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil. Across the Pacific, the 553-foot Navy oil tanker USS Mississinewa lay submerged in Ulithi Atoll, of the Federated States of Micronesia. In November 1944, the Mississinewa had been fully loaded with various fuels and lubricating oil supporting U.S. ships and aircraft when it was struck by a manned suicide torpedo of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The tanker sank in 130 feet of water, where it remained a silent war grave for nearly 60 years. In July 2001, a tropical storm passed over the Atoll, and oil began leaking from the tanker into Ulithi Lagoon and impacting nearby islands. At that time, the Mississinewa still contained over two million gallons of oil. In 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard and the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response coordinated overall oil removal and response to the Luckenbach, retrieving 85,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil from the 50-year-old shipwreck. To achieve success, oil recovery operations had to overcome several challenges. First and foremost, the ship lay at 175 feet, where divers contended with strong bottom currents, poor visibility, and 45-degree sea temperatures. The oil had a consistency of peanut butter and required the development of a tube style heat exchange and steam injection system so that it could be recovered. Moreover, the Luckenbach’s cargo had corroded and fused together, forcing divers to chisel through rust and debris to access vents. The operation involved 3D modeling, hull cleaning of significant marine growth, penetration diving and tapping, heat distribution and circulation, moving of cargo, self contained oil storage, and the deployment of large work platforms with ample deck space and seakeeping capability anchored over the salvage site. Upon completion, the ten-month oil recovery operation cost $19 million. As the Luckenbach response unfolded, concurrent efforts by the U.S. Navy to recover oil from the Mississinewa encountered a different set of challenges. In addition to environmental concerns and cultural artifact preservation, response operations also had to consider the potential for unexploded ordnance, the dis- I abling of unrecoverable weapon systems, and the preservation of war graves. It may be instructive to note that response operations in this case were aided (and costs minimized) by the Mississinewa’s location in warm, shallow, and protected waters. In addition, its upsidedown orientation offered easy access to the ship’s oil tanks for recovery/pump-out operations. The Navy recovered 1.83 million gallons of oil from the Mississinewa in 2003 at a project cost of $5 million. The Problem The Luckenbach and Mississinewa are but two of the thousands of sunken vessels that have accumulated around the world in the last 70 years. They call attention to a disturbing pollution threat posed by a population of wrecks in various states of decay containing untold volumes of oil, chemicals, and radiological substances. The scope of the problem is broad, encompassing both public and private vessels in domestic and international waters. Just as some wrecks pose little or no pollution threat, others may prove quite harmful. Efforts to mitigate or remove the pollution threat can be costly and further complicated by issues of cultural artifact preservation, concern for war graves, weapon systems, or unexploded ordinance associated with a vessel. In addition, the identification of responsible parties is often less than straightforward. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 15 International Policy Internationally, much of the discussion has centered on the International Maritime Organization’s draft Wreck Removal Convention. This Convention provides guidance on dealing with wrecks and drifting or sunken cargo posing a hazard to navigation or threat to the marine environment. It addresses issues such as locating, identifying, reporting, and removing hazardous wrecks—in particular, those found beyond territorial waters—along with the potential need for financial assurances to cover removal costs. While the Convention may provide guidelines for action in international waters, it remains the responsibility of individual nations to establish policy and procedures for recovery operations within their own waters. Issues of Concern in U.S. Waters Financial sources relevant to the wrecks issue are available, but limited in application. In the case of a discharge or substantial threat of a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance into waters of the U.S. coastal zone, the U.S. Coast Guard may access the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSTLF) or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Superfund on a case-by-case basis to mitigate or remove the pollution threat. When a vessel poses a threat to navigation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, under the Rivers and Harbors Act, may remove the vessel. In the absence of either a discharge (or substantial threat of discharge) of oil or hazardous substance or a navigational hazard, there is no clear-cut line of authority on the source of funds to initiate actions against potentially polluting wrecks in the U.S. coastal zone. Authority and funding are not the only issues. There are a number of federal, state, and private sector interests with a stake in both preemptive and post discharge response paradigms. Striking a balance between environmental, social, and economic concerns raises challenging questions as to appropriate levels of action; whether it is best to remove a vessel, to remove potentially pollut- 16 Marine Technology Society Journal ing oil or hazardous materials from the vessel, to simply mitigate the potential for leakage, or to do nothing. Characterizing the problem also raises questions. Where are the wrecks located? Do certain wrecks present a more substantial or imminent risk due to an advanced state of deterioration or proximity to environmentally sensitive areas? How should they be documented? Is the expense for anticipatory onsite surveys justified in building a risk matrix? When or where is it better to gather evidence of a potential discharge before investing in survey and recovery efforts? For some, the issue is simply a choice of paying now to mitigate the threat while pollutants are contained, or paying later once structural integrity fails and a discharge occurs. Finding an appropriate balance between fiscal realities and protection of the environment and public health or welfare clearly entails substantial challenges with difficult trade-offs. Conclusion Both the occasion and magnitude of the Luckenbach and Mississinewa as oil recovery events cast valuable light on an unrelenting problem. Unmeasured volumes of oil and hazardous materials remain tenuously confined by deteriorating hulls scattered throughout the maritime environment. We have learned there is a higher probability for environmental damage with aging wrecks, and yet, not surprisingly, the potential magnitude of the threat is set against a backdrop of limited resources. Assumptions of potential harm from these wrecks must be weighed against important questions of who has the responsibility, the will, the authority, and the financial backing to address an imprecise, but impending pollution threat. The Luckenbach and Mississinewa have piqued our collective interest. Varied dimensions of the wreck issue will be considered through a variety of perspectives, which should bring many stakeholders to the table. Continued and collective dialog among stakeholders would be a positive and welcome step toward scoping the issue and developing viable strategies to best serve the public good. C O M M E N TA RY The Pollution Threat Posed by Sunken Naval Wrecks: A Realistic Perspective and a Responsible Approach AUTHOR Richard T. Buckingham1 I n November 1944, the U.S. Navy oiler USS Mississinewa was torpedoed and it sank in Ulithi Atoll2 in the South Pacific. Almost fifty-seven years later, in August 2001, oil started leaking from the vessel following a typhoon that passed through the area. Within a matter of days, the Navy dispatched a response team who evaluated the situation and managed to plug the leak.3 In March of 2003, after careful planning and an extensive environmental assessment,4 the Navy successfully removed approximately 1.8 million gallons of oil that had remained aboard Mississinewa for almost six decades.5 Since then, the Mississinewa case has become the focus of much attention, especially by those who advocate a more aggressive and preemptive approach to cleaning up sunken tonnage. They point to Mississinewa for at least two purposes—as an example of the latent threat posed by sunken warships, and as a model of what can be accomplished if the nations responsible for these ships would just put their minds to it. However, the situation is more complex than that, and it’s worth stepping back a moment to gain some realistic perspective in three critical areas: (1) the scope/seriousness of the problem; (2) what can reasonably be accomplished within the parameters of responsible financial/environmental stewardship; and (3) the current lack of international consensus in terms of responsibility for these vessels. Scope/Seriousness: More Hype than Harm? Unfortunately, this topic has lent itself to hyperbole regarding the scope and serious- ness of the problem. Statements have been made creating the impression of looming catastrophic disaster when the reality of the risk is much less threatening. The ships have been called “toxic time bombs” or similar,6 and conventional WWII-era munitions aboard these vessels have been called “warheads.”7 Relatively small oil tankers, such as Mississinewa, have been referred to as “supertankers.”8 Articles point out that the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) has mapped more than 3,800 ships sunk in the Pacific theater of war,9 but typically fail to note that no more than 168 of them are believed to be oil tankers.10 Even facts about the Mississinewa and the effects of its August 2001 leak have been exaggerated. In one interview the vessel was said to have “nine million gallons of oil on board,”11 and an article said “five million gallons,”12 whereas in reality it contained less than two million gallons. It was also reported that oil from Mississinewa was “all over the place…causing a lot of damage to the marine ecosystems…and…causing fish poisoning, a lot of people were getting sick from eating the fish that’s been contaminated by oil.”13 In fact, a combined U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) survey and assessment team that traveled to Ulithi within days of the spill observed minimal oil on the beaches and did not even recommend further cleanup.14 The report that Ulithi islanders were getting sick from eating oil-contaminated fish was unsubstantiated. The short-lived symptoms that some islanders experienced in the wake of the typhoon were entirely consistent with episodic ciguatera fish poisoning which is indigenous to the area,15 and there was no evidence of a connection between any illness and the Mississinewa.16 Also, articles/papers on the war wreck issue typically reflect an unquestioned assumption that all such underwater hulls are severely corroded and ready to spew forth their petroleum contents at any moment. However, the evidence does not support that assumption. Mississinewa’s hull was found to be in good condition with very little hull corrosion in the vicinity of the cargo oil tanks.17 (Indeed, the source of the August 2001 slow leak was determined to be a small portion of the cargo transfer piping system that was easily plugged.)18 And this, notwithstanding that wrecks resting in relatively shallow, warm waters—such as Mississinewa—would be expected to be in the most advanced state of deterioration. This finding on the Mississinewa is significant because it is consistent with the low corrosion rates observed and measured on the hull of USS Arizona (in Pearl Harbor, HI) by the Submerged Resources Center, the underwater archeological arm of the National Park Service.19 Similarly, there is a substantial amount of misleading rhetoric implying that large quantities of oil remain aboard most war wrecks. While the articles and papers make reference to huge numbers of wrecks, they fail to acknowledge that many of these vessels did not, at the time of their sinking, contain large quantities of oil; and many that did no longer do, owing to the damage sustained when they were sunk. It is hardly a given that most of these vessels pose a serious risk of future major oil releases. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 17 Responsible Stewardship: Environmentally & Financially It must be recognized that the Mississinewa project was a unique case and was accomplished under best-case scenario conditions. The decision to remove the oil from the vessel involved a number of special factors, including the existence of the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia. 20 Other significant factors were: Mississinewa was a tanker believed to contain a large quantity of oil; it was situated upside down affording excellent access to the cargo tanks; and it was located in relatively shallow, warm and protected waters with excellent visibility—all contributing to a high probability of success. Even with all of that going for it, the operation’s cost still ran to almost $5 million. And very few cases will be that easy from an engineering standpoint. It cannot be overstated that Mississinewa was a unique case, and one must be careful not to regard it as representative of what can be accomplished at other wreck sites. Other cases—involving smaller quantities of oil, deeper and colder waters, lower visibility, or less cooperative weather— could easily cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars with no guarantee of significant success. For example, the recent SS Jacob Luckenbach operations off San Francisco consumed approximately $20 million to remove only 100,000 gallons of oil, leaving an unknown quantity of oil aboard the wreck—which is still slowly leaking. And in some cases, well intentioned but unnecessary (in the short term) oil removal efforts under less than favorable conditions could well trigger the very releases we all seek to prevent. Often the most responsible approach, both environmentally and financially, will be to do nothing in the short term if a wreck is not leaking; or to simply patch it if a slow leak does occur. It should also be remembered that the passing of time in these cases does not necessarily equate to a worsening situation. On the contrary, constant advances in technology will eventually make some removal operations—previously 18 Marine Technology Society Journal thought to be impossible or at least highly risky—efficient and safe, say ten or twenty years from now. For example, ten years ago we did not have at our disposal the remotely operated lightering system (ROLS).21 This technology uses a remotely operated vehicle (ROV), or robot if you will, instead of divers to make the critical connections to the hull to facilitate the hot-tap method of removing liquid product from sunken ships. Research is currently underway that will greatly increase (to a magnitude of ten) the depths at which that particular system will be able to operate. Another example of a promising system on the horizon is the development of neutron back-scattering technology, being pioneered by at least one major salvage company as a non-invasive method for effectively locating and measuring remaining quantities/levels of liquid in a sunken vessel’s tanks. Such a system offers the hope that at some point we can safely, accurately, and economically identify whether a given ship really does pose a significant threat. An excellent example of a conservative but responsible strategy is that of the U.S. Navy, whose approach has been, and continues to be, that of evaluating on a caseby-case basis the propriety of response or oil removal action with respect to sunken warships. The Navy prides itself on environmental stewardship, but in today’s world it faces many challenges with limited resources. Policymakers must ensure the efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars for both national defense and environmental protection. The Navy’s policy, articulated in its Environmental and Natural Resources Program Manual (OPNAVINST 5090.1B), recognizes each situation (in terms of particular war wrecks) as unique, and that the appropriate reaction to a report of a suspected or actual oil release from an historic naval vessel can only be properly determined on a case-specific basis. This position is consistent with that of the U.S. Department of State which recently reached agreement with the Pacific Island countries that are members of the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) to address clean up of potential war wreck pollution bilaterally on a case-by-case basis. Thus, it can be expected that the Navy will continue to follow this individualized approach, exploring with the Department of State the possibility of case-specific bilateral solutions. Consistent with its conservative approach, the Navy has declined to implement a program of pre-inspecting non-leaking wrecks to evaluate their current conditions, as has been suggested by some interested parties. Such “anticipatory site assessments” would be a questionable use of scarce resources. For example, had an anticipatory site assessment been conducted on Mississinewa in May 2001, it would have cost close to $300,000 and would have revealed simply a non-leaking wreck in apparently excellent condition. Should another wreck begin to leak, any action taken by the Navy would, of necessity, have to begin with an on-site assessment regardless of whether one had already been done. The time lapse between an anticipatory site assessment and one done at the time of a spill would negate the value/findings of the earlier assessment. The Lack of International Consensus22 Finally, it is important to realize that we are in uncharted waters in terms of responsibility for these vessels. There is currently no legal regime or agreement regarding whom, if anyone, is responsible for responding to pollution threats posed by war wrecks. No international law or treaty requires flag states, or the nations that sank the vessels, to inspect, respond to or clean up war wrecks.23 We also lack consensus on who the responsible party should be if such an international agreement/treaty were to be adopted. Should it be the vessel’s flag nation, or perhaps the nation that sank the vessel? Should it be the impacted coastal state, particularly if it derived a direct/indirect benefit (e.g., liberation or greatly enhanced tourism24) from the naval hostilities in question? Or should ownership/title of the vessel be the determining factor? Even in the case of the United States Navy, which asserts ownership of its war wrecks, such claim of ownership would not necessarily resolve the matter. For those of us whose careers have developed against the backdrop of modern environmental laws, it is all too tempting to conclude that if the Navy claims it owns these ships, then obviously the Navy, as owner, is responsible for any pollution threat or release emanating from them. But in law—particularly international law, and especially with respect to the rights and responsibilities of nations entitled to sovereign immunity—things are rarely that simple. First of all, it must be remembered that there is no precedent for attaching legal liability to the flag nation in such cases. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently contradictory or incongruous about a sovereign nation maintaining ownership of its sunken warships for the purpose of protecting their status as war graves and to preserve the vessels and related artifacts for historical purposes, while at the same time declining to assume the otherwise unprecedented responsibility/liability for pollution from the vessels. If a nation is free to insulate itself from responsibility by claiming to have relinquished ownership of sunken warships, it may alternatively be free to define the limited nature of whatever ownership claims it retains with regard to those same vessels. Given the current lack of international consensus, trying to assign responsibility in advance for pollution response/clean up should not be considered in the abstract. Each actual case will be unique and must be addressed as such. Conclusion Valid concerns expressed by potentially impacted coastal states and various interest groups regarding the environmental threat posed by naval war wrecks cannot be disregarded. By the same token, we must not allow ourselves to blow the perceived problem out of proportion. An overly aggressive approach can be wasteful, unnecessary, and in some cases harmful. A conservative strategy can be both fiscally and environmentally responsible. As an added benefit, it affords the additional time needed for those inevitable technological and international/ legal developments that will help solve the problem. 7 Earthbeat, program on Australian Radio National, Mar. 22, 2003 (www.abc.net.au/rn/ science/earth/stories/s812339.htm). 8 Endnotes 1 Assistant Supervisor of Salvage (Admiralty), Office of the Supervisor of Salvage & Diving (SUPSALV), U.S. Navy. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not necessarily constitute the views/positions of the U.S. Navy or any portion of the United States Government. 2 Ulithi Atoll is located in what is now Yap State, in the Federated States of Micronesia. 3 In late December 2001, the vessel began to leak slowly again. Once more, the Navy dispatched a dive team that stopped the leak, effected a more permanent repair, and conducted an extensive physical survey to assess the feasibility of removing the oil. Underwater Survey Report II, USS Mississinewa (AO 59), Ulithi Atoll, 26 January - 18 February 2002, by U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage & Diving, Naval Sea Systems Command. Id. The term “supertanker” conjures up visions of the Exxon Valdez, which was capable of carrying over 62 million gallons of oil; Mississinewa’s capacity was one-tenth of that. 9 World War II’s Time Bomb, on-line Nat’l. Geog. Mag., Oct. 2003 (http://magma.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/ 0310/resources_geo.html). 10 The 168 figure does, however, appear in: Pacific faces environmental disaster from hundreds of sunken warships. Pacnews, Mar. 4, 2004 (www.hellopacific.com/news/ general/news/2004/03/04/04m.html). 11 Earthbeat program on Australian Radio National, Mar. 22, 2003 (http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/earth/ stories/s812339.htm). 12 World War Two wrecks haunt Pacific with oil spills, Planet Ark, Nov. 4, 2002 (www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/ newsid/18431/story.htm). 4 Mississinewa Offloading: Ulithi Lagoon, Yap State, Federated States of Micronesia, Environmental Assessment, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, DC (May 2002). 13 Earthbeat program on Australian Radio National, March 22, 2003 (http:// www.abc.net.au/rn/science/earth/stories/ s812339.htm). 5 U.S. Navy Salvage Report, USS Mississinewa Oil Removal Operations, Supervisor of Salvage & Diving, Naval Sea Systems Command (May 2004). 14 USS Mississinewa Oil Spill, Ulithi Atoll, Yap State, FSM, USCG/NOAA Assessment Team Report, 24 August 2001. 15 6 E.g., Hodge, A., Pacific cloaks a toxic time bomb, The Australian, January 17, 2003; Pacific faces environmental disaster from hundreds of sunken warships, Pacnews, March 4, 2004 (www.hellopacific.com/news/ general/news/2004/03/04/04m.html); World War II’s Time Bomb, on-line Nat’l. Geog. Mag., Oct. 2003 (http://magma.nationalgeographic.com/ ngm/0310/resources_geo.html). It’s worth noting that when Mississinewa did begin to leak, it did so at a low discharge rate of approximately 360 gallons per day, as actually measured on-scene by divers. [Underwater Survey Report I, USS Mississinewa (AO 59), Ulithi Atoll, 17August – 17 September 2001; prepared by U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage & Diving, Naval Sea Systems Command.] Ciguatera is caused by toxin-producing dinoflagellates, a type of microalgae found in tropical and subtropical areas including the Pacific. Ciguatera poisoning cases typically increase following storms that cause damage to coral reefs. Damaged coral may be colonized by microalgae that are hosts for the dinoflagellates that can cause ciguatera within a 2-4 week period following the disturbance to the reef. The toxin is then passed up through the food chain to humans. Id. 16 Id. 17 Underwater Survey Report I, USS Mississinewa (AO 59), Ulithi Atoll, 17August – 17 September 2001, U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage & Diving, Naval Sea Systems Command. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 19 18 Id. 19 As related in a 2003 presentation by Larry Murphy who heads up the USS Arizona underwater archeological project for the National Park Service, as part of a special workshop on Understanding and Reducing the Threat Posed by Submerged and Abandoned Vessels, sponsored by the Ocean Studies Board of the National Academies. 20 This special treaty relationship gives the United States responsibility for military-related matters. 21 Some salvage companies operate this system under a different name, such as “PolRec” in the case of Smit Salvage. 22 In addition to the United States and impacted coastal states, there are numerous maritime nations with a stake in this matter — the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and Italy, to name just a few. 23 An insightful analysis of this issue can be found at: Cervi, G., War Wrecks and the Environment: Who’s Responsible for the Legacy of War (A Case Study: Solomon Islands and the United States), U. of Oregon, 14 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 351 (1999). 24 In some instances, it is the very presence of these wrecks as a dive attraction that serves as the primary draw for most tourists. 20 Marine Technology Society Journal PAPER European Experience in Response to Potentially Polluting Shipwrecks AUTHOR Michel Girin Director, CEDRE (Centre de Documentation, de Recherche et d’Expérimentations sur les Pollutions accidentelles des Eaux) P otentially Polluting Wrecks Bad weather, inadequate maintenance, human errors, wars, and piracy ensure that a small proportion of the innumerable ships sailing over the oceans do not reach their destinations. This issue has traditionally been seen only in terms of losses of human life and/or financial benefits. For millennia, wrecks were sources of dreams and riches: all children, all seamen, all divers have in their mind images of shipwreck treasures, whether historical artifacts or gold and silver. But in the last hundred years, oil became the major world energy source. Increasingly larger quantities of crude and refined oil were shipped over the oceans. Fuel powered engines became the norm in shipping. Ships grew bigger, with more powerful engines and larger fuel bunkers. Each new wreckage implied oil products in part spilled, in part trapped in the wreck. Oil trapped in a wreck, particularly the heavy fuel used to power ship engines, remains unaltered and slightly buoyant, waiting quietly for the ship structure to fail and to offer it an escape opportunity. Professionals speak of “potentially polluting wrecks.” Environmentalists call them “oil time bombs.” They already number in the tens of thousands, without counting the multitude of small fishing and leisure craft wrecked with nominal quantities of light oil aboard. There will be more in the future, unless suitable action is taken. Suitable action, i.e. depolluting those wrecks, would be time consuming and ABSTRACT Since hydrocarbon fuel powered engines became the norm for ships, each new casualty resulted in one more shipwreck with oil and fuel trapped in it. Some contained more potential contaminant than others—namely oil and chemical tankers. All were destined to suffer from corrosion and to someday release their liquid pollutant. The threat posed by those potentially polluting wrecks has long been neglected. But supertanker incidents and surprise spills from forgotten wrecks brought the problem to the front pages of the media and to the agenda of decision makers. This paper shows how consciousness of the problem took shape in Europe, and particularly in France, and how a response strategy was established as a result of actual incidents. Until now, that response strategy was limited both by cost considerations and by the capacities of the existing underwater intervention technology. That second limiting factor has now disappeared: the successful recovery of the fuel trapped in the Prestige wreck shows that oil recovery from a wreck has become technically possible at any depth. Consequently, the only remaining limiting factor is cost, raising the crucial question of how to identify the possible standards for weighing intervention costs against potential pollution hazards. Incidents are described, questions are raised; but no potentially polluting shipwreck records, no overall risk assessment, no specific response standards are proposed here. Potentially polluting shipwreck records are not public. Risk assessments do not exist. Response standards are still a case-by-case matter. However, one principle is emerging from the case studies presented here. Response standards can no longer reflect only the sole views of industry, of governments, and of their technical and legal experts. Rather, they have to account for the opinion and lobbying capacity of those who buy and elect: the consumers and the general public. costly. Up to now there have been many good reasons not to do it. With the exception of large tankers, each wreck contains a relatively small amount of oil. It is a local hazard, not a major one. Furthermore, the bunker steel plates of a sunken wreck hardly corrode to the point of releasing oil in less than 30 to 50 years, unless they were already heavily corroded before wreckage. Potential pollution by shipwrecks is a longterm concern – and long-term concern for the environment and environmental impact are rather recent concepts. I found no specific focus on potential oil pollution from sunken wrecks in the scientific literature prior to the Second World War. Most merchant ships were still coal powered, ships were smaller, the amount of oil trapped in shipwrecks was nominal, and little to no attention was dedicated to the impact of oil on the environment. Potentially polluting shipwrecks dramatically increased in number and in volume of trapped oil during the war (Nawadra and Gilbert, 2002). For evident reasons, mankind had other priorities than the environment at that time. And, in the aftermath of the war, decision makers had more urgent concerns than the future of the marine environment. Countries had to be rebuilt. Dedicating efforts and money to recover oil from the many ships sunk during the war wasn’t imaginable, when at the same time large quantities of unused ammunition, including toxic gas shells, were disposed of by being dumped at sea. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 21 In the years since 1950, economic reconstruction boosted shipping. Tar balls from operational spills and from older wrecks became a permanent nuisance on many recreational beaches. Little was said against that unavoidable consequence of economic development and no action was undertaken. Then the years 1960-70 brought the first supertanker casualties. Black tides became a threat and the public started considering that potentially polluting wrecks should be emptied of their remaining cargo. Pumping Oil and Chemicals from Tankers in Shallow Waters Most logically, the first decisions to pump oil remaining in wrecks involved oil tankers lying in relatively shallow waters close to coastal zones of high economic activity. France led the way with the tankers Boehlen and Tanio. The Boehlen, an East German tanker with 9,500 tons of heavy “Boscan” crude oil on board, sank on 15 October 1976, off the island of Sein at the tip of Brittany, in a violent storm (Cedre, 2004). Some 2,500 tons of oil were trapped in the seeping wreck, lying at a depth of 107 meters. This was an accessible depth for only the most elaborate diving technology of the time. At first, the authorities committed divers to seal the main crack of the wreck with concrete. Then, in February 1977, under strong pressure from tourism interests and professional fishermen, it was decided to pump the oil to the surface through a pipe and burn it on site. The operation was successfully implemented from May to August 1977, at public expense and at the high cost of the lives of two divers. The Tanio, a Malagasy tanker with 26,000 tons of heavy fuel on board, broke in two in a heavy storm on 7 March 1980, off Batz Island north of Brittany (Cedre, 2004). The aft part floated and could be safely towed to the port of Le Havre. The fore part sank with some 7,500 tons of fuel inside, at a depth of 90 meters. Submarine observations showed that it seeped 3 – 10 tons of fuel per day. Divers sealed the main cracks with concrete and synthetic resin in April, while wreck treatment options were 22 Marine Technology Society Journal investigated. Pumping into a lightening tanker was selected as the best option. It was expected to cost some US $10 million and be achieved in late September. Technical difficulties and bad weather didn’t permit it. Work was interrupted during the winter season, and resumed in the spring of 1981. It was completed on 18 August 1981: 6,500 tons had been recovered, at a cost of some US $25 million, without diver casualties. By this time, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund had entered into force and provided compensation to the French government for the part of the expense it deemed reasonable. These incidents demonstrated the technical possibility and reasonableness of pumping large quantities of oil from tankers lying at depths of up to some 100 meters, in economically and ecologically sensitive areas. The example was followed by some other countries in comparable incidents, particularly Korea, with the tankers Yuil-n°1 and Osung-n°3 (IOPC Funds, 2004). Fortunately, France had no need for such operations, until the Erika and Ievoli Sun incidents. The Erika, a Maltese tanker with 31,000 tons of heavy fuel on board, broke in two in a heavy storm on 12 December 1999, 30 nautical miles south of the Penmarc’h point, the southwest tip of Brittany (Cedre, 2004). The fore part sank overnight. The aft part followed the day after, during a towage attempt to prevent it from being washed ashore on the island of Belle-Île. They lay at depths of 114 and 128 meters respectively. Explorations undertaken with remotely operated vehicles, between 31 December 1999 and 2 January 2000, showed that the wrecks were seeping small quantities of fuel and were estimated to still jointly contain between 12,000 and 20,000 tons of fuel. The ship owner failed to comply with the order of the French authorities to deal with the pollution hazard represented by the wreck. However, an agreement was signed for that purpose on 26 January 2000 with the cargo owner, the Total Oil Company. As for the Tanio, the selected option was pumping into a lightening tanker, with assistance from divers. Heating of the oil was rejected in favor of an alternative option: reduction of oil viscosity through mixing with a fluidizer, a vegetable oil. Two special underwater mixing units were designed and built for that purpose. Operations on site started in midMay and were successfully completed on 6 September 2000, with the recovery of 11,245 tons of fuel, the lower end of the initial estimate. It was by far the largest ever oil recovery operation from a sunken tanker. Its cost amounted to some US $70 million, entirely borne by the Total Oil Company (Guyonnet and Bocquillon, 2000). The standard set by recovery of oil from the Erika was soon challenged by another incident. On 30 October 2000, the Italian double-hull chemical tanker Ievoli Sun called for assistance in a storm, 45 nautical miles north of the Batz Island, a few miles from the site where the Tanio sank in 1980 (Cedre, 2004). It was loaded with 6,000 tons of oil industry chemicals, namely styrene (4,000 tons), isopropylic alcohol and methyl-ethylketon (1,000 tons each). The crew was evacuated and the ship was taken in tow in the direction of Le Havre harbor. It sank midway, on 31 0ctober, by the southern limit of the Cotentin compulsory traffic lanes, 12 miles from the British island of Alderney and 20 miles from the French La Hague Cape, in a depth of 70 meters. There were few precedents of liquid chemical recovery from a shipwreck. After weeks of tense negotiations, supported by contradictory expertise, the ship owner, backed by the cargo owners, chose to comply with the order of the French authorities to pump the styrene, a recognized water pollutant, and the ship’s bunkers. It was agreed between the parties that the methyl-ethyl-keton and the isopropylic acid would be released from the wreck under controlled conditions and allowed to disperse in the surrounding seawater. The operation was contracted on 10 April, to be entirely implemented with remotely controlled robots. It started on May 2. After 53 days of underwater operations, it was successfully completed at the end of June, with the recovery of 3,012 cubic meters of styrene and 180 tons of bunkers. It was the first recovery ever of a liquid chemical cargo from a double hull tanker. Its cost, borne by the ship owner, amounted to US $12 million. These operations set clear precedents for handling future wrecks of oil or chemical tankers in French waters at depths within the capacity of remotely controlled underwater technology and in the vicinity of areas of economic and/or ecological importance. The ship owners and/or the cargo owners will be expected to remove any trapped oil or chemical pollutant. Neither the public nor the authorities will have any doubt that this is a reasonable measure, worth the cost. Pumping Oil and Chemicals from Old Wrecks in Shallow Waters Everybody living by the seaside knows about a shipwreck in the vicinity. Diver magazines offer maps, photos, stories, and many divers have watched slightly moving, highly viscous stalagmites occasionally seeping from corroded shipwrecks. Few of those who made the link with oil droplets on closeby beaches and reported the situation to the authorities for suitable action generated any response. National and local administrations are hardly interested in taking care of minor pollution from an old shipwreck, legally abandoned long ago by its owners, with all the corresponding responsibilities. Any action undertaken would be at their risk and expense. In some cases, however, the public pressure on authorities was such that depollution was undertaken at taxpayers’ expense. The examples of the Peter Sif and Charles de Foucault in France, and the Castillo de Salas in Spain are particularly demonstrative of the related problems. The general cargo vessel Peter Sif sank in a storm in the Bay of Lampaul on the west coast of the island of Ouessant (West of Brittany) in November 1979. It lay at a depth of 57 meters, with some 250 tons of bunker fuel (Cedre, 2004). The possibility of that fuel being salvaged was investigated, but the incident of the Tanio, in March 1980, focused attention on a much greater pollution problem and the Peter Sif was forgotten. That is, no salvage attempts were made on the Peter Sif and its owner abandoned the wrecked ship. In September 1998, oily seeps in the Bay of Lampaul revived memories of the forgotten wreck. Navy divers confirmed that the seeps came from cracks in the Peter Sif hull. The cracks were sealed, but the 1999 winter brought additional cracks and seeps. Fishermen, tourism operators, and local authorities were adamant that the pollution threat be dealt with. The maritime authorities investigated technical options. It was decided to open holes in the hull in the summer and to recover the oil at the surface of the bay. Tenders were prepared. However, none of the different departments possibly involved with contracting the works had the necessary budget. Finally, the pollution response team of the Navy implemented the operation with its own means. Work started on 7 June 1999 and was completed on 13 June. 130 tons of fuel were recovered. The passenger vessel Charles de Foucault sank in 1940 as a war casualty, in front of the Sablanceau beach on Ré Island, close to the port of La Rochelle. Winter storms progressively dismantled the wreck in the postwar years. There were other concerns at the time than the possible consequences of the resulting occasional seeps. No more seeps were reported over the seventies and eighties, during which the area became a recreational hot spot. Small seeps appeared again in the nineties, generating a local request for action. After years of hesitation, the local services of the Ministry of Public Works were provided with the necessary funding to contract the removal of the remains of the wreck. Work was contracted to a salvage company for implementation in spring 2004, before the summer season. The work was complicated by oil seeps, the presence in the area of remains of another vessel, and the discovery of heavy ammunition. Pollution response and explosion hazard measures had to be taken. Work finally extended into all of July and part of August 2004. The coal carrier Castillo de Salas, at anchor in the waiting area of the Gijon harbor with 100,000 tons of coal on board, drifted in a storm on 11 January 1986, ran aground on a submerged reef off the main beach of the city and broke in two (Arbex, 2003; Cedre, 2003). It lay at a depth of 14 meters, in front of the main beach of the city. The fore part could be lightered from most of its cargo, re-floated, towed away and sunk in deep water. The aft part was broken apart by rough weather. A total of some 60,000 tons of coal were released, generating heavy beach pollution. On 6 May 1986, the ship owner contracted with a salvage company for recovery of the ship remains, including the rest of its coal and its bunkers. During the work, the environmental authorities of the province requested that following the recovery of the bunker fuel stored in its compartments, the double bottom of the wreck be left in place to become an artificial reef. Work was completed in October 1986 and the ownership of the double bottom remains was passed to the Spanish government. Those remains soon became a scuba diving hot spot and the population and administration forgot the Castillo de Salas incident. On 16 August 2001, a small black tide affected the beaches and leisure port of Gijon. It was quickly correlated to the double hull remains. The government committed to deal with the problem. Divers were contracted to extract with hand hoses the contaminated sand and the fuel left in the double hull compartments: an unprecedented, highly unhealthy mission (photos in Arbex, 2003). They recovered some 250 tons of fuel over September and October 2001, while other small spills generated further media and political turmoil. Hardly more than 10 tons of fuel remained then in the structure and there was no risk of ecological catastrophe. But due to the social pressures, the authorities decided to remove all the remains. Work was contracted to a salvage company by the state company SASEMAR, at government expense. The remains—cut into 10 pieces, ranging from 240 to 400 tons—were lifted and brought ashore. The work began in August 2002; the last piece was removed on 10 July 2003. These operations set clear precedents for old and potentially polluting shipwrecks in European waters. If they become a local nuisance in sensitive areas, not only environmental considerations but also social and political pressure will, in the end, make it so that the pollutant source is eradicated at great public expense. This is a strong incentive for national authorities to require that ship owners take responsibility for dealing with the consequences of a wreck right after any new incident. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 23 From Removing Shallow Water Wrecks to Offloading Pollutants from Deepwater Wrecks Initiatives of the French authorities dealing with the car carrier Tricolor and Spanish authorities in response to the tanker Prestige are highly demonstrative examples of the development of a “do it now” policy. The sunken Russian tanker Nakhodka broke in two on 2 January 1997. The fore part floated and with its cargo landed 5 days later by the city of Mikuni, on the West coast of Japan. A causeway had to be built to pump the oil trapped in the wreck, which was later removed. The aft part sank at a depth of 1,800 meters. Oil sheen was regularly reported in the area by aerial surveys. In 1998, after investigations confirmed that little oil was seeping from the sunken deepwater wreck, the Japanese authorities concluded that the potential pollution hazard for the coastline was minimal and that sealing the wreck and/or pumping the few thousand tons of oil trapped in it would be beyond reasonableness (Girin, 2000). No one objected to that conclusion. In 2004, faced with possibly up to 35,000 tons of heavy fuel trapped in the wrecks of the Maltese tanker Prestige, lying at depths of 3,565 meters (aft part) and 3840 meters (bow part), the Spanish authorities immediately undertook to seal the seeps and committed to take care of the pollution hazard. A scientific committee was given the task to evaluate possible wreck treatment options and an agreement was signed with the national oil company, REPSOL, for the engineering and implementation of the possible options, among which recovery was a top priority. Further investigations of the wreck reduced the estimated amount trapped in it to 14,000 tons. A highly innovative recovery technology was developed and tested, using ROVs and shuttles between the wreck and the surface. Operations were completed at the end of September 2004 with 13,400 tons recovered from the bow part (Ministerio de Fomento, 2004), superseding the record set by the Erika operations. The overall cost of that recovery is estimated at US $120 million, financed by REPSOL on behalf of the Span- 24 Marine Technology Society Journal ish authorities. Both the ship owner and the Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club have already publicly stated that this expense was unreasonable by far, considering the potential pollution hazard. The response of the ship owner and of the P&I Club of the car carrier Tricolor were dramatically different when asked by the French authorities to deal with the potential traffic and pollution hazard represented by the ship at a depth of 30 meters, after a collision in the British Channel on 14 December 2002 (Cedre, 2004). The ship was loaded with close to 2,900 new luxury cars and 77 containers. It carried bunkers of 990 tons of intermediate fuel oil. Lying on one side and close to 30 meters wide, it represented a major navigational hazard in an extremely dense traffic area (Duchesne, 2004). The ship owner immediately activated his emergency crisis unit and agreed, together with his P&I Club, not only to pump the bunkers and to remove the wreck, but also to clean the sea bottom from cars and other remains. The fuel recovery work started on 21 December and was completed on 17 February 2003. Wreck removal options were investigated and work was contracted for the cutting of the ship body into 9 pieces of some 3,000 tons each (i.e. 10 times the weight of the pieces of the Castillo de Salas double bottom). Operations started on 22 July 2003 and the last large piece was removed on 19 July 2004. Recovery of cars and small ship body remains is now underway. The total cost of the contract, borne by the ship owner and his P&I Club, hasn’t been published. Reliable sources indicate some US $40 million. These operations introduce new, extremely high standards: oil recovery whatever the depth, full removal of wreck and cargo in shallow waters if in a highly sensitive area. Technology is no longer a limiting factor. Anything is possible; it is only a question of willingness to pay. Discussion: Where to Set a Limit? These case studies provide no hint of the larger environmental hazard represented by sunken wrecks in European waters. Few inventories of sunken wrecks, with assessment of their possible load of oil or other pollutants, exist in Europe. One such inventory was undertaken by Cedre for the French navy a few years ago, focusing on the coastal waters around continental France, and then only limited elements were published (Cabioc’h, 2001). Over four thousand wrecks within 20 nautical miles from the shore were registered in the databases. Of these, fewer than fifty were known as potentially polluting. However, information on the possible cargo and/or bunkers was lacking for 250 wrecks over 150 tons sunk since 1940. For those reasons, the only lessons drawn here are those arising for the few case studies described Before the Prestige incident, the technology was limited by hardly disputable “do” or “don’t” criteria. There are, of course, always inventors who claim they can do anything. Putting technical experts around a table and having them come to a common agreement is far from impossible. Now that the limits of technology no longer exist, the only true question has become willingness to pay. In light of this new situation, two possible options can be envisaged. Either there are no set rules and decision-making is based on precedents, with policies and procedures differing from one country to another; or some acceptable protocol is adopted as a worldwide standard. Whether national or international, it is essential that the standards used should be set in advance and accepted by all parties concerned. Setting standards at governmental or inter-governmental level, with participation of selected stakeholders, is relatively easy. But those standards are worthless if, at the time of an incident, they are openly rejected as unacceptable by politicians and public opinion. Decisions such as the one made by the Spanish government to recover the fuel trapped in the Prestige wreck, at an extremely high cost, may lead to conclusions that public pressure trumps all and that governments will in the end always give in to public pressure. Governments will indeed have no choice, unless they have the capacity to concretely demonstrate beyond what point the demand of the politicians and public is unreasonable. Ideally, the world standard should be reasonableness as set by the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) Conventions. But there is little chance that this will occur in the near future. One major reason among others is that the richest country in the world, the USA, uses a national standard, set by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), and U.S. consultants are promoting that standard in countries not entered in the IOPC Fund convention. The two standards have one fundamental point in common and one fundamental difference. The point in common is that they are not based on set terms (such as “in situation A, undertake action X”), but on reasonableness as assessed by oil pollution specialists. Little consideration is given to social or political aspects. As an example, removing the cleaned double bottom of the Castillo de Salas would have been unreasonable according to both IOPC Fund and OPA pure oil pollution standards. The fundamental difference between IOPC Fund and OPA rules is that assessment of reasonableness is undertaken by international experts in the IOPC Fund, and by national ones in the OPA. Without prejudice of their professional integrity, national experts may give more consideration to national public opinion than international ones In any case, the IOPC Fund Convention applies only to a small minority of casualties, namely oil tankers (although, when in force, the Hazardous and Noxious Substances—HNS—convention will substantially increase the proportion of vessels covered). And, even with regards to oil tankers, reasonableness as interpreted by the IOPC Funds assembly today doesn’t fulfill the understanding of the general public, politicians, and environmental associations in most European countries. The French decision to pump the Erika and the Spanish decision to pump the Prestige were made by the authorities under strong pressure from the general public, without consideration of IOPC Fund rules. In the absence of previously accepted national or international decision-making criteria, it was socially and politically impossible to leave that legacy to future genera- tions, given the severe impacts already caused by these incidents. It was no more imaginable, in the turmoil following the two catastrophes, to undertake a fully objective potential pollution hazard assessment study, including the assessment of the financial limit at which potential pollutant recovery would shift from acceptable to excessive in comparison with the expected consequences of a future spill. The simple request from the public was that the threat be neutralized, whatever the cost. There certainly is no easy solution. Points of view are necessarily far different between those living on the impacted coastlines and those in charge of balancing conflicting priorities at central government levels. They are not closer between environment preservationists and shipping defense associations. All points of views have their merits. The shipping industry rightly insists that excessive demands could put their business and the whole international trade economy in jeopardy. The public is rightly growing more conscious of their responsibility as regards their environmental legacy to future generations and how closely tied local and regional economies are to healthy coasts. Industry managers, politicians, dedicated environmentalists, small-scale shellfish pickers, and many others approach sustainable development from differing points of view. Directly or indirectly, the taxpayers and oil consumers in the affected countries paid for most if not all the depollution of the Boehlen, Tanio, Erika, and Prestige. As a consequence, it would be fair to clearly inform them that the “polluter = payer” principle applies only up to certain limits set by international bodies, where their country has only one vote; and that any action they deem necessary beyond that limit will be undertaken at their expense. That might increase public pressure on the authorities to obtain voluntary responses from ship owners, such as those of the Ievoli Sun and Tricolor. But it might also open a fundamental debate: up to what point are taxpayers ready to pay for remediations demanded by the public, “whatever the cost”? References Arbex, J.C., 2003. Castillo de Salas, dieceisiete años despues/seventeen years on. Ministry of Development ed., Madrid, Spain, 126 pp. Cabioc’h, F., 2001. Toward preventive depollution of potentially polluting wrecks: lessons of a national wreck survey and response to recent seeps. In: Getting better prepared to face offshore oil and chemical spills, ed. S. Hara, 6 p. Conference proceedings of Cedre, Brest, France, CD Rom Cedre, 2004. Website, see: Accidents, the dossiers on the Boehlen, Tanio, Erika, Ievoli Sun, Castillo de Salas, Prestige. Available at: www.cedre.fr Duchesne, T. 2004. Gestion des risques maritimes en Manche et mer du Nord, Préventique Sécurité, n°76, pp. 25-31. Girin, M., ed, 2000. From the Nakhodka to the Erika. Conference proceedings of Cedre, Brest, France, 162 pp. Guyonnet, P., and G. Bocquillon. 2000. Experience of pumping sunken wrecks in France: from the Tanio to the Erika. In: From the Nakhodka to the Erika, ed. M. Girin, pp. 135-142. Conference proceedings of CEDRE, Brest, France. IOPC Funds, 2004. Report of the activities of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds for 2003. Impact PR & Design Ltd, Blean, Canterbury, United Kingdom, 184 pp. Ministerio de Fomento. 2004. Website, see “Sasemar”, information on the Prestige wreck depollution operation. Available at: www.mfom.es. Nawadra, S., and T.D. Gilbert. 2002. Risk of Marine Spills in the Pacific Island Region and its Evolving Response Arrangements. International Oil Spill Conference, SpillCon 2002, Sidney. http://www.spillcon.com/2002/ 2002papers.htm. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 25 PAPER Abandoned Vessels: Impacts to Coral Reefs, Seagrass, and Mangroves in the U.S. Caribbean and Pacific Territories with Implications for Removal AUTHORS ABSTRACT Christine Lord-Boring Research Planning, Inc. The NOAA Abandoned Vessel Program (AVP) surveyed a subset of known abandoned/ derelict vessels in sensitive habitats in 2002/2003 in U.S. territories in the Caribbean and Pacific. Vessels were surveyed to determine current and potential impacts to benthic environments, particularly coral reef, seagrass, and mangrove habitats, and for potential navigational, pollution, and public safety hazards. In all, 180 vessels were surveyed, and the range of potential environmental implications varied. The majority of vessels surveyed in reef habitats were aground on hardbottom with low relief and low percent coral cover, and therefore were not considered to be producing substantial environmental impacts. The few vessels that were aground on or near higher quality habitat and/or had extensive debris fields were of very high concern to the AVP and local managing agencies. If the potential impact of these vessels is not addressed, further injury to surrounding habitats is likely. Damage to seagrass habitats also varied widely, but those vessels causing active erosion to seagrass beds, particularly when moved during storms, should also be considered a priority for removal. Damage to mangroves were typically less substantial than to coral reefs and seagrass, but the cumulative impacts of clustered vessels that have grounded during storms in sheltered, mangrove-lined habitats should be addressed. Ian J. Zelo National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Abandoned Vessel Program Zachary J. Nixon Research Planning, Inc. INTRODUCTION G rounded and abandoned vessels are a problem in many coastal areas, and they are a significant threat for coral reef, seagrass, and mangrove habitats (U.S. CRTF, 2000). In addition to the physical crushing and smothering of habitats, grounded vessels pose a significant threat of oil spills and release of other pollutants, may impede navigation, block public and private uses of intertidal and subtidal habitats such as aquaculture, become a site for illegal dumping of waste oils and hazardous materials, be a visual eyesore, and become a wildlife entrapment and public health hazard (Michel et al., 2002; Lord et al., 2003). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has a long and diverse interest in grounded and abandoned vessels including charting, pollution abatement and debris and entanglement removal. However, with the exception of vessels grounded in the National Marine Sanctuaries or those that pose significant pollution threats, usually no action is taken to address the vessel itself or to restore the grounding site. Existing federal laws and regulations provide less than optimal authority to promptly remove vessels that harm natural resources but do not threaten to disrupt navigation or release pollutants. 26 Marine Technology Society Journal Two significant events in 1999 and 2000 focused national attention on the impact grounded vessels have on coral reefs. In 1999, the U.S. Coast Guard, NOAA, and the Commonwealth of American Samoa removed nine tuna longliners from Pago Pago Harbor while simultaneously performing an emergency coral restoration on the site. In 2000, the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force (CRTF) published their National Action Plan and identified groundings as a significant factor in the loss of reef habitat. These events, combined with increasing agency concerns about the decline of coral habitats from a variety of causes, led NOAA and others to inquire whether abandoned vessels may be causing significant harm to coral habitats elsewhere. NOAA responded by implementing the Abandoned Vessel Program (AVP) to investigate the problems posed by abandoned and derelict vessels on U.S. coral reef habitats. The goals of this program include collecting information on the scope of the problem and data on individual incidents in U.S. waters. As part of these efforts, surveys of a subset of known abandoned vessels in sensitive habitats were conducted in 2002/2003 in U.S. territories in the Caribbean and Pacific (Michel et al., 2002; Lord et al., 2003). Vessels were surveyed to determine current and potential impacts to benthic environments, particularly coral reef, seagrass, and mangrove habitats, and for potential navigational, pollution, and public safety hazards. In all, 180 vessels were surveyed. Presented here are some key findings from this effort, with particular emphasis on physical impacts to benthic habitats. Also summarized are some critical salvage, removal, and damage mitigation issues of concern to parties involved in dealing with abandoned vessels. Study Methods In June 2002 and June 2003, surveys of abandoned vessels were conducted in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands (St. Croix and St. Thomas), Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (Saipan, Tinian, and Rota). The vessels surveyed are a subset of vessels in the Abandoned Vessel Inventory (AVI) database developed by NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration. The AVI database is a compilation of existing data from sources such as NOAA, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, States, Territories, and the maritime industry, as well as original data from charts and interviews with local sources. Database records were filtered to identify those vessels that were most likely to be located in sensitive habitats. This selection was based on their mapped location, vessel information, local knowledge of vessel location, and IKONOS satellite imagery. Effort was made to search all of the vessels using their reported positions, but in some cases no vessel was found, while in other instances, multiple vessels were found where only one was charted. Two types of vessel surveys were conducted: 1. A full site assessment and detailed survey, which included the following activities: a. Determining the current location using global positioning system (GPS) receivers; b. Inspecting to the extent possible, recording the vessel type, construction, dimensions, conditions, etc.; c. Conducting a biological survey of the benthic and adjacent intertidal habitats; and d. Filming the entire site, vessel footprint, and adjacent habitats using underwater video and digital photography following a set pattern. 2. A rapid assessment, conducted at vessels with low potential environmental impact or restoration value, consisting of the following activities: a. Determining the current location using GPS; b. Recording the vessel type and dimensions; c. Conducting an abbreviated site assessment; and d. Photographing and videotaping the site. Summary reports of findings from both the Caribbean and Pacific regions including completed field forms and photographs of each surveyed vessel are available from the NOAA Damage Assessment Center’s website: http:/ /response.restoration.noaa.gov/dac/vessels/ documents.html. Results and Discussion The AVP surveyed 107 vessels in the Caribbean (38 in Puerto Rico and 69 in the USVI) and 73 vessels in the Pacific (31 in Guam and 42 in the CNMI) (Table 1). TABLE 1 Information on vessel type and primary habitat for the vessels surveyed by the AVP in the Caribbean (June 2002) and the Pacific (June 2003) Location Caribbean Pacific Vessel Type Coral Reef Seagrass Habitat Mangrove Habitat Other Habitat Total Commercial 2 6 2 12 22 Recreational 1 13 28 34 76 Gov./Military 0 4 0 1 5 Unidentified 0 0 4 0 4 Total 3 23 34 47 107 Commercial 10 1 0 9 20 Recreational 1 0 1 13 15 Gov./Military 9 2 6 21 38 Total 20 3 7 43 73 The vessels were categorized into three types: commercial, recreational, and government/military. Examples of commercial vessels include longliners, salvage tugs, barges, fishing vessels, cruise ships, and ferries. The majority of recreational vessels observed were sailboats; although motor yachts, fishing vessels, and houseboats were also surveyed. Government/military vessels surveyed included barges, freighters, and landing craft, many of which were surplussed after WWII and abandoned by subsequent owners. Environmental Impacts Vessels surveyed were found afloat, aground on land, and partially or completely submerged on intertidal or subtidal benthic substrates. The primary habitat types that vessels were observed near, floating over, or resting on varied with elevation. Hardbottom, coral reefs, seagrass, macroalgae, sand and mud bottoms were found in the intertidal and subtidal zones while the intertidal and supratidal zones were composed of sand and gravel beaches, mangroves, and manmade shorelines (e.g. seawalls, riprap, and docks). Impacts caused by vessel grounding and abandonment to the coral/hardbottom reef habitat, seagrass, and mangrove habitats merit further discussion for several reasons (Table 1). The U.S. Coral Reef Task Force (CRTF) highlighted “coral reefs and their associated seagrass and mangrove habitats [as] among the most diverse and valuable ecosystems on earth” (U.S. CRTF, 2000). These ecosystems provide habitat for a vast number of species; have major economic benefits, particularly as a means of tourism for small island territories; play important cultural and natural heritage roles; provide commercial, recreational, and subsistence resources; and buffer shorelines and provide coastal protection (U.S. CRTF, 2000). Vessel groundings are considered to be one of the eight major threats affecting the longevity of these ecosystems (U.S. CRTF, 2000), and are among the most destructive anthropogenic factors affecting coral reef habitats (Precht et al., 2001). Coral Reef/Hardbottom Habitats Of the vessels surveyed by the AVP, 3 (3% of vessels surveyed) and 20 (27% of vessels surveyed) were aground on coral reef/ hardbottom habitats in the Caribbean and Pacific, respectively. Additional vessels in both regions were in close proximity to coral reef habitat, but were aground or resting on Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 27 other habitat types. Potential physical threats to coral and hardbottom habitats from abandoned and derelict vessels include: damage from the initial vessel grounding; damage from vessel or resulting debris and coral rubble moved by wave action, particularly during storms; crushing of benthic organisms and displacement of resident biota; filling in gaps; and reduction of the structural complexity of the reef (Maragos, 1994; Molina, 1994; Precht et al., 2001; U.S. CRTF, 2000). Although the AVP did not address potential injuries due to chemical releases from metal debris, it is possible that corroding metal vessel components may introduce iron, zinc, copper, or other elements into waters that usually only contain trace concentrations if healthy coral reefs are present (Green et al., 1997). The introduction of certain metals into coral reef ecosystems may be detrimental to some organisms while enhancing the growth of others (Martin and Fitzwater, 1988; Sunda, 1994). Antifouling agents present in bottom paint may also impact growth and recovery of corals and other benthic reef organisms (Negri et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2003). Impacts observed in the Caribbean were primarily crushing of hardbottom habitats directly under the vessel, with scattered debris amongst coral rubble, some of which was colonized with live coral and invertebrates. In some cases debris was scattered great distances around the vessel (tens of meters). Live coral cover was typically low (1-10%). One vessel in the USVI (Serendipity) was aground on a rock platform and gravel beach, and therefore was not impacting the reef at the time of the survey. The site was in a high-energy environment, however, and if moved or broken up the vessel could easily cause damage to the adjacent reef, which had some live coral cover including both hard and soft coral species. A much larger percentage of surveyed vessels were aground or resting on hardbottom and coral reef habitats in the Pacific compared to the Caribbean. The characteristics of the hardbottom/reef habitats and grounding incidents varied. In Apra Harbor, Guam, reef habitats consisted of shallow la- 28 Marine Technology Society Journal goons with low relief and low coral cover in the sheltered, shallow channels, while in the more open, deeper areas the substrate was composed of larger rubble and higher relief hardbottom with more live coral cover and attached organisms. The vessels in coral habitats in Guam were WWII and post-WWII era government/military types, often deeply mired in the sediments with live coral and invertebrates growing on the vessels themselves. Therefore, impacts to the habitats from these vessels in their current state are low; however, the vessels cannot be considered stable substrate for the long term, especially in a region prone to high-energy storms. The majority of vessels surveyed in coral reef/hardbottom habitats were located in the CNMI (11 vessels). The characteristics of the reef habitats varied and were similar to those described for the Caribbean and Guam in several cases, although percent coral cover in the vicinity of the vessels was often higher (10-30% cover) than on the other islands surveyed (1-10%). In addition, there were two large commercial vessels and a recreational vessel with extensive debris fields spreading tens of meters throughout surrounding habitats. The #62 Nam Sung in Sasanlago, Rota (Figure 1) is an example of a vessel that has developed into a large debris field that impacted the reef and will likely continue to do so because it is located in a high-energy zone, particularly as storms move the mobile pieces and break the vessel up further. In 2003 the vessel was aground on a shallow exposed reef flat with no live coral, yet seaward of the reef flat within 20 meters of the main vessel was an extensive spur-and-groove reef with 50-70% live coral cover and high species diversity. Debris lies within the spur-and-groove reef and throughout the shallow reef flat. Spur-andgroove habitats damaged by vessel groundings in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary have not recovered to their former states, even after decades, without substantial restoration efforts (Aronson and Swanson, 1997; Smith et al., 1998). In summary, most vessels surveyed in coral reef/hardbottom habitats were in areas of low live coral cover, and some vessels that had been present for a long period of time in low energy environments served as substrate for live coral growth. Yet, for those vessels located in higher energy environments aground or near healthier reefs, continuing damage to the habitat from moving debris was often apparent. Removal of intact vessels that are aground adjacent to coral reefs, such as the Serendipity in St. Thomas, USVI, prior to their potential shifting during a storm may be a cost-effective, preventive measure that can be taken to avoid future damage to coral reef habitats. FIGURE 1 Coral impacts - F/V #62 Nam Sung, Sasanlago-Tatqua Beach, Rota, CNMI, 10 June 2003, in coral reef/ hardbottom habitat. View from access point (A), propeller shaft and engine debris among coral rubble (B), and large coral head (C) less than 10 m seaward of hull shown in A. (A) (B) (C) Seagrass Habitats Of the vessels surveyed by the AVP, 23 (21% of vessels surveyed) and 3 (4% of vessels surveyed) were aground in seagrass habitats in the Caribbean and Pacific, respectively. Additional vessels in both regions were aground in mixed seagrass and macroalgae habitats, although impacts to these habitats were typically less severe than in seagrass beds alone. Potential physical threats to seagrass habitats and associated benthic organisms from vessel groundings are relatively well studied (Zieman, 1976; Durako et al., 1992; Sargent et al., 1995; Uhrin and Holmquist, 2003), but the AVP survey noted that continued presence of hulls and debris from abandoned vessels often resulted in additional impacts beyond those caused by the initial grounding. Such impacts observed in the Caribbean surveys included: physical damage to seagrass from initial vessel grounding; scour areas around vessels that ranged in width from a meter to over 30 meters, and in depth from 30-60 cm; actively eroding scarps; blowout areas; and lower shoot density and shorter blades in beds proximal to the vessel impact area. The majority of vessels causing impacts to seagrass habitats were located in the Caribbean. Eight of the vessels surveyed had small scour areas surrounding the vessels (3 m or less), and fifteen vessels had larger scour areas (up to 76 m long x 40 m wide surrounding the El Canuelo Barge, Isla de Cabras, PR). The scour areas are characterized by bare sand in otherwise dense seagrass habitats (typically over 70%, up to 90-100% cover in some areas) (Figure 2). Biologists swam 25 m transects off of the bow, stern, port, and starboard sides of each vessel, and in areas where scouring occurred, they often observed shoot density and blade height gradually increasing as distance from the vessel increased. Many of the vessels surveyed have been aground for decades, and recolonization of plants in bare, sandy scour areas was not apparent. Scarps were less common, but were evident around several vessels (Figure 2). The observed scarps were actively eroding and steep (30-60 cm high), exposing seagrass rhizomes and undercutting the root mats. Several vessels also had blowout areas, characterized by bare sandy areas adjacent to erosional scarps that are being recolonized by seagrass along the edge (EPA SA, 1998). In general, scours, scarps, and blowouts tended to be associated with larger vessels with metal hulls grounded in relatively deep locations with higher energy wave action. It is likely that these vessels possessed cross sectional hull area large enough to reflect wave energy sufficient to cause such impacts. The FIGURE 2 Seagrass impacts - scour devoid of seagrass under and around Unk2443 in Elephant Bay, St. Thomas, USVI (A), unvegetated scour area that extends 2.5-6 m off of port side and bow of Nago No. 15, Saipan Lagoon, Saipan, CNMI (B), and 30 cm high eroding scarp at edge of seagrass bed around the Pawnee, Bahia de Tallaboa, PR (C). (A) (B) (C) Nago No. 15 in Saipan Lagoon was the only vessel surveyed in the Pacific that had a significant scour area (ranging from 2.5-6 m wide) off of the port side and bow of the vessel. The other two vessels aground in seagrass habitats in the Pacific were WWII or post-WWII era barges that were deeply mired in sediments and did not appear to be impacting the vegetation. In summary, vessels, particularly large vessels with metal hulls, aground in seagrass habitats can cause erosional scouring, scarps, and blowouts that may continue to impact seagrass beds for decades. Additional movement of vessels during storms can widen the impacts to a much larger area than that caused by the initial grounding (Whitfield et al., 2002). Mangrove Habitats The AVP surveyed 29 (27% of vessels surveyed) and 7 (10% of vessels surveyed) aground in mangrove habitats in the Caribbean and Pacific, respectively. Potential physical threats to mangrove habitats from abandoned and derelict vessels include damage to prop roots and trees from the initial vessel grounding and damage from vessel or debris remobilization, particularly during storms. In the Caribbean, damage including dead or damaged trees, open canopy, and damaged prop roots, was observed in at least half of the grounding sites. Substantial impacts were observed around several vessels, extending landward up to 5-10 m at some sites, such as around the Tortuga, a converted fishing vessel aground in Boqueron Bay, PR, and adjacent to the Mi Sueno, a sailboat in Salt River Bay, St. Croix (Figure 3). Because some of the vessels surveyed in mangrove habitats were grounded by hurricanes or other large storms, it is difficult to conclude that the observed mangrove damage was caused by the vessels themselves. The majority of grounding sites with no appreciable mangrove damage still suffered minimal impacts where the vessels pressed against or rested on trees and prop roots and had lines tied from the vessels to the trunks. Remobilization of vessels or debris, particularly during storms, could result in further impact to such sites and affect their recovery. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 29 No substantial damage to mangrove stands was observed in the Pacific. Most of the vessels surveyed in mangrove habitats were WW II or post-WW II barges that were deeply mired in sediments and had mangrove trees and other shrubs growing in them. One vessel surveyed in Guam, the Seagull, a 70foot ketch grounded on a carbonate platform and a tidal flat directly seaward of a stand of mangroves, was removed in 2004, no longer posing a threat to the habitat. Almost 75 percent of the vessels surveyed (132 total) posed some threat to public safety. Slip/fall and entrapment hazards were the most common threats observed. In some cases vessels were abandoned in remote areas, with little threat of public exposure. In high-use areas, many vessels showed signs of being boarded. In addition, the majority of vessels observed were causing negative aesthetic impacts, therefore potentially interfering with the public’s use of the resource, possibly resulting in economic impacts by reducing the number of visitors to an area. In many cases the navigation, pollution, public safety, and resource use impacts are minimal compared to the potential physical, habitat damages. They can easily become overwhelming and costly, however. In June 2004, the Mwaalil Saat (identified as a priority for removal by AVP in 2003) broke its moorings during Typhoon Tingting (M. Cabrera, pers. comm.). The vessel grounded nearby and blocked the fuel dock for the island of Saipan. While natural resources were at risk, it was the impediment to navigation (the fuel is needed to operate the island’s generators) that motivated the response. Approximately 2500 gallons of fuel and 5000 gallons of oily water were removed in addition to the vessel itself, and the full response is expected to exceed $3 million. Figure 4 documents examples of vessels presenting navigational, pollution, aesthetic, or public safety impacts. In summary, the majority of vessels surveyed aground in mangrove habitats had impacted trees and prop roots in the vicinity of the grounding to some extent, ranging from minimal damage of roots and trees where the vessel was resting to an area the approximate dimensions of the vessel or larger. Removal of these vessels would prevent further impacts caused by remobilization during major storms. Other Impacts FIGURE 3 Mangrove impacts - Tortuga, Boqueron Bay, PR, 3 June 2002, in mangrove habitat with damaged trees and open canopy (A), Unk2401, Boqueron Bay, PR, 3 June 2002, in mangrove habitat with damaged trees (B), and Unk2463, Benner Bay, St. Thomas, USVI, 28 June 2002, in mangrove habitat with damaged trees (C). (A) (B) (C) While the physical damage that grounded and abandoned vessels inflict on coral, seagrass and mangroves is significant, there are a number of other impacts that should be considered. These include impeding navigation, releasing pollutants, threatening public safety and general impacts to coastal resource use and enjoyment. While, for a majority of the vessels surveyed, these threats were not the primary impact, in individual cases they could be a dominant management issue. Of the vessels surveyed, 65 (36%) were actual or potential navigation threats (Table 2). These mostly fell into three categories: vessels that were grounded near a channel and could be moved into the channel during a storm event, vessels grounded or sunk in or near mooring areas, and vessels in navigable waters that were either difficult to see or submerged just below the surface. There were also a few vessels grounded very close to port operations and could be problematic if they moved in a storm. Eighteen (18) vessels (10% of vessels surveyed) were potential or actual pollution threats. The threats mostly consisted of batteries and small amounts of hazardous materials left onboard. There were only a few instances where there were or could be significant fuel remaining aboard the vessel. Discussion and Implications for Mitigation and Removal The results of the AVP Caribbean and Pacific surveys confirm that vessel groundings are common, widespread, and cause injury to coral reef/hardbottom, seagrass, and mangrove habitats, as has been reported TABLE 2 Information on additional impacts by vessels surveyed by the AVP in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Location 30 Marine Technology Society Journal Navigation Potential Actual Pollution Potential Actual Public Safety Slip/Fall Entrapment Caribbean 11 13 7 3 63 14 Pacific 20 21 7 1 63 21 Total 31 34 14 4 126 35 FIGURE 4 Other impacts - Hosll II, Vieques Is., PR: a slip/fall hazard (A), Serendipity, Current Hole, St. Thomas grounded next to channel (B), TT Boat #1, Rota: vessel and debris on scenic beach (C), asbestos insulation in TT Boat #2 (D), Mwaalil Saat, Saipan : vessel aground next to island fuel dock with 2500 gallons of fuel on board (E). (A) (B) (C) (D) The Mwaalil Saat and the Lian Gi, were two vessels in the CNMI that AVP surveys identified as floating but in need of removal. Since June 2003, the Lian Gi was successfully scuttled offshore but the Mwaalil Saat broke its mooring in a typhoon, grounded, released diesel fuel and seriously impacted port operations (M. Cabrera, pers. comm). In addition, on a trip to Guam in February of 2002, the AVP documented the three vessels pictured in Figure 5 as floating derelicts and identified them as vessels at high risk of grounding or sinking. During the June 2003 survey, the AVP discovered that two of the vessels sunk at their moorings, and one had broken free of its mooring and grounded on shore during the 2002 typhoon season. Although removal of floating derelict vessels is constrained by limited funds and legal issues regarding ownership, impacts to sensitive habitats can be avoided if the vessels are removed in a timely manner. Grounded Vessels that are High Removal Priorities for Local Management Agencies (E) ■ ■ ■ ■ grounded vessels that are high removal priority for local management agencies; logistically complex removals because of large debris fields; clusters of derelict and grounded vessels; and vessels with historical significance. Derelict Vessels Still Afloat previously in many locations throughout the U.S. and worldwide (U.S. CRTF, 2000, Precht et al., 2001). A practical application of these findings includes the AVP’s ability to work with local and federal agencies to make recommendations regarding prioritization of vessels for removal and prevention of future environmental and other impacts. The AVP has found that while each grounding incident is unique, it is possible to categorize the incidents into the following removal scenarios: ■ derelict vessels still afloat; Derelict and abandoned vessels that remain afloat present a critical management challenge. In most cases, these vessels have not yet impacted natural, recreational, or commercial resources. However, as they deteriorate, the likelihood increases that they may sink or break free from their moorings. If this happens, impacts can be significant to benthic habitats, fuel and other hazardous materials may leak, or private property and public infrastructure may be damaged. Additionally, it is less expensive to remove a vessel that is still afloat. Local agencies responsible for managing coastal resources have often already identified vessels that they consider high priority candidates for removal. Prioritization of these vessels required the consideration of many complex factors including: current and potential habitat impacts, vessel condition and location, and public use of the area. The importance of these individual and cumulative factors is highly dependent on the specifics of the local physical, economic, and political landscapes. During the 2003 vessel surveys, 4 vessels of high priority to local management agencies were highlighted and surveyed in Guam and CNMI: Seagull, Charito, Nago No. 15 and Samala (Figure 6) (M. Cabrera, G. Davis, pers. comm). In all cases, they posed a threat to sensitive habitats (coral reef, seagrass, or mangroves) and/or public health and were potential sources of pollution. The Seagull was a 70 ft ketch grounded in excellent condition. Salvaging this vessel while its value was greater than the salvage costs was critical, and the government of Guam was able to successfully coordinate with the U.S. Navy to remove the vessel in the spring of 2004 (G. Davis pers. comm.). Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 31 FIGURE 5 FIGURE 6 Vessels still afloat - Agana Boat Basin, Guam. Lions Den in 2002 (A) and 2003 (B), Unk1900 in 2002 (C) and 2003 (D), and Ciao in 2002 (E) and 2003 (F). High priority vessels - vessels identified as high priority removal candidates by local agencies prior to AVP vessel surveys. Karma, Louis Pena Key, PR (A), YFU-83, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, PR (B), Samala, Outer Cove Marina, Saipan (C), view of debris on Porites coral head immediately adjacent to Samala (D), and Nago 15, Saipan Lagoon, Saipan (E). (B) (A) (A) (C) (D) (B) (E) (F) (C) (D) The Samala is a wooden cabin cruiser that has been grounded for many years on coral reef/hardbottom habitat and is rapidly deteriorating into a large debris field. The Charito is very close to shore in an area heavily used by the public on coral reef/ hardbottom habitat. It is an eyesore and poses a significant public health risk, and its proximity to vessel traffic and the shoreline puts it at risk of becoming an illegal hazardous waste dumpsite. The Nago No. 15 grounded in the middle of a large, shallow, seagrass bed in 1997 and is still in adequate condition to be refloated and then moved out of the area. It was identified by the AVP 32 Marine Technology Society Journal in 2003 as a vessel likely to move in a future storm event and is considered a priority for removal by the local government. While funding for its removal has not been identified the vessel has been pushed approximately 60 meters further inshore by a typhoon early in 2004, creating a long scar and increasing damage to seagrass habitats dramatically (M. Cabrera, pers. comm.). If the vessel had blown offshore, it would have grounded on high quality coral reef habitat. In 2002, the AVP surveyed the Karma off Louis Pena Key and a cluster of three landing craft (YFU83, Unk2415 and Unk2414) at the Roosevelt Roads Naval (E) Base in Puerto Rico. All of these vessels are grounded in seagrass habitats, and damage including scours and scarps were observed. The local managing agency, the Puerto Rico Department of Natural and Environmental Resources, and the U.S. Navy felt that expedited removal was warranted. Removal of any of the high priority vessels discussed above would prevent further habitat impacts. Logistically Complex Removals because of Large Debris Fields As was discussed in the coral reef/ hardbottom section, vessels exposed to highenergy environments for long periods of time frequently break up into many pieces, creating large and potentially mobile debris fields that threaten sensitive habitats. Scattered wreckage also presents unique removal challenges since locating and removing all of the pieces requires increased effort and additional salvage equipment. In addition to the #62 Nam Sung discussed in the coral reef/hardbottom section, the Sun Long No. 8, a steel freighter that was forced aground in 1987 by Supertyphoon Kim in Tinian Harbor, has a large, potentially mobile debris field. Since the grounding event, the vessel has broken into hundreds of pieces that now rest on hardbottom and coral reef habitat. Figure 7 includes a map depicting the debris field in addition to photos of the vessel debris and surrounding habitat. While this vessel is a large-scale example, the cost and complexity of any removal increases as the vessel breaks up into many pieces, and habitat impacts become more widespread. Smaller vessels can present similar problems. The debris field surrounding the Samala stretches for many meters with some of the more mobile fragments located nearly a kilometer from the vessel in mangrove and seagrass habitats. The sloop Karma, which sunk off Luis Pena Key, PR within 25 meters of a healthy coral reef, is another smaller scale example. When managing agencies first attempted to gain authority to remove the vessel, it was intact and the operation would have been brief and inexpensive. Due to legal issues involving the establishment of a clear removal authority, action was delayed and the vessel broke into many pieces that are more mobile, harder to locate, and more costly to remove. Vessels with large debris fields, particularly those in coral reefs, resulted in the most substantial environmental impacts observed during the Pacific surveys. Clusters of Derelict and Grounded Vessels During the 2002 and 2003 surveys, it was noted that wrecked and derelict vessels are not evenly distributed but often are concentrated by physical processes into collection areas that may form during major storm events. Examples include mooring areas, harbors, marinas, channels, and small bays. Figure 8 depicts a cluster of thirteen vessels in close proximity in Piti Channel, Guam. Vessel clusters were also observed in Puerto Rico and the USVI. There were 8 vessels in Boqueron Bay, PR and approximately 20 vessels in Benner Bay, St. Thomas and another 20 in the Salt River Estuary, St. Croix. The majority of vessels surveyed in these Caribbean clusters were recreational vessels that were damaged during hurricanes. Vessels in the surveyed clusters also pose navigation hazards and/or potential pollution threats. Additionally, such sites may attract boat owners to continue to abandon vessels at the site due to perceived acceptance by authorities to allow vessel disposal there. Impacts to mangrove habitats were common in sheltered bays in the Caribbean where vessels were clustered. Therefore, while the majority of habitat impacts to mangroves by individual vessels were considered minor, the cumulative impacts of 20 or more vessels aground in mangroves in a limited geographic area are of greater concern. FIGURE 7 Complex removal - Sun Long No. 8, Tinian Harbor, 9 June, 2003, grounded during a typhoon in 1987 and has since broken into a large debris field. Kingpost and large piece of debris on shore (A), large piece of debris on riprap shoreline (B), dense debris (C), small portion of debris field and sand and gravel substrate with coral rubble (D), and map showing the locations of large fragments of debris field (E). (A) (D) (B) (E) (C) Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 33 FIGURE 8 Vessels with Historical Significance Vessel clusters - a collection of 14 vessels known as the Apra Harbor vessel cluster in Piti Channel, Guam on 2 June, 2003. View to the SE towards Unk1906 (forefront) and Gauhan-2 (back) (A), Chamorro-1 (right) and Gauhan-2 (left) (B), Unk2527 (forefront) lying against the starboard side of Gauhan-2 (C), Merlin aground just southwest of Chammoro-1 (D), aerial photo showing vessel locations (E). While many abandoned and derelict vessels present environmental, humanhealth, or economic problems, there is a subset that may be protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and removal or mitigation of these potentially historic shipwrecks would be subject to a higher level of review. Examples include merchant and military ships sunk during World War I or World War II. The AVP surveyed twenty WW II era barges that may have historical significance in Saipan. To a large degree, these vessels are immobile and were grounded in mixed macroalgae/seagrass or lower value seagrass habitat, and therefore were not identified as causing significant habitat impacts. They are in an advanced state of deterioration, however, and may pose a risk to public safety. On Rota, three U.S. Military “M-boats” used during WWII and in inter-island service after the war were grounded in the 1960s in marginal hardbottom habitat of a shallow lagoon. In addition, four WW II era landing craft were abandoned in Apra Harbor, Guam after service in the private sector. As discussed earlier, these vessels provided substrate for coral growth and were not considered to be adversely impacting coral reef/hardbottom habitats. Although the Caribbean is a region well known to hold historical shipwrecks, the AVP surveyed none. Therefore, while WW II era vessels composed a large percentage of the vessels surveyed in the Pacific Region (52%), appreciable impacts to sensitive habitats were not observed, their removal priority was relatively low, and additional effort to determine their historical significance is not currently necessary. (A) (B) (C) (D) on or near higher quality habitat and/or had extensive debris fields (e.g., Charito, Samala, Sun Long No. 8, #52 Nam Sung, and Serendipity) were of very high concern, however, to the AVP and local managing agencies. If removal of these vessels is not addressed, further injury to surrounding habitats is likely. Damages to seagrass habitats also varied widely, but those vessels causing active erosion to seagrass beds, particularly when moved by storm events, should also be a priority for removal (e.g., Nago No. 15, Karma, YFU83). Damages to mangroves were typically less substantial than to coral reefs and seagrass, but the cumulative impacts of clustered vessels that have grounded during storms in sheltered, mangrove lined habitats (e.g., Benner Bay, Salt River Estuary) must be considered. Ackowledgements We thank D. Helton and J. Jeansonne from NOAA and J. Michael, S. Zengel, and C. Plank for field assistance and for manuscript comments. We thank J. Whitlock and J. Holmes at RPI for assistance with graphics. We thank the following agencies for their field assistance and hospitality: PR DNER, USFWS, U.S. Navy, USVI DPNR, U.S. Coast Guard, Gov. of Guam, CNMI CRM, and CNMI Port Authority. References Aronson, R.B. and Swanson. D.W. 1997. Video surveys of coral reefs: uni- and multivariate applications. In: Proc. 8th Int’l. Coral Reef Symp. 2:1441-1446. Cabrera, M. 2003-2004. CNMI Coast. Res. Manage., Saipan, CNMI. (E) Conclusions The range of potential environmental implications from abandoned/derelict vessels in Caribbean and Pacific U.S. territories varied. The majority of vessels surveyed in reef habitats were aground on hardbottom habitats with low relief and low percent coral cover, and therefore were not considered to be producing substantial environmental impacts. The few vessels that were aground 34 Marine Technology Society Journal Davis, G. 2003. Guam Dept. of Agric., Agana, Guam. Durako, M.J., Hall. M.O., Sargent. F., and Peck. S. 1992. Propeller scars in seagrass beds: an assessment and experimental study of recolonization in Weedon Island State Preserve, Florida. In: Proc.19th Ann. Conf. Wetl. Rest. Creat., ed. F. Webb. pp. 42-53. Tampa: Hillsborough Community College. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Government of South Australia (SA). 1998. Changes in seagrass coverage and links to water quality off the Adelaide Metropolitan Coastline. EPA, Dept. for Environment, Heritage, and Aboriginal Affairs, Adelaide, 33 pp. Green, A., Burgett. J., Molina. M., Palawski. D., Gabrielson. P. 1997. The impact of a ship grounding and associated fuel spill at Rose Atoll National Wildlife Refuge, American Samoa. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Pacific Islands Ecoregion, Honolulu, 60 pp. Hudson, J.H. and Goodwin. W.B. 2001. Assessment of vessel grounding injury to coral reef and seagrass habitats in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, Florida: Protocols and methods. Bull Mar Sci. 69(2):509-516. Lord, C.G., Plank. C., Zelo. I., and Helton. D. 2003. Surveys of abandoned vessels: Guam and CNMI. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service. Office of Response and Restoration, Seattle, 57 pp. + appendices. Precht, W.F., Aronson. R.B., and Swanson. D.W. 2001. Improving scientific decision-making in the restoration of ship-grounding sites on coral reefs. Mar Sci Bull. 69(2):1001-1012. Sargent, F.J., Leary. T.J., Crewz. D.W. and Kruer. C.R. 1995. Scarring of Florida’s seagrasses: assessment and management options. FMRI Tech. Rep. TR-1. Florida Marine Research Institute, St. Petersburg. 37 pp. + appendices Smith, L.D., Negri. A.P., and Philipp. E. 2003. The effects of antifoulant-paintcontaminated sediments on coral recruits and branchlets. Mar Biol. 143(4):651-657. Smith, S.R., Hellin. D.C., and McKenna. S.A. 1998. Patterns of juvenile coral abundance, mortality, and recruitment at the M/V Wellwood an M/V Elpis grounding sites and their comparison to undisturbed reefs in the Florida Keys. Final Report to NOAA Sanctuary and Reserves Division and the National Undersea Research Program/Univ. of North Carolina at Wilmington. 42 pp. Maragos, J.E. 1994. Reef and coral observations on the impact of grounding of the longliner Jin Shiang Fa at Rose Atoll, American Samoa. Report prepared for U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Pacific Island Office, Honolulu, Hawaii. 27 pp. Sunda, W.G. 1994. Trace metal/phytoplankton interactions in the sea. In: Chemistry of Aquatic Systems: Local and Global Perspectives, eds. G. Bidoglio and W. Stumm. pp. 213-247. Brussels and Luxembourg. Martin, J.H. and Fitzwater. S.E. 1988. Iron deficiency limits phytoplankton growth in the northeast Pacific subarctic. Nature 331: 341-343. Uhrin, A.V. and J.G. Holmquist. 2003. Effects of propeller scarring on macrofaunal use of the seagrass Thalassia testudinum. Mar Ecol Prog. Ser. 250:61-70. Michel, J., Zengel. S.A., Lord. C.G., and Nixon. Z. 2002. Surveys of abandoned vessels: U.S. Caribbean Region. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service. Office of Response and Restoration, Seattle, 58 pp.+ appendices. Molina, M. 1994. Trip report: Rose Atoll National Wildlife Refuge, American Samoa: October 31 to November 8, 1993. Administrative Report, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Honolulu, 13 pp. + appendices. Negri, A.P., Smith. L.D., and Webster. N.S. 2002. Understanding ship-grounding impacts on a coral reef: potential effects of anti-foulant paint contamination on coral recruitment. Mar Pollut Bull. 44(2):111-117. United States Coral Reef Task Force. 2000. The National Action Plan to Conserve Coral Reefs. 41 pp. Whitfield, P. E., Kenworthy. W. J., Hammerstrom. K. K., and Fonseca. M. S. 2002. The role of a hurricane in the expansion of disturbances initiated by motor vessels on seagrass beds. J Coast Res. 37: 86-99. Zieman, J.C.1976. The ecological effects of physical damage from motor boats on turtle grass beds in southern Florida. Aquat Bot. 2:127-139. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 35 PAPER Global Offshore Hazardous Materials Sites GIS AUTHORS John A. Lindsay Robert Aguirre National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Response and Restoration INTRODUCTION W e are deeply concerned about the potential health risks and environmental hazards posed by tons of chemical weapons that have been disposed of at sea by the U.S. Government previous to 1970. Of particular concern is the apparent lack of monitoring of these sites and the … unwillingness to monitor those sites that are known to exist (U.S. Congress, 1996). Underwater dumpsites or hazardous materials sites occur in every ocean. Do they pose a threat to human health, welfare or the environment? Currently no evidence exists to suggest that the majority of underwater dumpsites pose more than a localized risk to the environment. Nonetheless, underwater dumpsites represent a testimony of how marine disposal either benefited society as intended, or as more commonly perceived, created problems for later generations and the marine environment. A half-century ago, the environmental impacts of dumping hazardous materials at sea were largely unknown, and even today the longterm effects of that historical dumping at sea on fisheries and human health is uncertain given the paucity of adequate investigations. Regardless, given the lack of precise geographic information, any future interests in long-term monitoring or attempts at contaminant removal will be costly. Dumpsites are created by the intentional disposal of materials in the sea (London Convention, 1972), but the project discussed herein considers only those disposal activities involving hazardous materials. Hazardous materials sites result from un- 36 Marine Technology Society Journal ABSTRACT Underwater dumpsites or hazardous material sites lie in every ocean on the earth. A geographic information system (GIS) project documents the locations and associated data of Global Offshore Hazardous Materials Sites (GOHMS) potentially posing threats to human health, safety, navigation, commercial fishing, and the environment. Nearly 350 sites are currently in the project. This paper discusses some of the history of hazardous materials disposal and loss at sea, primarily off the United States coast between 1945 and 1970 when few guidelines existed to geographically document an underwater site. Although not publicly distributed at present, the GOHMS GIS project is intended to add value to existing historical information by providing site investigators and responders easy access to waste stream locations and other spatial data through NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration and the National Marine Sanctuaries Program. intentional dumping or loss in the sea. For purposes of this project, both site types are generically considered hazardous materials sites and the terms may be used interchangeably. These sites include those with unexploded ordnance (UXO), chemical industrial waste, radioactive wastes (RW), chemical weapons (CW), mine tailings, and sunken vessels releasing chemicals, or chemical cargo lost overboard. What is perhaps just as important as the number and proximity of underwater hazardous material sites is the depth at which they lie. Although commercial fishing gear can reach to depths of 2,000 meters (m), most commercial fishing occurs at depths of less than 1,000 m. As a consequence, sites relatively close to the U.S. coast in waters deeper than 1,000 m, such as off the Aleutian chain, may be less problematic than shallower sites, from a human health and safety perspective. Similarly, negative ecological effects emanating from an underwater dumpsite should be more limited in deeper water for several reasons, such as a relatively weak bentho-pelagic coupling and relatively small areal seabed coverage (MEDEA, 1997). Nonetheless, in the absence of actual monitoring, it is unknown whether these assumptions about underwater dumpsites and depth actually hold in all cases. The majority of underwater hazardous material sites in U.S. waters have never been investigated following disposal and they often lack detailed documentation regarding their exact locations (Figure 1). Part of the reason for this lack of detailed documentation is the fact the dumping took place between 1945 and 1970, a time when few regulations or guidelines strictly affected at-sea disposal. In some cases, dumpsite files have been destroyed. In those original reports and files that do exist with latitude or longitude locations, coordinates often offer marginal utility. The precision of a coordinate fix depends upon the accuracy of the latitude and longitude coordinates in degrees, minutes, and seconds corrected for the appropriate datum. In one report that stands as a summary of most U.S. site locations, many industrial chemical (many of these were liquid wastes) and UXO disposal site locations are only precise enough to pinpoint within 65 square kilometers (km2), (Smith and Brown, 1971). FIGURE 1 A sample of the kind of information compiled in GOHMS, including some analysis based on buffer zones around selected radioactive and chemical weapons underwater dumpsites. Population data from the U.S. Census. Realized Threats So just what is the potential threat today from underwater dumpsites? The United States alone dumped more than 90,000 metric tonnes (mt) of toxic chemicals associated with chemical weapons (U.S. Congress, 1996), most in depths greater than 1,800 m. Barges dumped an estimated 12,600 mt of pesticide wastes from the Mississippi Valley monthly (over an unspecified period) at a 350 m site in the Gulf of Mexico (Smith and Brown, 1971). Do such dumpsites pose chronic long-term threats, or should they be regarded as maritime archaeological relics of our industrial and war machine past? These questions have particular relevance today when considering examples of continuing occurrences of further dumping at sea, whether by releases from sunken vessels or cargo containers falling overboard (estimated at 10,000 per year), by permitted disposal, or potentially by some intentional release of dangerous materials designed to affect human health and disrupt the economy. For instance, in January 1992, heavy weather swept 21 containers overboard the M/V Santa Clara. Four containers, each with 108 drums, held about 170 kilograms (kg) each of arsenic trioxide, a poison and suspected carcinogen (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1992). The marine pollutant posed a serious threat to groundfishers, ocean quahog beds, and potentially to beach goers. Aided by side scan sonar and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), divers recovered the toxic materials. In another example, the M/V Empire Knight foundered during a storm in 1944 after hitting a shoal near Boon Island, Maine. The vessel contained cargo consisting of various war materiel. In 1991, a salvor sought to recover the 225 mt of onboard copper coils. A review of the cargo manifest identified 221 steel flasks, each containing approximately 34 kg of elemental mercury. State officials raised their concern that the salvage operation could inadvertently release the mercury and either contaminate local lobster and ground fisheries, or at least lead to the per- ception of a contaminated fishery. Such perceptions could negatively impact the State’s economy, as feared during the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. A removal operation that involved side scan and ROV surveys, testing of sediments and biological tissues, and hardhat divers operating out of a diving bell succeeded in recovering more then 800 kg of the potential ca. 7,500 kg. mercury cargo. The surrounding sediments revealed low levels of total mercury (maximum value 1.6 parts per million (ppm) dry weight), but more importantly, dangerous levels of the toxic methyl mercury never materialized in edible fisheries. Regardless, concern over a public perception of a lingering threat to edible fishery products forced continued monitoring of the situation for total mercury (NOAA, 1994), and at present a navigational exclusion area of one nautical mile extends around the wreck. The wreck area is also offlimits to recreational divers. Between 1946 and 1970, the Gulf of Farallones served as a permitted repository for RW and CW. RW estimates range from 23,247 to 47,000 containers with an activity ranging from 454 curies (Ci) to 14,515 Ci (Joseph, 1957; Tetra Tech, 1992). Public outcry over possible radioactive contamination of seafood, including the potential for upslope migration of radionuclides into active fishing areas, led to more than a dozen investigations in the region (e.g. Dyer, 1976; EPA, 1983; Karl et al.. 1994; Tetra Tech, 1993). While investigations to date failed to identify any serious threat to human health or the marine ecosystem, investigations documented radionuclide releases and uptake by some biota at the 110 km2 900 m RW site, one of three RW sites in the Gulf of Farallones (e.g. Schell and Sugai, 1980). Some public concern lingers. In another example of accidental dumping at sea, the Irving Whale barge sank in 1970 in the Gulf of St. Lawrence at 67 m depth, approximately 60 km northeast of Prince Edward Island, Canada. In addition to a fuel oil cargo of 4,270 mt, the closed loop cargo heating system contained 5,375 liters (L) of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs, Aroclor 1242) and 1,344 L of chlorobenzenes. Shellfish tissue monitoring disFall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 37 covered PCB-contaminated shellfish in the Gulf that was linked to the barge. Concern over possible consumption of contaminated seafood drove the government’s recovery of the barge; the Irving Whale was lifted from the seafloor in 1996. Forensic analysis indicated that 5,209 kg to 5,406 kg of PCBs released from the barge to the environment, with an additional 148 kg to 345 kg present in the surrounding sediments (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 1997). Seafood health monitoring continues. In 1987, the ore freighter, PacBaroness, sank with about 19,000 mt of powered copper ore and 379,000 gallons of fuel oil in 430 m of water off the California coast (Hyland et al., 1989). Contaminants in sediments threatened environmental quality. A re-survey of the wreck site in July 2002 suggested that oil is attenuating, but copper contaminants continue to spread outside the wreck (Lindsay et al., 2002). ROV surveys suggest that bottom megafuana abound in the area. Similar examples exist around the globe. The dumping of chemicals, munitions, and radioactive wastes received considerable attention during the past decade especially in the Arctic (MEDEA, 1997; Crane and Galasso, 1999). The former Soviet Union disposed of RW with an estimated activity of 2,300 kCi in the Kara and Barents Seas (IAEA, 1998). Tonnes more RW were deepsixed in the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and off the Kamchatka Peninsula (Champ et al., 1998). The Baltic Sea inherited different problems at the close of World War II when the allied nations disposed of more than 300,000 mt of Nazi chemical weapons in numerous locations. Other RW and CW sites are scattered about the globe, but predominantly in the northern hemisphere. All of these varied examples, as some members of Congress recognized in 1996, demonstrate value in the long-term monitoring of historic underwater dumpsites, as the global economy is so dependent upon chemicals. Monitoring would serve to provide a glimpse of the fate of hazardous materials in the marine environment over time, to inform contemporary ocean disposal policy analysts, to bring potential calm to a nervous public when an accident or irresponsible action in nearshore 38 Marine Technology Society Journal waters threatens their health or safety, or in some cases to plan for removal actions. At the very least, recognizing the existence of underwater dumpsites and plotting them on a map reminds us that the ocean once served as a giant blue rug under which to sweep our most problematic waste materials. In 1997, a major federal, state, and nongovernmental organization collaboration began with the intent to compile a Massachusetts Bay GIS project, specifically designed to map marine environmental features, including underwater dumpsites. The project was completed in 1999 (Butman and Lindsay, 1999). Following its completion, the senior author and his colleagues envisioned a greater need for access to information about the locations of underwater dumpsites and hazardous materials sites worldwide, and so began an initiative to build a Global Offshore Hazardous Materials Sites (GOHMS) GIS project. GOHMS The GOHMS GIS project is a product in development at NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R). The project is intended to serve at least two purposes for use by investigators of, hazmat contingency planners, and responders to undersea hazardous materials. One intention is to compile information, particularly information on the location, type, and quantity of disposed materials at underwater dumpsites worldwide. The GIS project includes all relevant citations and source notes for standard metadata development. The second intention focuses on compiling dumpsite coverages, such as boundaries (e.g. site boundaries, designated protected areas, shipping channels), bathymetry (soundings, side scan, multibeam), hazardous material inventory, habitats, biological assemblages, cultural heritage inventory (e.g. sunken vessels), sediment chemistry, and geology, along with hotlinks to underwater video clips and still images depicting significant features. Data acquisition of many of these seafloor attributes and features relies on a range of acoustic and optic marine observation technologies, in addition to conventional sampling techniques for marine biota, sediments and water. The GOHMS GIS project contains varying amounts of these forms of information to describe nearly 350 underwater dumpsites and hazardous material sites worldwide (Figure 2). FIGURE 2 Map from the GOHMS GIS project, showing the locations of nearly 350 sites harboring a variety of radiation wastes, industrial chemical wastes, chemical weapons, conventional munitions, and mine tailings. On this scale some locations include multiple sites. The overall objectives of GOHMS are similar to those of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Marine Environmental Laboratory and its work on global marine radioactivity (IAEA, 1998), which are discussed in another paper (Lindsay et al., 1999a). While the project, with the exception of Massachusetts Bay waste disposal sites (see below), is not publicly distributed, some of its content is included in the NOAA National Marine Sanctuary Program’s (NMSP) Resources and Under Sea Threats (RUST) database. RUST is an on-line collection of information about seafloor threats within the nation’s thirteen sanctuaries. Currently, the RUST database is an actively maintained comprehensive inventory of underwater threats and potential environmental hazards in U.S. waters. RUST with GOHMS data is interfaced with NMSP’s on-line Sanctuaries Hazardous Incident Emergency Logistics Database System (SHIELDS). All three databases are moving towards integration and they are intended to support investigators, incident responders, and marine resource managers. The Advantages of a GIS in Marine Site Investigation A GIS is an efficient means for compiling and displaying location data and imagery gathered at offshore hazardous materials sites (Lindsay et al., 1998a). A GIS can enhance compilation and graphic presentation of spatial data in coarse (>1-km2), fine (1m2 to 1-km2), and micro (10-cm2 to 1-m2) spatial scales, in formats that are relatively easily interpreted by scientists, risk assessors, risk managers, upper management, Congressional staffers, and the public. A suite of navigational aides, acoustic devises, and electro-optic imaging systems operating over a continuum of resolutions (Table 1) can be integrated in a GIS. The technical advantages of using a GISbased system for compiling information about underwater dumpsites are clear when it comes to marine site investigation. Examining terrestrial hazardous waste sites typi- cally requires information about themes varying from topography, soil chemistry, and biological tissue uptake to the location of debris, landfills, waste disposal pits, UXOs, and barrels (Lindsay et al., 1998b; 1999b). Hazardous materials site investigations in marine environments focus on similar features, but the technologies applied to acquire information below the sea surface are very different. Distinct as well are the information products derived from the variety of marine acoustic and optic sensing technologies used underwater, in terms of how well the technology is able to penetrate the water to see objects and features on or beneath the ocean floor (Table 1). A continuum of resolution approaches to offshore site investigations begins with low-resolution acoustic surveys followed by increasingly higher resolution acoustic surveys and medium to high-resolution optical surveys, often enhanced with very high-resolution optical surveys to interrogate specific targets and their surrounding environs. Similarly, in a terrestrial situation, aerial or satellite imagery and LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) provide a range of resolutions for defining environmental features. However, on land, collecting remote sensed information is usually followed by direct field reconnaissance or groundtruth on foot. By contrast, offshore site investigations usually deploy sophisticated remote sensing technologies, because of depth and safety considerations, thereby putting even more emphasis on indirect observation via technology rather than direct human observation to create the overall view of the site in relation to the wider marine and coastal environment. For utility in a marine site investigation, a tool is required that can mosaic information products of widely varying scales and resolution, derived from many different marine sensing and sampling technologies, in a seamless fashion in order to create the sense of having an overall picture of the site. A GIS works particularly well for this purpose. A GIS project was created to compile information for at least 39 historically designated waste disposal areas for bulk industrial chemicals, radioactive, munitions and dredged materials in Massachusetts Bay. In addition, a hypertext-based, comprehensive history of disposal and survey projects in Massachusetts Bay was developed in order to put the raw spatial data layers into a regulatory and environmental context (Butman and Lindsay, 1999). TABLE 1 Comparability among various acoustic and optic technologies providing for a continuum of resolution as applied in ca. 50-90 m Massachusetts Bay dumpsite investigations. System Scale of Survey Resolution Object recognition Multibeam Sonar (hull mounted; 95 kilohertz (kHz)) 1:12,500 5 to 9 m Low Side-Scan Sonar 100/500 kHz 100-200 meter (m) swath 46 centimeters (cm) Low Sector-Scan Sonar 325kHz 50-100 m radius 5-50 cm Medium Laser Line Scan (monochrome 488 nanometers) 2-10 m swath 5-10 mm High Sediment Profile Camera 15 cm vertical view 1 mm Very High Remotely operated vehicle (ROV) Hi 8 mm Video cm to m 1mm Very High Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 39 Case Study of an Offshore Dumpsite: Massachusetts Bay Scattered across an area six to twenty miles seaward of the City of Boston, MA are disposal grounds for industrial chemicals, radioactive wastes, conventional munitions, dredged materials, and derelict vessels. Licensed and permitted dumping of radioactive and industrial wastes occurred between 1945 and 1959. Stimulated primarily by incidents associated with commercial fisheries, public concern began to focus on whether underwater industrial chemical wastes and RW posed unacceptable risks to fishers’ safety, marine biological resources, and their human consumptive value. After nearly three-decades of concern and inquiry that included a partially successful effort in the early 1980’s (EPA, 1984), a full review began of the threat. Massachusetts Bay became one of the most investigated offshore hazardous materials dumpsites in the United States (Lindsay, 1996; Polaris Imaging, Inc., 1997; Lindsay et al.,1998b; Butman and Lindsay, 1999; Keith et al., 1999; Lindsay et al., 1999a). Nonetheless, answering the most basic questions, the exact locations of dumping grounds, and the quantity and type of dumped materials remains elusive. The lack of stringent permitting and monitoring requirements at the time along with poor record retention exacerbated investigation efforts, which failed to encounter more than a single speck of strontium 90 leaving the open question—where did the 4,008 containers (five gallon (gal) pails, thirty gal drums, fifty-five gal drums, and concrete coffins) of low level radioactive waste go [actual or approximate radioactive activity is unknown]? At the time of the dumping, regulators designated waste disposal areas in Massachusetts Bay using the technology of the day, which included referencing locations to buoys, lighthouses, or simple triangulation among land and sea based points in order to fix a position. Under current environmental and regulatory schemes such descriptions would be inadequate, especially given the frequent repositioning of buoys and lightships. 