Download 1 Nicholas Tarling, A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation

Nicholas Tarling, A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1911­1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001). A summary Chapter 1: Equality and Opportunity, pp. 1­38 a) Japan, Asia and the West There were Japanese settlements throughout Southeast Asia before the imposition of the sakoku policy, but the Japanese state had not seen this as an area for expansion. Prior to 1633, and after the opening of Japan in 1853, the main area of Japan’s interests was Korea and the Asian mainland. However, the Western move into China the 19th century raised questions as to whether Japan would support China, or whether it would take advantage of China’s weakness. b) The Meiji Restoration, 1868 The dramatic transformation of Japan in the latter part of the 19th century attracted the attention of other Asians as well as Westerners. The army (developed on French and German models) gained a special place because of the possibility of internal rebellion in the transition period. The navy (on the British model) developed more slowly. Japan’s main concern was to revise the unequal treaties imposed by Westerners in the 1850s and 1860s. These treaties gave American, British, French, Russian, and Dutch residents of Japan the right of extraterritoriality, making them subject only to the legal jurisdiction of their home nations' consular courts. They also established artificially low tariff rates, restricting sources of revenue for the Japanese government. c) Industrialization Japan was poor in resources and dependent on resources from other parts of the world. Industrial development was promoted to maximize exports, but this depended on access to raw materials. There was concern also about population growth, and it was felt there should be an outlet for migration.However, as yet there was no plan to build an empire. d) Colonial Policy (see further Chapter 2) Japan’s foreign policy was pragmatic, focused on building Japan’s strength and prosperity by acquiring resources. As such, they implemented slightly different policies in Taiwan (1895), Korea (1910) and Manchukuo (1933) e) The Russo­Japanese War, 1904­5 (see further Chapter 2) In 1902 Japan concluded an alliance with Britain, then the leading naval and imperial power; both were concerned about Russia’s involvement in Asia. Japan saw the treaty with Britain as recognition of world status; Britain felt it necessary to have an Asian ally so that it could concentrate on Europe. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 was seen by Asians as a triumph, although Japan had not been sympathetic to independence movements in Taiwan. Korea became incorporated into the nascent Japanese “empire”, initially as a protectorate and then as a full colony. The Kwantung Garrison was established in 1906 to guard the tertiroy Japan had acquired (the Kwantung leased territory, adjacent to the South Manchurian Railway). It consisted of around 10,000 men and was renamed the Kwantiung army in 1919. 1 f) Versailles Treaty and Washington Agreements Japan’s participation in WWI helped it to become a creditor nation. It presented China with the Twenty‐One demands in 1915, by which Japan demanded special rights in China and southern Manchuria. Neither Britain nor US intervened, and Japanese migration to southern Manchuria increased. In 1921‐2 the Washington Agreements ended Japan’s naval treaty with Britain, since the US was recognized as leading Pacific power. Instead, the Washington Agreements were intended to limit naval competition while endorsing China’s integrity; they were accepted by Japan as another indication of its equality, and because he Japanese at this point had adopted a “China‐friendship” policy. This changed in 1927 with a new government, and because of the threat to Japanese interests in Manchuria posed by the northern march of Chinese nationalists. Ironically, Emperor Hirohito had succeeded in 1926, and his reign was known as the “Showa (enlightened peace/harmony) period. In 1930 Japan was a signatory in the London Naval Treaty (an extension of the Washington Agreements)which regulated submarine warfare and limited shipbuilding. Meanwhile, southern Manchuria became even more important to Japan with 1929 depression. Acting independently, the Kwantung Army (now the most prestigious command of the Japanese imperial army) which was stationed in Manchuria to protect the railway took control in 1931, killing Chinese soldiers, and a puppet state was soon set up (Manchukuo). There was no way of enforcing the Washington Agreements that affirmed China’s integrity, despite Western disapproval.
g) Colonial Southeast Asia Tarling traces the history of colonialism in each country (see timeline). Japanese were
already trading in Southeast Asia in early 17th century and in the 1920s Japanese were
already looking to the oil of Netherlands East Indies. At this stage Japan was not
interested in the liberation of Southeast Asia from colonialism, and gave merely passive
support to nationalism. Some Southeast Asian nationalists were apprehensive about
growth of “Japanese fascism,” but in the early 1930s Japan felt that European colonialism
was coming to an end, and that this would open up opportunities in Southeast Asia that
Japan could exploit. In other words, no military action was necessary.
