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Review: Paying the Price of Failure: Reconstructing Failed and Collapsed States in Africa and Central Asia Author(s): John R. Heilbrunn Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 135-150 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688633 . Accessed: 31/07/2011 18:14 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Perspectives on Politics. http://www.jstor.org Review Essay the Price of Failure: Paying and Failed Reconstructing States in Africa and Central Collapsed Asia John R. Heilbrunn Eurasiain ComBeissinger,MarkR. and CrawfordYoung,eds. BeyondStateCrisis?Postcolonial Africaand Post-Soviet parativePerspective (Washington,D.C.: The WoodrowWilson CenterPress,2002). in Authorityand Control(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Lessons Herbst,Jeffrey.StatesandPowerin Africa:Comparative Press,2000). Luong, PaulineJones.InstitutionalChangeand PoliticalContinuityin PostSovietCentralAsia (New York:Cambridge UniversityPress,2002). PoliticsandAfricanStates(Boulder:LynneRiennerPublishers,Inc., 1998). Reno, William. Warlord in a Timeof Terror(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution Rotberg,RobertI., ed. StateFailureand StateWeakness Press,2003). (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004). Rotberg,RobertI., ed. WhenStatesFail: Causesand Consequences Introduction rchitectsof stateshavepuzzledoverthedilemmaof balancinggroup interestsin orderto protectminority rightsand preventa dictatorshipof the majority. If the architects fail in this regard, unresolved conflicts may undermine political stability and lead to authoritarian rule or violence. JamesMadison brilliantlyframesthis problem in "Federalist10" when he cautions that it is criticalto "breakand control the violence of faction."1An inability to strike a balance and control the impulse of factions to dominate political processesrisks tyranny or conflict as groups seek other means to redresstheir grievances. Despite the relativesuccessof most political leaders in their efforts to balance factional interests, some have failed and the states they governhave collapsedinto anar- John R. Heilbrunnis AssistantProfessorin the Graduate at Programin InternationalPoliticalEconomyof Resources the ColoradoSchoolofMines. Heilbrunnhaspublications on democracyin Africa, corruptionin France,and is currentlywritinga bookanalyzinginstitutionalchangeamong Africaspetroleumeconomies.Theauthorgratefullyacknowledgeshelpfulcommentsfrom VincentFoucher,Phil Keefer,Nic van de Walle,and the anonymousreviewersof Perspectiveson Politics. chy. The unfortunatepeople who live in these countries suffer war, dictatorship,warlords, criminal leaders, and constant threatsto their physicalwell-being. After a cessation of violence, however,politiciansand citizensundertake the daunting challengeof reconstructingthe state. This paper arguesthat afterviolent conflict and political collapse,people demand basicpublic servicesthat only statescan supply.Reconstructionof a state,howeverflawed the process and outcome, is inevitable after conflict and collapse. The essay suggests that state reconstruction is nonethelessa complex processthat requiressequencingof reformsto enable the resumption of essentialpublic services. How to achieve reconstructionis the central challenge that the leadersof post-conflictstatesmust overcome. To make its argument,the essay reviewssix exemplary contributions to a growing literature on state construction, failure, and collapse. The question of state construction is the central puzzle explored in the three single-authormonographsand three edited volumes this essayreviews.William Reno's WarlordPoliticsand African Statesbuilds on his earlierargumentsthat a shadow state emergesin circumstanceswhere the formalstate is unable to fulfill its obligations. In Statesand Powerin Africa,Jeffrey Herbst suggeststhat Africahas sufferedfrom imperfect state construction, low population densities, and a lack of integration into the world economy. The crucial implicationof StatesandPowerin Africais that a tragically March2006 l Vol. 4/No. 1 135 Review Essay I Payingthe Priceof Failure dysfunctionalstatesystemhas evolvedin Africathat denies citizens a political space in which they can mediate their interests.As a result, conditions of anarchyand state collapse have become common. By contrast, Pauline Jones Luong's InstitutionalChangeand Political Continuityin PostSovietCentralAsiashows how CentralAsian political leadersnegotiatedarrangementsthat shapedthe statesthat they governed after the collapse of Russian colonialism. However, as much as CentralAsian rulersenjoy political stability, Luong presents a milieu in which neopatrimonialismand nepotismhavebecome increasinglyentrenched in the polities. The developments in Central Asia bear disturbingsimilaritiesto post-independenceAfrica. The threeedited volumes contributerich case materials and conceptualessayson state failureand collapse.Beyond State Crisisis an excellent volume that compares experiences in Central Asia and Africa. While it may initially seem a most different comparative exercise, the editors assembleessaysthatformpairedcomparisonsof two regions that bear many similarities.Although conceptuallymore in a Timeof Terror narrow,StateFailureand StateWeakness that case materials complement the conceptual presents in When States Fail. Together these chapters assembled three volumes present theoreticalessays and case studies that are useful for students and practitioners. weakenedstates This literaturesuggeststhatprogressively in Africaand CentralAsia have providedlimited security, public services,and economic predictability.Democratic institutions characterizedby a "matrixof embedded civil liberties"areabsent in failed states.2Some stateshave collapsed altogether;their citizens live in a Hobbesianworld of povertyandviolence.Suchconditionshavebeen inflicted on people in countriesas diverseas Congo, Liberia,Sierra Leone, Sudan, and parts of Armenia, Russia,and Uzbekistan, to provide just a few examples.The persistenceof unrepresentative government, poor economic performance, and dangerousliving conditions has led some analysts to question whether the state is a viable organization in low income countries. However, without a deep consideration of alternativesto which the authors obliquely allude,it is unclearwhat arrangementsareproposedbeyond warlords and anarchy.This failure to consider concrete alternativesis perhapsthe criticalomission in these books. The argument This essayproposesa contributionto theoreticalapproaches to state construction with a focus on Africa and Central Asia. It questions the validity of argumentsthat a small number of failed states in Africaand CentralAsia constitutes sufficientevidence to assertthat a new type of organization has emerged. First, weak states persist in both these areas.The most common scenariois that politicians enact policies that are determined by distressinglevels of poverty.Only a very small subset of countrieshas experi136 Perspectives on Politics enced state failureand collapse.Second, argumentsto the effect that after violent conflicts, fragmentedcommunities in low income countriescreatesustainablealternatives to states fail to recognize that many public services are subject to scale economies. Warlordrule is typicallyfor a short period and is therefore unsustainable.It provides neither freedom from violence nor the basic servicesthat populations need after conflicts. This essay suggests that regardlessof academicdebates, after conflicts, people act collectivelyto establisha statethat