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The Effect of Government Policy on China’s Stock Market DISSERTATION of the University of St. Gallen, Graduate School of Business Administration, Economics, Law and Social Sciences (HSG) to obtain the title of Doctor Oeconomiae Submitted by Liya Wang from China Approved on the application of Prof. Dr. Li Choy Chong and Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann Dissertation no. 3716 Gutenberg AG, Feldkirchstrasse 13, FL - 9494 Schaan, 2010 1 The University of St. Gallen, Graduate School of Business Administration, Economics, Law and Social Sciences (HSG) hereby consents to the printing of the present dissertation, without hereby expressing any opinion on the views herein expressed. St. Gallen, October 19, 2009 The President: Prof. Ernst Mohr, PhD 2 Table of Contents Abstract 5 Introduction 7 Chapter One Literature Review 12 Chapter Two Monetary Policy 37 Literature and Methodology 40 Money Supply 45 Interest Rate 66 Bank Chapter Three Chapter Four Reserve Ratio and Open Market Operations 73 Fiscal Policy 91 Government Spending 95 Government Bond 109 Taxation Policy 121 Overview of Policies 136 Methodology 137 Summary of Major Fluctuations and Policy Changes 140 Game between Government and Investor 154 3 Economic Growth and Stock Market 157 Event Study 169 Stock Reform 179 Multi-Level & Functional Financial Market 196 Conclusion 227 Reference 230 Curriculum Vitae 242 4 Abstract China is moving from a planned economy toward a market-oriented financial system as it opens its economy to foreign competition in the last decade. Now facing the global financial crisis, the government is turning the export-oriented strategy which powered remarkable growth during the first 20-year of China’s growth story to a greater reliance on inner dynamism. This paper examines the effect of various government policies China has implemented during the 20-year development of its stock market. I used various empirical data collected from the government statistics bureaus, the central bank and research institutions to exam whether monetary policy, fiscal policy and some specific capital market related policies have direct or indirect effects on the stock market and whether their impact is positive for China’s development. Based on descriptive, regression analysis, Granger Causality, VAR model and case studies, the results suggest government’s policies have had significant impact on the stock market. I conclude that the central government has made the necessary efforts and posted positive influences on the development of China’s stock market, learning by doing, perfecting the framework during the transition to a market economy, although there have been several failed attempts along the way. 5 Zusammenfassung China bewegte sich während des letzten Jahrzehnts weg von der Planwirtschaft hin zu einem marktorientierten Finanzsystem. Aufgrund der globalen Finanzkrise änderte die Regierung die exportorientierte Strategie zugusten der inneren Dynamik des Landes. Die vorliegende Arbeit prüfte die Auswirkungen mehrerer Richtlinien der Regierung Chinas, welche bei der Entwicklung des Aktienmarktes während den letzten 20 Jahren erlassen wurden. Die empirischen Datensammlungen wurden verwendet, um den direkten oder indirekten Einfluss der Geldpolitik, Fiskalpolitik und andere spezifische kapitalmarktabhängigen Reglementierungen auf den Aktienmarkt aufzuzeigen, sowie auch ob sich diese Einflüsse positiv auf die chinesische Entwicklung ausgewirkt haben. Basierend auf den Resultaten von beschreibenden Regressionsanalysen, Granger Causality, VAR Modellen und Fallstudien waren die Einflüsse der Regierung auf den Aktienmarkt signifikant. Daraus schliesse ich, dass die Zentralregierung die nötigen Schritte unternommen hat, um die Entwicklung des chinesischen Aktienmarktes positiv zu beinflussen. Dabei ist die Gestaltung der Rahmenbedingungen während dem Übergang zur Marktwirtschaft ein konstanter Lernprozess, bei dem auch fehlgeschlagene Ansätze den Weg säumen. 6 Introduction The regulator presides over the financial market, holding a mission to maintain fairness and efficiency and to facilitate an orderly development. Stock markets are sensitive to information. Formerly, stock markets were less transparent and less regulated. The government could directly interfere using diverse monetary or fiscal tools or other regulations. Sometimes the government could even be manipulated by external commercial influences1. As the markets liberalize, government leaves more room to the market and relies largely on the country’s legal framework. The disagreement and debates between government intervention and economic freedom has been the core line of western economic development ever since Adam Smith’s ‘The Wealth of Nations’. Early this year, the renowned economist Paul A. Sameulson pointed out that it is utterly mistaken to believe ‘a market system can regulate itself’ 2 . The supervisory role of the government has been sharply 1 The most famous example is the South Sea bubble of Britain in 1720, when the government promulgated law to protect the monopoly of the South Sea Company. 2 See the interview of Paul A. Sameulson by NPQ in Jan 2009, who suggests ‘Don't expect recovery before 2012’. 7 curtailed in years especially in western economies, fed by the belief in the self-regulatory nature of the market economy. Analytically based lessons from the present crisis shall focus on revisions of the macroeconomic and regulatory frameworks to reduce the risks of dangerous booms and resulting busts. Thus people have shifted the focus back to the pioneering idea Adam Smith recognized 250 years ago – limitations of the market. Despite Smith’s detailed analysis of the working of a market economy, it would be hard to carve out from his works any theory of the sufficiency of the market economy. Keynesian economics again becomes the center of discussion when the conventional measures can no longer play much of a supporting role. Ever since the breakout of credit crunch in American autumn, many countries have acted on monetary measures in the beginning by continuously lowering interest rates aiming to stop the worsening financial condition. Official interest rates in several countries or region including the USA, Canada, Japan, UK, Switzerland, and Hong Kong SAR are close to zero. Notably the interest rate of the bank of England has not reached this level in its 315-year history. According to the latest US Federal Reserve policy meeting, the ideal interest rate for its economy in current condition would be minus 5%. A central bank however can not cut interest rates below zero. The actual situation 8 suggests that the central governments need to adopt unconventional policies and provide stimulus. Thus, fiscal policy has become critical to reinstate the global recovery. Countries at the G20 summit in November 2008 agreed to ‘use fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand to rapid effect, and as appropriate, while maintaining a policy framework conducive to fiscal sustainability’. The latest report from the IMF states the G20 countries will spend USD 820 billion in 2009 in their respective economies, or 2% of GDP. China has started a RMB 4 trillion (USD 585 billion) two-year stimulus package to boost its economic growth. The Chinese central government will fund as much as RMB 1.2 trillion. In the first quarter of 2009, lenders in China answered the government’s call to open credit taps by extending more than RMB 4.6 trillion in new loans; more than total new lending in 2007. Worries arose in observation of such rapid loan growth that history will repeat itself as in the 1990s when China suffered from bad loans. Government thus announced revitalization and restructuring plans for ten major industries, to promote economic growth pattern to domestic demand-oriented growth. Since the formation of China’s stock exchanges in 1990, the stock markets have developed rapidly. Stock markets have helped China to restructure SOE ownerships, improve their corporate governance, credit 9 market and capital allocation efficiency. They are also likely to harm economic development due to their susceptibility to market failure which is often manifest in the volatile nature of stock markets found in many developing countries (Singh and Weiss, 1998). Thus, government intervention is indispensable. As a developing economy, China has been pursuing a path of development in line with its real condition in the last two decades, from planned economy to market-oriented export economy. To unite a market mechanism with its socialist principles, government intervention is inescapable in its step-by-step reform. Government policy leads the development of stock market and, on the other hand, is affected by and adjusts itself according to the markets. The focus in this paper is China’s monetary policy, fiscal policy and specific capital market related policies. I start a detailed literature review in chapter one, discussing the development of western economics related to the role of government intervention. Chapter two concentrates on monetary policy. I firstly discuss the related literature and methodology, and then proceed with a detailed empirical analysis on the relationship between stock market, money supply and interest rates, supported by data of M0, M1, M2 and CPI. Regression and descriptive analysis is used in this chapter. The third chapter focuses on fiscal policy, namely 10 government spending, bond issuance and taxation policy, based on empirical data. Portfolio allocation theory and descriptive statistics is used. The next chapter summarizes the government policies adopted during China’s stock market development and discusses whether the macroeconomic conditions have a direct correlation with the stock markets. In this chapter, stock reform is introduced in detail, followed by the financial market related policies which government is or will implement to improve the general capital market condition. Game theory, VAR analysis, event and case studies are conducted. 11 Chapter One Literature Review Till the end of 19th century, the dominate thinking was still the ‘invisible hand’ theory derived from ‘The Wealth of Nations’, the founder of modern economics Adam Smith’s pioneer work. His discussion of the baker-brewer-butcher seeking trade has been enshrined in many economic books. Smith believes people’s rational egoism drives them to maximize their self-interests and in the meantime also benefits society. His ethical theory however is not equal to selfishness. He argued that the bank notes would come to have the same value as gold and silver money when people have such confidence (trust) that a banker is always ready to pay upon demand when notes are presented at any time to him. Before ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Smith published his first book ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ in 1759 which already put forward the relationship of morality and law in economic activities. It is not a laissez-faire economy. While stating that prudence was of all virtues that which is most helpful to the individuals, Smith also argued that humanity, justice, generosity and public spirit are the qualities most useful to others. Smith was deeply concerned about the poverty and defended the role of the state in doings 12 things the market might failed to do3. It is thus hard to carve out any theory of the sufficiency of the market economy but this is often overlooked. The laissez-faire notion was expounded in the 19th century, known as Say’s Law. In Jean-Baptiste Say’s work ‘Treatise on Political Economy’ aroused from French philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac’s utility theory of demand4 and Adam Smith’s theory of cost on supply, he outlined the famous Law of Markets which claims that supply creates demand. Such supply-side economics means that overproduction in a free economy is impossible as the inventory will be sold when price is cut to a certain level, or if supply increases but demand does not, the price will fall to a market clearing level. Say’s ideas focus on the underlying reason for recession. Therefore essentially Say’s Law suggests that a recession could not take place due to a failure in demand. As supply creates demand, there will be a demand for goods as long as there are goods available. As economists witness the failure of market mechanism when poor economic phenomenon appear, Swedish economist Knut Wicksell’s cumulative progress theory has defended a place of government 3 See Amartya Sen’s recent article ‘Adam Smith’s market never stood alone’, published in Financial Times, May 12, 2009. 4 Condillac suggests the value depends on the utility in relation to people’s needs. It increases or decreases when needs change. 13 intervention. As the grounder of the Swedish School, Wicksell implied in his work that the difference between the natural rate of interest and the money (loan) rate of interest set the financial demand. He defined the natural rate as a rate which is neutral ‘in respect to commodity prices, and tends neither to raise nor to lower them’ (1936 translation). When the natural rate is equal to money (loan) rate, supply and demand for capital are in equilibrium in an economy. When the natural rate is higher than money (loan) rate, people will borrow money from the banks and invest. In other words, the margin of capital is greater than its cost. Thus, government decisions on the change of interest rate results in a system of changes in the real economy, essentially by changing the demand for investment. So the influence on short-term interest rates to contain inflationary pressure and promote growth and employment lie in the work of Wicksell. Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises and his student Friedrich Hayek took Wicksell’s cumulative cycle progress work further. According to them, a ‘malinvestment’ is generated by expansionary central bank monetary policy when borrowers are misled to borrow more. An artificially low interest rate makes investors believe that the income they will generate in the future exceeds their investment costs so that they 14 misallocate the capital. Therefore, a tendency towards overinvestment in a low interest rate environment is almost inevitable. In other words, a boom is caused by a series of wrong ‘malinvestments’. When people eventually realize that supply outpaces demand, ‘malinvestment’ made during a monetary boom must be liquidated as people start to reallocate their savings and consumption and banks stop credit expansion (Rothbard, 2006). A boom busts. After analyzing empirical data, Milton Friedman concluded the explanation of the business cycle is false (1993). Though the boom-bust cycle theory may correspond to the housing bubble fueled by the Federal Reserve’s artificially low interest rate5, the two important origins of such a cycle should be questioned. Firstly, the theory figures out that the prime culprit is centralized monetary intervention. Besides the government, the market itself may also create the cycle, suggested by Real Business Cycle Theory. Imagine a scenario when supply increases, people have more to consume. One may consume all or consume partially and invest the rest in order to increase the future consumption. The life cycle saving theory, for example, argues that individuals consume based on expected income 5 ‘Greenspan’s Bubbles’ by William A. Fleckenstein suggests that Greenspan’s policy of keeping rates too low for too long inflated the housing bubble. Greenspan however defended that the growth of China and other emerging market led to excessive savings and pushed global long-term interest rates down, which caused mortgage rates and the benchmark Fed-funds rate to diverge after moving “in lockstep” from 1971 to 2002. 15 so they save while they work (Fisher, 1930). This theory however does not really comply with the consumption style of the Americas. Secondly, the above cumulative cycle theory is based upon the ‘malinvestment’ made. Could it also be caused by a symmetric ‘malconsumption’? Barro and Grillio found that consumers’ tendency to increase the consumption grows bigger if he/she expects the change of income to be permanent (1994). Two scenarios could be considered at least. a) When the marginal propensity to consume is bigger than one6: under this situation, consumers borrow money to finance expenditures. In case that their income increase is slower than the increase of expenditure, or disposable income is smaller than spending or their expected future income is lower than what it actually is, the demand is artificially higher. Entrepreneurs thus will enhance the production. When consumers could not finance the expenditures prepaid by credit card or loan or even finally default, the ‘malinvestment’ by entrepreneurs must be liquidated. This consumption scenario is more 6 Marginal propensity to consumer is measured as the ratio of the change of consumption with respect to the change in disposable income that produced consumption. The ratio thus is a figure between 0 and 1. 16 in line with the over-extended American consumption style. The two graphs below portray such a situation. Chart 1 US Credit Card Debt v.s. Real Wage and Household Savings v.s. Debt 17 Source: Innovest, from Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. b) When the consumer does not increase consumption accordingly while the disposable or expected income is increasing or they are more conservative in existence of the poor economic environment, the demand grows comparatively slower or even flattens out. The below chart, for example, displays China’s individual consumption and disposable income growth from 1995 to 2007. People’s disposable income grows at a faster 18 pace than their consumption. Companies therefore stabilize the supply according to the consumption level to avoid overproduction, although they could have increased the output to the same level as the income. What is more, the consumer consumption style should be affected by factors such as the personality, risk preference, social consumption style etc. The research category of economics has grown far further than the traditional definition in the 20th century. Analyzing subjects have been expanded to many human behaviors from family issues such as marriage, divorce, crime, and political matters e.g. voting behavior etc. Stigler (1984) called such expansion of economics an imperial economics. Family, in the subject in microeconomics, is regarded as an ‘enterprise’ by Becker (1978). Chart 2 Individual Consumption v.s. Disposable Income in China, rebased 19 350 300 Consumption Disposable Income 250 200 150 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 100 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) Opposite to cumulative progress cycle theory, Irving Fisher overhauled the quantity theory of money and states that if the quantity of money increases, the level of prices rises when the circulation and transaction volume of money does not change (1911), known as the Fisher Equation. For Fisher, changes in money supply almost fully explained the changes in long-term prices. The disagreement of Wicksell and Fisher continued later by the debates between Keynesian and monetarists. 20 British economist John Maynard Keynes’ research has posted major influences on the modern economic and political literature. His thinking has overturned the free market theory. He advocated that government shall use fiscal and monetary tools to correct adverse economic effects. In his main article ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money’ published in 1936, Keynes asserted that when the interest rate on money exceeds the expected return on capital, people intend to hold money instead of investing in that capital. He also claimed that the amount of savings had little to do with variations in interest rates which in turn had little impact on investment. As an extension to the IS/LM model7, the Mundell-Fleming model portrays that fiscal policy has effect on domestic economic output when capital movement is limited and exchange rates are flexible. However, such a mechanism is likely to differ in an open economy from a closed economy. In a very open economy, investment and consumption may increase in response to a government spending shock while they fall in the existence of a relatively closed economy, suggested by the quantitative findings of Corsetti et al (2007). An important transmission mechanism of monetary policy is delivered through the change of interest rates, which results in the 7 For a detailed view of IS/LM model, see John Hicks’ paper ‘IS-LM: An Explanation’ (1980-1981), Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, version 3, page 139-155. 21 changes on market rate, asset price, exchange rate and people’s expectations. The change of interest rate influences people’s incentives to borrow and save. The disposable income impacts people’s spending. If credit is constrained, the consumption is significantly affected. When interest rates climb, the cost increases by holding money, people intend to buy other non-money valuables, and vice versa. This point not only has been discussed by famous Keynesian money supply theory, but also by Tobin (1956) and Baumol (1952)’s inventory theoretic approach. Keynesian economists believe the aggregated demand is influenced by public and private decision primarily including monetary and fiscal policy. Now let’s have a brief look of the relationship described between the three important tools in monetary and fiscal policy – interest rate, money supply and bonds. Keynes believes people can hold their wealth in two forms, money or bond. The nominal interest rate is the return on bond and it is the opportunity cost of holding money. Keynes believes there are three motives for the demand of liquidity: a. Precautionary demand: people intend to hold more liquidity when they are less certain about the future b. Speculative demand: higher interest rates lead to higher cost of holding money, people therefore intend to hold less money 22 c. Transaction demand: the more people wish to buy, the more amount of money they intend to hold. In this case, people’s real income may be higher. The key theoretical element in Keynes’ liquidity theory is the concept of equilibrium (Chart below). When nominal interest rate is at R1 and money supply is at M1, people hold more money than preferred (excess supply); they intend to decrease the money stock by buying more bonds till R2. As bond prices rise with demand, nominal interest rates fall. The same applies to point R3 where people hold less money than they wish to (excess demand), they intend to increase the holding of money by buying less bonds till R2, leading to the increase of nominal interest rate and force the bond price to drop. As money supply increases from M1 to M2, at the old equilibrium R2, people have more money than they wish to (excess supply again where red dashed line), nominal interest rate will drop as they invest more in bonds. Keynes argues that when nominal interest rates reach certain point (R4), people are not willing to convert money into bond investment when money supply increases (from M3 onwards). Thus, interest rate falls no further. Chart 3 Keynes Equilibrium Concepts 23 Interest Rate Excess Supply R1 R2 Excess Demand R3 R4 M1 M2 M3 M4 Money Keynes thinks when nominal interest rates drop sharply, it will not affect investment decision materially (imagine replacing above downward curve with a downward sloping straight line with a more gradual degree of inclination). Keynes’ theory has then been widely accepted and put into practice in the western world. The American economist Hyman Minsky, followed the Keynesian tradition, supported some government intervention in financial markets. Minsky believes a speculative euphoria develops when companies have excess cash and debt grows to a level when borrowers can not pay off. 24 Such debt-income relation creates a financial crisis unless government steps in. Thereafter the tightening strategy adopted by banks and lenders leads to the contractions of economy. This capital movement is known as the financial instability hypothesis (detailed in 1992). He defined three distinct income-debt relations for economic units, labeled as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance. The hedge borrowers can fulfill all contractual payment obligations by current cash flow, such as banks. The speculative borrowers can meet their payment commitments by liability rollovers. Government and corporations with floating debts and commercial papers are typical speculative borrowers. The Ponzi borrowers can not fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due. They borrow on the belief that the appreciation of the assets in the future will be sufficient to finance the debt; therefore the Ponzi finance has a low margin of safety to the holder of this kind of debt. The economy could be an equilibrium seeking and containing system if hedge financing dominates. The likelihood that the economy moves to a deviation amplifying system grows with the increase of speculative and Ponzi finance. Minsky argues ‘economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance’. When 25 such debt expansion occurs during an inflationary state, government will intervene with attempts such as monetary constraint. Units with cash shortfalls will therefore be forced to sell out positions, which likely leads to a collapse of asset values. Minsky’s proposition seems to draw the evidence of the current financial crisis. An alternative view to the conventional Keynesian macroeconomic model is the neoclassical approach known as Barro-Ricardo equivalence proposition (Barro, 1974). It argues that a lower taxation now will not stimulate people to spend more as they would expect a future tax rise thus save the margin from tax cut in order to pay more future taxes. So savings would rise between the current tax-cut and future tax-raise. Thus the permanent income of household is unaffected meaning consumption remains also unchanged. This theory however is based on a perfect capital market and individuals have operative altruistic bequest motivates (Barsky et. al, 1986). In spite of these assumptions which were later widely challenged, a key point illustrated in this modern macroeconomic theory is that policies can have unintended consequences. Milton Friedman accepted Keynesian economics but later challenged it. He criticized Keynes’ absolute income consumption hypothesis and developed permanent income hypothesis, a more comprehensive 26 explanation of the relationship between individual income and consumption. His empirical research with Schwartz published in his 1963 book suggests that a correlation between the money supply fluctuation and economic fluctuation as the rate of inflation and the rate of money growth per unit of output were generally similar in two world wars. They concluded that there is causation from price to money. Friedman held the opinion that government’s interference in the economy should be restricted and the fiscal tool is not efficient in improving demand. He criticized the marginal propensity consumption theory of Keynes and claims that when people’s original desire gets satisfied, new consumption sentiment is generated. As such, an expansionary policy will inherently cause inflation. The close linkage between money supply and inflation, he argued, suggests rule-based monetary policy to control money supply is the only efficient method. Friedman believes if the Federal Reserve would have provided sufficient liquidity accordingly during the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933 when the quantity of money dropped by 1/3, the tragedy could have been avoided (1999). Friedman promoted such a macroeconomic policy which is formulated later as monetarism. Monetarism has been put into practice by the USA and UK especially in the 1980s. The disinflation policy adopted by the UK, however, led to the 27 growing unemployment rate. From the 1950s to the 1960s, the unemployment was lower than 2%, which jumped to 9.1% in 1981 and 13% in 1985. The application of Keynesian economics, namely to expand demand by tax-cut, did not stabilize the Western economies and prevent the stagflation in the 1970s. Keynesian theory is criticized therefore by so-called supply-side economics. As its name implies, its main characteristic, is to emphasize that supply can effectively create economic growth, and demand will adjust to the change of goods and services produced. The pioneer of this theory is the Canadian professor Robert Mundell. Mundell advocated tax deductions and application of the gold standard to stabilize the USD in 1974. Mundell’s proposition was developed by economist Arthur Laffer and popularized by journalist Jude Wanniski. Laffer is best known for studying the trade-off between tax rate and tax revenue which is named the Laffer curve by Wanniski (1978). Why lowering taxation may actually increase tax revenue is based on three assumptions (Niskanen, 1988): a) Tax revenue does not necessarily develop in the same direction as the marginal tax rate. When they reach a certain point, they trend in opposite directions. Laffer 28 exhibits the curve below (2004) including two extreme situations when the tax