Chapter 2: Diplomacy and Force, pp. 39­79 a) Expansionism Though Japan continued to expand its objectives, its leaders did not envisage conquest of Southeast Asia; in the mid‐1930s the focus was still on East Asia, especially China. Japanese hoped to make gains in Southeast Asia without military activity. The conflict in China continued because the Japanese underestimated the strength of Chinese nationalism and failed to really define their objectives in China. In addition, the Japanese officer class was now much larger and included many men whose communities had been affected by economic storms and who were ready to listen to nationalist rhetoric. Competition between Japanese army, navy and air force was already developing because of limited resources. The Japanese delegation,
defying world opinion, withdrew from the League of Nations Assembly in 1933 after the
assembly had adopted a report blaming Japan for events in Manchuria. The following
year Japan abandoned the Washington Naval Treaty (also known as the “Five-Power
2 Treaty”), which had specified the limits of naval armaments of Japan and the other four signatories: the United States, Britain, France, and Italy. b) Konoe Fumimaro (twice Prime Minister of Japan, 1937­39, 1940­4) Japanese navy favored peaceful penetration to get access to East Indies oil in case US cut off supplies, wanted moderate policy in China. Army concerned about Soviet build‐up in Asia. 1936: Principles of National Policy affirmed the need to oppose Soviet aggression while acquiring naval power sufficient to secure command of western Pacific. Japan signed the Anti Comintern Pact with Germany (1936), but from 1937 an undeclared war with China broke out. 1938: declaration of “New Order” in East Asia, but Southeast Asia was not explicitly included, although in 1936 govt. had authorized “footsteps” to the south. c) The European crisis Germany signed non‐aggression pact with Soviet Union in 1939. Munich crisis gave Japan more opportunities – occupied Hainan, Spratly islands, attacked Canton – these moves gave navy a bigger role and brought Southeast Asia into closer focus. The KMT in China was getting supplies from Burma and through French Indochina. d) The phoney war and the fall of France, 1940 Japan was shocked by German pact with Soviets. Japan cautious for the first six months of the war, but changed after fall of France in June 1940. July 1940 Roosevelt placed embargoes on arms munitions, some categories of oil in order to restrain Japan. US policy in Asia also changing. US now building a two‐ocean navy, and more interested in fate of Southeast Asian colonies. Meanwhile, the Japanese navy was stressing need for access to oil, but this issue also becoming important to the army as well. e) The first move on Indo­China When Japanese landed troops on Hainan Island in February 1939 (close to Vietnam), Indochina was almost defenceless. The primary French concern was to maintain their position in Indochina, but Japanese leaders were already seeing Indochina as a base for a southward advance, although in July 1939 Japanese promised they would respect Indochina’s integrity. By September, after Vichy govt. set up, French agreed to stationing of Japanese 6,000 troops, 25,000 allowed to transit, and use of 4 air bases. The US responded by severely limiting or eliminating Japanese access to iron and steel, but this did not halt Japan’s advance. Roads into southern China were to be closed f) The Burma Road The Japanese wanted the British to close the all‐weather road through Burma (completed late 1938) which they said helped KMT resistance. British agreed to close road for three moths on condition that this time would be used to bring about peace. Negotiations never occurred and the road was later re‐opened. (For US reaction, see http://cbi‐theater‐3.home.comcast.net/~cbi‐theater‐
3/roadclosed/roadclosed.html) g) The Kobayashi mission to Batavia, August 1940 When Germany overran the Netherlands in May 1940 it seemed likely that Japan would seize Netherlands Indies. In August Japan sent a mission to Batavia under Kobayashi Ichiro, Minister of Commerce and Industry; colonial government wanted to maintain Dutch position and said they “would resist all attempts to alter the 3 status quo in Netherlands East Indies.” On August 29 the Japanese cabinet decided that Japan faced an emergency situation and that they must establish “political leadership over Dutch territory”, and the concept of the “Greater East Asia Co‐