40 Marine Technology Society Journal Investigators verified some actual disposal locations within the limits described by original source documents, but a full accounting of all the materials, especially radioactive wastes, has eluded repeated surveys. The arsenal of investigative tools seemed exhaustive. Hardware included numerous side scan sonar systems, multibeam sonar, towed and fixed platform laser line scanners, several ROVs, two manned submersibles equipped with a gamma radiation (sodium iodide) spectrometer, and various camera systems. While the numerous side scan sonar investigations conducted over two decades failed to delineate exact site boundaries, side scan and multibeam sonar images assisted the targeting of follow-up observations using finer scale techniques, such as optical interrogation and sediment sampling (Lindsay, 1996; Lindsay et al., 1998a). In one interesting example, anomalous features detected by side scan sonar were later hypothesized as munitions blast craters in the fine sediment, approximately 50 m in diameter, formed during or after disposal at sea (Figure 3). The resolution provided by marine-sensing technologies generally ranges from approximately several meters (depending on the altitude above the seafloor) for multibeam sonar systems to less than a meter for some high resolution, side scan sonar. While a pixel resolution of 50 cm can in theory capture the form of a one-meter barrel lying on its side, one pixel is insufficient resolution to validate an object. Investigator resolve to identify small objects may have more to do with the general lie of the seafloor environment than the technology. Side scan sonar (30 kHz) demonstrated utility in locating containers the size of 55 gal barrels (Karl et al., 1994) in deeper waters (900 m) of the Gulf of Farallones, but only on flat and gently sloping bottoms uncluttered with objects, such as glacial till and fish traps. Side scan sonar has not yet proven practical for locating 55 gal barrels or smaller objects on the seafloor of Massachusetts Bay cluttered with lobster traps, glacial till and other debris. Acquiring accurate locations of relatively small and isolated underwater objects, such as reagent bottles and UXO, continues to test the limits of our latest technologies. Figure 4 illustrates an example of the error associated with taking latitude and longitude coordinate fixes of a 55-gal barrel on the seafloor of Massachusetts Bay. The barrel containing reagent bottles, potentially with laboratory grade radioactive wastes, was initially targeted by a ROV configured with forwardlooking sector scanning sonar. Subsequent deployments involved interrogations with a video camera, and a manned submersible equipped with a monochrome laser line scan system. A shipboard Trackpoint II ultra short FIGURE 3 Sun-illuminated bathymetry of the Massachusetts Bay Industrial Waste Site based on USGS survey (Valentine et al., 1996; adapted from Butman and Lindsay, 1999). The depressions approximately 50-60 meters in diameter are hypothesized as formed by munitions explosions during or following disposal. baseline acoustic positioning system navigated both the ROV and manned submersible. A DGPS (Differential Global Positioning System) on-board the surface support vessel was integrated with the positioning system on the submersibles through a PC, to provide real time subsurface geo-referencing with an accuracy of 10 m±. The optical (camera) interrogations were made on the same day. The target 55 gal barrel had some known structural features and unique marine growth that proved useful in identifying it among other similar barrels in the turbid waters (ca. 2 m horizontal and < 1 m vertical visibility) of Massachusetts Bay. The technicians took fixes on the barrel from different perspectives. Subsequent plotting of the fixes in a GIS suggested that three separate targets lay on the seafloor, as much as 12 m apart, which approximated the accuracy of the Trackpoint II’s ultra short baseline navigation system (Figure 4). Without knowing the target’s precise location, i.e. precise to one meter or better, investigator confidence to reoccupy seafloor targets is low in areas where similar targets might exist over a relatively large area, and especially where visibility is poor, or where the target lacks uniquely distinguishing features that will persist over time (e.g. seasons, years). The above example demonstrates what is obvious but not frequently recognized in marine seafloor investigations. Using surface DGPS to compute locations to accuracies better than 10-20 m on the seafloor is not easily done, as routinely required in terrestrial survey work (i.e. 1 cm to 1 m horizontal). Why is precision navigation to obtain meter or sub-meter accuracy important on the seafloor? Typically, large targets like sunken vessels, container vans, and downed aircraft can be found using technologies such as side scan sonar, and because of their size they can be relatively easily reoccupied with an ROV or manned submersible. But for underwater investigations at dumpsites, highly accurate location data can offer greater value. Sea time with advanced technology is expensive. Finding a small target (<1 m in dimension) in deep and/or turbid waters is currently more good fortune than robust technological capability and consequently expensive. Although the U.S. Navy demonstrated the potential for such a capability (Lathrop et al., 1997) in shallow waters (< 30 m), it was still costly. Generally, accurate hazardous target location becomes important when: targets are small; monitoring contaminant spread or attenuation with minimal sampling is necessary; the seafloor is littered with objects; sedimentation rates are high and subject the site to obscurity; the target is subject to dislocation or destruction by trawling gear or storm-induced alterations; or, the area is subject to sudden changes in sea state that can cause an aborted dive. Small objects harboring potential contaminants of ques- tionable hazard, or with radioactive or medical wastes may be more appropriately left in place in lieu of exposing equipment, vessels, and crew to contamination, or until the proper recovery precautions are put into effect. Most investigators might tend to elect monitoring the situation for contaminant release rather than attempt removal. Monitoring can require a large number of samples to achieve data confidence especially if samples are acquired from a surface platform. But fewer samples can be taken to reduce variability if highly accurate positioning allows the investigator to reoccupy a relatively small source area, especially when using an ROV, manned submersible, or potentially an autonomous underwater vehicle. FIGURE 4 Three positional fixes taken with an ultra short baseline Trackpoint II acoustic navigation system of the same “barrel” containing unknown reagent bottles at the Massachusetts Bay Industrial Waste Site, depth 87 m. Barrel identity verified during two ROV dives equipped with video feed to the surface and a third dive by a manned submersible equipped with a laser line scanner (figure adapted from Butman and Lindsay, 1999). Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 41 Conclusions The marine environment stands out as the most challenging environment to access and explore on the earth’s surface. Sequestered in that environment are several hundred hazardous materials sites dating predominantly from post-World War II to the 1970’s in the United States, and later in some other nations. Continued losses at sea by vessels sinking or losing cargo overboard contributes to a growing list of sites. Currently little evidence exists to suggest that these sites pose any significant risk to human health, welfare or the environment. Yet within the last fifteen years, several sites raised sufficient concern over their threat to human health and safety to initiate investigations and response actions. Some lawmakers recognized this need to understand and monitor hazardous materials sites off the United States coast by requesting President Clinton to take action. However, excepting an account of their approximate locations, and the chemical and radioactive inventories of some, the vast majority of these sites leave no legacy as to their eventual fate or impacts on the larger marine and coastal environments. Current technologies are significantly more adept at locating and monitoring underwater dumpsites than older technologies, but they are also more costly. An ability to gather accurate and reproducible sub-meter positions of individual objects on the seafloor for potential recovery or further evaluation could contribute to reductions in investigative and removal action costs. The current sophistication of GIS provides an adequate platform by which to guide contingency planners, investigators, and response teams through displays of data and images acquired by a variety of acoustic and optical sensing technologies. The Global Offshore Hazardous Materials Sites GIS project is being developed to display such information for those purposes. Data taken from the GOHMS GIS project is already included in a NOAA Webaccessible Resources and Under Sea Threats database. GOHMS also represents one approach to securing a legacy for one of humankind’s most infamous uses of the sea, and to promote the integration of informa- 42 Marine Technology Society Journal tion products derived from different marine technologies into a seamless picture of an underwater environment. The information in this paper reflects the views of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect the official positions or policies of NOAA or the Department of Commerce. References Butman, Bradford and J.A. Lindsay (editors). 1999. A Marine GIS Library for Massachusetts Bay: with a focus on disposal sites, contaminated sediments, and sea floor mapping. CD-ROM. USGS Open File Report 99-439. Champ, M.A., V. V. Makeyev, J.M. Brooks, T.E. Delaca, K. M. van der Horst and M. Vorela Engle. 1998. Assessment of the Impact of Nuclear Wastes in the Russian Arctic. Mar Pollut Bull. 35(7-12):203-221. Crane, K. and J.L. Galasso. 1999. Arctic Environmental Atlas. Office of Naval Research, Naval Research Laboratory, and Hunter College. 166 pp. Dyer, R. S. 1976. Environmental Surveys of Two Deep-Se Radioactive Waste Disposal Sites Using Submersibles. In: International Symposium on the Management of Radioactive Wastes from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. IAEASU-207/65 (IAEA-Vienna). EPA. 1983. Survey of the Marine Benthic Infauna Collected from the United States Radioactive Waste Disposal Sites off the Farallon Islands, California. Washington, D.C.: EPA 520/1-83-006. 54 pp. November 1983. EPA. 1984. Data from Studies of Previous Radioactive Waste Disposal in Massachusetts Bay. Office of Radiation Programs, Washington, D.C.: EPA 520/1-84-031. 110 pp., plus appendices. Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Environment Canada. 1997. Scientific Assessment of the PCB Contamination in Sediments and Biota Around the Site of the Sinking of the Barge Irving Whale. Status Report. 48 pp. Hyland, J., J. Kennedy, J. Campbell, S. Williams, P. Boehm, A. Uhler and W. Steinhauer. 1989. Environmental Effects of the Pac Baroness Oil and Copper Spill. Proceedings of the 1989 Oil Spill Conference. February 13-16, 1989, San Antonio, Texas. pp. 413-419. IAEA. 1998. Radiological conditions of the western Kara Sea. Assessment of the radiological impact of the dumping of radioactive waste in the Arctic Seas. Report on the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP). Radiological Assessment Reports Series. Vienna, Austria. International Atomic Energy Agency. 124 pp. Joseph, A. B. 1957. United States Sea Disposal Operations. A Summary to December 1956. WASH-734 United States Atomic Energy Commission. Technical Information Service, Oak Ridge, TN. Karl, H.A., W.C. Schwab, A.S.C. Wright, D.E. Drake, J.L. Chin, W.W. Danforth, and E. Ueber. 1994. Acoustic mapping as an environmental management tool; I. Detection of barrels of low-level radioactive waste, Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary, California. Ocean Coast Manage. 22:201-227. Keith, D., J. D. Colton, J. Lindsay, H. Louft and L. Stewart. 1999. New technology for conducting radiation hazard assessments: The Application of the Underwater Radiation Spectral Identification System (URSIS) at the Massachusetts Bay Industrial Waste Site (U.S.A.). Environmen Monit Assess. 54:259-282. Lathrop, J.D., J.F. McCormick, P.J. Bernstein, J.T. Bono, D.J. Overway, G.S. Sammelmann, T.-H. Chao and K.C. Scott. 1997. Mobile Underwater Debris Survey System (MUDSS) Feasibility Demonstration Report, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, FL. 10 pp. Lindsay, J. (editor). 1996. The Massachusetts Bay Industrial Waste Site: A Preliminary Survey of Hazardous Waste Containers and an Assessment of Seafood Safety (May and June 1992), NOAA Technical Memorandum. NOSORCA 99. 149 pp. plus appendices. Lindsay, J.A., B. Coles, I. Babb, D. Tomey, M. Liebman, A. Nevis, J.S. Taylor, T. Askew, Jr., W.J. Bell, K. Keay, H. “Chip” Louft, T. Fredette and R. Regan. 1998a. Acoustical/optical technology integration with a manned submersible and an ROV for the investigation of a radioactive materials disposal site and a sewage diffuser outfall. In: Proceedings of the 1998 International Symposium on Underwater Technology. April 15-17, 1998, Tokyo, Japan. Lindsay, J., H. Karl, P. McGillivary, P. Vogt, R. Hall, I. MacDonald and B. Coles. 1998b. Response Actions at Offshore Hazardous Waste Sites. In: Proceedings Oceans ’98. Nice, France September 28-October 1, 1998. 5 pp. Lindsay, J. A., G. Graettinger, T. Simon and G. Pope. 1999a. Mapping a Range Continuum of Resolution at Offshore Hazardous Waste Sites. Extended Abstract. In Proceedings of Coastal Zone ‘99 Conference, San Diego, CA. 27 July 1999. Lindsay, J. A., T. Simon, G. Graettinger and C. Bailey. 1999b. A Global Offshore Hazardous Materials Sites GIS (GOHMS-GIS). Extended Abstract. In Proceedings of Coastal Zone ‘99 Conference, San Diego, CA. 27 July 1999. Lindsay, J., S. Fangman and R. Schwemmer. 2002. Unpublished data obtained during the Cruise on the PacBaroness in July 2002. London Convention. 1972. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. International Maritime Organization. London. MEDEA. 1997. Ocean Dumping of Chemical Munitions; Environmental Effects in Arctic Seas. McLean, Virginia. Schell, W. R. and S. Sugai. 1980. Radionuclides at the U.S. Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Near the Farallon Islands. Health Phys. 39:475-496. Smith, D.D and R.P. Brown. 1971. Ocean disposal of barge-delivered liquid and solid wastes from U.S. coastal cities. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency PB-213-437. 119 pp. Tetra Tech. 1992. Baseline Ecological Assessment of Disposal Activities in the Gulf of the Farallones: Information Identification, Evaluation, and Analysis. Final Report. Prepared for: Hazardous Materials Response Branch, NOAA, Seattle, Washington. November 1992. 44 pp. plus appendicies. U.S. Congress. 1996. Letter: Frank Pallone, Jr., Lloyd Doggett, Edward J. Markey, Bob Franks, Charlie Rose, Ronald D. Coleman, Barney Frank, Robert A. Underwood, Nancy Pelosi, Walter B. Jones, Jr. Robert G. Torricelli, Nydia M. Velazquez, Anna G. Eshoo, Peter A. DeFazio, Curt Weldon, John J. LaFalce, Lane Evans and Maurice D. Hinchey to President Clinton. May 31 1996. 3 pp. U.S. Department of Transportation. 1992. Marine Board of Inquiry M/V Santa Clara I. Report No. USCG 16732/03 HQS 92. 35 pp. Valentine, P.C., W.W. Danforth, E.T. Roworth and S.T. Stillman. 1996. Maps showing topography, backscatter, and interpretation of seafloor features in the Massachusetts Bay Disposal Site region off Boston, Massachusetts: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 96273, scale 1:10,000 and 1:12,500, 2 sheets. NOAA. 1994. Empire Knight: Assessing Environmental Risk. NOAA Technical Memorandum NOS ORCA 81. December, 1994. Seattle, Washington. 31 pp. plus appendices. Polaris Imaging, Inc. for Louis Berger & Associates. 1997. Boston Lightship Dump Ground Area, Massachusetts Bay – Processing and Analysis of 1991 Sidescan Sonar Data, for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I. EPA Contract No. 68-D5-0171. 88 pp. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 43 PAPER Quantified Marine Oil Emissions with a Video-Monitored, Oil Seep-Tent AUTHORS ABSTRACT Ira Leifer University of California, Santa Barbara Engineering Research Center A video-monitored oil capture tent was developed and deployed during two field trips to quantify oil emissions from several sites in nearshore waters off Summerland Beach in Santa Barbara County, California, at a water depth of ~5 m. The tent was a tall, inverted polyvinyl chloride plastic cone, which funneled oil into a video-observed sample collection jar. Sample jars were periodically retrieved and analyzed to determine oil and gas emissions at two seeps not associated with physical structures, and a suspected abandoned oil well, designated S-3. Oil and gas emissions at the seeps were ~1 ml day-1 and ~90 L day-1, respectively. At the S-3 site, emissions were 51 ml oil day-1 and 0.35 L gas day-1. The size distribution of bubbles at S-3 was sharply peaked at 1500-µm radius, and bubbles rose significantly slower than equivalent size non-oily bubbles, demonstrating the effect of oil on buoyancy loss. A method was developed to estimate from the measured rise velocities the oil-to-gas ratio of each bubble, calibrated with the sample analysis oil and gas fluxes. Autocorrelation showed strong peaks at 64.3 s and 120.0 s period, which were likely related. Other autocorrelation peaks at multiples of 8.2 s corresponded to Fourier spectrum peaks at 8 s and 23.4 s, and were proposed to relate to wave swell-induced surge. Other spectral peaks were observed at 4.9 s, 13.0 s, and 45-50 s period. Ken Wilson California Department of Fish and Game, Oil Spill Prevention and Response INTRODUCTION 1.1. Motivation P etroleum in the ocean is of enormous concern, affecting the environment, economy, and quality of life for coastal inhabitants. Globally, 1,300,000 tons of oil entered the oceans annually in the 1990s, of which natural seeps emitted 600,000 tons. Tank vessel spills accounted for 100,000 tons, run-off 140,000 tons, while pipelines just 12,000 tons. A total of 160,000 tons of oil are emitted annually from seeps in North America. California seeps annually emit 20,000 tons of oil, ~12% of the North American total (NRC, 2003). Despite the significance of oil in the ocean, many aspects of its fate remain poorly understood. Natural seeps long have aided oil prospectors in determining where to conduct geotechnical surveys, build piers, drill wells, and place platforms. Much of the California coastline, from Pt. Conception to Santa Monica, was home to numerous oil piers, platforms, and wells in the nearshore and offshore waters, many of which are now abandoned. A number of 44 Marine Technology Society Journal these oil facilities were alleged to have been improperly abandoned, posing a threat of leakage (Grosbard, 2002). Facilities located in natural seepage areas, such as offshore Summerland Beach, California (USCG, 1995; PENCO, 1995), provide a particular challenge with respect to discriminating between natural and anthropogenic oil emissions. This is particularly relevant in cases where the responsible parties no longer exist and state and/or federal taxpayers are asked to pay for control, containment, and cleanup. Identifying and quantifying sources of oil and seabed emissions are the first steps in assessing the need for and desirability of various mitigation strategies. However, absent understanding the causes of variability in emissions from both anthropogenic and natural sources, accurate assessment can be elusive. Temporal and spatial variability in seabed oil emissions influence the location and appearance of surface slicks and the disposition of the newly surfaced oil. In this paper, we present a new technique for quantifying seabed emissions—a diver-deployed, video-monitored oil seeptent, that provided both real-time and high time-resolution monitoring of oil emissions, allowing assessment of variability. Absent long-term, in situ monitoring, which can be expensive, assessment of sources of variability is key to determining if flux measurements during any given interval represent upper limits. In an effort to identify and quantify the source(s) and intermittency of oil emissions in the Summerland Beach area, dive and beach studies were conducted to locate the Treadwell-10 Well (T-10) site and other emission sites. Studies included deployment of oil-capture seep-tents to quantify gas and oil emissions. These studies also sought to understand the magnitude of the effects on beaches and wildlife. While the field studies were directed primarily at abandoned oil wells in shallow (5.2 m) nearshore waters off Summerland, California, the methods and conclusions are also applicable to natural seepage and abandoned oil wells elsewhere in the marine environment. FIGURE 1 A) Map of area surrounding Summerland study area (from Topo! 1997 Wildflower Productions). GPS coordinates are NAD83. Inset: Map of S. California. B) Summerland study area map (Golder Associates, 1995) with seafloor bathymetry (contours in feet). S-1 to S-3 are tent deployment sites, and T-10 is the proposed location of the abandoned Treadwell-10 well. 1.2. Background Onshore, nearshore, and offshore oil seeps have attracted prospectors since the late 1800s (Grosbard, 2002). The world’s first offshore well was drilled in Summerland (Giallonardo and Koller, 1978). The field was depleted and production ceased circa 1906. Abandonment procedures for depleted oil wells left much to be desired. For example, depleted oil wells at Summerland were often stuffed with “… rags, rocks, earth and wooden poles …” (Fairweather Pacific, 2000). Despite multiple efforts to re-abandon the T-10 and other wells (Lammers, 1975; Curran, 1995), reports of leakage persist (Fairweather Pacific, 2000). Leakage occurs (1) through the process of natural seepage, in which oil and gas are driven through fractures primarily along faults from the reservoir source to the surface, and (2) along low resistance pathways associated with abandoned oil wells. One such area, located offshore Summerland Beach in 5.2-m water (see Fig. 1), is an example of where both may be occurring. Natural seepage (Freckman, 1981; Curran, 1995; USCG, 1995) and oil from some abandoned wells (PENCO, 1995) have been reported to contribute to oiled beaches and surface waters at Summerland. Over the years, reports of petroleum sheens (beach and sea surface) in the Summerland area have been attributed to leakage from the T-10 site; however, the reports have been inconsistent (Fairweather Pacific, 2000; Leifer et al., 2004). This may be due to intermittency and variability of the emissions from the T-10 site, other anthropogenic sources, and/or natural sources. There also have been reports of oil emissions from the intertidal zone. The first estimate, reported by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in 1994, was ~21 L day-1 (1/2 barrel day-1) from the vicinity of an abandoned oil facility, Becker Onshore (USCG, 1995). A more recent estimate at the same site was 12 L day-1 through a thick sand overburden (Leifer et al., 2004). 2.0. Seep Tents Seep tents of two different designs were deployed in nearshore waters off Summerland in two separate operations, the first in May 2003 and the second in October 2003. In May 2003 a modified, gas seep-tent was deployed to collect oil and gas. The tent was the base of a turbine seep-tent (Leifer and Boles, 2004b) absent the turbine (Fig. 2A). The tent was a 1 m tall cone with a 2 m base diameter constructed from 1/16 inch thick sheets of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plastic, pop riveted together. The cone was riveted to a support frame of 1/2-inch diameter PVC pipes. The bottom of the support frame was a PVC pipe ring that was attached to the tent plastic by a rope threaded through a series of holes at the tent’s bottom edge. A deployment bridle was attached to three eyebolts in the frame. This configuration evenly distributes stress during recovery, when the tent acts like a sea anchor. Five 2 kg diving weights were connected to the frame to keep the tent on the seabed despite the swell. An inverted glass jar held above a stainless steel funnel collected oil and gas. Periodically, a diver retrieved, capped, and replaced the jar with a new one. An improved second oil seep-tent was designed and constructed and is shown schematically in Fig. 2B. The new tent profile was significantly steeper to reduce the likelihood of oil attachment to the tent’s inner surface thereby preventing capture by the collection jars. The new tent was wider and thus taller (2.5 m diameter and 2 m tall) to increase the collection area. This tent was made of 1/16 inch PVC sheeting, pop riveted together, and its interior surface was lined with aluminum foil. The tent had a 1" Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 45 FIGURE 2 A) First oil seep tent. B) Second oil seep tent and C) Image of oily bubbles entering collection jar on second oil seep tent. diameter PVC-pipe framework, which provided support and attachments for stability weights, bridle hook-ups, and feet. Feet outfitted to the framework held the tent above the seabed, reducing the tendency of swell and tent movements to disturb and release oil from oilsaturated sediment below the tent’s edge. The PVC-pipe framework had holes drilled to allow water to enter during deployment, reducing the tent buoyancy. A clear, 200 ml, wide mouth glass collection jar mounted over the cone’s narrow end collected gas and oil (Fig. 2C). The jar sat on the rim of a cut stainless-steel funnel mounted in the top of the tent. The cutoff funnel opening was several millimeters narrower than the jar opening. Six bolts threaded into a collar positioned the jar. A quick release strap allowed easy exchange by divers. Jars were numbered and marked every 1 cm for a video sizescale. A video camera (SuperCam 6500, DeepSea Power and Light, San Diego, CA) transmitted images of the jar to a shipboard video recorder. The camera was mounted on a plate with an attached PVC pipe that was tightly inserted into a larger PVC pipe mounted on a platform secured to the tent framework. A quick-release pin secured the camera to the mount. Two undersea, AC powered lights backlit the jar and its contents, overpowering the ambient light (Leifer and MacDonald, 2003). The lights also allowed 46 Marine Technology Society Journal nighttime operation. The video camera was remotely controllable, allowing selection of a sufficiently fast shutter speed to prevent motion blurring (Leifer et al., 2003a). FIGURE 3 Example of image analysis procedure for a 4770 µm radius bubble with a thick oil coating rising in the collection jar. A. Original image. B. Extracted image. C. Thresholded image. D. Two-dimensional intensity profile of image subset indicated by dashed box on B. 3.0. Video Analysis Analysis of the video provided high time-resolution bubble emission series allowing calculation of the oil and gas transported by each oily bubble. Video was digitized into a series of frames (108,000 hr-1). Navigation through the sequence of files, image processing, and basic analysis was performed with routines written in NIH Image (National Institute of Health, 2003). Since most frames were empty, only a small percentage required analysis. Moreover, since the oily bubbles rose slowly, bubbles were analyzed for each five frames in the sequence. This allowed a statistically significant number of measurements of each oily bubble to account for shape oscillations and noise. Frames with bubbles (Fig. 3A) were “extracted” (Fig. 3B), a process in which each odd pixel row is replaced by interpolation of neighboring even pixel rows (Leifer et al., 2003a). Extraction removes interlacing effects. The image was then thresholded—i.e., made binary (Fig 3C)—at an intensity slightly above the background. Correctly choosing the intensity threshold was important since the measured bubble diameter decreases with increasing thresholding intensity. This can be seen in the cone shape of the 2-dimensional intensity surface plot (Fig. 3D). The threshold value used in Fig. 3C is indicated in Fig. 3D by a line. Leifer et al. (2003b) showed that the appropriate intensity is slightly below the background, because bubbles are surrounded by a bright halo created by off-axis reflected rays. From this analysis, a time series of major and minor axes and x and y locations was produced. Since the units were pixels per frame (at 30 frames per second), a size scale and the frame rate were used to convert to cm s-1. The variable length lens was set at ‘wide angle’ because poor water visibility prevented obtaining clear images unless the camera was very close to the collection jar. Thus, the size scale varied significantly from 32 pixels cm-1 at the distant jar wall, to 48 pixels cm-1, at the jar’s near wall. This size uncertainty was minimized by noting whether oily bubbles were in the near, center, or distant portion of the jar and us- ing the appropriate size scale. In this manner, size error was reduced to about ±7%. Further analysis was by routines written in MatLab (The Mathworks, Mass). The bubble equivalent spherical radius, r, was (1) where r1 was the major radius, and r2 was the minor radius (Sam et al., 1996). Each bubble was tracked through the frame sequence, and measurements of r and VB for each bubble were averaged together. The bubble rise velocity, VB, was calculated from the vertical distance between bubble locations in subsequent frames. The bubble size-distribution, Φ, was determined by size segregating the time series of radii into logarithmically spaced bins and normalizing to per unit radius increment and per time interval (i.e., the number of seconds analyzed). Error bars were calculated from the square root of the number of bubbles in each radius bin. Bubble sizedistributions generally are described by a power law dependency—e.g., Johnson and Cooke (1979), (2) where S is the power law exponent and k is a constant. Values of S were calculated by a least-squares, linear-regression analysis of the log of both sides of (2) over an appropriate size range. Bubble sizes within the camera field of view were larger than at the seabed due to the decrease in hydrostatic pressure. Seabed depth was 5.2 m while the camera was at a depth of 3.2 m. Thus, by Boyle’s law, P1Vol1 = P2Vol2. Using the volume of a sphere, yields r2 = r1(P1/P2)0.33. For P1 = 1.32 Atm and P2 = 1.52 Atm, the increase in bubble size from the seabed to collection jar was 4.8%. This is an upper limit because some fraction of the bubble volume was incompressible oil. A second factor that could cause bubble growth is oil outgassing. Absent data on the dissolved gas pressure in the oil, we assumed that the gas and oil were in equilibrium at the seabed. Oil has the effect of decreasing a bubble’s buoyancy. Thus, comparison of the measured VB with VB for similar sized, oil-free bubbles allows the amount of oil on each bubble to be inferred. For this approach it is necessary to know whether the comparison is with an oil-free, clean bubble or an oil-free, dirty bubble. Herein, clean and dirty refer to hydrodynamic behavior. Dirty bubbles are contaminated with surfactants (surface-active substances), which are compounds or particles that have both hydrophobic and hydrophilic sites, i.e., they “prefer” air-water interfaces. Dirty bubbles rise slower and exchange gas slower than clean bubbles. A bubble can be hydrodynamically clean in contaminated water if insufficient surfactant has accumulated on the bubble surface (Leifer and Patro, 2002). For example, Patro et al. (2002) showed that bubbles larger than r ~ 1500 µm behaved clean in seawater. For this analysis, we propose that since oil is surface active, the behavior of an oily bubble, absent its buoyancy effects, is most like a hydrodynamically dirty bubble. Thus, we propose the appropriate comparison is between the measured VB and VB for dirty bubbles. The bubble VB is a balance between the drag and buoyancy forces, where the buoyancy force is driven by the density difference between the water and the oily bubble. There is no simple expression for the drag force, except for very small and slow rising bubbles where the flow around the bubble is laminar (Re < 1, where Re is the nondimensional Reynolds number and is defined Re = 2rVB /v where ν is the kinematic viscosity of water). At higher Re, details of the bubble’s wake and bubble shape are important. To estimate the oil mass on the bubble, we looked at the decrease in rise velocity due to decreased buoyancy. Buoyancy affects VB by the density difference between the water and the oily bubble, and is expressed for laminar flow bubbles (Re < 1) by Stoke’s rise velocity, VB-ST , which is (Clift et al., 1978) (3) where g is gravity, ρW is water density, ρB is the bubble density. For a pure gas bubble, Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 47 ρW >> ρB and is (ρW - ρB) ~1, although with increasing oiliness, ρB increases and ρW - ρB decreases. Equation (3) can be solved for ρB and then using the bubble volume (4/3 πr3), the bubble mass, MB, (both oil and gas) can be calculated if the oil density is known. The problem with using Stokes VB is that it is inappropriate for the bubbles observed which had large values of Re. Instead, we solved for MB using the ratio of observed and predicted VB(r)—dirty, non-oily. The empirical parameterization for dirty VB is shown in Fig. 7. We assumed that oil-coated bubbles behaved hydrodynamically dirty (Leifer and Boles, 2004a). Based on Equation (3), we related the ratio of density differences to the ratio of the rise velocities, (4) where k is a function of radius that describes the effect of oil on bubble hydrodynamics. Specifically, as the oil decreases buoyancy and decelerates the bubble, the drag also decreases. Consequently, the bubble does not slow down as much as if the drag had not decreased—i.e., the reduction in VB is less if the effect of oil on bubble hydrodynamics is included. For Stoke’s rise, k = 1, but for higher Re, k < 1. In Equation (4) the bubble density for the non-oily dirty VB is much less than ρW and was neglected. Equation (4) can be solved for ρB, which is simply MB divided by its volume, (5) or (6) Once the oil volume is determined using the oil density, ρOIL, ~ 0.975 g cm-3 for reservoir oil in the Summerland area (Bill Castle, California Dept. of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), personal communication, 2004), the gas volume, VolGAS is calculated by subtracting the oil volume, VolOIL, from the bubble volume, VolB . 48 Marine Technology Society Journal FIGURE 4 Image sequence of a 4770 ± 250 µm radius oily bubble rising in the collection jar. Time relative to first panel, t, noted above each panel; horizontal lines are 1 cm apart. The drop rose at 2.8 cm s-1, and had a Reynolds number of 250. Arrow indicates position of bubble. (7) An example image sequence is shown in Fig. 4. The bubble had r~4770 µm and VB = 2.8 cm s-1. In comparison, VB-Dirty = 20 cm s-1, thus its VB ratio was 0.136. Using Equation (6) with k = 1 yielded MB = 0.4 g for a 0.455 cm3 bubble. The gas volume from Equation (7) was 0.54 cm3 and the oil to gas volume ratio for this oily bubble was FIGURE 5 Tide height at Summerland for Oct 27-28, 2003. 7.4 to 1, implying this bubble was primarily an oil droplet containing a small gas bubble. Since the observed oil to gas ratio for this jar was 1 to 5.3, either this bubble was highly atypical, the assumption k = 1 was inappropriate, or both. With regard to whether the bubble was atypical, it had a VB ratio significantly less than for other similar size bubbles. The approach outlined above assumes the effect of oil on the rise of a bubble is solely due to buoyancy (k = 1), neglecting hydrodynamic effects. If hydrodynamic effects were included, the reduction in VB would be less (k < 1), thus, MB is an upper limit. The authors are unaware of any literature on oily bubble hydrodynamics. Thus, the value for k was derived by summing MB for all bubbles that entered the jar and dividing by the measured oil in the jar. This represents a first step, and must neglect factors upon which k depends—i.e., factors that affect bubble hydrodynamics such as radius, oiliness, and temperature. 4.0. Results 4.1. Field Observations and Tent Deployments Field deployments were scheduled for periods of a minus tide. On May 20, 2003, the modified gas seep-tent (Fig 2A) was deployed in 5.2 m of water on a flat sandy seabed with a sand overburden of undetermined thickness, in nearshore waters off Summerland, CA. Divers noted droplets and stringers of oil and gas bubbles emerging from holes in the sandy bottom, and surface slicks originating from the region. The tents were deployed for 20 minutes and the collected gas to oil ratio was estimated at 100 to 1 (analysis by the OSPR’s Petroleum Chemistry Laboratory) with total estimated oil seepage of ~36 ml day-1 for the entire area surrounding the tent. Uncertainty in the number arises from a poorly constrained seabed seepage area. On Oct. 27-28, 2004, divers positioned the oil seep-tent (Fig. 2B) at three seepage sites. Deployments were planned to coincide with significant minus tides (Fig. 5). The measurements are summarized in Table 1. The first site, Site 1, was located on a featureless sandy bottom, similar to the deployment site of May 20, 2003. Seep bubbles appeared clear and the measured gas to oil ratio was 111,000 ± 55,000 to 1, with estimated gas seepage of 90.4± 14 L day-1 for the area covered by the tent. Clearly, these bubbles were very slightly oily. The oil emission rate was 0.98 ml day-1 for the area covered by the tents. Bubbles at the second site (Site 2) were similar in appearance to site 1 bubbles as was the measured gas-to-oil ra- tio, 94,000 ± 20,000 to 1. Estimated daily oil and gas seepage rates for the area covered by the tents were 1.07 ± 0.4 ml day-1 and 96.2 ± 21 L day-1, respectively. At the third site (Site 3, S-3), most bubbles appeared black, and there was the most significant number and extent of seasurface oil slicks off Summerland at this site. The seabed consisted of sand, cobbles, subcanopy forming algae, and the ornate tubeworm, Diopatra ornata. A partially buried concrete cap and metal form was found, and the site was designated S-3. The site was located ~30 m southwest of the California State Lands Commission (CSLC) coordinates for the T-10 Well. The measured gas-to-oil ratio at this location was 8.36 ± 6.9 to 1. Gas and oil seepage was very different from the other sites. Gas seepage was 350 ± 330 ml day-1, oil seepage was 51.5 ± 65.5 ml day-1. The large variability arose from an increase by an order of magnitude in both oil and gas emissions for the last of the three samples collected at S-3 (See Table 1). While seabed observations at S-3 suggested seabed emissions primarily arose from a 4 m diameter area, the surfacing footprint of oily bubbles suggested a larger seabed emission area, ~8 m diameter. Based on the observed 47 ml day-1 and 6% tent coverage, the daily site emission rate was 0.8 L day-1. Underwater visibility in this extremely shallow water was very poor during all surveys. Thus, the seabed area estimate was qualitative, but likely conservative. 