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The Political Ecology of
War and Resource
Exploitation
PHILIPPE LEBILLON
£j
bOdiedas a "girl's best friend" by Marilyn Monroe,
diamonds have recently reappeared in the media in
the guise of a "guerrilla's best friend:" precious stones
financing armed groups responsible for tens of thousands of
deaths in Angola, DR Congo, or Sierra Leone.! These
so-called "conflict" or "blood" diamonds have come to symbolize the "heart of the matter" in the "heart of darkness:" the
chief prize of greedy warlords rampaging a lost continent.
The financial role of diamonds in several contemporary
wars is not unique. Other extractive resources traded on the
international market, such as oil, timber or coltan, have also
earned the appellation of "conflict resources" for their role in
sustaining the predatory economic behaviour and violence of
many repressive governments and armed groupa- Nor is this
role a recent phenomenon: natural resources "have been used
in the past, and will be used in the future, as tools or targets of
war and as strategic goals to be fought for."3 This current role
is itself embedded in and, in many instances, prolongs the violent historical trajectory of defining and extracting
"resources" such as slaves, rubber, or oil. What is recent is a
post-Cold War context in which declining foreign sponsorship
turn belligerents towards commercial and criminal sources of
revenue, an international trade environment facilitating connections between local resources and global markets and the
need for conflict analysts to fill a supposedly ideological vacuum with alternative sources of motivations for belligerents,
such as "greed"or "ethnic hatred."4
Relocating the idea of "strategic resources" of the Cold
War heydays into the contemporary setting of civil wars in
Third World countries, the concept of "conflict resources"
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70, Spring 2003
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nevertheless deserves attention. Conflict resources do reflect
upon the pattern of underdevelopment and violence affecting
many countries in the global South. They also reflect on the
nature of globalization and the reality of a liberalized international trade. In a dramatic showcase, "blood diamonds"
demonstrate the ugly face of an economically "liberal" and
political "neutral" trade linking killing fields to shopping
malls. The concept of conflict resources also tells us about
how "we" in the developed world come to see and understand the political economies of these remote places, and how
"our" regulation of international trade could prove to help
"them."
This paper analyzes the political ecology of war, focusing
on the ways in which the political economy, geography and
materiality of resources can influence the incidence and
course of war. Following an overview of arguments linking
natural resources to armed conflicts, the paper discusses the
role of extractive companies-often portrayed as the main
intermediaries linking, through resource and financial flows,
the killing fields to the shopping malls. The final section
argues that in the context of globalization, economic deregulation requires political regulation because political accountability is the first victim of deregulated trade in primary
commodities, with occasionally dramatic consequences for
populations in producing countries.
Natural Resources, Developmental Paths, and Armed
ConOicts The recent literature on resources and armed conflicts has argued that the availability of a resource and the
level of dependence upon it-understood as the large economic and political significance of a natural resource in
exporting and importing countries-have potential consequences in the causes of conflicts at the domestic and/or international leve1.5 In terms of resource availability, with
resources often described as "abundant" or "scarce," political
scientists like Thomas Homer-Dixon have emphasized environmental scarcity as an underlying cause of armed conflicts
through "social frictions" and "adaptation failure."6 Yet
empirical evidence from a limited number of recent conflicts
points out that war is more likely to be associated with
resource abundance rather than scarcity? This finding com60
leBiUonlEcology
of War
plements the literature on the political economy of resourcerich states, which argues that a rich endowment of extractive
resources such as oil and minerals appears more as a curse
than a blessing in terms of economic growth and development.s The two concepts of abundance and scarcity are,
however, largely relative, and to some extent only the terminology separates these two views. Political scientist RomerDixon, for example, has integrated "structural scarcity" into
his model-the political economy of a resource can make it
abundant for the most powerful groups and scarce for the
marginalized ones-and shifted his writing away from environmental factors to social "ingenuity" ones. The limits of the
concepts of abundance and scarcity point to the importance of
dependence and its management as factors in conflicts.
Building on studies of the economic functions of violence
and the economic agendas of "warlords," economists Paul
Collier and Anke Hoeffler identified primary commodity
dependence as "the most powerful risk factor" of civil war in
their search to devise which of "greed" or "grievances" was
the chief motivation of rebellion.? They first interpreted this
result as evidence that civil war resulted from greed over
valuable and plentiful resources, rather than grievances over
scarce resources. While Collier and Hoeffler recently revised
their argument and placed natural resources as a contextual
"opportunity" for rebellion rather than a primarily motivational factor, the "greed factor" is not the only one linking
natural resources to violent forms of conflicts and appropriation. Despite a diversity of populations, cultures, and political
systems, many resource-dependent countries share similar
difficulties-induding
poor economic growth, high inequalities, and political authoritarianism-all
factors of grievances.
In the light of the prominence of resource dependence as a
characteristic of conflict-ridden countries, both greed and
grievances need to be acknowledged; as does the influence of
resource dependence on the vulnerability of institutional
arrangements and the conflictuality of power politics.
The exploitation of abundant natural resources has long
been presented in mainstream development discourse as a positive factor, or even a driving force, not only in providing
greater material wealth but also in building greater political
consensus. Whether in the imagery of "benevolent colonial61
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ism" or postcolonial development, much hope was once placed
in extractive sectors to "lift" countries in the South from their
"underdevelopment." Incorporation into Northern-dominated
trade would have the potential to assist poor countries in
developing economically, and therefore to contribute to their
political stability and security. In a modernizationist argument,
poor countries short of financial capital to mobilize their surplus labour and provide public services would find the springboard of their economic development in the commodification
of nature.i? After decades of often-predatory colonialism,
international agencies and local governments engaged in massive projects of resource development, nationalization of
resource sectors, or international producer organizations aiming for the capture of larger resource rents.it The restructuring
of the oil sector for the benefit of producing countries, through
massive nationalizations and the creation of the Organisation
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and its consequences for the global economy provide the most striking and
enduring example.J2
The prevalence of cases of economic collapse and poor
governance among resource-rich countries, and cases such as
Angola, Congo/Zaire, or Peru in which the wealth of their
natural endowment so sharply contrasts with the misery of
their populations, have much discredited this modernizationist resource-based development paradigm.i- Radical political
economists have continued to argue that this modernist
developmental discourse has been constructed and motivated by the vested economic and power interests of the colonial
and postcolonial ruling class and inherently biased leads to
uneven empowerment,
injustice, and environmental
bankruptcy.t- Building on the contrasting rapid growth of
resource-poor countries in Northeast Asia, the pattern of economic and political "underdevelopment"
affecting most
resource-dependent countries has given rise to the concept of
"resource curse" or "paradox of plenty." In turn, the political
and economic pattern of "underdevelopment" increases both
the vulnerability to and risk of conflicts.
Development economists understand this "paradox of
plenty" as the result of inflation associated with a lack of supply in non-resource sectors, currency overvaluation due to
larger foreign earnings, high exposure to price shocks, or a
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shrinkage of the manufacturing sector and the loss of production externalities due to a concentration of investment
and talent into the resource sector.i> In Rwanda, the dependence of the ruling elite and many farmers on coffee exports
was identified as a defining structural factor in the weakening
of the state and the radicalization of exclusionary politics by
Hutu extremists of President Habyarimana's regime into the
mass murder of Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians.to The
decline in coffee prices from the mid-1980s, with earnings
falling from US$144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 1993,
increased hardship among farmers and strained state finances
as well as the interests of many among the elite.i? The massacre in Burundi of tens of thousands of Hutus by the Tutsidominated army in 1972 after a long period of stable coffee
prices demonstrates, however, the limits of such analysis.
Economic policy instruments in resource-rich countries
are also intensely politicized and oriented towards rent-seeking by certain elites, rather than towards economic liberalization favouring growth.tf The availability of the resource rent
is also frequently associated with the corruption of state institutions, high economic inefficiency and subsidization of
politicized schemes, as well as budgetary mismanagement.i?
