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Transcript
World War I was a climactic event in the beginning of the 20th Century that
fundamentally changed the political structure of Europe. Analysis of the conflict by International
Studies scholars had varied greatly due to the multitudes of theories available to explain the war.
These theories include Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and Power Transition Theory.
While first three approaches aptly explain some of the issues surrounding the event, none of
them do it as holistically as Power Transition Theory. Power Transition Theory compellingly
explains the cause of the Great War, specifically the nature of the war’s start, it correctly defines
the conditions required to win the war, and it rationalizes why its aftermath set the stage for
future conflict.
Under a Realist lens, World War I can be described as a conflict between independent,
unitary actors in an anarchic international system. A fundamental principle in Realism Theory is
that world politics and the laws that goes along with it are inherently objective. In a Realist’s
perspective, the world is anarchic with no visible system that restrains people from deferring to
their baser, animalistic instinct. In such an environment, it’s kill or be killed, and under Realism,
rationalism takes precedent over morals or ideals as the way to avoid self-destruction
(Morgenthau 1967). Unitary states ultimately seek self survival in this anarchic world, and in the
words of John J. Mearshimer, “States fear each other [and] regard each other with suspicion […]
They worry that war might be in the offing [so] there is little room for trust among states.”
(Mearchimer 2001) Because of states’ distrust of each other’s intentions, they attempt to ensure
their own survival by pursuing more power, which manifests through the buildup of arms,
forming alliances, territorial compensations, and turning potential rivals against each other
(Morgenthau 1967). All of these developments were present in World War I: The major players
of the day—Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and to some extent Italy and the
Ottoman Empire—wanted to preserve their own wellbeing in the face of each other. In order to
do so, all these nations undertook an arms buildup and attempted to overpower one another by
entering alliances, creating a balance of power in Europe where no single nation is powerful
enough to overpower others and create hegemony. According to realists, the purpose of Balance
of Power is “maintaining the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the
elements composing it.” (Morgenthau 1967) The outbreak of war was only a result of the
increasingly multi-polar nature of the alliance system, and at its end, no nation, victorious or
vanquished, was completely destroyed. The states quickly reestablished equilibrium in Europe
with a new Balance of Power. Due to Realism’s basis on the nature of mankind, it has been an
ever present part of human society. The situation in World War I between the European powers
was no different than that between Athenians and Melians during the Peloponnesian War of
Antiquity.
Under Liberal lenses, the outbreak of WWI can still be viewed as a conflict between
European empires over matters of imperialism, but the participation of the United States in the
final stages of the war and its subsequent establishment of the League of Nations and attempt at
implementing President Wilson’s Fourteen Points illustrate the growing influence of democratic
values. Liberalism Theory takes on a markedly different approach towards its analysis of the
Great War. Unlike Realists, who focus on human nature and nation states, and instead
emphasizes the ideals behind liberal democracy such as trade, human rights, and cooperation
through international organizations. Liberalism Theory also differs from Realism in that it’s
chronologically linear in nature, that is, the spread of democracy and capitalism developed over
the span of human history, and has only come to prominence relatively recently. Henry Kissinger
commented that in his attempts to convince the public to war, Woodrow Wilson managed to tap
into the general American citizen’s sense of American Exceptionalism that stemmed from a
history of “liberal, democratic, and moral institutionalism” (Kissinger 52). In entering the
United States in World War I, he hoped that American Democracy could be spread to all of
Europe as to “end all wars”. His rhetoric supports that theory that democracies are less likely to
war with each other due to shared institutions, cultures, and trade, and his call for the
establishment of a League of Nations echoes those of Kant when he claims that peace is achieved
through the establishment of international organizations that share information among members
as well as enforce the laws it imposes (Kant 1970). Liberal ideology was further proven by the
fact that at the end of the war, even though it was the most powerful nation in the world, the
United States did not, as Realists would argue, impose hegemony over Europe, and instead
retreated back towards relative isolationism on its North American base. The world, according to
Liberals, is on an inexorable march towards democracy, and WWI is an example to how liberal
ideals are integrated gradually upon nations.
