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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35:4
0021–8308
A New Understanding of Terrorism Using
Cognitive Dissonance Principles
Andrea
O
Understanding
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Article
Maikovich
Terrorism
Blackwell
Oxford,
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ANDREA KOHN MAIKOVICH
“. . . for the social psychologist it is not a question of who is good and who is evil, but how activists
and defenders make sense of actions as morally or legally accessible acts” (Harré, 2004, p. 102).
The earliest records of human civilization contain accounts of interpersonal conflict;
the earliest accounts of interpersonal conflict contain evidence of the use of terrorism
(Abi-Hashem, 2004). In other words, terrorism is not a novel phenomenon, and
has been employed as a form of theatrical violence at least since the beginning of
recorded human history, and most likely during pre-history as well (Sternberg, 2003).
The September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C.
catalyzed a burgeoning interest in terrorism among researchers from a variety of
fields, while the media became saturated with stories about terrorist organizations
and their international roots (Colvard, 2002). Much of the coverage, however, has
been emotionally charged and biased. Research suggests that the majority of today’s
terrorists are neither psychologically insane nor driven by hate, as so vehemently
purported by Western governments and the Western media (Stout, 2002; Bush,
2001). It is not terrorist organizations’ violent component that typically appeals
to terrorists, but rather the sense of purpose and identity the organizations offer,
as well as their purported central sociopolitical goals (defending Muslim culture
against Western influence, for example). Within this paper I offer a new theory,
rooted in the principles of cognitive dissonance, to help explain what differentiates
the mass numbers of identity-seeking, politically and socially discontent individuals from the few who actually become terrorists. I write this article “not to endorse
terrorism, but to point out that terrorism is not typically the irrational act that it
is often made out to be . . .” (Wessells, 2004, p. 261).
BACKGROUND
There is no clear consensus about the most valid and thorough definition of terrorism.
A commonly accepted definition, and the one I use in this paper, is offered by the
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Andrea Kohn Maikovich
Federal Bureau of Investigation: “[terrorism is] the unlawful use of force or violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”
(Whittaker, 2001, p. 3). Modern terrorist behavior is typically divided into two
categories—state-sponsored and non state-sponsored. Approximately 170 million
people died in state-sponsored terrorist activities in the 20th century alone, including 42 million under Stalin and 2 million under Pol Pot (Rummel, 1996). The
number of deaths resulting from non state-sponsored terrorist activities is dramatically lower, with estimates of 260 state-sponsored terrorism deaths for every one non
state-sponsored terrorist death (Rummel, 1996). My focus is on non state-sponsored
terrorist activities, primarily because private terrorist networks have sparked such
concern in the West following al Qaeda’s 2001 attacks.
There are several competing psychological theories about terrorists and terrorist
organizations. The theory that has captured the public’s imagination is encapsulated
by a single word—psychopathy. McCauley (2002) describes the common belief that
terrorists must be so psychologically abnormal that they are best categorized as
psychopaths devoid of moral feeling and empathy. McCauley describes how difficult it is for people to believe that the violence committed by terrorists is possible
unless it is explained by psychopathy. People want to believe that terrorists are
psychologically ill, that their theatrical violence falls far outside the realm of
normalcy. When one turns on the television and sees pictures of devastation and
death following a terrorist attack, it is easy to conclude that those responsible are
“absolutely crazy.” Piven (2002, p. 128) embraces this common sentiment: “I have
termed [terrorist behavior] psychotic because such a dearth of empathy and such
malignant rage, alongside such distorted and paranoid displacements constitute
a massive deformation in personality development and reality testing.” However,
data from over thirty years of research have not consistently supported this theory
(McCauley, 2002). The majority of studies to date (most of which are based on
interviews and psychological evaluations of terrorists, because the topic does not
lend itself to controlled studies) have concluded that few terrorists meet the criteria
for a DSM-diagnosable psychological disorder (McCauley, 2002; Long, 1990).
One of the most thorough studies of terrorists’ personalities focused on Germany’s
Baader-Meinhof Gang, one of Europe’s most infamous post-World War II terrorist
organizations (McCauley, 2002). Researchers meticulously reviewed the following
records for each terrorist: perinatal, pediatric, preschool, lower school, grade school,
high school, and university. Researchers also conducted interviews with the
terrorists’ family members, neighbors and classmates. Surprisingly, there were
no psychological differences between the Baader-Meinhof Gang members and
demographically matched controls. Further evidence that terrorists’ behavior
cannot simply be explained by psychopathy is rooted in the fact that many such
terrorists made the choice to sacrifice their lives in attacks. McCauley (2002)
highlights the fact that no research exists suggesting that psychopaths are
self-sacrificing in any sense. Furthermore, he describes how psychopaths are
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characteristically irresponsible and impulsive, two traits diametrically opposed to
the trust, mutual commitment, and cooperation terrorists typically display. He
uses the coordinated group of September 11th plane hijackers as an example of
how terrorist personalities are the antithesis of psychopathic personalities.
A second common theory is that terrorists are motivated by hate and frustration (Naimark, 2001; Staub 1996). This is one of the most popular explanations
endorsed by Western world leaders, and it is United States President George
W. Bush’s public explanation for September 11, 2001 (Stout, 2002). A few months
following the attacks, for example, President Bush stated that, “The events of
these seven weeks have shown . . . that America and the cause of freedom have
determined enemies; that there are people in this world who hate what America
stands for. They hate our success, they hate our liberty” (Bush, 2001). At the 2002
World Economic Forum, speakers also consistently identified hate as one of the
main catalysts for terrorist violence directed against Western civilization (Stout,
2002).
Sternberg’s (2003) triangular theory of hate is a coherent psychological explanation of how hate catalyzes terrorism and other forms of mass violence. According
to this theory, three core components of hate constitute a potent terrorism
instigator—negation of intimacy, passion (often expressed as intense anger),
and cognitive devaluation of the targeted group to foster contempt and the desire
to destroy. Furthermore, terrorists use propaganda to foster this hate, thereby
recruiting new “haters” and potential terrorists. Although Sternberg identifies
hate as a main cause of terrorism, he admits that it cannot be identified as the
singular cause in most cases. Similarly, Baumeister (1996) identifies four roots of
terrorism, at least three of which are strongly related to hate. First is an ideological
division between good (one’s own group) and evil (the enemy), leading to hatred
for the enemy because the enemy is evil. Second is a desire for revenge because
of perceived injustice against one’s group at the hand of the enemy. Third is the
desire to reach a goal that is blocked by the enemy. Fourth is sadism, the component least related to hate. Some researchers endorsing hate theories have
focused more on the role of frustration. For example, Staub (1996) theorizes that
terrorism is likely to occur when basic human needs are not met, leading to
frustration, and subsequently violence as a form of need fulfillment.