Over-optimistic resource revenue forecast and the use of
future revenues as collateral for loans has led to high levels of
debts difficult to reimburse, not only in case of resource price
fall, but also due to outright embezzlement and the allocation
of public revenues to unproductive activities.w Oil-rich
Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria or Venezuela present typical
cases)l Finally, resource-rich states tend to spend more on
defence, which reduces productive investments, often
because of corruption opportunities or the threat of a
resource grab by domestic or foreign competitors.v The oilrich Persian Gulf and more recently the Caspian region are
typical examples.zs
As with the economy, political institutions often become
"resource dependent." In her study of petro-states, political
scientist Terry Karl argues that "dependence on a particular
export commodity shapes not only social classes and regime
types ... but also the very institutions of the state, the framework for decision-making, and the decision calculus of policy
makers."24 Studies of oil- and mineral-rich countries demon-
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strate that regimes tend to be more corrupt, ineffective, prioritize military expenditures, and more authoritarian than
otherwise, thereby implying a causality factor between the
context of resource dependence and these characteristicsz>
While authoritarianism is more prone to civil war than strong
democracies but less so than weak democracies, the fact that
resource-dependent states are more inept than others at
avoiding conflicts and becoming violent would thus indicate
that their forms of authoritarianism
are vulnerable.se
Although political stability can result from the economic
boom and increased patronage of rulers during periods of
resource revenue windfall, such increased dependence may
nevertheless weaken state capacities as states do not have to
rely on broad-based taxation, and population and elites place
unsustainable expectations on state-controlled
resource
rents. A tight economic and political control by the ruling
elite of a resource sector dominating an otherwise poor economy leaves little scope for accumulating wealth and status
outside state patronage, especially in the case of mineral and
oil exporters. As the wealth and power gap between the ruling and the ruled increases, so does the frustration of
marginalized groups seeing political change as the only
avenue for satisfying their greed and aspirations, or expressing their grievances. In the absence of widespread political
consensus-which cannot be maintained solely through a distribution of rents and repression-violence
becomes for
these groups the main, if not only route to wealth and power.
Resource-dependent countries thus tend to have predatory
governments serving sectional interests and face a greater
risk of warP The vulnerability to rebellion of states such as
Congo/Zaire, Liberia, or Sierra Leone can be seen in that
light: countries where resources rents eroded by depletion,
mismanagement, or falling prices remained dangerously at
the core of political institutions.
Politically, resource rents provide rulers with a classic
means for staying in power by establishing a regime organized through a system of patronage rewarding followers and
punishing opponents.28 Regimes in resource-rich states can
divest themselves of the need for popular legitimacy by eliminating the need for broad-based taxation of a diversified formal economy, financing a repressive security apparatus, and
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of War
rewarding a network of political supporters. Although a large
state-controlled resource rent is neither necessary nor sufficient, it greatly facilitates such forms of political rule. While
not dismissing the control of other revenues by single-party
regimes or the role of ideologically aligned foreign aid,
resource rents assisted long-lasting rulers, such as Abacha in
Nigeria or Suharto in Indonesia. In Congo/Zaire in the early
1980s, the nationalized copper and cobalt mining parastatal
Gecamines provided 51 percent of the total revenues of the
state. Along with other "public" resources, it participated in
President Mobutu's strategy of patronage that included some
of the 43 government reshuffles he oversaw between 1965
and 1990.29
Even in the case of relatively benevolent, rather than
predatory regimes, resource dependence leads to disproportionate reliance on the fiscal transfer of resource rents at the
expense of statecraft.w Windfall rents may allow rulers to
extend this clientelist circle to the general population-as in
many oil rich microstates such as Brunei or Gulf emiratesestablishing a skewed impression of popular political legitimacy. Such an economic contract between a population and
its rulers can become overstretched or give further ground
for dissent. Benevolent governments coming under pressure
from contests for resource rents often trade off coherent economic policies maximizing long-term welfare against the
management of social tension.u This trade-off results in inefficient investment and low growth, which, if the resource rent
proves insufficient to dampen conflictual demands for
reform, increases both the vulnerability of the state and social
tensions while lowering the opportunity cost of joining criminal gangs or insurgent groups. This is especially the case
when there is significant disjuncture between popular aspirations and available means, as well as between the ideology of
the regime, its actual practices, and the compromises necessary to maintain resource flowing. In Saudi Arabia, the oil
rent and un diversifying economy did not keep pace with rising population size and aspirations, resulting in a significant
decline of the per capita income and growing inequalities
between the extended Royal family and the general population. Unsurprisingly, such situation and the oil-related presence of US troops on the "Holy Soil" of the Arabian
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Peninsula led to criticisms and were used by Osama Bin
Laden to justify terrorism.v
Finally, profitable resource sectors also provide little
incentive for rulers to develop a diversified economy that
could give rise to alternative sources of economic power
strengthening political competitors. Besides the economic
risk of "staple trap," resource dependence would thus have
a backward political linkage. The risk of domestic political
competition can be further curtailed by devolving the
exploitation of the resource sector to foreign firms; a measure that also offers the advantage of satisfying international financial institutions and consolidating external political
support, including through "private" diplomacy driven by
business interests.P A large part of the population or informal business groups who are lightly taxed, or not taxed, are
likely to be less concerned by a government's lack of
accountability and legitimacy than heavily taxed ones, and
therefore less motivated to promote gradual political
changes and hold their government more accountable.
Rulers can benefit through a tolerance or instrumentalization of corruption and the informalization of most of the
economy. An alternative "organic social contract" can thus
emerge between the population and its so-called "rulers"
whereby the informal character of most of the economy
allowing the survival of the population matches the plunder
of state-controlled resources by the elite. Such was the
arrangement under Mobutu, when he urged his citizens to
fend for themselves and to "steal a little in a nice way" without aiming to become rich overnight or to transfer funds
overseas, while keeping to himself and a coterie of generals
and cronies the spoils of the industrialized mineral sectors.v
The
characteristics and vulnerabilities of resource-dependent
states would be sufficient to explain why conflicts are more
likely,but the mobilization of organized violence rarely simply
results from economic and social grievances. Several poor
resource-dependent countries such as Botswana did not experience armed conflicts over the last two decades, and most
poor countries are economically dependent upon primary sectors, thereby conflating poverty and resource dependence. The
Power, Violence and the Political Ecology of Resources
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political economy perspective presented above (emphasizing
the historical relations of resource dependence and polities
and a sociocultural approach linking the wealth of resources
and the behaviour of colluding predatory elite in the South
and the North) needs to be complemented by a critical perspective upon the processes through which violence itself
becomes linked to nature and its commodification. It also
needs to incorporate the role of resources themselves through
their material and geographic characteristics. To caricature,
resources need to be given agency.
In the process of becoming a resource and a commodity,
nature acquires the power of money. But nature itself and the
process of commodification also provide contested spaces
resisting a homogeneous construction of power. By creating
opportunities for alternative modes of violent appropriation
or "looting," nature enters the social realm as resources. What
is described here as the "political ecology of conflict
resources" relates to the materiality of resources as well as
the territorialization and political economy of their exploitation to the unfolding of war. Nature alone does not predetermine war. As anthropologist Paul Richards noted on the case
of violence and endowment in diamonds in Sierra Leone:
Violence is a social project-it has to be organized or opposed,
accepted or rejected, by groups of human agents ... Environments
select among social projects, like their select for genes, but they no
more cause social life than they cause genes. A resource endowment is a circumstance, and not a social project.s>
The role that nature plays as an endowment remains the
choice of individuals made within the context of an historical
trajectory of cultural politics and in particular the material
and symbolic dimensions of violence.w Among social projects
enabling the commodification of nature for the benefit of belligerents are profit-making business ventures usually defining
their role as that of "neutral" economic agents, and limiting
their political intervention to the protection of their most
immediate corporate interests. Under both internal and
external pressure, this stand is increasingly being challenged.
Yet while the self-regulation of some major western corporations may address the reputation concerns of their share-
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holders, a globalizing economy without political accountability has already long demonstrated its tragic impact. In short,
globalization requires new forms of political regulation linking consumption to the broadly defined security needs of
populations in producer countries. Such regulation must not
only address the opportunistic behaviour of war profiteers,
but also the profound sense of grievance resulting from misery in the midst of plenty.
The commodification of nature into tradable natural
resources through a capitalist system generally entails a system of spatial, legal and economic enclosures that are deeply
uneven in their (re )distribution of economic benefits and
social power.s? Using a dependency framework, geographer
Stuart Corbridge argues that "development in the core, and
underdevelopment in the periphery, are two sides of the same
global capitalist coin. Metropolitan capitalism depends on the
exploitation and active underdevelopment of an already capitalist periphery."38 In his detailed study of underdevelopment
in the Amazon region, Bunker argues that extractive systems
"ultimately depend on processes that progressively decelerate
the economy, disrupt the ecosystem, and simplify social organization in extractive regions."39 Because they develop few
"linkages" within the regional political economy, while depleting the resources upon which it rests, Bunker characterized
such extractive regions as "extreme peripheries" doomed to
economic and social failure. Bunker's study seems to be perfectly illustrated by such apparently "extreme peripheries" as
the killing and mining fields of Angola or Sierra Leone portrayed by the media. Yet, beyond explanations of state failure
due to corruption, self-interest and conflicts within and
between governmental agencies offered by Bunker also lies
the specificity of conflicts and violence associated with the
extractive sector.
Although the transformation of nature into tradable commodities can be peaceful and consensual, ownership and loss of
livelihoods due to forced displacement, land use or user rights
changes, pollution, as well as resource-driven migration are all
potential sources of conflicts. The conflicts over oil exploitation
in the Niger Delta, for example, include oil spills and flaring,
lack of employment and public services, forced displacement,
fire and explosion hazards, brutal repression and extra-judicial
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killings.w These conflicts often go well beyond the local setting
and increasingly involve global networks.s! The pattern of
social relations, the quality and legitimacy of institutions, as
well as the nature of the resource extraction are involved in
shaping the formation and arbitration of the conflict as well as
the potential use of violence.