rate is zero and 100%. The prohibitive range suggests the taxation is too high; a rate cut will result in increased government revenue. Laffer curve illustrates that there is no government income if taxation is 100% as nobody will work if no return can be generated. However, in a classical Communist society, an effective 100% tax rate is in place as promoted by pure Marxism. Such questioning remains therefore highly theoretical rather than practical as it is essentially overruled by basic economic thought. Chart 4 Laffer Curve 29 b) A lower marginal tax rate encourages people to work and save as the lower taxation rate will be offset by greater employment and productivity. c) High taxation leads to low investment return, which reduces the total investment amount. Therefore a lower marginal tax rate creates a higher propensity to invest. The supply-side theory was accepted and put into practice by the Reagan administration in the United States. To fight inflation, Reagan 30 passed the Economic Recovery Tax Act to slash taxes by USD 749 billion over five years. Non-labor income (non-earnings income) was cut to 50% from 70% in 1981 and the top capital gains tax limit was reduced from 28% to 20%. As a result, unemployment declined from 1983 to 1984 and returned to the level of the 1970s in 1986 (Mishra, 1990). Since the 1970s, the assumption and implication of rational expectation has been largely applied by economists. The theory, originally proposed by John Muth in 1961, was later developed by Robert Lucas Jr. Facing scarce resources, an economic unit is expected to maximize its outcome by allocating resources in the most efficient way. It is recognized as the Pareto optimum. Information, policy, preference, cognitive level and risk are the basis of estimation initially. Rational expectation is defined to be the best guess of the future by making use of all available information. It focuses on analyzing the impact on economic life and influence on economic policies. It protects, develops neo-classical economics and repudiates Keynes’ theories. It transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy. Lucas and his rational expectation theory won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1995. Meanwhile, modern finance, based on financial economics, rose between the 1950s and the 1960s. It agreed to a 31 large degree on rational selection. Some researchers started to use rational selection theory, such as Olson’s collective action theory. Thereafter, neo-classical economists inherited and developed classical economics’ rational person theory. It abandoned the objective mental factor and turned to rational selection, replacing the concept of preference with intention. The researchers used margin analysis in their research where the maximizing concept requires rational selection to maximize pleasure with minimum pain. After all, in neo-classical economics, a rational person shall have his preference (within a feasible range) of actions, assuming perfect information and computation capability. After deliberate consideration, he will opt for those which benefit himself the most. Rationale, in economics, means economical rationale. Irrational is simply the opposite to the assumption of a perfectly rational person. A rational action shall depend on the environment in which the goal is set. Traditional economical analysis is based on the specific goal of the actor. By adding particular economic factors, economists do not take psychological conditions into account. However, action is the result of thinking. The cognitive limitation of both knowledge and cognitive capacity restricts perfect consideration. The only solution might be, within a certain time frame and under certain circumstances, is to create a 32 model which helps to make the decision. This model is the heuristic simplification and it is a decisive consideration in behavior finance, which is called cognitive bias and irrational behavior. Hirshleifer (2001) categorizes several types of cognitive errors investors can make. One type of bias, self-deception, occurs when people believe they are better than they really are. Both psychology and financial literature define those with this type of behavior as being ‘overconfident’. Overconfidence however can be identified in several aspects including miscalibration, unrealistic optimism and better than average effect. Biais et. al (2002) argued that ‘the importance of specifying what kind of overconfidence – miscalibration, the better than average effect, illusion of control – may be influencing trading behavior’. These investors intend to overestimate their knowledge and underestimate the risks. Cognitive error also causes investors to under-react or over-react to the new information. Barnes and Ma (2002) found in their event analysis that domestic Chinese investors overreacted to the announcements of proposals instead of the final approvals of bonuses in stock market. Chinese stock market is barely 20 years old so the notion of investing is relatively new to most Chinese investors in comparison with those from more capitalistic oriented countries. Thus, Chinese investors shall be more inclined toward 33 making mistakes and being influenced by biases. Chen et. al (2003) studied 66’891 brokerage accounts in China and found strong evidence that the more sophisticated Chinese investors are, the more likely they will make trading mistakes and be affected by disposition effect. They therefore concluded that investor sophistication does not necessarily mitigate behavioral biases, nor improve trading performance. Shefrin (2000) discovered two main implications of investor overconfidence. The first is that investors take bad bets because they fail to realize that they are at an informational disadvantage. The second is that they trade more frequently than is prudent, which leads to excessive trading volume. Although investors are affected by their cognitive ability to make wrong investment decisions, researchers also find that experts (people with higher degree of experience) may even be more prone to overconfidence than novices as they believe theories and models applied tend to outweigh market reality (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). Additionally, people generally have social biases – trend-following. This is also referred to as herd instinct. Herd instinct describes a phenomenon in which people tend to identify with the beliefs or behaviors following a larger group of individuals who communicate frequently with each other. As information is not efficiently spread, investor decision predominantly depends on 34 others’ behavior rather than present information. When everybody talks the same, black becomes white. While we all are biased to some degree, the difference may only be that some may be more susceptible than others due to the innate personality styles such as conscientiousness, neuroticism, extraversion etc. Rational expectation has been used to support several hypotheses such as policy ineffectiveness proposition and efficient market theory which is extensively used in financial market analysis. Many macroeconomic models are widely based on the adaptive expectations principle which suggests authorities only act after an improper government policy is in effect 8 . The policy ineffectiveness proposition was proposed by Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace based on rational expectation theory (1975 and 1976). They argue that the government can not effectively intervene in the economy by simply manipulating output. When government implements an expansionary monetary policy in order to stimulate production, wage and price level will go up accordingly as rational people will foresee the influence. Thus, in effect, real output, salary and price levels remain constant. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) opposed the above theory by arguing that for the 8 E.g. Nikolaos Kouvaritakis & Antonio Soria & Stephane Isoard, 2000, Modelling energy technology dynamics: methodology for adaptive expectations models with learning by doing and learning by searching, International Journal of Global Energy Issues, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd., volume 14(1), page 104-115. 35 purpose of profiting from the government policy, people will not reveal the information gained from their cognitive knowledge so that the policy will remain effective. Another important hypothesis developed from rational expectation is efficient market theory which asserts the financial market to be informationally efficient. The hypothesis was developed by Eugene Fama. In his influential article (1970), he believes that the stock market is extremely efficient in reflecting information. It is generally accepted that when information is released, it spreads fast enough so that it can be incorporated into stock prices without delay. The hypothesis is associated with the idea of a random walk which suggests that if the information is effectively and immediately reflected by stock prices, tomorrow’s stock price will only reflect tomorrow’s news and it is independent from the price changes occurring today. This assumption however, does not correspond to many stock price movements in China. 36 Chapter Two Monetary Policy Monetary policy attempts to stabilize the economy by controlling interest rates (the cost of money) and the supply of money. A successful implementation of monetary policy requires a fairly accurate consideration of how fast the impact of such policy changes could be delivered to other parts of the economy and how large the impact is. In China, financial markets are built as a transition to a market economy. There has been increasing but realistic emphasis in the use of market instruments to the extent that such a transmission mechanism can be delivered. The impact of money supply change can be expressed by adjustments in investor’s portfolio allocations. An increase of capital breaks the balance of a given portfolio, changing the marginal utility ratio of the assets therein. Money is a comparatively stable asset. Increasing the cash amount in a portfolio lifts the ratio of the riskless asset. To maximize the return, a rational investor will generate a new balance by investing more in riskier assets. If the supply of a given riskier asset stays unchanged, its price climbs. So in principle when money supply increases, 37 stock prices follow in the same direction. The interest rate is the price the borrower pays to use a resource at a given time. This implies that the higher the interest rate, the more valuable that resource is today. Interest rates change the cost of holding cash. When interest rates increase, the borrowing cost rises. Investors will therefore reduce the allocation to the stock market as it is considered to be more risky. Additionally, a higher interest rate generates higher return on cash deposits. When interest rates decline, investors buy more stocks as they prefer to hold comparatively more profitable investments. Interest rate changes will also affect companies’ profitability. Higher capital costs leads to lower expected return. If the rate adjustment is already expected by investors, based on the efficient market hypothesis, the demand for stocks will not change much. However, if the rate decreases unexpectedly, according to Keynes’ liquidity preference theory, people will believe interest rates will rise in the future, meaning stocks will become cheaper. One should sell now and buy later. This leads to a drop in stock markets. The converse is true. The impact of interest rates on stock markets can be summarized in the following way: a) Investment replacement 38 Interest rate changes affect return on deposits. Investors will reallocate investment between deposits, bonds, stocks or other investments to realize maximum return. When interest rates increase, capital may flow from stock markets to bank deposits and bonds, resulting in falling stock prices. This replacement effect however depends on the elasticity on interest rate change of other investments. For instance, people's deposit activities are highly correlated with the adjustment of interest rates, meaning deposits as investments have a high elasticity on interest rate change; a decrease of interest rates will impel people to look for other investments. Such a replacement effect would also be highly affected by investors’ risk preference. b) Impact on company profit The change of interest rate affects the operation of companies, changing their profitability and investors' expectation. First of all, a lower interest rate increases the expected future return on investment. Secondly, interest rates are the opportunity cost of current consumption. A lower rate encourages people to lift their expenditures. However, if investors have pessimistic expectations of future income, or the price drop of goods is larger than the 39 reduction of interest rate, the actual impact on lifting investment decreases. Moreover, on the consumer side the marginal propensity to consume would drop in a gloomy economic environment, leading to higher marginal savings. c) Impact on stocks’ inherent value Stocks’ inherent value is decided by future cash-flow. Such value has an inverse relation to discount rate under certain risk scenarios. A drop of discount rate causes lower inherent value, leading to lower stock prices. There is usually a time lag between interest rate adjustment and stock price change. Therefore, when considering such effects it is necessary to take a long-term perspective. Within a short period of time, investor’s expectations have a large effect on stock markets. The market reaction depends on whether the rate adjustment is expected in the market. Only with unexpected adjustments, may we witness high volatility. 2.1. Literature and Methodology Various studies are inclined to use charts and regression methods to analyze the relationship between money supply, interest rate change and stock market performance. Friedman (1988) used United States data from 1961 to 1986 and found evidence suggesting that the real quantity of 40 money (M2) demanded relative to income is positively related to the deflated price of Standard&Poor equities which lagged by three quarters and negatively related to the contemporaneous real stock price. Sprinkel (1964) found a relation between the money supply and interest rate changes, two-month prior, to the bull market between 1918 and 1963. Homa and Jaffee (1971) concluded, using regression analysis, that money supply and interest rate changes always precede stock index movements. Hysteretic data can then be used to predict future stock returns. However, this theory is contradictory to efficient market hypothesis, which believes stock prices fully reflect all available information. Therefore the investor is rational, he will adjust the portfolio in time, leaving no excess return. As such, monetary policy change can not be the foundation to forecast future stock returns. Research thereafter shows that money supply and rate changes in the past do not have predictive value. On the contrary, it is an opposite Granger causality relation, meaning stock prices causes change in money supply and interest rate change (Rogalski and Vinso, 1975). Due to the conflict discovered from empirical studies, researchers start to look at the characteristics of money supply and interest rates, and the limitations of the approaches used in empirical studies. Sellin (2001) 41 suggests the cause of such causality contradiction originates from the mixture of money supply and demand. Money supply is endogenous, while interest rates are also an inherent variable of economic systems. Money Zero Maturity (MZM) has become popular as a measure of money supply. MZM refers to the total amount of money that is immediately redeemable at par value on demand. It includes coins and currency in circulation, checking and saving accounts, and money market funds. Thus, MZM includes all financial instruments that can be freely accessed immediately without penalty or risks. The recent research by Leuthold Group and Factset found that the peaks in the ratio of MZM to total US stock market capitalization have coincided with troughs in the stock market performance historically from 1970s to January 2009. Chart 5 MZM to Market Cap v.s. DJ Wilshire 5000 Index 42 Source: Leuthold Group, Factset, as of January 31, 2009 The definition of MZM, unfortunately, does not provide the evidence of such money assets’ format nor location. Wikipedia has defined money as anything that is generally accepted as payment for goods and services and repayment of debts. Some of MZM does not fulfill such a definition. M0 represents the upper most liquid money type – currency in circulation. M0 is normally stable but due to its liquid characteristics, it is exposed to seasonal fluctuations. The curve below displays the M0 curve from February 2002 to March 2009. In China, this fluctuation pattern is witnessed around Spring Festival on yearly basis. My analysis below is therefore based primarily on M1. 43 Chart 6 China’s M0 35 M0, YOY 25 15 5 -5 Feb-02 Oct-02 Jun-03 Feb-04 Oct-04 Jun-05 Feb-06 Oct-06 Jun-07 Feb-08 Oct-08 Source: Bloomberg Case studies concentrate on the instantaneous response of stock markets following the announcement of a change in monetary policy. This research focuses on the daily or weekly movements rather than monthly or quarterly changes. Pearce and Roley (1983) concluded that unexpected monetary change has a negative impact on stock prices, based on weekly data between 1977 and 1982. Qian Xiao’an (1998) investigated the correlation between money supply and stock price by using static regression and variance decomposition analysis on data from March 1994 to February 1997 in 44 China’s stock market. He found Shanghai and Shenzhen index movements were positively correlated to M0, not correlated to M1, and inversely correlated to M2. He believes expectation has a greater influence on the performance of stocks than the actual change in money supply. Tang Qiming (2000) concluded that China’s stock market is somewhat sensitive to interest rate decreases but that every rate change led to a different result; sometimes stocks retreated when interest rates were lowered. Jiang Zhengsheng and Jin Ge (2001) found the inter-bank borrowing rate was inversely related with Shanghai stock market. Using the same approach as Qian Xiao’an, Liu Zhiyang (2002) came to the conclusion that money supply is positively correlated to stock price, and that this linkage is strengthening. Sun Huahao (2003), however, discovered that M0, M1 and M2 have no impact on the market, but interest rate changes had significant effects during the period from June 1993 and October 2002. Liu Song (2004)’s result shows the change of M1 had an obvious impact on stock markets, and stock market movements had visible influence on M0. 2.2. Results – Money Supply Are stock prices set by money supply? Some researchers like Wray 45 (1998) have questioned such hypothesis. The null hypothesis: the stock market is not correlated to M1 The chart below indicates the year-on-year M1 growth has a significant visual correlation with the Shanghai Composite Index, from January 1996 to March 2009. M1 moves contemporaneously with the business cycle. M1 measures the currency in circulation plus the checkable deposits. This type of money represents the highest liquid money in a given economy. Essentially, stock markets are capital-fueled markets. It makes sense that the capital inflow promotes the stock market and an outflow of capital leads to the market drop. As a macroeconomic indicator, M1 also presents a strong cyclical pattern. We may see from the below graph that in China, M1 generally depicts a three-year cycle. Such a cycle is considerably stable and predictable due to the characteristics of a large scale of economy. What can also be discovered is the lag between the stock market following the bottoming of M1, normally within 3 months except the most recent trough, while the tops of the stock market, were broadly in line with the peaks of M1. What is special about the last cycle of the stock market and M1 is that the bear run has been realized faster than the bull run and the cycle is expanded to October 2008, 1-year longer than usual. The sharp decrease of stock markets was associated 46 with the tight monetary policy government implemented from the beginning of 2008 in order to cool the overheated investment and such a sudden correction was also influenced by the worldwide credit crunch. Moreover, the bottoming of the stock market seems to precede M1. The volatility of M1 and Shanghai Composite indicates that except during the course of financial crisis (1997 and 2007), stock market is less volatile, stating that asset prices are not excessive relative to monetary variables. Chart 7-1 M1 v.s. Shanghai Composite Index 250 25 200 20 150 15 100 50 10 0 5 -50 Shanghai, YOY M1, YOY -100 0 1/31/1996 6/30/1997 11/30/1998 4/30/2000 9/30/2001 2/28/2003 7/31/2004 12/31/2005 5/31/2007 10/31/2008 Source: Bloomberg, Shanghai at left scale Chart 7-2 M1 v.s. M2 47 30 25 23 25 21 19 20 17 15 15 13 11 10 9 M2, YOY M1, YOY 7 5 5 6/30/1998 10/31/1999 2/28/2001 6/30/2002 10/31/2003 2/28/2005 6/30/2006 10/31/2007 2/28/2009 Source: Bloomberg, M2 at left scale In chart 7-2, we can see that except the peak in 2003 and the time period during 2009, the general tendency of M1 and M2 seems to be irrelevant. M2 also looks to be less volatile than M1. Kydland and Prescott (1990) find that M2 leads the business cycle in the US. The Granger Causality result however suggests that in China, M1 ‘Granger Causes’ M2. It implies that Chinese intend to keep time deposit intact (relatively prudence) while checkable deposits are the most actively moving assets between investments and savings. 48 Additionally the correlation between M1 and stock market year-on-year growth can not be identified in the United States during the same period. Except the three peaks from 2000 to 2004, the below image seems to imply a rather inverse relationship between M1 and Dow Jones Index. Chart 8 US M1 v.s. Dow Jones Index 49 20% 60% 15% 40% 10% 20% 5% 0% 0% 1/31/1996 7/31/1997 1/31/1999 7/31/2000 1/31/2002 7/31/2003 1/31/2005 7/31/2006 1/31/2008 -20% -5% -40% M 1, YOY -10% Dow, Y OY -60% Source: Bloomberg, Dow at right scale. The inverse relationship of M1 and Dow Jones Index can be plotted in the below chart. 50 US M1 Line Fit Plot 60% Dow Predicted Dow 40% Dow 20% 0% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% -20% -40% -60% US M1 To test whether the visual correlation stands between M1 and stock market in China, I use ANOVA regression analysis. The following results can be generated based on the above data. The confidence interval is set at 95%. The adjusted R2 shows 39.4% which is expressly high for a single variable model. The F-statistic is large at 103.8. Additionally no zero can be found within the confidence interval – between lower 95% and upper 95%. And X-variable (Shanghai)’s P-value is extremely small, suggesting there is barely a likelihood that the slope of the regression line is a non-zero value by chance, so the slope is considered statistically significant. T-statistics and significance F states the significance level is below 0.05. The line fit plot displays there is a significant correlation. So 51 the null hypothesis is rejected. Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.630811184 R Square 0.39792275 Adjusted R Square 0.394087863 Standard Error 2.906958315 Observations 159 ANOVA df 1 157 158 SS 876.8469848 1326.713843 2203.560828 MS 876.8469848 8.450406642 F 103.7638805 Significance F 5.03568E-19 Coefficients 14.68974197 0.04419315 Standard Error 0.24643752 0.004338423 t Stat 59.60838254 10.18645574 P-value 9.8486E-110 5.03568E-19 Lower 95% 14.20298090 0.03562394 Regression Residual Total Intercept Shanghai, YOY Upper 95% 15.176503035 0.052762361 Shanghai, YOY Line Fit Plot 30 25 M1, YOY 20 M1, YOY 15 Predicted M1, YOY 10 5 Shanghai, YOY 0 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 Using Eviews’ (version 6) estimate equation function, the regression can also be tested in least squares method as below. The results reiterate 52 the conclusion above. Thus it can be concluded that China’s stock market has a strong correlation with M1.A residual graph is shown below. The fitted curve refers to the predicted value. We can see that the predicted peak between 2002 and 2003 is higher than the actual and the forecasted peak in 2007 is much lower than the actual top. These discrepancies between actual situations and the predicted curve imply that government tried to stimulate a market recovery after the Internet Bubble and intended to cool the market in 2007, although the actual outcomes deviate somewhat. 53 Now I look at the recent two-year development of real money supply and stock market prices when the market experienced both bull and bear conditions. The following graph displays the M0, M1 and M2 movements in comparison with the Shanghai Composite Index from February 2007 to March 2009. The volatility of M0 present in January and February 2008 is the seasonal fluctuation due to the Spring Festival so these two months can be excluded. According to Keynes’ liquidity preference theory, M1 and M2 should grow equally, meaning that when income increases, checkable deposits should accumulate at the same speed as term deposits. 54 It can be seen in the graph that M1 and M2 kept at the same level during the course of 2007 while M0 descended by half. The gap between M0 and M1/M2 indicates a large amount of liquidity (cash in circulation) may have flooded into the stock market, and this coincided with the climb of the stock market during the same period. Facing the danger of an overheated stock market and inflation driven by the booming economy, the People’s Bank of China tightened the money supply by increasing required RMB reserve ratios 10 times in 2007, from 9.5% to 14.5%, aiming to limit the currency in circulation soas to support a reasonable credit growth. An adjustment of bank deposit reserve ratios is designed to have obvious effects on the total money supply as it forces banks to adapt rapidly to the new policy and leads to an immediate drop of credits granted. In fact, the strong policy change did indeed slow down the growth of M1 and M2 but it didn’t overturn the situation of excess liquidity. This was owing to a high trade surplus and a large amount of individual bank deposits. A report from General Administration of Customs shows that the trade surplus in May 2007 expanded to more than USD 23 billion, 73% higher than the year earlier. Therefore, the aggressive change of bank deposit reserve ratios was considered necessary. 55 The total money supply started to decrease in 2008, during which time M2 stayed basically stable while both M0 and M1 dropped within a similar scale. The discrepancy between M0/M1 and M2 suggests people cashed out their checkable deposits. However, the stock market lost half of its value despite such a significant growth in capital. Odean (1997) surveyed 10’000 accounts of a large brokerage house and concluded investors are reluctant to realize their losses while they sell winners too quickly and hold losers too long. This is called disposition effect by Shefrin and Statman (1985). Therefore, what occurred may be explained in that investors added to their investments in order to rebalance their portfolios to reach a break-even during the long bear market caused by the global financial crisis. Some investors may also be over-confident on themselves on predicting the bottoming of stock markets. Additionally, people would have hesitated to realize losses by selling dropping stocks, which also explains the tendency of the decrease to redeem checkable deposits. The government thereafter loosened the credit policy to help tackle the economic slowdown. The Shanghai Composite Index picked up almost simultaneously with the increase of money supply. The swifter elevation of M0 and M2 implies people became more cautious facing the global financial crisis as they may have preferred to hold safer assets such 56 as cash or make longer-term time deposits. Chart 9 Money Supply v.s. Shanghai Composite Index, rebased 250 M2 Shanghai M1 M0 200 150 100 50 2007.02 2007.03 2007.04 2007.05 2007.06 2007.07 2007.08 2007.09 2007.10 2007.11 2007.12 2008.01 2008.02 2008.03 2008.04 2008.05 2008.06 2008.07 2008.08 2008.09 2008.10 2008.11 2008.12 2009.01 2009.02 2009.03 0 Source: NBSC, The People’s Bank of China The Granger Casualty test between Shanghai Composite and M1’s year-on-year growth returns the following results. Therefore it can be concluded that due to the low p-value of 0.0002, the null hypothesis can be rejected. I can say Shanghai ‘Granger Causes’ M1. 57 CPI Friedman (1988) explains in his paper that a rise in stock prices means an increase in nominal wealth, and generally, given the wider fluctuation in stock prices than in income, also a rise in the ratio of wealth to income. If money supply and stock markets are very much associated with investor behaviors and their wealth condition, what can I acquire from the relationship between M1 and the CPI? Schwert (1981) found that inflation volatility predicts stock volatility. The null hypothesis: there is no relationship between M1 and the CPI. The graph below compares the year-on-year returns of the CPI and M1 from January 1996 to March 2009. Data is monthly, collected from Bloomberg. It can be seen that CPI presents some level of time lag behind the movement of M1 but I expect there is a high correlation. 