suppliesessentialservices. States inevitably re-emergein post-conflict countries. When conflicts end, people return to their homes and delegate responsibilitiesto political leadersto rebuild the agencies that provide education, health care, police, and road construction, etc. The resulting complex organization, a state, is thereforean inevitableoutcome. To assert that people accept non-state options is to imply that citizens arepassivepolicy takersafterconflicts. Such passivity may occur in the face of continuing violence, but when given choices aboutwhat organizationto reconstruct,people are active in their efforts to construct agencies and associationsthat have functional goals and, when assembled together,compose a state. Both internal and externalpressuresaccount for state reconstruction.First,the state is a complex political organization that people collectivelyestablishto provideessential services. When citizens delegate responsibilities to politicians,they demand familiarorganizationsto provide security,conflictmediation,rulesto selectleaders,and basic civil liberties.With few exceptions,politiciansreconstruct administrativeentitiesfromearlierexperiences;rarearethe leaderswho undertakenovel political solutions to reconstructstateswith new institutionalarrangements.Second, aspeopleresumetheireconomiclivelihoods,theycreaterecognizable associationsand join political partiesto articulatetheireconomicandsocialinterests.Third,a resumption of economic activitiesbinds many individualsto the land. Their mobility is thereforelimited. This limited mobility alsoreinforcesincentivesto mediatepoliticalarrangements with competitorsand form associationswith like-minded peopleformutualgain.Finally,statescompriseagenciesthat representtheir countries internationallyand are the basis forcooperationand development.Followingconflict,every governmentrequiresan organizationto representits intereststo internationaldonorsanddiplomaticmissions.Hence, state reconstructionis all but inevitable. To separateexperiencesof contemporaryAfrican and CentralAsianstatesas uniquefailuresignoresthat throughout history, states have failed, collapsed, and reformed. Failuremayoccurwhen politiciansbreakmediatedarrangements because their constituents perceive that bargains are no longer respected.In these circumstances,communities atomizeand people compete for scarcepublic goods. Recent researchhas demonstratedthat this competition is aggravatedin countries like SierraLeone that possess abundantnaturalresources;violent actorshave incentives to loot diamonds to financetheirwar.3However,it is only a small subset of statesthat sufferthe emergenceof violent non-state actors, a breakdown of community, and state collapse.When conflicts end, this essayproposes,political leadersmobilizeavailableresourcesto reconstructthe state and furnish essentialpublic goods. The most elementarypublic good is security;without security,stateconstructionis impossible.It was the increasing capacity of Europe'skings to provide security from brigandsduring the late Middle Ages that contributedto the growth of trade.4 Since the seventeenth century, a crucialevolutionhas been "theincreasingtendencyof states to monitor, control, and monopolize the effective means of violence."5 Control over the means of violence is a defining characteristicof the state. In exchangefor security, citizens pay taxes, compromisewith others, contribute to civic life, participatein government, and concede to majorityrule.To question whether the state as an organization is still relevantfor Africa and Central Asia ultimately requires a systematic assessment of sustainable alternatives.Such a systematic analysisneeds to consider how people would receive the services they demand following state failureif not from a state. A failed state has a minimal bureaucracythat imperfectly deliverspublic goods; its citizensmust providesecurity and mediate conflicts on an ad hoc or informalbasis, and social services are partiallydelivered. In a collapsed state, by contrast, citizens have no channels to mediate conflicts, public servicesare unavailable,and in the worst cases, they are subject to random violence. Warlordsand militia contest the state's monopoly over the means of violence and administrative,economic, political,and social organizationsfragment into smaller units. A weak state fails when it inadequatelydeliversservicesthroughout its territoryand is incapableof mediating factionalinterests; a failedstate collapseswhen its bureaucracyceasesto function, public servicesareunavailable,and violence becomes commonplace. To structureits argument,the essaypresentsthis introduction and then considersin the firstsection, some antecedents of state failure in Africa and CentralAsia. These antecedentsarefound in colonialism, noteworthyfor partial state construction evident in a routine use of violence and a failure to administer the entire territoryunder its jurisdiction.This failurewas compounded by the partial imposition of Europeanadministrativemodels on African and CentralAsian populations that neglected to create a political arenawhereinfolk could articulatetheir demands and compromise on policy. In the second section, the essayexaminessome elements of state failure.It notes that afterindependence,statesin Africaand CentralAsia Were progressivelycapturedby illegitimate and corrupt political leaders.Although these states have stumbled along as semi-democracies and authoritarian regimes, few con- structedan efficient, sustainablepolity. The lack of legitimate government was compounded by problems of economic mismanagement.In section three,the essaysuggests that state construction depends on the definition of the rule of law, effectiveelectoralrules,and guaranteesfor an active civil society.It concludes that afterwar and civil conflict,politicalleadersreconstructstatesto mediateinterests, deliverfundamentalpublic services,and reconstruct political space. Common themes The books under reviewhere sharea number of common themes. First, the authorsaccept the Weberiandefinition of a state as a complex organization that administersa defined territoryand has a monopoly over the means of violence. Here, the common unit of analysisis the state as a political organization that is a historic product of mediatedinterests.The Weberiandefinition of the state is crucialsince path dependentargumentssuggestthat institutionalfailureis a resultof partialstateconstructionunder colonial rule.A second common theme in this literatureis how colonial administrationsaffected state construction in Africa and Central Asia. The editors of BeyondState Crisispresentan analyticcomparisonof differentcolonial experiencesof Africaand CentralAsia.They assertthat in both regions the "territorialgrids of authority imposed over these populations"have shapedadministrativestructures and contributedto the "conflictualcharacterof cultural politics after independence".6 Many populations experiencedthe partialstate construction of colonialism, yet only a few have failed, much less collapsed.Hence, the causes of state failure must be sought in variablesother than colonialism alone. Colonial administrationsleft deeply flawed states by selectivelyincluding some groups while excluding others from the political arena.For instance,the size of an ethnic group in a country relativeto othershad a distinct impact on its post-colonial influence. Some groups evolved into "veto players"whose agreement with particularpolicies was essential for any shift from the status quo.7 Others were transformedinto permanent minorities unable to affect any policy outcomes. Recent researchhas shown that the methods by