Whether physical or structural, violence is frequently
involved in resource exploitation in the form of resource
appropriation, price manipulation, forced labour or population displacement, as well as a militarization of both licit and
illicit exploitation schemes. In many developing countries,
this violence is rooted in the pattern of resource extraction
successively translated by mercantilism, colonial capitalism,
and state kleptocracy that articulate networks of local elites,
transborder commercial agents, and global markets. As
Harvey notes, "productive inequalities become naturalized
through cultural understandings of social hierarchy that
encourage popular consent .... [and] struggles over symbolic
processes are themselves conflicts over material relations of
production, the distribution of resources in society, and ultimately power."42It is in this way that a violent and contested
history of resource extraction and the persistence of resource
dependence can increase the risk of war by sustaining conflicts, affect the pattern of their arbitration, and routinize the
use of violence in social relations.
With extracted resources, violence is most likely to take a
physical form to achieve territorial control and safety. New
ownership and user rights over resources have often been
violently imposed on local communities. Forest resources are
widely disputed and new rules imposed violently by state
forestry or environmental agencies for logging or conservation purposes.P In many of the areas affected by resourcelinked war, there is often a long-established pattern of violent
resource control.
This was the case in the diamonds fields of Congo/Zaire
prior to the conflicts of the late 1990s.During the 1970s,the
paramilitary force of the diamonds state company MIBA
routinely executed clandestine diggers authorized by customary authorities and local police.s- The liberalization of the
diamonds sector in 1982 vastly increased the number of operators and networks of private political and military protec69
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tion, resulting in both greater economic opportunities and use
of violence as well as an erosion of predatory state control
welcomed by the popularion.s> Local communities in politically disputed areas are often seen as a threat, not only on
production sites but along transport routes. Pipelines in particular have a history of violence; in Burma with a gas
pipeline passing through ethnic minority areas, or in
Indonesia for gas exploitation in Aceh and gold and copper
extraction in West Papua. In Colombia, British Petroleum has
been accused of supporting a military unit renowned for its
murder of civilians for the sake of protecting an oil pipeline
threatened by rebels.se Distrustful of local populations
because of potential support for separatist armed movements, the Sudanese army and its local allies have killed or
driven people out of oil areas in Southern Sudan after
Canadian oil company Talisman and others engaged in oil
fields development and pipeline construction in the late
1990s.Abandoned in the early 1980s by Chevron following
attacks by southern insurgent movement SLPA, the oil areas
have been the object of a military campaign of "pacification"
involving the forced displacement of local populations,
including aerial bombardment and helicopter-gunship
attacks, as well as combat between anti- and pro-government
militias.s?
With produced resources such as cash crops, and more
generally labour-intensive resource sectors, violence usually
takes a more structural form, such as coercive forms of labour
or controls over trade. Slavery is still practiced notably on
agricultural plantations in Western Africa, mostly in the form
of forced labour in which servitude is linked with debt repayments.ss The control or manipulation of prices at the farm
gate, through state-controlled marketing boards or cartels, as
well as conditions of access to resources can result in structural forms of violence such as poverty and marginalization.
Like physical violence, such structural violence may have secondary effects involving armed conflict as an alternative to
other expressions of grievances and everyday forms of lowkey resistance such as pilfering.s? In Chiapas, the rebellion by
self-defense groups and the Zapatista movement staged a relatively peaceful "armed rebellion" to respond to the structural violence of a local political economy of dispossession
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and neglect towards indigenous communities, challenge the
"global neoliberal order" which supported it, and attract the
attention of the government and medias to improve their bargaining position.v
Not all resource exploitation will be conflictual and not all
conflicts will result in large-scale violence. To some extent, the
likelihood and viability of war will also depend upon the
opportunities presented by the "lootability" of natural
resources. Arguably, belligerents intent on financing or profiteering from war will loot and trade whatever they can. With
the sharp drop in foreign military assistance to many governments and rebel groups resulting from the end of the Cold
War, belligerents have become more dependent upon private
sources of support to sustain their military and political activities. Although domestic and foreign state budgets continue to
support armed conflict expenditures, major sources of funding
include available natural resources, as well as protection rackets, diversion of relief aid, or Diaspora remittances.u
Yet, it does not simply happen that natural resources often
constitute the most valuable and available source of finance
and reward. As sociologist David Keen remarks, economically motivated violence among rebels is more likely when the
potential rewards are great and "can be exploited with minimal technology and without the need to control the capital or
machinery of the state."52 Natural resources are specifically
prone to looting because of their fixed location, often in
remote areas, and the often-minimal bureaucratic infrastructure needed to tax them. Unlike manufacturing and to some
extent agriculture, extractive activities cannot be relocated.
Although extractive businesses may decide not to invest or to
disengage from their current operations, they generally sustain their access to resources and protect their investments by
paying "whoever is in power" -ranging from a few dollars to
let a truck pass a checkpoint, to multimillion dollars concession signature bonuses paid to belligerents. Moreover, some
resources can be extracted in wartime, even after the destruction of most infrastructures. While this is not the case for
mechanized and capital-intensive
mining projects-few
investors will rush to rebuild a multimillion dollar plant soon
after its destruction-some
resources such as timber and high
value alluvial minerals like diamonds or colt an can be
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extracted with minimal investments and traded without the
need for massive transport capacities.
Actual looting and involvement in trading are not necessarily needed to provide a source of finance and support to a
rebellion. Armed groups can simply extract protection rents,
motivating payments through threats of violence, destruction
of equipment, or murders. Both the ELN in Colombia and
the Renamo in Mozambique have been able to extract protection rents from companies by threatening or blowing up
their pipelines. In forested areas affected by insurgency, many
armed groups collect fees from venturing logging companies.
In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge established a set of monthly
fees for logging companies to pay in order to operate a chainsaw,a truck, or a sawmill in areas they controlled, even if only
sporadically. Loggers often provided goods, and in particular
rice, instead of cash payments. Such sources of support were
crucial to the viability of small guerrilla groups far from their
bases. Similarly, government soldiers and authorities collected fees from the same loggers, thereby giving them an incentive to authorize logging in Khmer Rouge controlled forest
areas. Kidnappings are also a major source of financing which
does not requires looting as such. The staff of resource businesses is particularly exposed because operations in remote
areas are often weakly controlled by the government; hence
the use of bodyguards and the private militarization of
resource projects.
External parties such as businesses or regional powers have
also invested in rebel factions in advance of actual looting
with the hope that that they could control resource areas.
From late 1996, foreign companies supported the Rwandan
and Ugandan-backed Alliance des Forces Democratiques
pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL) as it gained control of
eastern Congo/Zaire (including key mining sites). Its leader,
Laurent Kabila, reportedly earned an estimated US$300million in contracts over future concession and by renegotiating
those signed with Mobutu.f In Sierra Leone, future control of
diamonds was amongst the motivations of Charles Taylor to
provide military assistance to the RUE Signature bonuses,
front payments, and loans collateralized with future resource
outputs are several ways to rapidly raise incomes, even in
relatively uncertain political and military conditions.
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Furthermore, it is not unusual for businesses to pay both sides
when the final outcome is not yet sure, as oil company Elf
Aquitaine allegedly did in Angola by paying both UNITA and
MPLA in the pre-electoral period in 1991.54 Using private
brokers and international banks, the Angolan government
was also able to secure oil-collaterized loans mortgaging up to
seven years of government share in future oil productions.
Such sources of finance linked to future resource incomes
allowed it to finance massive arms purchases and contract private military companies such as Executive Outcomes or
International Defense and Security, which were later granted
shares in oil or diamonds concessions.55 Such front payments
can command bargain prices and hefty commissions for brokers, but constitute speculative and highly risky investments.
Over the last five years, many companies including
Zimbabwean parastatal interests have lost their investments
in DRC.56
The lootable character of a resource is also clearly related
to lack of effectiveness in securing it. On one hand, underpaid
soldiers and officers with poor logistical support tend to provide weak security for resource exploitation sites, while a lack
of respect, low status, and absence of trust with local communities and businesses can compound the problem. Companies
and central government attempt to increase security by hiring
private military companies, or mercenaries, for the protection
of economic assets. On the other hand, manpower, trucks,
communication, and firearms can provide a "competitive
advantage" to a class of military entrepreneurs with or without the support of the central government. In both cases, the
commercialization of war starts with the commercialization of
the security apparatus, through the privatization of protection
or the organization of commercial ventures by military units.