prosperity Sphere” was articulated. h) The Tripartite Pact, Sept. 1940 This was a masterstroke for Prime Minister Konoe. Since July 1940 there had been a new concern with the south, and Japanese government felt a need to establish Japanese domination of “South Seas” to forestall United States and Britain. Japanese encouraged by closure of Burma Road and access from Indochina, saw this as “a great opportunity”. By the Tripartite Pact, Japan, Italy and Germany promised to assist each other in case of attack (no mention of Soviet Union, which pleased Japan). i) Mediation between French Indochina, China and Thailand. Japan was admired among young Siamese; Siam abstained from League of Nations vote on Manchukuo. But Siam’s leaders also concerned about idea of Asia for Asiatics, said they had gained much from the west. Siam (from 1939 Thailand) declared neutrality in European war. Collapse of France and Japanese presence in Indochina made Thailand recalculate. October 1, Bangkok agreed to allow Japanese troops to cross Thailand to attack Singapore. In return, Japan would support cession of Lao territory to Thailand previously taken by France. March 1941: Thailand agreed not to make agreements with nations hostile to Japan; in June 1941 Britain was still trying to conciliate Thailand by offering loans and commercial credits j) The Yoshizawa mission to Batavia, January 1941 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, former Foreign Minister, send as special envoy to Batavia. Japanese demanding special treatment, more access for fishing trade, and help in developing resources “for the welfare of the world.” Britain nervous because Japan now able to get access to tin and rubber in Thailand and Indochina. Dutch allowed some trade in tin and rubber, but Japanese were not satisfied and mission left k) Southern Indochina Japan still hoped to use relationships with powers to secure objectives in Southeast Asia without war. 22 June, Germany invaded Soviet Union. Japan decided not to attack from the rear, but to concentrate all efforts on a southward advance. Vichy France forced to agree to allow Japan to actually occupy Indochina; resistance would not be tolerated. French felt some authority better than none. 26 July, Roosevelt froze Japanese assets. l) Negotiations with the United States Japanese had already decided that a move south would involve an attack on the Philippines. Roosevelt tried to persuade Japan not to occupy Indochina and guarantee Philippines neutrality, and in return US would suspend military measures and persuade British and Dutch to do the same. 6 September 1941, Konoe said the Japanese Empire was opposed by US, Britain and Dutch, and if diplomatic means failed Japan should resort to war. Negotiations continued through October and November. US wanted Britain to have access to Southeast Asia so they could keep fighting in Europe, but US also expanding navy. 1 December; Japanese leaders felt war could not be avoided, but gave little thought as to how this could be brought to an end. 4 7 December: bombing of Pearl Harbor, but despite euphoria few Japanese leaders believed Japan could gain a total victory against the US. The move into Southeast Asia followed a long period in which Japan had sought to achieve its aims through pressure rather than invasion. It was not prepared for the task of occupation Chapter 3: War and Peace, pp. 80­124 a) Pearl Harbor Japanese hopes that this would be a decisive blow were disappointed because destruction of navy not as great as planned. Japan was already at war in China and its resource base was much less than opponents. A long war could not be sustained, but Japan had little idea how to make the conflict short. Leaders hoped Germany would win in Europe, and Allies might just accept a Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia. Main goal was to secure control of oil of Netherlands East India Attack on Pearl Harbor a strategic failure. Japan already had commitments in East Asia, so army could not spare a great number of divisions for the Southeast Asia campaign (they deployed 11 out of 51; each division had 18,000 men, and 700 or 1500 aircraft; navy better equipped, with 1000 aircraft and over 200 ships, including 63 submarines and 113 destroyers. b) The Thai alliance Japanese able to use Southern Thailand for advance, and on 25 January Thailand declared war on Britain and the United States, because they regarded Japan as “the winner”. Thailand would also assist Japan in the Burma campaign 5 c) The Malayan campaign On December 8 1941 Japanese troops landed in Malay Peninsula, and 10 December two British battleships, Prince of Wales and Repulse, both torpedoed off Singapore. In a few days the British were already retreating. British had no tanks (unlike Japanese) and no protecting Navy or Air Force. Australian and British troops (including many Indians) more numerous than Japanese, but many were inexperienced and under‐trained. They could not hold important river lines, and decision made by end January to withdraw to Singapore. 