which post-colonial authoritiescreated "individualpolitical ideals, opinions, identities, and preferences"have a strong effect on state building.8As a consequence, some people were excluded from the arena that evolvedout of imperfectstateconstruction.This exclusion has prompted attention to the inherent problems present in the nation-stateas it was transferredto Africa. Clapham, for instance,has arguedthat "neitherthe international system of states as we came to know it in the second half of the twentieth century,nor most of the individual stateswithin it have any plausibleclaim to permanence."9His critiqueraisesa heuristicquestionof whether March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 137 Review Essay I Payingthe Priceof Failure the state is an appropriateorganizationto deliver public servicesin Africaand CentralAsia during the twenty-first century. A thirdcommon theme is the transformativeroleof violence,whetherperpetratedby stateor non-stateactors.Violence in developingcountrieshas been depictedas nothing less than development in reverse.10Civil wars and incidentsof organizedviolenceperpetratedby militiaand criminal networksindicate a breakdownin the state'scapacity to enforce laws and provide security.The growing attention to stateweakness,war,and failed and collapsedstates recognizesthat violence imposes huge costs on development; it undermineseffectivebureaucracies,the ruleof law, electoralrules, and stable propertyrights. For the people who inhabitthese countries,fashioningnew arrangements that allow them to resumepursuit of their economic and socialinterestsis foremostamong theirgoals.However,it is through the state that they channel their interests. A final common theme is the relationshipbetween state weaknessand neopatrimonialauthorityin Africaand Central Asia. Although the pernicious effects of neopatrimonialism have long been observed in African political development, this authority pattern is only now being recognizedas a factorin the formerSoviet Union.11 First, it is conceivable that Central Asian states may suffer the pattern of neopatrimonialrule, systemic corruption, and economic decline that retardedAfrica'spost-independence development.Second,such statesmay encouragethe emergence of autonomous nodes that profit from the inattention of corruptneopatrimonialleaders.Reno arguesthat a personalizationof rule in Africa accounts for the emergence of "shadowstates"that challenge the formal state's hegemony.12Neopatrimonial leadership,whether predatory or benign, encouragesalternativeauthoritystructures that undermine the state'scapacity to rule. This conceptualizationof how power relationshave evolved in developing countriesis the basisfor fundamentaldoubts about the state'sviability. The Antecedents of State Failure in Central Asia and Africa At least three causes of state failure are evident in Africa and CentralAsia. First,the enduringeffectsof partialstate constructionthat resultedfromcolonialpracticeshavecontributedto deeply flawedstatesin Africaand CentralAsia. Second,violence,havingbecome a routinepracticein colonial states, continued after independence. Initially,European powersconqueredvast territories,establishedcolonial empires, and levied taxes on subjectswho were powerless to demand the concessionsthat merchantsin Europehad wrought from their kings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.The criticalaccountabilitythat taxpayers imposed on European monarchs was absent in colonial states. Colonial subjectspaid taxes, but they had no voice 138 Perspectives on Politics to demandhow they were used. Finally,partialstatebuilding meant that only a portion of the territorysupposedly under colonial rule was actuallyadministered.As a result, vast expanses were beyond the administrative purview therebyunderminingthe colonial state'slegitimacy.These three legacies constitute policy failures that continue to haunt contemporarypost-colonial states. Partial state construction and colonialism Colonialismtransplantednew administrativepracticesthat intentionally changed the political dynamics among populations in the conquered territories.African kings were militarilyoverthrown,stripped of status, and made subservientto often corrupt and incompetent European administrators. Meanwhile, domestic commercial networkswere strippedof theirwealth and replacedby European trading houses. In colonial cities and regions considered"useful",voluntaryassociationsand tradeunions became activewhile they were strictlycontrolled in those territoriesdeemed "useless".Urban centers were favored thus causing policy distortions that persisted long after independence.13These inherited asymmetries contributed to legacies of flawed policies that denied postindependence leaders the latitude to adjust to market conditions because urban populations acted collectively whenever their interests came under threat. As a consequence, an overwhelming majority of African countries was under authoritarianrule within a decade of independence. Sometimes these countries were governed by the national leader Europeanofficialshad identified as most amenableto honor post-colonial agreements. The causesof Africa'sshift towardauthoritarianismare presentin the legaciesleft by colonialism. Europeanpowers conqueredkingdoms, demarcatedborders,established bureaucracies,imposedcurrencies,collectedtaxes,ascribed identity, and their agents respondedwith brutalitywhen the subjugated populations challenged their policies. Althoughthe Europeanscreatedadministrationswith many of the attributesof a bureaucraticstate, Young has convincingly shown how the absenceof sovereignty,national identity,or internationalstandingdiscreditedthe colonial powers'claims of statehood.14For certain, the European authorities could have hardly foreseen the extraordinary challenge posed by a mandate to administerthe vast territoriesthey had conquered in Africa. Herbst comments on this challenge: "Europeanpracticeswere largelycongruentwith existingpre-colonialpoliticsthat did not stress 15 As a result, populations in far the control of territory." received the servicesprovidedthose territories never flung and regionsof commerin cities colonial who lived people cial interest.Afterindependence,authoritarianleaderssimilarly focused their attentions on urban centers that providedthe productivityand revenuesnecessaryto maintain a regime. A second impact of colonial rule that contributed to authoritarianismwas an exclusion of substantialportions of the population from the rights of citizenship.In effect, a majorityof the people living under colonial rule could hardly claim citizenship since "the concept of citizen was intended to be inclusive-to insist that all persons in a state, and not just some persons (a monarch, aristocrats) had the right to be included in the process of collective decision-making in the political arena and the right to receive the social benefits the state might distribute."16 Colonial powersdenied their subjectscitizenship;instead, they allowed their administratorsdiscretionto designatea selectpopulationas "evolved"subjects,and an even smaller number as citizens. What transpiredin Africa has been condemned as an incomplete and imperfect process of state construction that failed to provide subjects experience in interestmediation.17Hence, despitegenuineefforts to constructa state afterindependence,many countriesin Africa and CentralAsia lacked an institutional legacy on which political leaders could construct new rules and norms. Partialstate construction was evident in authoritarian statesthat reflectedhistoricalcontinuitiesof oligarchyand repression.Colonial