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HITLER’S ARMIES
CONTENTS
Introduction: A Phoenix from the Ashes
Blitzkrieg: Hitler’s War Machine Unleashed, 1939–40
North Africa and the Balkans, 1940–43
Operation Barbarossa and the War in the East, 1941–43
Italy and the Western Front, 1943–44
The Final Defeats: Retreat to the Fatherland, 1943–45
Conclusion
Further Reading
INTRODUCTION: A PHOENIX FROM THE
ASHES
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Unpromising beginnings. The Reichsheer during the 1920s and early 1930s had limited
potential for military investment under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Here, in 1931, an
MG 08 machine-gun team train alongside two trucks mocked up as tanks, testing out
emerging theories of combined arms warfare.
WEHRMACHT (LITERALLY ‘DEFENSIVE POWER’ ) WAS BORN OUT OF THE most unpromising
circumstances. When the dust and arguments settled after World War I, the victorious Allies
imposed a series of restrictions on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919. Among
other things, the treaty stated that by 31 March 1920, the German Army was to consist of no more than
100,000 men, of whom just 4,000 were to be officers. The treaty conditions also specified the structure
and organization of this army: there were to be 21 three-battalion infantry regiments (with 21 training
battalions attached), and each regiment was to have one mortar company. There were to be
proportionally larger numbers of cavalry, plus seven artillery regiments of three battalions, and seven
field engineer, signals, motorized and medical battalions, a total of seven divisions in all.
The German Army of 34,000 officers and nearly eight million men which had fought from 1914 to
1918 was to be reduced to insignificance, with no hope of operations larger than at corps level and,
most importantly from the point of view of the vengeful French, no prospect of cross-border
excursions. Furthermore, the Germans were to be prevented from forming reserves, by virtue of the
ITLER’S
restriction that men had to serve a minimum of 12 years, and officers 25 years before discharge. It was
envisaged by the victorious powers that never again would Germany’s armed forces be in a strong
enough position to threaten the peace of Europe.
The decimation of her armed forces was not the only difficult situation Germany had to contend
with. The heartfelt relief at the end of the war was almost universal but political turmoil in the wake
of the conflict was keenly felt and particularly in Germany. She had removed its emperor, Kaiser
Wilhelm II, at the end of the war and was struggling to find a form of government that had the power
and prestige to set Germany on the way to recovery. The nation was both economically and militarily
bankrupt. Although American efforts to shore up what was a much-weakened nation helped to some
extent, political unrest was to continue in Germany until the mid 1930s.
This political uncertainty was compounded by the fear of her neighbours and former enemies. To
the west Germany was bordered by France with an army of one million. To the east was Poland,
traditionally regarded as a threat by German minds, especially with its superior force of 30 infantry
divisions and ten cavalry brigades. Geographically the Danzig corridor in the east separated East
Prussia – still a German territory – from the homeland, and in the Rhineland in the west the victorious
Allies had insisted upon permanent demilitarization as well as occupation for 15 years. To add to this
and other burdens there was also the matter of hefty reparations payment, a matter upon which the
French were vehemently insistent.
On 2 April 1920, General Hans von Seeckt became de facto commander-in-chief of the remnants of
the German Army, and was faced with transforming it into the 100,000-man Reichsheer (Imperial
Army) as specified by the Treaty of Versailles. He held this role until 7 October 1926 and, despite a
personal preference for cavalry, he conceived and promulgated a doctrine that was to form the basis of
German operational military thought and deed until the end of World War II.
Von Seeckt had served on various staffs during the Great War, ending up as Chief of Staff of III
Corps. For five months in 1919 he was Chief of the General Staff and spent much time immediately
after the war evaluating operational concepts in which the machine gun, barbed wire, artillery and the
tank had dominated. He realized that the Reichsheer (German Army) was a spent force that could not
fight any future war as it had done the last.
No matter what Von Seeckt’s political views were, his actions would affect the military world
fundamentally. To avoid the tremendous losses incurred by the return to medieval siege tactics of
1914–18, he realized that military strategy had to be based on mobility. No doubt, like Field Marshal
Haig, he had longed to loose the cavalry into the enemy’s rear after a breakthrough of the frontline
enemy trenches. More perceptively, however, he also saw that such breakthroughs were not easily
achieved once the enemy had time to dig in and fortify. He had noted the successes of the
Sturmgruppen (storm groups) – dedicated assault forces specializing in mobile attacks – who had
made such progress in 1918. What he emphasized was that such breakthroughs had to be supplied, and
then resupplied with men, weapons, food and all the other prerequisites of warfare if they were to
maintain their momentum.