15 February: Singapore surrendered, “the worst disaster in British history”, said Churchill. d) Attack on British Borneo Japan wanted control of oil wells in Sarawak and Sabah, there was no support from Singapore, and Japan in full control 24 December 1941 e) Capture of the Philippines Japan able to destroy American aircraft at Manila airport, also naval yard at Cavite Japan had control of the air, and landings began 10 December. MacArthur withdrew to Bataan Peninsula, but his forces were captured in April and island of Corregidor overwhelmed 6 May 1942. Japanese also attacked southern Philippines, used as base to attack Netherlands Indies 6 f) The Conquest of Netherlands India Japanese forces landed in Sumatra on 9 February 1942, even before fall of Singapore. They moved into eastern Borneo and eastern Indonesia, especially Timor. Aircraft at Darwin airport (northern Australia) destroyed, 19 February.27 February: Battle of the Java Sea, Japanese victory and Java taken. By end of March Dutch forces had surrendered. g) The invasion of Burma Japanese regarded this as essential to protect northwestern flank of occupied territories, secure more oil and rice, and block Burma Road. British forces here even more under‐resourced than in Malaya, since they had not expected Burma to be attacked. Japanese air raids from 23 December 1941 and invasion began 22 January, 1942. British retreated to Imphal, in India (arrived 18 May); around 400‐450,000 refugees, mainly Indians, fled by land and sea, but an estimated 10‐50,000 died. Japanese dropped bombs on eastern Indian cities but essentially they had reached their perimeter. 7 h) Midway Japanese now planned to invade Australia; January 1942 already moving into New Guinea. [In late May and early June 1942, Japanese midget submarines attacked shipping in Australian harbors of Sydney and Newcastle] Extraordinary series of triumphs means Japan had secured Southeast Asia. However, May and June 1942 saw Japanese defeats in Battle of Coral Sea and Battle of Midway.
8 i) Thoughts of Peace Some Japanese leaders after Midway beginning to think of possible negotiations for peace. Japan now involved in a type of war she could not win. Between 1941 and 1945 Japan built 70,000 planes, the US 300,000. j) Fighting in the Pacific Midway disaster meant Japan had to re‐think strategy, but Allied began offensive in New Guinea (regained by Allies January 1943) and in the Pacific. Japanese steadily retreating and by May 1944 140,000 Japanese soldiers and seamen cut off from main body of Japanese forces. Americans moving through Pacific and towards the Philippines. By August 194 Japan clearly facing defeat, now using kamikaze or suicide bombers. Under MacArthur, Philippines retaken by end February 1945. Raids on Japan intensifying. k) The coup in Indochina September 1943, Japan re‐examined policy in Indochina, and decided on takeover, but not implemented even after Paris retaken in June 1944. However, in March 1945 French administration eliminated, some French killed. Vietnamese saw this as a moment for independence l) Battle of Imphal (in modern India), May­July 1944 1942 Japanese had begun construction of a railway linking Thailand and Burma (possibly 60,000 prisoners of war and conscripted Malays, Burmese, Tamils, Chinese and Javanese died). Americans already making it clear that the reconquest of colonial territories was not their priority – defeat of Japan was. In 1944 British reputation partly restored through rebuilding Indian army and attacking and defeating Japanese advancing in western Burma towards India (at Imphal). British continued with reconquest of Burma and by May 1945 Rangoon in British hands again. Dropping of bombs on Japan, battle for Okinawa in April showed how vulnerable Japan was . m) Surrender For most Japanese the idea of negotiation for peace was problematic although it was being discussed by September 1943 . 8 May 1945 Germany surrendered, but still no agreement in Japanese cabinet. Military would not admit they were beaten, despite lack of oil stocks. 6 August atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and then on Nagasaki. 