58 Chart 10 CPI v.s. M1 12 25 10 20 8 6 15 4 10 2 0 01/31/96 09/30/97 05/31/99 01/31/01 09/30/02 05/31/04 01/31/06 09/30/07 5 -2 -4 CPI, YOY M1, YOY 0 Source: Bloomberg, CPI at left scale Using ANOVA regression analysis, I generate the below statistics and plot a chart based on real-time data used in the above graph. Confidence interval is set at 95%. The adjusted R2 is only 3.58% and the P-value of the F-statistic (significance F) is not large, but these could be caused by the single variable model. No zero can be found within the confidence interval – between lower 95% and upper 95%. Additionally X-variable’s P-value is also sufficiently small at 0.97%, suggesting there is a low likelihood that the slope of the regression line is a non-zero value by chance, so the slope is considered statistically significant. The line fit 59 plot shows there is a certain correlation but the model’s explanatory power is low. Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.204603378 R Square 0.041862542 Adjusted R Square 0.035759756 Standard Error 2.95196355 Observations 159 ANOVA df 1 157 158 SS 59.77497658 1368.111942 1427.886918 MS 59.7749766 8.7140888 Coefficients -0.43659844 0.16470136 Standard Error 1.007140045 0.062885203 t Stat -0.433503212 2.619079713 Regression Residual Total Intercept X Variable 1 F Significance F 6.859578545 0.00968095 P-value 0.665244275 0.009680953 Lower 95% -2.42589196 0.04049110 Upper 95% 1.552695076 0.288911621 X Variable 1 Line Fit Plot 12 Y 10 Predicted Y 8 Y 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 0 5 10 15 20 25 X Variable 1 The Granger Casualty test results between M1 and the CPI are shown below. As p-value is almost at zero, the null hypothesis that M1 does not ‘Granger Cause’ CPI can be rejected. Thus, I can conclude that 60 M1 ‘Granger Cause’ CPI. If CPI lags behind M1, could statistics fit better if I use real-time M1 data but lagged CPI? After six month-by-month tests, I find that CPI lags half a year behind M1, shown in the below graph. The troughs and peaks almost fit perfectly. Chart 11 6-month lagged CPI & M1 61 10 25 8 20 6 15 4 2 10 0 07/31/96 03/31/98 11/30/99 07/31/01 03/31/03 11/30/04 07/31/06 03/31/08 5 -2 CPI, YOY -4 M1, YOY 0 Now I conduct the regression analysis based on the 6-month lagged CPI data and M1 data. The following results were generated. Now we have a much higher adjusted R2. Meanwhile, coefficients, P-value and t-statistics are all more significant and zero again does not fall inside the confidence interval. In comparison with the last test, the results can be displayed more vividly in the below fit plot chart. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected. There is a correlation between CPI and M1. Inflations seem to be associated with a rapid increase in money supply (also see chart 11). 62 Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.47762054 R Square 0.22812138 Adjusted R Square 0.22300960 Standard Error 2.38582949 Observations 153 ANOVA df SS 254.0228168 859.5195361 1113.542353 MS 254.0228168 5.692182358 Coefficients Standard Error -3.88396374 0.8798856 0.36297115 0.0543344 t Stat -4.414169002 6.680315306 Regression Residual Total Intercept X Variable 1 1 151 152 F Significance F 44.62661258 4.30001E-10 P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 1.92063E-05 -5.622441648 -2.145485831 4.30001E-10 0.255617178 0.470325118 X Variable 1 Line Fit Plot 10 8 Y Predicted Y 6 Y 4 2 0 -2 0 -4 5 10 15 20 25 X Variable 1 The Granger Casualty test between CPI and the Shanghai Composite Index returns the following results. Due to the low p-value of 0.0014, I conclude that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Therefore, the Shanghai variable ‘Granger Causes’ the CPI variable. 63 Shanghai, CPI and M1 Now I know both CPI and M1 are correlated to stock market. If I create a model with lagged CPI and M1 as variables, will it increase the correlation significance to the Shanghai Composite Index? The results are shown in the table below. Now adjusted R-squared is higher than the single factor equation with M1 or CPI in the above results. Correlation Matrix Shanghai M1 Lagged CPI Shanghai 1.000000 0.600643 0.542435 M1 0.600643 1.000000 0.477621 Lagged CPI 0.542435 0.477621 1.000000 64 The above results conclude that the stock market is highly correlated to M1 and the CPI. Stock market changes ‘Granger Cause’ M1 and inflation indicator CPI to fluctuate. Stock markets appear to lead money growth rates9. Thus the findings suggest stock market efficiently digests and incorporate news about monetary policy. Stock markets move simultaneously with M1 while CPI lags by several months. The year-on-year growth of M1 and the Shanghai Composite Index also indicates that Chinese investors are not always speculative during normal times as most people believe to be. In reality, M1 and M2 could not include all money supply in China due to the large amount of trade surplus in recent years. Additionally, due to China’s foreign currency 9 See, for example, Rozeff, ‘Money and Stock Prices’ (1974), Kraft and Kraft, ‘Determinants of Common Stock Prices’ (1977), and Rogaiski and Vinso, ‘Stock Returns, Money Supply and the Direction of Causality’ (1977). 65 control, households largely hold some amount of foreign currencies which is normally not affected by the stock market performance. 2.3. Results – Interest Rate The graph below exhibits the one-year real deposit rate movement in comparison with the Shanghai Composite Index and trading volume from 1994 to 2007. The dramatic decline of interest rate barely affected people’s trading activities till 1998 looking at trading volume, though the stock market climbed from 1995 to 1997. Less trading volume but higher index price means the index increase was driven by higher stock prices. Government continued a contracted monetary policy in 1998 and 1999 but this barely helped to lift market prices, neither was there an increase in trading activities. Although the extreme interest rate decrease from 1995 to 1999 was meant to expand economic growth, from the government’s point of view, the stock market failed to react to such stimulation. The rally in 2000 followed by the expansionary monetary policy suggests there is a lag between the initiation of policy and market reaction, which is contrary to efficient market theory. In the mean-time, interest rate stayed flat in 2000 and 2001 when markets experienced the Internet Bubble. The bear market continued until the end of 2002 when the lower interest rate did not immediately turn the market around. Trading volume development from 2003 onwards suggests people started to trade more actively. But the stock market reaction was the opposite until 2005 when the stock reform began. After then, both trading volume and stock index moved in the same direction as the increase of interest rates. People appeared to welcome the new round of stock reforms that 66 government determinedly carried out. The fact that the stock index ascended at a faster pace than trading volume from 2005 is the evidence of a swifter stock price increase. Chart 12 Interest Rate vs. Trading Volume and Shanghai Composite Index Shanghai 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Trading Volume One-year Deposit Rate Source: NBSC, the People’s Bank of China, Bloomberg Looking at more recent data starting from 2007, it is easier to identify patterns, especially facing a crisis. The graph below depicts the most recent deposit rate changes in comparison with the Shanghai Composite Index. Being aware of the overheated stock market, authorities 67 aggressively lifted the interest rate six times during the course of 2007. The stock market started to descend after the fifth interest rate increase. Assuming the tremendous drop from the end of 2007 to 2008 reflect the series of interest rate increases, the rate decreases from December 2007 to December 2008 shall bring about a certain level of recovery, which is shown from October 2008 till the present. The movement of the stock market displayed below together with the phenomenon discussed above strongly suggests that there is significant delay of the implementation of monetary policy to the realization in the stock market. Chart 13-1 One-year Deposit Rate v.s. Shanghai Composite Index One-year Deposit Rate 2009.04 2009.03 2009.02 2009.01 2008.12 2008.11 2008.10 2008.10 2007.12 2007.09 2007.08 2007.07 2007.05 2007.03 Shanghai 68 Source: the People’s Bank of China, Bloomberg It is interesting to see that the interest rate and stock index lines start from the same level and end at the same place again. It may be concluded that the stock market and interest rate move in a rotated ‘Z’ circle during the crisis when government intervenes with monetary tools. The tendency of both movements is perfectly identical though with different scales. The upper shadowed area means there is excess demand of stocks in the market which overrules the effect from the increase of interest rates, while the lower shadowed part means supply of stocks is larger than the correction impact created by interest rate decreases. Thus, theoretically, if the government would have the cognitive ability to predict the forthcoming overheating of the markets, it could have started to implement a contracted monetary policy in advance or increase the interest rates at a larger scale and begin to decrease the interest rate before the stock market overacts and goes into a recession. The chart below illustrates the Federal Reserve fund rate changes in comparison with the Dow Jones Index from 2001 (after the Internet Bubble) till the current financial crisis (the end of 2008). A clear ‘Z’-shaped interest rate curve can also be witnessed. The time span however is much larger, at a seven-year interval. The valley of interest rates after Internet Bubble in 69 the middle of 2003 corresponds to the trough of the Dow Jones Index. The peak of the interest rates at mid 2006 is one year too early. The stock market climbed remarkably after the interest rate cuts. This may have resulted in a large amount of ‘malinvestments’ (speculative or Ponzi finances) when some investors borrowed money as they expected higher future profits to cover the costs, possibly one of the causes of the present credit crunch. Chart 13-2 US Federal Fund Rate v.s. Dow Jones 6 14000 5 13000 4 12000 3 11000 2 10000 1 Fed Fund Rate 0 4/18/2001 9000 DOW 8000 10/2/2001 6/30/2004 2/2/2005 9/20/2005 5/10/2006 1/22/2008 10/29/2008 Source: US Federal Reserve System Would it be possible that the discrepancy between policy change 70 and stock market fluctuation is caused by the consumer behavior? Let’s look at the graph below which illustrates the latest interest rate and CPI changes. We can see from the chart that the consumption behavior has not reacted to the change of interest rates simultaneously. The increase of interest rates from the beginning to the end of 2007 only started to exert influence on people’s consumption style from April 2008; and the decrease of interest rates during 2008 started to revise the dropping goods and services price from February 2009. This signifies that consumers keep their consumption pattern till they realize the effect from interest rate changes. It might not be hard to explain such phenomenon. The price of goods and services would change more apparently when affluent consumers start to alter their consumption patterns. Chart 14 Interest Rate v.s. CPI (rebased), % 71 10 8 6 4 2 One-year Deposit Rate CP I 0 2009.03 2009.01 2009.02 2008.12 2008.10 2008.11 2008.08 2008.09 2008.07 2008.05 2008.06 2008.03 2008.04 2008.02 2007.12 2008.01 2007.10 2007.11 2007.09 2007.07 2007.08 2007.05 2007.06 2007.04 2007.02 2007.03 2007.01 -2 Source: NBSC As herd instinct suggests, people are inclined to follow a larger group as information does not spread efficiently. When a greater number of people begin to switch their preferences, such impact disperses even quicker. Contrary to efficient market theory which assumes information gets out quickly, such phenomenon can well explain the lag discussed above. An ongoing survey conducted online by JRJ.com shows that people are well aware of the purposes of government interest rate changes. However, the consumption pattern does not change immediately when 72 interest rates change. Chart 15 Survey on Interest Rate Changes 13.95% 39.09% 19.15% 27.81% Reduce co nsumptio n Depends o n needs B uy real estate as so o n as price dro ps B uy real estate o r car 2.4. Results – Bank Reserve Ratio and Open Market Operations Since 2003, the People’s Bank of China raised the deposit reserve ratio from 6% to a high of 17.5% at the middle of 2008. Beijing then reduced the ratio by 2.5% by the end of 2008 aiming to overrule the dropping market. The graph below displays all the deposit reserve ratio changes since 1998 in contrast with the Shanghai Composite Index. The curves suggest that the higher reserve ratio has doubtful contemporaneous influence on stock markets, at least till the end of 2007. A lower bank reserve requirement starting from mid-2008 could not produce an 73 immediate effect either. Looking at the actual securities investment of financial institutions from 1994 to 2007, it is not difficult to understand why the bank deposit reserve ratio change did not post significant impact on the stock markets; the total investment in securities was always below 14.5% of the overall fund usage. Chart 16 Deposit Reserve Ratio v.s. Shanghai Composite Index, rebased 500 400 300 200 100 Bank Reserve Ratio Shanghai 98.03 99.11 03.09 04.04 06.07 06.08 06.11 07.01 07.02 07.04 07.05 07.06 07.08 07.09 07.10 07.11 07.12 08.01 08.03 08.04 08.05 08.06 08.09 08.10 08.11 0 Chart 17 Overview of Investment on Securities 74 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 94 95 96 97 98 99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 Source: NBSC China’s bank deposit reserve ratio system was initiated after the setup of the People’s Bank of China. In 1984, the deposit reserve ratio was set according to the deposit type: corporate deposits at 20%, deposits of rural regions at 25%, savings deposits at 40%. The high reserve requirement limited the lending capacity of commercial banks. In 1985, the deposit reserve ratio was fixed at 10%. In 1987 and 1988, in order to prevent inflation and concentrate on key project financing, government raised the deposit reserve ratio to 12% in 1987 and to 13% in 1988 respectively. In 1989, banks were required to keep a certain amount of 75 cash, called cash reserve ratio, in order to satisfy withdrawal demand. The cash reserve ratio was set between 5% and 7%. In 1995, the People’s Bank of China adjusted the cash reserve ratio according to the characteristics of commercial banks. Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China were required to keep at least 6% of cash. This ratio was set at 5% for both China Construction Bank and Bank of Communications and 7% for Agricultural Bank of China. The deposit reserve ratio was stable till 1998 when China enhanced the transition of its economy and started to reform the banking system. The deposit reserve and cash reserve were merged into one reserve deposit account. The legal deposit reserve ratio was lowered thereafter from 13% to 8% and any excess reserves can be decided by banks independently. Since 2003, some banks exhibited strong credit expansion but some of them began to lose capital adequacy and asset quality. From 2004, government applied different reserve ratio requirements based on asset quality and capital adequacy ratios. Most countries try to avoid changes in bank reserve ratios as such changes can lead to a sudden shortage of credit and consequently result in production/construction postponement. Most countries do not favor the use of bank reserve ratios due to their rapid and dramatic effects. Instead, 76 rediscount rates and open market operations are preferred by most western authorities. Rediscount rate is the rate of interest charged when a bank borrows money from a central bank. A lower rediscount rate means a commercial bank can borrow money at a lower cost from a country’s central bank. This increases the currency in circulation and thus directly increases money supply. However, the use of rediscount is in the hand of commercial banks, not the government. The government can only adjust rediscount rate and passively wait for the response of commercial banks. The People’s Bank of China started the use of rediscount rates from September 1, 1988. The rediscount has not accounted for a large amount of China’s money supply however. The commercial credit of China is generally relatively low and the commercial paper market is young. As China executed a planned economy, it had direct control and administration over credit. Commercial credit was therefore highly limited, resulting in a dominant position of banks in social credit. Open market operations refer to the action that a central bank controls money supply by buying or selling government bonds or other financial instruments. When money flows into the market as bonds are repurchased, it increases the total money supply. When money flows into commercial institutions, it stimulates credit expansion and in turn creates 77 an increase in money supply. In China, the Law on the People’s Bank of China allows the central bank to purchase treasury bonds, other government bonds and foreign exchange. In recent years, China has begun to engage more and more in open market operations. The following graph shows bond repurchase trades since 200210 to March 2009, in comparison with the Shanghai Composite Index. Government increased the bond repurchases from 2002 to 2004, and thereafter gradually decreased these until the end of 2006. The huge capital inflow contributed to double-digit economic growth. Stock markets however, only started the bull run when repurchases faded. Due to the limitation of data, I can hardly conclude the repo trading has a five-year cycle. Nonetheless, it does necessarily exhibit a symmetric peak with the stock market, which is worthy of note. 10 Data only available since 2002 from the People’s Bank of China website. 78 Chart 18 Repo. Trading v.s. Shanghai Composite Index 5600 6500 Repo Shanghai 4800 5500 4000 4500 3200 3500 2400 2500 1600 1500 800 0 2002.01 500 2003.01 2004.01 2005.01 2006.01 2007.01 2008.01 2009.01 Source: the People’s Bank of China, repurchase amount (left y-axis) in 100 million yuan. Theoretically, the larger the repurchases, the more stock markets benefit. This theory does not seem to be true for the real time data. The below regression and correction results de facto lead to a negative relationship. 79 Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.308236759 R Square 0.0950099 Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations Repo Shanghai Correlation Analysis 1 -0.30823676 1 0.084362957 75.20221661 87 ANOVA df Regression Residual Total Intercept X Variable 1 SS 50466.73875 480706.7375 531173.4763 MS 50466.73875 5655.373383 F Significance F 8.92367936 0.003678027 Coefficients Standard Error 183.8276626 16.82890639 -0.362246977 0.121264252 t Stat 10.9233279 -2.98725281 P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 7.2684E-18 150.3672679 217.2880572 0.00367803 -0.603352942 -0.121141012 1 85 86 X Variable 1 Line Fit Plot 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Predicted Y Y Y 0 100 200 300 X Variable 1 The year-on-year returns however display a positive correlation though it is not very significant. The analysis results and the graph are shown below. 80 Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.29130533 R Square 0.08485880 Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations Repo, YOY Shanghai, YOY Repo, YOY Shanghai, YOY 1 0.2913053 1 0.07232261 0.67653478 75 ANOVA df Regression Residual Total 1 73 74 Intercept X Variable 1 SS 3.09821725 33.41204955 36.5102668 Coefficients Standard Error 0.17110835 0.081451598 0.17063871 0.065586093 MS F Significance F 3.09821725 6.769110614 0.01122366 0.45769931 t Stat P-value 2.100736569 0.039117876 2.601751451 0.011223663 Lower 95% 0.00877544 0.03992573 Upper 95% 0.33344126 0.30135170 Chart 19 Repo. Trading v.s. Shanghai Composite Index 800% 300% Repo, YOY Shanghai, YOY 600% 200% 400% 100% 200% 0% 0% -200% 2003.01 -100% 2004.01 2005.01 2006.01 2007.01 2008.01 2009.01 Source: the People’s Bank of China, Bloomberg We can see from the above graph that the year-on-year decline of 81 bond repurchase from 2004 till 2007 did not influence the stock market development. The sudden increase of repurchase scale starting from 2007 however coincides quite clearly with the jump of the Shanghai Composite Index. As bond repurchases lead to the increase of money supply ultimately, it should increase the correlation with the stock market. I add bond repurchase year-on-year returns (REPOYOY) as an additional variable into the regression equation. The results are shown below. The adjusted R-squared increases to 70% and the Akaike information criterion is lower than the earlier results with only M1 or lagged CPI as variables. But the p-value of M1 increased dramatically and the coefficient of bond repurchase turns out to be negative. Thus, bond repurchase does not fit into the estimate so M1 and lagged CPI are more accurate factors in the equation to estimate stock prices. 82 Interest rates and bank deposit reserve ratios together can control bank lending activities. Domestic financial institutions have been squeezed by low interest rates which dented the profits they can earn on their huge base of customer deposits. On the other side however, strong lending and treasury activities can generate respectable revenues. We can see from the image below that except for the stock market bubble in 2007 to 2008, the general tendency is identical between M2, bank loans and stock markets. Particularly RMB loans extended reached all-time highs in March 2009. China’s banks released a record RMB 4.6 trillion in new loans during the first quarter of 2009 in support of government efforts to 83 revive the economy. The March Goldman Sachs China Financial Conditions Index loosened by the largest amount in single-month movement history. A stronger increase of bank loans (displayed below) than M2 suggests the capital has flowed into the real economy, mainly fixed asset investment. Chart 20 M2, Bank Loan Ratio and Shanghai Composite Index M2 Bank Loan Shanghai 1,000 Source: NBSC, CEIC, UBS. Left scale is the growth ratio of M2 and bank loan, right scale presents the stock index level logarithmically. The extreme jump of bank lending in the first quarter of 2009 was generated by the expansionary monetary policy and government stimulus 84 measures (to be discussed in the next chapter). The fast increasing bank lending raised worries of bad loans which arose in the 1980s and 1990s when bank loans went into low quality SOEs and projects during reforms. In the 1980s enterprise autonomy was introduced for the SOE reform. Insufficient controls were imposed on the expansion of credits that SOEs got directly from banks while banks were mistakenly given autonomy in the same way. Aggregate demand and national output were expanded at a fast speed. The government thereafter assigned credit quotas to banks in difference regions, together with higher deposit rates. In the 1990s the credit expansion was carried out on the back of increasing investments after the Southern Expedition of Deng Xiaoping. The same administrative methods applied in the 1980s were used to blow away the new round of inflation. What the banking authorities did to solve all the bad loans accumulated was to inject capital into banks and set deposit rates above lending rates. The consequence was that the government allocated capital which should be consumed by households to cover any potential bank losses. Regulators also artificially lowered the deposit and lending rate in order to slow down the increase of bad loans in order to support banks’ operational profits. This results in the fact that production surpassed demand. Thus the government had to rely on exports to absorb the excess 85 supply. The ongoing global recession reduced the import capacity of partner countries forcing China to overhaul its strategy. Learning from the past, the government promulgated various regulations and rules to monitor the credit usage carefully. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology recently announced that for those steel corporations, whose excess production could not be supported by the market, the government will forbid banks to extend additional loans to curb production expansion. The latest statistics suggests household lending accounted for 25% of the April’s new loan, compared with 9.2% in March. Middle and long-term infrastructure construction accounted for 63% of the April’s new loan. This implies liquidity is flowing into the right direction. Consequently domestic financial companies outperformed the Shanghai Composite Index in the first four months in 2009. The robust profits were also reported from foreign banks’ mainland business including HSBC which said its pretax profits increased by 137% mainly by trading local currencies, bonds and derivatives for major corporate clients. Citigroup also reported its net income for 2008 in the country increased by 95% amounting to USD 191 million. Chart 21 Financial Index v.s. Shanghai Composite Index 86 180 Shanghai Financials 160 23.7% 140 120 4/24/2009 4/3/2009 3/13/2009 2/20/2009 1/23/2009 12/31/2008 100 Source: Bloomberg A Case Study Now let’s look at a specific event before the current global financial crisis. In the year of 1998, the central bank decreased its one-year deposit rate three times, from 5.67% to 3.78%, a total of 33.33%. However except the first rate correction when the market reacted slightly, the later two adjustments did not stop the market from dropping. The reason may be explained examining the following factors (data sourced from NBSC and the Ministry of Commerce): 87 a) The total fixed capital investment increased 15% in the year of 1998, higher than the 10.1% of 1997. Such an increase was due to the expansionary fiscal policy which enhanced infrastructure construction investment. Investment of non-SOEs and foreign invested companies declined by 2% and 8.9% respectively compared with 1997 however. Hence the investment hike was only created by the government’s fund injection (fiscal policy). Monetary policy did not play a role in stimulating non-government entities' investment behaviors. b) From 1993 to 1998, GDP declined from 13.5% to 7.8% gradually. The poor macroeconomic situation made people more cautious in their investment outlook. A lower interest rate is supposed to ease corporate debt. The average SOE asset-liability ratio was as high as 80%. The total loss for SOEs in 1998 was RMB 12.7 billion, 20% more than the year before; and the year-end inventory increased by 5.5% than 1997. Furthermore, an essentially heavier taxation was implemented. Although the government increased spending, the total taxation 88 increased by 13.3%, compared with a GDP growth of 7.8% and an industrial value-added growth of 8.8%. c) The discrepancy between actual interest rate and price index changes: the total nominal decrease of interest rates in 1998 was 1.89% but the price dropped at a faster pace of 3.4%. GDP grew 7.8% in 1998, quicker than total consumption which was up 6.8%. Additionally, the retail price index was 2.6% lower than 1997, decreasing at an annual 8.2% rate from 21.7% in 1994 year-on-year. Consumers thus anticipated further decline of prices, which hindered spending. Total bank deposits were up 18% in 1998, growing much faster than GDP. Meanwhile the total turnover of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets decreased by 23.4% despite the fact that 106 new companies were listed in 1998. d) The central bank’s contradictory monetary policy: on one hand, the deposit and lending rate decrease attracted capital to flow out of the banks. On the other hand, the government did not increase money supply at the same pace. M0, M1 and M2 grew 10.1%, 11.9% and 15.3% 89 year-on-year respectively in 1998, which was 4%, 5.4% and 6.2% respectively slower than 1997. In general, I observe a strong relationship between China’s stock market and interest rate changes. As monetarists suggest, the change of interest rate potentially increases capital flows. The realization of such policy change, however, posts delayed effects on stock markets. It is fair to conclude that the Chinese government has made the necessary efforts to guide the market despite several limitations. Firstly, it is not easy to foresee what is about to happen due to the restriction of cognitive knowledge as the economy is in transition. Secondly, interest rate control in China limits its possible floating range. Although in 2004, the People’s Bank of China loosened such limits and started to marketize interest rate adjustment; lower limit of loan rate (not lower than 90% of the benchmark rate) and higher limit of deposit rate (not higher than the benchmark rate) still persist. Thirdly, the time-lag effect of monetary policy decreases its regulative function. Last but not least, in China, people’s main purposes to make bank deposits are for retirement pension, medical service and children’s education. Such social behavior means the change of interest rate has a comparatively limited impact in comparison with western economies where social security is more advanced. 