Lootability is not limited to poor countries, but can reflect
interstate military imbalance, as demonstrated by the invasion
of Kuwait by Iraq, and the subsequent US-led Gulf War in
1991.While Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait can be seen
in the light of looting as he sought a new source of revenues
after his costly war against Iran, the US was not engaged in
"looting" during the Gulf War but in preventing Iraq from
controlling and threatening other oil sources in the Gulf, a crucial matter for its economy.
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While such security context is generally propitious to
rebellion or a militarization of resource sectors, opportunities
for armed groups also depend upon the specific locations,
concentration, and nature of the resources. 57 The geography
of resources plays a crucial role in shaping these networks
and therefore conflicts through the production of territories
linking resource location-in
both spatial and political
terms-with the practices of their exploitation in a condition
of armed conflict. In short, the greater the distance, difficulty
of access, or political dissent from the centre of power, the
greater the cost of control and the higher the risk of losing the
resource to an opponent group. Pure geographic distance, is,
of course, not a determining factor in itself, as one needs to
consider the technological and political "tools" of control that
have allowed distant actors such as colonial powers or
multinationals to gain such access to resources and to consolidate it.58 Furthermore, the concentration of resources, in
both territorial and organizational terms, will influence the
lootability of a resource. In Angola, if the rebel group
UNITA wanted to control offshore oil, it had to control the
state and gain the recognition of petroleum companies.
UNITA could not even inflict major damages to the oil revenue of the government, as the overwhelming majority of
the oil fields were offshore. Similarly, if the government
wanted to control diamonds, it had to secure a monopoly of
access over a vast territory. Even though the major mines
are concentrated in the northeast, alluvial diamonds can be
found in many riverbeds over a huge territory covered by
bush and facilitating guerrilla activities and are accessible to
a large number of firms and even small groups of
garimpeiros-freelance diggers. 59 Although diffuse by geography and mode of production, the tight control exercized
by UNITA over garimpeiros and mines in some regions is
such that diamonds can also be considered as a point
resource with regard to the concentration of profits. If diamonds had been found only in Kimberlite pipes, as in
Botswana, or on the seabed along the coast, as in Namibiaboth of which requiring investments-access
to diamonds
by UNITA would have been complicated, not to say impossible. Different resources located in different places thus
present different opportunities to belligerents.
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leBiUonlEcology
of War
The materiality-physical
characteristics-of resources in
association with their exploitation and marketing characteristics also intervene. Coffee and cocoa are diffuse resources that
can be easily looted, but are bulky, of low value, and require a
large workforce. As such, while initial stocks have offered significant loot for rebels in both Congo/Zaire and Sierra Leone,
the lack of manpower due to population displacement has
greatly diminished their role as a sustainable source of funds.
Alluvial diamonds are a diffuse resource that can be exploited at a variety of scales-from small teams operating over a
24-hour period through a single pit to groups of several thousands operating over several months. Highly valuable, remotely located, and easily mined through artisanal means when
found in alluvial deposits, diamonds are a "resource of choice"
for rebels. Small, light, easily concealable, as well as anonymous and internationally tradable, diamonds are also a "currency of choice" for money laundering and financing clandestine activities, including those of Islamic terrorist groups such
as Bin Laden's al Oaeda.w Oil is a concentrated resource due
to its mode of control and requires large-scale investments. As
such, it is most likely an opportunity for governments, except
as mentioned earlier through racket and futures contracts,
provided to rebels. Timber is a bulky and diffuse resource of
medium value, but logging can be mechanized and requires little workforce and time for exploitation if roads or rivers are
accessible. Furthermore, forests offer a favourable terrain to
guerrilla movements. As such, and because of its relatively
common occurrence, timber is the natural resource most frequently involved in war economies.
Cutting the Links Between Killing Fields and Shopping Malls
Responsibility for conflicts and abuses lies first and foremost
in the hands of the perpetrators: warring parties, yet businesses and consumers are not neutral economic actors and
their influence is particularly significant for producer countries facing chronic political instability and armed conflicts.e!
While war is overwhelmingly bad for most businessesbecause of the high uncertainty and insecurity putting at risk
investment, staff, production, and trading-some
maintain
viable economic enclaves (e.g., offshore oil industry or militarily protected mines). In Angola, the US oil company Gulf
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Studies inPolitical Economy
Oil (now Chevron) thrived during 14 years of war of independence and 26 years of civil war. While much attention has
been devoted to major transnational corporations in conflicts
affecting resource-dependent countries, little attention has
been devoted to risk-taking entrepreneurs, networks of brokers, and criminal outfits thriving by linking war zones to
international markets. Tens of thousands of Congolese diamond diggers and traders flocked to wartorn Angola in
search of diamonds, despite widespread dangers such as rape,
beatings, landmines, and summary executions. Previously
working under UNITA, many now work under the control of
the government or rogue army generals.e- Whether siding
with the government or the rebel, or straddling all parties for
the sake of profit opportunities, the self-described "neutrality" of businesses can arguably be seen as complicity.
The potential spectrum of business involvement in war is
broad, from directly encouraging belligerence for the purposes of business to the loss of investment, and even staff, as a
result of war. In some cases, entanglement can simply be the
unintended consequence of doing business in a predatory
environment where violence is an accepted part of business
practice. Given that direct complicity only requires intentional participation with knowledge of foreseeable harmful
effects-and
not any intention to do harm-all businesses
willingly associated with war criminals in the form of taxes or
business deals are therefore complicit. Cases of indirect complicity is the unintentional participation in acts committed by
someone else without knowledge but with benefits accruing
to the businesses-as with the pre-emptive military eviction
of potential rebels supported along a pipeline. Finally, silent
complicity fails influencing the principal offenders, even if
this does not accrue benefits.O
Naturalizing the ethical problems they face, resource businessmen such as oilman and now US vice-President Dick
Cheney have argued that "the good Lord didn't see fit to put
oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments" and have as such to continue engaging with some of
the world's worst political environments.s- Besides the frequent historical relation between resources development and
political instability in the first place, however, the successful
management of political risks of war, political instability, or
76
leBillonlEcology of War
international sanctions can provide businesses with a significant competitive advantage. Within the development of the
oil industry itself, as Waelde noted, "At the beginning of most
corporate or individual successes ... was usually some bold,
rarely very ethical, exploitation of commercial opportunities
blocked to competitors by politics."65Support to belligerents
at an early stage of a conflict can provide concession bargains
or future political favours. Shell, for example, is already in
contact with separatist groups in West Papua, currently under
Indonesian rule. In its search for old-growth forests, logging
businesses cut deals with belligerents. In Cambodia, Thai and
regional businesses engaged with both the Khmer Rouge
rebels and corrupt government officials to export hundreds
of millions of dollars worth of tropical timber.66 Similarly in
Burma, Thai logging companies engaged with the
SPDClSLORC regime to export timber from insurgent areas.
Attracted by opportunities of "quick bucks" or "speculative
market positioning" some businesspeople are ready to
engage with illegitimate authorities, including war criminals.
Conflict-affected countries thus constitute a "niche market"
in which risk taking and often-unscrupulous businesses can
thrive.
Because of its own history of resource development and
specialized financial markets, Canada is home to a large number of extractive companies. Many of these are small or middle-size "junior companies" (in contrast to multinational
"majors") willing to take greater risks to venture into difficult
markets because of political instability or reputation costs.
War-affected countries constitute a "niche market" for many
of these companies, especially if they integrate security components into their activities. Canadian junior company
DiamondsWorks, for example, enjoyed close links with private military companies. such as Executive Outcomes for its
work in Angola and Sierra Leone. Similarly,Heritage Oil was
reportedly awarded a contract in relation to the military
activities of Executive Outcomes.e? Most recently, Canadian
oil company Talisman has been accused of fuelling the war by
supporting the Sudanese government waging' a war on rebel
movements in the South and motivating the clearing of population around oil fields by military means.s'' In Colombia,
TransCanada and IPL Entreprises have been tarred with the
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Studies in Political Economy
same brush as British Petroleum and other oil companies
accused of financing military death squads active in the protection of the oil pipeline.s?
Private corporations, either domestic or international, need
to assume their political role and to take a moral stand by
demonstrating their "corporate citizenship."7o Yet such positions should not be cynically used by First World companies to
exclude competitors in the Third World; for example by characterizing African diamonds in general as "blood" diamonds,
and those of developed countries (e.g., Australia and Canada)
as "clean" ones. Nor should resources produced by multinationals be systematically considered "peace-prone" and artisanal ones "conflict-prone;" with the risk of undermining local
small-scale producers as happened in Cambodia as a result of
a crackdown on small-scale logging mostly conducted by selfdemobilized soldiers and seasonal migrants.n
Advocacy groups and governmental and intergovernmental agencies increasingly challenge the permissive or cynical
attitude of external private actors. Many local and international Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) campaign
for greater transparency and accountability and investigate
supply-chains linking battlegrounds to shopping malls. In the
diamonds sector, the industry and producer/trader countries
have understood the threat of a boycott resulting from the
"conflict diamonds" campaign, and both acknowledged their
role in fuelling war and engaged into regulating the practices
in the· industry with the assistance of governments and
NGOs.72 Yet once again, the nature of resources, their political economy and even social identity are important.