14 August Japanese decided to surrender. n) MacArthur and the Philippines MacArthur anxious to regain Philippines, not bypass it. By time of surrender neither Singapore nor Malaya had been retaken. Americans had sole responsibility for retaking Philippines. Most of northern areas taken end March, and US forces moved into south in May. Japanese continued to fight in the interior o) The peoples and the war All Southeast Asia involved in war, but experience differed; Japan’s polices also varied p) The Indian National Army Japanese generally reluctant to arm natives, although this did happen. Indian revolutionaries encouraged Japanese to form an Indian National army from Indian prisoners of war and other volunteers, but this largely for propaganda purposes. However, the British prewar colonial army included a large percentage of Indians 9 and now Britain reluctant to use Indian army as they sought to restore equilibrium after the war. Main effect of Japanese occupation was to dislodge colonial regimes. Though they had spoken of Great East Asia, idealism was limited from the start and qualified by wartime demands Chapter 4: Conquest and Liberation, pp. 124­43 a) Racism and rhetoric Japan had not really developed any prewar specific plans about the new position envisaged in Asia. Military objectives always predominated, and planning for administration of an empire was limited. Desire for independence among peoples in Greater East Asia Co‐Prosperity Sphere should be respected but these must be subservient to Japan’s military and economic requirements. On the other hand, care should be taken not to appear as an aggressor. b) The Greater East Asia Co­Prosperity Sphere (GEAPS) The meaning of this concept was contested among Japanese policy makers, but it was decided the army should have primary responsibility in Philippines, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, British Borneo and Burma: Navy to be predominant in Dutch Borneo Sulawesi, Maluku (eastern Indonesia) and New Guinea. But policies improvised and varied, methods borrowed from previous experiences in Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria. Japanese had different ideas about what GEAPS actually meant in practice c) The guidelines Military requirements for raw materials to have priority; use existing structures as far as possible; people to be encouraged to co‐operate; decision to promise Philippines and Burma independence, if they showed desire to co‐operate, but no such offers would be made to the other countries. d) The Ministry of Greater East Asia New Ministry set up November 1 1942 to oversee administration of occupied areas. Debates about GEAPS changed as war advanced. By 1943 more emphasis being given to Japan as a liberator. November 1943, a kind of answer to Atlantic Charter – Countries of great East Asia would respect traditions, maintain friendly relations, abolish racial discrimination, undertake cultural exchange, establish intimate relationship etc. e) Independence Japan thought Germany might surrender in 1944, but this did not happen and Allies demanded unconditional surrender from Japan. Early in 1944 Japan working hard to win over natives by promising independence – this was to be a “legacy for the future,” and might help in future restoration of Japanese power if defeat could not be avoided. f) War and Empire Japanese empire shaped by wartime conditions, largely under military administration, and military needs a priority, but still faced the problems of other empires. Japanese initially wanted to emphasize continuity and order, but as their position deteriorated they opened up new opportunies for the local leaders who would have to take charge after the war. 10 Chapter 5: Control and Mobilisation, pp. 144­217 (the details in these chapters will be developed in specific country presentations) a) Politics and Administration Policies of Japanese towards Southeast Asia shifted over time because of the nature of particular countries, and the nature of Japanese interests there. Local leaders adopted some of the Japanese policies after the war. b) Burma Burma was the last Southeast Asian country to be conquered, but with the Philippines was the most advanced constitutionally, although the British had not specifically promised independence. Japanese recruited thirty student leaders, (the Thakin, young masters) including Aung San (father of Suu Kyi), in 1 February 1941. They co‐operated with the Japanese army invasion in March 1942, but there were continuing internal disputes between Aung San and the puppet government under Prime Minister Ba Maw. 1 August 1943 Burma given independence, but Japanese control was strong. Aung San disillusioned, established alliance with Communist leader and in Sept 1944 created Anti‐Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). British saw this group as best allies for the future, and after Japanese surrender AFPFL dominated government of Burma British as accepted independence, which was proclaimed 4 January 1948. In the meantime, Aung San had been assassinated by a rival. c) The Philippines Philippines conscious they had not gained independence in 1896. Americans had given promise this would happen in 1946. Manuel Quezon was president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (from 1935), and took refuge in Corregidor while the Japanese established a new collaborative