90 Chapter Three Fiscal Policy Fiscal policy refers to government attempts through changes in tax, bond, government expenditure, and allowance etc, to influence the direction of the economy. When government spending equals to tax revenue, it is a neutral fiscal policy. Increasing spending or reducing tax revenue is an expansionary fiscal policy, resulting in a budget deficit. Oppositely, contractionary fiscal policy occurs when net spending declines and is compensated by higher tax revenue or less spending or a combination of the two. This would lead to a budget surplus. Such a tight policy is implemented if inflation is high, in order to achieve price stability. Cutting spending is often difficult because spending benefits politically influential interest groups (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). Such problems however are less significant in China due to its single-party dominance. Keynesian economics suggests that adjusting state spending and tax rate are the best ways to stimulate aggregate demand – the total demand for final goods and services in the economy at a given time and price level. Thus in Keynesian theory, fiscal policy is a distinct demand-side 91 instrument. The government can affect aggregated demand directly through its own expenditure and indirectly by taxation. While in a monetarist’ view, government budget has important supply-side effect but has no demand-side function unless it triggers changes in monetary policy. In times of recession or low economic activities however, fiscal policy would be essential and an efficient tool to stimulate speedy recovery or growth. In theory, deficits can be paid then by an economy boom that would follow. This theory is naturally proved by the current large rescue plans initiated worldwide. Economic fundamentals shall be the prerequisite of the development of stock markets. The supply of stock return in theory is generated by the productivity of companies in the real economy. In absence of a strong economy, bubbles are easily produced. In 1978, the state revenue was only a bit more than RMB 100 billion (USD 12 billion), occupying 31.24% of the GDP. This exhibits a heavy burden on households. In the next 18 years till 1995, the income increased 11.87% on an annual basis. In 1995, the revenue to GDP ratio decreased to 10.67%, meaning a much higher household income. The new fiscal policy starting from 1994 has changed largely the proportion between state income and GDP. From 1996 to 2007, state revenue increased at a faster pace than GDP. In the 92 last 5 years from 2003 to 2007, the wealth has been increasingly accumulated by the state. The moderate macro control has provided a good environment for stock markets. In the late 1990s, the bust of the Asian financial crisis led to a drop of prices of goods, higher unemployment, lower investment and consumption, and consequently slower economic growth. An expansionary fiscal policy was adopted since then till 2005 when the government switched to a steady fiscal policy. Chart 22 State Revenue and GDP, rebased in RMB billion 10,000 1,000 100 State Revenue Rebased GDP 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 10 Source: NBSC 93 The scale of government bond issuances is the primary consideration for government bond management. Authorities have to take into account both consumers’ purchasing power and the government’s repayment capability. The purchasing power of government bonds can be categorized as macro and micro factors. The macro factor is related to a country’s GDP while the micro factor refers to bank deposits. The worldwide recognized practice is specified in the excessive deficit procedure of the Treaty of Maastricht which defines that gross debt of the government should not be above 60% of GDP. China’s deficit rate is quite low in this sense and also in comparison with most countries. The ratio was increased from 1% in 1981 (the first government bond issuance) to 19.7% in 2008. The increasing government debt ratio has fueled mainly infrastructure improvement, contributing to economic growth. Spending now would have to be paid in the future, either by bond issuance or higher taxation. It is important to maintain the confidence of the public on the long-run sustainability of the fiscal system; otherwise any discretionary short-term expansion of fiscal policy will have counterproductive effects. Chart 23 Burden Ratio of National Debt 94 25 20 15 10 5 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: National Debt Association of China This chapter will analyze the impact of fiscal policy on stock market in three perspectives: government spending, government bond and taxation policy. The analysis is based on the empirical data analyzed using descriptive statistics, regression model and portfolio allocation theory. In taxation section, I’ll analyze the turnover velocity of the Shanghai Composite Index. 3.1. Results – Government Spending State budget reflects the economic scale, balance and direction of a country. Increasing government spending is the main tool in expansionary 95 fiscal policy. Government can finance its spending by either taxation or issuing bonds. The result normally helps to lift stock prices. Public spending however, shall reflect both microeconomic and macroeconomic considerations. The chart below illustrates the change of government spending and the Shanghai Composite Index from 1990 to 2007. We can see from the graph that although the general tendency is the same – trending both upwards, the stock index appears to exhibit greater volatility. In the period from 1990 to 1992, the stock market was first born, leading to what one can call a start-up rally. A natural cool-down is witnessed from 1993 to 1995. The market seems to be more in line with the government’s spending tendency from 1995 onwards. Similar to interest rates, we can see from the image that stock market often indicates a time lag after the change of government spending. For instance, the sudden increase of spending from 1997 to 1999 may correspond to the market rally from 1998 to 2002, so does the period from 2004 to 2007 where a flat expenditure seems to echo to a slight drop of the market. Chart 24 Government Spending v.s. Shanghai Composite Index, rebased 96 10,000 Government Shanghai 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 100 Source: NBSC Compared with monetary policies, government spending change creates more immediate impact on domestic economic growth and consequently benefits the stock market. In 2008, state budget financing accounted for 62.2% of the total urban fixed asset investment, while domestic loans and self-raised funds financed 15.7% and 4.7% respectively. Since the economic slowdown became apparent in the last quarter of 2008, the government swiftly shifted to a pro-growth policy. The two-year RMB 4-trillion stimulus measures taken by the central government to fight the global financial crisis have proved to be effective in various aspects. Aiming at increasing the financing of the stimulus plan, 97 China Insurance Regulatory Commission specified that life and property insurance companies could invest as much as 6% and 4% of their total assets respectively (based on Q1 2009) on infrastructure projects. The stimulus package will be spent in the following manner. Chart 25 7% Stimulus Plan 4% 1% 9% 45% 9% 25% Transport&Power Grid Rural Public Housing Healthcare and Education Sichuan Reconstruction Environment Innovation Source: National Development and Reform Commission It can be seen in the following economic indicators that consumption and industrial production rebound instantly after the implementation of the stimulus package since the beginning of 2009. The Shanghai Composite Index climbed from 1820.81 at December 31, 2008 to 2477.57 as of April 30, 2009 registering an increase of 36% within four months, a monthly 8% average growth. It can be seen from indicator PPI 98 that inflation pressure has been decreasing from September 2008. The dropping speed is somewhat softening in 2009, whereas PMI and value added of industry both registered strong rebound. Similar trends are witnessed in the UK, Japan and the US after the government stimulus plan implementation. Chart 26 Various Economic Indicators’ Reactions to Stimulus Plan 15 10 5 0 PPI, YOY -5 -10 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 99 29 Value Added of Industry, State-owned 19 9 -1 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 60 50 Manufacturing PMI 40 30 Jan-05 Jun-05 Nov-05 Apr-06 Sep-06 Feb-07 Jul-07 Dec-07 May-08 Oct-08 Mar-09 100 Source: NBSC, China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing, Bloomberg The main driver of the acceleration is the strong increase of fixed asset investment driven by such government-led infrastructure investments. Nonetheless, self-raised funding shall accordingly increase as business confidence improves on the back of better-than-expected domestic demand growth. The most recent data provided by CEIS suggests there are already signs of rebound in non-public investment growth, especially in the property and commodity spaces (see chart below). Within the 1405 companies which reported first quarter earnings by the end of April, 1048 of them reported a profit, accounting for 74.6%, in which 33.5% of them realized a net profit growth. Together with low credit costs, fixed asset investment growth is expected to remain firm as bank loan growth start to slow as government policy gradually normalizes. A domestic demand rebound thereafter will create higher returns and stronger confidence for private investment opportunities as the result of increasing income transfers from government to households. Chart 27 Non-infrastructure Investment Growth 101 Source: CEIS, GS Global ECS Research Government expenditure can not only be directly injected into fixed asset investment, it can also help to restructure inefficient SOEs. Many of the SOEs were facing poor management and low efficiency levels in China. To format a consolidated layout, in 2005, the government spent RMB 22 billion on closing down 115 SOEs and resettled more than 590’000 people. The second phase was thereafter pushed forward by isolating organizations set up by SOEs, typically schools, hospitals and service companies. The authorities supported structural change and debt-to-stock conversion, promoted the reform in industries such as 102 electricity, telecom, railway, airline and post, and strengthened the 11 financial supervision of the four state asset managers . These structural changes have greatly improved these large enterprises’ competitiveness. The present financial crisis has proved to be a benefit for the better-run companies as the export slump has actually done a useful job of clearing out the dead wood as businesses gravitate to the better run companies producing higher quality items. To preserve industry development, National Development and Reform Commission recently unveiled a steel industry revitalization plan. The plan intends to reduce steel output by 8% in 2009 compared with 2008, and then gradually increase again in 2011. Additionally government will strengthen elimination of outdated capacity, revise import tax and raise export VAT rebate rate for high-tech and high value-added steel products. The steel industry will attract as much as RMB 1 billion on support of R&D and technical reform, according to the Industry & Information Technology Association. Government’s action on promoting M&A and increasing industry concentration rate will restructure the whole steel industry and generate three super-large steel makers – Bao Steel Group, An Steel Group and Wu Steel Group. Such consolidation and restructure attempt also applies to the automobile 11 These companies are China Cida Asset Management Corporation, China Orient Asset Management Corporation, China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation, China Huarong Asset Management Corporation. 103 industry. The revitalization foresees the establishment of 2 to 3 super-large automakers with an annual production volume of more than 2 million vehicles and 4 to 5 giant companies whose annual production volume shall surpass 1 million vehicles. If it goes as planned, there will be less than 10 manufactures in China’s market controlling 90% of the market share (presently controlled by 14 players). Further plans outlined are the revitalizing and restructuring of the country’s light industries and petroleum refining sector. The outline for the refining sector will raise crude oil processing capacity by about 18% by 2011 and the government plans to build three or four major large, modern refineries in the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. The plan for the light industrial sector is meant to upgrade technology and provide more support for SMEs which suffer from a lack of access to bank loans and other financing. These two plans are expected to create about 3 million jobs for the country. Although government investment has an instant impact on the domestic economy, self-generating growth from factors like employment and domestic consumption is the key in order to maintain sustainability and to offset the deterioration in exports arising from the present global financial crisis. A structural change of economy is needed. A large part of 104 China’s success over the years has been to manufacture goods at cheap labor cost and sell them mainly to the US and Europe. The government realizes that the real market may be domestic however, and is now trying to break its dependence on exports as the mainstay of its economic growth to one relying more on its internal dynamism. The previous disasters from the centrally planned economy and less sophisticated social security have taught Chinese consumers the importance of saving and fiscal prudence, a sharp contrast to the American style of living. As a result a strong household balance sheet has offered families a measure of protection against possible downturns. In early 2009, people began to spend fairly freely again, even though the news from the global economy seemed to get worse and worse. A survey conducted by China Confidential assessed consumer spending intentions among an estimated 64-million middle and upper income households in 189 cities in March 2009. The results suggest there is a much higher propensity to spend in lower-tier cities which have been hit less by the global downturn (less dependent on exports) than the traditional growth powerhouses clustered around the Yangtze and Pearl River deltas. Average sales revenues for nine of China's top 10 retail companies bounced back 8.49% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2009. Companies like Wal-Mart plan to expand its 105 network further in second-tier cities to capture the spending power of inland consumers. China's nominal retail sales reached RMB 10 trillion in 2008 with an annualised growth rate of 17.8% per year over the last five years. According to a new forecast from TNS Retail Forward, China will surpass Japan becoming the second-largest retail market after the US. Retail sales in the first quarter of 2009 remained robust, growing at a 15% year-on-year pace (N.B. Feb data may be affected by Spring Festival), while CPI and PPI inflation remained negative in April according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Despite all these robust figures, it is hard to build up consumer confidence in general. Domestic consumers’ confidence and expectation has been decreasing since September 2007. The chart below suggests despite the decent recovery in all sectors, consumers still are relatively conservative in light of crisis. Chart 28 China’s Consumer Confidence and Expectation 106 110 115 Consum er Confidence Consumer E xpectation 110 105 105 100 100 95 95 90 90 85 85 80 80 1/31/1991 1/31/1993 1/31/1995 1/31/1997 1/31/1999 1/31/2001 1/31/2003 1/31/2005 1/31/2007 1/31/2009 Source: Bloomberg, 1997=100, consumer expectation at right scale The structural growth of consumption comes from drivers like the ongoing urbanization, a rapidly evolving consumer culture and diversity in the consumer population. To pump up domestic consumption, the government will subsidize purchases of cars and home appliances to replace older models. The State Council said it will spend a total of RMB 5 billion on subsidies to consumers who trade in older vehicles for new ones, and RMB 2 billion on the appliance subsidy program which pays a rebate of 10% of the purchase price. In order to persuade shoppers to save less and spend more, it is essential for the government to improve housing, education and healthcare to aid the development of a consumer-based 107 economy. According to the World Bank, the savings rate in China has risen as high as 50% of gross domestic product, including the retained earnings of state-owned companies, and even families with incomes of less than USD 200 per year would save 18% of their income, as people believe they must save up for future healthcare costs, education expenses, pensions and other burdens. Spending by the central government on healthcare has been increasing in recent years. Lately government has pledged a RMB 850-billion healthcare reform over the next three years, to have 90% of citizens covered by 2011 and everyone insured by 2020. It is a long-lasting project but this would be a big step forward for China. The reforms will probably not have any immediate impact on savings habits but it will gradually spur to rise more consumption. At the same time in the United States, President Obama also outlined his plan to create a USD 630 billion health reform reserve fund to provide coverage for 42 million uninsured Americans and to reduce the growth of healthcare costs by USD 2000 billion over the next decade. The actions of governments have proved again the ideology of political economist Adam Smith – the state-supported indigent which goes much beyond relying only on a profit-maximizing market economy. In his first book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he extensively investigated the powerful role of 108 non-profit values. In fact all the affluent countries in the world have depended for some time on transactions that occur largely outside the markets including healthcare, public pensions and other features of social security. A strong social security system helps to create an internal-dynamic to drive growth. 3.2. Results – Government Bond A government bond is regarded as a risk-free bond as the government can always repay by raising taxes or printing more money to redeem the bond at maturity. State bond issuance can change the money supply and circulation. Without imposing the risk of inflation, the issuance of bonds helps to relieve the costs of infrastructure construction and economic stimulus plan. Friedman (1988) analyzed the Dow Jones stock market index and the velocity of M2 and suggests that a rise in stock prices reflects an increase in the expected return from risky assets. Although there is no guarantee that this increase in relative risk will be accompanied by a change toward risk aversion, nevertheless, a shift toward relatively safe, fixed income securities plus money may be expected. We shall be then confronted with the phenomenon of gains in one asset class usually being accompanied by losses in the other, or 109 returns on one asset type decline while another declines less or even gains. Thus, investors are inclined to allocate capital back and forth between bond and stocks facing different risks. The chart below displays various risks investors face from allocating 100% bond to 100% stock, based on monthly closes of the T-bond Index (launched in 2003, tracking the government bond performance in the Shanghai Stock Exchange) and the Shanghai Composite Index from 2003 till April 2009. This behavior shall result in a negative correlation between bond and share prices. Thus I hypothesize there is a negative correlation between bond and stock prices. Chart 29 T-Bond v.s. Stock Allocation 150% Return 100% 50% 0% -50% 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009.04 -100% 100% bond 80% bond & 20% stock 60% bond & 40% stock 40% bond & 60% stock 20% bond & 80% stock 100% stock Volatility (Risk) Source: Bloomberg 110 The performance of t-bond and stock market differs to the largest decrease in the years of 2006, 2007 and 2008. How fast an investor will change his portfolio allocation would depend on his risk tolerance level. The graph visually supports that investors substitute t-bond with stocks when stocks outperform, particularly in the two time frames outlined in the graph. With the growing amount and quality of institutional investors in China’s financial market, such replacement effect shall be more obvious, as institutional investors are believed to be able to allocate investment more wisely and efficiently. Chart 30 T-bond Index v.s. Shanghai Composite Index T-bond 2/27/09 6/30/08 10/31/07 2/28/07 6/30/06 10/31/05 2/28/05 6/30/04 10/31/03 2/28/03 Shanghai Source: stock.sohu.com, Bloomberg To test whether the hypothesis stands, I take firstly the returns of 111 t-bond index and Shanghai Composite Index in the above time frame, in total 75 observations. The below regression and correlation results were generated. The adjusted R2 and the slope are negative suggests there is a certain degree of negative correlation but zero falls in the 95% interval. In addition, correction analysis suggests there is a positive correlation. So on a long-range average, the correlation in both price levels is positive because in the long term an upward trend in stock market is also accompanied by an upward trend in bond index. The hypothesis does not fare well over Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.074382397 R Square 0.005532741 Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations the Column 1 Column 2 entire Correlation Analysis 1 0.424642232 sample. 1 -0.008090098 0.010969226 75 ANOVA df Regression Residual Total Intercept Shanghai 1 73 74 SS 4.8868E-05 0.008783647 0.008832515 Coefficients Standard Error 0.002632871 0.001275673 -0.008762612 0.013749828 MS 4.8868E-05 0.000120324 F Significance F 0.40613714 0.525930403 t Stat P-value Lower 95% 2.063907461 0.042581494 9.04567E-05 -0.637288898 0.525930403 -0.036165998 Upper 95% 0.005175286 0.018640773 112 T-bond Index Shanghai Line Fit Plot -40% -20% 3% 2% 1% 0% -1% 0% -2% -3% -4% -5% -6% -7% 20% 40% T-bond Index Predicted T-bond Index Shanghai Might focusing on a shorter period expose a useful relationship? Now I shorten the model to a 1.5 years time frame, namely January 2003 to June 2004, July 2004 to December 2005, January 2006 to June 2007, July 2007 to December 2008. a) January 2003 to June 2004: adjusted R-square, coefficient and correlation results state there is a slight negative correlation. But zero can be found between the lower 95% and upper 95%. 113 Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.11488902 R Square 0.013199487 Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations Column 1 Column 2 Correlation Analysis 1 -0.11488902 1 -0.048475545 2.969920589 18 ANOVA df SS 1.887718961 141.1268529 143.0145718 MS 1.887718961 8.820428304 F Significance F 0.2140167 0.64986644 Coefficients Standard Error 103.1225396 10.51461849 -0.048220529 0.104233697 t Stat 9.807539829 -0.46261939 P-value Lower 95% 3.59725E-08 80.83254917 0.64986644 -0.269186046 Regression Residual Total Intercept X Variable 1 b) 1 16 17 Upper 95% 125.412530 0.17274499 July 2004 to December 2005: adjusted R-square is significant at 70%. Zero does not fall in the 95% interval. Coefficients and correlation results imply there is a strong negative correlation between two variables. Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.84735569 R Square 0.718011665 Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations Column 1 Column 2 Correlation Analysis 1 -0.84735569 1 0.700387394 3.107464211 18 ANOVA df Regression Residual Total Intercept X Variable 1 1 16 17 SS 393.3984183 154.5013412 547.8997595 MS F Significance F 393.3984183 40.73993563 9.07457E-06 9.656333823 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 152.2600347 8.099217266 18.7993518 2.48007E-12 -0.637937629 0.099946606 -6.382784316 9.07457E-06 Lower 95% 135.090465 -0.8498149 Upper 95% 169.4296044 -0.4260603 114 Y X Variable 1 Line Fit Plot 110 108 106 104 102 100 98 96 94 92 0 Y Predicted Y 20 40 60 80 100 X Variable 1 c) January 2006 to June 2007: correlation states a positive relationship but adjusted R-square is not high and coefficient is almost zero. Additionally zero can be found in the 95% interval. Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.411360269 R Square 0.169217271 Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations Column 1 Column 2 Correlation Analysis 1 0.411360269 1 0.11729335 0.781142055 18 ANOVA df Regression Residual Total Intercept X Variable 1 SS 1.988553361 9.762926561 11.75147992 MS 1.988553361 0.61018291 F Significance F 3.258946339 0.089885779 Coefficients Standard Error 109.1708897 0.486132068 0.005365259 0.002972022 t Stat 224.5704342 1.805255201 P-value Lower 95% 2.01083E-29 108.140336 0.089885779 -0.000935146 1 16 17 Upper 95% 110.2014434 0.011665663 115 d) July 2007 to December 2008: strong opposite correlation analysis result. Adjusted R-square is as high as 78%. Zero does not fall in the 95% interval. Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.891806566 R Square 0.795318951 Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations Column 1 Column 2 Correlation Analysis 1 -0.891806566 1 0.782526385 1.604708433 18 ANOVA df Regression Residual Total Intercept X Variable 1 SS 160.0943295 41.20142648 201.2957559 MS 160.0943295 2.575089155 Coefficients Standard Error 120.9328761 1.104136151 -0.033312224 0.004224855 t Stat 109.5271411 -7.884821024 1 16 17 F Significance F 62.17040259 6.68998E-07 P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 1.94687E-24 118.5922125 123.2735396 6.68998E-07 -0.042268514 -0.024355934 116 X Variable 1 Line Fit Plot 122 120 118 Y Predicted Y 300 400 Y 116 114 112 110 108 106 0 100 200 500 X Variable 1 It is necessary to connect the above results with the below correlation chart and the table associated with the bond-stock allocation chart. The regression and correlation analysis suggests the strongest negative correlation in 2005 and 2008 when bond performed the best and in 2007 when stock market peaked during the bubble with growing uncertainty. People tend to switch from stock investment swiftly to bond investments. While in 2006 and 2009 (till April), although stock outperformed remarkably, the two asset price levels exhibit a certain degree of positive relationship. Such phenomenon implies obvious risk-reversal characteristics during a bull run. Table 1 T-bond v.s. Stock Allocation 117 RETURNS (%) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009.4 100% Bond -0.6 -3.8 14.1 2.1 -0.5 9.4 -0.1 80% Bond & 20% Stock 1.6 -6.1 9.6 27.8 19.0 -5.6 7.1 60% Bond & 40% Stock 3.7 -8.4 5.1 53.5 38.4 -20.5 14.3 40% Bond & 60% Stock 5.9 -10.8 0.6 79.1 57.8 -35.5 21.6 20% Bond & 80% Stock 8.1 -13.1 -3.8 104.8 77.2 -50.4 28.8 100% Stock 10.3 -15.4 -8.3 130.4 96.7 -65.4 36.1 The yearly Pearson correlation movement is illustrated in the below curve. I can conclude that t-bonds have a strong negative correlation with stocks. But this does not mean the increase of stock definitely lead to a decrease of t-bonds. Their price correlation, both positive and negative, appears to be extraordinary when t-bond and stock register above average growth. Retail investors account for more than 72% of total accounts in China, according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), amongst the 139 million accounts in 2007. 51.3% of the total investment capital comes from retail investors, 25.7% from investment funds, 0.8% from social security funds, 2.5% from insurance companies, 1.4% from securities companies and other institutional investors occupy 18.3%. 