Diamonds are "sexy" for the media, and loaded with positive
social value such as love, eternity, and purity. Furthermore,
they are dispensable luxury goods, at least for non-industrial
purposes. As such, diamonds constitute a commodity vulnerable to boycott and regulation, even if the physical characteristics of diamonds and the discretion, if not clandestinity,
characterizing the industry are likely to remain in the way of
eradicating "conflict diamonds."
Engaging more broadly with economic agendas and commodities sustaining wars, the United Nations Security
Council is also taking steps to see member states enforce
"smart sanctions," notably by establishing investigative
78
leBiUonlEcology
of War
expert panels and monitoring mechanisms having for prime
responsibility the "naming and shaming" of sanction
busters.T' While initiatives for corporate transparency and
accountability are valuable, they should nevertheless avoid
causing even more deterrence to investments by legitimate
businesses in regions associated with conflicts-such as SubSaharan Africa. Nor should these initiatives be half-measures
leaving a gap for even less scrupulous and accountable businesses to move in. In this regard, a global regulatory framework linking resources flows to political accountability in
both producing and consuming countries is needed. Such
framework can be the result of a number of sector specific
negotiations-as for diamonds-but would be best addressed
through an international agreement on transparency and
accountability in extractive industries.
Although recommendations for the (self)regulation of
businesses in respect to armed conflicts fall outside the scope
of this paper, some major directions can be noted.t- If there
is not, for the moment, any international instrument specifically regulating business activities during war, international
human rights and humanitarian laws as well as the Charter
of the United Nations and resolutions of UN Security
Council (UNSC) provide some foundations and regulatory
instruments. The judicial prosecution of sanction busters and
commercial actors engaging with war criminals is still in its
infancy. Progress in the short term is most likely to come
from national judicial systems in commodity-importing
countries. There have already been some cases in Belgium
involving arms and diamonds dealers with on-going trials."
Human rights activists and victims of human rights abuses
increasingly use extraterritorial jurisdiction over resource
businesses involved in human rights violations, provided, for
example, by the US's Alien Tort Claims Act,76At an international level, the most significant effective instrument measure could come from the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which theoretically applies to businesses dealing financially with terrorists
and war criminals.r? This convention could be applied to
diamond dealers linked to al-Qaeda financing networks.ts
In terms of global jurisdiction, the International Criminal
Court could playa role that has not yet been fully explored.
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Studies in Political Economy
There are obvious difficulties in this regard, starting with the
necessary expansion of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction
and the likely resistance of the US.79 On the international
enforcement side, a critical engagement has come out of the
United Nations following innovative investigative and
reporting work by advocacy NGOs such as UK-based Global
Witness.s' Most notably, sanctions and war economies are
now being monitored through panels of experts that do not
hesitate to name and shame businesses and foreign political
backers.
It has been argued that the voluntary self-regulation of
businesses has many advantages, given some of the apparent
limits, costs, and constraints of a legalist approach. Selfregulation takes mainly the form of business and industrywide codes of conduct such as the "Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights" for the extractive and energy
sectors agreed by the US and UK governments as well as a
number of businesses and NGOS.81 Self-regulation schemes
have the advantage of being internally defined and thus possibly better adapted to local circumstances, but they can be
limited in scope-generally
concentrating on core business
activities- and lack external accountability through independent auditing. Given the paramount and necessary importance of profitability in the conduct of business, "voluntary"
approaches in fact often find their roots in the normative
pressure imposed upon businesses by evolving international
ethical norms and rights as well as the "reputation" impact of
advocacy work and media information on consumer and
investor choices. As mentioned above, the recent flurry of
"voluntary" initiatives in the diamond sector, for example,
only came about following pressure from advocacy groups
and the UN Security Council. Furthermore, some industries
and many businesspeople are largely insulated from this type
of pressure.
There are further reasons to argue for an international regulatory framework. A weak judicial system, legal vacuum, or
political interests at the highest level in the conflict-affected
country can also limit the effectiveness of domestic regulation.
An international regulatory framework can fill some of this
vacuum, while international mechanisms for accountability can
limit political collusion. Regulations can also have the advan80
leBillonlEcology of War
tage of promoting a level playing field;that is,creating an environment in which legitimate businesses following "pro-peace"
best practices are not at a disadvantage compared with their
less scrupulous competitors. Finally,a constraining "war-time"
regulatory framework can motivate businesses to promote
peace and civil governance to achieve a more favourable regulatory environment. An international regulatory approach
should not preclude self-regulation and pro-active engagement
by businesses, but complement them. Businesses themselves
need to receive clear and early regulatory signals from the
international community, legitimate domestic authorities, and
civil society to assist them in upholding relevant international
law and to contribute to conflict prevention/resolution initiatives as well as economic development. Businesses often stress
confusion resulting from conflicting and unclear rules of social
responsibility.Not only is there a whole array of laws,government expectations, NGO demands, and corporate codes of
conduct, but international businesses are expected to respect
different ones simultaneously.
Beyond the above-mentioned rationale for the international regulation of war economies and business practices,
UN principles on human rights and labour set by international conventions (UN and ILO) already provide some basic
benchmarks for the conduct of business, even in times of
armed conflict. Similarly,the Geneva Conventions have been
ratified by most states and they include articles relevant for
the practices of businesses. Along with the statutes of the
International Criminal Court, these texts provide the legal
basis upon which to judge abuses and crimes. The general
character of these rights would nevertheless require more
precise definitions and norms directly related to business
practices. For the moment, UN Security Council resolutions
are the only international instrument with a capacity to regulate businesses by calling on member States to apply economic sanctions and other measures in the interest of peace
and international security (Chapters VI, VII). Despite being
legally binding for UN member states, the effectiveness of its
resolutions depends on national level legislation and enforcement. The political and economic effectiveness of sanctions
depends on monitoring and implementation. Badly designed
or enforced, sanctions can prove benign for the targetted
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Studies in Political Economy
group or political regime or even counterproductive, leading
to a criminalization of the economy aggravating suffering by
populations, and prolonging conflicts.esRecent initiatives on
those issues include urging all States to make sanction busting by their nationals a criminal offence and the creation of
UN investigation teams. Building on the successful work of
independent panels of experts publicly releasing information
on sanction-busters, there is now a momentum to create a
permanent sanction-monitoring unit under the UNSC, which
would maintain permanent links with international and
national intelligence and policing agencies through
Interpo1.83
Individual governments or regional organizations have
also regulated businesses by passing specific investment or
trading bans; the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) declared an economic embargo against
areas controlled by warlords in Liberia in the early 1990s.84
Such measures aim to increase the leverage of states and
international bodies-often first exercized through aid conditionality-by
directly affecting the private sector.
Mechanisms include, for example, a blanket ban on investment, a ban on official export credit and insurance, or a
penalty surcharge on procurement contracts for companies
investing in targetted countries. Several other regulatory
instruments have also been used in the past. Aid conditionality can exert a certain degree of leverage upon a targetted
country to influence its trade policy or the behaviour of the
private sector, and donors and the IMF in the case of logging
in Cambodia used this instrument repeatedly.s'
Overall, unilateral or regional regulations are politically
demonstrative. Devoid of effective enforcement, their impact
is often limited and may be counterproductive. The increasing
use of economic sanctions led both international and local
NGOs to question their humanitarian impact. Following an
extensive study, the Congolese group POLE argued that
despite the clear links between war and coltan, as well as the
need to stop the illicit economy organized and controlled by
armed groups, "the people of the Kivu would not gain [from
an embargo], but lose one of their very few remaining sources
of income."86To this end, an ideal regulatory framework
should address the dilemma of sustaining the local economy
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leBillonlEcology of War
in the interest of the population while weeding out activities
supporting belligerents. At the same time, "buying-out" belligerents through economic incentives may be a necessary
step towards achieving peace. This challenge thus entails both
economic supervision and wealth sharing.
Like demobilizing soldiers and monitoring elections, attendant to most peace processes, a war economy needs to be
"demobilized" and "monitored" to avoid the resumption of
conflict. Cease-fires and peace agreements offer the opportunity to implement such measures, but they are too frequently
used as mere breathing spaces for military reorganization and
rearmament-as
was the case in Angola, Cambodia,
Colombia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan over the last
decade. Beyond sanctions and global regulatory measures, it
is thus imperative to set up practical regulatory frameworks
depriving belligerents of revenues that allow them to follow a
double agenda of peace transition and rearmament, as happened repeatedly in Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Liberia,
Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Although economic activities,
even illicit ones, can contribute to social peace by increasing
the well being of the population and changing the focus of
groups in conflict, some nevertheless run the risk of fuelling
future tensions.