authoritiesanointed a small number of "evolved"individuals for leadership positions. These individualshad incentivesto limit accessto politicaloffices; they allocated public goods strategicallyto protect and extend their tenure in office. In both Africa and Central Asia, post-colonial leaders similarly restricted electoral freedoms,hinderedelite recruitmentand circulation,and selectivelydeliveredpublic goods. As a consequence,neopatrimonial arrangementsreflected the preferencesof a single leaderwho controlled access to power and wealth. These patterns of rule have shaped the dismal postcolonial outcomes in Africa and CentralAsia. In parts of Africa and Central Asia, people excluded from the centers of power establishedinformal organizations to supply servicesunmet by the state. Countries as diverseasArmenia,Chad, Chechnya,Liberia,SierraLeone, and Congo (formerZaire)experienceda steadydeterioration of service delivery outside their administrativecapitals. In the worst cases, paralleldevelopment occurredin regions where people establishedtheir own service organizations independent of predatory,corrupt politicians. Luong shows how elite politicians in Central Asia used their former positions in the Soviet coerciveapparatusto retain office. In many transitioneconomies, formerpoliticians receivedinsider informationabout plans to privatize state owned enterprises; they used that privileged information to capture economic assets.18An effect was that an oligarchic system emerged that rewarded its members handsomely while blocking real and potential competitors. Control of influence and wealth through seizureof the state was a common strategyamong post-independence politicians. In Africa,flawedadministrativearrangements often resultedin a concentrationof power in one individual who ruled with extraordinarydiscretion.This pattern has been replicated in Central Asia where for example dynastic nepotism has become a practice in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.Indeed, these practicessuggest the neopatrimonialpattern that is evolving in CentralAsia may be a precursorto the instabilitythat followedAfricanindependence.While this question fallsoutside of most analyses presented by Central Asian specialists,its disturbing implicationsbode poorly for the region'sdevelopment. Partial state construction and violence The links between state construction and warfare,military organization,and taxation have been demonstrated in Europeandevelopment.19A desireto pursuewarsforced Europe'smonarchs to make concessions to a rising merchant class.Revenuesthat the monarchsneeded to engage in war requiredcrediblecommitments to specificpolicies and progressiveconcessionsto citizens'demands.20Between 1689 and 1714, the commercial freedoms the English king granted in exchange for revenues encouraged a politically-motivatedbourgeoisieto negotiate the concessions that set forth the preliminaryinstitutions of parliamentarydemocracy.21This processwherein the monarch conceded to strongerparliamentaryrule has been absent in Africa and Central Asia. If the inter-stateconflicts in Africaand CentralAsiaweremore widespread,they might be perceivedas the violent throes of nascentnation-states. However,inter-stateconflicts are relativelyfew in Central Asia and Africa,while weak states are many. As much as warfarewas an integralpart of state constructionin Europe,Herbst has trenchantlyobservedthat "acentralfeatureof colonialismwas violence."22Colonial wars might have been expected to result in the hierarchy of military authoritywith its officersand soldiers, meritbased promotion, and routines that Hintze cites as an explanation for Europe'sbureaucraticstates.23However, the militaryorganizationthat emergedin Europewas never replicatedin Africa;after the defeat of Africankingdoms, the Europeansforced local populations to submit to an inefficient and partial bureaucraticstate. Imperial rule demandedtributein the form of taxesthat benefitedurban centersthatwereprofitablefor metropolitaninterests.Colonial policies visited a harsh brutalityon the daily lives of colonial subjectsthrough taxes and forced labor policies. Indigenousand Europeaninstitutions uneasilyco-existed while administratorsfavoreda small proportion of colonial subjects.24 Peopleexcludedfrom the colonialstatedevelopedinformal networksto pursuetheireconomic and politicalgoals. After independence,these networkscontinued to operate as uneasy coalitions that people joined as a response to uncertaintythat was laterdeepenedby militarycoups and March 2006 | Vol. 4/No, 1 139 Review Essay I Paying the Price of Failure predatory regimes. In states with abundant natural resources,greedypolitical leaderscapturedlucrativesectors. These "stationarybandits"seized and consumed the rents and revenuesavailablefrom national resources.25Individuals excluded from this capture of state resourceswere able to de-link from the formaleconomy into the parallel, informal sector. Some createdindependent blocs to seek aggressivelysome portion of the resourcewealth. Their compatriots however had little choice but to survive as best they could under a dysfunctionaland predatorystate. When states in Africa and Central Asia collapsed, warlordsand their militia profitedfrom the disintegration of order to amassrelativefortunes through the captureof naturalresources.These violent entrepreneursused criminal practicesreminiscent of a mafia without any of the stabilizing effects on property rights that Gambetta describesin Italy.26Volkovrecognizeshow violence affects criminalincentivesin his study of" 'violent entrepreneurship' [that] can be defined as a set of organizationalsolutions and action strategies enabling the conversion of organizedforce(or organizedviolence)into money or other marketresourceson a permanentbasis."27Reno similarly analyzeshow violent entrepreneursuse war to captureand exploit naturalresources.28His studieshighlightthe shortterm strategiesthat criminalsassembledin militias use to capturenaturalresourcesthat they exportthroughunscrupulousmiddlemenrepresentingWesterncorporations.This work shows how unorganizedviolence may be as much an entrepreneurialactivity in Africa as it is an organizing principle in the privatearmiesof CentralAsia. However, it is advisableto avoid over generalizingabout the mayhem that is described in a small number of African and CentralAsian states. Partial state construction and service delivery A willingness to extend political freedoms in the respective colonial territorieswas idiosyncraticand dependedon assessmentof any risksnationalistsubeachadministrator's jects might pose to the empire. In some colonies, colonial authorities pitted regional leaders against each other to compete for political office. The effect was to divide the territory politically. In other colonies, selected national politicianscollaboratedwith Europeanadministratorsand excluded all competition. These collaborators'incentives were to protect their parochialinterests.In Indochina, for example, an armed indigenous militia collaboratedwith the Frenchto protect colonial assetsthat had been expropriated from indigenous merchants.29This militia protectedVietnameseadministrators,manyof whom belonged to the Cao Dai sect that sought to build a national identity apart from French colonialism.30These administrators made the "brutalpolitical calculationsabout how it is possible to extend power within individual states" that Herbst has suggestedessentialto the developmentof state 140 Perspectives on Politics systems.31Such brutal calculations in colonial societies led elite politicians to restrict competitors from voicing