Although some components of these hate theories of terrorism seem plausible,
certainly hate and frustration cannot completely explain the phenomenon. Case
studies of terrorist leaders reveal that a high percentage come from middle or
upper class families in which basic need fulfillment is not a concern (Stout, 2002).
In addition, many terrorists have histories of academic and cultural exposure to
the West through positive scholarly interactions. For example, terrorist Mohammed
Atta came from a middle class Egyptian family. After earning status as a wellrespected scholar in Germany, he enjoyed strong positive reception among the
Western academic world before becoming a suspected mastermind of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States (Stout, 2002). Later, I will discuss
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several other examples of terrorists whose profiles suggest neither a paucity of
basic need fulfillment, nor a history of negative exposure to Western culture that
could potentially fertilize seeds of hate.
My theory about why certain individuals become violent terrorists is rooted in
cognitive dissonance principles. According to Festinger’s (1957) original cognitive
dissonance theory, dissonance is aroused when two “elements of knowledge” (or
“cognitions”) are both relevant to one another and dissonant. For example, if an
individual is cognizant of the fact that smoking is harmful to her health and can
lead to premature death (one element of knowledge), but is a chain smoker and
addicted to nicotine (a second element of knowledge), she will experience high
levels of dissonance. Festinger asserted that dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable, and that individuals will often attempt to reduce this arousal in one or
more of three ways: remove dissonant cognitions, add consonant cognitions, or
reduce the importance of dissonant cognitions (Festinger, 1957). Other investigators
added a fourth means of reducing dissonance—increase the importance of consonant
cognitions (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). There are two major cognitive dissonance
research paradigms that are relevant to terrorism, and that I discuss in depth later in
this article—the free-choice paradigm (Brehm, 1956) and the belief-disconfirmation
paradigm (Festinger et al., 1956).
Within my theory, I argue that becoming a terrorist is a graduated process; it
happens not all at once, but over time, as the inhibiting forces of cognitive dissonance are reduced within the individual contemplating terrorism. While I write
as a psychologist, it is important to note that sociologists of religion and sociologists of social movements, most notably McAdam (1986), have also written about
this gradual conversion process as it relates to religious cults and social activism
movements. I discuss the work of these sociologists’ later in this article, but mention them here to acknowledge the fact that a basic component of my theory,
gradual conversion, has been discussed in past sociological literature but interpreted differently. Certainly the cognitive dissonance-based theory I propose is
not an all-encompassing explanation for terrorism, but is rather one more lens
through which to look at a complicated, internationally threatening phenomenon.
THE THEORY
A surprisingly large number of people support terrorist organizations’ purported
ultimate goals (such as to defend Islam against Western influence), and believe
that terrorists’ actions are defensive against unfair, aggressive, and imperialistic
Western foreign policy. For example, the International Herald Tribune and Pew
Research Center conducted a poll of international leaders two months following
the September 11, 2001 attacks. They found that 76% of those polled reported
believing that the al Qaeda attacks were in direct response to offensive U.S.
foreign policy (McCauley, in press). Some polls have also suggested that the
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majority of people within terrorists’ home countries support the use of violence
given the current sociopolitical situation. For example, a July 2001 poll revealed
that 58% of Palestinians approve of the use of terrorist attacks against Israeli
civilians (Wolin, 2003). Even if these data are overestimates, as is likely, it is clear
that the majority of citizens are not willing to actually use violence themselves, as
evidenced by the relatively few number of terrorists compared to the general
population. When these non-violent individuals try non-violent approaches to
achieve sociopolitical goals and fail, or when they repeatedly witness the failure
of non-violent approaches, some become more interested in terrorist organizations as a last resort. In short, cognitive dissonance begins to arise at this point of
vacillation, peaking when these initially non-violent individuals contemplate
actually becoming perpetrators of violence themselves. For the great majority, this
dissonance serves as an effective inhibitor, and they do not actually become terrorists. I suggest that what differentiates the few who do become terrorists from
the majority who do not is often the ability to reduce this cognitive dissonance.
The major assumption of this theory is that dissonance arises when individuals
contemplate utilizing violence (first element of knowledge) despite previously
rejecting it as a solution (second element of knowledge). Data point to the existence of dissonance at this point in terrorists’ lives, although it has not traditionally
been interpreted in this way. First, there is clear evidence that many terrorist leaders
and organization members originally attempt to achieve their sociopolitical goals
through non-violent means. One often-researched case study is Germany’s Red
Army Faction (formerly the Baader-Meinhof Gang), which did not originate as a
terrorist group, but rather was formed during the 1960s European student demonstrations against the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe ( Demaris, 1977).
The founding members came from respectable, middle to upper class families
(Long, 1990). Andreas Baader was the son of a historian; Ulrike Meinhof was the
daughter of an art historian, and was herself undertaking graduate study in philosophy. Another founding member, Gudrun Ensslin, was also a philosophy graduate student and the daughter of a clergyman. None of the founding members had
violent intentions and were actually originally pacifists, engaging solely in political
action (McCauley & Segal, 1989). When these peaceful attempts proved futile, the
group gradually radicalized and eventually became extremely violent.
The organization’s violence escalated over a time span of years ( Long, 1990).
The group’s first terrorist act was attempted arson at a department store in Frankfurt, Germany in April of 1968. Andreas Baader was arrested, convicted, and
sentenced to a prison term, but jumped bail and went underground. The following year, several leaders of the group (which now called itself the Red Army
Faction, or RAF) began training in Jordan with the Marxist Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. Between 1970 and 1972, the now clearly terrorist organization staged a series of theatrically violent attacks on multiple American, NATO
and German buildings, installations and officials. By 1977, most of the founding
members were dead, either as the result of hunger strikes or suicide. A new
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generation of leaders took over, and continued to escalate the violence with
bombings and arson attacks, culminating in the July 1986 murder of Siemens
Electronics Company director Karl-Heinz Beckurts. Long (1990, p. 24) sees the
violent transformation of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang/RAF organization as
representative of the transformation of many originally non-violent, even pacifist,
organizations: “Groups generally resort to violent acts gradually over time. They
do not spring up overnight as fully developed terrorist organizations but rather
adopt increasingly violent tactics as the group itself develops cohesion.”
Indeed this pattern is evident across nearly all major terrorist organizations.
Many of the European-based terrorist groups began as peace movements in the
late 1960s in correlation with anti-Vietnam movements in the United States
( Long, 1990). In the 1960s, future terrorists were peacefully demonstrating against
nuclear proliferation, and identifying themselves as pacifists as the Vietnam War
raged. With time, and the failure of these peaceful tactics, a few of these pacifists
became increasingly violent, eventually forming cohesive terrorist organizations.