This economic aspect of peace processes is generally
neglected and too often placed under the initiative of belligerents jockeying for key economic positions within the new
authority or simply embezzling funds to re-arm. As mentioned earlier, Foday Sankoh either ignored the mineral commission he chaired following the Lome agreement, or used its
legitimacy to advance his personal interests and to re-arm the
RUF.87 Similarly, while UNITA handed over to the government the control of its main diamond areas in late 1997, the
rebel movement continued mining and purchasing weapons.
Diamonds will always remain a difficult commodity to
control. But their malign exploitation can at least be limited
through internationally supervised tax collection and budgetary allocation using escrow funds. In such a scheme, populations would benefit from tax transfers to social services,
while the respective administrative and military structures of
belligerents would receive monitored budgetary support to
implement their effective integration into new government
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Studies in Political Economy
structures. Businesses themselves. would be deterred from
operating outside the scheme through a system of incentives,
such as secure legal ownership and deterrents, such as effective sanctions. If successful, and in the absence of alternative
sources of support, opting out of a peace process would
become a prohibitively costly alternative for belligerents.
The "oil for food" program, set up to help implement UN
sanctions against Iraq and lessen their humanitarian impact,
represents an early example of such schemes. Despite being
cumbersome and having achieved only limited results, the
UN expert panel on Liberia has recommended a similar program to prevent the proceeds of the Liberian shipping and
corporate registry from financing arms sanctions-busting.88
The Security Council moved in that direction by calling upon
the government of Liberia to establish transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes over its use of revenues
derived from both its shipping and corporate registry as well
as the timber industry, to demonstrate these are not used for
busting sanctions but for "legitimate social, humanitarian and
development purposes."89
The World Bank also has an indirect oversight role over
the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline
Project intended to prevent conflicts and prioritize the allocation of oil revenues to social sectors.w After nearly three
decades of civil conflicts, negotiations between the northerndominated government and the main southern rebellion in
the mid-1990s made it feasible for oil companies to develop
fields in southern Chad. The oil companies' consortium
viewed the World Bank as the "centrepiece of its risk reduction strategy" by attracting institutional funding as well as
assisting the Chad government in revenue management and
implementing social and environmental programmes.v' To
manage the estimated $1.5 billion in forecasted revenue over
the next 28 years, the Chad parliament put this revenue into
an offshore escrow account, allocated it to social and environmental priority sectors, and submitted it to a public auditing and an oversight committee.vz President Deby, who came
to power through a military coup in 1990,however, used four
million dollars from the oil development "signature bonus" to
purchase weapons, triggering an NGO outcry and leading the
World Bank and the IMF to threaten exclusion from their
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debt relief programme.vvAs "moral guarantor" of the
scheme, the World Bank also established an International
Advisory Group observing the implementation of the project
and making recommendations to both governments.v- There
remains a risk that the oil factor will bring about internal conflicts-a risk already clearly demonstrated in neighbouring
Sudan.
With an ongoing war, rising oil revenues and a viable (if
fraught) peace process, Sudan is a strong candidate for a
supervised wealth-sharing mechanism between the different
parties and the population. The Government of Sudan was
able to attract international investors and companies, in large
part thanks to the 1997 Sudan/Khartoum Peace Agreement
which was boycotted by the rebel Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) but established an effective ceasefire with some southern factions in control of the oil fields
and involved a wealth-sharing accord between the parties
that was incorporated into the 1999 constitution. Military
threats to oil operations have dramatically increased since
some of these southern factions rejoined the SPLA, but the
logic of an agreement on peace- and revenue-sharing persists.
Some government officials have declared that an "oil-sharing
for ceasefire deal makes sense," but SPLAleader John
Garang himself is against sharing oil revenues without a
broader agreement.P> Some SPLA officials even acknowledge that without proper supervision, each party is likely simply to increase its military capacity, resulting in an intensification of the war.96
The key to long-term success, however, is strong democratic control over resource revenues, rather than a weak
external mode of regulation.v? An external supervision
scheme could increase the risk of resumed conflict if the
scheme dampened pressure for democratization by providing
a facade of legitimacy through a partial control of the
resource rents by a few selected civil-society representatives
and foreign advisors.
Conclusion Natural resources have long been a strategic concern for states. Despite rising demand for raw materials and
tensions related to resource access in key areas such as the
Persian Gulf, the fear of shortages in oil or rare minerals that
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drove this concern eased when the Cold War ended and international trade became freer, more flexible and more reliable.
There is a need to continue moving towards negotiated solutions, including resource sharing, conservation measures, and
to avoid renewing a militarized approach. Apparent progress
also has not resolved, and may even have aggravated, several
other strategic issues involving the export of natural
resources.
The first strategic issue relates to the political economy
and governance of resource-dependent countries, many of
which face a similar pattern of growth collapse, corruption,
and delegitimated state authority. Given the importance of
natural resources in the economy and the economic potential
of most developing countries, the issue of translating resource
exploitation into political stability and economic development will remain central in the years to come, often for entire
regions.
The second concerns the scale. and number of economic,
environmental or sociocultural conflicts related to resource
exploitation that increasingly oppose the welfare of local
populations, business interests, the state, and global environmental and human-rights networks.w While most of these
conflicts are either peacefully terminated or are limited to
social protest movements and small-scale skirmishes, in some
cases violent traditions and a radicalization of ideologies
have turned them into full-scale civil wars. Growing opposition to economic and increased demand for raw materials is
likely to increase such adversarial politics and the need for
more effective dialogue.
The last but most pressing issue is the operational and
motivational dependence of armed groups on natural
resource exploitation. Accessible and internationally marketable resources such as diamonds and timber, not to mention drugs, have figured prominently in conflicts in at least 20
countries during the 1990s.Even if "conflict resources" come
under greater regulatory pressure, given the high incidence of
wars in poor countries with few foreign-earning sources, natural resources are likely to remain an economic focus of most
belligerents.
This paper has examined some of the reasons, processes
and possible solutions relating to these issues, with a focus on
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leBillonlEcology
of War
the characteristics and role of "conflict resources" in fuelling
wars. The cases examined here suggest that the vulnerability
of populations and the need for political and economic
accountability in resource management should be taken seriously at both local and international levels.There is no simple
and comprehensive measure that can reduce the prevalence
of conflicts in resource-dependent countries, but several factors can assist in this regard.
The UN Security Council, national governments, business
associations, and advocacy NGOs have been developing an
array of rules, investigation, sanctions, and implementation
measures targetted at specific commodities over the past few
years. These initiatives need support and encouragement.P?
Most noticeably, diamonds have been the target of unprecedented regulatory measures. In the absence of sustained monitoring, however, these efforts will most probably remain
plagued by difficulties inherent in the physical and market
characteristics of the commodity. In other cases, vested commercial and economic interests, as well as the potential
humanitarian impact on the targeted "conflict resource,"
have continued to limit sanctions, with mixed results.
Although isolating the resources that fuel war from international markets is generally necessary, it should remain a
short-term measure that could otherwise prove counterproductive. To sustain the economy of affected countries while
limiting the possibilities of further hostilities, alternative
mechanisms associating targetted sanctions and economic
supervision are required.
Beyond regulating war economies, an array of innovative
policies is also needed to prevent resource-driven conflicts.
International financial mechanisms and trade rules should
give renewed attention to the stabilization of primary commodity prices and continue to open the markets of rich countries to processed commodities from developing countries. A
revolutionary move in this direction would be the inversion
of trade tariffs that long protected and still continue to protect the wealthiest economies. An international trade agreement imposing tariffs on the importation by industrialized
countries of raw materials rather than processed goods could
motivate investors to consider more seriously downstream
processing in resource-dependent
and poor countries.
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Studies in Political Economy
Downstream industrialization, however, has a poor record in
developing countries and the movements in this direction
should be made with especial caution and deliberation.
Ultimately, however, value- adding industries and services
remain the main way out of poverty for Third-World countries.
Since many resource-dependent countries are likely to
remain so over the coming decade, it is imperative to maximize the capture of revenues by resource-exporting countries while strengthening the quality of their governance and
the legitimacy of their institutions. Such a policy would
involve democratization
and improved communication
among different stakeholders as well as respect for human
rights and mechanisms of transparency and accountability
starting at the project level, and extend to final customers to
ensure greater and more diverse leverage.