administration under Salvador Laurel in January 1942. MacArthur withdrew, accompanied by Quezon who was upset that Americans gave so much attention to the fate of a “distant cousin”, Britain, while ignoring the Philippines (“a daughter raped in the back room.”). Japanese declared Independence in October 1943, but pro‐American sentiment continued and there was considerable guerilla resistance from the pro‐communist Hukbalahap. MacArthur returned October 1944. After the war, elections held, and Manuel Roxas made president when independence declared 4 July 1946. Collaboration was an issue after the war. Politics were factionalized, parties personality‐based, and elite wanted to preserve their position. d) Netherlands India Dutch colonial army largely composed of Christians, Muslims underrepresented, Dutch always suspicious of arming locals. Resources here much more important to Japan than any other country; Japan also knew the Netherlands was not a major power. Dutch had relied on a small contingent of colonial officials and indigenous aristocracy to rule. Japanese fostered relationships with Muslim and nationalist leaders. Little anti‐Japanese resistance, and generally Japanese welcomed. Nationalists like Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, released from prison, were willing to co‐operate. Japanese created youth organizations in 1943, and formed an umbrella Muslim organization, Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), in October 1942. Armed units (heiho) formed in May 1942, and in October 1943 an armed organization PETA (defenders of the fatherland) 11 established. Throughout the Japanese were trying to obtain support, but as the was situation deteriorated, life for Indonesians grew much harder because of forced deliveries to Japanese. Growing peasant unrest in 1944. By My 1945 Sukarno pushing for independence, and Japanese war leaders belatedly agreed. Japan surrendered 14 August, and Indonesian leaders made a brief statement announcing independence 17 August. But situation difficult because no colonial power had driven out the Japanese, and Dutch were not committed to granting independence. e) Borneo Japanese administered the island in five units (“Our Borneo”). No promise of independence made and British Borneo never included in Indonesia. No efforts to promote political unity of island, and emphasis was on the status quo. Chinese badly treated; Chinese led guerilla resistance. f) Malaya and Singapore Japanese policy did not lead to political change, no promises of independent future. Country divided into ten provinces, Malays used in some administrative positions, usually aristocrats. The Sultans of the individual states were not removed, and they were given nominal positions in the Japanese administration. Japanese policy towards the Chinese was punitive and often brutal (as in Singapore where 40,000‐
70,000 were killed). However, Japanese recognized they also needed collaboration of Chinese to maintain economy. Indians encouraged to join Indian Independence League, led by anti‐British Indians. Many Chinese took to the jungle, formed the main component of the guerilla movement, the Malayan peoples Anti‐Japanese Army (MPAJA), dominated by Communists. There was some Malay anti‐Japanese activity as well. Even when Japan was losing, no promises made about independence because of difficulty of deciding whether it would be communal (i.e. non‐Malays given political power as well) or Malay‐dominated, or whether it should be joined to Indonesia. Malays angered when Japanese transferred northern Malay states to Thailand in August 1943. g) Thailand Thailand still independent, in 1941 had to work out what side to back. Thai leaders were co‐operative, and Japan promised they would get back “lost territories” ceded to colonial powers in earlier years. However, Prime Minister Phibun trying to cover all bases, and in 1943 attempting to work out the best time to turn against the Japanese. Another Thai leader, Pridi, made secret contacts with Allies, Japanese growing more distrustful. 