Groups that did not begin as violent organizations, but that morphed into such,
include the Red Brigades of Italy, Action Directe of France, the 17 November
Revolutionary Organization and the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), both
based in Greece, and two Japanese New Left organizations, Chukaku-Ha and the
Japanese Red Army.
Organization members experience symptoms suggestive of cognitive dissonance as their organizations progress to more violent tactics. Moghaddam (2004)
describes how as organizations become more violent, and as terrorists move up
the ranks to more violent positions, members, out of necessity, must become more
secretive, even with close friends and family members. This aspect of terrorism is
particularly difficult for many recruits, especially the youngest. Several examples
discussed in the section on reducing dissonance also illustrate that many terrorists
initially report feeling ambivalent about committing violence ( Long, 1990). I
theorize that the ability to reduce this dissonance distinguishes those who become
terrorists from those who abandon their organizations before becoming perpetrators of violence themselves.
What about individuals who join terrorist organizations that are already very
violent? Indeed, recruiting young terrorists, especially ones willing to lose their
lives in suicide missions, is, ironically, a crucial life-sustaining mechanism for a
terrorist organization. These individuals frequently undergo a transformation
process that parallels the transformations described above, despite the fact that
their organizations are already violent (Long, 1990). Many new recruits support
the organization’s cause and appreciate the sense of identity and purpose that
membership offers, but do not want to actually commit violent acts themselves.
However, with time they become radicalized and contemplate taking on more
violent roles, and some eventually become suicide bombers or perpetrators of
massive-scale violence. For these individuals, too, dissonance arises and must be
overcome prior to committing an act of violence.
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Terrorist organizations are extremely hierarchical, and are constructed so that
new recruits do not have to commit violence right away. Long (1990) describes
the many roles new recruits can take, including administrative jobs, logistical
support tasks, accounting, courier roles, etc. He further notes that terrorist organization members often take on more violent roles only after lengthy periods of
membership. What happens during that period of non-violent participation is
crucial.
Terrorist organizations are designed so that once individuals are recruited to
them and take on non-violent roles, conditions within the organization favor
radicalization and foster the desire to commit violence. Whereas new recruits
commence involvement with, at most, unpleasant roles that are not too violent
(Bandura, 2004), leaders enforce the message that in order to truly make a contribution to the organization and its cause, recruits must engage in increasingly
extreme behaviors, and eventually violence (McCauley & Segal, 1989). Dissonance begins to arise, and some members leave the organization at this point.
Moghaddam (2004) identifies several “preconditions” that, when considered as
a whole, can indicate when a terrorist organization is likely to evolve within
a culture. These preconditions also demonstrate how the inner structure of
terrorist organizations favors the radicalization of new recruits: isolation from
the outside world, emphasis on a categorical “good vs. evil” view of the world,
portrayal of present society as illegitimate and unjust, portrayal of the need for
radical social change, portrayal of a lack of legal means to achieve change,
assertion that the ideal society justifies any means, assertion that the terrorist
organization can bring about societal change, and assertion that societal change
improves the organization’s standing (Moghaddam, 2004). Moghaddam also
notes that terrorists report perceiving the option of leaving the group as extremely
difficult.
In table 1, I display how these organizational characteristics contribute to
minimizing the arousal of cognitive dissonance during the recruits’ transformation, based on Festinger’s (1957) original means of reducing dissonance.
Recruits often do not receive the details of their missions until just prior to
their occurrences. Osama bin Laden described how “the brothers, who conducted the [September 11, 2001] operation, all they knew was that they have a
martyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go to America, but they
didn’t know anything about the operation, not even one letter. But they were
trained and we did not reveal the operation to them until they are there and
just before they boarded the planes” (Bin Laden, 2001). There is evidence to
suggest that despite terrorist leaders’ efforts to minimize the arousal of
dissonance in their recruits as they become indoctrinated and begin contemplating violence, dissonance does still arise. (It should be noted that terrorist
leaders likely do not see themselves as “reducing dissonance” per se, but rather
simply as reducing guilt or uncertainty.) I discuss specific cases in the section on
reducing dissonance.
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Andrea Kohn Maikovich
Table I
Condition
Dissonance-Reducing
Mechanism
Isolation from outside
world
Reduce dissonant cognitions
“Good vs. Evil” view of
world
Society as illegitimate
and unjust
Increase consonant
cognitions
Increase consonant
cognitions
Need for radical social
change
Lack of legal means to
achieve change
Ideal society justifies
any means
Increase importance of
consonant cognitions
Increase consonant
cognitions
Reduce importance of
dissonant cognitions
Terrorists can bring
about social change
Societal change
improves organization’s
standing
Increase consonant
cognitions
Increase consonant
cognitions
How?
Avoid hearing opposite
perspectives from nonorganization members
Frame actions as “good”
fighting “evil”
Legitimize using drastic means to
fight unjust governments and
their people
Make the situation seem urgent
Emphasize paucity of alternative
solutions
De-emphasize doubts about
violence because of the
importance of an ideal society
Idealize terrorists’ role
Emphasize how actions can
bolster support for organization
So why, when dissonance is high, do individuals not simply leave a terrorist
organization before actually committing an act of terrorism? Some do, despite
enormous pressure from their organization not to (Moghaddam, 2004). I propose
that although pressure from the terrorist leaders not to leave the group is partially
responsible for the low rate of attrition, another very important factor is some
recruits’ high motivation to reduce dissonance (traditionally interpreted as doubt,
uncertainty, guilt, etc.) and advance in the organization. The reason for their high
motivation is best understood by examining data from cognitive dissonance studies
conducted in the free choice paradigm.
Brehm conducted the original free choice paradigm experiment (Brehm, 1956).
Researchers presented the experiment to female subjects under the pretense of
“market research.” Participants rated how desirable they found each of eight
household items, such as a coffee maker. After the women had rated the items,
researchers asked them to choose one of two products, selected from the eight by
researchers. The two products were either items that the participants had ranked
as very close on the desirability scale (making it a difficult decision), or that they
had ranked as very far apart (making it an easy decision). After making a choice,
the women re-ranked the products again. The participants ranked the product
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they chose after a difficult decision as more desirable than they had originally, but
ranked the rejected product as less desirable than originally. Brehm interpreted
this as demonstrative of the women’s high motivation to reduce the dissonance
that arose from rejecting a product close in desirability to the chosen product.
This phenomenon, termed “spreading the alternatives,” laid the empirical foundation for future studies looking further at how motivation to reduce dissonance is
increased after making difficult decisions (Shultz & Lepper, 1996).