their political interests and pursuing autonomous economic goals. Colonial authoritiesascribedidentity to Africanpopulations accordingto their assessmentof economic utility. "Practitionersof Britishand Frenchcolonialismwere well aware,often to the point of obsession, of just how meekly they had penetrated the vast parts of Africa they had suddenly committed themselvesto ruling."32An undercurrentof potential violence buttressedthe weak administration'scapacity to exercisepower. After colonial rule, people in distant regions were ignored by politicians living in the capital cities. It was only when the size of an ethnic group attained a certain threshold relative to the political arenathat ethnicity gained salience in domestic politics.33However,for the most part,colonialismin Africa providedneithera nationalidentity for its inhabitantsnor an administrativestructurethat could legitimatethe emerging state. These administrativeand political failurescontinue to vex the continent. By contrast, identity was used in CentralAsia "asconscious investments that Central Asian elites and masses alike made in responseto the structuralincentivescreated under Soviet rule".34A capacity to deliver education as evidencedby high levels of literacyindicatesan awareness of the political utility of a national identity.The development of a distinct nationalidentity explainsthe outcomes that followed the Soviet Union's disintegrationwherein states retained their colonial borders and administrative integrity. For example, Soviet rule in Uzbekistan reproduced precolonialrelations:"institutionsand policiestransformed, reinforced,and politicized pre-existingidentities basedon territoryratherthanwholly constructingthem".35 Despite insurgencies and violence in Central Asia, the statesthat governtheseterritorieshaveencouragednational identity as a strategyto retain control over their colonial boundaries. Partial state construction and territorialpenetration After independence,legaciesof incomplete state construction in Africawere reflectedin fiscalshortagesthat denied remote locations basic public services. Fiscal shortages prevented administrations from projecting their power throughoutthe territoriesunder theirjurisdiction.Herbst writes that "statesare only viable if they are able to control the territorydefined by their borders."36Yet,African states have typicallyfailed in this elementaryfunction. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that some African states have entered a cycle of violence, failure, anarchy, collapse, and partial reconstructionas a consequence of their inability to administerthe territory.Contemporary conflicts in Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states raise questions as to whether an inability to project power within their borders might auger poorly for state construction. Colonial bordersin Africahave enduredsince independence. Whereas colonial laws ended propertyrights over people (slavery), European administratorsimposed new economic institutions of contract law and private property through administrativeunits (bureaucracy)that were establishedfor the convenience of colonial authorities.37 Weak administrations partially governed the territories under their jurisdiction. It has been suggested that "state consolidation in Africa can be understood by examining threebasicdynamics:the assessmentof the costs of expansion by individual leaders; the nature of buffer mechanismsestablishedby the state;and the natureof the regional statesystem".38 Leadersof independentAfricanstatesinherited these imperfect administrationsand had few incentives to correct the state's inherent weaknesses. As a consequence, weak African states evolved into juridical shells that interactedwith the internationalcommunity, but provided few services to their citizens.39 Perhaps Herbst'sgreatestcontribution is not in an explanationof the few failed and collapsed states in Africa, but rathera considerationof the many states that persistdespite weak administrations, systemic corruption, and dismal economic performance. As implied above, the failureof some Africanand CentralAsian statesto extend administrativecontrol overtheir territorycounts among the causesof state failureand collapse. Mbembe argues that a lack of territorialdomination by the African state has fragmentedboundariesand contributedto "sovereigntyoutside the state ... basedon a confusion betweenpowerand fact, betweenpublic affairs and privategovernment."40This perspectivesuggeststhat the emergenceof violent non-state actorsis a logical result of an imperfect control over the means of violence. Reno assertsthat "shadowstates"are indicative of a new "relationship between corruptionand politics"in a conceptual space between "formalstate institutions and privatesyndicates."41His argument that new political systems have emerged from the ruins of failed regimesin SierraLeone, Liberia,Congo-Kinshasa,and Chechnya implies that an untested path exists for some developing countries.Tragically,this new path is traveledby warlords,child soldiers, AIDS, impoverishedvictims, and anarchy.The picture is quite bleak. Elements of State Failure Multiple elements converge to cause state failure. First, a malaise afflicts the political system; citizens reject their political leaderswho have little or no legitimacy.A delegitimation of the state prompts individualsto avoid predatoryofficialsin bureaucraticpositions.They de-link from the formal state and make informal arrangementsto satisfy their essential needs. Second, the sense of ownership that is crucial for nationalist sentiments is absent from popularattitudesabout the state.Inhabitantsof an ignored regionmay accepttheirnationalidentitywithout an acceptance of the state'slegitimacy. Finally, a key element of weak states is mismanagementof the political economy. In Africanand CentralAsian economies, political leaders sometimes lack the basic technical skills to understand complex policies. Therefore,they enact decreesand laws that deepen fiscal crises and dismal economic circumstances. When combined with exogenous shocks, deeply flawed policies may cause weak states to fail and, in the worst cases, collapse. Delegitimation and state failure The frameworkin the two Rotbergvolumes uses a familiar dichotomy that distinguishesstates as weak or strong. A strong stateprojectsan administrativeregimethat guaranteesthe rule of law,definesefficientpropertyrights,and providesequitablesecurity.By contrast,a weakstateimperfectly enforcesadministrativerules beyond its core cities. This frameworkrecallsMigdal'sanalyticcontributionsof weak states and strong societies in which he depicts state strength as a function of "capacitiesto penetratesociety, regulatesocial relationships,extractresources,and appropriate or use resourcesin determined ways."42A state's strength is therefore indicative of its ability to provide citizens with security,public services,a regulatoryframework, and prosperity. Rotbergsuggeststhat stateweaknessmay be a predictor of failure. However,a proposition that weaknesspredicts failure and potential collapse neglects to analyze why a state is weak. For example,an unwillingnessor incapacity to establishpolitical space in which social groups articulate their interestsmay indicatea weak state. However,the absenceof such a spacemay equallyreflectpersistentpoverty that prevents genuine efforts to create an arena in which citizens may deliberatepolicies and articulatetheir interests. Factions and individuals excluded from policy deliberationsmay deny the legitimacyof laws that benefit only a small fraction of the population aligned with the centers