118 Assuming 2/3 of investment funds’ capital belongs to retail investors in China, it may well be that 70% of the total investment capital in stock market comes from them. Thus retail investors’ investing behavior could essentially influence the stock market. Chart 31 Price Correlation of T-bond Index and Shanghai Composite Correlation 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009.1- 4 The following table shows the t-bond issuance from 2003 to 2008. It states that the central government did not heavily engage in the t-bond issuance as a tool to affect the stock market. The yearly issuance growth is generally stable excluding the special issuance in 2007. The greater 119 issuance in 2004 is corresponding to the largest t-bond index drop at the same time. Besides aiming to cool down the overheated stock market by reducing liquidity along with tight monetary policy, the main purpose of the 2007 special t-bond issuance was to set up the state-owned investment company China Investment Corporation as the People’s Bank of China is not allowed to directly purchase (excluding open market operations) or do exclusive sales of t-bond due to legal limitations. The registered capital was set at USD 200 billion, according to the Ministry of Finance. Agricultural Bank of China, in fact, purchased in total RMB 13’500 million t-bonds in 2007, then sold them to the People’s Bank of China in exchange for the USD. Thus, only RMB 2’002 million t-bond flowed into society, in which RMB 1’034 million t-bonds were sold in September, RMB 705 million in November and the rest in December respectively. The stock market peak began to descend in October 2007. This is also in line with the extra t-bond supply. The one-year bear run stimulated people’s appetite for t-bonds. Although the coupon was not significantly higher than what time deposits offered, during the first issuance in 2008, t-bonds were sold out within hours in banks across in China as people expected interest rates to drop further. Table 2 T-bond Issuance, in 100 million RMB 120 CATEGORY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Book-entry 3776 4366 5042 6533 6347 6665 Certificated 2505 2510 2000 1950 1600 1300 34 650 Savings - - - 400 Special - - - - Total 6280 6876 7042 8883 15502 23483 8615 Source: jrj.com 3.3. Results – Taxation Policy Profit per share after tax is the foundation of stock price. For listed companies, cutting tax implies fewer costs and more profits, making stock more valuable which in turn leads to higher stock prices consequently. For the public, lower tax, broader tax reduction or exemption range may increase income and in the mean time encourage consumption and investment needs, as suggested by Keynesian economics (instead of increasing savings which is a theory promoted by Barro). Higher investment needs will thereafter result in more stock purchases. In general, cutting tax benefits stock price. The 11th Five-Year plan sets the goal of shifting from a production-based to a 121 consumption-based value-added tax (VAT) regime from 2006 to 2010. To spark growth facing the current financial crisis after a 5-year pilot program, China has implemented the reform under which companies no longer need to pay VAT upon equipment purchases. Applicable from January 1, 2009, this new taxation policy could save companies RMB 120 billion per year, according to the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation. The government wishes to encourage enterprises to upgrade their technology base and increase the demand of equipment on the back of this reform. Adding to the domestic consumption stimulation measures besides VAT deduction, from November 1, 2008, the government has reduced the property deed-tax for first-time buyers from 1.5% to 1%, temporarily waived land VAT and stamp duty on transactions of real estate. Additionally the minimum mortgage down-payment has been reduced from 30% to 20% for those who purchase for self-usage. These measures has improved consumers’ buying-power, especially that of young people, and also provoked transactions. A recent report of CB Richard Ellis’ China division suggested that psychological effect was important while the national and local measures only reduced the cost of housing by 2% to 5%. The State Council’s support was seen as indicative of a policy shift 122 from dampening demand to reinvigorating the property market. Whether real estate is in its recovery is of crucial importance as it is one of the economy's most effective locomotives of growth. Property drives about 17% to 18% of total steel demand and also takes shares of cement output. For retail sector, real estate transactions drive sales of home appliances (especially durable goods), furniture and other household products. Some people are not yet entirely convinced by the policy shift as they expect developers are likely to further reduce prices due to over-supply in the some regional markets including Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. Even though, property transactions have been rising in 2009 and land sales have resumed. Increasing amount of people attending property fairs in various parts of China confirmed this sense of surging demand. The rationale behind this is that buyers had been waiting for eight or nine months for the bottom of the market to become apparent. In many cities, people think this has now arrived. One of the most potent forces in Chinese real estate in recent years has been the group-buying by wealthy investors from Wenzhou. Recent surging sales in Wenzhou, Suzhou and Hangzhou signal that Wenzhou businessmen are calling the bottom of the market. In addition, due to the lower margin of projects, the developers who survive the tumultuous 2009 may well stand to gain once 123 the market turns the corner. The financial difficulties faced by some developers have been a corresponding increase in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Developers with lower gearing and strong balance sheets are active buyers of properties from distressed developers. The industrial consolidation and the recovering consumer confidence have achieved nearly 70% outperformance of real estate index compared with Shanghai Composite Index, from November 2008 to April 2009. Chart 32 Real Estate Index vs Shanghai Composite Index, rebased daily 240 Real Estate Index Shanghai 200 69.8% 160 120 80 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 Source: Bloomberg, stock.sohu.com Among all kinds of taxes, stamp duty on share transaction is probably related most closely to trading cost. Stamp duty was invented by 124 the Dutch in 1624 when the government was in financial trouble. Stamp duty is easily raised and accepted by the public, thus it has been widely put into practice all over the world. The original work in the literature on stamp duty effect was conducted by Jackson and O’ Donnell (1985). Their findings, based on quarterly data, suggest that every 1 percentage point (ppt) stamp duty cut from 2% to 1% leads to an extreme 70% increase in equity turnover.12 There are findings that higher stamp duty tax has imposed negative effects on turnover. Ericsson and Lindgren (1992) used international panel data and find that 1 ppt increase in stamp duty tax causes a turnover decrease between 50 % and 70 %. Bond et. al (2004) investigated stamp duty on share prices in the UK and find that the announcements of cuts in stamp duty had a significant and positive effect on the prices of more frequently traded shares compared to other shares. Stamp duty is charged once per transaction. The Tobin tax proposes such transaction taxation in order to discourage volatile short-term trading13. However, Saporta and Kan (1997)’s research implies the opposite. They examined the response of the equity market to announcements of changes in stamp duty rates. They compared the prices of two assets – American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and their London 12 Stamp duty (the UK securities transaction tax on shares and debentures) was cut from 2% to 1% in April 1984. 13 The Tobin tax was first suggested by and named after James Tobin (1974). 125 Stock Exchange-traded stocks – which are similar in all respects apart from their treatment for stamp duty purposes. Their findings suggest that stamp duty is capitalized in prices and it has no effect on volatility. In general, when the market is overheated, the government intends to raise stamp duty to cool down the market; while on the other hand, when the equity market is in recession, government would reduce the stamp duty to stimulate trading volume. The rate of stamp duty in China has changed over the years. On June 28, 1990, China ordered sellers to pay 0.6% of the total transaction turnover on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This marked the first stamp duty on stock in Chinese history. In that November, Shenzhen started to levy the same duty also on buyers. These attempts triggered a slump in the Shenzhen market, forcing the government to cut the duty in half to 0.3% in October 1991. At the same time, Shanghai began to levy 0.3% stamp duty on both the buy and the sell side. In 1996, China’ stock markets began a strong bull run. Despite repeated official warnings of an overheated market, the Shanghai Composite Index nearly tripled from early 1996 to early May 1997. On May 10, 1997, the state lifted stamp duty from 0.3% to 0.5%, which ended the bull run and led to a drop of more than 30% within half a year. On June 12, 1998, the stamp duty was adjusted to 0.4%. Then on June 1, 126 1999, the government reduced the duty for B-shares to 0.3%. The B-share index climbed above 50% within one month. On November 16, 2001, Beijing decreased the duty to 0.2%. In January 2005, government lowered the duty to 0.1% from 0.2% in order to boost stock prices during a market slump lasting from 2001 to 2005. The bear run did not end until the startup of stock reform. On top of a 130% jump in 2006 and a 62% year-to-date rise of the Shanghai Composite Index, on May 30, 2007, the stamp duty was increased to 0.3% from 0.1%, a move seen as a bid to clamp down on the overheated market which unfortunately did not play its role. The most recent move on stamp duty rate was on April 24, 2008, when Beijing lowered it from 0.3% back to 0.1% aiming to tackle the spreading of global financial crisis. From September 19, 2008, authorities announced to levy stamp duty only on sales. I plot in the chart below the stock market turnover from 1992 to 2008 (data from 1990 to 1991 not available). Clearly turnover increased dramatically during the period following the 0.3% cut in 1991 till mid 1997 and after the 0.1% cut in January 2005 till mid 2007. The high turnover period from 2005 to 2007 however was also the result of the exogenous structural change caused by stock reforms. Total trading dropped when stamp duty was increased to 0.5% during the period from mid 1997 to mid 1998 and from mid 2007 to 127 mid 2008. The two rate cuts from mid 1998 to early 2005 did not produce obvious effects eventually as the total turnover basically flattened at the end of this time window but two hills can still be observed in between. Thus, the development of turnover visually confirms the theory that stamp duty decrease has positive impact on stock market trading turnover but not necessarily in the long run. Chart 33 Turnover, in RMB billion 100,000 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 10 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: NBSC, turnover including A and B shares. To gain some intuition, I draw below the velocity of turnover in the period, in comparison with the Shanghai Composite Index. The market turnover velocity is defined as the ratio of the value of shares traded (turnover) divided by market capitalization. It is also referred to as 128 turnover rate or average holding period. A low turnover to market capitalization suggests low liquidity. It can also be interpreted as that investors expect the market will pick up. A declining velocity in a bull market is a positive sign as it indicates that investors are holding on to stocks. However in a volatile market, it means traders are stuck with deals and therefore have little choice but to hold on to the stocks longer than they would otherwise prefer. During the period from 1992 to mid 1997 following the first stamp duty cut in 1991, velocity is quite volatile but finished by up 110%, twice that of the appreciation of the stock market. This implies better liquidity and the fluctuation gears to that of the stock market. In the implementation of the 0.5% stamp duty regime, turnover decreased by about one third while stock market capitalization increased 11% and index retreated slightly by 0.4%. The change of stamp duty in mid 1998 did not seem to produce the usual outcome in the longer-term. In this time frame till the end of 2001, the stock market gained 44% along with a doubled market capitalization contributed by 36% more listings, while velocity increased slightly in between but dropped sharply after the market correction caused by the Internet Bubble. The bear run from 2002 to early 2005 did not hold back the increase of velocity, indicating very strong trading activities and better liquidity prior to the bull market which 129 was enhanced later by the 0.1 percentage cut. The velocity increased further following the cut in 2008. This phenomenon suggests investors intend to hold on to the stocks and even add investment in order to reach a potential break-even. Chart 34 Velocity of Turnover and Shanghai Composite Index 250% 6000 5000 200% 4000 150% 3000 100% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 2000 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 50% 1000 0% 0 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 Velocity 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Shanghai Source: NBSC, Bloomberg If stamp duty change does not ultimately generate an influence on the stock market, this impact observed must be strong on a short-term basis. The table below summarizes the return of the Shanghai Composite Index on the day when there was a stamp duty adjustment and the following 30-day return after such change. 130 Table 3 Announcement Effects of Stamp Duty Changes, Shanghai DATE EVENT DAY RETURN 30-DAY RETURN Oct 10, 1991 Decreased to 0.3% in +1.0% +22.3% SZ, SH Started to levy May 10, 1997 Increase to 0.5% +2.3% -13.1% Jun 12, 1998 Decrease to 0.4% +2.6% +1.0% Jun 1, 1999 Decrease to 0.3% for +2.5% +32.1% B-share Nov 16, 2001 Decrease to 0.2% +1.6% +3.3% Jan 23, 2005 Decrease to 0.1% +1.7% +6.1% May 30, 2007 Increase to 0.3% -6.5% -11.9% Apr 24, 2008 Decrease to 0.1% +9.3% +5.9% Source: Bloomberg, stock.sohu.com The four charts below outline the stamp duty changes in the corresponding dates of the Shanghai Composite Index, at 5-year intervals. It graphically supports that stamp duty does impose effects, but such impact exhibits more announcement effects – a short-term trigger, instead of a long-term stimulation in China’s stock market. 131 132 10/1/00 7/1/00 4/1/00 1/1/00 10/1/99 7/1/99 500 4/1/99 1/1/99 10/1/98 7/1/98 0.3% to 0.5% 4/1/98 1/1/98 10/1/97 12/19/95 9/19/95 6/19/95 3/19/95 12/19/94 9/19/94 6/19/94 3/19/94 12/19/93 9/19/93 6/19/93 3/19/93 12/19/92 9/19/92 6/19/92 3/19/92 12/19/91 9/19/91 6/19/91 3/19/91 12/19/90 200 7/1/97 4/1/97 1/1/97 2000 10/1/96 7/1/96 4/1/96 1/1/96 Chart 35 Stamp Duty Changes 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 0.3% 0 2500 0.5% to 0.4% 1500 1000 0.4% to 0.3% for B-share 0 3/1/09 1/1/09 11/1/08 9/1/08 7/1/08 10/1/05 7/1/05 4/1/05 1/1/05 10/1/04 7/1/04 4/1/04 1/1/04 10/1/03 7/1/03 4/1/03 1/1/03 10/1/02 7/1/02 4/1/02 1/1/02 500 5/1/08 3/1/08 1/1/08 2000 11/1/07 9/1/07 7/1/07 5/1/07 3/1/07 1/1/07 11/1/06 9/1/06 10/1/01 7/1/01 4/1/01 1/1/01 1000 7/1/06 5/1/06 3/1/06 1/1/06 2500 2000 1500 0.4% to 0.2% 0.2% to 0.1% 0 7000 6000 5000 0.1% to 0.3% 4000 3000 1000 0.3% to 0.1% 0 Source: Bloomberg, stock.sohu.com Among all sorts of taxes, stamp duty is one of the easiest to 133 administer, given that most transactions on the stock exchange are now electronic and thus it can be deducted automatically. Compared with other taxation, stamp duty is perhaps also the cheapest of all to collect. The amount of revenue raised varies from year to year but was always below 5% of the government financial income. The chart below displays the revenue weighting of stamp duty on stock transactions. The taxation revenue on stamp duty reached two highs in 2000 and 2007, when stock markets peaked while tax ratios were fairly low. The overall weighting in fiscal revenue is not high. In developed economies, stamp duty on stock transactions were abolished over time. OXERA estimated that stamp duty raises the cost of capital by 0.72 to 0.87 percentage points14. China will eventually follow this path. In connection with the stock market performance, I may conclude that stamp duty taxation does not post strong long-term impact on China’s stock market and this is likely to continue to be the case. 14 OXERA, 2001, Impact of Stamp Duty on the Cost of Capital of UK Listed Companies, paper prepared for the London Stock Exchange / The Hundred Group of Finance Directors. 134 Chart 36 Stamp Duty Weighting in Fiscal Revenue % 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 Source: NBSC, CSRC All in all, taxation policy has direct and obvious impact on stock markets. Impact from stamp duty change is observed especially in a shorter-term period compared with other tax changes which need to be digested gradually by the market. I see Chinese government has reacted generally at the right time on increasing or decreasing certain taxation for the development of the market. 135 Chapter Four Overview of Policies When the unusual movement of the stock market jeopardizes the stabilization of financial conditions, the government promulgates policies or releases information to guide the direction of the market. It is said, in a healthy market, stock price presents the inherent value of a company, while the reaction to the policy shall be based on the public expectation of such policy’s effectiveness, and such effectiveness should be moderate. The Chinese stock market was born in an economy in transition. Stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen in December 1990. The Shanghai Stock Exchange began operations on December 19 while Shenzhen started seven months afterwards. The ‘Chinese Characteristics’ in some degree hindered the development of the market, originating from communism. Government has a special role and function, not only as a governor of the macro economy but also an organizer and promoter. It could use compulsory system change and other administrative methods to realize this goal. As a young market, the incomplete structure and unprofessional investors lead to low risk-resisting ability and instability. The market 136 could be excessively stagnant or overheated. In order to expedite the development and ensure the necessary stability, the government began with clear goals to direct the secondary market. In a planned economy, a government’s experience of supervising the market would not prevent the self-development of the market. Compelling system changes were released during the course of maturation, which urged the speedy growth of the stock market. Such changes barely address the role of compatibility between social acceptance and inductive system change. However under such conditions: a) Government policy change becomes an origin of risk b) The powerful impact of policy largely restraints the formation of price mechanisms and damages market efficiency c) The stock market is generally recognized as a money-making tool by speculative investors. Anyhow, despite these potential damages, the market would not be able to reach its current state without those government interventions and guidance. 4.1. Methodology With the development of econometric methods, economists began to apply VAR (vector auto regression) models. A VAR model is a set of 137 linear dynamic equations where each variable is specified as a function of an equal number of lags of itself and all other variables in a given system. As a non-structured multiple equation model, which differs from structural approach, a structural approach describes the relation between variables based on economic theory which could not strictly describe the dynamic relations between variables. Since the basic principles were put forward by Sims (1980), the VAR model has been used extensively within both closed and open economy environments. To assess the impact on stock markets, event study has been largely used as a common method in quantitative studies. The first event study was conducted and published by Dolley in 1933, who examined nominal price effects on stock splits. Dolley used a sample of 95 splits between 1921 and 1931 and concluded that share price increased in 70% of the cases while declined in only 27% of the instances. Since then, this methodology has been used and improved by Ashley (1962), Ball & Brown (1968), Fama et al (1969) and Mayers & Copeland (1982). Although there is no unique structure to perform an event study, there is a general flow to conduct the analysis which consists of 7 steps (MacKinlay, 1997). Despite the improvements, there are several limitations on the method, as the research is based on the assumptions of efficient markets 138 where stock reflects all relevant information, event shall be unanticipated and there are no confounding factors. The primary criticism is aimed at the last limitation, based on the fact that the methodology may capture effects from other events which occur in the same event window. Another methodology often used is case study. This qualitative method is widely practiced to emphasize detailed contextual analysis across a variety of disciplines. Robert K. Yin (1984) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. Others criticize case study on its limitation of cases offer no grounds for establishing reliability and biases the findings. In recent years, researchers start to show interest in a phenomenon of time series, that autocorrelations decay slowly. Econometrics uses the ARMA model to describe such phenomenon, which is called long memory time series. Such time series characteristics are not only discovered in finance but also observed in other fields by Hydrologist Hurst (1951 and 1957), geophysicists Mandelbrot & Wallis (1968), and meteorologists Mcleod & Hipel (1978). The most famous long memory 139 case is processed by Hurst. He used the yearly minimum water levels of the Nile River from 1007 to 1206 and the persistence of river flows is known as the Hurst Effect. This chapter will summarize the major fluctuations in China’s stock market in association with potential policy changes. I analyze then the game between government and investors. To access whether government policy has essential influence on stock markets or whether it is correlated still to real economic growth, I utilize a VAR approach to test the relationship between China’s GDP growth and the Shanghai Composite Index performance. In stock reform section, I’ll use event and case studies to assess the government policy impacts. 4.2. Summary of Major Fluctuation and Policy Changes In China’s stock market, it is not difficult to find that most of the big market movements were related to policy change. Table 4 No. Date Major Market Fluctuations from 1992 to 2008 Days % 1 116.2% Main Cause Category 1992 1 5.21 Stock waived price limitation Policy 140 2 8.10 2 -37.59% New share issuance NSI 3 9.7 2 -20.98% New share issuance NSI 4 9.11 1 12.0% Control new share issuance Policy 5 10.26 2 -19.90% New share issuance NSI The first B-share of 6 11.23 4 83.31% Shanghai Vacuum Electron Policy Devices Co. Ltd. (SVEC) 1993 7 2.22 3 -20.22% NSI State owned shares of Lujiazui Finance and Trade 8 4.6 4 41.47% transferred to private Policy investors with compensation Time deposit rate up 5.15 1 2.18%, lending rate up Policy 0.82% Government expressed 9 6.1 3 37.06% importance of stock Policy markets One-year time deposit rate 7.11 1 raised to 10.98% from Policy 9.18% New share issuance of 10 7.30 1 11.2% Harbin Pharma led to Market hostile trading 11 12.20 1 -20.2 Stock option regulation Policy 1994 141 12 1.14 5 -13.59% Government’s financial situation discussion (risk) Policy Four ‘NO’ policy (no new issuance within half a year, 13 3.11 1 9.9% no stock income tax, no merger of non-tradable and Policy tradable shares, no stock distribution) 14 4.13 6 -20.31% Avoid state capital loss Allow 15 8.1 1 33.5% capital Policy raise, Chinese and foreign joint Policy venture fund 16 9.26 5 -40.69% Market rumors 17 10.26 1 -8.9% 18 12.15 1 -7.2% National bond issuance Lujiazui’s dividend below expectation Market Market 1995 19 2.22 1 -9.9% New bond issuance 20 5.18 1 31.0% Stop t-bill future trading Policy new shares issuance scale 21 5.23 1 -16.4% to be announced in the NSI second quarter 22 6.15 1 -7.6% 5.5 billion share issuance quota NSI 1996 23 4.30 1 -8.4% 24 10.30 1 -6.1% Regulation on insider holding of listed companies Strengthening of Policy Policy 142 supervision 25 12.2 1 9.9% 26 12.12 4 -27.26% Market Editorial on People’s Daily Policy Speeches of the presidents 27 12.18 1 7.8% of Shanghai and Shenzhen Policy exchanges 1997 Rumor of the death of 28 2.18 1 -9.9% 29 2.19 1 7.7% Death of Deng Xiaoping 30 5.8 1 -7.3% Increase stamp duty 31 5.13 2 -8.2% 32 5.16 1 -8.3% 33 5.21 2 -11.3% Deng Xiaoping Policy 30 billion share issuance quota Four companies suspended Forbid state owned companies to trade stocks NSI Policy Policy Forbid certain cash inflows 34 6.6 1 -8.4% from bank to the stock Policy market 35 6.10 2 -8.5% 36 6.13 1 7.7% 37 7.2 1 -9.9% 38 7.7 1 -7.2% 39 9.22 2 -13.5% Rumor on processing law-breaking institutions Prosecute law-breaking institutions 29 new listed companies within two weeks Policy NSI NSI Depression Market 1998 143 40 1.13 1 -9.2% Asian financial crisis Bank deposit reserve ratio 41 3.23 1 -0.6% decreased from 13% to 8% 42 8.17 1 -8.5% Policy 15 Flood 1999 43 5.19 1 4.9% 44 6.15 1 -7.5% 45 6.25 1 -6.7% 46 6.28 1 6.2% Speech of Wen Jiabao Policy 47 7.1 1 -7.7% Securities Law in force Policy 48 7.20 1 6.5% Editorial of People’s Daily Market Market Stated 49 9.9 1 6.6% Policy own enterprises, state controlled companies and listed companies can Policy trade in secondary market 50 11.22 1 -0.3% Bank deposit reserve ratio reduced from 8% to 6% Policy 2000 50% of NSI rationed to 51 2.14 1 9.0% investors in secondary Policy market 52 5.9 2 -6.1% Web trading regulation Policy 53 9.5 2 -4.2% Three party supervision Policy 54 11.24 1 -3.6% Market 2001 15 The bank reserve rate was fixed at 10% since 1985. It was increased by 2% from 10% to 12% in 1987 and another 1% to 13% in 1988. 144 A famous share manipulation case – Guangdong Yi’an Group. 55 4.26 1 -2.4% Insiders bought and sold 87.34% of the companies’ Policy tradable shares, pushing price from RMB 7.55 to 126.31 56 7.30 1 -5.27% Reduce state owned stake Guangxia 57 8.6 1 -3.91% Policy (Yinchuan) Industry Co., Ltd faked financial report 58 8.27 1 -3.61% Reduce state owned stake at market price Regulates 59 10.10 2 -6.1% stake non-tradable transfer, forbids over-the-counter stake Policy auction 60 10.23 1 9.86% 61 11.7 1 -4.62% 1 6.35% Stop reducing non-tradable shares Illegal conduction Policy of Hainan Seg Trust 2002 62 1.23 Deny the plan of reducing non-tradable shares Release 63 1.28 1 -6.33% Reducing Research State Policy of owned Policy Shares 145 Announcement: the above 64 1.31 1 6.81% Research focuses on Policy investors’ interest Policy maker suggests to 65 3.5 5 11.35% legislate the reduction of Policy state owned shares Commission charged by 66 4.5 1 -0.43% securities companies no Policy more than 3‰ Establishment of Securities Companies with Foreign 67 6.6 1 4.05% Equity Participation Rules; Rules on the Establishment of Foreign-shared Fund Management Companies Stop implementation of Interim Measures of the State 68 6.24 1 9.25% Council on the Management of Reducing Held State Raising Shares Policy and Social Security bond trading Funds 69 10.10 1 -0.32% Reduced charge by 50% Policy Notice on Transferring 70 11.4 2 3.14% Issues of Stated-owned and corporate-owned Shares to Policy Foreign Investors 146 Interim Provisions Foreign Exchange Administration 71 11.28 2 4.02% on of Domestic Securities Policy Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 2003 72 1.14 1 5.81% 73 4.8 6 7.68% Insititutional investors’ trading Fund companies buy in Delisting 74 5.13 1 -3.04% regulation NSI Market warning released. 58 Policy companies warned 75 6.14 6 -3.54% Central Bank’s new housing loan system Policy CSRC released Interim 76 9.1 1 1.96% Measures for the Administration of Bonds of Policy Securities Companies 77 9.22 1 -0.7% Bank deposit reserve ratio up by 1% to 7% Expectation Policy on forthcoming policy from 78 10.10 1 2.54% the Third Session of the Sixteenth Policy Central Committee 79 12.22 1 3.23% CSRC’s Trial Policy 147 Implementation Measures for the Customer Asset Management Business of Securities Companies 2004 State Council’s Opinions 80 2.2 3 5.93% on capital market’s reform Policy and stable development 81 3.25 1 -0.2% 82 4.27 1 -1.5% Floating rate of re-lending to financial institutions Bank deposit reserve ratio raised from 7% to 7.5% Administration 83 7.1 1 3.00% Policy of Securities Investment Fund Management Policy Companies Policy Procedures Executive meeting of State 84 9.14 5 16.1% Council emphasizes the implementation of the Policy above Opinions Administration of Stock 85 10.25 2 2.42% Investments by Insurance Institutional Investors Policy Tentative Procedures 86 10.28 3 -2.80% 1 -1.29% Deposit and lending rate increased by 0.27% Policy 2005 87 3.17 Housing loan increased by Policy 148 0.18% Notice of the CSRC on 88 4.29 1 -2.44% Piloting the Share Reform Policy of Listed Companies Administration Buyback 89 6.6 1 2.05% of by the Listed Companies of Their Public Policy Shares Procedures (Trial Implementation) Possible capital injection RMB 140 billion into market including 60 billion 90 6.8 1 8.21% to securities companies. In addition, rumors about the interest rate will remain stable. 