Download The Rhineland - Learning on the Loop

From “The Coming of the Second World War”….by H. G. Gelber First published 1967 by F.W. Cheshire Publishing PTY Ltd, Melbourne The Rhineland Early in 1936 Hitler decided to capitalize on the situation by deploying his military forces in the Rhineland. This area had been demilitarized for ten years, largely as a concession to French security requirements. Both the German Foreign Office and General Staff had been anxious for its reoccupation for some time. The need to secure the vital industrial area of the Ruhr and the communications artery of the Rhine valley was obvious. These considerations were of course not new. But now, the disarray of the Western powers offered a good opportunity. A pretext lay to hand. Germany had objected to the Franco­Soviet treaty of May 1935 from the start. This grievance had several advantages. Hitler was harping on a matter which was causing deep divisions within France. He was complaining about an aspect of French policy which enjoyed no support in Britain. And he could appeal to the anti­bolshevism of all western Europe. On 27th February 1936 the French Chamber of Deputies ratified the Franco­Soviet treaty. Hitler, who had already decided to move into the Rhineland, sent in his troops on 7th March. It was an operation which relied more on bluff than actual power. Only three battalions were sent west of the Rhine. The local police, which had long been organized into battalions and regiments and received military training, was formed into four infantry divisions, though these of course lacked all heavy equipment. The German forces in the Rhineland were therefore not so weak as has since been claimed. But they were far weaker than the exaggerated French estimates at the time, which put their strength at around 265,000. In his by now usual fashion, Hitler accompanied the military move by peaceful gestures. He offered to conclude a twenty­five year non­aggression pact with France and Belgium as well as an air pact under British and Italian guarantee, non­aggression pacts to Germany's Eastern neighbours, similar to the German­Polish pact, and a resumption of German membership of the League of Nations. Since France, Hitler added, had betrayed Europe by her alliance with Asiatic bolshevism, Germany had been forced to take steps to defend her interests. On 29th March fresh elections were held. These, even allowing for the doubtful value of voting in dictatorships, seemed to show that Hitler had impressive majority support. The question was, how would the Western powers react? Hitler had timed his move well. With the Abyssinian war still on, Anglo­French relations were not warm. The only force within reach which could rebuff the Germans quickly was the French army. We now know that this would have been amply sufficient. The forty­eight hours after his move, Hitler admitted later, had been the most nerve­racking of his life. The German forces were too small to put up any serious resistance and would have been forced to withdraw if the French had moved. Some French writers have claimed that France was ready and willing to do this, but was held back by the British. The French diplomatic documents for the period, published in 1964, tell a somewhat different story. France's own commanders did not believe that their army was either trained or equipped for offensive action. The defensive strategy adopted after 1918 had made offensive movement difficult and perhaps impossible. The strength of the Germans was overestimated. A French move was therefore thought to require mobilization, and this would have the most serious domestic political repercussions. In any case, France was unwilling to move without assurance of British support. The French therefore turned to London. Here is another problem. Had they decided not to move and were 'passing the buck' to the British? Or would the French Government, if the British had given positive support, have been willing to disregard the right­wing opposition in Parliament and the unpreparedness of its general staff and order the army into action? We do not know. Certain is only that both the French and the British people were overwhelmingly opposed to war. The British Government was doubtful about the Rhineland. Britain and France were entitled to move in case of aggression, but did the German occupation of bits of their own country constitute aggression? Were the Germans doing more than 'walking into their own back yard'? The Labour Party was clearly prepared to support neither military nor economic sanctions. Even Anthony Eden declared that the German action fortunately carried no threat of hostilities. In any case, Britain had no forces to send, even if she had wanted to. Thus no one moved. The British and French consulted. The Council of the League conferred. But there was no action and there were no sanctions. The consequences were important. Hitler had triumphed once more. His popularity at home was enhanced. The hesitations of the German generals were proved wrong. The possibility of internal resistance to Hitler grew even less. The evidence was clear that France, in spite of her military superiority, could not or would not act to preserve a major element in her post­1918 security system. If France would not move so close to home, how firmly could she be expected to stand by her engagements in Eastern Europe? A number of countries weighed the new situation and drew hard­headed conclusions.