In this connection, businesses can be both victims and beneficiaries of the "politically sensitive environment" in which
they operate, having to cope with higher risks but possibly
reaping higher profits from the deterrent effect of those risks
on competitors.Iw Left to its own devices, the current process
of economic globalization risks following the colonial tradition of distinguishing between "useful" and "useless" areas in
resource-dependent countries, creating commercially driven
enclaves around the most profitable resource reserves and
ignoring the rest. Sustaining relatively benevolent autocracies
has so far been the principal recipe for securing minimal and
profitable political order, but democratic pressure is challenging this arrangement, sometimes with dramatic consequences after years of predatory regimes. Isolating countries
by branding them as "pariah states" is not a long-term solution either. Reinforcing an exclusionary form of "globalization" barring countries from investments and legitimate trade
will only further promote their re-inclusion in the international arena in the form of illegal immigration and fraud or,
now, "terrorist havens," and condition political instability
through poverty.
This situation has become untenable. Both businesses and
international regulators need to promote an alternative
framework in which trade comes to reinforce governance. If
outside involvement is to succeed in mitigating the economic
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leBillonlEcology of War
vulnerability and dampening effects of resource-dependence
on domestic politics in producing countries, the call of UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan "to unite the powers of markets with the authority of universal ideals" must be heeded.
So far, unfortunately, this call has led only to the creation of
the value-based platform of the "Global Compact," which
essentially demonstrates the relative strength of businesses in
the new mode of engagement by international institutions.
A global regime of governance for resources is thus
required to level the playing field for populations, governments and businesses. To take the example of accountability
in the oil sector: the demand of the local population for full
fiscal transparency is more likely to be conceded by the host
government if it is legally imposed on oil companies by stockexchange regulators and commercially urged by consumers.
Such a global regime entails a custody-chain securing
accountability through a systematically ethical consumption.
Inspiration for such schemes can be found in the Kimberley
certification process on diamonds, the Forest Stewardship
Council certification of "sustainable timber harvesting," or in
the fair trade movements for coffee or garments.tvt The
essential difference in the preambles of the 1947 GATT and
1994 WTO agreements was the inclusion in the later text of
an environmental protection clause based on the principles of
sustainable development and economic level of development. While the social objectives of both agreements refer to
"raising standards of living" and "ensuring full employment,"
one might argue that "trade and economic endeavour"
should also be conducted with a view to increase the safety of
populations from poor governance and violence sustained by
international trade. While WTO may not be the best place to
start reforming the international political economy in favour
of such "human security" agenda, at least it should not stand
in the way.
Notes
1. UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) is a
rebel movement in Angola dating back to the early 1960s,supported by
apartheid South Africa and the USA until the early 1990s.The RUF
(Revolutionary United Front) is a rebel movement in Sierra Leone dating back to the early 1990s,initially supported by the government of
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Burkina
Gberie,
Faso and Charles
Ralph Hazleton,
Taylor in Liberia.
See Ian Smillie, Lansana
The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone,
Diamonds, and Human Security (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada,
2000); "Diamonds
Are a Guerrilla's
Best Friend," Globe and Mail (13
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
90
January 2000).
The term "conflict resource" was first used for diamonds by the advocacy NGO Global Witness. The term "predatory"
refers here to the
unsustainable
appropriation
of economic assets. Coltan is a metal ore
particularly used in the mobile phone industry.
Peter H. Gleick, "Environment
and Security: The Clear Connections,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47/3 (1991), pp. 18-22; see also Ian O.
Lesser, Resources and Strategy: Vital Materials in International Conflicts,
I600-Present Day (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1989); Arthur H. Westing,
(ed.), Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental
Factors in Strategy Policy and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1986).
See for example, Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The Changing
Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt, 2001); Robert D.
Kaplan, "The Coming of Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly (February
1994). For a critique, see the introductory
chapter of Nancy L. Peluso
and Michael Watts, (ed.), Violent Environments (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2001), pp. 3-38.
Resource dependence
is generally defined in terms of percentage
of
total exports or GDP and often benchmarked
at 30 percent.
Thomas Homer-Dixon,
Environment, Scarcity and Violence (Princeton
NJ: Princeton
University
Press, 1999). A critique of Homer-Dixon's
model falls outside
the scope of this paper, see Simon Dalby,
Environmental Security (Minneapolis,
MI: University
of Minnesota
Press, 2002); Nils Petter
Gleditsch,
"Armed
Conflict
and the
Environment:
A Critique of the Literature," Journal of Peace Research
35/3 (1998), pp. 381-400.
Indra de Soysa, "The Resource
Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by
Rapacity or Paucity"," in Mats Berdal and David Malone, (eds), Greed
and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2000) examines all conflicts resulting in over 25 battle-deaths
between 1989 and 1998.
Alan H Gelb, (ed.), Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse (Oxford: Oxford
University
Press, 1989); Richard M. Auty, Sustaining Development in
Mineral Economies: the Resource Curse Thesis (London: Routledge,
1993); Michael L. Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,"
World Politics 51/2 (1999), pp. 297-322.
David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars,
Adelphi
Paper No. 320 (Oxford:
Oxford University
Press, 1998);
William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1998); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance
in Civil War" (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001).
Canada and the US provided examples of success and led to a debate
over staple theory of growth and the risk of staple trap, see Harold A.
Innis, Essays in Canadian Economic History (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1956).
Judith Rees, Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics and Policy
(London: Routledge, 1990).
Jahangir Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC's Windfalls and
Pitfalls (London: LB. Tauris, 1999).
leBiUonlEcology
of War
13. For minerals and oil, see Michael Ross, "Extractive Sectors and the
Poor," Oxfam America Report (New York: Oxfam America, 2001).
Resource dependence is measured as a ratio of resource exports to its
gross domestic product, while standard of living is measured through
the Human Development Index, which combines income data with life
expectancy and education.
14. David Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism (London:
Croom Helm, 1984);Adam Swift, Global Political Ecology: The Crisis in
Economy and Government (London: Pluto Press, 1993); Martin
O'Connor, Is Capitalism Sustainable? Political Economy and the
Politics of Ecology (New York: Guilford Press, 1994).
15. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "Natural Resource
Abundance and Economic Growth," National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 5398 ( 1995).
16. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, (New York:
Columbia University Press).
17. Peter Uvin, "Rwanda: the Social Roots of Genocide," in E. W.Nafziger,
F. Stewart and R. Vayrynen, (eds.), Weak States and Vulnerable
Economies: Humanitarian Emergencies in Developing Countries 2
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
18. Gustav Ranis, "Towards a Model of Development for the Natural
Resources Poor Economy," Discussion Paper 529 (Yale: Yale Economic
Growth Center, Yale University, 1987).
19. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty; Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth.
Corruption is understood as a violation of public duties by private
interests when rules or norms objectively define these two realms. The
violation, however, often has an endogenous character that serves
functions other than simple financial self-interest, such as political
ordering; see Philippe leBillon, "Fuelling War or Buying Peace: The
Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts," Discussion Paper 2001165
(Helsinki: UNU/WIDER, 2001).
20. Many primary commodity prices dropped from the mid 1980safter high
price rises in the 1970s; see, Osmel Manzano and Roberto Rigobon,
"Resource Curse or Debt Overhang?," NBER Working Paper 8390
(Washington DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2001).
21. World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, July 2001, devdata.worldbank.org
22. Ross, Extractive Sectors and the Poor, p. 15.
23. Bjorn Moller, "Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Gulf Region,"
Emirates Occasional Papers. 10 (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center For
Strategic Studies and Research, n.d.).
24. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p. 7.
25. On oil see Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," World
Politics 53 (2001), pp. 325-41.
26. Helen Fein, "More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and
Democracy in the World, 1987," Human Rights Quarterly 17/1 (1995),
pp. 170-191;Patrick M. Regan and Scott Sigmund Gartner, "Threat and
Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship Between Government and
Opposition Violence," Journal of Peace Research 33/3 (1996), pp. 273287. War or 'military intervention' by democracies, such as the US,
against non-democratic states or political groups however is common.
27. War is generally defined as armed conflicts involving more than 25 or
1,000 battle-related deaths.
28. Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: the Political
Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, CA: University of California
91
------------------
----
Studies in Political Economy
Press,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
Berkeley
CA,
1981); Raymond
L. Bryant
and
Michael
J. P.
Pamwell, (eds), Environmental Change in South-East Asia: People,
Politics and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 1996).
Kisangani
N. F. Emizet,
"Zaire
After
Mobutu:
A Case of a
Humanitarian
Emergency," Research for Action 32 (Helsinki: WIDER,
1997).
Karl, The Paradox of Plenty.
Auty, Resource Abundance.
Michael Dobbs, "Inside the Mind of Osama Bin Laden. Strategy Mixes
Long Preparation,
Powerful
Message
Aimed
at Dispossessed,"
Washington Post (20 September 2(01), p.AOI.
William Reno, "Foreign Firms, Natural Resources, and Violent Political
Economies," Social Science Forum, 2000, on-line: http://www.social-sci-
ence-forum.org.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
92
Cited in Emizet, Zaire after Mobutu, p. 35.
Paul Richards, "Are 'Forest Wars' in Africa Resource Conflicts? The
Case of Sierra Leone," in Peluso, N.L. and M. Watts, (eds.), Violent
Environments (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 65-6.