The decision to even join a terrorist organization, let alone actually commit an act
of violence, is for many not an easy decision. Often it means deceiving family and
close friends, living a dangerous lifestyle, and eventually becoming quite isolated
from the outside world in a cult-like fashion (Moghaddam, 2004). I propose that
after making the difficult decision to join an organization, individuals will be
highly motivated to reduce dissonance by “spreading the alternatives.” For example,
they might perceive the terrorist organization and its ideals as more desirable than
they did from a more critical pre-membership stage, and simultaneously perceive
the outside world as less desirable. Of course, spreading the alternatives to reduce
dissonance does not spontaneously transform a non-violent individual into a
terrorist. The process is gradual, and only over time do terrorists become more
committed to their organization and more disengaged from the outside world,
and less prone to self-censure (Bandura, 2004).
In sum, many terrorist organizations began as non-violent protest groups
that radicalized and became violent only over time, as non-violent tactics failed.
Recruits to already violent organizations also undergo a transformation, typically
first taking on non-violent roles, and only later becoming violent themselves.
Cognitive dissonance arises when these previously non-violent individuals discover
themselves contemplating using violence, dissonance that they are highly motivated
to reduce as explained by free choice paradigm principles. Bandura (2004, p. 140)
writes that the “development of the capability to kill is usually achieved through
an evolvement process, in which recruits may not recognize the transformation
they are undergoing.” The “evolvement process,” I argue, is possible because of
dissonance-reducing mechanisms.
In a study about recruitment to “high-risk activism,” (social activist activities
involving a high level of risk or danger to the participant), McAdam found that
individuals with a personal history of involvement in “safe” activism were more
likely to be successfully recruited into higher risk activism groups (McAdam,
1986). Although McAdam was writing about positive high-risk activism activities,
specifically participation in the pro-civil rights 1964 Freedom Summer movement, the
parallel between the gradual radicalization of high-risk activists and high-risk
terrorists is evident. McAdam found that a supportive network with a “pulling”
influence also characterized those who were successfully recruited into high-risk
activist activities. As will be discussed later, integration into a supportive network
(such as current terrorists trained to provide social support with a “pulling” influence to potential terrorists) is a strong dissonance-reducing mechanism.
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Before discussing the dissonance-reducing mechanisms that I propose are so
crucial to crossing the line from non-violent to violent, it is important to look
more closely at the individuals about whom I write. Who exactly are the men
(and increasingly women) drawn to and recruited by terrorist organizations?
Terrorist researchers consistently identify youth as an important trait of these
individuals. Abi-Hashem (2004, p. 178) describes how “leaders of the terrorist
organizations such as bin Laden must now engage in the recruitment process, and
naturally their attention is going to turn to young men and women. These young
people find themselves at a time in their life when they are looking to the future
with the hope of engaging in meaningful behavior that will be satisfying and get
them ahead.” This has serious implications for current terrorist leaders, who
find a reservoir of potential recruits in their countries’ youthful populations. For
example, the majority of modern Arab nations have populations that are at least
50% composed of individuals under age 25, which Zakaria (2003) describes
as a demographic time bomb. He asserts that as the bulging Arab youth population ages, frustration with poor economic prospects will translate into resentment
toward the Western world that was identified throughout childhood as the source
of their troubles.
Several studies have been conducted to analyze terrorists’ personalities. Although
little data support a tendency toward psychopathic personalities, two traits consistently appear—inability to tolerate uncertainty and low self-esteem. Hallett
(2004) describes how terrorists typically have an inability to tolerate uncertainty,
which is reflected by their eagerness to attach themselves to expansive, rigid
ideologies that leave little room for uncertainty. Similarly, terrorists tend to
adapt extremely rigid mentalities, which are more tolerable psychological states
for them (Woodberry, 2002). Terrorist organizations offer clear answers, and
specialize in minimizing uncertainty: “For the terrorist . . . blind commitment
to political, economic, religious, or philosophical beliefs comforts the mind by
eliminating or reducing the uncertainty . . . when beliefs become linked to the
meaning of life itself, the conviction becomes even more rigid” (Marsella,
2004, p. 42). I propose that this inability to tolerate uncertainty makes these
individuals particularly motivated to reduce dissonance, and makes them more
successful at it.
The second commonly identified terrorist personality trait is low self-esteem,
frequently accompanied by a strong need to be acknowledged as worthy ( Woodberry, 2002). Joining the terrorist organization provides a sense of identity and a
sense of worthiness. As Taylor and Louis (2004, p. 180) ask, “What could be more
attractive than an organization that offers a clear set of guidelines for how to
better the life for the individual and indeed for the entire group?” Again, this trait
also helps explain why some individuals are better at reducing dissonance than
others. If they have a low self-esteem, they might be more motivated to reduce
the dissonance that stands in the way of being accepted by an organization that
both makes them feel worthy and provides them with an identity.
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REDUCING DISSONANCE
Thus, a plethora of evidence suggests that most individuals are initially drawn to
terrorist organizations not because of their violent component, but rather because
of the sense of identity and purpose that membership offers. As discussed above,
it is frequently the central goal of the organization—to defend one’s Muslim
culture against destructive Western influence, for example—that appeals to future
terrorists, most of whom commence their involvement in terrorist organizations
with non-violent contributions such as hiding sought-after members or providing
secretarial services (Long, 1990). Frequently these individuals are initially ambivalent toward violent means of achieving sociopolitical goals; their affinity is
toward terrorist organizations’ ends, not their means (Crenshaw, 1986). What,
however, keeps these initially non-violent individuals in the organizations once
violence escalates? And perhaps more importantly, what psychological mechanisms are involved in these individuals’ choices to become violent themselves, and
in some cases to sacrifice their lives in suicidal attacks? The transition point from
non-violent organization supporter or member to actual violence perpetrator
marks the zenith of the individual’s level of cognitive dissonance. I propose that
what distinguishes terrorists from terrorist supporters is often the ability to reduce
this dissonance. This portion of the article examines five commonly identified
terrorist attributes that I propose function as dissonance-reducing mechanisms: (a)
just world bias, (b) social support, (c) prioritizing dream imagery over external
reality, (d) diffusion of responsibility, and (e) moral disengagement.
Just World Bias
One of the major themes emerging both from the rare interviews that terrorists
grant researchers and uncovered documents is that terrorists’ justifications for
their violent acts commonly are rooted in a just world bias, which I propose is
one of the most frequently employed and most effective dissonance-reducing
mechanisms terrorists use. The concept of a just world bias, introduced by Lerner
(1980), is essentially the assumption that people deserve their fates, that their fates
are “just.” The bias frequently catalyzes a process of devaluing victims and their
suffering because of the assumption that this suffering is deserved (Staub, 2004).
When terrorists view the current sociopolitical situation through the lens of a just
world bias, their attack victims are not unjustly hurt or killed, but rather deserve
these fates either because of what they did personally or, more commonly, because
of what their governments’ did.