of power. Whereas the causes of state weakness may lie in poor policy choices and fiscaluncertainty,state failureresultsfrom political de-linkagefrom society and a delegitimationof political processes. Failedstatesare unable to deliversecurityefficiently.In his introduction to When StatesFail, Rotberg proposes that "failedstates are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested",43while collapsed states are at an extremewhere security is provided by strength, and violence is the defining social behavior.Rotberg'sspectrum analysisis seductivefor its easein assigningposition. However,the analysismight be improvedby stipulatinga threshold at which a state under stressmight be expectedto fail. Instead, a problematic circularityexists in its argument March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 141 Review Essay ] Payingthe Priceof Failure that weak states fail because they are weak. This circular argument is unable to account for the numerous weak states in Africaand CentralAsia that continue to provide their citizens minimal servicesin spite of numbing poverty and shortagesof bureaucraticcapacity.In many weak states, non-state actors assume official functions to provide services through clans, fictive clan ties, and ethnic affiliations.44 Evidently,more than stateweaknessis needed to explain failureand collapse. A delegitimationof politics is a structuralflaw of states that suffer failure and collapse. In WarlordPolitics and African States, Reno defines state collapse as "the total absence of bureaucraticstate institutions"wherein nonstate actors "takeon a wider range of political roles conventionallyreservedfor stateinstitutions,such as providing internal security for rulersand diplomatic relationswith other outsiders".45He presentsa persuasiveargumentthat "thefailureof state institutions allows non-state organizations to take advantageof economic opportunity and create new political alliances.The disorderof collapsingelite accommodationsopens new, unorthodoxvectorsfor accumulation".46For Reno, it is "theproliferationof alternative meansto accumulateresources[that]holds a powerful attractionfor strongmen and for rulerswho face internal securitywoes. Thus, the presenceof associatednetworks can significantlyinfluence the political choices of rulersin modestly successfulbut strugglingstates".47The "shadow state"builds on patronagenetworksthat erode the state's authority and ultimately, its legitimacy.For Reno, a delegitimation of the state is thereforemanifest in dysfunctional networksand associations. Despite the evidence that Reno presents, it is unclear why networks and associations are so dysfunctional in one set of circumstancesand not in others. Individuals join with other people to form voluntary associations and pursue mutually desirableoutcomes. Factions composed of violent actors only emerge in unusual cases of social conflict and state failure. However,when societies commence the reconstructionof a collapsed state, various factions find that voluntary associations provide a means to express their interests. These factions participate in reconstructinga collapsed state, a process that is all but inevitable.Indeed, Reno'sanalysisof Abacha'sNigeria leaves unansweredquestions of how the country succeeded in makinga democratictransitionto the Obasanjo administration.48Without question, the strong tradition of associational activity in Nigeria contributed to that country's transition from a relatively short period of extreme authoritarianismto a more democratic form of government.Nigeria is hardlya case where factions cause dictatorships;possibly because of its numerous associations the country avoided an entrenchment of authoritarianleadership.From this perspective,Reno'sargument concerning dysfunctional networks ignores the positive effects of associationalactivity. 142 Perspectives on Politics Nationalism and state failure Nationalism unifies the sentiments of diversegroups and maydirectthose sentimentstowardstateconstruction.Few Africanneopatrimonialleadersbuilt consciouslynationalist movements.To the contrary,thesedictatorsreducedpolitical space and distributed benefits to a select circle of supporters.A lack of nationalismhas prompted Clapham to observethat "thecentraldomestic problemsof stateformation in much of tropicalAfricahave thus been ones of politicalcultureand notablythe difficultyof adaptingculturesdeeplyattunedto theirown environmentsto the very differentchallengesinvolvedin managingstatesof the kind that were imposed on the continent through colonialism."49Indeed,a cultureofwhat J.P.Nettl hascalled"stateness"is absentin manyAfricancountriesto an extent that their counterparts in Central Asia do not share.50This absenceof "stateness"supportsargumentsthat partialrule has been endemic in manyAfricancountriesand accounts for the barriersto successfulstate construction. Experiencesshow that nationalismmay build an identity that legitimatespolitical systems and their leaders.It is preciselythis processof building nationalismand legitimacy that Luong tracesin her study of electoralrules in Central Asia. The presidentsof Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstanmanipulated concepts of national identity to shapeelectoraloutcomes, hold office, and deny real and potentialrivalsany influence.Althoughsimilarmanipulations occurredamong the Africanpost-colonial politicians who manipulatedtheir constitutions to consolidate neopatrimonialregimes,nationalistsentimentswere minimized by populist leaderswho governed through nepotism and routine violence. It is plausiblethat the populist neopatrimonialregimesin CentralAsia may followAfrica's tragic experience of instability, coups, and progressive impoverishmentof the population. Politicalstabilitycharacterizedby effectiveelectoralrules is among severalvariablesthat might preventCentralAsia frommimickingAfrica'snepotisticneopatrimonialism.The noteworthy stability among Central Asian states has reflectedimportantcontinuities in electoralruleswherein "the persistence of old formulas produced new institutions".51Although democratizationwas far more problematic in Central Asia, Luong found that "while the establishmentof electoral systems did not launch a full fledged transition to democracy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,and Uzbekistan,both the processby which these new electoralsystems were designed and the outcome of that processprovideseveralcrucialinsights into the nature of power and political change in CentralAsia after independence"52.Hence, nationalist pride that finds expression in electionsmay encouragepoliticalparticipationeven while post-colonial leaders are entrenching practices of nepotismand neopatrimonialism.However,eventsin 2005 in Kyrgystansuggestthat a farless stable futureawaitsthe states that Luong examines. Economic mismanagement and state failure Economic mismanagementis a common problem in low income countries. Its causesare found in the shortagesof capablepeople in the bureaucracyand economy. Second, the waves of military coups in Africa brought rulerswho governed through practicesof neopatrimonialism,nepotism, and corruption.Where systemic corruptioncharacterizesofficialbehavior,citizenshave few incentivesto pay taxes or participatein government. The effect in Africa was a progressivedegradationof economic performance, and by the 1990s, a majorityof African stateswas under the tutelage of multilateralbanks. Constraintson malfeasance have been exercised by international donors who impose normsof due diligenceand accountabilityon funds they disbursein developingcountries.However,these policies could