The essence of his teaching was that ‘tactics depend upon co-operation between arms’ and that the
next war would be one of ‘manoeuvre’.
Unlike many staff officers, Von Seeckt was well travelled and had been educated at a secondary
school in Strasbourg rather than in a military school, which probably endowed him with more
flexibility of mind than granted by traditional military studies. His work from 1920 to 1926 resulted in
the publication of a pamphlet, Führung und Gefecht (Command in Battle), which emphasized the
importance of movement in combat. He wanted an army that was only big enough to counter a
surprise enemy attack. The real strength of this new army would lie in its mobility, which would be
provided by a large contingent of cavalry, physically well-conditioned infantry and a full complement
of motorized or mechanized units, machine guns and artillery. Of course, the men of the Reichswehr
(armed forces) were already battle-hardened, experienced fighters. All he had to do was train them to
exploit their mobility.
Mechanized forces of the German Condor Legion move through Spain during the Spanish
Civil War. Germany’s involvement in the Spanish conflict gave it a superb opportunity to trial
tactics and technologies prior to its invasion of Poland in 1939.
Von Seeckt’s work was of such importance that from 1923 the German Army began to base its
training and exercises on his published theories, and although the army had very few men to put on the
ground in exercises, the basic elements of his ideas became fundamental to German strategic and
tactical thinking. The emphasis was now on rapid reaction to new events, together with a preparedness
for decisive action against the enemy. Exercises and manoeuvres from 1923 to 1926 showed how the
concept of this war of movement was also becoming standard thinking in the German Army right
down to section level.
Although Von Seeckt had retired by 1933 when Hitler and the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP; National Socialist German Workers’ Party) came to power, his legacy to the
German Army had not been lost. Hitler was elected to the chancellorship on 30 January 1933, under
the critical eye of the German president, Paul von Hindenburg. Hitler intended to enlarge the army to
further his expansionist aims in Europe, and the army was naturally delighted. Senior officers believed
Hitler could be controlled: nothing, however, could have been further from the truth.
Germany had been divided into Wehrkreise (military districts) for recruitment purposes since
before World War I. Each district recruited and trained the men for the army, and within each district
there were the relevant corps headquarters, barracks and training areas needed for the Reichswehr. On
Hitler’s accession he made it quite plain that the army was to expand from the original seven divisions
to a total of 36 divisions in 13 corps. The army’s initial reaction was one of total surprise, as they
contemplated the sheer logistical problems of such voluminous expansion. However, they were
delighted to be free of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, with the army assuming
the honourable position within German society that it had enjoyed prior to 1918.
Every German male was to be liable to serve in the armed forces, even though this policy had been
strictly forbidden by the Versailles Treaty. On 16 March 1935, Hitler promulgated the ‘Law for the
Expansion of the German Armed Forces’, which reinstated conscription, and increased the army to the
aimed-for 36 divisions. Then on 21 May 1935, a second law defined the duty to serve in the armed
forces (or the Wehrmacht as they were now known), noting very few exceptions. Although Hitler was
still establishing the power base of the NSDAP, his relationship with the army was strengthened by
these laws, for it meant that at long last, the small, professional force created and trained under Von
Seeckt would now have new men to train, and a much greater standing in society at home and in the
military world at large.
From 2 August 1934, all German soldiers swore the following oath: ‘I swear by God this holy oath:
that I will always be unconditionally obedient to Adolf Hitler, Leader of the German Reich and
people, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and, as a valiant soldier I am prepared to lay down
my life at any time for this oath.’ Hitler had, by this time, established a clear dictatorship, and the
revised oath was an emphatic sign that the German armed forces were now under new management.
Bolstered by a massive rearmament implemented by Hitler, the Wehrmacht expanded rapidly. Like a
phoenix from the ashes, Germany’s army had risen above the combined disasters of defeat in World
War I and the restrictions of Versailles to be once again one of the dominant military powers on the
continent. On 1 September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland, its army numbered 3,180,000 men.
It eventually expanded to 9,500,000 personnel, and on 8/9 May 1945, the date of its unconditional
surrender on the Western and Eastern Fronts, it still numbered 7,800,000. It was a far cry from the
original 100,000-strong force that Hitler had inherited.