Nancy L. Peluso and Emily Harwell, "Territory,
Custom, and the
Cultural Politics of Ethnic War in West Kalimantan,
Indonesia,"
in
Nancy L. Peluso and Michael Watts, (eds), Violent Environments
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2(01), p. 83-116.
Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of
Space 2nd ed (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
Stuart Corbridge,
Development Studies: a Reader (London: Edward
Arnold, 1995), p. 4-5.
Bunker, Underdeveloping the Amazon, p. 30.
Gedicks, Resource Rebels; Michael Watts, "Petro-Violence:
Community,
Extraction,
and Political Ecology of a Mythic Commodity,"
in Peluso
and Watts, Violent Environments, pp.189-212.
Al Gedicks, New Resource Wars: Native and Environmental Struggles
Against Multinational Corporations (Cambridge, MA: South End Press,
1993); Al Gedicks, Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and
Oil Corporations (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2001).
David Harvey, Nature, Justice, and the Geography of Difference
(Oxford: Blackwells, 1996), pp. 382-3.
Peluso and Watts, Violent Environments.
Anonymous, "Les Massacres de Katekelayi et de Luamuela (Kasai oriental)," Politique Africaine 2/6 (1982), p. 72.
Hugues Leclerc, "Le Role Economique
du Diamant dans Ie Conflict
Congolais," in Lauren Monnier, Bogumil Jewsiewicki, and Gauthier de
Villers, (eds.) Chasse au Diamant au Congo/Zaire (Paris: L'Harmattan,
2001), p. 60.
Michael Gillard, Ignacio Gomez and Melissa Jones, "BP Hands Tarred
in Pipeline Dirty War," The Guardian (17 October 1998).
Sudan: The Human Price of Oil, Report no. AFR 54/01100 (Washington
DC: Amnesty International,
2000).
"Stopping
Forced Labour"
(Geneva:
International
Labour
Office,
2(01), p. 21.
James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant
Resistance (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1985).
Neil Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and
Democracy (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1994).
For a review of the literature
on the political economy of war, see
http://www.odi.org.uklhpglwarecons.
leBillonlEcology of War
52. Keen, Economic Functions, p. 41.
53. Jean-Marie Balancie and Arnaud de La Grange, Mondes Rebelles.
Guerres Civiles et Violences Politiques (Paris: Michalon, 1999),p. 420.
54. Jean-Francois Medard, "Oil and War: Elf and 'Francafrique' in the Gulf
of Guinea," mimeo (2002).
55. Interviews with AMF and Diamonds Works staff (London, November
2(00).
56. Michael Nest, "Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic
Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo," African Affairs
100/400(2001),pp. 469-90.
57. Philippe leBillon "The political ecology of war: natural resources and
armed conflicts," Political Geography 20/5 (2001),pp. 561-584.
58. Daniel Headrick, Tools of Empire: Technology and European
Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981).
59. Filip de Boeck, "Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars: Identity,
Expenditure and Sharing in Soutwestern Zaire (1984-1997),"
Development and Change 29/4 (1999),pp. 777-810.
60. Douglas Farah, "AI Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade" Washington
Post (2 November 2001), p. AOl; Financial Action Task Force VIII
"Money Laundering Typologies Exercice Public Report" (1996)
http://www. ustreas.gov/fincen/fatf.pdf.
61. Peter Frankental and Frances House, Human Rights: Is It Any of Your
Business? (London: Amnesty International and The Prince of Wales
Business Leaders Forum, 2000).
62. Field study in Angola (July 2001).
63. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, "Categories of Corporate Complicity
in
Human
Rights
Abuses,"
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Clapham-Jerbi-paper.htm.
64. Dick Cheney, former Chairman of Halliburton and US Vice President,
cited in Petroleum Finance Week (1 April 1996); see also Shell (2000)
Operating in Politically Sensitive Regions. On-line: http://www.shell.
comJroyal-en/contentI0,5028,25547-51060,00.html
65. Thomas Waelde, "Legal boundaries for extraterritorial ambitions," in
John V. Mitchell, (ed.), Companies in a World of Conflict: NGOs,
Sanctions and Corporate Responsibility (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs and Earthscan, 1998),p. 178.
66. Philippe leBillon, "The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia
1989-1999: War, Peace and Forest Exploitation," Development and
Change 31/4 (2000), pp. 785-805.
67. David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention,Adelphi Paper
316 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1998).
68. John Harker, Human security in Sudan: the Report of a Canadian
Assessment Mission (Ottawa: Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2000).
69. Michael Gillard et al., "BP Hands "Tarred in Pipeline Dirty War."
70. For an exploration of the concept from a business-friendly perspective,
see the Journal of Corporate Citizenship 1/1 (2000).
71. leBillon, "The Political Ecology of Transition."
72. See http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond.
73. UN Department of Political Affairs official, interview with the author,
March 2001.
74. See Philippe leBillon, "Regulating Businesses During Armed
Conflicts," (London: Overseas Development Institute, forthcoming);
93
Studies in Political Economy
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
94
Jane Nelson, The Business of Peace. The Private Sector as Partner in
Conflict Prevention and Resolution (London: International Alert,
Council on Economic Priorities, and the Prince of Wales Business
Leaders Forum, 2000).
Andrew Osborn, "Brussels Holds Kenyan Wanted by UN and UK for
Fuelling Civil War," Guardian (16 February 2002).
In the John Doe Iv. Unocal Corp. case, the plaintiff alleged that the oil
company Unocal was complicit in human rights abuses while building a
gas pipeline in Burma, see http://www.earthrights.orglunocal/.
Adopted at the UN General Assembly in December 1999,and currently been under the process of ratification by member states. See
www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm. War criminals are included in the
broad definition of the original convention but the EU, among others,
greatly narrowed it; interview with Anthonius de Vrie, EU commission
(Ottawa, March 2002).
Douglas Farah, "AI Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade," Washington
Post (2 November 2001), p. A01; Christian Dietrich and Peter
Danssaert, "Antwerp Blamed, Again" (Antwerp: IPIS and
Diamondstudies.com; November 2001).
Offences of financial complicity in genocides, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity are not included in the jurisdiction of the ICC, but
could be defined by the Review Conference pursuant to article 123 of
the Final Act.
See http://www.globalwitness.org.
These principles, adopted in December 2000, deal with risk assessment
(identification of security risks, potential for violence, human rights
records, rule of law, conflict analysis, equipment transfer), and interactions between companies and public as well as private security (security arrangements, deployment and conduct, consultation and advice,
responses to human rights abuses). While this initiative provides a standard of engagement on security issues for corporations, it does not carry
force of law,nor provides commitment of compliance assessment by the
US and UK governments.
Pierre Kopp, "Embargo et Criminalisation de l'Economie,' Economie
des Guerres Civiles, F. Jean and J.-c. Rufin, (eds), (Paris, Hachette,
1996),pp.425-65.
United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security
Council Sanctions Against UNITA S/2000/203 (New York: United
Nations Secretariat, 2000).
Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, "Regulating Illicit Trade in Natural
Resources: The Role of Regional Actors in West Africa," Review of
African Political Economy (Forthcoming December 2002).
"IMF Playing 'Delicate Game' Over Logging," Phnom Penh Post (29
November 1996),p. 13.
"The Coltan Phenomenon" (Goma: POLE, 2001), p. 4.
Report of the Panel of Experts Concerning Sierra Leone S/2000/1195
(13 December 2000), para. 90-8.
S/2001/1015,para. 59.
UN Security Council resolution S/RES/1408 (2002), art. 10.
The oil development involves the construction of a pipeline through
Cameroon.
Korinna Horta, "Questions Concerning The World Bank and
Chad/Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project," Environmental Defense
Fund (March 1997).
leBillonlEcology of War
92. Act n.lIPR/99 Concerning Oil Revenues Management, N'Djamena (11
January 1999).
93. "Note on the Use of Petroleum Bonus," The Chad-Cameroon
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Washington DC: World
Bank, June 2001).
94. http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/iag_tor_en.pdf.
95. Cited in "God, Oil and Country. Changing the Logic of War in Sudan,"
(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), p. 195.
96. Interview with SPLA official, Nairobi (November 2001).
97. Interview with Charmian Gooch, Global Witness (London, June 2002).
98. Al Gedicks, Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and Oil
Corporations (Cambridge MA: South End Press, 2001).
99. Philippe leBillon, Jake Sherman, Marthia Hartwell, "Controlling Illicit
Resource Flows to Civil Wars: A Review and Analysis of Current
Policies & Legal Instruments" (New York: International Peace
Academy, 2002).
100. Jedrzej G. Frynas, "Political Instability and Business: Focus on Shell in
Nigeria," Third World Quarterly 19/3,pp. 457-78.
101. Michael B. Brown, Fair Trade: Reforming the International Trading
System (London: Zed Books, 1993).
95