1945 May, Pridi proposed a “Free Thai” uprising against Japanese. When Japanese surrendered he said that the declaration of war against Britain and US in January 1942 had been unconstitutional and he renounced wartime territorial acquisitions. Thailand able to separate from Japanese and still maintain good postwar relations while becoming a semi‐ally of Britain and the US. h) Indochina The French had ruthlessly suppressed nationalist uprisings in Vietnam, both Communist and non‐Communist. Viet Minh founded 1940‐1, but Ho Chi Minh decided to wait for general insurrection, perhaps when Japanese army surrendered. French tried to win support while they still had some control by setting up new youth organizations, but these eventually used against French. Bao Dai, Vietnamese puppet emperor, urged by Japanese, declared independence March 1945. With 12 Japanese surrender, Ho Chi Minh ordered general uprising, 12 August 1945, and moved into Hanoi. Bao Dai abdicated 25 August. Ho made contact with US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), asked US and United Nations to grant independence “If not, we will keep fighting until we get it.” He declared Vietnam’s independence 2 September. Non‐communist nationalists had not received any outside support. Cambodia had a late anti‐French movement (1942), but French not sympathetic. Prince Sihanouk reluctantly welcomed French back after war. In Laos royal family were pro‐French, but when Japanese arrived king declared independence, this reaffirmed on Japanese surrender French able to re‐establish position. French regained territories lost by Cambodia and Laos during war to Thailand. Chapter 6: Demand and Supply, pp. 218­51 a) Disruption and inflation Inflation hit all occupied territories, and worsened during occupation. There was also much physical destruction, especially in Philippines and Burma b) Earlier patterns Prior to the nineteenth century trade in Southeast Asia had been largely intra‐Asian but it was now tied more closely to Europe. Japanese had been active traders in Southeast Asia before 1633, and even after that they did receive goods from the region on Dutch and Chinese ships. But Japanese government did not see itself as supporting Japanese commercial interests already in the region – Japanese residents in Southeast Asia were seen as helpful guides and interpreters, but military authorities only began to make real use of them economically in 1943. c) Wartime pattern Big businesses, zaibatsu, and carefully selected companies benefitted by Japan’s involvement in Southeast Asia. The information they acquired put to good use after the war. Despite ambivalent relationship, Japanese also willing to work with Chinese. But Japanese unable to bring about the economic change they sought because control was not nearly as great as in Korea and was too short. d) Netherlands India Japanese had invested heavily in Netherlands Indies in interwar period. During occupation Japanese policies failed to produce adequate rice (e.g. Java); peasants forced to grow non‐food crops like sisal for gunny sacks and castor oil, used as aircraft lubricant. Because rice prices Japanese offered were too low, black market emerged and this was manipulated by village officials who were supposed to deliver surpluses to the Japanese. Distribution also poor, much infrastructure destroyed by Dutch scorched‐earth policies. Famine – by 1944 people dying along the roads, in many places death rate exceeded birth rate. Village officials also had to recruit romusha, “Physical laborers.” Occupation exacted a heavy price, especially from landless laborers and smallholders. e) Malaya and Singapore Both were important to Britain because of long‐standing tin industry and rubber, developed from late 19th century. The Japanese occupation meant these resources no longer available to Allies. However, Japanese didn’t really need either rubber or tin to prosecute the war (enough supplies from Thailand and Indochina), although it was interested in Malaya’s bauxite. Singapore remained of strategic interest, 13 although trade slumped. Because Japan did not need nearly as much tin or rubber as Malay produced pre‐war, smallholders suffered. Not enough good rice‐land for Malay and Singapore to be self‐sufficient, although Japanese tried to force more food production. Japanese formed kumiai, groups of local firms given quasi‐monopolies (e.g. over fish, vegetables, etc., but they became essentially govt.‐protected black marketers. f) Borneo Japanese primarily interested in oil here. Despite destruction by retreating British, Japanese got oil‐fields going again. Japanese tried to promote self‐sufficiency in food. Locals also had to supply food to Japanese army, which expanded to 17,000 in September 1944. Zaibatsu benefitted here Conscript labor used, romusha brought in from Java, thousands died at end of the war when they were left to fend for themselves g) The Philippines Japanese had been actively trading and investing in the Philippines under the Spanish, communities of Japanese developed; 24,000 Japanese living in the Philippines in 1939. Japanese firms allocated land to start plantations, e.g. cotton. Japan requisitioned rice; Filipino labor drafted. By December 1944 dead and dying a common sight in Manila’s streets. h) Burma Burma was an exporter of rice in 1939m sometimes called the “rice‐bowl of Asia.”