2006 Lending rate for financial 91 4.28 1 1.66% institutions up 0.27% to Policy 5.85% CSRC forbids short-term 92 5.12 1 4.26% investment on securities Policy companies 93 7.5 1 2.20% 94 8.15 1 1.59% 95 8.19 1 0.20% Bank deposit reserve ratio lifted to 8% from 7.5% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 8.5% One-year deposit and Policy Policy Policy 149 lending rate up 0.27% 96 11.15 1 1.84% 1.15 1 4.7% 2.25 1 1.4% 3.18 1 2.9% 4.16 1 2.2% 4.30 1 2.2% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 9% Policy 2007 Bank deposit reserve ratio raised to 9.5% Bank deposit reserve ratio increased to 10% Interest rate up by 0.27% Policy Policy Policy Bank deposit reserve ratio up half a percent to 10.5% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 11%, Policy Policy One-year deposit rate up 5.21 1 1.0% 0.27%, lending rate up 0.18%. Bank deposit Policy reserve ratio up to 11.5% 6.1 2 -10.91% Stamp duty up to 0.3 ‰ nd 2 6.28 1 -4.03% quarter meeting Monetary Policy of Policy Committee of the People’s Bank of China Measures of State-owned 7.9 1 2.69% Share Transfer of Listed Policy Companies Allowed investment ratio 7.17 1 1.94% of A-share up to 10% for Policy insurance companies 150 Decrease tax on interest 7.23 1 3.81% from 20% to 5% and increase interest rate by Policy 0.27% 7.30 1 2.20% 8.22 1 0.50% 9.6 1 1.6% 9.11 1 -4.51% 9.17 1 2.06% 10.15 1 2.2% 11.12 1 -2.4% 12.10 1 1.4% 12.21 1 1.15% 1 -2.6% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 12% Deposit rate up by 0.27%, lending rate up by 0.18% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 12.5% RMB 200 billion special government bond issuance Interest rate up 0.27% Policy Policy Policy Policy Policy Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 13% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 13.5% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 14.5% Deposit rate up by 0.27%, lending rate up by 0.18% Policy Policy Policy Policy 2008 1.17 Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 15% Announcement 1.21 2 -12.35% Policy that Ping’an Insurance planning to sell as much as 1.2 billion shares and RMB 151 41.2 billion convertible bond, total refinancing amount to RMB 160 billion 1.28 1 -7.19% Snow storm Vice president central 2.25 1 -4.07% of the bank said tight monetary unchanged, policy avoiding Policy inflation is still the primary goal 3.19 1 2.5% 4.7 1 4.45% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 15.5% People’s Daily – investors’ interest shall be protected People’s 4.14 1 -5.62% Policy government Daily needs – to intervene and stop loss 4.17 1 -2.1% 4.24 1 9.29% 5.13 1 -1.8% Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 16% Stamp duty down to 1‰ from 0.3 ‰ Bank deposit reserve ratio up to 16.5% Policy Policy Policy Bank deposit reserve ratio 6.10 1 -7.7% to be increased by 0.5% twice to 17.5%, to be implemented Policy respectively 152 from June 15 and 25, 08 Lending rate 9.16 1 -4.47% 0.27%, bank down by deposit reserve ratio down 1% (2% Policy for earthquake region) Sell-side stamp duty only; State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 9.19 2 17.23% supports SOEs to buy back shares; Policy Central Huijin Investment Company Ltd (Huijin) bought ICBC, Construction Bank and Bank of China shares Interest 0.27%; 10.9 1 -0.84% reserve rate bank ratio down by deposit down by Policy 0.5%; temporarily abandon tax on interest 10.30 1 2.55% 11.10 1 7.27% Interest 1 1.05% down by 0.27% RMB 4 trillion stimulus plan Interest 11.27 rate rate down Policy Policy by 1.08%; large banks’ deposit Policy reserve ratio down by 1% 153 to 15%, small and middle sized banks’ reserve ratio down by 2% to 14% Adding RMB 100 billion government loan to banks; 12.3 1 4.01% Huijin bought RMB 1.2 billion bank shares; further Policy policy released to promote stock market 12.23 1 -4.55% Interest rate 0.27% down by Policy NSI represents for new share issuance. Data source:from 1992 to 2000, Shi Daiming, ‘Study of Volatility and Efficiency of China’s Stock Market’ , P160-162,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Press, Jan 2003; from 2001 to 2002, Wu Xiaoqiu, ‘China’s Capital Market: Share right Splitting and Liquidity Change’, P91, Renming University Press, Apr, 2004; from 2003 to 2004, data mainly comes from http://www.stock01.com. Bank reserve ratio changes from website of People’s Bank of China. 4.3. Game between Government and Investor The inconsistence of government targets is the substantial origin of intervention. On one hand, it hopes to bring forward a bull market, which would help companies raise capital. On the other hand, the market should not be overheated. Therefore, the preference of the government is non-monotonic. It changes according to the market level, whereas investors’ preference is changeless. Their only goal is to pursue the 154 possible largest bid-ask spread. The contradiction between government and investor determines that the performance of the market is largely the outcome of a game process, which can be demonstrated in a simple table below. Table 5 Payoff Matrix between Government and Investors GOVERNMENT Investors Direct Indirect Intervention Regulation Reaction to Policy a, e- c1 b, 0 Stock Valuation b, e- c2 d, e Say, e as (short-term) effectiveness of policy by direct interference, c1 as the government’s cost when investors react to policy intervention, c2 as government regulating cost when investor insists on value investing (meaning not responding to policy change). Naturally, c1 is smaller than c2. When policy achieves its expected result, e-c1 would be bigger than zero. However, governing cost grows if investors do not react to the policy when c2 increases. This may lead to an invalidation of policy when e minus c2 is a negative number. Based on the actual situation, assuming direct intervention and indirect regulation are implemented, investor’s dominant strategies would be either following the policy as the public or 155 stick to stock evaluation, as shown in the table. So variables a>d>b. Obviously the game has two Nash equilibriums: government’s direct intervention, investor follows; government’s indirect regulating, investor does company evaluation. A market dominated by policies represents the first equilibrium. In the short-term, such allocation has the strongest Pareto optimality. Government reconciles the contradiction by using policy intervention. It is strong enough to change the direction of the market. Hence, the decisive role of stock’s inherent value is overruled by the policy effect, when investors can only follow herd instinct to realize profit. While from a long-term perspective, frequent government interventions lead to a misunderstanding that companies’ inherent strength does not matter. Under such circumstance, investors give up the valuation of company itself, but embrace policy-speculation as investment philosophy. Such an idea strengthens itself after more and more interferences, which finally replaces a rational investment. Every time when a positive signal comes from the authorities, investors largely expect the increase of index and money flows into the market. When the government signals a cooling-down, investors sell off sharply. When the market is in continued depression, people look to the government for a rescue plan. Once the 156 plan comes, they follow the tide and this causes high market volatility. Undoubtedly, such situations increase the governing cost. Authorities have to release stronger policy or interfere more frequently in order to meet the target. Unfortunately such intense intervention can only enhance the belief of people’s policy-following investment philosophy, where people put their ‘rational’ expectation on policy above the company itself. Once the policy does not meet such expectation, the government becomes ineffective. This can be explained by Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics theory (1974). For instance, when an investor continuously observes the policy changes, he would speculate that the government has intentions to reverse such a policy in a later stage. So when a new policy comes, he would expect it to be overturned down the road. This expectation leads to a market under-reaction, forcing authorities to put forward a similar-kind of regulation to enhance the functionality. However, investors know the market will not keep climbing or dropping, their anticipation of policy reverse strengthens. When such anticipation reaches a limit, we would even witness markets to move in opposite directions. 4.4. Results – Economic Growth v.s. Stock Market China’s stock market was relatively small compared to its GDP. The 157 stock market development of several countries shows that stock markets grow slowly when the economy is in developing stage and the society has not reached a certain level of wealth. Taiwan stock market was set up in 1962. In 1981, its market value accounts for only 11% of GDP, an annual increase of less than 0.6%. The Japanese stock market was born in May 1878 under the name of the Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo, which initially provided government bonds, gold and silver trading. It was closed down during the Second World War between 1945 and 1949. After reopening in 1949, the market was renamed to the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Since then the economy boomed till the year of 1981 before the bubble started, its annual market capital to GDP ratio growth was not more than 1%, less than 31% of the country’s GDP. In China, the tradable share capital to GDP ratio kept the average of around 1% annual growth from 1991 to 2004 when it accounted for 9.11% of GDP. In 2005 after the start of stock reforms, this ratio climbed to 17.6% in 2005 and 44% in 2006. Stock market capitalization exceeded China’s 2006 GDP the first time on August 9, 2007, according to the data from the China Securities Journal. At the end of 2007, the overall capitalization of China’s stock market reached 132.7% of its GDP. Government policy is used to guide the macroeconomic activities in 158 a country, thus a ‘correctly’ implemented policy shall lead to a positive development of its economy. The question is then, does China’s stock market performance mirror the real economic growth? In order to answer this question, I define two variables: GDP and the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (Shanghai). GDP data used here is the constant price year-on-year rate (source: Bloomberg). The growth rate over the same period last year (%) is computed at constant price which is all the final products of all resident units of a country during a certain period of time. This is non-cumulative year on year percentage change on GDP comparable price. Data sample is collected quarterly from Q1 1995 to Q1 2009, in a total of 57 observations. Now I use Eviews to generate a non-restricted VAR model. Lag intervals for endogenous defines the range of intervals. It instructs Eviews to use the first through a certain lags of endogenous variables. Now I need to define what the preferred lag length is. The below table exhibits the model selection criteria for 10 lags. The lag selection criteria suggest a model with either 1 or 7 lags. After considering SC, I use lag 1 for evaluating VAR. 159 After the lag is set, I conduct the unit root test of variables in all three regression forms: without constant and time trend, with constant, and with constant and time trend. The stationarity or otherwise of a series can strongly influence its behavior and properties. The first test does not include intercept and trend. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-statistic is at -1.065695. It is smaller than all critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. Therefore I can conclude to reject the null hypothesis, meaning GDP series does not have a unit root problem and it 160 is stationary. The second test includes intercept (constant). Again the ADF t-statistic is smaller than all critical values. Therefore the null hypothesis 161 does not stand. The following test includes both intercept and time trend. The results are consistent with the two tests earlier. GDP series does not have a unit root problem. Same tests have been done for variable Shanghai. The two 162 test results without time trend suggest stock index is stationary, while in the test with intercept and time trend, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level. The VAR estimate model is therefore defined and results are 163 generated as shown below. The model returns a very high adjusted R-squared. 164 To analyze the appropriateness of the estimated VAR, I diagnose the model with the following reports: AR Roots Graph, Granger Causality, Normality Test, Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition. a) AR Roots Graph. This reports inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial. VAR model is stationary if all roots have absolute value less than one and lie inside the unit circle. There should be (number of variables) multiples (number of lags of roots) visible on the graph. As seen from the graph, in my model, all 4 roots lie on the unit cycle, so this suggests that our model is stable. 165 b) Granger Causality. Here I test whether GDP growth does granger-cause stock market performance, or vice versa. According to the below results, I can conclude that due to fairly large p-values, both null hypotheses can not be rejected, whereas a higher p-value of 0.6228 suggests GDP growth has greater impact on stock market. c) Normality Test. This Reports the multivariate extensions of the Jarque-Bera (JB) residual normality which compares the third and fourth moments of the residuals to those from the normal distribution. The null hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero. Any deviation from this increases the JB statistics. Thus I reject the hypothesis that residuals are normally distributed. 166 d) Impulse Response Function. This function traces the effect of a one-time shock to one endogenous variable on the other variable in the VAR. I generate below two graphs with two orderings: left graph – impulse GDP and response Shanghai; impulse Shanghai and response GDP. The impulse response function of Shanghai to a shock of GDP shows a continuous 167 convergence toward zero after the first 7 periods. e) Variance Decomposition. This test decomposes variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the endogenous variables. It gives information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in the VAR. The percentage of the forecast variance due to each innovation, with each row adds up to 100. The variance decomposition indicates that after increasing in the first 15 periods, the percentage of the forecast error explained by its own shocks stabilizes around 90% for the rest of the 35 period horizon. The result indicates that shocks to GDP have little impact on stock market. 168 Based on the above results, I conclude that the real economic growth and stock market are correlated and the economic growth to a higher degree has ‘Granger Cause’ to the stock market performance but it does not imply that the stock market is dependent on real economic growth. 4.4. Event Study The initial task is to define the event and the time period during which the effects of the event will be examined. This is generally recognized as an event window. In my study, I investigate what impact government policy has on the stock market. So the event I choose is the 169 index movements and the time period is 1995 to 2008. The second step is to determine selection criteria. There are two main indexes in China: the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SSECI) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index (SZCI). China launched the New Shanghai Composite Index (NSSECI, also called G-share) on Dec 31, 2005. NSSECI consists of all companies which completed stock reform, called G-shares. My study below is based on the daily returns of SSECI. There are however several limitations by choosing daily data in event study (Brown and Warner, 1985). The most obvious limitation is normality. The daily return exhibits substantial departures which are not observed in monthly data. The findings of Fama (1976) suggest the distribution of daily returns is more fat-tailed than a normal. The daily and monthly closes of the Shanghai Composite Index from 1995 to 2008 generates the below results. The bigger standard deviation (variance) of daily closes indicates the data are spread out over a larger range of values, in line with Fama’s research. Nevertheless in order to assess the particular policy effects on a single day basis, it is necessary to use daily closes. Mean DAILY MONTHLY 1759.601 1688.651 170 Standard Deviation 1047.252 990.788 The next step is the measurement of normal and abnormal performance. The normal performance is the expected return without the event taking place. In this case, abnormal performance is computed by using the actual return minus the normal return. Thereafter, to calculate abnormal return, one has to know the normal/expected return. There are three common models to determine the expected return: constant expected return (CER) model, market model16 and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). As the name implies, CER model assumes the return is fixed and the correlations between returns are constant through a certain period of time. Although CER model is perhaps the simplest model, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) find it often yields results similar to those of more sophisticated models. A market model, also called single-index model, says stock return depends on the return of the market. Such responsiveness can be measured by beta, a single factor, which exhibits the relation by a stable linear. Modern Portfolio Theory introduced by Harry Markowitz in 1952 inspired his student William Sharpe to publish Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), a comparatively 16 MacKinlay (1997) 171 more sophisticated reasoning to indicate the relationship between risk and return and describe the pricing of assets and derivates. With CAPM, Sharpe shared Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science with Markowitz and Merton Miller. The general idea of CAPM is that investors are compensated in two ways: the time value of money and risk. The time value of money, represented by risk-free rate (Rf), compensates the investors for the investment during a certain period of time. Normally government bond rate is recognized as risk-free rate, as a state is believed to be the lowest risk lender. Risk measure is represented by Beta (β). A beta of one means the stock moves with the market, while a beta between zero and one moves with the market but to a lesser degree (a conservative investment); an aggressive stock then has a greater than one Beta; a negative beta means thereafter a stock moves in the opposite direction as the market. It can be calculated by covariance of a market’s return and a certain stock’s return divided by variance of this market’s return. For example, if one is interested in Abbott which is listed in the S&P 500, Beta can be calculated by covariance of S&P500’s return and Abbott’s return divided by variance of S&P 500’s return. Rm represents the expected market return over the period, following the above example then 172 as S&P 500’s return. Rs represents the expected return of a certain stock (or portfolio). The formula is known as: Rs=Rf+β(Rm- Rf) This formula can be shown further below as a linear graph with a slope depending on β, as investors are only compensated by bearing systematic risk, the degree to which stock changes in price relative to the general stock market. CAPM believes if the expected return does not meet the required return, one should not make such an investment. However, the funny thing is, β is finally determined by a correlation which is again calculated by several stocks’ Rs. Because of the measurement of β and expected return, in practice, CAPM is said to be more difficult to implement than Binormial Option Pricing Model 17 and Black-Scholes Formula18. Chart 37 Traditional CAPM 17 Binormial Option Pricing Model, developed by Cox in 1979, simplifies the evaluation under the assumption of efficient market, shortened duration and price changes in a risk neutral view. 18 Mathematically more complicated but frequently used, Black-Scholes Formula, developed by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes in 1973, looks into options from CAPM and hedging argument. 173 Return β Risk-free Rate of Return Rm- Rf Burton (1998) reviewed CAPM and described it as: every investment carries two risks: the risk of being in the market and the risk specific to a company’s fortunes. Being in the market risk (β), called systematic risk by Sharpe, cannot be diversified away by holding a well-diversified portfolio, while the other risk, unsystematic risk, can be diversified away by holding a basket of stocks which imitates the movement of a certain market. Fama and French (1996) tried to separate systematic risk from unsystematic risk by adding another two factors beyond β. They observed that two particular types of stocks perform better than the market: small-capitalized firms and those with high book-to-price ratio (B/P), called ‘value’ stocks. This is called Three 174 Factor Model19. The usage of CAPM has been criticized by Fama and French as it has sensitive restrictions such as assumption of no transaction costs, taxes and unlimited borrow to a risk free rate. As the target is stock index, Beta is set at 1. The risk free asset in this case is the government bond. To assess the risk free rate, I use the average (mean) rate of government bond from 1995 to 2008, which is 4%. Thus, all daily returns larger than 4% are assumed to be abnormal. The chart below exhibits an overview of the daily performance of SSECI from 1995 to 2008. From the initial observation, we may see that the market is more volatile in the period of 1995 to 1997, 1999 to early 2000, mid 2001 to mid 2002 and 2007 to 2008. 19 They observed that two particular types of stocks perform better than the market: small-caps, meaning small-capitalized firms and those with high book-to-price ratio (B/P), called ‘value’ stocks. The two factors they added into traditional CAPM formula can be reflected as Bs*SMB+Bv*HML. Bs and Bv. SMB stands for ‘small (cap) minus big (cap)’, while HML for ‘high (B/P) minus low (B/P)’. On a rough scale of 0 to 1, Bs equals one means it is a small-cap portfolio; equals zero means large-cap. Bv equals one will be a portfolio with high B/P, while zero is low B/P. Standard calculation will have pre-defined SMB and HML. 175 Chart 38 Daily Fluctuation of SSECI from 1995 to 2008 32% 30% 28% 26% 24% 22% 20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10% -12% -14% -16% 5/19/08 The abnormal points returned can be summarized in the below table. Table 6 Abnormal Points YEAR DATES EXHIBIT ABNORMAL POINTS 1995 2/6, 2/22, 2/24, 3/6, 4/27, 5/18-23, 5/25-26, 6/15, 7/7, 7/17, 10/25 1996 1/5, 3/4, 3/6, 4/26, 4/29-30, 5/17, 5/21, 6/5, 6/10, 6/18, 7/1, 7/16, 7/19, 9/20, 9/23,10/30, 11/1, 11/18, 11/21, 11/29, 12/2, 12/4, 12/13-19, 12/24 176 10/30/08 7/24/07 12/21/07 2/24/07 9/27/06 4/30/06 7/4/05 12/1/05 2/4/05 9/7/04 4/10/04 6/15/03 11/12/03 1/16/03 6/26/02 5/2/01 11/28/01 3/8/00 10/4/00 8/11/99 1/13/99 6/17/98 4/23/97 11/19/97 9/25/96 8/2/95 2/28/96 1/4/95 -18% 1997 2/18-19, 2/21, 3/21, 5/8-9, 5/14, 5/16, 5/22, 6/6, 6/20, 7/2-3, 7/7, 8/14, 9/22-24, 10/27-28 1998 1/13,3/27,7/20,8/17, 8/19, 1999 5/10, 5/19,6/14, 6/16, 6/28,7/1,7/6, 7/20,9/9 2000 1/6, 1/11, 2/14, 2/28, 3/16, 8/31, 10/27, 11/24 2001 1/15, 7/30, 9/18, 10/23, 11/7 2002 1/14, 1/17, 1/23, 1/28, 1/31, 5/27, 6/6, 6/24, 12/16 2003 1/14, 3/27, 9/15, 10/10, 11/20, 12/22 2004 1/5, 7/1, 8/4, 9/15, 11/10 2005 2/2, 6/8 2006 5/12, 6/7, 7/13, 12/11, 12/29 2007 1/15, 1/31, 2/2, 2/27, 4/19, 5/30, 6/4, 6/28, 7/5-6, 8/20, 9/11, 10/25, 11/8, 11/14, 11/22, 11/29 2008 1/21-22, 1/28, 2/4, 2/25, 3/24, 3/27-28, 4/1, 4/7, 4/9, 4/23-24, 4/30, 5/7, 5/20, 6/10, 6/18-19, 6/27, 7/7, 8/8, 8/11, 8/18, 8/20, 9/16, 9/19-22, 10/6, 10/27, 11/10, 11/18-19, 12/3, 12/23 Except the points on Jan 13 and Aug 17, 1998 which were created by 177 the Asian financial crisis and the enormous flood in China, almost all other abnormal points were created directly or indirectly by government policy changes (please refer to the policy summary table). Within them, 3 market fluctuations were not directly corresponding to the policy/announcement releases but were indirectly caused by the rumors before or after the policy/announcements. Table 7 Abnormals caused by Market Rumors Date SSECI(%) SZCI(%) 5/19/1999 4.85 4.99 7/20/1999 6.46 8.35 1/23/2002 6.35 7.13 The extreme volatility can be observed from May 18 to May 23, 1995 which resulted from ‘327 t-bill scandal’ happened in February 1995 and eventually led to the collapse of the whole T-bond futures market and the bankruptcy of the country's largest brokerage company. This manipulation case caused RMB 6 billion loss in a single day. It was widely compared to the Barings Bank scandal which took place in the same month of 1995. After a 3-month hot debate inside the government, t-bill future trading was suspended from May 18 by the CSRC. Due to the suspension of t-bill future trading, enormous amounts of capital poured 178 into the stock market which led to an index increase of almost 48% in the next 3 trading days. On May 22, the State Council announced the new share issuance scale to be released in the second quarter. This stopped the 3-day blowout and started a bear run. What can also be concluded from the results is that the abnormals were generally created by discreet policy incidents, only a few were caused by sequential policy changes such as the trading commission change on April 5, 2002 followed by another adjustment on October 10 in the same year (except the interest rate adjustment on March 27, 1998). If the government would mainly use sequential policies to regulate the stock market, market’s correlation to macro economy may be more obvious. 4.5. Stock Reform The regulation published in May 1992 formally defined four equity ownership structures in China: state share, legal person share, public share and foreign share. Both state share and legal person share are categorized as non-tradable shares. Public share is also known as individual share, which is issued for company employees or external people. Different from other industrialized countries, the primary reason for creating the stock market in China was to allow SOEs to raise capital 179 from Chinese households and from foreign entities. The biggest barrier, according to many experts, is the state share, created by the government for starting up the stock exchange market. The origin of state shares, recalled by Liu Hongru, the ex-chairman of the CSRC, was old communism thinking under the principle of public ownership: all those countries which have stock holding systems and stock exchange markets have to privatize properties. As China is a communist state, this cannot be the path. What was agreed at that time was that the companies which changed to the stake holding system must keep 60% state shares. This has created a historical problem which substantially decreases the self-control of the market as investors cannot thoroughly evaluate a company by its stock price. According to Chinese law, tradable and non-tradable shares entitle the same rights such as the rights to dividend, voting etc, except for liquidity. This liquidity issue causes a price differential. Meanwhile, it costs more to obtain tradable shares than non-tradable shares, as the valuation of the latter is based on the net asset value of listed companies. Additionally, the demand of tradable shares is relatively higher, since the pricing mechanisms for these two categories are different. In exchange for liquidity, the shareholders of non-tradable shares shall pay 180 consideration to those own tradable shares as the additional liquidity generated by non-tradable shares will cause dilution of the company shares in the market. In order to maintain the stability of share price, the Measures for the Administration of Full Circulation Reform of Listed Companies has enforced a 12-month hard lock-up on non-tradable shares which are converted into tradable shares. 4.5.1. Share Structure The features of concentrated ownership structure appear to be monitoring the management and expropriation of minority external shareholders. A concentrated external shareholder shall have higher interest to monitor the management closely. This can decrease agency conflict. The earliest research on corporate ownership may be traced to Berle and Means (1932). They believe a concentrated power has a positive linear relation to the company performance as a dispersed ownership arises a free rider problem. This theory has been supported by the research of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who found out the management intends to be less opportunistic in existence of a large external shareholder. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) provided empirical evidence on the above finding and further proved that large shareholding has positive monitoring effect and leads to better performance. Despite 181 the above literature, there are a number of criticisms on the structure of large shareholder. Leech and Leahy (1991) analyzed the result of the separation of ownership and control power on British companies. They found a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and the firm’s value and profitability. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that in some countries, agency conflicts come from the disharmony between major and minority shareholders instead of the dispute between managers and shareholders. Large investors can be effective in solving agency problem but due to the inconsistency of interests between large and minority shareholders, concentrated ownership may also inefficiently redistribute or expropriate wealth from other investors to themselves. SOEs in China, as a matter of fact, have the characteristics of concentrated ownership and state share. Research of the effects of state share in corporations can be seen in both positive and negative terms. Government’s positive role has been described as a helping-hand model where it corrects market failure and companies gain from their close ties to government. Shareholders’ benefit from their connection to the government is not only observed in developing countries but also in developed countries. The legal protection is less strong in economies 182 during transition. David’s (1996) finding on the research of ambiguous property rights in China proved that state shareholding can prevent malicious violation of government. Additionally, Johnson et. al (2006) reported that Malaysian firms with political connections increased in value after the imposition of capital controls. Sapienza (2004) found that Italian state-owned banks charge lower interest rates compared to privately owned banks after controlling, and their lending behaviors at the local level are related to electoral strength of the political party affiliated with the bank’s top management. Faccio et al (2004) analyzed a sample of 357 companies from 35 countries and their matching peers over the period of 1997 to 2001 and concluded that firms with political connections are also more likely to receive bailouts when they face financial distress than firms without such connections. While on the other hand, as advocated by Shleifer and Vishny, the negative role of government, presented by holding state share, is the grabbing hand.20 Besides its commercial target, companies with major state shareholders have a political goal, which leads to heavy political interference and distorts the best allocation of resources, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1994). In China, SOEs’ initial principal is public, an 20 The book ‘The Grabbing Hand’, by Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, published by Harvard University Press in 1998. 183 abstract disability subject. State-owned asset supervisors and administrators, such as local government and commissions, can not directly benefit from the quality improvement and profitability of SOEs, they lack of incentives to control and supervise the management. The weak domination of government over management results in the insider control problem. In addition, due to the illiquidity of state shares and limitation on transfer, the regulators can not do the proper assessment of the management and the lesser possibility of take-over enhances the insider issue. He (1998) found that the bigger shareholding of state share in China, the worse the insider problem is. The theory of incomplete contracts suggests that the greater power one party has over the other, the less creditability the agreement is. Government, which has the biggest domination power, leads to its low creditability. This decreases the incentives of managers and employees. Furthermore, as the law-makers for the market, government acts also as a shareholder. The conflicting roles as both judge and player cause abuse of power and damages market rule. Legal person ownership is the second largest identity in most of the SOEs. It was created by authorities to aid the transition from state-owned to private-owned. This ownership category is a mixture of various 184 domestic institutions, composed of private companies, SOEs and non-bank financial institutions such as investment funds and securities companies. Researchers in China generally believe legal person shareholding has positive influence to the company profitability, as the purpose of such investment is profit seeking. Additionally, it does not have the political objectives as state shareholders so they have relatively more freedom than state shareholders in deciding profit allocation and strategy implementation. Due to its illiquidity, the only way to benefit from this ownership is dividend. As such, they are not only motivated to pursue the profit maximization but also have the ability to effectively monitor the management. Unlike the representatives of state shareholders who are appointed by the government, representatives of legal person shareholders are elected to the board of directors and the supervisory board. So in practice, legal person shareholders increase the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. As for the public shareholding, the common view is that it has passive supervision function on the company. Due to the limitation of individual wealth, public shareholders normally have only a small percentage of shares. The good of active supervision is divided by all shareholders but the responsibility for the bad is not borne alone. 185 Therefore, the public shareholders have strong incentive to free ride. 4.5.2. Consideration/Compensation Plan No matter whether tradable shares or non-tradable shares, the prices should be related to the performance of the company itself, the price discrepancy between the two categories arises mainly from their liquidity status. Once non-tradable shares are floating, they bear the same characteristics as tradable shares. Liquidity enables securities to undergo a high volume of trading without significant change in price. As known from all financial books, stock’s inherent value comes from its future return. Such theory has a hypothesis which assumes the investor must hold the stock till the future return is claimed. However, a stock has also a marketability which enables investors to trade. Imagining two stocks which have the same future returns and risk, investors would intend to pay a higher price for the marketability/liquidity right which enables them to enter and exit at any time. How to evaluate such liquidity rights determines a company’s consideration/compensation plan when processing the reform. Theoretically, we may consider the floating of non-tradable shares as if an investor purchases non-tradable shares and its put option. This put option can be used to price the liquidity right of non-tradable shares. Such 186 option can be calculated by option pricing models such as the Black-Scholes model. In practice, the net asset per share can be used to evaluate non-tradable shares. Another often used method is reasonable P/E ratio. This methodology takes the average P/E ratio of the companies of the same industry in the developed market as the reasonable ratio. Based on a company’s earnings per share in the previous year, one can get a reasonable price after non-tradable shares become floating, then comes up with a compensation plan after taking the costs of holding tradable shares into account. This approach however assumes the value of tradable shares remains the same. Below is a summary of the consideration practices adopted by listed companies in China: a) Shares Transfer Non-tradable shareholders agree to give away and transfer certain amount of non-tradable shares to the holders of tradable shares, to receive the right to trade the non-tradable shares. b) Cash Payment Holders of non-tradable shares will pay consideration in cash to the holders of tradable shares. c) Recapitalization of Retained Earnings 187 A listed company will capitalize its retained earnings and issue new equity shares. The holders of non-tradable shares will pay the holders of tradable shares the new equity shares they received as consideration. d) Unilateral Reverse Shares Split by Non-tradable Shareholders The overall number of non-tradable shares is reduced and the share ownership percentage of the owners of tradable shares will increase proportionally. This method of consideration achieves a similar result as type a. e) Buying Tradable Shares at a Fixed Price Controlling shareholders of non-tradable shares agree to purchase certain tradable shares at an agreed fixed price from tradable shareholders. f) Issuing Put Warrants by holders of non-tradable shares Holders of non-tradable shares transfer the put warrants to holders of tradable shares at no cost as consideration to receive the right to convert their holdings. g) Combination of the above methods The combination of practice ‘a’ and any forgoing methods are most popular and widely adopted. 4.5.3. The Development of Stock Reform 188 From 1993 to 2002, the government had made several attempts to implement stock reform but the results were disappointing. Many had feared the huge supply of non-tradable shares would outstrip demand leading to a collapse of the market. a) In the January of 1993, China tried to trade state shares. Shanghai Jiafeng (600606), the first guinea pig of the program, traded its state shares suddenly in the market. The market price was around 12 yuan, but the earnings per book were worth only 1.63 yuan. The result was a disappointing response of the market with only 23’908 shares being sold. b) The highlight of the Chinese financial market was the share buybacks in Shanghai stock market in 1999. In April, Yunnan Yuntianhua (600096) proposed to buyback 200 million state shares. On October 19, Shenergy (600642) announced a buyback plan of 1 billion shares. Ten days later, Tsingtao Brew (600600) announced to take back 200 million H shares. The buyback pushed the individual stocks up but didn’t turn the bear run around. c) The next try was publicly announced as ‘a reduction of state shares’ in October 1999, to adjust the state capital structure. The principle was the price of the entitled right must be bigger than its book value but smaller than 10x P/E. This principle was generally accepted by the market 189 with great enthusiasm. On November 29, 10 potential companies were announced, in which 9 of them were the top movers. When two companies Jialing Industrial (600877) and Guizhou Tyre (000589) were finalized as pilots, share prices climbed 4.61% and 5.07% respectively after announcement. Goodness doesn’t last long. On Dec 13, the market changed the attitude dramatically because both companies chose to sell at the top limit of 10x P/E. Till the end of the rights offer, Jialing sold 81.99% of its state shares, while Guizhou Tyre made only 75.29%. The unpleasant results left the story unfinished. d) In April, 2000, transferable warrants of SOE state shares were traded in the market. The difference between normal right and a transferable warrant is that the latter can be transferred to other investors. For example, when SOE entitles a right for its state shareholder to buy additional shares, the state shareholder can trade this right on the market. This special right was created between 1994 and 1997 but cannot be traded until 2000. CSRC announced that such warrants can be traded on the market according to their issuing dates, meaning that if a company issued such warrants at different times, the earlier one would be tradable first in the market than the latter one. There are around 168 firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen which issued this kind of right, accounting for 190 3.3 billion shares or 3.96 percent of A-share markets. e) On June 12, 2001, the State Council announced a new reduction plan: IPOs include a slice of state shares equivalent to 10% of the total offering. The return from state shares goes to the local social security fund. For example, if a SOE has 400 million value of state shares. The company now issues 110 million shares IPO at 10 yuan, in total 1.1 billion yuan. 1 billion capital raised by the IPO belongs to the company; 100 million goes to local security fund, meaning that state shares reduced to 290 million shares. From Jul 25 to Sep 30, 15 firms practiced this new regulation, including Fiberhome Telecom (600498) and Kweichow Moutai (600519). The market fell. This supposed-to-be win-win plan surprised the government with a 30% drop of SSECI in the next four months. f) January 26, 2002, the CSRC published on its website the systematical result of reducing state shares and proposed a scheme named ‘discount placement’. The program proposes a public bid of a portion of state shares. The final price of the bid is set to be the accepted standard. Then according to the price difference between this final bid price and the market price, shareholders get compensated by entitling rights or shares. The Shanghai and Shenzhen indexes responded with a nearly 7 percent 191 slump, although the scheme was only under discussion. On January 28, CSRC held a conference and stopped this scheme. Markets reacted positively on the cancelling of this plan. On January 31, 2004, China released ‘Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets’. The regulation presented authorities’ intention to effect stock circulation reform in a ‘proactive, reliable and orderly’ manner. On April 29, 2005, the CSRC promulgated ‘Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Piloting the Share-trading Reform of Listed Companies’, announcing the start of a pilot program. On May 9, the first trading day after the one-week Labor Day holiday, four pilot companies were announced: Tongfang (600100), Sany Heavy Industry (600031), Shanghai Zi Jiang (600210) and Jinniu Energy (000937). This was a threshold of the new stock reform. These four companies come from different industries. Sany and Zi Jiang are private enterprises, while the other two are SOEs. From an ownership point of view, the four companies have relatively simple shareholding structure. The biggest shareholders in Tongfang, Sanyi and Jinniu hold more than 50% stake, namely 50.4%, 72.4% and 74.5% respectively, while the largest shareholder Zijiang Holdings has a comparatively lower stake, 36.8% of 192 Zi Jiang. All of the four only have A shares, no issuance of B or H shares. The Shanghai and Shenzhen markets retreated 2.4% and 3.3% on May 9 trading day. 4.5.4. Case Studies Did the pilot program launched in 2005 work as hoped? Does the government finally manage to proceed with the stock reform? Here I’d like to conduct case studies on Sany after the pilot program On May 9, the board passed the proposal that every 10 tradable shares entitle 3 shares and RMB 8 in cash. Based on the last trading day, Sany has 240 million shares including 60 million tradable/liquid shares. Total market value is RMB 4.7 billion. This means, to keep the equity unchanged, the non-tradable shareholders shall pay 18 million shares and RMB 48 million to tradable shareholders. On May 11, share price of Sany was up 10%, reaching the daily limit. On May 14, Sany corrected the 2004 annual distribution and corporate action plan from 10-share receiving 5-share and RMB 1 to 10-share receiving 10-share and RMB 2. The new plan increased company equity and cash dividend. On May 25, after the road show and long discussion with investors, Sany agreed to increase the share entitlement by 0.5 shares. On June 10, 2005, the adjusted share reform plan of Sany was successfully passed by tradable 193 shareholders. Thereafter the tradable shareholders shall receive 21 million shares, 3 million shares more. With regard to the most concerning issue – reducing shareholding by large non-tradable shareholders, Sany announced that non-tradable shareholders will not sell shares within 24 months after the first trading day of share reform implementation, and the market price of any continuing 5 trading days shall be above or equal to RMB 19. The graph below demonstrates the stock performance of Sany compared with the Shanghai New Composite Index since 2006. By eyeballing the graphs below, we may observe that the peaks and troughs align almost in the same places and the upturns and downturns coincide. At least two styled facts or regularities can be found: persistence and co-movements. After stock reform, the performance of Sany has obviously outperformed the index. Chart 39 Sany v.s. SSECI (rebased) 194 1,950 1,800 S any 1,650 Shanghai 1,500 1,350 1,200 1,050 900 750 600 450 300 150 Source: Bloomberg On June 19, 2005, China announced 42 more companies which would go through the stock reform. Till July 20, these 42 companies released the reform plan. By August 19, all 46 companies including the 4 pilot firms finished the execution of the reform. On the evening of August 23, the CSRC, the State Asset Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and the People’s Bank of China jointly promulgated ‘Guiding Opinions on Share-trading Reform of Listed Companies’. The documentation believes vital progress has been made in the various reforms and the pilot work has been completed smoothly. As policy expectation and market expectation on the reform are becoming 195 12/19/08 10/24/08 8/21/08 6/26/08 4/28/08 2/29/08 12/26/07 10/31/07 8/29/07 7/4/07 5/9/07 3/7/07 12/29/06 11/3/06 9/1/06 7/7/06 5/12/06 3/10/06 1/4/06 0 increasingly stable, it has laid a solid foundation and created good conditions for overall steady and positive shifting of the reform. On September 4, the CSRC published and implemented ‘Measures for the Administration of the Share-trading Reform of Listed Companies’. This marks the comprehensive launch of stock reform. On September 12, the first batch of 40 companies entered the reform. Afterwards, one batch was brought forward each week. The share reform has inspired creativity and improved corporate quality. Started in 2005, companies have applied more combinations of share, warrant, right, and share or cash dividend, buyback and etc. As an unavoidable path to the marketization of stock markets, stock reform has been an important page of China’s stock market development. The policies released and implemented during the period are undoubtedly necessary and helpful in the execution of the reform. 4.4. Multi-level and Functional Financial Market China did not legally define the existence of most financial instruments. Old Securities Law applied a single product transaction principle, namely only spot transactions are allowed and forbid any option, future or credit trading of any kind. Such an environment plus the 196 old ownership structure provided big institutional investors the opportunities to manipulate the market, as smaller investors can only do one-side trading, meaning only buy low and sell high. Such single directional market plus high retail investor dominance often led to higher volatility, frequently witnessed in stock markets of emerging markets. Even in existence of the daily movement limit (10%), the volatility in China’s stock market is still higher than those of developed markets. It was the earliest hit by the sell-off in 2007 compared to what developed markets experienced and exhibited a steeper stock market decline. It was also the earliest to welcome relief. In order to diversify risks and reduce volatility, securities credit trading is in discussion. The original financing service provided by securities companies in China was overdraft, where securities companies keep collateral from the clients. A contract between two parties defines the maximum overdraft amount, interest rate, liquidation and etc. Due to gradually closer monitoring by the authorities, financial institutions’ overdraft services become more and more undercover. Presently, securities companies and fund managers can do inter-bank borrowing and stock Lombard loans. Banks’ credit thus enters the stock market through a covered channel. It’s hard for authorities to monitor and regulate. Additionally, credit trading 197 will largely increase brokerage operational revenues which came only from trading commissions before. Securities credit trading also offers diversified investment opportunities. It is prepared for different risk preferences. Investors can hedge their investment and lower risks. Commercial banks, insurance companies and securities companies can take the opportunity to allocate resources in a more efficient way. Securities credit business also connects the capital and money market. The earliest securities credit trading can be traced back to the year of 1607, when people did such trading on the shares of Dutch East India Company21. United States started to regulate securities credit trading after the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Based on these two Acts, Japan enacted Securities Exchange Law in 1948 and started securities borrowing trading in 1951. Securities lending business appeared in 1954 followed by the setup of its first securities finance company. From 1962 to 1989, Taiwan’s securities lending and borrowing business was done through banks which acted as agent due to its small scale. Only after 1990 when the ‘Operational Regulations for Securities Firms Handling Margin Purchases and Short Sales of Securities’ was implemented, the modern securities credit trading 21 Dutch name ‘Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie’, 198 business in Taiwan started. With regard to the service provider, there are currently two models which widely adopted in the world. One is recognized as a distributed/marketized model, represented by the USA for instance, meaning securities companies may offer such business with their own capital and securities. The risk is borne by the service provider. Authorities only perform a supervisory function. On the other hand, some countries such as Japan and Korea apply a concentrated/specialized model which allows only specific companies to do such business. Nowadays, there are three companies in Japan conducting the business, namely Japan Securities Finance Co., Ltd, Osaka Securities Finance Co., Ltd and Chubu Securities Finance Co., Ltd. Korea Securities Finance Corporation is the only authorized institution engaged in this business in Korea. Earlier in mid 2006, the CSRC promulgated ‘Measures for the Administration of Pilot Securities Lending and Borrowing Business of Securities Companies’. This has been regarded as a milestone in China’s securities trading history. In August 2006, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges implemented the rules for securities credit trading. The rules detailed the lending/borrowing period, collateral requirement, loan to value ratio, maximum lending/borrowing limit on a single stock and 199 target securities. Due to several reasons the business has not been officially opened for the next two years. In April 2008, the CSRC released ‘Regulation on the Supervision and Administration of Securities Companies’ which officially includes securities lending and borrowing business in securities companies’ business range. Later in October 2008, the CSRC permitted securities firms to use their own capital and securities to experiment with margin trading. The initial margin is set at 50% of the purchase price when buying eligible securities or 50% of the proceeds upon a short sale. The launch of securities credit trading is expected during the course of 2009. The revised Securities Law (on October 27, 2005) made some breakthroughs in securities transactions. First of all, Article 39 defines that ‘all stocks, corporate bonds or any other securities that have been publicly issued according to law shall be listed in a stock exchange as legally established or in any other places for securities transaction as approved by the State Council. This leaves room for the setup of a multi-level capital market as the earlier regulation forbids over-the-counter (OTC) transactions. In addition, Article 40 suggests securities regulatory authorities may adopt trading in different means, not only centralized transactions. And Article 42 reads ‘securities transaction 200 shall be carried out in the form of spot goods as well as any other form as prescribed by the State Council’, which builds the legal basis for derivatives products. Securities market not only finances different types of companies in different stages, but also protects investors’ interests. A mature market has diversified trading systems which serves unique financing needs and risk preferences. A prominent problem in China was that the direct finance proportion is too low and indirect finance was mainly provided by banks. The average financing ratio of loan accounts for an average of about 80% of the total transactions in the last eight years, compared with less than 4% from corporate bonds (see Table 8 below). The bond market is underdeveloped when compared with its gross GDP and the size of its corporate sector. China started to accelerate development of the corporate bond market in 2006 to reduce companies’ reliance on bank loans and improve the central bank’s ability to manage the economy. Selling corporate bills allows companies to make better checks on investor perceptions of risk and meanwhile government will not lose ownership control of some giant corporations. In addition, developing the bond market helps to diversify the risk in the financial system and act as a catalyst for reform of the state-owned commercial sector. The ongoing 201 financial crisis has also urged the structural change in European corporate finance, when European companies have been able to issue some of the largest bonds seen in certain sectors in 2009 and euro-denominated bonds were sold during the first quarter than at any other time, according to Société Générale. Table 8 Non-Financial Institutions’ Financing Activities In % 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Loan 83.1 78.7 82.0 78.1 87.9 85.1 80.2 75.9 Stock Market 6.1 13.1 5.6 6.0 5.2 3.9 4.0 7.0 Gov-Bond 1.7 3.6 6.7 9.5 10.8 10.0 14.4 15.7 Corp-Bond 9.1 4.6 5.7 6.4 1.1 1.0 1.4 0.9 Source: China Monetary Policy Report, 2001 to 2008. 