not reverseyearsof economic mismanagement even when the multilateralbanks imposed strict austerity programsand fiscal discipline. Citizensgovernedby failedstatescommonly lived under a policy environmentcharacterizedby economic mismanagement and systemic corruption. Leadersof these states often lacked the skills or training that might have prepared them for the complex tasks of managing national economies. As a result, the country's economic performance declined. An absenceof talented leadershipis poignantly illustratedby Reno in his discussion of military officers who took power in Liberia (Doe), SierraLeone (Strasser),and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kabila).53These leaders consistently demonstrated a lack of knowledge or comprehensionof economics that contributed to a cycle of inept policy formulation, poor implementation, and political instability as their economies experiencedcrisisaftercrisis.54Their policies reflectedthe fact that a ruler'sprimary motivation was to hold onto power.These leadersthereforeevaluatedanypolicyin terms of its impact on their own personalsecurity.Despite the insolvency of their governments,such incompetent leadersdivertedscarcerevenuesto an innercircleof supporters. Inexperienceand poor preparationleft many African leaders dependent on advice provided by representatives of donor organizations.The World Bank and IMF have been paying increasing attention to post-conflict countries and the challengesof state reconstruction.55Despite the best of intentions, internationalfinancialinstitutions' policies often resultin harmfuloutcomes.56For example, in EasternEuropeand CentralAsia "theassistanceregime that lay at the core of the effortsof internationalfinancial institutions (IFIs) and Western governmentsto facilitate economic and political reform actually had the reverse effect-helping to underminestatecapacityand stunt legitimate economic performance".57Collier has argued that an increasing reliance on international donor assistance has "worsened the credibility problem African governments now face:investorsdo not believethat policy change has been internalizedby Africangovernments."58Hence, internationalinvestorsand other donors look for signaling in the form of acceptanceof conditionality included in IFI programs.In the worst cases, governmentofficials simply lack the technicalcapacityto evaluatecriticallyIFI programsthat leavethe stateindebtedwhetherthe projects succeed or fail. An unanticipatedeffectof multilaterallending,whether for projects or structuraladjustmentcredits, has been to maintain the political status quo, even in the absence of development.59Aid packages that support neopatrimonial regimescreateincentivesfor political leadersto freeze institutionaldevelopmentand fostera dependenceon internationaldonor support.This outcome resultsfrom multilateraldevelopmentbanks'articlesof agreementthatrequire lending decisionstake only economic factorsinto account when contemplatingeligibilityfor loans. Hence, multilateral donors have provided credits to ruthless dictators, corruptoligarchs,and authoritariancabalsthat systematically divert funds for their personal enrichment. Some regimeshave receivedsubstantialsums that have enabled them to consolidatetheir rule and avoid either state construction or economic development.The effect has been both a delegitimationof politicalrule and economic instability since donor exigencies add a volatility to revenue flows in the poorest countries. Avenues Out of Chaos: The Policy Implications of State Reconstruction Violent conflict causesan institutionalvacuum characterized by bureaucraticcollapse; rules and norms cease to constrainpoliticiansand non-stateactors.However,when conflicts end and political leadersbegin to reconstructthe state, they recreatea bureaucracybasedon what had functioned in former governments.Conceivably the component agencies are ineffective and may contribute to the re-emergenceof a weak state prone to failure. However, informationis limited for statearchitects;they select organizational models that recall the administrationsof former states.60In francophoneAfrica, for instance, cabinet ministriesarebasedon Frenchconstitutionalmodels. Similarly, British administrativestructuresinform many of the agencies in their former colonies. Interestingdeviations frompath-dependentstateconstructionincludeNigerian federalismand accommodativedemocracyin South Africa. Whereas South Africa avoided violence and collapse by successfully implementing a system that protected factional rights, private property,and the rule of law, the Nigerian state failed during Abacha'styrannical rule. However,its leaderswere able to reconstructthe polity without succumbing to the anarchypredicted in the failed states literature. Rather than building institutional arrangementsthat contribute to fiscal stability and representativegovernment, violent conflictshave reverseddevelopment,and by March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 143 Review Essay I Paying the Price of Failure implication, state construction. In some countries, the entrepreneurialactivitiesof militia leadersand their criminal henchmen have brought about state collapse. However, the rise of warlordsoften reflectspolitical failure to delivernecessarypublic sectorservicesmore than warlords' greed or desiresfor self-aggrandizement.For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, legacies of venal, incompetent politicians encouragedinternationaladventurismthat causedthe stateto collapse.61The Congo Wars depleted leadership capacity;people fled the country as refugees,or for the lucky talented few, for betteropportunities in Western Europe and North America. The case studies in StateFailureand StateWeakness and BeyondState Crisisconfirm similarly dismal circumstancesin several countries. How these countries might reversethe brain drain and heavy costs to reputationis among the primary challengesfor their leaders. State reconstructionis hardlya science, and its practice needs to acknowledge the influence of primaryand secondary agents. In this respect, a crucial contribution of the failedstateperspectiveis that it callsfor an understanding of how actors in economic, social, and political organizationsadaptto crises.First,afterfailureand collapse,it is necessaryto reconstructsecuritythrough the demobilization,disarmament,and reintegrationof belligerents.Only then can politicalleadersrebuildthe institutionsthat guarantee the rule of law and increasepredictabilityin orderto attract business investments.Third, electoral rules determine proceduresfor selecting political representativesand delegatingpowersto agenciesthat distributepublic goods. Finally, after conflicts end, people establish civil society organizationsin their communities that impose checkson state actions and bring about crucialaccountability.How policymakerssequence reformshas a determinantimpact on the sustainabilityof peace and in post-conflict state reconstruction. 