In Terror in the Mind of God, Juergensmeyer (2000) describes how if an individual
or society perceives the world as peaceful, then violent acts are easily judged acts
of terrorism. However, if the world is perceived as being in a state of war, violent
acts appear more legitimate. In short, when previously non-violent individuals
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Andrea Kohn Maikovich
consider committing violence and subsequently experience cognitive dissonance,
they can reduce this dissonance by seeking out evidence to corroborate their
leaders’ vision of the world as already in a state of global war. This belligerent
outlook on the current world situation reframes their organization’s violent acts
as merely self-defensive or retributive acts of war against enemies, not innocents.
In an interview, Hamas founder Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi described how his organization’s “martyrs” (suicide bombers) acted in direct response to specific incidences of Israeli violence, usually violence that victimized innocent Palestinians
( Juergensmeyer, 2000). Rantisi explained how if Hamas did not use violence in
this manner, Israel would use violence against them. When asked how he could,
in good conscience, oversee and approve Hamas missions that frequently result
in the violent and brutal deaths of civilian women and children, Rantisi stated
simply: “We’re at war” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 73). He later expanded on his
statement, explaining that Hamas was at war with all of Israeli society because
Israeli citizens support the destruction of Islamic nationalism; therefore, the IsraeliHamas war can involve no innocent Israeli victims, because all Israeli society
members are war enemies.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C., the face and words of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden became
infamous in the Western world. This terrorist leader’s rhetoric illustrates how a
just world bias can serve as a dissonance-reducing mechanism for terrorists; his
assertions that al Qaeda’s actions are defensive against the aggressive, intrusive,
unjust United States have become mantras. In a 1997 CNN interview, bin Laden
warned that, “A reaction might take place as a result of the U.S. government’s
hitting Muslim civilians and executing more than 600,000 Muslim children in
Iraq by preventing food and medicine from reaching them. So, the U.S. is responsible for any reaction, because it extended its war against troops to civilians” (Bin
Laden, 1997). Thus, even four years before the September 11th attacks, bin
Laden began establishing his official position that future al Qaeda violence would
be in response to United States actions. He would act defensively. He would act
out of necessity. He could not be held responsible for any aggressive actions.
When bin Laden later spoke to his organization and to the Western world
through the Al Jazeera network three years following the September 11th attacks,
his rationale echoed his 1997 warnings: “God knows it did not cross our minds
to attack the towers but after the situation became unbearable and we witnessed
the injustice and tyranny of the American-Israeli alliance against our people in
Palestine and Lebanon, I thought about it. And the events that affected me
directly were that of 1982 and the events that followed—when America allowed
the Israelis to invade Lebanon, helped by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. As I watched the
destroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me punish the unjust the same way
[and] to destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we are tasting
and to stop killing our children and women” (Bin Laden, 2001). The consistency,
repetition, and skillfully crafted rhetoric that are evident in not only these two
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examples of bin Laden’s speeches, but also in the bulk of all of his communication,
powerfully reinforce the just world bias.
Recent terrorist studies suggest that this type of rhetoric, which reframes each
organization member’s role from terrorist to defensive soldier fighting a war, is
both successful and extremely common. Juergensmeyer (2000) conducted interviews with multiple terrorists, nearly all of whom emphatically insisted that the
term “terrorist” was not applicable to them. They were simply “militants” fighting a battle. For example, a Lutheran pastor convicted in a terrorist abortion
bombing case described how he resorted to violence only because it was the sole
way to defend the unborn against murderers, which made his violence not terrorism but a defensive attack in an ongoing war against baby killers ( Juergensmeyer,
2000). Belfast citizens deemed terrorists by Western standards declared themselves
“paramilitaries;” Hamas suicide bombings were merely war “operations” in the
words of the group’s leaders. After extensive interviews with Hamas leaders,
Juergensmeyer (2000) concluded that the organization’s leaders, like the leaders of
so many other terrorist groups, conceptualize their organization as an army that
plans violent attacks that are both defensive and necessary.
In Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, Schmid
and de Graff (1982) provide a table, which presents further examples of diametrically opposed terminology and concepts for terrorist-related issues (table 2).
The American Reverend Michael Bray’s defense of anti-abortion terrorist acts
further illustrates how the just world bias functions as a dissonance-reducing
mechanism ( Juergensmeyer, 2000). In a 1996 interview, Bray defended the use
of violence against abortion doctors, and even the murder of these doctors, by
Table II Some In-Group & Out-Group Labelings for the Same Thing
Out-Group Labeling
In-Group Labeling
Criminal
Terrorist
Murderer
Gang
Subversive Element
Bloodbath
Lunatic
Mercenary
Threat
Aggression
Assassin
Propaganda
Extremist Fanatic
Attack
Hired Killer
Murder
Revolutionary
Guerrilla
Freedom Fighter
Army
Liberator
Purge
Martyr
Soldier
Warning
Preventive Counter-Strike
Avenger
Communiqué
Dedicated Anti-Imperialist
Operation
Example of Revolutionary Solidarity
Revolutionary Justice
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Andrea Kohn Maikovich
explaining that once again this violence is merely defensive in an ongoing war in
American society (a war, he emphasized, that is largely unnoticed due to its
gradual and subtle onset and progression). This war, according to Bray, is similar
to World War II, because in both instances violence is justified ( Juergensmeyer,
2001). Specifically, Bray maintains that just as violence against Hitler and the
Nazis much earlier in the war would have prevented the murder of millions of
Jews, violence against baby killers is justified now to prevent the future murder of
millions of unborn children. Juergensmeyer (2000, p. 150) notes that “Michael
Bray’s vision of a world caught in an imminent and almost eschatological confrontation between the forces of good and evil arrayed on the battlefield of politics
is not idiosyncratic,” but rather is extremely similar to the views expounded by
many groups responsible for recent terrorist attacks, including Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman and his Egypt and New Jersey factions, the
militant Sikhs in India, and Rabbi Kahane’s Kach party in Israel.
As discussed previously, terrorist organizations frequently increase their use of
violence with time. The dissonance that the increased use of force arouses is
further reduced by the addition of consonant cognitions in the form of evidence
that non-violent tactics were attempted before resorting to violence. Hamas
founder Rantisi emphasized that originally Hamas militants exclusively targeted
Israeli soldiers, and that “every measure” was taken to prevent both massacres
and the necessity of suicide bombings ( Juergensmeyer, 2000). However, in 1990
when Israeli police attacked Palestinian demonstrators near the Dome of the
Rock, and when Dr. Baruch Goldstein massacred Palestinians in Hebron during
Ramadan, Hamas was forced to conclude that Israel was attacking, and was at
war with, the entire Palestinian society. Thus, Hamas resorted to retaliation and
self-defense. Rantisi emphasized that Hamas terrorists are victims in this ongoing
great struggle, and certainly are not the cause of it. He lamented that America
perceives his organization as aggressive, which he identifies as America’s number
one misunderstanding.
