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World War I was a climactic event in the beginning of the 20th Century that fundamentally changed the political structure of Europe. Analysis of the conflict by International Studies scholars had varied greatly due to the multitudes of theories available to explain the war. These theories include Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and Power Transition Theory. While first three approaches aptly explain some of the issues surrounding the event, none of them do it as holistically as Power Transition Theory. Power Transition Theory compellingly explains the cause of the Great War, specifically the nature of the war’s start, it correctly defines the conditions required to win the war, and it rationalizes why its aftermath set the stage for future conflict. Under a Realist lens, World War I can be described as a conflict between independent, unitary actors in an anarchic international system. A fundamental principle in Realism Theory is that world politics and the laws that goes along with it are inherently objective. In a Realist’s perspective, the world is anarchic with no visible system that restrains people from deferring to their baser, animalistic instinct. In such an environment, it’s kill or be killed, and under Realism, rationalism takes precedent over morals or ideals as the way to avoid self-destruction (Morgenthau 1967). Unitary states ultimately seek self survival in this anarchic world, and in the words of John J. Mearshimer, “States fear each other [and] regard each other with suspicion […] They worry that war might be in the offing [so] there is little room for trust among states.” (Mearchimer 2001) Because of states’ distrust of each other’s intentions, they attempt to ensure their own survival by pursuing more power, which manifests through the buildup of arms, forming alliances, territorial compensations, and turning potential rivals against each other (Morgenthau 1967). All of these developments were present in World War I: The major players of the day—Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and to some extent Italy and the Ottoman Empire—wanted to preserve their own wellbeing in the face of each other. In order to do so, all these nations undertook an arms buildup and attempted to overpower one another by entering alliances, creating a balance of power in Europe where no single nation is powerful enough to overpower others and create hegemony. According to realists, the purpose of Balance of Power is “maintaining the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it.” (Morgenthau 1967) The outbreak of war was only a result of the increasingly multi-polar nature of the alliance system, and at its end, no nation, victorious or vanquished, was completely destroyed. The states quickly reestablished equilibrium in Europe with a new Balance of Power. Due to Realism’s basis on the nature of mankind, it has been an ever present part of human society. The situation in World War I between the European powers was no different than that between Athenians and Melians during the Peloponnesian War of Antiquity. Under Liberal lenses, the outbreak of WWI can still be viewed as a conflict between European empires over matters of imperialism, but the participation of the United States in the final stages of the war and its subsequent establishment of the League of Nations and attempt at implementing President Wilson’s Fourteen Points illustrate the growing influence of democratic values. Liberalism Theory takes on a markedly different approach towards its analysis of the Great War. Unlike Realists, who focus on human nature and nation states, and instead emphasizes the ideals behind liberal democracy such as trade, human rights, and cooperation through international organizations. Liberalism Theory also differs from Realism in that it’s chronologically linear in nature, that is, the spread of democracy and capitalism developed over the span of human history, and has only come to prominence relatively recently. Henry Kissinger commented that in his attempts to convince the public to war, Woodrow Wilson managed to tap into the general American citizen’s sense of American Exceptionalism that stemmed from a history of “liberal, democratic, and moral institutionalism” (Kissinger 52). In entering the United States in World War I, he hoped that American Democracy could be spread to all of Europe as to “end all wars”. His rhetoric supports that theory that democracies are less likely to war with each other due to shared institutions, cultures, and trade, and his call for the establishment of a League of Nations echoes those of Kant when he claims that peace is achieved through the establishment of international organizations that share information among members as well as enforce the laws it imposes (Kant 1970). Liberal ideology was further proven by the fact that at the end of the war, even though it was the most powerful nation in the world, the United States did not, as Realists would argue, impose hegemony over Europe, and instead retreated back towards relative isolationism on its North American base. The world, according to Liberals, is on an inexorable march towards democracy, and WWI is an example to how liberal ideals are integrated gradually upon nations. Constructivism, on the other hand, eschews the Realist emphasis on power and the Liberal focus on democratic institutions. Instead, constructivists argue that the most important aspect in deciphering international relations is ideas and how they are interpreted. The Great War can thus be view from a number of perspectives. Under a Marxist view it can be seen as a conflict perpetuated by capitalistic tendencies of competition among the bourgeois among Europe and fought by the oppressed proletariat. (Marx 13). It can be just as likely to interpreted its outbreak as a family feud among the grand children of Queen