Hitler believed, incorrectly as events were to prove, that his political skills were matched by a
unique ability as a strategic commander. His increasing influence on the Wehrmacht’s conduct of
World War II eventually proved to be disastrous. This book looks inside the development of Hitler’s
land forces from their days of victory in 1939 and 1940 to their final devastation in 1945. There is no
denying that Germany produced a first-rate military organization, respected by all who fought it in
combat. For the first three years of the war it was practically unassailable, and during the years of
defeat it remained stubborn in the defence. What this book aims to show is how the German Army and
related groups, such as the Waffen-SS and the Luftwaffe’s Fallschirmjäger (paratroopers), earned their
reputation, and the extent to which it was justified.
BLITZKRIEG: HITLER’S WAR MACHINE
UNLEASHED, 1939–40
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This column of troops wears the uniform typical of the German Army in 1939. For the march,
they have adopted the Feldmütze (field cap) rather than the 1935-pattern steel helmet, which
hangs from their belts.
BLITZKRIEG (LIGHTNING WAR ) PERIOD, FROM 1 SEPTEMBER 1939 TO 25 JUNE 1940, was ten
months of almost total triumph for the Wehrmacht. With the exception of Great Britain, the
German forces defeated every country that took the field against them, and for the next two
years they appeared almost unassailable.
German strategy at this time combined two concepts: the traditional ‘decisive manoeuvre’,
developed by Prussian General Von Moltke in the 1850s, and the ‘armoured concept’ pioneered by
Heinz Guderian in the 1920s and 1930s. ‘Decisive manoeuvre’ used infantry to attack the enemy’s line
of retreat, trapping it in pockets. Guderian, however, advocated concentrations of tanks, mechanized
infantry and Luftwaffe dive-bombers to punch a hole in the opposing line, and penetrate into rear
areas to destroy key command centres, forcing a total collapse in enemy morale and the ability to
resist. Both strategies demanded that Germany be the aggressor, a position in line with the Third
Reich’s xenophobic and expansionist ideology. Germany had the vital advantages of surprise and of
choosing the time, place and conditions of the battles. Its opponents pinned their hopes on neutrality,
diplomatic skills and static frontier defences. They were psychologically unwilling to fight, and
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reluctant to prepare for war.
POLAND AND THE WEST
On 26 August 1939, the Wehrmacht began a secret partial mobilization for Fall Weiss (Case White),
the invasion of Poland, leading to full mobilization on 3 September. On 1 September, the army was
finally unleashed. The invasion force, consisting of 1,512,000 men, was organized in two army groups
totalling 53 divisions (37 infantry, four motorized, three mountain, three light, six Panzer), and it
attacked on three fronts. Army Group North, under Generaloberst Fedor von Bock with 3rd and 4th
Armies, attacked from north-east Germany and East Prussia. Army Group South, led by Generaloberst
Gerd von Rundstedt with 8th, 10th and 14th Armies, advanced from south-east Germany and northern
Slovakia, supported by the 1st and 2nd Slovak divisions.
An infantryman in 1934 wearing the standard field jacket and trousers of the period. Belt
equipment includes ammunition pouches, each holding 15 rounds of 7.92mm ammunition
for the Gewehr 98 in his right hand. His boots are the experimental buckled boots of 1934,
which did not go into general service. 1) The German national colours, initially found on the
left side of the helmet but then moved to the right when the national emblem (2) was
introduced; 2) The national emblem for helmets, placed on the left side of the helmet, in
white; 3) The 1916-pattern helmet; 4) The national emblem as applied to the uniform jacket;
5) Rank chevrons to the end of 1936: (i) Oberschütze; (ii) Gefreiter; (iii) Obergefreiter; (iv)
Oberstabsgefreiter; 6) The shoulder board for an infantryman of the 30th Infantry Regiment;
7) Garrison cap or side hat; 8) The Gewehr 98, the standard issue rifle of World War I; 9) The
bayonet, which was fixed below the muzzle of the rifle on a mounting post welded to the
barrel: also shown is the black leather scabbard; 10) A five-round clip for the rifle; 11) The
Pistole 08 or Luger; 12) Belt kit as seen from the rear; 13) The Type 24 hand grenade and
(13a) pamphlets for instruction; 14) The transitional boot, with three buckles on the outside. It
was soon abandoned as it was prone to let water in and was awkward in heavy undergrowth;
15) A military torch and battery. Note the coloured slides, which were interchangeable.