One of the reasons why I propose that a just world bias is so effective as a
dissonance-reducing mechanism is that in the current international sociopolitical
state, it is not difficult for many individuals to interpret Israel’s military behavior,
or much of the United States’ military behavior, as aggressive. As Dr. Max Manwaring of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (2001)
described, there are many actions that fall somewhere in the gray area between
war and peace, and these gray area actions will likely only increase in number in
the future. It is not difficult, then, to add consonant cognitions to corroborate
one’s dissonance-reducing conception of a world at war by interpreting actions in
the “gray area” as simply more black-and-white than perhaps they actually are.
Some researchers suggest that it is now especially easy to accumulate evidence
supporting the just world bias given the current United States administration’s
venture into the domain of preemption (Abi-Hashem, 2004). In the words of Steele
(2002, p. 14), the United States now claims “the right to strike, pre-emptively, at
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any nation which it decides is developing weapons of mass destruction or supporting terrorism. It is carte blanche for war on the world.”
Ironically and tragically, the Western media’s current language and images feed
the mouths of terrorists hungry for dissonance-reducing evidence to support their
just world bias and perception of a world at war with pugnacious Americans on
the offensive. For example, following the September 11th World Trade Center
attacks, Steve Dunleavy wrote in a New York Post article: “The response to this
unimaginable 21st-century Pearl Harbor should be as simple as it is swift—kill the
bastards. A gunshot between the eyes, blow them to smithereens, poison them if
you have to. As for cities or countries that host these worms, bomb them into
basketball courts” (Piven, 2002, p. 138). Rich Lowry, editor of The National
Review, similarly wrote: “America roused to a righteous anger has always been a
force for good. States that have been supporting if not Osama bin Laden, people
like him need to feel pain. If we flatten part of Damascus or Tehran or whatever
it takes, that is part of the solution” (Piven, 2002, p. 138). On September 11,
2001, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told CNN, “There is only
one way to begin to deal with people like this, and that is you have to kill some
of them even if they are not immediately directly involved in this thing” (Piven,
2002, p. 138). A vicious cycle thus emerges: terrorists attack “defensively” and out
of necessity in a world at war with eye-for-an-eye battleground ethics, prompting
their victims to respond with belligerent rhetoric and a display of force. Terrorists
interpret this response as further evidence of the need for self-defense, which
reduces any dissonance associated with acting violently against the West. The
terrorists respond with more attacks. And it continues.
Social Support
Terrorist researchers frequently describe the strong social network that supports
individuals as they train for terrorist missions. Again, I propose that this common
feature can best be understood not simply as a common feature, but also as an
important and powerful dissonance-reducing mechanism. Bandura (2004, p. 141)
asserts that, “the merchandising of terrorism is not accomplished by a few unsavory individuals. It requires a worldwide network of people, including reputable,
high-level members of society, who contribute to the deathly enterprise by insulating fractionation of the operations and displacement and diffusion of responsibility.” I discuss displacement and diffusion of responsibility later in this paper, but
first focus on the “worldwide network of people” Bandura describes that supports
and insulates each terrorist.
Festinger validated the ability of social support to reduce dissonance in his
foundational studies conducted using the belief-disconfirmation research paradigm (Festinger et al., 1956). Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956) studied a
Lake City cult, the members of which believed that aliens had revealed to them
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the date on which a flood would destroy the world. The only human survivors
would be members of their cult, who would be evacuated by flying saucers. When
the doom’s day date passed (and the world still existed), the individuals who had
spent the supposedly ill-fated day with their fellow cult members did not lose their
faith in the prophesy, but rather believed that God had decided to prevent the
flood because the cult was such a force for good. However, individuals who were
not with their cult on the pre-set date lost their faith in the prophesy and left the
cult. Furthermore, after the date passed, those still in the cult proselytized much
more passionately and frequently than before, seeking out further social support
for their beliefs by recruiting and converting new members. Festinger interpreted
this behavior as an attempt to reduce dissonance by adding consonant cognitions,
namely by seeking reassurance from each other and by increasing the number of
believers. Based on the increased faith of the cult members, their dissonance was
clearly dramatically reduced.
Arguably this dissonance-reducing mechanism operates in terrorist organizations as well, as research indicates that terrorist organizations operate similarly to
cults (Long, 1990). As discussed above, frequently terrorists make great sacrifices
to join their organization, and sometimes agree to make the ultimate sacrifice of
their life, with the understanding that their actions will help lead to the ultimate
defeat of their perceived enemies in the near future. Even as terrorist leaders’
promises of imminent victory over the West fail to materialize, with each attack
terrorists’ beliefs that they will soon prevail strengthen (Long, 1990). Festinger et
al. (1956) hypothesized that five conditions must be met in order for there to be
this increased passion and fervor for a cause following disconfirmation of a belief:
the belief is held with deep conviction and has some relevance to the believer’s
actions; the belief holder has committed him/herself to the belief, and has committed an important action for the sake of the belief; the belief is specific and
concerned with the real world, and thereby is vulnerable to refutation; undeniable
disconfirmatory evidence occurs and is recognized by the belief holder; and the
belief holder has strong social support. When all five of these conditions are met, as they
frequently are for terrorists, one’s underlying faith in the holiness and importance
of the cause or belief becomes more passionate and engrained. Dissonance is
reduced, paving the way for more violent actions in the future.
The wider the social support network available for terrorists to tap into, the
more dissonance is reduced. Often isolation and secrecy from friends and family
is one of the most difficult aspects of joining a cult or terrorist organization, but
when family and close friends offer support, as they increasingly do in many
terrorist-saturated regions of the modern world, dissonance is reduced even
further. A clear example is found in modern day Palestine. Funerals held for young
Palestinian suicide bombers are not somber events, but are rather celebrations
that frequently inspire other youth to become terrorists themselves (Abi-Hashem,
2004). The powerful dissonance-reducing potential of social support is no secret
to terrorist leaders, even if they understand social support simply to be an effective
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means of encouraging self-sacrifice. Once a potential terrorist is identified, organization leaders go to great lengths to ensure that he is continuously surrounded
by supportive individuals who both encourage him to become a terrorist, and
isolate him from outsiders who would present a different perspective (Post, 2001).
Once someone makes the decision to become a suicide bomber, the tight network of
supporters becomes even more insulating and supportive. Hamas founder Rantisi
described in an interview how, for example, young Palestinians who agree to
become martyrs/suicide bombers are instructed to sign friendship pacts and write
goodbye letters to their families in order to solidify their decision ( Juergensmeyer,
2000). It is very rare for terrorists to act alone, and one of the most common
terrorist attributes is a strong social network (Long, 1990).
Seeking social support is therefore a very easy means of reducing dissonance.