Victoria. For Constructivist Theory, ideas and norms dictate how states behave and are only important when states deem it as important. Constructivism as a result is based on much more abstract ideals than the other theories. Such can include economics, as is the case for Marxism; it could also be based socially, such as the claim that the European powers chose to go to war with each other in order to quell unrest among their own populations, which at that time is becoming more and more politically fragmented. As Alexander Wendt states in his article “Anarchy is what States Make of It”, “All theories of international relations are based on social theories of the relationship between agency, process, and social structure. Social theories do not determine the content of our international theorizing, but they do structure the questions we ask about world politics and our approaches to answering those questions.” (Wendt 1992) This approach in short focuses on social constructs humans project and how they relate to the way interactions take place. Because of the interpretive flexibilities inherent in Constructivist Theory, WWI could be interpreted a number of ways through Constructivist lenses. The above theories all adequately explain World War I to some degree, but fail to sufficiently describe specific events within the war. Realism persuasively comments on the nature of alliances and the Balance of Power prior and after the war. It doesn’t, however, account for the actual outbreak of war. Realists claimed that Balance of Power should’ve kept the European powers from conflict due to equal distribution of strength and mutual fear of self destruction, but conflict nonetheless happened, and even Realist blame on the multipolar nature of the alliance system doesn’t fully account for war as it contradicts the rationalism behind state actions to readjust that very balance. Realism’s focus on state actors also renders it incapable of properly explaining Russia’s withdrawal from the war as a result of revolution. Liberalism theory makes a solid argument on the increasing viability of democratic ideals in promoting cooperation among states through the introduction of the League of Nations and the Fourteen Points in the war’s aftermath. But if democracy was becoming ever more present in Europe, why did the League fail in its international regulatory tasks and allow the rise of totalitarian dictatorship throughout Europe some two decades after? While Constructivism is much more versatile than the other two, the supporting evidence for its different approaches varies on a case by case basis, which makes it difficult to evaluate a Constructivist interpretation of the war. Power Transition Theory addresses all of these issues, making it my favored approach towards examining the Great War. Power Transition Theory is very similar to Realism in its focus on sovereign nation states and the pursuit of power. It differs from Realism in that where areas Realism touts Balance of Power, Power Transition champions the exact opposite. Power Transition views the war as fundamentally unipolar in which one state is overwhelmingly more powerful the rest. By being the most powerful state it also dictates the world order that it imposes on the world. In the 1900s that nation was Great Britain and it supported a world order based on trade and liberal institutionalism. Conflict becomes the most likely when said great power declines and a rival is right on the cusp of overtaking it, and in 1914 that contender was Germany. Power Transition accurately measures that power through industrial capacity, and by the eve of war Germany and Britain were basically equal in their industrial output. It is important to note that Power Transition Theory only stipulates that conflict is likely in this event instead of inevitable, as the U.S. in 1900 overtook Britain peacefully as the most industrious and thus most powerful nation on the globe. The reason that war never came between the U.S. and U.K. is because they shared common values and the U.S. did not express a desire to change the world order Britain propped up when they overtook the British. Germany, on the other hand, showed a strong likelihood to install a new order hostile to British values. German rise also threatened French and American interests, thus conflict erupted across Europe. The Industrial measure Power Transition employs accurately predicted the victors of the war, as the Central Power had less industrial potential then the allies, but defeat did not knock Germany out of the power race; Power Transition Theory stated that states aren’t rendered impotent just from one war, and would bounce back within 20-30 years to compete for power once again. Germany fulfilled this prophecy almost to a tee—rising again to challenge Europe in 1939. Power transition theory is all about the “importance of changing power distributions in the international system arising from industrialization and the stabilizing effects of concentrations of power.” (DiCicco, Levy, 1999) and as shown above, it provides the most holistic explanation to the cause, conduct, and outcome of World War I. Bibliography DiCicco, Jonoathan M. and Jack S. Levy “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program” Journal of Conflict Resultion (Dec) 675-701 http://www.jstor.org/stable/174600 (October 9, 2014) Kant, Immanuel. 1970. Kant’s Political Writings. Hans Reiss, ed. H. B. Nisbet, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University press Kissinger, Henry 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1848, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Germany. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29-54 Morganthau, Hans J. Politics among NationsL The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), Chaps. 1, 3, 11, 12, 14 Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It” International Organizations (Spring) 391-425.