4.2. Video Observations 4.2.1. Bubble Distribution Φ for oily bubbles showed a sharp peak (Fig. 6). The distribution was narrowly peaked, which is typical for low flow vents where bubbles escape singly or in bubble lines (Leifer and Boles, 2004a). Values smaller than r~1000 µm were unreliably close to the lower size limit. The power law exponent, S, was 3.84, i.e., Φ decreased sharply. Because S > 3, the maximum in the bubble volume was close to the peak in Φ. TABLE 1 Results of analysis of collected sample jars for oil and gas. Coordinates in NAD 27 Sample Time deploy Time (min) Site 1, 10/27/2004 Oil (ml) Oil Flux (ml dy-1) Gas (ml) Gas Flux (L dy-1) Gas/Oil ratio 34.4175858°N, 119.5969998°W 1 14:35 5.15 0.0027 0.75 364.60 101.95 135,000 2 14:39 6.20 0.0027 0.63 407.70 94.69 151,000 3 14:46 5.00 0.0054 1.56 259.40 74.71 48,000 Site 2, 10/27/2004 34.4178164°N, 119.5977455°W 4 15:25 6.32 0.0027 0.62 318.50 72.57 117,000 5 15:36 4.08 0.0036 1.27 298.70 105.42 83,000 6 15:52 3.46 0.0032 1.33 265.30 110.41 82,900 0.368 16.3 Site 3, 10/28/2004 34.4180579°N, 119.5984375°W 7 13:34 31.3 0.4910 22.6 8.00 8 14:05 112.29 0.4310 5.53 1.50 0.019 3.48 9 15:56 26.60 2.3360 126.46 12.40 0.67 5.31 Mean Site Values Oil Flux (ml day-1) (L day-1) Gas Flux Site 1 0.979±0.4 90.4±14 Site 2 1.072±0.4 96.2±20 Site 3 51.5±65.5 0.35±0.33 Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 49 FIGURE 6 Oily bubble emission size-distribution as a function of radius, r, of all analyzed oily bubbles and fit to data over size range shown. At these low emission rates, the bubble size is determined solely by vent diameter (Blanchard and Syzdek, 1977). In this case, the vent mouth was most likely the sand pore-throat diameter. Based on observations of seeps at Coal Oil Point, CA, Leifer and Boles (2004a) proposed that time-varying oil emissions create an oil coating of varying thickness on the vent mouth (and walls) and thereby cause the bubble size to vary. 4.2.2. Rise Velocity In contrast, Leifer and Boles (2004a) found that Φ for high flow rate vents (where bubbles come out in a plume rather than singly or in lines) were very different, both broad and shallow. The different shape of Φ was primarily due to bubble breakup both at the vent mouth and in the rising bubble stream due to turbulence. For the low emission vents observed at Summerland, bubble breakup did not occur. Furthermore, the presence of thick oil coatings may play a roll in stabilizing bubbles against breakup. Confirmation of the oil analysis conclusion that bubbles were heavily oil contaminated is shown by a plot of VB versus r for the analyzed bubbles (Fig. 7). VB was significantly slower than the dirty (non-oily) VB parameterization; however, the general data trend roughly followed the dirty parameterization. For example, there was no peak in VB(r) as there is for the clean VB parameterization. There was a roll-off for small bubbles at r ~ 1500 µm, which is similar to the roll-off in the dirty VB parameterization at r ~ 1000 µm. A second-order polynomial was fit to the VB values with a least-squares, linear-regression analysis and was: (8) which had a finite velocity (1.29 cm s-1) for a zero-radius bubble, indicating the difficulty of forming very small oily bubbles. For the data shown in Fig. 7A, Re varied between ~20 and 104, i.e., Re for these bubbles were too large for Stoke’s VB to have been appropriate. Bubbles from natural hydrocarbon seeps escape with varying oil to gas ratios (Leifer and Boles, 2004a), and the same was true for emissions at the S-3 site. This is shown by the scatter in VB(r), up to a factor of three (Fig. 7A) and the variation in the velocity ratio VB VB–Dirty from 4.7% to as high as 77% (Fig. 7B). Larger bubbles generally had the highest gas-to-oil ratios, although some small bubbles had very high ratios, too. The mean velocity ratio was 32±17%. Since the velocity ratio varied significantly at a given r, the oil-to-gas ratio must have varied from bubble to bubble. Furthermore, since the analysis did not show significant non-petroleum detritus, hydrocarbons must have caused the buoyancy reduction. / 4.2.3. Oil and Gas Volume Emission Using the approach outlined above, the oil and gas fluxes were estimated for the analyzed video and compared with the quantitative values shown in Table 1 to test the k = 1 assumption. Since only a 10minute video sequence (~20,000 frames) was analyzed, the calculated flux rates were scaled to the collection time for the sample FIGURE 7 A) Bubble vertical rise velocity, VB, versus radius, r, and fit to data over size range shown. Also shown are the clean and dirty (non-oily) bubble VB parameterizations in stagnant water from Clift et al. (1978) and polynomial, least-squares fit to the data. B) Ratio of VB to dirty VB parameterization with respect to r. 50 Marine Technology Society Journal jars. Thus, we assumed that Φ remained approximately constant during the collection period. From the bubble video analysis, the total predicted oil flux for sample jar 8 was 37 mg oil compared with 0.43 ml oil, yielding k = 0.016, i.e., k << 1. Using k = 0.016, the oil flux time series was cal- culated and is shown in Fig. 8A, where the mass of all bubbles in each 2-second time bins was summed and then normalized to units of mass per second. A significant amount of the mass occurred in a single pulse at ~375 s; although there were two smaller, but significant pulses at ~125 s and FIGURE 8 A) Time series of oil flux at collection jar at site S-3; zero time is arbitrary. B) Time series of oil seabed emission, corrected to seabed emission time; zero time is relative to A. C) Smoothed time series of seabed oil emissions. D) Same as C. but with three main peaks deleted. Note time scale on B.- D. is different from A. See text for details. ~275 s. There also appears to be several series of smaller pulses involving numerous bubbles lasting 10-15 seconds—e.g., at 305 s. Of greater interest than the arrival time at the collection jar is the seabed emission time series, shown in Fig. 8B. The seabed emission time was calculated using the tent height and the rise speed of each bubble. We define the oil “flux” as in the water column, while emission is solely at the seabed. Interestingly, the three largest pulses were emitted in evenly spaced intervals of ~120 s, while the smaller pulses appear less organized. The series was then smoothed with a low-pass filter (Fig. 8C) and detrended to allow calculation of the spectrum. An autocorrelation was calculated for the smoothed, detrended data series (Fig. 9A). There were two clear peaks at 64.3 s and 120.0 s for the detrended data, matching the significant peaks in Fig. 8C. A spectrum for the data series (not shown) showed a significant peak at 120 s, and numerous harmonics due to the data’s delta functiontime character. Thus, the three main peaks in Fig. 8C were deleted (Fig. 8D) and the autocorrelation and spectrum (Fig. 9B) recalculated. The strongest peaks were at 105 s, 49.2, 8.2 s, with decreasing peaks at 16.0 and 25.0 s that are integer multiples of a strong peak at 8.2 s. The smoothed time series was detrended and a 256-point Fourier transform with 50% overlap and a Blackman window performed (Fig. 9C). There were strong peaks at 8.0, 13.0, and 23.4 s as well as a very sharp peak at 4.9 s and a broad peak at 45 – 55 s (Fig. 9C). The 8 and 23.4 s peaks likely were harmonics, as may be the shoulder of the 13.0 s peak, at ~15.0 s. The 8 s period peak, also observed in the autocorrelation, was similar to the wave period observed at the site (5 - 8 s) in video of wave-induced surge. Swell during this field study (Oct 27-28, 2003) was very weak, ~10 cm; however, underwater video showed surge motions moving detritus back and forth. This surge may also explain the narrow 5 s peak. Other peaks may relate to details of the subsurface oil flux, akin to the dripping of water from a leaky faucet. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 51 FIGURE 9 6.0. Conclusion A) Autocorrelation (AutoCorr) of time series shown in Fig. 8C and B) with main 3 peaks removed, i.e., of time series shown in Fig. 8D. C) Spectrum of time series with main 3 peaks removed i.e., time series shown in Fig. 8D. In this study, a video-based seep-tent for quantifying oil and gas emissions from natural seeps and leaking oil facilities was deployed. Video analysis, calibrated with collected and analyzed oil samples allowed a detailed time series of emission rates to be determined for investigation of sources of variability. Oil emission variations with a periodicity comparable to the swell were observed, as was a strong response at 120 s. Improvements in the imaging are necessary to allow more automated analysis. Acknowledgement 5.0. Discussion Results (Table 1) were consistent with a tidal influence causing the observed 10-fold increase in both the oil and gas emissions for the last collected sample ~1 hour before the lowest low tide (Fig. 5). Although the increase could have been random, review of the video did not show any indication it was due to a large oil pulse. Unfortunately, data collection for Site 3 covered only a 3.5-hour period approaching the lowest low-tide of a ‘minus’ tidal cycle (Fig. 5) and did not continue through the oil emission peak. Safety concerns due to an absence of shipboard lighting forced tent retrieval before sunset. The spectral analysis suggested a swellinduced variation. There are several potential mechanisms by which swell may influence oil and gas emissions at the seabed. One is that the decreasing hydrostatic pressure causes a greater probability that a bubble will escape. This was observed by Leifer and Boles (2004b) at natural hydrocarbon seeps in the Coal Oil Point seep field where the seeps studied were predominantly gas, unlike those observed in the Summerland area. However, swells at Summerland during tent deploy- 52 Marine Technology Society Journal ment were extremely small (0.1 - 0.2 m in height). A second mechanism is that the swell-induced surge made bubble formation easier. This mechanism is observed in the laboratory for non-oily bubbles (Tsuge et al., 1981). A third potential mechanism is that slightly negatively buoyant oily bubbles remain in seabed depressions until decreasing hydrostatic pressure from the falling tide makes them buoyant. Since the oil is positively buoyant (0.975 g cm-3), oily bubbles and even pure oil droplets must rise in seawater. Thus, oil droplets and/or oily bubbles that do not rise must contain a small fraction of denser material, such as tar, sediment, or sand. However, analysis of the collected oil did not show significant sand or sediment, thus if the bubbles collected had been resuspended, their initial negative buoyancy must have been due to tar. The authors would like to thank the numerous scientists who participated in the field missions: Robin Lewis and John Tarpley, Department of Fish and Game, Oil Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR); Ann Bull, United States Minerals Management Service; and Greg Sanders, United States Fish and Wildlife Service including students Tonya Del Sontro and Una Matko who aided in the construction, testing, and deployment of the large oil seep-tent. We would like to thank the support of the California Department of Fish and Game, OSPR, and the University of California Energy Institute #SB020003. Views and conclusions in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the California government or University of California, Santa Barbara. References Blanchard, D.C. and L.D. Syzdek. 1977. Production of air bubbles of a specified size. Chem Eng Sci. 32:1109-1112. Clift, R., J.R. Grace and M.E. Weber. 1978. Bubbles Drops and Particles. New York: Academic Press. 380 pp. Curran, Steve. 1995. Summerland Oil Well Abandonments – Re-evaluation. Internal memorandum to Greg Scott, Mineral Resources Management Division, State Lands Commission. Dated 16 March, 1995. Attachements: Summerland Map, PENCO proposal, Coast Guard Update. Unpublished. Fairweather Pacific LLC. 2000. Summerland Well Research Phase 1 Project Report. Unpublished. Freckman, J.T. 1981. Memorandum to D.J. Everitts, Chief State Lands Commission. Dated 8 April 1981. Subject Pete Brumis Contract: Oil Seep Location and Containment, Summerland Beach Area, Santa Barbara County. Giallonardo, T., A. Koller. 1978. Gaviota offshore gas field. Calif Div of Oil and Gas. Pub No. TR21. 8. Golder Assoc, 1995. Map and Dive Report. Geophysical interpretation magnetometer, side-scan sonar, and sub-bottom profiler data, Maps 1 and 2. Report to PENCO/ Margeophys CA. Dated Feb.17, 1995. Unpublished. Grosbard, A. 2002. Treadwell wharf in the Summerland, California oil field: the first sea wells in petroleum exploration. In: Oil Industry History, ed. Friedman. Drake Well Found. 3(1)18. Johnson, B.D. and R.C. Cooke. 1979. Bubble populations and spectra in coastal waters: a photographic approach. J Geophys Res. 92C2:3761-3766. Lammers, D.A. 1975. Internal memorandum to D.J. Everitts. Removal of hazardous conditions, Summerland and Ellwood. Dated July 21, 1975. Leifer, I., K. Wilson, J. Tarpley, R. Lewis, R. Imai, M. Sowby, K. Mayer, and C. Moore, 2004. Factors affecting marine hydrocarbon emissions in an area of natural seeps and abandoned oil wells - Summerland, California. Proc. International Oil Spill Conference, Miami, May 2005. Submitted. Leifer, I. and Boles. J. 2004a. Measurement of hydrocarbon flow through fractured rock and unconsolidated sediment of a marine seep. Mar Petrol Geol. In press. Leifer, I. and Boles. J. 2004b. Turbine seeptent measurements of marine hydrocarbon seep forcing on second time scales. J Geophys Res. In press. Leifer, I., G. De Leeuw and L.H. Cohen. 2003a. Optical measurement of bubbles: System‚ design and application. J Atm Ocean Tech. 20:1317-1332. PENCO (Pacific Environmental Corporation). 1995. Golder Assoc., David Evans Assoc. Dive Report, Geophysical survey, magnetometer, side-scan sonar, and sub-bottom profiler data – Maps 1 and 2. Dated Feb 17, 1995. Unpublished. Sam, A., C.O. Gomez and J.A. Finch. 1996. Axial velocity profiles of single bubbles in water/froth. Int. J Min Proc. 47:177-196. Tsuge, H, S. Hibino and U. Nojima. 1981. Volume of a bubble formed at a single submerged orifice in a flowing liquid. Internat. Chem Eng. 21:630-636. U.S. Coast Guard, (USCG). 1995. Summerland Beach oil well abandonment. Letter from Captain E.E Page to interested parties. Dated 24 Feb. 1995. Unpublished. Leifer, I., G. De Leeuw, L.H. Cohen and G. Kunz. 2003b. Calibrating optical bubble size by the displaced mass method. Chem Eng Sci. 58:5211-5216. Leifer, I., I. MacDonald. 2003. Dynamics of the gas flux from shallow gas hydrate deposits: Interaction between oily hydrate bubbles and the oceanic environment. Earth Plan Sci Lett. 210:411-424. Leifer, I. and R. Patro. 2002. The bubble mechanism for transport of methane from the shallow sea bed to the surface: A review and sensitivity study. Cont. Shelf Res. 22: 2409-2428. National Institute of Health, 2003, NIH Image Software, NIH Image ver. 1.63 (developed at the U.S. National Institutes of Health and available on the Internet at http:// rsb.info.nih.gov/nih-image/). National Research Council (NRC), 2003. Oil in the Sea III: Inputs and Fates. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. ISBN 0-309-08438-5, 265 pp. Patro, R., I. Leifer and P. Bowyer. 2002. Better bubble process modeling: Improved bubble hydrodynamics parameterisation. In: Gas Transfer and Water Surfaces, eds. M. Donelan, W. Drennan, E.S. Salzman and R. Wanninkhof. pp. 315-320, AGU Monograph Volume 127. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 53 PAPER Science for Stewardship: Multidisciplinary Research on USS Arizona AUTHORS ABSTRACT Matthew A. Russell National Park Service, Submerged Resources Center The National Park Service’s Submerged Resources Center and USS Arizona Memorial are conducting and coordinating research directed at understanding the nature and rate of natural processes affecting the deterioration of the USS Arizona in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The USS Arizona Preservation Project is designed to be multi-year, interdisciplinary and cumulative, with each element contributing to developing an overall management strategy designed to minimize environmental hazard from fuel oil release and provide the basic research required to make informed management decisions for long-term preservation. The primary project focus is toward acquiring requisite data for understanding the complex corrosion and deterioration processes affecting Arizona’s hull, both internally and externally, and modeling and predicting the nature and rate of structural changes. This research program is designed to be a cumulative progression of multi-disciplinary investigative steps. Multiple lines of evidence are being pursued simultaneously, each directly or indirectly linked to the others and to the overall project objectives. This project is an example of government agencies, academic institutions, military commands and private institutions working together effectively for public benefit. The USS Arizona Preservation Project is designed to serve as a model because it will have direct application to preservation and management of historical iron and steel vessels worldwide and to intervention actions for other leaking vessels. Larry E. Murphy National Park Service, Submerged Resources Center Donald L. Johnson Metallurgical Engineering Group University of Nebraska-Lincoln Timothy J. Foecke Metallurgy Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology Pamela J. Morris Marine Biomedicine and Environmental Sciences Center, Medical University of South Carolina, and Center for Coastal Environmental Health and Biomolecular Research and Hollings Marine Laboratory, NOAA Ralph Mitchell Laboratory of Applied Microbiology, Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University 54 Marine Technology Society Journal INTRODUCTION Significance he National Park Service’s (NPS) Submerged Resources Center (SRC) and USS Arizona Memorial (USAR) are conducting and coordinating research directed at understanding the nature and rate of natural processes affecting the deterioration of the USS Arizona in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The USS Arizona Preservation Project is designed to be multi-year, interdisciplinary and cumulative, with each element contributing to developing an overall management strategy designed to minimize environmental hazard from fuel oil release and provide the basic research required to make informed management decisions for longterm preservation. This project has been designed to serve as a model because it will have direct application to preservation and management of historical iron and steel vessels worldwide and to intervention actions for other leaking vessels. The USS Arizona, a National Historic Landmark—the highest level of national historic significance—is administered cooperatively by NPS and U.S. Navy and among the most recognized and visited war memorials in the nation (Figure 1). More than 1.5 million people annually visit the USS Arizona Memorial, tomb of more than 1,000 U.S. sailors and marines and the most visible warship lost in World War II. This ship, a national shrine and Naval memorial that remains deeply ingrained in American consciousness, still commands an honor guard from the many capital ships that ply Pearl Harbor today as it did during the war when it served as inspiration to Navy personnel going into battle. The Memorial above the ship commemorates the largest loss in U.S. Naval history and ultimate Allied victory in WWII. T Goals and Objectives FIGURE 1 The USS Arizona Preservation Project builds upon pioneering site documentation and research led by the National Park Service’s Submerged Cultural Resources Unit (later renamed SRC) in the 1980s (Lenihan, 1989). The early SRC investigations initiated in situ documentation and study of large, submerged steel warships both in the U.S. and internationally (Figure 2). The current project is designed to provide a foundation for long-term preservation and management of this immensely significant site. The primary project focus is toward acquiring requisite data for understanding the complex corrosion and deterioration processes affecting Arizona’s hull, both internally and externally, and modeling and predicting the nature and rate of structural changes. Developing reasonable and effective management alternatives and deciding the most desirable actions, particularly those regarding intervention or rehabilitation, cannot be done without this information. The current research program is an important step in obtaining necessary scientific information upon which sound management decisions will be made. An important goal of this research is to develop and recommend shortterm and long-term management plans for site preservation based on the results of the research program. This project addresses another important issue besides preservation of an important national shrine. USS Arizona contains several hundred thousand gallons of fuel oil, which has been slowly escaping since its loss in 1941. This oil, a potentially serious environmental hazard, is contained within the corroding hull. Catastrophic oil release, although by all indications not imminent, is ultimately inevitable. Understanding the complex and varied hull corrosion processes and modeling structural changes and oil release patterns offers the most efficient method of developing a solution to this potential hazard. This project will develop a research strategy for environmental impact risk assessment and abatement to address the oil issue. Because of the particular national importance of Arizona, any solution to the oil issue must incorporate a minimum-impact The USS Arizona Memorial in Pearl Harbor. Credit: Brett Seymour/NPS. approach or long-term site preservation could be compromised. All research operations are conducted with respect due an American war grave and with minimum impact to the site. Unnecessary disturbance to Arizona’s hull is likely to be seen by many as more problematic than the limited oil release now occurring, although managers will ultimately have to face the possibility of a large release. Addressing the oil release problem within a site-preservation framework as incorporated within this research design provides the best balance of competing social values, and it has the highest probability of success for arriving at the best and most defensible solution for both issues. Methodology SRC is providing project principals who have been involved in Arizona research from the early 1980s. NPS is also partnering with military units, researchers, academic institutions, commercial companies, research laboratories, professional societies and other federal agencies in addressing the many multifaceted questions that confront managers responsible for USS Arizona preservation and minimizing environmental risk. This research program is designed to be a cumulative progression of multi-disciplinary investigative steps. Multiple lines of evidence are being pursued simultaneously, each directly or indirectly linked to the oth- FIGURE 2 A map of USS Arizona’s remains was completed by the National Park Service in the mid-1980s. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 55 ers and to the overall project objectives. The approach chosen by NPS is to pursue a twofold strategy of research and monitoring. Primary research is directed towards characterizing overall corrosion processes and determining internal and external corrosion rates. These data are requisite to developing a predictive model of how Arizona is deteriorating and when the corrosion will reach the point where structural changes indicate collapse is imminent. Archeologists and conservation specialists in Australia conducted pioneering research on iron and steel shipwreck deterioration and determined the major factors affecting shipwreck corrosion are metal composition and metallurgical structure, marine growth, water composition, temperature, extent of water movement, seabed composition and depth of burial beneath the seabed (North and MacLeod, 1987). Collecting data necessary to characterize critical corrosion processes on USS Arizona will involve evaluating each of these factors, perhaps identifying additional processes, all of which are complex and interrelated and affect corrosion in many different ways. The result is that when attempting to evaluate the corrosion history of an object it must be considered individually—there are very few oceanographic and environmental parameters that are uniform between sites. In addition to corrosion research, related research is focusing on the oil that remains trapped within Arizona’s hull and on the geological substrate supporting the ship. Monitoring activities are aimed at collecting baseline data for inclusion in corrosion analysis, and can also be used to assess changing conditions over time, and to quantify various on-site conditions such as physical movement of the ship and oil release amounts. Data collected during monitoring is incorporated into overall research domains that give researchers and managers an indication of overall site stability and how it is changing. Research and monitoring activities are broken down into individual research domains discussed below. Each research domain either directly contributes to primary research goals or plays a key supporting role in project objectives. All are interconnected on some level. 56 Marine Technology Society Journal Finite Element Analysis Finite Element Analysis (FEA) is a principal research product that will be the primary predictive tool used during USS Arizona research. A Finite Element Model (FEM) is a computer model used to calculate stresses and shape changes in a structure under load using experimental variables based on observational data. The FEM divides a complex solid into small components called elements, each of which can be one of many simple shapes. Properties for the material of each element are input to describe the element’s behavior between its end points (for example, mechanical properties, heat flow, density, etc.). The end points of each “finite” element are called nodes. Conditions are set regarding how nodes connect to one another and loads (known as boundary conditions) are added to the model. The results are plots of displacements of nodes and calculated stresses in the structure at all points. For historical shipwrecks such as USS Arizona, an FEM will allow manipulation of multiple variables, such as corrosion rate and hull thickness, to analyze loads and stresses on hull structure for prediction of probable collapse rate, nature and sequence and consequent impact on structures containing fuel oil. In addition, the FEM will provide a fundamental tool to evaluate consequences of proposed management alternatives involving structural intervention or preservation strategies. There are particular difficulties in applying an FEM to shipwrecks, however. Geometry is constantly changing due to ongoing corrosion, loads can be very complex, and load and corrosion interact in such a way as to increase the complexity of the model (for example, stress corrosion cracking). There are ways to overcome these difficulties, but accurate data based on direct measurements and observation are of primary importance. For the model to be representative of the real world, input data such as structural dimensions and connections, corrosion rates and loads must be as precise as possible. Baseline FEM development is being conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and is focused on modeling the Arizona hull structure in its as-built original state for an 80-ft. cross-sec- tion, amidships from frame 70 to 90. The 80-ft area selected for initial modeling represents an area affected by the blast that sank the vessel and the ensuing fire. Because this is pioneering research in the sense that FEA has not been applied to corrosion and deterioration of a historical shipwreck before, this preliminary model is a necessary step to refine and test methodologies for developing the overall model required for predicting present and projected future structural strength. It is important to note that the great majority of the work in creating a finite element model of a structure is in the generation of the model and mesh in the computer. Remediation scenarios can then be tested and further stability studies can be made by simply changing the inputs and accounting for new measurements or ideas. The next development stage of the FEM will focus on incorporating structural effects of the blast and fire that sank the vessel. Modeling the structural changes to Arizona resulting from the explosion and subsequent fire is the logical starting point for understanding the vessel’s present condition and projecting its future condition and rate of deterioration. The final stage of FEM development will incorporate external and internal corrosion and thickness measurements to complete the model of Arizona’s present condition and to allow researchers to extend the model into the future. Predictions about current status and future collapse will vary in accuracy depending on the detail of the input data, crafting the correct boundary conditions, and by minimizing simplifying assumptions. For the first issue, the greatest deficiency in data in this case is knowledge of the actual thickness and conditions of hull features both internally and below the mudline. All other assumptions and simplifications have a much smaller effect on the results than these data. The boundary conditions are similarly difficult, as the hull is being supported by a soft, water saturated semi-solid that moves relative to the hull. As the primary “product” of the current research program, much of the data collected during field work and as a result of the ongoing monitoring is designed to be fed directly into revising and refining the FEM to make it as accurate as possible. When combined with corrosion rates and other variables, the model will provide predictability required for evaluating timing, necessity and long-range consequences of management actions. Corrosion Analysis Corrosion research on USS Arizona is focused on understanding and characterizing the specific nature of corrosion occurring on the vessel and determining the corrosion rate for different structural elements of the ship. The goal is to establish a curve of deterioration and “plot” where Arizona currently falls on that curve. The rate of corrosion is a crucial parameter necessary for making long-term predictions about Arizona’s structural integrity using the FEM. Because the battleship is a large, complex three-dimensional structure, and it is impossible to directly measure corrosion rates for all critical elements, there will necessarily be some generalizing and use of inferential data to derive rates of deterioration, particularly for inaccessible internal structures. In addition, a comprehensive understanding of all relevant parameters, such as hull steel chemistry and microstructure, constituent analysis of concretion covering the ship and seawater chemistry, is necessary for making indirect estimates of overall corrosion rates. The most accurate measure of corrosion rate at our disposal is to compare current structural steel thickness with original thickness found on ship’s plans, determine how much metal has been lost over a specific period of time and use the calculated corrosion rate in a linear extrapolation to determine overall corrosion rate for that particular location. Cumulative corrosion analyses may provide a more accurate variable rate. Present indications are that corrosion rates are initially high, and decrease to a lesser rate. Although it was possible to remove some small (4-in. diameter) hull samples (coupons) for direct comparison, in most cases it is not feasible to take direct measurements of steel hull thickness because of the destructive nature of the process and inaccessibility of interior features. Because research on Arizona must be carried out in the most non- invasive manner possible, other less-destructive methods for calculating corrosion rate, including ultrasonic thickness measurements, must be devised, some of which will rely on inferences made from the few direct measurements we have and by comparing other variables critical to the corrosion process. Because the physical environment plays such a large role in how corrosion takes place, baseline environmental data are important in general (see below), but specifically the environment at the hull/concretion interface must be characterized since that is where corrosion occurs (Johnson et al., 2003). Exterior Corrosion Analysis Metallurgical and Metallographic Analysis Metallurgical and metallographic analyses are designed to establish basic chemical, structural and strength characteristics of steel used in Arizona’s original 1914-1915 construction and later 1929-1931 reconstruction. Investigation of steel hull samples is a necessary step towards determining corrosion nature and rate. Analysis has originally focused on steel collected from superstructure elements stored on land at Waipio Point, Hawaii that were removed from Arizona before construction of the Memorial began in 1960. Samples from both the 1914-1915 and 1929-1931 construction periods were analyzed by scientists from University of Nebraska, Lincoln (UNL). Tests performed include chemical constituent analysis, microstructural examination and Charpy impact testing to determine basic strength characteristics (Johnson et al., 2000). Additional metallurgical and metallographic analyses are being performed on hull coupons collected in situ from Arizona’s hull. Four-inch diameter hull samples, including intact exterior and interior concretion, were removed using a hydraulic-powered hole saw (Figure 3). A total of eight coupons were removed from external, vertical hull locations on both port and starboard sides (Figure 4). On each side, one sample was taken at the Upper Deck level, near the water line; from the Second Deck level, above the torpedo blister; from the Third Deck level, in the torpedo blister; and from the First Platform level, in the torpedo blister and below the mud line. After removal, each location was plugged using a standard plumber’s pipe plug and sealed with marine epoxy to prevent formation of a localized corrosion cell. UNL researchers used metallographic methods to examine the hull coupons to measure metal thickness at Rail Sciences laboratories in Omaha, Nebraska (Johnson et al., 2003). Additional metallurgical and metallographic analyses on the same samples are being performed by researchers from NIST. FIGURE 3 A Navy diver from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One collecting a coupon from USS Arizona’s hull. Credit: Brett Seymour/NPS. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 57 FIGURE 4 Hull coupon with interior and exterior concretion. Credit: Brett Seymour/NPS. late compounds that make up the concretion and environmental scanning electron microscopy (ESEM) to determine relative percentages of each element. X-ray diffraction was conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Eglin Air Force Base, while ESEM analysis was completed by the Composite Materials and Structures Center at Michigan State University. Preliminary results are consistent with North’s (1976) findings that concretion formed on wrought and cast iron structures contains the mineral siderite, which is formed by the exchange of iron ions for calcium ions. UNL scientists are researching how density and electrical resistivity of Arizona’s outer hull concretion can be used to characterize the corrosion process and how concretion analysis may be used to determine corrosion rates. Concretion Analysis Fundamental research into the composition and characteristics of the concretion covering Arizona’s outer hull is being conducted to aid in understanding the kinetics and mechanisms of the corrosion process on the ship and to determine how concretion chemistry correlates with hull metal loss. The hard layer of concretion that forms on iron and steel objects in seawater is a combination of iron corrosion products and marine organisms, beginning with pioneering coralline algae that leave layers of calcium carbonate when they die. The calcium carbonate residue is overlaid by subsequent layers of coralline algae, and the increasing calcium carbonate layers forms a suitable substrate for secondary growth, such as soft corals and mollusks (North, 1976). Outwardly diffusing iron ions replace some of the calcium resulting in a mix of iron corrosion products, calcium carbonate and living marine organisms covering the iron or steel object. The concretion forms a semi-permeable barrier between the bare metal and seawater and has a significant influence on corrosion by reducing the amount of dissolved oxygen available for the corrosion reaction, increasing acidity at the metal-concretion interface and increasing the chloride ion concentration (North, 1976). Concretion investigation on USS Arizona has focused on x-ray diffraction to iso- 58 Marine Technology Society Journal In Situ Hull Corrosion Measurments When iron or steel is placed in seawater, corrosion begins as a reaction in which the oxidation of metal forms the anodic portion of a corrosion cell, and the consumption of oxygen forms the reduction, or cathodic, part of the reaction. When the oxidation and reduction rates are equal, there will be a voltage that characterizes the specific reaction rate or corrosion rate—that characteristic voltage is known as the corrosion potential (Ecorr). In general, a more negative Ecorr value indicates a lower corrosion rate while a more positive Ecorr indicates a higher corrosion rate (MacLeod, 1987). In situ Ecorr is measured using a silversilver chloride (Ag/AgCl) reference electrode giving a voltage measurement in millivolts (mV). In addition to Ecorr, pH is another critical parameter giving an indication of corrosion, and the combined data can be directly related to appropriate Pourbaix Diagrams. The Pourbaix Diagram, a two dimensional map of Ecorr vs. pH, shows regions of stability for corrosion products as a function of Ecorr and pH and identifies limits for corrosion, immunity from corrosion or limits for formation of protective layers on the metal surface. Diagrams for iron/water and iron/water/ CO2 are especially useful in characterizing corrosion processes at the steel/concretion interface and into the concretion itself. (Johnson et al., 2003). In normal seawater, pH ranges from 7.5 to 8.2, but levels below 6.5 and as low as 4.8 are found under concretion covering actively corroding metal. Lower pH levels (more acidic) typically characterize increased corrosion levels (North and MacLeod, 1987). In situ corrosion measurements taken systematically along Arizona’s hull include pH and Ecorr. At selected stations on the vessel, pH and Ecorr are measured at various concretion-depths using pH and Ag/AgCl reference electrodes inserted into holes drilled into the concretion. Hole depths are controlled by several depth jigs to provide uniform data to the metal surface. Multiple samples are drilled in a vertical transect at each station at varying water depths to characterize how the corrosion process changes with water depth and concretion thickness. In addition, these data are compared over multiple field seasons. Efforts are underway to correlate Ecorr with corrosion rate (Johnson et al. 2002). Another critical in situ measurement of USS Arizona’s hull includes ultrasonic thickness measurements. The eight hull coupons collected in two vertical transects on Arizona’s hull provide an empirical measure of corrosion rate at each of these locations when compared to as-built hull thicknesses. Because of the invasive nature of collecting hull coupons, however, it is necessary to develop a more non-invasive technique to expand hull thickness data. Since hull thickness measurements give a direct measure of corrosion rate, this data is essential to developing an accurate FEM. Because the specific metal thickness has been precisely measured at the eight coupons locations, they are a control for ongoing testing of ultrasonic thickness techniques and instruments (Figure 5). Interior Corrosion Analysis Analysis of the nature and rate of interior corrosion in USS Arizona is so far limited to indirect measurements of environmental parameters and Ecorr, subjective observation of interior conditions based on images taken by a small VideoRay ROV, and FIGURE 5 NPS archeologist Matt Russell taking ultrasonic thickness measurements on Arizona’s hull. Credit: Brett Seymour/NPS. experimental evaluation of ultrasonic thickness techniques using the ROV as an instrument platform. NPS management has limited diver access to the Arizona’s hull, so interior data can at present only be collected remotely. The VideoRay ROV is the primary tool used for collecting internal data (Figure 6). It can be used as an instrument platform to carry a YSI 600XLM Multiparameter Sonde to measure pH, temperature, salinity, dissolved oxygen, oxygen reduction potential and conductivity—the same parameters being recorded externally (see below). The ROV can also carry a GMC STAPERM silversilver chloride reference electrode to measure interior Ecorr. An evaluation was made for use of an ROV-mounted Cygnus Ultrasonic Thickness Gauge to measure interior bulkhead thicknesses, but so far this technology has not proved suitable for this application. FIGURE 6 Environmental Monitoring Oxygen reduction is typically the main cathodic reaction occurring in steel exposed to seawater, so dissolved oxygen availability at the cathodic site controls the corrosion rate, with higher dissolved oxygen content resulting in higher corrosion. Water at the ocean’s surface is generally oxygen-saturated, so over- A variety of factors have been identified that directly influence metal corrosion on shipwrecks, including water composition (dissolved oxygen, pH, salinity and conductivity), temperature and extent of water movement (North and MacLeod, 1987). A VideoRay ROV examines the marine encrustation on a mirror above the sink in the sediment filled Division Marine Office. Credit: Brett Seymour/NPS. all dissolved oxygen content depends on the amount of mixing that occurs with surface water—increased water movement and mixing results in elevated dissolved oxygen levels. In addition, temperature and dissolved oxygen are inversely proportional, so lower temperature results in increased dissolved oxygen. The pH level is indicative of overall corrosion activity. In normal seawater, pH ranges from 7.5 to 8.2, but levels below 6.5 are found under concretion covering actively corroding metal. Lower pH levels (more acidic) typically characterize active or increased corrosion levels. Salinity is closely related to the corrosion rate of steel in water, so increased salinity usually results in higher corrosion rates. This is evident when comparing metal preservation in freshwater compared to seawater environments—freshwater lakes typically exhibit better preservation of iron and steel. There are several ways that higher salinity affects corrosion, including increasing conductivity (which facilitates movement of ions between anodic and cathodic areas), increasing dissolved oxygen and supplying ions that can catalyze corrosion reactions, among others (North and MacLeod, 1987). Higher