Just as it is not difficult to interpret American actions in such a way as to deem
them evidence corroborating a just world bias, it is also not difficult to tap into a
widespread support network, which both adds consonant cognitions and simultaneously reduces dissonant cognitions (through becoming isolated from people
with different opinions). Indeed, one of the most frightening aspects of these
powerful dissonance-reducing mechanisms is that they are so easy to utilize. Ditzler
(2004, p. 201) describes how, “as a general rule, every handful of core terrorist
operators who actually commit acts of violence are supported by a structure that
evolves outward in an onion-layer fashion to include tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of persons who provide varying degrees of support.” The two
dissonance-reducing mechanisms discussed thus far frequently work together, as
often vast networks of terrorists and supporters share the just world bias that
legitimizes the use of violence. Juergensmeyer (2000) describes how in order for
terrorist acts to be executed successfully, usually a large community of support is
necessary. Only a large amount of social support can legitimize such acts of
violence.
For those who commit the largest and most brutal attacks, or for those who
sacrifice their own lives, dissonance may be so high that support from within the
organization is not enough to reduce it. Studies reveal that the most infamous
terrorists frequently relied on outside support networks (real or imagined) to
increase consonant cognitions ( Juergensmeyer, 2000). There are several elucidatory examples of this phenomenon: Yigal Amir, Yitzhak Rabin’s assassin, emphasized his enormous amount of support from the Messianic Zionism movement
both in Israel and abroad; both Timothy McVeigh, who was partially responsible
for the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, and Buford Furrow, the purported attacker of a Jewish daycare center, relied
on support from a militant Christian subculture with wide roots spread throughout the entire United States; Unabomber Theodor Kaczynski claimed that he
was supported by the “strident student activist culture” dominating the late 1960s;
and the “trenchcoat culture” in theory supported the two 1999 Columbine killers
in Littleton, Colorado. In all cases, the terrorists maintained that their vast, some© The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
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times international network of supporters confirmed the defensive and necessary
nature of their violence, once again pointing to a strong link between a just world
bias and social support.
I digress here briefly to note that psychologically oriented social psychologists
have traditionally held the entire concept of cognitive dissonance in higher esteem
than have more sociologically oriented social psychologists and sociologists (Spilka
et al., 2003). Spilka et al. suggest that the reason for this divergence of opinions
is that psychologists have traditionally adopted more of an outsider’s perspective,
identifying the presence of dissonant beliefs by rational, objective criteria. For
example, Festinger assumed that cult members experienced dissonance after their
prophesy of the world’s end was undeniably disconfirmed (i.e. the world still
existed). In contrast, Spilka et al. note that sociologists have traditionally adopted
more of an insider’s perspective, focusing on a “socially constructed reality incapable of any simply [sic] falsification” (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 358).
For example, although from an outsider’s objective perspective the end of the
world prophesy certainly did fail, from an insider’s perspective the prophesy might
not have failed at all (Pollner, 1987). Specifically, recent sociologists and sociologically oriented psychologists have observed “failed” prophesies interpreted by
cult members as tests of faith from God (Tumminia, 1998). Bainbridge points to
the historical example of Jehovah’s Witness Charles Taze’s failed prediction of
Christ’s return in 1874, highlighting the fact that Taze’s followers reported believing that Christ had returned invisibly (Bainbridge, 1997). In sum, many current
authors have repeatedly found examples of such “spiritualization,” the process by
which failed prophecies are reinterpreted as having been fulfilled (Zygmunt,
1972).
I note this because some sociologists and more sociologically oriented psychologists might argue that labeling anti-Western terrorists’ beliefs “dissonance-reducing”
is flawed because I have assumed a Western perspective. From the terrorists’
perspective, a violent way of life might make complete sense, and might actually
not lead to dissonance at all. Perceiving the world through a just world bias lens
is not, in other words, a defense mechanism to reduce dissonance if the world
really is, to them, at war. As discussed above, in recent years Western leaders’
belligerent language has substantiated this view. This perspective is certainly valid;
however, because terrorists have reported having to overcome ambivalent emotions in order to commit acts of violence, and because of the extreme measures
terrorist organization leaders take to reduce the guilt and uncertainty (or dissonance) experienced by their new recruits, there is good reason to believe that
potential terrorists do in fact face the psychological task of overcoming dissonance.
My identification of a just world bias serving a dissonance-reducing purpose for
terrorists does not mean, certainly, that this belief lacks all epistemic merit. While
I do acknowledge that I am writing from a Western psychological perspective, this
certainly is not the only valid perspective from which to examine this complex
phenomenon.
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Dream Imagery
The third common terrorist trait that I propose serves as a major dissonancereducing mechanism is the utilization of dreams and dream imagery as justification for violence. The heavy emphasis on dream imagery and its legitimacy as a
source of guidance has deep roots in many terrorists’ cultures, religions, and
backgrounds. For example, the Afghanistan Taliban movement was founded in
1994 after its future leader, Mullah Omar, reported a dream in which God
ordered him to restore order ( Judah, 2001). Omar’s disciples interpreted the
dream as proof of God’s will to create the movement (Edgar, 2004). Osama bin
Laden reportedly relied on dreams as justification for many of his terrorist acts.
When his followers questioned him about why they themselves had not experienced such dreams, bin Laden convincingly explained that God would not want
everyone to see the dream images because this would threaten the secrecy of the
attack plans (Lines, 2001). In one of his final emails, United Kingdom shoe
bomber Richard Reid talked about how his dreams revealed to him special divine
meaning about his role and duty as an Islamic militant (Edgar, 2004).
One way terrorists reduce the dissonance aroused when they contemplate utilizing violence, then, is to emphasize their dreams over external reality, thereby
increasing consonant cognitions. The dreams, or reported dreams, are consonant
with their acts of violence; external reality frequently is dissonant. As suggested
in early versions of cognitive dissonance theory, there are four basic strategies for
reducing dissonance: remove dissonant cognitions, add new consonant cognitions,
reduce the importance of dissonant cognitions, or increase the importance of
consonant cognitions (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). In emphasizing the authority of dream images, terrorists both add consonant cognitions
and augment these consonant cognitions’ importance. Researchers have noted
that, “it may be the case that some militant members, such as Richard Reid . . .
the shoe bomber, are motivated or perhaps reassured by their dreams as to their
path in life” (Edgar, 2004, p. 28). I propose that what motivates this action is
dissonance, and that the reassurance the dreams provide stems from their ability
to reduce that dissonance.