2007 government bond data excludes the special bond issuance of RMB 1550 billion. Corporate bond includes corporate bond, short-term financing bill and mid-term paper. Chart below illustrates the above table more vividly, excluding corporate bonds. The over concentration of financial assets in banks accumulates big financial risks. To ensure capital security, banks act with characteristics of cis-periodicity, meaning they expand credit activity when economy booms and decrease loan lending when economy shrinks. This holds back the development of commercial banks and hinders the conduction of central bank’s monetary policy as their lending terms do 202 not change upon an accommodative policy. In addition, the five banks, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Bank of Communications dominate the market. Such large banks intend to lend more to big and middle sized enterprises. Chart 40 Non-Financial Institutions’ Financing Structure Stock Market, 6.1 Government Bond, 1.7 Loan, 83.1 Therefore, it is necessary to enrich the financial market and build a multi-level capital market. Main board market generally has higher listing requirements on corporate size, operational and profit stability. Such regulations limit the development of smaller companies. Second board market allows SMEs to raise funds. In China, SMEs accounts for 99% of the total number of companies and they weight about 60% of GDP at the end of 2005. The 11th Five Year Plan has emphasized the importance of SMEs and intends to increase the weight of GDP 203 contribution to 65% with supportive policies, a 1% annual growth. Worldwide there are two popular types of second board markets: a) Attached to the main board: This type of second board market has the same trading system as the main board and probably also the same supervision standard and management. The only difference is the listing standards. In practice, companies are listed firstly in the second board and then upgraded to the main board when they meet certain requirement, such as Britain’s AIM, or they are listed parallel to the main board, such as Hong Kong’s Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). b) Independently running: This type of second board market has a unique trading system and listing requirements. The typical success examples are Japan’s JASDAQ, Taiwan’s ROSE/TAISDAQ and USA’s NASDAQ which contains also main board and growth enterprise market. On the contrary, Germany’s Neuer Market is a failure. Neuer Market was open in March 1997 but closed down in June 2003. In the peak time, Neuer Market had more than 300 listed companies. However, after the year of 2000, due to 204 the bursting of the Internet bubble, low listing requirements and false financial data led to the failure. Table 9 Comparison of Capital Market Levels USA Level NYSE, Dow Jones 1 BRITAIN CHINA London Stock Shanghai, Exchange Shenzhen (official list such as FTSE companies) Level NASDAQ 2 Alternative GEM Launched Investment on May 1, 2009, Market (AIM), Shenzhen SMEs OFEX Market Level Over-the-counter Regional Capital Agency Share 3 Bulletin Board Market Transfer System (OTCBB), the Pink (Old STAQS and Sheets, NET) Regional OTC Market Level Private Equity (PE) PE/VC PE/VC (fast 205 4 /Venture Capital growing market) (VC) Since 1998, China has been considering the launch of second board market. China’s stock market is immature and lacks regulation. To promote the setup of second board market step-by-step and additionally due to the fact of SMEs’ economic importance, Shenzhen launched SMEs market in May 2004. In 2007, China highlighted the plan to continue the construction of a multi-level financial market. The data from Zero2IPO shows the IPO listing in Shenzhen SMEs market has been the primary exit channel by private equity and venture capital investors. On March 31, 2009, the CSRC promulgated ‘Administrative Measures for Initial Public Offerings and Listing on the Second Board’, which announced the second board market, also called GEM, is launched on May 1, 2009 though the first company may only be listed as early as August. Table 10 IPO Listing as Exit for Private Equity and Venture Capital LISTING LOCATION 2007 Transactions 2006 % Transactions % 206 SZ SMEs 42 42.0% 16 53.3% NASDAQ 27 27.0% 7 23.3% NYSE 11 11.0% 0 0.0% HK MB* 11 11.0% 1 3.3% HK GEM 3 3.0% 1 3.3% Korea GEM 2 2.0% 0 0.0% Tokyo 2 2.0% 0 0.0% SSECI 1 1.0% 0 0.0% Singapore 1 1.0% 4 13.3% SESDAQ* 0 0.0% 1 3.3% In Total 100 100% 30 100% Mothers MB MB stands for main board market. SESDAQ stands for Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated Quotation Systems In addition, Shanghai Stock Exchange is presently examining a proposal which allows foreign qualified multi-nationals to sell A-shares or depository receipts and the government has already begun the development of an international board. The plan was initiated as early as 207 2007 but was shelved over fears of a stock glut. As the market stabilizes, government hopes that the listing of foreign companies would soak up excess liquidity and avoid possible equity-market bubbles in the future. On the other hand, listing of foreign companies would also help to diverse domestic investors’ risk. Although attempts to make the Yuan an international currency still face difficulties, government has elaborated the plan of its international status by 2020. The international status of the Yuan has been improving in recent years, due to the country's currency swap with trading partners and the trial of international trade settlement in Yuan. According to the National Development and Reform Commission, since mid-December 2008, the government has signed currency swap contracts worth 650 billion Yuan (USD 95.6 billion) with Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Belarus, Indonesia and Argentina. Authorities also draw the roadmap to build Shanghai as a global shipping hub able to allocate international shipping resources by the year of 2020, drawing from the experience of existing international financial centers – Hong Kong, London and New York. The Shanghai port was ranked the world's second for handling 28 million standard containers in 2008. As one of the major policy breakthroughs, this plan will open up China's high-end shipping and financing services as the government will allow 208 major domestic shipping companies to set up financial leasing firms and encourage such firms to trade and issue bonds on the Shanghai-based inter-bank market. To enhance the IPO exit framework, a comprehensive market entry supervision system is necessary. The restriction on market entry could create rent-seeking phenomenon and corruption (Grossman and Kim, 1995). Additionally, an uncertain, mean and opportunistic supervision system may cause high costs which is much larger than the short-term benefit (Sachs, Woo and Yang, 2003). Two kinds of offerings are widely used – best efforts offering and firm commitment offering. In a best efforts offering the underwriter, the bank or brokerage firm hired to sell the shares, does its best to sell the issuing company’s shares. But it does not guarantee the sale amount nor buy the share outright. The more common practice is firm commitment, where the issuer and underwriter agree upon a share sale amount and the underwriter guarantees its commitment by purchasing the securities themselves if the amount is not fulfilled. There are three kinds of IPO sales: fixed price, auction and book building. Fixed price IPO is the traditional way, where the issuer and underwriter do research on the likely market value of the issuing company, agree on an issue price and determine how many shares will be 209 offered based on the capital the company wants to raise. The subscribers then may fill in application forms and subscribe at such a price. However, investors may not necessarily be allocated all the shares they committed to buy. An auction based IPO requires all investors to declare their committed price and quantity within a time limit. After the bid closure, the underwriter accumulates all commitments starting from highest offers. The price when the accumulated subscription reaches the authorized amount is the issuing price. All offers above such price win the bid. The investors then buy the shares either at their bid prices (discriminatory auction) or all purchase at the same price (uniform price auction). A book building is a process of price discovery. In the pre-selling period, the issuer and the underwriter (also called book runner here) perform a road show to collect investors’ opinion and in the mean time also disclose information on issuing company. Within a price band, investors present their offering price and quantity. The underwriter thereafter evaluates all offers and sets the final price. Under such a mechanism, the underwriter controls the allotment of stocks. The stock issuance policy in China had restricted requirements, such as an IPO must have a price to earning (P/E) ratio less than 20 times; raised capital must not be more than double the net assets etc. In recent 210 years, the government has been making efforts to marketize its stock selling mechanism. From 1990 to early 2000, IPO applications were examined and approved by the Stock Issuance Examination and Verification Committee of the CSRC. In August 1999, the CSRC allowed underwriters and their clients to set their own IPO prices instead of a fixed one set at a P/E ratio between 12 and 15. In the period of March 2000 and November 2001, the CSRC eased the limitation on IPO price. The average IPO P/E during this time was more than 20. But the P/E requirement was re-enforced later due to a bear market starting from the second half of 2001. In addition, from March 2001, IPO applications shall be processed and recommended by securities companies, then brought to the CSRC for approval. Many IPOs have been approved in this way but in absence of securities companies’ supervision after listing, many of them encountered problems. As such, from February 2004, Beijing launched a whole-new so-called sponsor system. To avoid faked-financial IPO applicants, the underwriter and the client were bundled together. IPO applicants must be recommended and pledged by a sponsor and sponsor institution. After listing, they keep their responsibility of supervising the listed company. In case of a listing fraud or a financial loss immediately after listing, the sponsor and sponsor institution business will be ceased 211 temporarily or even dismissed. To strengthen market supervision and to relax government influence, authorities abolished the requirement that intended raised capital must be less than 2 times its net assets. Such capital can be decided by the shareholders. At the end of 2004, the CSRC promulgated ‘Circular on Several Issues concerning the Trial Implementation of the Price Inquiry System for Initial Public Offerings’. The price inquiry system has been changed from administrative pricing to marketized pricing starting from 2005. The Circular defines which subjects of price inquiry can be conducted by securities investment fund manager, securities company, trust investment company, finance company, insurance company, QFIIs and other CSRC approbatory institutional investors. The implementation of ‘Administration Measures of Securities Issuance and Underwriting’ since September 2006 means it is not necessary for all companies to go through the two-phase price inquiry. For those to be listed on the main board, the inquiry shall be divided into two phases – the initial inquiry and the accumulated bidding inquiry. For those to be listed in Shenzhen SMEs Board, the IPO price can be determined by initial inquiry only. Chart 41 IPO Issuance Policy Change22 22 Issuance quotas are RMB 5 billion, 5.5 billion, 15 billion and 30 billion in the years of 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997 respectively. 212 Policy Less than 65% of total equity Less than 65% of total equity Less than 65% of total equity Less than 65% of total equity Less than 65% of total equity Less than 2x net asset Less than 2x net asset Decided by shareholders Fixed IPO price 12-15x PE Booking building and fixed price (Aug 1999) Booking building and fixed price Less than 20x PE Less than 20x PE Less than 20x PE Less than 20x PE Issuance quota limitation Issuance quota limitation Issuance quota Security company recommends Security company recommends Security company recommends Sponsor system Sponsor system Examination and approval system Examination and approval system Approval system Approval system Approval system Approval system Approval system Approval system 1993 1997 Mar 2000 Mar 2001 Nov 2001 Jul 2003 Feb 2004 May 2006 On one side, authorities must provide an easy issuance standard, allowing companies to raise capital. On the other side, in order to attract investors and maintain social stability, they need to provide necessary legal protection. The two contrary goals frequently lead to two consequences: ease standard causes market downturn, while higher standards may result in a shrinking of the financing function. Therefore, the policy has been swinging between the two. The later regulations have been improved by eliminating the problems encountered in the earlier stages. The CSRC has pledged to improve fairness and transparency of the IPO review process. In order to increase transparency, the CSRC has started to reveal, on its website, the names of participating members that 213 vote on each IPO application. Presently the government is working on a new issuance regulation. The current IPO practice in China is primary offerings – sale of new shares. One key discussion now is secondary market offerings (also called existing securities sale in Hong Kong). There are two kinds of secondary offerings, or called follow-on offerings. One is a secondary offering during IPO, where an offering is from shareholders of the company. Another is the secondary offering after IPO, where existing shareholders reduce their holdings. Secondary offering is commonly used. It not only improves the financing power and capital liquidity but also is a way for existing shareholders to transfer equity. Secondary offering has been widely implemented in USA IPOs. Brau, Li and Shi (2007) studied a sample of 4’219 IPO cases from 1980 to 2001. Among them, there are 1’830 secondary offerings, 43.4% of the total. Arik Den Dor analyzed 4’316 IPO cases from 1980 to 1997 and concluded that combined primary and secondary offerings IPOs are 1’899 cases, 44% of all. A report shows that in 16’958 IPO cases from 1999 to 2003 in 38 countries, IPOs which are classified as primary offering occupy 76.2%; IPOs which file only secondary offerings are 1.7%; the rest 22.1% IPOs combine primary and secondary offerings.23 23 Source Internet, finance.ifeng.com, reported March 14, 2009, http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/zqyw/20090314/444955.shtml 214 Third board or officially named agency share transfer system in China, is the over the counter bulletin board. It is the service which a transfer agent provides to holding companies to transfer their shares. The third board in China allows delisted companies and the companies traded in old Securities Trading Automated Quotation System (STAQS)24 and National Electric Trading System (NETS) to trade their shares. The first company was traded on July 16, 2001 on the third board in China. The system reform of the third board is in process and the expansion is planned in June 2009. The third board is defined differently in other countries. For example, in the USA, third board refers to listed companies’ OTC trading. In Britain, third board serves companies which do not qualify listing requirements of either main board or Unlisted Securities Market (USM). Third board in Britain was merged into USM in late 1990 while USM was replaced by AIM in 1995. Level 4, where I refer to PE/VC/M&A transactions, has grown to be one of the most important financing channels in China. According to Van Hedge Fund Advisors, there were only 1373 PE companies worldwide in 1988 with assets under management (AUM) of less than USD 42 billion. 24 STAQS was created by Stock Exchange Executive Council (SEEC) and started running in late 1990. The idea was to link the stock exchange in order to build a NASDAQ-liked trading system. On July 1, 1992, State Council authorized STAQS to list and trade legal person (LP) shares. However, CSRC banned new LP share listing in May 1993 due to the concern of diminution of public ownership. Trading in both STAQS and NETS were stopped in September 1999 as the old Securities Law defines listed companies’ share can only be legally traded in stock exchange market. 215 Till the end of 2003, there were more than 8000 PE companies with total AUM of more than USD 1 trillion. Statistics research of Intelligence Ltd. Show that at the end of 2007, the AUM of PE companies had jumped to more than USD 2 trillion. With the current credit crunch roiling the worldwide financial markets, PE/VC/M&A firms in the USA and Europe find increasing difficult to fund their projects. Though also affected by the global financial crisis, PE/VC continues to grow in China. Such growth is fueled by several factors: a) The improving quality and competitiveness of Chinese companies. In a mature market, companies face the same market environment. Their quality and competitiveness depends on themselves, not directly the responsibility of the authorities, except in the case of criminality. During a transition period, capital markets have not been well regulated and supervised and some companies’ operations do not accord 100% with the rules. This can seriously affect investors’ confidence and restrict the very development of capital markets themselves. The past experience in China has proved that it is not enough to rely solely on the companies themselves to enhance their quality due to some elements such as system, 216 mechanism and environment etc; they also need the government and related authorities’ supervision and support. On October 19, 2005, ‘the Opinions of the CSRC on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies’ (the Opinions) has been approved and forwarded by the State Council. The Opinions require local government at various levels to assume responsibility for handling risks of listed companies and may keep custody of those which are in crisis and may exert significant influence on social stability. Furthermore, the Opinions emphasize that the key of improving quality lies in the board of directors, board of supervisors and the management who should be honest and diligent and committed to improving the company’s competitiveness and capacity to make profits. Companies shall establish and enhance internal control systems, improve operational transparency and further stimulate and restrict senior management and its employees. On the other hand, the authorities underline that they respect and maintain the independence of listed companies. b) The tight lending policies of Chinese banks, especially to SMEs. SMEs enhance competition and often have a positive 217 impact on innovation and productivity. They usually are more productive than large firms but their development is widely constrained by lack of finance. Chart 40 illustrates the extreme weight of commercial bank lending in non-financial institutions. Financing difficulty for SMEs is a worldwide issue. Direct financing of SMEs is not easy to implement as big enterprises have large economies of scale, stability of employment and are better positioned for competition. Each country normally has its own definition of SMEs, which can be divided according to quantitative or qualitative methods. Currently more than 80% of the countries worldwide define SMEs based on quantitative criteria, such as number of employees, registered capital and sale volume. In the USA, SMEs get financing in several means, in which 45% from the savings of owners, 13% from friends, 29% from commercial banks and investment companies, 4% from securities financing and only about 1% from government support25. Due to higher operational risk and lower credit than big enterprises, the Small Business Administration (SBA) was set up in the USA. It 25 Data from China Property Right Exchange, data ID EE-C02130010203. 218 provides guarantee for those SMEs which meet criteria and promises to pay back not less than 90% of loan in case of default. Secondly, the SBA may examine and authorize the founding of a SME investment company, which can obtain favorable lending support from the federal government. In Europe, the funding requirements are similar to the USA26. In Japan, companies like Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprises, Shoko Chukin Bank, National Life Finance Corporation and credit guarantee corporations provide financial supports whereas SME consulting companies act as interactive dialog. Learning from the experience from the developed countries and based on its own unique situation, the China Bank Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has urged state owned big and medium sized banks to set up a special unit to serve the unique needs of SMEs by the end of the second quarter of 2009. Such department must apply six mechanisms, namely independent accounting, independent bad loan accounting system, an independent constraint and motivation, special training, quick decision-making and black list system. 26 According to ‘A Comparison of SMEs in Europe and in the USA’, the study of European Capital Market Institute. 219 Credit system needs to be adapted in order to implement SME financing. As an additional attempt, the People’s Bank of China will legalize private lending, estimated at about RMB 2 trillion a year, in bid to ease rural credit. Inter-company cooperation is also needed to improve the financing situation (such as Alibaba’s B2B which bundles SMEs’ loan application together as a bank guarantee). c) Optimism of Chinese economic growth and increasing prosperity of ultra wealthy and middle class. In the first quarter of 2009, China saw a GDP growth of 6.1% and CPI decreased 0.6%. Despite the credit crunch, China is expected to see growth compared with the USA or Europe. The 2009 Hurun Wealth Report released on April 15, 2009 shows that China has 825’000 individuals with personal wealth of more than RMB 10 million. Given a comparatively more conservative investment approach, Chinese have been less exposed to the global financial crisis. The Hurun Report also suggests 82% of the wealthy confirm their lifestyle has not been affected. The RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan has begun to reinstall confidence in the higher end of Chinese real estate. As an example, Li-Ka 220 Shing’s Cheung Kong Property Developers first phase development at La Grande Villas close to Beijing’s International Exhibition Center which comprises luxury houses priced at between USD 750’000 to USD 2 million, sold out its entire stock of housing units over 48 hours in the second weekend of May 2009. d) The financing capacity of PE/VC/M&A is far larger than the stock market (see the chart below). Such development is only sustainable under a fair and reliable legislative environment. The amended Company Law and Securities Law in 2005 have provided an important operational frame for China’s capital market. The new legislation reduces government intervention and mandatory requirements and enhances the protection of shareholders. The QFII and QDII regulations exhibit government’s tendency to internationalize its financial market. The recent promulgated Guidelines on Risk Management of Loans Extended by Commercial Banks for Mergers and Acquisitions represent a remarkable step in development and modernization of capital market. It marks an end to the prohibition of acquisition finance promulgated under the 221 General Rules on Lending issued in 1996. Under the Guidelines, domestic commercial banks can engage in M&A activities by asset acquisition and merger, debt restructuring, purchase of existing equity interests, subscription of new capital and etc. Chart 42 Capital Raised by Stock Market and PE/VC/M&A 6,000 Stock Market PE/VC/M&A 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: NBSC, Zero2IPO. Stock market data include A, B, H, N shares and right issues. e) Stock reform and the development of a multi-level market increase exit possibilities. The research conducted by Zero2IPO shows the clarity of ownership structure in SOEs can significantly increase the PE investment of domestic investors. 222 The graphs below show the exit preference and the impact of stock reform for foreign and domestic investors. We can see from the chart that M&A and share transfer have in total a higher exit preference than domestic IPO listing which is completely not the channel preferred by foreign investors. The main reason is that main board listing in Shanghai and Shenzhen requires long waiting periods and the listing requirement is too high especially for growing SMEs. Stock reform clears up the ownership structure of SOEs and enables the trading of illiquid stakes. In addition, the current development of the second and third board markets brings more exit options. In 2007, 94 companies out of 242 which were listed were supported by PE/VC. Out of these 94 companies, 33 were listed domestically, increased from 10 in 2006. The research of Zero2IPO suggests in the first quarter of 2009, there were 4 exits of PE investments, in which three of them chose IPO. The domestic IPO listing starts to become the mainstream of exit. Chart 43 Exit Preference of Foreign and Domestic Investors 223 Management Acquisition Domestic IPO M&A Share Transfer IPO Abroad 0% 10% 20% Foreign Investors 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Domestic Investors Chart 44 Stock Reform’s Impact on Foreign and Domestic Investors 17.70% 2.90% 2.90% 17.70% 58.80% Great er impact on domestic investors Great er impact on foreign investors Hard to say No comments Great er short-term impact on domestic investors but larger long-term impact on 224 Source: Zero2IPO f) First large scale investment by foreign and domestic PE/VC investors. The graph below exhibits the CAGR growth of 25%. Chart 45 10-year PE/VC Investment Scale in China, in USD million 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: Zero2IPO g) Government’s supportive policies have contributed to the growth of PE/VC despite the slowdown owing to credit crunch. The 11th Five Year Plan (2006 to 2010) encourages the development of clean technology27. From 2006 to 2008, the 27 Cleantech includes 9 first-grade industries, which are new energy, water/sewage treatment, air/environmental protection, new materials, environment-friendly waste treatment, energy facilities, energy reserves, new agriculture and building energy conservation. 225 investment in clean tech market saw an annual growth of 67%, in which investment in new energy field accounts for 69.8%, according to Zero2IPO. This investment pattern is similar to those of Europe and North America. In addition to the national plans and policies, local governments also stimulate the private equity transactions. Chongqing, for example, promulgated local policy which compensates rent costs and applies favorable taxation rate for PE investors. On April 30, 2009, China’s Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation released new M&A tax rules which present a more comprehensive set to address the issue of tax treatment and illustrate ways for internal restructurings. 226 Conclusion Although more economic research has been done in the past 25 years than ever before, the economists whose names are most frequently referenced today, such as Adam Smith, John Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky, are from earlier generations. Despite the numerous non-government intervention theories, the history has reiterated that people look for state’s assistance when facing crisis. As an emerging economy, market can not regulate itself without government intervention in China. It can be concluded that monetary, fiscal and other policies have significant influences on China’s stock market, but neither of them could exert their roles exclusively. Policies interact with each other and the combination puts forward a tentative sign of green shoots. In the past, China adopted directional policies and public expectation was irrational. The special share structure has imposed lots of negative influences. Government had failed in the past in promoting the efficiency and profitability of SOEs through bank lending which led to huge bad loans. Learning by doing policies promulgated later have made a breakthrough. The successful transition of 736 SOEs’ ownership structure owes to the last reform attempt authorities conduct. Shanghai New Composite Index (also called G-share index) outperformed Shanghai benchmark index since its launch, suggesting growing confidence in SOEs’ clearer share structure and improving corporate governance. In order to develop the economy, the government adopted an export-oriented strategy when facing limited domestic demand due to its 227 low domestic prosperity and large population base. Such policies have successfully made China the world manufacturing house and contributed to its economic growth remarkably. With the growing domestic wealth and facing the global financial crisis, the government swiftly pushed out the inland consumption stimulation package, together with insurance and healthcare improvement plans. Despite some complaints from the National Audit Office (NAO) regarding the regional delays of financing the stimulus plan, NAO admits there is no serious abuse of funding due to the increasing transparency measures taken against government official corruption. Since the 1970s, economists have been engaged in the research that macroeconomics should have microeconomic foundations, meaning the big policy issues should be grounded in the study of individual behavior. However, there could not be a single theory of all human behavior. Herd instinct, asset mis-pricing and grossly imperfect information have led the history. Government’s policy is generated along with the evolution of individual beliefs and the advance of human knowledge. Thus the economic understanding requires an amalgam of logic and intuitions and a wide knowledge of facts. Regulations cannot prevent financial crises altogether but they can minimize the devastation. Government’s guidance has created the rapid growth of China’s stock market and the stock exchange in Shanghai generated the world's seventh and Asia's second largest turnover in 2008. Shanghai beats benchmarks in the world's five other biggest markets UK’s FTSE, Hong Kong’s HSI, Japan’s Nikkei, France’s CAC and America’s S&P 500 by at least 39% in the period since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 till the first quarter of 2009. 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Wray, R. L., 1998, Modern Money, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No.252. Yin, R. K., 1984, Case study research: Design and Methods, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 241 Curriculum Vitae CONTACT INFORMATION Name: WANG Liya, LL.M. Address: Rieterstrasse 11, 8002 Zurich E-mail: [email protected] EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 07/2008 – Current: Harcourt Investment Consulting AG Product Management 07/2004 – 06/2008: HSZ Group (Zurich, Switzerland) Marketing 01/2003 – 12/2003: Beijing Grand Prospect Trading Ltd. (Beijing, China) Assistant CEO, Researcher 01/2002 – 04/2002: Commercial Court, Futian District of Shenzhen (Shenzhen, China) Clerk, Legal Enforcement and Consulting 07/1999 – 09/1999: Intellectual Property Court, Haidian District of Beijing (Beijing, China) Clerk, Legal Enforcement and Consulting EDUCATION 242 10/2003 – 06/2009: University of St. Gallen (St. Gallen, Switzerland) Candidate of Ph.D. in Economics and Management Asia Research Center Ex-Vice President of Chinesischer Studentenverein HSG (Student Union) 10/2002 – 08/2003: Utrecht University (Utrecht, the Netherlands) LL.M. in Law and Economics, DELTA Scholarship Thesis: The Consequence of Network Economy for Competition and Competition Policy 09/1998 – 07/2002: Changchun University of Science and Technology (Changchun, China) LL.B. in Economic Law with High Honor, First-class Scholarships Thesis: E-Business and Law “Outstanding Graduate in Jilin Province” Award; “Outstanding Leadership” Award and etc. Second Prize in the “National College Student English Contest” LANGUAGE SKILLS Chinese: Native 243 English: Fluent German: Good CERTIFICATES Microsoft Certificates: MCP, MCP+I, MCSE, MCDBA IELTS; TEM 8 (Test of English Major Band 8); Band 6 English Test 244