conductivity can increase corrosion by increasing the movement of ions during the corrosion process. In general, corrosion increases as temperature increases. Under controlled laboratory conditions, corrosion rate doubles for every 10°C rise in temperature. This relationship is complicated, however, by the effect of temperature on both dissolved oxygen and biological growth. Warmer water supports increased marine growth, which contributes to concretion formation on steel in seawater and that, in turn, generally reduces corrosion rates. In addition, as discussed above, lower temperature results in higher dissolved oxygen content, which consequently means increased corrosion (North and MacLeod, 1987). Water movement from waves and currents on a site affects corrosion in several ways, but generally high-energy environmental conditions results in higher corrosion rates. Active water movement can contribute to mechanical erosion of metal surfaces and can also impede development of Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 59 protective concretion layers by removing accumulating ions before they can precipitate and begin the concretion formation process. Waves and currents also contribute to water mixing and aeration that result in increased dissolved oxygen levels (North and MacLeod, 1987). Factors that affect corrosion on metal shipwrecks are complicated and interrelated. Reducing one key factor can increase another, and the results are often unpredictable. It is clear, however, that in order to understand the corrosion history of an object, even a complex object like a World War II battleship, and to begin to define the nature and rate of deterioration affecting the object, an understanding of the various environmental factors at play is necessary. An important aspect of the current research program is long-term monitoring of oceanographic and environmental parameters on USS Arizona. This is being accomplished with in situ multiparameter instruments placed on the hull and on the seabed to the side of the vessel. Exterior Monitoring The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and NPS are analyzing data from oceanographic and water-quality monitoring instruments placed on and near Arizona to determine long-term, seasonal variability in key parameters that affect corrosion. Researchers calibrated and deployed a SonTek Triton waveheight and current meter and a YSI 6600 Multiparameter Sonde on Arizona in November 2002. These instruments have internal memory and batteries and can be left in situ for up to 60 days, recording data multiple times an hour. The instruments are retrieved and downloaded, then recalibrated and deployed every 60 days by USAR staff. The data are sent to the SRC in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and the USGS in Santa Cruz, California, for compilation and analysis. The instruments are collecting baseline data including wave height and direction and current velocity and direction around the vessel, and basic environmental parameters including pH, temperature, salinity, dissolved oxygen, oxygen reduction potential and conductivity. The goal is to collect at least a two- 60 Marine Technology Society Journal year database to discern seasonal variation and patterns of environmental parameters within Pearl Harbor. As discussed above, each of these parameters can affect corrosion rates on the ship. Interior Monitoring Environmental monitoring is also being conducted within Arizona’s interior cabins to determine internal environmental conditions. Internal conditions can be compared to external conditions in an attempt to infer interior corrosion nature and rate. These data are critical to developing a viable FEM that takes into account both interior and exterior hull corrosion. A VideoRay ROV is equipped with a YSI 600XLM Multiparameter Sonde to measure pH, temperature, salinity, dissolved oxygen, oxygen reduction potential and conductivity—the same parameters being recorded externally. Initial investigations are focused on second deck cabins accessible via open portholes and inside Barbette No. 3. Subsequent investigations will record environmental parameters in Third Deck spaces—although very few of these areas are currently accessible to the ROV. One of the goals of interior investigation is to locate access to Arizona’s lower decks. Data from both external and internal environmental monitoring will be assessed, and the results will be factored in developing the Arizona FEM. Structural Monitoring Monitoring observable changes to USS Arizona’s accessible external areas is designed to allow researchers and managers to quantify physical changes to Arizona’s fabric. As internal and external structures corrode and weaken, various parts of Arizona’s hull may experience shifting, settling or collapse. Since a regular NPS presence on Arizona began in 1982, a qualitative assessment by researchers indicates that Upper Deck areas in and around the ship’s galley are showing signs of change—widening cracks and limited deck collapse are occurring. So far any measurable change has only occurred to non-structural portions of the vessel—”non-structural” in the sense that Upper Deck areas do not contribute to the battleship’s overall structural integrity, especially oil-containing structures. Most Upper Deck structures were removed from Arizona before construction of the Memorial, which spans the ship just aft of the galley area. Regardless, active monitoring of the entire ship, including these Upper Deck areas, is ongoing to watch for evidence of significant structural changes. External Monitoring The primary method used to monitor physical changes to USS Arizona’s hull is a series of very high-resolution Global Positioning System (GPS) points. Using dual-frequency GPS receivers, researchers have set a series of monitoring points across Arizona’s exposed decks. Initially using stainless steel studs, later changed to PVC disks, in selected locations, NPS surveyors leveled a large, purpose-built underwater tripod over each point (Figure 7). Extension poles set on top of the tripod extending above the water’s surface allowed the GPS antenna to be placed precisely over the desired point. Using advanced survey techniques, each point was collected with sub-centimeter accuracy in three dimensions. These points will be re-surveyed every two years to FIGURE 7 NPS archeologist Larry Murphy setting up an underwater tripod on USS Arizona used to collect highresolution GPS positions. Credit: Brett Seymour/NPS. determine if, and how, the ship is moving, shifting, or settling. Although the accuracy of each point was mathematically calculated to about 0.5 cm (Circle of Error Probable), it will be necessary to apply a more conservative threshold of change to future monitoring re-occupations. Because of environmental conditions and differences in equipment and stadia variations, a more realistic threshold is 10 cm. Instrument error, set-up error, or most likely, nearly imperceptible antenna movement caused by water movement can create cumulative errors of up to 10 cm. Consequently, we cannot reliably attribute any observed change that is less than 10 cm vessel movement; however, corroborative evidence would be sought for any level of change. In addition to GPS, structural changes are being monitored using a series of crack monitors normally employed in measuring how cracks are widening on historic building walls. These plastic monitors were affixed over numerous cracks in the Upper Deck galley where Arizona’s deck collapse has been observed. The crack monitors are checked periodically to see if the cracks are widening or shifting. Internal Monitoring Internal structural monitoring of USS Arizona is a qualitative process using the VideoRay ROV to visually examine interior areas and note observable changes over time. Interior investigation is taking place over multiple years in all accessible areas for measuring and monitoring interior environmental factors and corrosion parameters. During this process, overall internal structural condition will be observed and noted. We will continue seeking appropriate ROV-deployable metal thickness measurement technology. dation of oil trapped within different areas of Arizona’s hull to ascertain residence time of each oil cache by determining the length of time each oil release has been in contact with seawater. Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) researchers are analyzing oil samples using gas chromatography coupled to mass spectrometry in order to assess the environmental weathering of the oil and to obtain a “fingerprint” of the oil leaking from the ship by examining the biomarker profile. While Bunker C is susceptible to biotic and abiotic weathering processes in the environment, it tends to be persistent due to the increased concentration of high molecular weight hydrocarbons. Using gas chromatography-flame ionization detection (GCFID) and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) to chemically characterize oil leaking from different regions of the ship, researchers have determined that oil leaking near Barbette No. 4 showed almost no detectable signs of weathering, while oil trapped in Second Deck overheads and leaking from other locations were depleted of nalkanes and low molecular weight polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. Results of analyses may differentiate individual oil bunkers, as well as differentiate age of oil (relative to sea water exposure) in cabin overheads and being released from various locations around the battleship, which has important implications for structural analysis. This approach may provide inferential indicators about the state of deterioration and structural changes of oil bunkers that are presently inaccessible in the battleship’s lower deck areas. In addition to baseline oil analysis, ongoing monitoring is being conducted to measure the amount of oil escaping from the ship at several locations. Using a custom-built oil collection device, researchers periodically capture all oil escaping from each location around Arizona’s hull during a 24-hour collection period. This quantifies the leakage rate for long-term monitoring to see whether oil leakage from specific locations is stable or increasing. Currently, we are collaborating on development of a remote oil monitoring system that can quantify the total, variable amount of oil being released in real-time. Microbiology Microbiological analyses are being pursued for several purposes. One of the main applications is to examine the role of microbially induced corrosion (MIC) in the FIGURE 8 Illumination inside a Junior Officer’s Stateroom reveals oil pooling between deck beams of the ceiling overhead. A white microbial community is visible growing on the oil surface at the left of the photograph. Credit: Brett Seymour/NPS. Oil Analyses Analysis of oil leaking from Arizona’s hull and trapped in accessible overhead spaces is designed to collect baseline data about the approximately 500,000 gallons of Bunker C fuel oil still remaining within the battleship and to be used indirectly to investigate the condition of interior oil bunkers. Collaborative research is focusing on using oil characterization to measure environmental degraFall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 61 degradation of Arizona’s oil bunkers. Biofilms are communities of microorganisms attached to an interface and embedded in a polysaccharide matrix produced by the microorganisms. They are ubiquitous in nature and are a common cause of corrosion. The depletion of oxygen from microhabitats within biofilms has important consequences for the corrosion of metals. Anaerobic conditions can result in the growth of sulfate-reducing bacteria (SRB), a frequent cause of MIC. Metal corrosion is driven by the hydrogenase activity of the SRB. Harvard University researchers are currently in the process of determining the ability of hydrocarbon degrading microorganisms isolated from USS Arizona to degrade steel. The objective is to determine the rate of corrosion in the oil-containing bunkers in USS Arizona. In addition to research into MIC, other microbiological investigations are being carried out on USS Arizona. MUSC scientists are currently developing innovative research that examines the role of microorganisms in fuel oil degradation and the aerobic biodegradation potential of microorganisms associated with the battleship’s hull (Figure 8). They are using denaturing gradient gel electrophoresis analysis to examine the microbial community structure of oil-degrading microorganisms from sediments adjacent to the USS Arizona that are using oil leaking from the ship as the sole source of carbon. The biodegradation potential of these microbial communities has demonstrated extensive degradation of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons from Bunker C crude as well as a novel pattern of biomarker degradation. Geological Analyses The USGS and NPS are conducting an analysis of the geological substrate surrounding and beneath USS Arizona to determine its nature and characteristics. The basic question being investigated is how stable are supporting sediments beneath the battleship, and is it possible Arizona is experiencing movement due to shifting sediments? Arizona’s overall stability within its supporting matrix is important because it can potentially affect GPS structural monitoring 62 Marine Technology Society Journal and the FEM. To be accurate, interpretation of GPS monitoring-point movement and predictions regarding structural stability, such as those produced from an FEM, must control for geological support variables. If movement is observed in GPS monitoring, it will be necessary to isolate potential internal changes (shifting, settling, and collapsing decks and internal bulkheads) from external movement (the entire ship settling into surrounding sediments). In addition, the FEM must take into account sediment characteristics surrounding and supporting Arizona’s hull, including potential differential support, to give an accurate indication of the vessel’s overall structural integrity. To conduct a comprehensive analysis of the geological substrate around USS Arizona, researchers are using a combination of geophysical remote sensing and geotechnical analysis of recovered 50-ft cores. Stratigraphic description and geotechnical analysis of cores recovered from around Arizona are providing data about sediment consolidation and compression properties and triaxial shear strength of distinct strata beneath the seabed. Chirp seismic reflection data collected in a wide area surrounding Arizona and precise correlation of sub-bottom records to geological core analysis project these engineering properties across the subsurface geological strata of Pearl Harbor surrounding the battleship. The combination of these data should give an overall indication of how stable Arizona is within its supporting geological matrix. Geographic Information System Development Geographic Information Systems (GIS) allow researchers to incorporate different types of data such as maps, plans, graphs, video and photographs into a single, cumulative, spatially referenced database for rapid display and manipulation. GIS is the use of multiple, spatially referenced databases to produce maps that graphically depict usergenerated combinations of variables presented as themes, layers or coverages. GIS has proven to be the appropriate methodology to compare variables among many sets of spatial data, such as artifact categories, remote sensing results and natural environmental characterizations, to examine distribution and change over space, and, if sufficient data are available, over time. Rapid manipulation of scale and variables can facilitate pattern recognition that may not be apparent at other levels. Examination of combined variables is instant because they are presented graphically, greatly simplifying analysis by precluding the necessity of generating mathematical and statistical models to characterize patterned relationships. Current computer and software speed allow rapid manipulation of multiple variable combinations, which allows generation of associations and relationships that might otherwise be unanticipated. GIS data sets can be presented as tabular database files or themes that can be generated, analyzed, scaled, combined, superimposed and displayed through direct user access in unlimited variations in a GIS program, such as ArcView. Data themes are presentations of nonspatial data referenced to a common location expressed as geographic coordinates. One way of looking at themes is to consider them x-y horizontal locations that share a category of variable z values, which represent discrete, quantifiable attributes, for example water depth or magnetic intensity. Primary electronic data are being consolidated into a single GIS database, including archeological maps and drawings, aerial images, relevant plans and technical drawings, photographs, video and results from ongoing fieldwork. The fieldwork results incorporated into the GIS include remote sensing data from sub-bottom profiler and single-beam bathymetric survey, data collected each year on eight GPS monitoring points, geological core locations and characteristics, and oceanographic and environmental monitoring instrument locations and data. In addition, contractors are developing a “geodatabase” of USS Arizona that includes digital information for each cabin and space on the plans—each object, space or cabin is a digitally separate entity with attributes linked to it through the geodatabase. Using these base maps and the geodatabase, scanned ship’s plans can be “linked” to their appropriate object or location on the ship. In this way, hundreds of scanned original USS Arizona plans can be incorporated into a single electronic database for easy accessibility, manipulation, and analysis. The GIS is being developed primarily for use by researchers involved with the current project, and as a seamless, cumulative, user-friendly way to organize and access data collected each field season. As a side benefit, certain portions of the GIS project can be made available to the public in the future via the internet. References Conclusion Lenihan, D.J. (Editor).1989. Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona Memorail and Pearl Harbor National Historic Landmark. Submerged Resources Center Professional Papers No. 9. Santa Fe, NM: National Park Service. This research approach for USS Arizona is designed to produce cumulative data whose synthesis will lead to management actions to preserve the vessel for future generations. We believe this experimental approach will produce results that will contribute to the disciplines involved and be applicable to numerous iron and steel legacy vessels submerged worldwide. This research partnership for the Pearl Harbor vessels is an example of government agencies, academic institutions, military commands, and private institutions working together effectively for public benefit. This collaboration is a model for combining public and private resources to cost-efficiently address issues important to the American people. Funding for this research is provided by the National Park Service Systemwide Archelolgical Inventory Program, Department of Defense Legacy Resources Management Fund, USS Arizona Memorial, and Arizonia Memorial Museum Association. Johnson, D. L., J. D. Makinson, R. De Angelis, B. Wilson and W. N. Weins. 2003. Metallurgical and Corrosion Study of Battleship USS Arizona, USS Arizona Memorial, Pearl Harbor. Unpublished Manuscript on file at National Park Service. Johnson, D.L., W. N. Weins, and J. D. Makinson. 2000. Metallographic Studies of the USS Arizona. In: Microstructural Science Vol. 27: Understanding Processing, Structure, Property, and Behavior Correlations. ed. William N. Weins. pp. 85-91. New York: ASM International. MacLeod, I. D. 1987. Conservation of Corroded Iron Artifacts – New Methods for On-Site Preservation and Cryogenic Deconcreting. International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Exploration, 16(1):49-56. Makinson, J. D., D. L. Johnson, M.A. Russell, D. L. Conlin and L. E. Murphy. 2002. In Situ Corrosion Studies on the Battleship USS Arizona. Materials Performance, 41(10):56-60. North, N. A. 1976. Formation of Coral Concretions on Marine Iron. International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Exploration, 5(3):253-258. North, N.A. and I.D. MacLeod. 1987. Corrosion of Metals. In: Conservation of Marine Archaeological Objects. ed. Colin Pearson. pp. 68-98. London: Butterworth & Co. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 63 PAPER Methodologies for Removing Heavy Oil as Used on the SS Jacob Luckenbach and Joint International Testing Programs AUTHOR ABSTRACT Craig Moffatt PCCI, Inc. At 0440 on July 14, 1953, the 468-foot long C3 Cargo/Oil Carrier SS Jacob Luckenbach was struck by the SS Hawaiian Pilot about 31 km (17 miles) west of the Golden Gate Bridge, San Francisco, CA. The Luckenbach sank with no loss of life, but sustained massive structural damage from the collision, which caused the sinking. At the time of her collision and sinking she was in route to Korea with a full cargo of jeeps, trucks, and railroad equipment for the Korean War effort. It is estimated that her bunkers were topped off for the trip with heavy bunker C oil. In early 2002, the Luckenbach was identified as the source of “mystery” oil spills along the California coast. In May 2002, Titan Maritime LLC, with engineers from PCCI Inc., was contracted by the U.S. Coast Guard, Pacific Area Command, San Francisco, to conduct a vessel assessment and remove available oil. Global Diving & Salvage, Seattle, provided saturation diving services and Crowley Maritime provided the primary work barge and tug services. Problems encountered included extended cold-water saturation diving at depths to 55 m, strong reversing currents, extremely adverse weather, and poor sub-sea visibility. The heavy residual oils in the deep tanks and double bottoms also proved to be a pumping challenge since some tanks contained oil that was far more viscous than normal number 6 fuel oil (Ingersoll-Dresser, 1998). This paper describes the approach to the oil recovery from this wreck, as well as expanding upon more recent and ongoing developments in the field of emergency ship and sunken vessel viscous oil off-loading methodologies. 1.0 Residual Oil “Bunker Fuels” Here to Stay G lobal Markets for bunker fuels are on the rise and have been for a couple of decades, according to Bunkerworld (www.Bunkerworld.com) and the International Bunker Industry Association (IBIA). This is due primarily to the industrialization of developing nations in Asia, South America, and Eastern Europe. The impacts of this phenomenon are quite apparent when we look at some of the most recent international incidents such as the New Carissa (Oregon), the Prestige (Spain), and the Nakhodka (Japan) to name a few. The increase in the global demand for residual fuels creates increased risks for strandings and sinkings. The potential for larger spills also has increased as tanker sizes for heavy fuel oils increase. According to an article in World Bunkering by IBIA chairman Doug Barrow (2004): “We are seeing a growing trend towards larger stems with deliveries of over 8,000 tonnes no longer uncommon…This means that many new double hulled barges will be built bigger and have faster pumping rates …” According to the International Organization of Standards (ISO 8217), Viscosity Grades for residual oils can range from 50 centistokes (cSt) at 50°C to 810 cSt at 50°C. The heavier grades are the most persistent and most difficult to off-load and to clean up when spilled into marine eco-systems. This problem is further exacerbated when trying to recover heavy fuel oils, such as bunker C, from older wrecks like the Jacob Luckenbach, due to the waxing and weathering of the oil. Oil viscosities measured from ship strandings and sinkings have 64 Marine Technology Society Journal tended to be much higher than the heavy oil viscosities listed above for the ISO high and low range (see Table 1). This paper examines some of the aspects of the Jacob Luckenbach oil recovery project, with respect to some of the equipment and methodologies that were used during that project. There are also new methods and equipment being developed as a result of large oil recovery operations and the success of joint operational tests between the United States Coast Guard, the Canadian Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy. The Luckenbach provided us with a worst case type scenario (albeit not the worst case) of trying to recover weathered, cold, bunker C oil from a sunken wreck. Full scale tests results and advancements in new systems under development will enhance the salvors’ capability of dealing with future scenarios such as this. SS Luckenbach Oil Recovery Project (Overview) In May 2002, Titan Maritime LLC, with PCCI Inc., was contracted by the U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command, San Francisco, to conduct a vessel assessment and perform removal of the pumpable oil. Titan Maritime LLC directed all marine salvage and pumping operations, and PCCI provided engineering services for pumping and wreck assessment. Global Diving & Salvage of Seattle provided saturation diving services. Crowley provided the staging barge and support services. The offshore portion of the project lasted from May 26 through October 2, 2003. The wreck was located 31 km west of the Golden Gate Bridge in the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary. Pertinent project statistics include the following: Average depth at sea floor 55 meters (180 ft) Oil type #6 Oil Bunker C Total quantity petroleum products recovered 480 tons (125,000 US gallons) Water recovered with oil 151 tons (40,000 US gallons) Type of diving utilized Saturation Helium/ Oxygen Mix Recovery Platform Barge CMC-450-10 137 meters (450 ft) The Crowley 450-10 project support barge was positioned over the wreck using a transponder-based GPS system. This allowed the salvage master to view the recovery platform’s position over the wreck at any given time. The 3-dimensional model of the wreck was overlaid onto the position chart to enable real-time viewing of the respective positions of the wreck, support barge, and diving bell. Once on station over the wreck, the initial stages of the project (aside from 20 days of heavy seas) involved assessing the condition of the wreck and locating and testing accessible tanks for oil. The assessment required a two-man saturation dive team to conduct visual and video examination of the wreck. The divers drilled holes to test tanks and spaces for oil by pulling samples and probing with special tools. A virtual model of the wreck was updated, as oil was found and actual wreck damage assessed. This information was analyzed to determine the best approaches for oil recovery. FIGURE 1 SS Jacob Luckenbach as a troop transport tic masses in hundreds of frames throughout the ship. The leakage essentially stopped at that time. In the late summer and fall each year, the bottom currents changed direction allowing the current to enter the hull and slowly push small amounts of viscous trapped oil out of the ship to the surface or to roll along the bottom and drift ashore much later as tar balls. It is likely that this slow periodic release has occurred over many years, oiling the California coast. The only oil information initially available were viscosity reports indicating that some of the oil was a low-viscosity “diesellike” product or that the oil was tar-like, with a viscosity of over 300,000 cSt at ocean bottom temperatures. A range of high viscosity oils was found in the tanks. Since bottom temperatures were in the 4°C to 8°C range, most of these waxy high-pour point heavy oil products would not easily flow and greatly complicated the recovery operation. FIGURE 2 View of support barge over the wreck site 2.0 Oil on the Luckenbach When the Luckenbach sank, her bunkers were warm and would have leaked from various hull cracks, vents, and compromised bulkheads shortly after the sinking. Some of the oil that did not escape ended up in the overheads of the many cargo spaces and ‘tween decks. As the oil cooled in the approximately 5°C water, it solidified into sticky semi-plasFall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 65 3.0 The Oil Recovery System FIGURE 3 The oil recovery system used on the Luckenbach evolved over the course of the operation. Many of the pumping system components initially mobilized were off-the- shelf items or were quickly fabricated, based on very limited initial information about the wreck. Hull attachment flange with steam and annular water injection 3.1 Initial Pumping Operations The oil on board this vessel was highly viscous and the condition of tank piping and the vent system was highly deteriorated. Hull plating samples and hull thickness gauging showed that the hull was in surprisingly good shape, particularly near the fuel tanks. Hull thickness deterioration typically varied from 60% to 5% wastage from the upper to the lower hull plating respectively. The ship’s vents, sounding and piping systems, however, were in extremely poor condition. The vent piping was made using electric seam welding. The weld metal used in that process had disappeared from much of the vent piping over the last halfcentury. In June, an attempt was made to heat and simultaneously off-load oil from a port deep tank in the stern section. The approach was to use a 75 mm (3-inch) screw pump with a 75 mm discharge hose. The small screw pump, a Desmi DOP160, had a water inlet injection flange designed by flemmingCo Environmental Aps, Denmark and VOPS water-outlet injection flange designed by PCCI. After the system was attached to the hull, using a 150 mm bolted hot-tap system, steam was applied to both the pump elbow and to a steam injection point 3 meters below the pump inlet. The objective was to heat the oil in proximity to the pump while pulling oil from the hole at a slow pump rate. This would cause oil in the tank to flow into the heated void left behind by pump suction due to hydrostatic head. Steam was provided by one of two 1.03 mPa (150 psig) boilers on the recovery barge. Figure 3 shows a pump attached to installed piping and flanges. The first oil recovery attempt recovered only about four cubic meters of oil before water was encountered. It appeared that the 66 Marine Technology Society Journal surrounding cold oil was too viscous to flow into the heated pump inlet; instead, cold water was pulled into the pump from a tank vent. Since the oil density was approximately the same as that of the surrounding seawater, the oil would neither float nor sink when displaced by seawater. This stopped further oil from heating using that method of heat insertion. Later in the operation, insertion heaters were used successfully to heat the entire tank contents over the course of several days (see Section 3.3). The deep tanks were usually vertical tanks located above the double bottom tanks between the cargo tanks (see Figure 4). Oil in tanks such as the number 5A deep tank was so viscous that it had nested and weathered in the pipe vents and stopped leaking at the time the vessel went down. Once the tank was heated, this vent oil was warmed and then flowed up the vents and through the upper holds, causing a surface spill. It became obvious that it would be necessary to access and seal the tank vents. This process of containment took approximately 30 days to seal all the accessible vents on the ship. Tank heating and pumping resumed in late July. 3.2 Saturation Diving Operations Saturation diving was chosen for the Luckenbach oil removal project for its relative safety and efficiency. This is a method of diving whereby the divers are held under pressure around the clock, eliminating risks and time spent on daily decompression schedules. When divers go into saturation, their bodies become completely saturated with dissolved gases. During normal diving operations the diver spends a limited time at depth, with the breathing gas entering his system slowly at shallow depths and quickly at greater depths. The diver must decompress slowly in order to allow the dissolved gases to exit his body through normal breathing. Each time a diver goes through decompression, he is at risk of suffering from decompression sickness or gas embolism. These risks are eliminated when divers are in saturation, as there is only one decompression event performed per run. Saturation runs last from two days to a month, depending on the project. A two-man, 12-hour saturation schedule was chosen. Divers awakened at 0500 for breakfast, loaded out the bell with the day’s supplies, and descended in the pres- surized bell at approximately 0700 each morning. Divers tended each other, with one diver working in the morning and the other in the afternoon. Each dive lasted 4.5 hours, for a total of approximately 9 hours of working bottom time per day. To achieve the equivalent amount of bottom time using conventional surface diving techniques to the working depth of 55 m, approximately 10 dives per day would have been required, along with approximately 50 hours of decompression time in both the water and the deck chamber. This would require a crew of at least 20 additional people, working 24 hours a day. The Luckenbach project presented some unique challenges to the dive crew. These included working on a wreck in very poor condition, repeated exposure to black oil, and constant adaptation to changes and variations in sub sea tasks. The vessel had never been properly surveyed prior to launching the project, so no one was sure of its position or condition. Careful measurements had to be made and re-checked, due to the heavy marine growth hampering identification of ship structures. It was originally thought that the portion of the vessel containing the intact fuel tanks was sitting basically upright. Inspection by divers revealed that the vessel was listing heavily to starboard, with several starboard tanks completely inaccessible without massive tunneling. Divers could not allow any oil to enter their habitat or the bell, because the toxicity of any fumes emanating from the oil would be magnified due to bell pressure. Therefore, procedures were developed to avoid direct exposure to oil. If exposed, the diver decontaminated himself outside the bell prior to entry and was inspected and scrubbed down further by his partner as he entered the bell. Whenever the interior of the bell was potentially exposed, the bell was surfaced and thoroughly scrubbed down at night while the divers were sleeping in the habitat. Many planned procedures for inspection, oil verification, heating and removal worked well; however, an equal number needed to be refined or re-thought in order to produce the desired result. One continuing problem was communication, because divers doing the work were never in face-to-face contact with topside personnel. The proper use of simple new tools or techniques had to be explained in laborious detail to avoid frustration. The use of nightly phone conversations to the chamber and drawings and notes passed through an air lock (with a supply of cookies) were often necessary to prepare for the next day. 3.3 Tank Heating The recovery team designed and procured six special-purpose heat exchangers that could be inserted through the hull into the fuel tanks without injecting live steam into the tank. The steam hoses for these units were linked in series to other heat exchangers, and the exhaust condensate was dumped into the sea. Two 1300 kw-hr (4.5 million BTU) low-pressure boilers were used to feed the steam manifolds of 38 mm (1.5 inch) steam lines. The average steam line consisted of 110 meters of hose. Four primary steam lines were used, with a fifth available as necessary. Each boiler was esti- mated to be able to provide about 1 metric ton of usable steam per hour. However, the total effective heating capacity of the any one boiler could not be transferred with just the insertion type heaters on hand. When all of the insertion heaters available were used at once they could only handle approximately 25% of the estimated effective capacity of the boiler. The advantage of having multiple boilers was a) redundancy and b) having more steam line circuit capacity. When live steam was used in conjunction with the heat exchangers all the available energy of the boiler was utilized. Live steam was usually used by putting steam into the water bottoms of the tanks. Larger tanks, such as the horizontality configured number 2 and 3 double-bottoms, required the use of all six heat exchangers plus a pair of live steam injection nozzles. Both boilers were used to provide the steam in the quantity needed to feed these units. For the smaller tanks, only one boiler and two or three steam lines were required for the heat exchangers and live steam injection nozzles. FIGURE 4 Double bottom tank #2 shown with heat exchangers and circulation loops attached Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 67 With ocean bottom temperatures around 6°C and steam temperatures at over 148°C, a continuous heat loss into the surrounding ocean occurred from both hoses and tank walls, requiring most of the tanks to be heated for several days before pumping a single tank. Once the heating process started to warm the oil, the oil in the tanks was circulated to aid in conveying that heat throughout the tank (see Figure 4). The circulation process allowed the use of hot oil to help heat parts of the tank space that could not be reached directly with the heat exchangers. This was accomplished by using the main “screw” (attached to the skin of the target tank) to pump cold or warmed oil from the tank via transfer hose through ‘Tee’ sections built into sections of the heat exchangers. The hot oil was then diverted via flexible hose to a long insertion pipe that would push the oil into the middle or corner section of the tank in order to redistribute the heat. Thus warm oil or cold oil would be pulled from the tank and pushed passed a heat exchanger and back into the tank. This process worked well to help heat the entire tank contents. It would have taken a much longer time to heat via normal conduction and convection within the large, shallow double-bottom tanks. The initial estimated heat loss to the surrounding seawater was 20% although an after action analysis of the amount of heat produced and put into the system compared to the amount required to heat the same mass of oil in ideal conditions showed that heat losses were several times higher than the original estimate. A pressure loss of 25 psi per 400-foot section of hose was calculated. Multiple sections of hose were used to supply steam from the two boilers. After overcoming a bottom pressure of 87 psia the expected steam pressure was assumed to be in the 50-psia range to the heat exchangers. In order to try to quantify the amount of effective heating taking place in the tank, internal tank temperature readings were recorded during the operation. The temperatures were obtained by drilling and tapping holes into the hull and threading temperature gauges into the side of the ship. Although having temperature gauges inserted 68 Marine Technology Society Journal only just inside the skin of the tank did not give a true picture of what was happening throughout the tank, they did help to provide a relative indicator as to how heat was moving throughout the tank. Oil temperature was also measured at the pump inlet (gauge located in the pump suction elbow) and at the surface. The amount of heat energy required depended upon many variables, some of which were not known. We had to make some assumptions about heat losses from the tanks, heater efficiencies, and hose. The recovery team was able to achieve average tank temperatures of 40°C to 55°C (105°F to 130° F) before pumping started. Heating took place for a period of hours or days, depending on the tank geometry, until warm pockets of oil could be circulated by the main pump. Oil was pumped to the surface only when temperature probes indicated that the average temperature in the tank was over 115°F with temperatures near the heat exchangers reaching as high as (77°C) 170°F. The temperature of the oil reaching the receiving station on the recovery barge was usually 32°C to 38°C (90°F to 100°F) with a 10°F difference between the oil entering the pump and arriving at the surface. An annular water injection system was used to both keep the pump cool during direct steam injection, to keep the inlet warm during coil circulation and to lubricate the discharge TABLE 1 Expended energy and final efficiency during tank heating hose in order to enhance flow and