Diffusion of Responsibility and Moral Disengagement
The final two terrorist traits that I propose function as dissonance reducing mechanisms have much to do with the terrorist organization itself. The traits, diffusion
of responsibility (Zanna & Sande, 1987) and moral disengagement (Bandura et
al., 1996), are related. Researchers have repeatedly shown that individuals tend
to act more violently when a legitimate authority source accepts responsibility
for their actions (Diener, 1977; Milgram, 1974). Tilker (1970) found that displacement of responsibility lessens concern about the well-being of others who are
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being mistreated, and also lessens the moral restraints one feels on one’s own
actions. Terrorist organizations are typically extremely hierarchical, so that those who
actually commit the violent acts can nearly always be said to be following orders
of some higher authority. According to Bandura (2004, p. 132), “the higher the
authorities, the more legitimacy, respect, and coercive power they command, the
more willing people are to defer to them.” Terrorist organizations are designed so
that the leaders are extremely legitimate, commanding of respect, and powerful.
Kilham and Mann (1974) found that individuals in the middle of a hierarchy
of command most easily experience moral disengagement, since they are not held
responsible for actually making the decisions, but also are not held responsible for
actually carrying out the acts of violence. Often future terrorists fill these middle
hierarchical roles, such as secretarial work, for some time before actually becoming perpetrators of violence themselves. In addition, some of the most important
components of terrorist organizations include these middle roles, such as weapons
supplier. These crucial individuals sometimes very consciously use moral disengagement to reduce dissonance. The testimony of Frank Terpil, an ex-CIA agent
turned terrorist entrepreneur, is illustrative (Thomas, 1982).
Terpil, who supplied terror weapons and torture instruments to anti-American
terrorist groups worldwide, reported that he made a conscious effort to avoid any
information about the ultimate use of his “supplies.” He reported, “I don’t ever
want to know that” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 141). He emphasized that his job
was a weapons dealer; he focused on his job, not on any consequences for human
victims: “If I really thought about the consequences all the time, I certainly
wouldn’t have been in this business. You have to blank it off.” He explicitly stated
that he did not feel responsible for any ends to which the weapons were put, and
that avoiding knowledge about the weapons’ use helped him to avoid feeling any
sense of responsibility.
Crenshaw (1986) describes another example of conscious use of moral disengagement as a dissonance-reducing mechanism. Layla Khalid, a member of the
terrorist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), participated in the
1969 hijacking of a Trans World Airline plane en route to Damascus. In an
interview, Khalid described how the only way in which she could carry through
with the hijacking was to consciously repress thoughts about the potential negative consequences for child passengers on the plane.
As seen above, individuals involved in terrorism actively reduce dissonance
within themselves by avoiding potentially unappealing information about their
actions and by placing responsibility on a higher authority. Terrorist leaders,
however, also make a huge effort to reduce dissonance in new recruits by shielding
them from unappealing information. Much of this is achieved through isolating
potential terrorists from their families and outside friends, as discussed above.
Bandura (2004) describes how terrorist organizations are adept at managing their
communication systems in such a way that members are uninformed (or even
misinformed) about the harm resulting from their group’s actions.
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Finally, when terrorist organizations take hostages, they often displace responsibility onto the countries of which the hostages are citizens, stating that it is up
to that country’s government to meet their demands (Bandura, 2004). In these
cases, dissonance is reduced by eliminating dissonant cognitions (by not focusing
on the original kidnapping), and by adding consonant cognitions (by focusing on
the fact that it is up to the hostage’s government to save the kidnapped individual). For example, when Kashmiri rebels took American and European hostages
after the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa in 1995, they reported that they “did
not necessarily want to murder the young men . . . but felt they had an obligation
to be true to their word after they had threatened to kill them if their demands
were not met” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 210).
CONCLUSION
Sternberg (2003, p. 299) wrote that, “the beginning of the 21st century has seen
a renewal of terrorism on a grand scale that threatens the entire world.” Clearly
there is a great need for further studies looking at the roots of terrorism, with the
ultimate goal of developing effective interventions to reduce terrorism. The theory
proposed here is by no means complete, nor is it all-encompassing. There are
likely many individual terrorists and terrorist organizations whose actions cannot
be explained by cognitive dissonance principles. In addition, this process of reducing dissonance before committing acts of violence is not unique to terrorism, but
likely also operates in other non-violent individuals turned violent. However, it is
important to note that many violent individuals grew up under circumstances that
normalized and even promoted violence, and some were likely born with genetic
predispositions for impulsive and aggressive personalities. For many violent individuals, then, violence is a reasonable conflict-reducing strategy that does not
cause any dissonance whatsoever. My theory applies exclusively to those who are
initially non-violent, and for whom violence is not initially appealing.
When the Western world declared a “War on Terrorism,” it adopted the principle of revenge, of violence as a response to violence. Arguably the belligerent
language of Western leaders feeds terrorists’ well-documented just world bias;
belligerent rhetoric adds the consonant cognition that America and the Western
world are at war and therefore terrorism is a justified means of self-defense. Just
one example of this rhetoric is President Bush’s speech that, “We are at the
beginning of what I view as a very long struggle against evil. We’re not fighting
a nation; we’re not fighting a religion; we’re fighting evil. And we have no choice
but to prevail. We’re fighting people that hate our values, they can’t stand what
America stands for. And they really don’t like the fact that we exist. And I want
to assure you all that we will fight this fight on every front. We will use every
resource we have. And there is no doubt . . . in my mind that in our time, we will
prevail.” (Bush, 2001). While clearly terrorism provokes anger and the desire for
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revenge, if we understand that this belligerent language fuels the just world bias
and reduces terrorists’ dissonance, we can see that it actually contributes to the
ever-escalating cycle of violence.
Marsella (2004, p. 13) writes that, “The governments of the United States,
Great Britain, and Israel hold that terrorism can be defeated through vigilance,
counterterrorism, and the elimination of terrorist resources. However . . . these
actions alone, potent though they may be, can never be sufficient to stem the tide
of terrorism, which springs from human discontent with and resentment of inequality and indifference and from widespread beliefs that violence is justified in
the face of oppression and insult.” Similarly, Bandura (2004, p. 143) writes that,
“A focus on fighting violence with violence while neglecting needed long-term
remedies is likely to produce an escalative cycle of terror and retaliation.”
I argue that there is a desperate need for more peace psychology research on
terrorism. Clearly there is a need to respond to acts of terrorism, and world
leaders must be presented with potentially effective non-violent means of intervention so that they have an alternative to violence. Of course the details of
diplomacy and international policy are the material for a different article, but
suffice it to say here that this theory suggests that fighting violence with violence,
although sometimes effective in the short run at destroying certain groups of
terrorists, not only will not halt the recruitment and fostering of future terrorists
and terrorist organizations, but will actually fuel it. We should be careful not to
use terrorist attacks as our own dissonance-reducing mechanisms that fuel our
own just world bias.
Andrea Maikovich
University of Pennsylvania
3720 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
[email protected].
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Peter Salovey for his mentorship and guidance during the completion of this article. I would also like to thank Marsha and
William Maikovich, Derek Fong, and four anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments on various drafts.
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B, W.S. (1997). The sociology of religious movements. New York: Routledge.
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