Constructivism, on the other hand, eschews the Realist emphasis on power and the
Liberal focus on democratic institutions. Instead, constructivists argue that the most important
aspect in deciphering international relations is ideas and how they are interpreted. The Great War
can thus be view from a number of perspectives. Under a Marxist view it can be seen as a
conflict perpetuated by capitalistic tendencies of competition among the bourgeois among
Europe and fought by the oppressed proletariat. (Marx 13). It can be just as likely to interpreted
its outbreak as a family feud among the grand children of Queen Victoria. For Constructivist
Theory, ideas and norms dictate how states behave and are only important when states deem it as
important. Constructivism as a result is based on much more abstract ideals than the other
theories. Such can include economics, as is the case for Marxism; it could also be based socially,
such as the claim that the European powers chose to go to war with each other in order to quell
unrest among their own populations, which at that time is becoming more and more politically
fragmented. As Alexander Wendt states in his article “Anarchy is what States Make of It”, “All
theories of international relations are based on social theories of the relationship between agency,
process, and social structure. Social theories do not determine the content of our international
theorizing, but they do structure the questions we ask about world politics and our approaches to
answering those questions.” (Wendt 1992) This approach in short focuses on social constructs
humans project and how they relate to the way interactions take place. Because of the
interpretive flexibilities inherent in Constructivist Theory, WWI could be interpreted a number
of ways through Constructivist lenses.
The above theories all adequately explain World War I to some degree, but fail to
sufficiently describe specific events within the war. Realism persuasively comments on the
nature of alliances and the Balance of Power prior and after the war. It doesn’t, however, account
for the actual outbreak of war. Realists claimed that Balance of Power should’ve kept the
European powers from conflict due to equal distribution of strength and mutual fear of self
destruction, but conflict nonetheless happened, and even Realist blame on the multipolar nature
of the alliance system doesn’t fully account for war as it contradicts the rationalism behind state
actions to readjust that very balance. Realism’s focus on state actors also renders it incapable of
properly explaining Russia’s withdrawal from the war as a result of revolution. Liberalism theory
makes a solid argument on the increasing viability of democratic ideals in promoting cooperation
among states through the introduction of the League of Nations and the Fourteen Points in the
war’s aftermath. But if democracy was becoming ever more present in Europe, why did the
League fail in its international regulatory tasks and allow the rise of totalitarian dictatorship
throughout Europe some two decades after? While Constructivism is much more versatile than
the other two, the supporting evidence for its different approaches varies on a case by case basis,
which makes it difficult to evaluate a Constructivist interpretation of the war.
Power Transition Theory addresses all of these issues, making it my favored approach
towards examining the Great War. Power Transition Theory is very similar to Realism in its
focus on sovereign nation states and the pursuit of power. It differs from Realism in that where
areas Realism touts Balance of Power, Power Transition champions the exact opposite. Power
Transition views the war as fundamentally unipolar in which one state is overwhelmingly more
powerful the rest. By being the most powerful state it also dictates the world order that it imposes
on the world. In the 1900s that nation was Great Britain and it supported a world order based on
trade and liberal institutionalism. Conflict becomes the most likely when said great power
declines and a rival is right on the cusp of overtaking it, and in 1914 that contender was
Germany. Power Transition accurately measures that power through industrial capacity, and by
the eve of war Germany and Britain were basically equal in their industrial output. It is important
to note that Power Transition Theory only stipulates that conflict is likely in this event instead of
inevitable, as the U.S. in 1900 overtook Britain peacefully as the most industrious and thus most
powerful nation on the globe. The reason that war never came between the U.S. and U.K. is
because they shared common values and the U.S. did not express a desire to change the world
order Britain propped up when they overtook the British. Germany, on the other hand, showed a
strong likelihood to install a new order hostile to British values. German rise also threatened
French and American interests, thus conflict erupted across Europe. The Industrial measure
Power Transition employs accurately predicted the victors of the war, as the Central Power had
less industrial potential then the allies, but defeat did not knock Germany out of the power race;
Power Transition Theory stated that states aren’t rendered impotent just from one war, and
would bounce back within 20-30 years to compete for power once again. Germany fulfilled this
prophecy almost to a tee—rising again to challenge Europe in 1939. Power transition theory is
all about the “importance of changing power distributions in the international system arising
from industrialization and the stabilizing effects of concentrations of power.” (DiCicco, Levy,
1999) and as shown above, it provides the most holistic explanation to the cause, conduct, and
outcome of World War I.
Bibliography
DiCicco, Jonoathan M. and Jack S. Levy “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the
Power Transition Research Program” Journal of Conflict Resultion (Dec) 675-701
http://www.jstor.org/stable/174600 (October 9, 2014)
Kant, Immanuel. 1970. Kant’s Political Writings. Hans Reiss, ed. H. B. Nisbet, trans.
Cambridge: Cambridge University press
Kissinger, Henry 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1848, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Germany.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power” The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, 29-54
Morganthau, Hans J. Politics among NationsL The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New
York: Knopf, 1967), Chaps. 1, 3, 11, 12, 14
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It” International Organizations
(Spring) 391-425.