(Adam Hook © Osprey Publishing)
The Polish Army, deployed too close to the German frontier, was already being outflanked when, on
17 September, seven armies (41 divisions and equivalents) of the Soviet Red Army attacked them in
the rear. Threatened on four fronts, the heavily outnumbered Polish Army officially surrendered on 27
September, and ceased all hostilities on 6 October.
Poland was the German Army’s first great victory, and vindication of its tactical theories and prewar training regimen. An eight-month ‘Phoney War’ followed, with much posturing by Anglo-French
forces but little in the way of significant action. Nevertheless, anxious that the Allied forces might
attack Germany through Norway and Denmark, Hitler decided to invade these militarily weak neutral
states in a pre-emptive strike called Unternehmen Weserübung (Operation Weserübung), commanded
by General der Infanterie Nikolaus von Falkenhorst. The attack against Denmark was launched on 9
April 1940. The inexperienced Danish Army, with 6,600 troops organized in two infantry divisions, its
strategic position hopeless, was forced to surrender after just four hours’ limited resistance.
THE FLOWER WARS
Hitler’s political manoeuvrings, and Franco-British reluctance to risk war, gave the German Army five bloodless victories
before September 1939. Hitler’s troops annexed neighbouring territories in operations known as the Blumenkriege, or
Flower Wars, a reference to the flowers often thrown by local ethnic Germans to welcome German forces.
On 7 March 1936, 30,000 troops from the 5th, 9th, 15th and 16th Infantry Divisions marched across the Rhine and
occupied the demilitarized Saar region on the west bank. Then on 12 March 1938, 200,000 troops of the 8th Army (VII and
XIII Corps, and 2nd Panzer Division) invaded Austria, annexing it and dividing it into Wehrkreise XVII and XVIII in April
1938, and absorbing the Austrian Army as the 44th and 45th Infantry, 4th Light and 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions.
The army had originally expected to deploy 39 divisions in five armies (numbers 2, 8, 10, 12, 14) for an invasion of
Czechoslovakia, but following the Munich Agreement in September 1938 it occupied the Sudetenland border areas without
bloodshed from 1 to 10 October 1938 with elements of the six neighbouring German corps – IV, VII, VIII, XIII, XVII,
XVIII. The Sudetenland was incorporated into Wehrkreise IV, VII, VIII, XIII and XVII. On 15 March 1939, these units
occupied the rest of Bohemia-Moravia, designated Wehrkreis Böhmen und Mähren in October 1942. Finally, on 23 March
1939, elements of I Corps annexed the Memel district of western Lithuania to Wehrkreis I.
On the same day XXI Corps, with 3rd Mountain, 69th and 163rd Infantry Divisions, disembarked in
Norway, later reinforced by 2nd Mountain, 181st, 196th and 214th Infantry Divisions, with 40th
Special Panzer Battalion providing token armour. They totalled some 100,000 men, and engaged six
infantry divisions of the Norwegian Army (with only 25,000 of its 90,000 men mobilized), backed up
by the Allied Expeditionary Force with the equivalent of two infantry divisions. Showing their
growing confidence and capabilities, the German troops forced an Allied evacuation and a Norwegian
surrender on 9 June 1940.
German motorbike troops bracket a staff car during the German reoccupation of the
Rhineland in 1936. The staff car is the Kraftfahrzeug (Kfz) 15, which also served as a
communications vehicle. Its long wheelbase was an impediment during cross-country
manoeuvres.
FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES
Hitler had now built up momentum, and he sought to conclude his domination of Western Europe. For
Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), the Western offensive, the German Army assembled 2,750,000 men in 91
divisions, divided among three army groups. Army Group A under Generaloberst Von Rundstedt with
4th, 12th and 16th Armies, including Panzergruppe von Kleist (Panzer Group Von Kleist), was to
advance through Belgium into France. Army Group B, led by Generaloberst Von Bock with 6th and
18th Armies, would attack the Netherlands and Belgium, whilst Army Group C under Generaloberst
Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, with 1st and 7th Armies, would pin down French forces on the Maginot
Line. These forces totalled 75 infantry divisions, including the 22nd Luftlande (Airborne) Division,
one Luftwaffe airborne division, four motorized, one mountain, one cavalry and ten Panzer divisions,
with a further 42 divisions in reserve.
The German invasion of Poland, September 1939. Routes of advance of the main German
armies and formations are depicted in blue.