keep the pressures down. The temperatures achieved for heating water for AWI were around 38°C (100°F) at the surface but even assuming the actual water reaching the pump was only on the order of 21°C to 27°C (70 or 80°F) it was still enough to keep oil flowing in the pump suction. It was found that without AWI cold oil would clog the pump suction and not allow the forced circulation process to take place. A steam lance was used for local heating, such as directly behind or near the pump, or underneath the oil in a water pocket. U-tube closed coils were inserted for longer-duration, larger-tank heating. The bottom steam pressures were expected to be on the order of 350 kPa across the coils. This was due to losses of 170 kPa from pressure drop and having to overcome bottom pressure of 480 kPa. Some basic initial steam equations put the heat required at approximately 17 kw-hr per metric ton of oil (approximately 27 BTU/lb), heat losses from the tank itself not withstanding. As can be seen from Table 1, the “after action” data analysis shows us we expended energy on the average of 194 Kw-hr (300 BTU/lb). Theoretically, about 528 kw-hr of heat energy could be put into the tank using only one boiler. This accounted for both heat conduction through hose walls and pressure drop for volume of steam flow through given length of hose. For the smaller tanks, such as number 5A-Port with only about 50 metric tons of oil, this meant the entire mass of oil could have been heated to target temperatures in only a few hours. Tank heat losses were originally estimated to be much less than they really were because the heavy oil created an insulating blanket on the internal surface of the tank. In actuality though, that tank was heated for almost 24hours before recirculating or removing oil. An important factor that was not considered until well into the operation was the effect of the cold seawater that would fill the void left by removing the oil. This is why pumping to the surface was delayed until all the tank contents could be heated to a high temperature. The average temperature obtained in tank 5A-Port was 43°C, with pockets measured as high as 71°C. By referencing the information in Table 1, one can see that although the heating system and methods were ultimately very effective in achieving the oil heating goals, they were extremely inefficient when viewed from an energy supplied vs. energy utilized standpoint. This information is important for future projects where there is very little control over environmental factors such as water depth, temperature and currents, and boiler/heat exchanger sizing must be estimated in advance of having all the variables known. that oil that has cooled becomes much more viscous and difficult to remove. It also shows us that oil that has to be recovered from the sea becomes extraordinarily difficult to remove because it may exceed its pour point. This effect complicates the oil removal and pumping operations. The bar graph in Figure 5 is included here to provide a visual comparison of the significant difference between standard #6 bunker fuel viscosity and some of the “case history” examples of oil viscosity as tested from oil samples taken during or after attempted oil recoveries from these wrecks. The New Carissa, Prestige and Jacob Luckenbach oil viscosities were tested at similar shear rates and were extraordinarily high. In the case of the New Carissa, the oil tested was taken after the ship was set on fire and then burned out which helps to ex- plain the high viscosity as any lighter ends were boiled off. Unfortunately a large amount of residual oil remained on board after the fire had gone out and the remaining product was much more viscous and difficult to remove than the original bunker oil. The Luckenbach oil had weathered deep water for 49 years, hence it was semi-solidified, waxy, and very resistant to flow without large amounts of heat. After the stranding of the New Carissa in Oregon in 1999, the USCG, the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage, and members of industry formed the Joint Viscous Oil Pumping System (JVOPS) Workgroup. From 1999 to 2003 there were six full-scale pumping viscous oil transfer type tests conducted in the U.S. and Canada. The goal was to explore and develop the use of An- FIGURE 5 Comparison of various wreck recovered bunker oil viscosities 3.4 Improvements in Oil Removal Technology Since the Jacob Luckenbach Ship casualties that involve heavy residual oils (either as cargo or bunkers) have created difficult oil recovery conditions. Vessel casualties with heavy oil, such as the Morris J. Berman (1994, Puerto Rico), New Carissa (1999, Oregon), the Erika (1999, France), and the Prestige (2002, Spain), make global headlines due to the persistence of the oil, the difficulty of the clean up and the impact of the oil on the shorelines. Figure 5 shows a bar graph with temperature vs. viscosity curves of oil recovered from several wrecks as well as a normal, high viscosity range # 6 (Bunker C) oil. The importance of this graph is that it shows us Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 69 nular Water Injection (AWI) and other flow enhancing techniques to improve high viscosity oil pumping capability. Annular Water Injection is the process of injecting water into either the discharge pipe at the outlet of the pump, or into the suction side of the pump via annular flanges. The small amount of water coats the inside of the transfer hose creating a moving sleeve of water, which displaces the “oil-to-hose wall” friction with a water-to-hose wall friction. Although there is additional friction between the oil and the water the resulting drop in pressure is phenomenal. When used correctly, i.e., when used with warm or hot water at the inlet and ratios of 2% to 4% at both the inlet and the outlet, the resulting drop in pressure as compared to not using AWI ranges from 10:1 to 25:1 depending on oil type, hose length, pump type, and water temperature. The final JVOPS test objectives achieved in 2003 testing, which took place in Houma, Louisiana using very viscous bitumen oil obtained from Canadian tar pits included: ■ Bitumen oil of approximately 200,000centistoke (cSt) viscosity was pumped to a distance of more than 450 meters at greater than 56 cubic meters per hour ■■ Bitumen oil of approximately 500,000 cSt viscosity was pumped through 150 mm hose to a distance of more than 150 meters at 27.5 cubic meters per hour ■ Successful comparison of new AWI and existing AWI flange designs was completed ■ Comparison of hot and cold water injection on both inlet and outlet sides of the pump was completed and results showed that warm or hot water used at the inlet flange and warm or cold water at the outlet flange worked the best ■ The impact of local bulk heating (heating oil surrounding the pump inlet to facilitate inflow) on the effectiveness of water injection was tested with disappointing results (increase in flow rate or drops in pressure were not greater than with just water injection) ■ Techniques to re-establish flow in a long hose run after a period of extended system shut down were tested; findings showed that flow could be re-established in 100 70 Marine Technology Society Journal ■ meters of hose filled with 200,000 cSt oil using the hot water inlet and outlet injection but flow could not be established in 450 meters of hose Finally, new in-situ hose pigging and cleaning techniques were successfully developed and tested, which allows reuse of oiled hoses 4.0 AWI Techniques Produce Phenomenal Results The effects of AWI on viscous oil pumping can be verified by the data presented here and by previous tests and workshops (Moffatt, 1999, 2003; Loesch, 2000). The data can be compared for tests conducted on oil of similar viscosity. This included all tests with bitumen in the range of 148,000 cSt viscosity to 210,000 cSt. That set of data produced a curve showing hose length vs. head pressure with constant flow rate. This curve is shown in Figure 6. The curve also shows the theoretical pumping head pressure of pure bitumen of 200,000 cSt viscosity in similar conditions as calculated by using the Darcy Weisbach equation. Because of the high pumping pressure needed to overcome frictional losses, the curve had to be plotted on a scale of 100:1 so that it could be plotted on the same graph as the test data using AWI techniques. The low head pressure achieved in the series of tests that this data was taken from show us that salvors and oil response personnel can use the AWI tools to transfer viscous oils relatively long distances. By plotting the test results from the range of viscosities described above, we can compare the curve for pure bitumen to head pressure created by using AWI techniques. Using the AWI techniques developed and nurtured by the JVOPS Workgroup, the resulting pressure drop is greater than that of pure turbulent water by a non-linear ratio that increases with hose length. The difference of AWI incurred head pressure to that of pure bitumen, however, is significant and the ratio increases exponentially. The results of these optimized AWI techniques are phenomenal due to the enormous gains in the form of increased flow rates and reduced pressure drops achieved from the FIGURE 6 Comparison of pumping pressures developed transferring heavy residual bitumen oil process. The downside of using AWI technology is that in order to utilize it you must add one or more small pumps, additional small hose, increase in supply power to operate the pumps, and ideally add a portable source of heat energy to the system. There also must be the addition of the AWI flanges to the main oil off-loading pump. The process also adds water to the recovered oil in the range of 2% to 8% of water to oil volume. This water, which usually ends up being separated out in the oil recovery tank, can be re-used as injection water if the system is set up to operate that way. 5.0 Summary The recovery of viscous oil from stricken vessels at sea, whether they are stranded near shore or lying at the bottom of the sea, is a formidable challenge. The proper application of both new and old techniques is the key to successful oil recovery. Salvors and their engineers must be prepared to utilize many different techniques to overcome the unknown conditions of the wreck and the oil viscosity. Recent oil recovery operations from wrecks, including the SS Jacob Luckenbach, and from subsequent testing and development have increased the knowledge and experience of heavy oil recovery. As a result, better tools and techniques are now available to the salvors. As with all salvage and wreck recovery work, it will ultimately come down to the ingenuity and perseverance of the men and women tasked with recovering the oil that determines the success of the operation. At least now they have more options available to them then they did in 1999. References Barrow, D. 2004. Time Waits For No Man. World Bunkering. 9(2). Bunkerworld.com. International Bunker Industry Association. Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Company. 1998. Cameron Hydraulic Data. Viscosity of Fuel Oils. 4:30. Loesch, R.M., Moffatt, C., and Knutson, S. 2000. Development and Testing of the U.S. Coast Guard water injection enhanced Viscous Oil Pumping System (VOPS). Proceedings of the 23rd Artic and Marine Oil spill Program Technical Seminar, Environment Canada, Ottawa, ON, pp. 385-399. Moffatt, C. 1999. Testing of the U.S. Coast Guard Viscous Oil Pumping System (VOPS Prototype) at the MMS OHMSETT Test Facility, Earle, NJ, November 1999. U.S.C.G./ US Navy/GPC Technical Report 19. Moffatt, C. 2003. Final Report Joint Viscous Oil Pump Test and Workshop #6, Houma, Louisiana December 2003. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 71 PAPER Resources and UnderSea Threats (RUST) Database: An Assessment Tool for Identifying and Evaluating Submerged Hazards within the National Marine Sanctuaries AUTHOR ABSTRACT Michael L. Overfield National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Sanctuary Program Recent incidents within our National Marine Sanctuaries and throughout our country have directed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to begin to look proactively at catastrophic oil and other chemical releases from submerged sources. Integrating data from federal, state, and private sources, the Resources and UnderSea Threats (RUST) database was developed to inventory and determine, through analysis, the scope of this potential threat. This paper describes the development, structural content, and data analysis tools incorporated. Although RUST was developed initially for use by sanctuary resource protection managers, its application has relevance to the broader response community. BACKGROUND T he National Marine Sanctuary Program serves as the trustee for a system of 14 underwater parks, encompassing more than 150,000 square miles of marine and Great Lakes waters. The sanctuary program is part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which manages sanctuaries by working cooperatively with the public to protect sanctuary responses while allowing compatible recreational and commercial activities. The system includes 13 national marine sanctuaries and the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve, which is being considered for sanctuary status. The program works to enhance public awareness of our marine resources and maritime heritage through educational programs, outreach, monitoring, scientific research, and exploration. The Resource Protection Team (RPT) within the National Marine Sanctuary System responds to incidents which have potentially significant impacts on sanctuary resources, and the uses of those resources such as the crash of Alaska Air # 261, and oil spills from the M/ V Cape Mohican and SS Jacob Luckenbach. For every incident, field and headquarters 72 Marine Technology Society Journal Resource Protection staff are required to make decisions and recommendations in a compressed amount of time. The incidents noted above, combined with heightened national security awareness, have highlighted the need for coordinated, multi-hazard contingency planning to safeguard the marine, historical, and cultural FIGURE 1 SHIELDS home page resources within the National Marine Sanctuaries. In response to that need, the National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP) and NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration’s Hazardous Materials Division have developed the Sanctuaries Hazardous Incident Emergency Logistics Database System (SHIELDS) (Figure 1). SHIELDS is a comprehensive web-based tool for preparedness in planning and protecting the National Marine Sanctuary System. SHIELDS enables NOAA, its partner trustees, and other response agencies to plan and respond to incidents in the sanctuaries using one source that provides information on all relevant sanctuary resources and maritime uses. The web-based interface guides users through critical steps to identify information about resources at risk, additional threats, available response assets, notification contacts, maps, coastal observations systems, and jurisdictional information. The system can also be set up for offline use for on-scene field deployment during response events. Some response events stem from incidents that occurred years previously. Often this type of pollution is perceived as normal seepage or emanating from passing vessels, and often requires years of repeated sampling and assessment to narrow down potential sources of these threats. Other underwater sources (vessels, pipelines, abandoned well heads, ammunition and chemical weapon dumpsites), losing their structural integrity, may be introducing pollutants into the marine environment at a slow and steady rate. FIGURE 2 RUST data displayed in ArcGIS A Proactive Approach Over 150,000 ships are reported lost in U.S. waters (Figure 2). Many of these reported sinkings are both historical and cultural time capsules, and the majority does not present a risk to the environment or to human safety. Since the late 1800s, however, many vessels carried cargos that do pose a threat. The inevitable release of a sunken vessel’s cargo, either through a chronic lowlevel discharge as in the SS Jacob Luckenbach, or by catastrophic failure as in the USS Mississinewa, is only a matter of time. In an effort to take a proactive approach in identifying potential risks before an incident occurs within the sanctuaries, NOAA decided a national database of possible threats be established, focusing specifically on those issues of concern to both federal and state resource protection personnel. Using this approach sites can be considered for direct intervention such as the removal of the threat sources, isolation of the threat, and management plan development or establishment of a monitoring protocol for the site. Although oil releases from World War I and World War II era vessels pose a concern to the NMSP Resource Protection Team, there are other hazards of concern as well. In the spring of 2004, for example, discarded naval ammunition from an offshore disposal site found itself underneath a fuel dock on the California coast. A century of open ocean dumping has left us with a legacy of chemical and conventional weapon, and nuclear waste dump sites, to name a few, that time has forgotten, but whose contents may contain additional threats to our ocean systems. Abandoned and exploratory wells are also part of our past and are themselves beginning to show signs of structural failure. As each year passes since the sinking of vessels and other steel structures and containers, the environment acts to further deteriorate them and increases the risk of a significant release of oil and other chemicals. One of the tools being incorporated into SHIELDS to address this situation is the Resources and UnderSea Threats (RUST) Database. Development of the Database As one of the first steps in discovering the point source of years worth of beach and bird oiling on the central California coast, a regional database search was conducted, using multiple database sources, to narrow down a list of potential contributors to the continued spills. It was through this successful query that a list of potential point source targets was identified. Through investigative techniques and oil ‘fingerprint’ analysis, the SS Jacob Luckenbach (Figure 3) was identified as the decade-long oil release point source. RUST builds upon the strategy used in identifying the point source through regional database analysis and expands the strategy to a national level. The database development team was tasked to create a national database of undersea threats through a collation of existing historical databases and identification of data gaps (location, cargo contents, vessel types), and, through the database, determine what the likely impacts are to the surrounding environment. In addition, should a historically or archaeologically significant site be identified within the database, identify the outside influences that may pose a threat to the site. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 73 FIGURE 3 Multi-beam image of SS Jacob Luckenbach, responsible for mystery oil spill for over 50 years. Image courtesy of USCG, 2002. The mission of the RUST database is to develop, maintain, and manage an active and comprehensive inventory of undersea threats and potential environmental hazards within United States waters. RUST assists NOAA and other trustees to locate and identify potential hazards and develop resource protection strategies improving emergency preparedness and contingency planning for America’s coastal and maritime resources. RUST also serves as a repository for new assessment data as it is obtained. RUST focuses specifically on locating and identifying those underwater threats that may be pollution hazards such as abandoned wellheads, pipelines, platforms, and sunken tankers. Also, the database includes other hazards such as explosive ordnance, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and chemical weapon dumpsites, along with sites requiring protection of historical and cultural importance. The scope of RUST data collected extends from the coastline of the United States to the outer continental shelf. Database Structure The RUST database is a Sequel Server relational database designed by NOAA’s National Marine Sanctuary Program and Special Projects Office, and is housed in a secure server 74 Marine Technology Society Journal maintained by the Information Management Division at NOAA headquarters in Silver Spring, Maryland. Fourteen tables have been built into the database with over 150 fields being populated for each record. This information includes, but is not limited to: positioning, ship typology, date of loss, cargo, amount of oil or fuel remaining, contact information, bottom type, site proximity to sanctuaries, and the inherent risks associated with the record. Each record has the capacity to store images, PDF files for Hazardous Materials Data Sheets, and other record source information. RUST is comprised of federal, state, and private databases from around the United States. These databases are currently being identified, acquired, analyzed and incorporated into the RUST database. Each data set is compared to all the others; duplicate records are eliminated, while still retaining attributes unique to the individual data sets. The RUST database contains only select fields from the original databases found to be compatible with the mission of RUST. Initial database fields populated represent only 20% of the data that can be held for each record within the database; archival research combined with field investigation will result in an accurate and up-to-date representation of each individual record. RUST contains over 20,000 records currently, though will exceed 40,000 records by 2005. Each record is given position coordinates in decimal degrees based upon its known or reported location, along with position quality/accuracy information associated with the coordinates assigned. This allows the data to be displayed in GIS for visual interpretation, evaluation, spatial analysis, and for the data to be queried through any GIS software application in either vector or raster formats. Information regarding the proximity of a site to large population centers, maritime borders, ports, and coastal approaches are but a few areas that may be viewed. The database was designed with the capacity to expand into a geospatial database, increasing its functionality in GIS applications. Initial analysis of the records concentrate on those sites with the best-known position quality and accuracy. Records with low or poor position quality/accuracy information will be subjected to other analytical tools (i.e. multi-beam surveys, magnetic anomaly maps, and other remote sensing applications) in an attempt to locate and identify, with a more precise degree of accuracy, ‘targets’ for further investigation. The site-specific information within each record includes depth associated with each record allowing for the plotting of potential ‘targets’ in 3-D applications. Data Security The RUST database is held behind a secure firewall and is accessible only through NOAA’s internal network by administratively controlled passwords, and only available to designated users through NOAA’s intranet system. Prior to users being assigned a password to the database, they must sign a non-disclosure agreement to protect sites of historical and cultural significance. Each user is then assigned specific tables and fields, based on their needs, to view and access. The NMSP realizes that sensitive information contained within the databases acquired for this project needs to be protected. Addressing this concern, the NMSP has developed a non-disclosure statement representing our commitment to protecting sensitive historic properties contained in those databases. Risk Assessment FIGURE 4 Hard lessons learned in the decade-long oiling of shoreline and seabirds along the California coast, finally attributed to the SS Jacob Luckenbach in 2002, and concerns about other casualties such as the Puerto Rican, Montebello, and the recent Bow Mariner sinking (Figure 4), prompted NOAA’s National Marine Sanctuary Program to initiate a risk assessment of these undersea threats within the RUST database. The RUST database, through the synthesis of the databases collected, provides its users with vulnerability assessment of undersea threats and presents a better picture of those threats currently lying within United States waters. One of the key components of the database is the Risk Assessment query. This query provides a baseline risk value for each record within the database and allows for a comparison of different site types. The assessment will allow Resource Protection staff members throughout the United States to determine the best method to approach each site. Pre-selected fields within each record (i.e. structural remains, position accuracy, fuel remaining, cargo type, its potential threat to pollution, navigation, human safety) have been selected to receive a numeric expression based on a pre-determined algorithm. Although subjective in nature, this will produce a base risk level assessment for each record within the database. The risk value algorithm and numeric values may be changed for each record and fields to reflect new situations or better data acquisition. Based on the initial data capture and assessment, the RUST database may be queried in a variety of ways. Two pre-set queries have been incorporated into the database. The Risk Assessment Query generates a regional report of threats identified within either a general or specific geographical area. The reports include information on the immediacy of the threats, geographic latitude/longitude/ depth, type of threat, and source information. A more site-specific ‘target’ analysis can be performed on any individual record, and the report will include the above information in addition to site plans, schematics, and a brief history of the target. Multi-beam image of Bow Mariner. Image courtesy of NOAA, 2004. Effects of Corrosion on Steel There are several fields within the risk value assessment that need additional research and first-hand knowledge. Assessment of ferrous-hulled submerged vessels generally occurs after an oil release has taken place continuing a “reactive” strategy to oil spill response. Analysis usually consists of identifying areas of the vessel that are leaking, attempting to patch the vessel, or remove the oil. A “preventative” approach to submerged vessels’ potential to release oil, allowing for mitigation or salvage of the oil prior to release, will result in an active response strategy, but it is first necessary to understand elements critical in conducting vessel damage assessment. There are a variety of factors in the underwater environment that affect the condition of sunken metal objects. Marine bacteria, storms and currents, bottom sediment type, and the sea itself all play a part in metals destruction. Degradation rates depend on the water oxygen content, pH level and temperature, depth the vessel has been lying in, as well as the extent of damage, construction method, materials used in construction, and the age of the vessel prior to sinking (Hamilton, 1996). Sunken vessels from both World Wars have been affected by many factors since the time of their sinking. Some of the vessels may have been structurally altered and undermined due to explosions, fire, collisions causing stress, and tension/compression changes in the steel. Once submerged, these vessels have been continuously exposed to the corrosive effect of seawater. If sunk in an area of strong currents, higher oxygen levels accelerate the steel corrosion process (MacLeod, 2002). Impacts from storms and the bottom sediments in which a vessel lies also play their part in the site formation process causing additional structural stresses and eventual failure of critical components within the vessels. Iron oxide (rust) begins to occupy more physical volume than the iron or steel itself, causing failure of metal components and fasteners. Leakage of oil and other chemicals from shipwrecks often occur in the valves, areas of dissimilar metals, and other mechanical connections (Shier, 1963). In order to better understand the processes described above, a site survey and vessel assessment must be performed. Discussed below are several methods that may be employed in the site assessment: 1). Remote sensing tools can be successfully employed to accurately locate the vessels and allow for comparison of change over time during follow-up assessment evaluations. Side-scan sonar and magnetometers contribute their own unique data that can be used for analysis and tell us a great deal about the submerged ferrous-objects. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 75 2). Photographic and visual inspection provides general information on a vessel’s integrity and site conditions. The baseline data obtained through either still or video photography allow for a comparison of the site over time. Visual observations identify whether the current condition of each vessels’ hull has the potential to contain oil in bunker fuel and cargo tanks. 3). Initial measurement of a vessel’s length/ beam tell us whether a vessel has been changed or altered during or after the wrecking process. The state of preservation at a site depends on the nature of the environment in which it is deposited, and a change in environmental conditions may have disastrous results on the site’s preservation. Analysis of the structure itself can be accomplished through a variety of methods. Understanding the environmental conditions affecting the wreck requires sampling of the seawater pH (partial hydrogen ion concentration) in multiple locations at varying distance from the wreck, temperature, oxygen level, and salinity, along with sediment type, current speed, the presence or lack of micro-bacteria (Beggiatoa) or other organisms (Piero, 2002). It should also be noted if some areas of the wreck are deteriorating at a rate faster than others. Visual inspection in several locations of the hull plate allow for comparison of the same area in subsequent trips to the site. Visual inspection of the welds, rubber gaskets, and rivets provide the same type of baseline data. Assessment Field Work The RUST marine archaeologist participated in a study of steel hulled shipwrecks during the summer of 2004. The joint NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service investigated seven shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico sunk by German U-boats during World War II. The primary goal of the study was to assess the wrecks archaeologically and determine how the environment is affecting their degradation, and how these wrecks are affecting the environment. The RUST archaeologist focused on a Corrosion Study of Deep Gulf Ship- 76 Marine Technology Society Journal wrecks of World War II and evaluated the present condition of the seven steel-hulled shipwrecks. Vessels analysis included: ■ visual assessment of the areas of corrosion present at each site ■ documentation of environmental conditions affecting the wreck sites ■ visual assessment of vessels’ structural integrity ■ determination of site formation characteristics unique to each site Data gathered in this study contributed to our knowledge of the behavior of corrosion on a variety of vessels sunk within the same year. A second study will take place in mid2005 off the coast of North Carolina, where a baseline assessment of several steel-hulled vessels will include an assessment of the structural remains and Ecorr measurements. The RUST database will be used to acquire, analyze, and review data throughout the course of the project. Upon the conclusion of the project, the assessment data collected will update the RUST database and the sitespecific risk index. The methodology to be employed on the project includes: ■ a review of ship plans ■ remote-sensing surveys ■ general sketches of the wrecks ■ documentation of site formation characteristics and condition of wreckage ■ visual assessment of vessels’ structural integrity ■ measurements on structural stress cracks and other evident features that will be monitored over a number of years ■ effects of corrosion and hull/container degradation ■ baseline assessment of site conditions ■ corrosion surveys at the metal concretion interface ■ establishment of baseline corrosion voltage for the vessels ■ determined fuel cargo gravity ■ oil release trajectory models on all sites The underwater evaluations allow the RUST project to update the current sites’ conditions, provide valuable structural information on a variety of vessel types, and apply the knowledge gained from this project to other vessels in similar site con- ditions that may present a threat within or in close proximity to National Marine Sanctuaries. The 2004-2005 field projects also will add valuable assessment data on ferroushulled vessels, contribute to the field of underwater research, allow interpretation and peer review of the results, and provide baseline data to examine long-term protection strategies for National Marine Sanctuaries currently threatened by shipwrecks containing oil within or in close proximity to their boundaries. RUST Database Not Restricted to Sanctuaries Alone NMSP Resource Protection Team, using data collected in RUST, has assisted in recent incidents off the New Jersey and Virginia coasts. An unidentified source of heavy oil washed up on the New Jersey shore Tuesday, February 3, 2004 between Shark River Inlet, Monmouth County, and Seaside Heights, Ocean County. The spill spanned a 12-mile stretch of shoreline. Reported were “Tar Balls” and “Tar Patties” that ranged from ¼- inch to 12 inches in diameter, very light and sporadic, consistent with a low impact spill. Numerous over flights by Coast Guard Air Station–Atlantic City, New Jersey State Police, and Monmouth County Sheriff Shade Tree Commission over several days reported no sign of oil sheen on the water. Using information from the RUST database, several underwater wrecks were identified, analyzed, and suggested as possible point sources of the oil leak. The list of suspected vessels was passed on to U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Group–Philadelphia for further investigation. Oil samples recovered are currently being tested to determine type and age, and modeling of the oil release may further assist in the identification of the source. Within hours of notification of the explosion and subsequent sinking of the M/V Bow Mariner, NMSP RPT was able to identify numerous RUST sites within a 50-mile radius of the tanker’s submerged position. This data was provided to first responders and identified areas to be avoided should a salvage operation commence. The Resources and UnderSea Threats project is also currently working with the State of California’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response in identifying and evaluating vessels thought to contain large quantities of fuel oil, building upon the assessment studies conducted during summer 2004. References Conclusion Piero, Jacqueline. 2004. Site Formation Processes Acting on Metal Hulled Shipwrecks. Masters thesis, East Carolina University, 109 pp. The scope of RUST data collected extends from the coastline of the United States to the outer continental shelf. RUST is used to inventory, assess and provide resource managers and responders with the necessary information to assess risk, and to plan and respond to a variety of submerged releases. It also allows NOAA to safeguard the marine, historical, and cultural resources of the United States that have significant value beyond the potential hazardous cargo or fuel they may contain. Development of the RUST database is currently a “work in progress,” focusing on the acquisition of federal, state, and private data sources. The database is being populated on a regional basis starting on the West Coast and moving into the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, and Great Lakes. Initial population of the RUST database for all U.S. waters will occur by 2006. Additionally, the NMSP intends to share information with the appropriate governmental agencies for the protection of our nation’s security. Hamilton, Donny. 1996. Basic Methods of Conserving Archaeological Material Culture. pp. 42-89. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program. MacLeod, Ian. 2002. In Situ Corrosion Measurements and Management of Shipwrecks Sites. pp. 697-714. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Shier, L.L., ed. 1963. Corrosion Volume 1: Corrosion of Metals and Alloys. p.17. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 77 PAPER Undersea Pollution Threats and Trajectory Modeling AUTHORS ABSTRACT Lisa Symons National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Marine Sanctuaries Program The National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP) in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has developed the Resources and Undersea Threats (RUST) database in an attempt to inventory and assess potential threats from underwater sources of pollution. Undersea threat information is only the first step of several in determining the potential scope and scale of the spill trajectories that demonstrate potential to impact sensitive resources. Resource managers frequently have to make decisions based on the precautionary approach, using the best available information to weigh alternatives without knowing for certain whether they are making the right choice. In contrast, pollution responders are generally reactionary, and response alternatives must be generated with the best available information. The Office of Response and Restoration, Hazardous Materials Response Division (HAZMAT) has developed a spill response and planning application, Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP), which randomly samples seasonal climatology and runs hundreds of possible trajectories. These trajectories are combined to form several modes that display various types of ocean analysis. Combining TAP modeling with the Resources and Undersea Threats database could provide marine resource managers with critical information for making planning decisions, as well as for developing preparedness and response options for inclusion in coastal Area Contingency Plans. Marc K. Hodges National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Response and Restoration, Hazardous Materials Response Division Underwater Threats T he Resources and Undersea Threats (RUST) database garners data from a series of sources including: the NOAA Automated Wrecks and Obstructions Information System (AWOIS), the Navy wreck list (NIMA), the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) and many other state and regional sources of information on sunken vessels, planes, pipelines, dumpsites and obstructions. RUST is constructed to allow the user to query, add, or edit records. For example, edits may include the addition of new field survey and assessment information or correction of location information. Where information is available, construction diagrams, cargo manifests, on-board fuel types and volumes are recorded. RUST data can be displayed geospatially, showing the locations and potential pollution threats in relation to shoreline and biological habitat areas. Modeling Capabilities HAZMAT responds to over 100 oil and chemical spills per year. In the interim, these individuals design and program pollution applications that provide scientific analysis to assist the response and contingency planning processes. The applications used in these processes include among others: the General NOAA Oil Modeling Environment (GNOME), and the Trajectory Analysis 78 Marine Technology Society Journal Planner (TAP) models. These applications require both physical process data and analysis of that data to make them effective. GNOME is NOAA/HAZMAT’s nowcast/forecast oil trajectory model. This is a simple two-dimensional Lagrangian model that uses currents, tides, hydrology and winds to move particles that represent some amount of spilled oil. GNOME is limited by the quality and accuracy of the weather forecast. If the weather forecast used for the model is only accurate out to 36-48 hours, then the GNOME trajectory is only accurate out to 36-48 hours. Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP) randomly samples climatology and displays probabilities of possible oil trajectories. By randomly sampling the seasonal climatology, the probability contours displayed will be a combination of hundreds of probable oil spills per pollution source. This TAP mode is called Impact Analysis. Since TAP randomly samples historical physical processed data, this applica- tion cannot be used for actual oil spills. TAP can, however, be used for potential pollution threats and area contingency planning and could have applicability for analysis of the underwater threats found in RUST. TAP is fundamentally a view engine that displays the outcome of hundreds of potential spill trajectories. Running HAZMAT’s two-dimensional GNOME model several hundred times on each source site (RUST site) creates the spill trajectories. This data is stored in a three-dimensional array or “cube”. Each data “cube” has three axes. The first axis represents time; the second represents the number of Lagrangian particles, and the third the potential receptor sites. A receptor site is an individual cell of a scaled grid over the entire water region being modeled. The scale of the grid depends on the accuracy of the physical process analysis. If the uncertainty is large, then the receptor grid cells are also large. Each cube represents one physical process season for one pollution threat. The seasons are defined by analysis on the historical wind records. If an area has four distinct seasons, then one pollution threat will have four distinct data “cubes”. (Since GNOME is a two-dimensional Lagrangian model, only the surface pollutant is modeled. Future projects in the three-dimensional arena could be applied to this same trajectory analysis and provide pollution probability contours at depth.) During a GNOME run, using historical current, tide, wind and hydrology data, a Lagrangian particle trajectory makes a path through the water basin grid. The numbers of particles that move through each cell are counted during each time step. TAP involves running the GNOME model for hundreds of possible trajectories—combining all the particle counts for each time step—and for all the receptor sites, resulting in the development of probability contours of all possible trajectories for a particular season. TAP has several modes that convey information, including: Impact Analysis, Site Oiling Analysis, Response Time Analysis, Resource Analysis and Threat Zone Analysis. Site Oiling Analysis determines how much pollution product could reach a particular area at a particular time. Response Time Analysis determines how long it may take for the pollution product to reach any specific site. Resource Analysis combines Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) Shoreline and Biological data to determine how many meters of specific shoreline type and resource (birds, turtles, clams, etc…) could be impacted. Threat Zone Analysis is functionally the reverse of Impact Analysis in that it models which areas are the most likely threats to a specific point or resource. This information can be evaluated on a seasonal basis. This could determine which seasons may be the most critical for monitoring, to facilitate decisions such as when to undertake lightering operations on an underwater source, as well as decisions regarding which sites must be dealt with proactively, prior to them becoming a fullfledged pollution hazard. Model Limitations/Data Requirements Models are only as good as the input data and the analysis of that data. This is critical to understanding the range of error associated with the probability contours. Real-time data observations are necessary to determine the state of the physical processes at a specific point in time. However, it is the analysis of that data that leads to accurate model forecasting. With that in mind, TAP works best in data rich areas, such as tidally dominated regions like bays, sounds and estuaries. Here, several years to decades of oceanographic and meteorological data often exist and can be or has been analyzed. Unfortunately, spill incidents and underwater threats are not confined to these areas. Indeed, within hours to a few days, spilled product will eventually leave these regions and move out to open ocean. Unfortunately, it is in the open ocean that the long-term and realtime oceanographic data and the analysis based on that data become limited. If the information in a model or a database is inaccurate or incomplete, any analysis of that data incorporates that inherent error, and could, in fact, amplify the error considerably. This is a significant issue when response planners are making decisions as to where and when to deploy or to not deploy protective equipment such as boom or skimmers. For marine resource managers the decisions are about determining how an area may be used, or whether it merits special protections or regulations. The outcomes are generally not as compressed in time, but may have longer-term impacts. Models that provide probabilistic trajectories give a manager more information for management decisions than is often available otherwise. Specific Data Inputs: Tides, Winds, Ocean Currents, Temperature, and Archeological/ Underwater Threats For models and forecasts to be useful, they must be based on accurate real-time observations as well as the analysis of those observations, whether used real-time or as historical climatological records. These are a few of the data sources NOAA uses. Tides: National Ocean Service (NOS) tidal data is the backbone of NOAA HAZMAT predicted tides. Center for Operational Oceanographic Products and Services (CO-OPS) tidal data meters, deployed in several major U.S. ports, add further analysis, displaying the error between the predicted tides and actual tides. This data is invaluable for spills that are in tidally dominated areas (i.e. bays, sounds and estuaries). Hydrology: The United States Geological Survey (USGS) provides real-time data observations on gauge heights and stream flows. The National Weather Service River Forecast Centers (RFCs) provide river flow forecasts. Some larger rivers, though few, have surface velocity current meters. Surface velocity information is preferred although it can be estimated by a rough cross sectional area and a given stream flow. Current velocities at depth are necessary for any accurate 3D spill analysis. As of this writing, no full vertical column current profiler exists on any U.S. estuary. Winds: NOAA’s National Data Buoy Center provides and maintains many of the ocean and coastal buoys, as well as land based C-Man stations. These stations have, at a minimum, real-time wind speed and direction data. National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) archives historical wind data for local, regional and international airports and from a multitude of states and university sources. The National Weather Service provides the wind forecasts that are critical for any accurate nowcast/forecast spill trajectory product. Ocean Currents: While there is a growing recognition of the importance of ocean current information, accessibility of this information is quite limited. This may change as the International Ocean Observing System (IOOS) is fully funded and implemented and the resulting data is appropriately accessible and archived. The Texas Automated Buoy System (TABS) in the Gulf of Mexico (south of Texas) is currently the only nationally accessible surface ocean current data system in U.S. coastal waters. Analysis on this data is provided by Texas A&M University. The Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 79 National Marine Sanctuaries, National Coastal Data Development Center (NCDDC) and the National Oceanographic Data Center (NODC), along with other California State agencies, are looking into expanding and enhancing the University of Santa Cruz’s full vertical column ocean current meters off of the California coastline as a component of the regional implementation of the IOOS. It is not yet determined which agencies will provide the analysis on this data. High Frequency Radar is becoming more prevalent throughout the U.S. coastline to measure the surface flow velocities of the ocean current. Broad scale oceanographic analysis of this data is not yet complete. Other Data: Current Depth and Temperature (CDT) meters can also be used to determine both mixing layer and vertical column ocean currents. For this to be accurate, a grid of current meters would have to be used simultaneously over the desired area. Depending on the area and the variability of currents in those areas, this data analysis would be good for possibly 1-3 days and then the meters would have to be redeployed and new data gathered. Archeological/Underwater Threats Data: There are over 20,000 shipwrecks in United States coastal waters with varying amounts of information available on each. Verifying details for every underwater threat is not possible given NOAA’s limited resources. Initial analysis of the records in RUST allows for some quick screening and generalization of potential threats based on age, size, fuel on board or cargo. These sites can then be assessed and monitored more specifically for their potential threat. As RUST is further developed, NOAA intends to develop a risk assessment index to facilitate the threat screening process. TAP Examples The following two examples show usage of the impact analysis mode of TAP and are illustrative of some of the inherent data issues as well as the significance of the information provided for planning purposes. 80 Marine Technology Society Journal Luckenbach Spill In 1953, the SS Jacob Luckenbach collided with her sister ship and sunk in San Francisco Bay, off the coast of California. For the last 10 or more years, oiled seabird fatalities were a seasonal occurrence and were attributed to mystery spills. In 2002, after several similar mystery spills could not be attributed to transient shipping, the State of California, USCG, and NOAA joined forces to determine the source of these spills. After much hindcast analysis and evaluation of a number of potential sources, it was determined that the SS Jacob Luckenbach would be both likely to leak oil and to still have a significant amount of fuel on board. Oil from the wreck was matched via the chemical fingerprinting process to the oiled birds. As a component of the contingency plan for the oil removal process, NOAA HAZMAT ran the Trajectory Analysis Planning (TAP) model on the SS Jacob Luckenbach, to determine what areas were most likely to be affected during a catastrophic release. More than 12 years of seasonal wind data was used for these trajectory runs. No current data or current analysis exists for this region of California. (See Figure 1). General net current flow at this location is from the north to the south. However, at any point in time, ocean currents could flow in a number of directions and at various speeds. Indeed, some ocean current speeds have been noted as extreme as 2-3 (or more) knots. Hence, within the time frame of 3 days, the error could be hundreds of miles. This points to the necessity of having both wind and current measurements for increased accuracy in the trajectories. FIGURE 1 TAP output showing probable impact areas from the SS Jacob Luckenbach. Bow-Mariner Spill On February 28th, 2004, the T/V Bow Mariner carrying 3.2 million gallons of ethanol and 200,000 gallons of a heavy fuel oil exploded off the coast of Virginia. NOAA HAZMAT responded to supply the Coast Guard with scientific support including real-time trajectory analysis (GNOME). National Marine Sanctuaries utilized the RUST database to ascertain if any undersea threats were under or adjacent to the wreck and would exacerbate the response or impede salvage efforts. Two weeks into the response, the Unified Command Post queried, “Could oil from this sunken vessel reach land in one month?” Again, using Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP), NOAA HAZMAT ran hundreds of spills using more than 25 years of historical wind data and a uniform current pattern from the north to the south between 0.1-0.3 knots in velocity. Without any long-term point source offshore current data for that area, estimates were necessary. A Gulf Stream current expert was consulted and determined that a 0.1 - 0.3 knot current from the north to the south generally occurred during this time of the year, as the eddies from the Gulf Stream don’t come that far inshore during this period. This current pattern was uniformly applied to the incident region. The probability contours can be seen in Figure 2. Based on the TAP probabilities, oil from the T/V Bow Mariner would be unlikely to reach shore, with the predominant oil spill direction moving offshore. With a huge potential variability in the direction and speed of the ocean currents, this probability contour could be in error on several hundreds of miles. No long-term point source offshore current data is available for this region, although there are historical wind records. Given the existing status of the physical process data and analysis for this area, this answer was as good as the data inputs could provide. RUST/TAP Analysis Using the RUST database, we can determine what potential undersea threats exist in the Coastal U.S. waters and beyond (See Figure 3). However, we need to know more than just where these threats are located; we need to understand their ability to put environmental and economic resources at risk. Using the existing wind and current analysis, TAP could be applied to significant RUST sites in a particular coastal area. Given the current state of ocean science, this would provide model outputs associated with each undersea threat that can be applied to contingency planning. However, these trajectories will only be as accurate as the oceanographic observation data available for the input and analysis. Without moving ahead to use TAP for probability analysis and risk assessments, NOAA and other trustees are left waiting, watching, and wondering when the next SS Jacob Luckenbach will occur and what environmental and economic resources it will impact. FIGURE 2 TAP analysis of T/V Bow Mariner for release of 7,000 bbl of oil over the month of March using estimated currents and more than 25 years of wind data. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 81 FIGURE 3 Screenshot of ArcIMS output of RUST on the National Marine Sanctuaries intranet response and contingency planning site. Conclusion The combination of using Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP) with the Resource and Undersea Threat (RUST) database can provide seasonal probability pollution threat contours for each significant undersea pollution threat. This information, if incorporated into regional risk assessments and response planning, can lead to more robust Area Contingency Plans. Limited offshore current data and the ocean physics based on that data will add error to these trajectory analyses. This error could be significant based on the variability of the ocean currents. Assuming the threat doesn’t exist and making no attempt to analyze the risk is a far greater error. Ideally, a TAP analysis could be developed with the available data, and when future regional ocean current analysis are completed, the TAP outputs could be re-analyzed to provide more accurate answers. There are some open ocean areas, such as the Gulf of Mexico and the Channel Islands off of California, that provide enough data and analysis for the TAP model to be used in the analysis of RUST targets. This TAP output will provide resource managers with additional information for decision-making, and facilitate NOAA taking the lead among 82 Marine Technology Society Journal trustees and being proactive about the threat from potentially polluting wrecks that may be the source of future spills. BOOK REVIEW The Machine in Neptune’s Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment Edited by Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren Science History Publications/USA, 2004 xxviii + 371 pp., illustrated; $49.95 Reviewed by Stephanie Showalter, Director Sea Grant Law Center University of Mississippi T “ o understand the human relationship with the sea, it is essential to look at how knowledge about the ocean has been produced: by whom, with what kinds of instruments; using what kinds of scientific practices; and in which historic contexts.” The Machine in Neptune’s Garden, edited by Helen Rozwadowski and David van Keuren, is a fascinating look back at some of the important moments in oceanographic history. Did you know the first self-registering tide gauge was invented in 1832? Or that Scripps Institute planned to build an island off the end of the campus pier to support “man-in-the-sea” research? Or that Mary Sears, a Harvard-trained planktonologist, joined the U.S. Navy in 1943 to help the war effort and became the head of the Hydrographic Office’s Oceanographic Unit? Neptune’s Garden is chock full of juicy tidbits for those lulls in conversation at cocktail parties. Neptune’s Garden is a compilation of ten papers commissioned for presentation at the Third Maury Workshop on the History of Oceanography, held June 20-23, 2001 in Monterey, California. The theme of Maury III was “oceanography’s role in understanding global environmental conditions and the application of technology to the project of understanding the ocean’s aquatic environment.” A wide range of topics are covered—the invention of self-registering tide gauges, the first time mathematical physics and ocean circulation came together, the use of “cultural translators” to bridge the gap between Navy combat officers and oceanographers, how the development of the nuclear bomb influenced oceanographic research, the North Pacific Experiment and the Mohole drilling project in the 1960s, the development of fisheries acoustics in Norway, the Mary Sears story, the doomed Chesapeake Bay Hydraulic Model, and Scripps Island. Whether you are an oceanographer, meteorologist, biologist, landscape architect or simply curious, there is something for everyone in Neptune’s Garden. The most memorable passage for me in the entire book is in Michael Reidy’s chapter on tide gauges. “Lubbock had secured twenty-five years of observations of high water from Isaac Solly, the Chairman of the London Docks Company, and this type of data determined Lubbock’s approach to the subject. First, keeping separate the tides that took place on each day of the moon’s age, Lubbock had his calculator, Joseph Foss Dessious of the Admiralty Hydrographic Office, form for each month of the year a column of the times of high water.” Where was my calculator when I was struggling with physics and calculus in college? Most of the chapters are 20 - 30 pages long, minus endnotes. Several of the chapters have wonderful illustrations of early scientific instruments. It is especially enlightening to see, through the illustrations in Helen Rozwadowski’s chapter, how the Institute’s vision for Scripps Island evolved over the years as various designs were submitted and considered. The history of oceanography is not simply a history of science. Oceanographers and their research are influenced by world events. World War II propelled Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute into the center of national defense preparations and led Mary Sears and other female scientists to challenge traditional notions of a woman’s place in the military. The development of the atomic bomb altered the course of research at Scripps Institute of Oceanography, which became heavily involved in weapons testing, radioactivity tracers, and the debate surrounding the disposal of nuclear waste. The Army Corps of Engineers’ Chesapeake Bay Hydraulic Model was rendered obsolete by computer modeling. To understand where we are, it is important to know where we came from and how we got there. Neptune’s Garden helps us do just that. Neptune’s Garden also helps us remember that progress is rarely made by individuals operating in isolation. There are always calculators standing in the shadows of obscurity. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 83 BOOK REVIEW Recent Advances and Issues in Oceanography By C. Reid Nichols, David Larsen Porter, Robert G. Williams Greenwood Press, 2003 409 pp., $49.95 Reviewed by Robert L. Sand University of Rhode Island, Graduate School of Oceanography I t’s been more than 20 years since I received my degree in Oceanography, so when I was asked to review this book, I had high expectations of gaining new insights and perspectives into the state of Oceanography today. Unfortunately, I don’t think the book lived up to its billing. It seems hollow; full of facts, but without focus or cohesive integration. At first glance the book looks well organized. The chapter descriptions listed in the Table of Contents seem comprehensive and well thought out. Topics like “Oceanography Today,” “Technology Today,” and “Social Issues” appeared to be good starting points to focus on defining modern oceanography. However, after reading a few pages, problems arise. First, the apparent audience for this book is never made clear. There is so much scientific content in the book that you almost need a degree in oceanography to understand the jargon and use the concepts presented. However, if you have a degree in oceanography, you will be disappointed at the superficial treatment of most of the topics. No happy middle ground was reached. The book contains few illustrations and those present are often not illustrative of the concepts or features described in the text. Hence they provide little value to the reader. There are no color photographs, only dark, black and white photos printed with far too little contrast. In addition to the photos and figures, the book contains a number of tables; 84 Marine Technology Society Journal some of which are informative, but others are simple lists of words that, because of their lack of inherent relationship, should not be presented in tabular form. The book makes a number of factual errors, which is especially troubling for a science book. In the chapter on today’s technology the authors state, “The advent of the bathyscaphe in the 1930s afforded biologists a chance to observe marine life in situ at great depths …”. In fact the bathysphere was built and used by William Beebe in the 1930s, but the bathyscaphe wasn’t used until the 1950s. Of particular affront to me personally is the malformed description of my alma mater. The authors state, “The University of Rhode Island’s Narragansett Marine Laboratory is one of the premier oceanographic institutes on the East Coast.” While I certainly don’t disagree with their assessment, the name of the institution is the University of Rhode Island’s Graduate School of Oceanography. The moniker, Narragansett Marine Lab, was used in the 1950s and 1960s, but is not in common use today. Stylistically, the book seems stilted and rigid. Information doesn’t flow and the reader is often left wondering why particular information was presented or omitted. In the description of chemical oceanography, the authors stretch their reach discussing paleo biology and the hypothesis of Tyrannosaurus Rex being warm blooded, neither of which are mainstream oceanography. In another in- stance, Table 1.4 is titled “The Earth’s Deep Ocean Reaches are Called Trenches.” If I was previously uninformed, I might think that the terms trench and reach are synonyms. The authors consistently miss opportunities to elaborate on points made or, conversely, present positions that aren’t supported by the facts. For instance, the authors describe extreme storm waves in great detail, noting how and where they form and their danger to large ships. The authors even state, “Several supertankers have been lost in this way,” but never name the vessels, year of sinking or any other information that might permit an interested reader to pursue topics from other sources. Likewise, in describing Deep Water Dump Site 101, the authors state, “Unfortunately, the refuse that sinks to the bottom finds itself in cold, deep storage. In temperatures near freezing and with no oxygen, the refuse has a very long residence time.” They never explain 1) why is it unfortunate or 2) the consequences of having a long residence time. This sort of thing happens much too frequently in this book. Chapter 7 is comprised of a series of previously published documents, speeches, federal testimony and reports, some seemingly photocopied directly from the Federal Register. Again, there is no detailed commentary or analysis of the material presented. Chapter 9 is entitled “Statistics on Education, Budget and Resources” and consists of a series of often unrelated tables populated by words and numbers. Unfortunately, there is no descriptive text to inform the reader of the relevance or importance of the material presented. The reader wonders, why is this here and what does it mean? Perhaps the most puzzling material is in Chapter 10, “Organizations and Associations,” and Chapter 11, “Print and Electronic Resources.” These two chapters contain 130 pages of descriptions of organizations related to oceanography; their name, address, phone number, fax, email address and more. These listings are not organized by topic, not by area of expertise, but alphabetically; Acoustical Society of America, American Academy of Underwater Sciences, American Association of Petroleum Geologist, … through to the Year of the Ocean. It seems like such a waste of paper! All this information could easily be retrieved by a well thought out Google search! Frankly, this book reads like an assignment pulled together at the last minute to try to meet a deadline. Bottom line: if you know much about oceanography, don’t waste your time with this book. If you don’t know much about oceanography, go and learn about this fascinating field of science, but don’t waste your time with this book. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 85 BOOK REVIEW The Silent Landscape: The Scientific Voyage of HMS Challenger By Richard Corfield Joseph Henry Press, 2003 255 pp., $24.95 Reviewed by John F. Bash University of Rhode Island R ichard Corfield has written an interesting survey treatise on the history of oceanography using HMS Challenger as a backdrop for the book. This reviewer was excited to get a fresh look at the famous historic expedition only to be disappointed at the dearth of information on Challenger. The title, The Silent Landscape: The Scientific Voyage of HMS Challenger, suggests otherwise. Corfield appropriately credits those giants in the field that have unlocked the mysteries of the ocean. He chronicles the turning points that have triggered new knowledge with an easy writing style that allows the unfolding of discoveries that led to oceanography as we know it today. His prose is pleasantly offered as in the following: “In the early hours of January 18, 1873 Challenger entered the Mediterranean Sea through the Straits of Gibraltar, slipping quietly past the Pillars of Hercules as a huge gibbous moon climbed silently into the sky from behind the summit of the rock.” It is fitting that the greatest naval power of the day funded Challenger’s pioneering expedition. The expedition began on 1 January 1873 and did not return to England until 23 May 1876, circumnavigating the globe and sampling every major ocean. They visited many outposts of the Empire as well as both friendly and unfriendly ports of the world. The book would have been greatly enhanced by more illustrations, sketches and drawings. Challenger literature has a wealth 86 Marine Technology Society Journal of exciting illustrations; those included in this book numbered only nine. The book contains 285 pages including a well developed index. The chapter titles such as “Kingdom of Mud and Lime” or “The Library of Time” or “The Groaning Planet” provide a lilt to the subject and add to the book’s interest. Corfield’s Challenger material comes primarily from the diaries of scientists, officers, and ship’s crew. Corfield explains that Challenger’s expedition spawned many other cruises. It set the tone for exploration of the oceans and scientific discoveries to this day. The expedition deserves credit for being the foundation for this dynamic and still unfolding science. Although not keeping true to the book’s title, the material and information provided is clearly worth the read. The reviewer would recommend this book to all those interested in the stepping blocks of oceanography. History buffs interested in the sea should also enjoy the nuggets of information about Challenger’s prodigious expedition. Fall 2004 Volume 38, Number 3 87 Marine Technology Society Publications Listing The following Marine Technology Society publications are available for purchase. Prices for 2004 are listed below. Members are granted a discount of 10% off the purchase order. You can purchase our publications by: 1. Calling MTS at 410-884-5330 with your publication(s) order and credit card number. Please use reference number FA38:3 when placing your order. 2. Log on to our website at www.mtsociety.org, click on icon publications, sidebar publications list. 3. Circle the items you would like to order, fill out the form below and mail to MTS. JOURNALS Innovations in Ocean Research Infrastructure to Advance High Priority Science .................... $20 Human-generated Ocean Sound and the Effects on Marine Life ........................... $20 Ocean Observing Systems ................................ $20 Science, Technology and Management in the National Marine Sanctuary Program ............ $20 Ocean Energy—an Overview of the State of the Art ........................................................ $20 Marine Archaeology and Technology— A New Direction in Deep Sea Exploration ... $20 Technology in Marine Biology ......................... $20 Ocean Mapping—A Focus of Shallow Water Environment .................................... $20 Oceanographic Research Vessels ....................... $20 Technology as a Driving Force in the Changing Roles of Aquariums in the New Millennium ......... $20 Submarine Telecoms Cable Installation Technologies ............................................... $20 Deep Ocean Frontiers ...................................... $20 A Formula for Bycatch Reduction .................... $16 Marine Science and Technology in the Asia Region, Part 2 ......................................................... $16 Marine Science and Technology in the Asia Region, Part 1 ......................................................... $16 Major U.S Oceanographic Research Programs: Impacts, Legacies and the Future ................. $16 Marine Animal Telemetry Tags: What We Learn and How We Learn It ........................................ $16 Scientific Sampling Systems for Underwater Vehicles ...................................................... $16 U.S. Naval Operational Oceanography ............ $16 Innovation and Partnerships for Marine Science and Technology in the 21st Century .................. $16 Marine Science and Technology in Russia ........ $16 Public-Private Partnerships For Marine Science & Technology (1995) ...................................... $16 Oceanographic Ships (1994–95) ...................... $16 Military Assets for Environmental Research (1993–94) .................................................. $16 Oceanic and Atmospheric Nowcasting and Forecasting (1992) ...................................... $12 Education and Training in Ocean Engineering (1992) ........................................................ $12 Global Change, Part II (1991–92) ................... $10 Global Change, Part 1 (1991) .......................... $10 MARINE EDUCATION Education and Training Programs In Oceanography and Related Fields (1995) ....................... $6 Operational Effectiveness of Unmanned Underwater Systems .................................................. $99 State of Technology Report—Ocean and Coastal Engineering (2001) ................................ $7 dom ............................................................. $9For. State of Technology Report—Marine Policy and Education (2002) ................................... $7 dom ............................................................. $9 For. PROCEEDINGS Oceans 2003 MTS/IEEE (CDROM) .............. $50 Oceans 2002 MTS/IEEE (CDROM) .............. $50 Oceans 2001 MTS/IEEE (CDROM) .............. $50 Artificial Reef Conference ................................ $25 Oceans 2000 MTS/IEEE CD-ROM ............... $50 Oceans 1999 MTS/IEEE ‘99 Paper Copy ........ $80 Oceans 1999 MTS/IEEE CDROM ................. $40 Ocean Community Conference ‘98 ............... $100 Underwater Intervention 2002 ........................ $50 Underwater Intervention 2000 ........................ $50 Underwater Intervention ‘99 ........................... $50 Underwater Intervention ‘98 ........................... $50 500 Years of Ocean Exploration (Oceans ‘97) ............................................. $130 Underwater Intervention ‘97 ........................... $50 The Coastal Ocean—Prospects for The 21st Century (Oceans ‘96) ................. $145 Underwater Intervention ‘96 ........................... $50 Challenges of Our Changing Global Environment (Oceans ‘95) ........................ $145 Underwater Intervention ‘95 ........................... $75 Underwater Intervention ‘94 ........................... $95 Underwater Intervention ‘93 ........................... $95 MTS ‘92 ....................................................... $140 ROV ‘92 ....................................................... $105 MTS ‘91 ....................................................... $130 ROV ‘91 ......................................................... $95 1991–1992 Review of Developments in Marine Living Resources, Engineering and Technology ................................................. $15 ROV ‘90 ......................................................... $90 The Global Ocean (Oceans ‘89) ...................... $75 ROV ‘89 ......................................................... $65 Partnership of Marine Interest (Oceans ‘88) ..... $65 The Oceans–An International Workplace (Oceans ‘87) ............................................... $65 Organotin Symposium (Oceans ‘87, Vol. 4) ..... $10 ROV ‘87 ......................................................... $40 Technology Update–An International Perspective (ROV ‘85) ................................. $35 Ocean Engineering and the Environment (Oceans ‘85) ............................................... $45 Ocean Data: Sensor-to-User (1985) ................. $33 Arctic Engineering for the 21st Century (1984) ..... $20 Marine Salvage: Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium (1984) ................. $21 M T S P U B L I C AT I O N S O R D E R F O R M — R E F : FA 3 8 : 3 S E N D A P P L I C AT I O N T O : Please print _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Mr./Ms./Dr. First name Last name _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Address _____________________________________________________________________________________________ City State Zip Country _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Telephone FAX Marine Technology Society 5565 Sterrett Place, Suite 108 Columbia, Maryland 21044 Please call MTS at 410-884-5330 for a MTS Membership Application or see following pages for an Application. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Total E-mail P A Y M E N T : Make checks payable to Marine Technology Society (U.S. funds only) Credit card: ❏ Amex ❏ Mastercard ❏ Visa ❏ Diners Club FAX (410) 884-9060 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ EMail: [email protected] Card Number Exp. 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Mail: Fax: Online: Phone: Send application with check or credit card info to: Marine Technology Society / 5565 Sterrett Place, Suite 108 / Columbia, MD 21044 Fax application to: 410-884-9060 (credit card payments only) Apply online at www.mtsociety.org Contact us at: 410-884-5330 Notes Notes Notes Marine Technology Society Member Organizations C O R P O R AT E M E M B E R S Alstom Power Conversion, Inc. Houston, Texas C-Mar America, Inc. Houston, Texas Compass Publications Arlington, Virginia Cortland Cable Company Cortland, New York Dynacon, Inc. Bryan, Texas FMC SOFEC Floating Inc. Houston, Texas Fugro Chance, Inc. Lafayette, Louisiana Fugro Geoservices, Inc. Houston, Texas Fugro-McClelland Marine Geosciences Houston, Texas Fugro Pelagos, Inc. San Diego, CA General Dynamics/AIS Herndon, Virginia Geospace Offshore Cables Houston, Texas Innerspace Corporation Covina, California J. P. Kenny, Inc. Houston, Texas JDR Cable Systems, Inc. Houston, Texas Klein Associations, Inc. Salem, New Hampshire Kongsberg Maritime, Inc. Houston, Texas Kvaerner Oilfield Products Houston, Texas Maritime Communication Services Melbourne, Florida Mitsui Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. Tokyo, Japan Mohr Engineering & Testing Houston, Texas Nautronix, Inc. Houston, Texas Navatek, Ltd. Honolulu, Hawaii Neptune Sciences, Inc. Slidell, Louisiana Ocean Design, Inc. Ormond Beach, Florida Oceaneering International, Inc. Houston, Texas Oceaneering Technologies Upper Marlboro, Maryland Oil States Industries, Inc. Arlington, Texas Orincon Hawaii, Inc. Kailua, Hawaii Pegasus International, Inc. Houston, Texas Perry Slingsby Systems, Inc. Jupiter, Florida Phoenix International, Inc. Landover, Maryland Planning Systems, Inc. Reston, Virginia RD Instruments San Diego, California Reson, Inc. Goleta, California SBM-IMODCO, INC. Houston, Texas Schilling Robotics, LLC Davis, California Science Applications International Corp. San Diego, California SeaCon Brantner and Associates, Inc. El Cajon, California Sippican, Inc. Marion, Massachusetts Sonsub, Inc. Houston, Texas SonTek/YSI, Inc. San Diego, California South Bay Cable Corp. Idyllwild, California SubConn, Inc. Burwell, Nebraska Subsea Seven Houston, Texas Technip Houston, Texas Thales Geosolutions, Inc. Houston, Texas The Tsurumi-Seiki Co., Ltd. Yokohama, Japan Tyco Telecommunications (US) Inc. Morristown, New Jersey BUSINESS MEMBERS 4 Controlled Solutions Houston, Texas Aanderaa Instruments, Inc. S. Attleboro, Massachusetts Applied Marine Solutions Kailua, Hawaii Applied Subsea Technologies, Inc. Providence, Rhode Island Ashtead Technology, Inc. Houston, Texas Bennex Subsea, Houston Houston, Texas Bluewater Offshore Production Systems USA, Inc. Houston, Texas C.A. Richards and Associates Houston, Texas C & C Technologies, Inc. Lafayette, Louisiana Deep Marine Technology, Inc. Houston, Texas Deepsea Power and Light San Diego, California DTC International, Inc. Houston, Texas Falmat, Inc. San Marcos, California Gilman Corporation Gilman, Connecticut Impulse Enterprise San Diego, California InterOcean Systems, Inc. San Diego, California Makai Ocean Engineering, Inc. Kailua, Hawaii Marine Desalination Systems, L.L.C. Washington, DC The Marine Technology Society gratefully acknowledges the critical support of the Corporate, Business, and Institutional members listed. Member organizations have aided the Society substantially in attaining its objectives since its inception in 1963. Matthews-Daniel Company Houston, Texas Natural Resources Canada Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada Oceanic Imaging Consultants, Inc. Honolulu, Hawaii OceanWorks International Houston, Texas Physics Materials and Applied Mathematics Research (PM & AM) Kailua Kona, Hawaii Prizm Advanced Communication Electronics, Inc. Baltimore, Maryland Pro Staff Engineering Houston, Texas Remote Ocean Systems, Inc. San Diego, California Saipem, Inc. Houston, Texas Sonardyne, Inc. Houston, Texas Sound Ocean Systems, Inc. Redmond, Washington Tension Member Technology Huntington Beach, California TSC Holdings Group, Inc. Palm City, Florida Videoray, LLC Exton, Pennsylvania Westney Consulting Group, Inc. Houston, Texas INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERS British Embassy Washington, DC CEROS Kailua-Kona, Hawaii Consortium for Oceanographic Research and Education Washington, DC Department of Transportation Library/OST Washington, DC Gulf Coast Research Lab, Gunter Library Ocean Springs, Mississippi Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution, Inc. Fort Pierce, Florida International Seakeepers Society Fort Lauderdale, Florida MBARI Moss Landing, California Mitretek Systems Falls Church, Virginia National Ocean Industries Association Washington, D.C. NOAA/PMEL Seattle, Washington Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center Port Hueneme, California Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command Stennis Space Center, Mississippi Scripps Institution of Oceanography La Jolla, California Service Argos, Inc. Largo, Maryland SPAWAR - San Diego San Diego, California U.S. Naval Academy Annapolis, Maryland University of British Columbia Library BC, Canada University of California Library Berkeley, California Marine Technology Society 5565 Sterrett Place, Suite 108 Columbia, Maryland 21044 Postage for periodicals is paid at Columbia, MD, and additional mailing offices.