. It was also rich in minerals, zinc, nickel, lead, silver. Japanese occupation wanted to exploit mining of minerals, oil and metals, but rice production fell dramatically. Markets were lost and Allied air raids demobilized rice mills. Indian laborers had fled. Thousands died as conscripted laborers, especially on Burma‐Thailand railroad where 85,000 Burmese were used. Forced labor became one of the greatest Burmese grievances against the Japanese. i) Thailand Rural populations not greatly affected, insulated from both the war and contact with the Japanese. Thailand remained a primary producer; Japan thought it would be a food supplier to Japan and other areas of Greater East Asia, but economy affected because markets lost, especially for tin and rubber. Thai government extended loans to finance Japanese military purchases. Inflation and shortages felt mainly by townsfolk (though not as bad as elsewhere in Southeast Asia) because baht now linked to yen at artificial rate. By April 1945 prices for commodities 46 times higher than in 1937. j) Indochina Indochina supplied tin and rubber by agreements made in May 1941; after Pacific War developed, cotton emphasized more, vegetable oils, jute and hemp, but especially rice – Indochina major supplier of rice to japan. But conversion of so much land to non‐edible crops led to famine, which worsened with allied bombing, flooding, collapse of transport system. In 1944‐45 an estimated two million Vietnamese died of starvation. Famine helped win support for Viet Minh, which developed distribution system. 14 Chapter 7: Memory and Legacy, pp. 252­68 a) Violence Japanese violence remembered, in part because there is no clarity about responsibility and little official interest in encouraging debate. Fourteen of condemned war criminals are in national shrine at Yasukuni. Death rate of prisoners much higher than in German or Italian prisons, even allowing for tropical climate Japanese saw capture or surrender as dishonorable; did not ratify 1929 prisoner of war convention. In Southeast Asia Japanese also wanted to destroy prestige of Europeans, and often brutal treatment of Chinese related to events in China. Tarling notes i) Japanese military campaign carried out well, but not enough thought given to civilian administration ii) New imperial venture always under war conditions iii) Japanese army training was brutalizing and they were therefore effective in war (Korean draftees in Japanese army especially feared), but unnecessarily violent as an occupying force. b) The end of imperialism Southeast Asian nationalist leaders were not particularly attracted by Japanese ideas of a “co‐operative” sphere. They were only interested if Greater East Asia Co‐
Prosperoty sphere (GEAPS) would guarantee independence, and some leaders were suspicious of future Japanese domination. But Japan did not set out to liberate, and was primarily interested in maintaining law and order rather than encouraging revolution. Yet in the end only Vietnam was unable to secure independence because it was caught up in Cold War politics.
c) Reparations Japan paid reparations as a way back into Southeast Asia, and Japan soon began to play a major role in post‐war economics in Southeast Asia d) Malaya, Singapore and Borneo Severity and cruelty still remembered, especially by Chinese. Military prisoners badly treated, and Chinese here treated worse than in other parts of Southeast Asia; “sook ching, or “purification” meant torture and death for many. Kempeitai (military police) greatly feared. e) Netherlands India Imprisoned Dutch treated reasonably at first, then more hardly; after the war they were not immediately released because at the end of the war there was conflict between Indonesians and Allied forces seeking to support Dutch return. Sexual exploitation of comfort women, both Dutch and Indonesian. f) The Philippines 10,000 Filipinos and 650 Americans died after surrendering at Bataan and being marched 120 kms. to Tarlac. Another 15,00 died in the camp. Guerilla warfare, poor treatment of Filipinos, great cruelty; comfort women as well. g) Burma Like the Philippines, Burma experienced much fighting on its soil. Still complaints about Japanese cruelty, although no guerrilla movement developed here h) Thailand Thailand kept control of domestic affairs, and excesses of Japanese checked. i) Vietnam 15 Presence of both French and Japanese tended to check day‐to day oppression of Vietnamese. Violence less evident here. Japanese treatment of civilians and military personnel not forgotten. Yet it is remarkable that out of chaos of war local elites managed to make a reality of the idealism that the Japanese had only half‐heatedly put forward. The political legacy the Japanese left was that of mass mobilization. Experience of Japanese rule influenced the nature of post‐war independent governments. 16