1. Reconstruct security Without security,economic growth and political stability remain elusive. The absence of security reduces interactions among actors in a given territoryto a function of strength.Hence, the re-establishmentof securityis a necessary precondition to state reconstruction. Few would deny that without a demilitarizationof combatants,conflicts will continue. For example, in September 1995, the AbujaAccordsto end the Liberianconflict began the task of disarmingapproximately50,000 combatants,of whom 30-40% were youngerthan 15. However,unemployment and opportunities to use their "skills"in other conflicts has contributed to the spreadof war to SierraLeone and Cote d'Ivoire.The intimidating problem of disarmament and demobilizationof belligerentsreceivesrelativelylittle attention in the failed-statesliterature.This inattention perhapsreflectsthe extraordinarydifficultyof makingcon144 Perspectives on Politics crete proposalsor conceiving sustainableresponsesto the problems of demobilization and demilitarizationof collapsed states. Among the obstaclesfacing demobilizationand demilitarizationis the establishmentof a crediblecommitment to peace. Once groupsdemobilizeand turn in their weapons, their bargainingleverageis significantlycurtailed.62 Yet, as experiencehas shown, a demilitarizationof a postconflict country is a necessaryfirst step to begin the process of state reconstruction.63Challenges that confound efforts to reconstructpeace include the nature of conflict and the economic reintegrationof belligerents.The provision of jobs is an essentialelement of reintegration;without work, demobilizedsoldiersturn to crimeor mercenary employment.This requirementthat people find some livelihood demonstratesthat economic growth is absolutely crucial for state reconstruction.In order to foster conditions that improve economic performance,interventions are necessaryto reestablishthe rule of law, redefineelectoral rules, and encourage civil society organizationsto operate. 2. Reconstruct modes of conflict mediation and the rule of law After the re-establishmentof peace and security,any effort to reconstructthe state demands the effectivemethods of conflict resolution and the rule of law. Business actors respondnegativelyto high levels of uncertaintycausedby an absence of the rule of law. In many African societies, for example,businessactorscreate"growthcoalitions"that minimize transactioncosts by sharinginformationamong themselves about other merchants and market conditions.64 Such coalitions are essential building blocks of democracy.Businessgroups are crucialactors in an effort to reconstruct post-conflict states; they form coalitions thatcontributeto employment-generating investmentsthat enable a country to escape a cycle of failureand collapse. These conditions obtain when the rule of law minimizes opportunism;it protectsprivateproperty,contracts,investments, and economic institutions. The rule of law is among the most important institutional arrangementsto be reconstructedin a post-conflict state. Beyond the benefit of reducinguncertainty,the rule of law imposes rules and norms that form a foundation for economic growth. Without the rule of law, transactions lack predictability,which drivesup their costs. RoseAckermanemphasizesthe positiveeffectsof legalguarantees on political, economic, and social actors.65Her perspective is that the rule of law preventscorruptionand abuses of power.What Rose-Ackermanfails to emphasizeis the centrality of an independentjudiciary that limits discretion and imposes accountabilityon elected and appointed officials.While her essay recognizesthat the reconstruction of judicial bodies including audit agencies, financial inspectorates,and courts is absolutely necessaryfor predictable contract law and efficient propertyrights, it fails to note that without independence, a judiciaryis vulnerable to the capricesof authoritarianrule. An independent judiciary is a critical enabling condition for economic growth since it constrains executive discretion;it thereby preventsthe emergence of a predatory state and defines stable propertyrights.The work of Acemoglu et al. on Botswanaconfirmsthat institutionsof privateproperty"protectthe propertyrightsof actualand potential investors, provide political stability,and ensure that the political elites are constrained by the political system and the participationof a broad cross-sectionof the society."66While Acemoglu et al. emphasizethe crucial natureof stable economic institutions, they miss that a fundamentalpart of Botswana'ssuccess is judicial independence. Rules that provide for an autonomous judicial branch also protect privateproperty,the rule of law, and an independentjudiciarywhose decisionslegitimatethose institutions. Reconstructionof the rule of law in Africaconfronts a historyof stuntedjudicialdevelopment.ContemporaryAfricanjudiciariessufferfromfinancialdistressthathasresulted in significantdelaysand widespreadcorruption.Ensuring the rule of law is an essentialelement of what Widner calls a condition "tofosterthe attitudesand behavioressentialto The compromiseand cooperationin the politicalrealm".67 criticalquestion for Widner is to build trust and community as preconditionsfor statereconstruction.She proposes a list of interventionsand caveatsthat is impressivefor its breadth;however,it leavesuntreatedthe crucialproblems of sequencing and prioritizationfor each policy area.The resultis that where to startand how to proceedis left outsideof heranalysis.Hence,whileWidneracknowledgesthat reconstructingthe judiciaryis absolutelyessential,how to enactthesereformsis identifiedonly asa problemthatpostconflict statesmust confront. Although it is impossible to ensure the rule of law in conflict circumstances,it is a necessaryfirst step in the reconstructionof legitimacy.When judicial decisions are deemed legitimate,businesstransactionsgain predictability. With that predictability,investments for longer term capital formation are more probable. Any policymaker recognizesthat investmentsand a reversalof capitalflight are conditions necessaryto rebuildingfiscal stability.The challengeis to foster consensusamong politicalveto players in governmentas well as actorsin businessassociations and other civil society organizations.Reforms that foster widespread consensus contribute to the political legitimacy that results from electoral rules crucial for reconstruction of the polity. Legitimacy is enhanced by the enactment of guaranteesfor judicial independence,judicial processesthat areimpartialand fair,and the introduction of free and fairelections predicatedon widely agreedupon electoralrules. 3. Reconstruct electoral rules An undercurrentin this literatureis the problem of legitimacy for politicians who abuse their offices and enact self-servingpolicies. The absence of political legitimacy causesbusinessesto evadetaxes,peopleto avoidstateoffices, and citizens to fail to vote or participatein electoralcontests.When political arrangementslack legitimacy,people have few reasons to participate in policy deliberations whereinthey can mediate their interests.A cycle ensuesof fiscal crises that lead to an expanding informal sector, declining tax revenues, and an absence of participation that together contribute to failure and collapse. Hence, state reconstructiondepends largelyon the establishment of inclusive electoralsystems that build political efficacy. The reconstructionof electoral institutions in failed or collapsed states is therefore the third critical step to be undertakento mediateinterestsand createa sense of ownership among citizens. Electoral rules have a direct impact on policy outcomes, and ultimately,the distribution of economic and political power.68Yet,a strikingomission in this literature has been a considerationof the origins of differentelectoral rules in pre-conflictstates. Conceivably,flawedelectoralrulescontributedto the emergenceofneopatrimonial, authoritarianregimes.Althoughauthoritarianism need not alwaysresultin state failure,much less collapse,a number of African states experiencedlengthy periods of authoritarianrulewith a perversionof electoralrulesthat ensured a dictator'slongevity in office. Reno shows how Sierra Leone was unable to overcome the legaciesof authoritarian rule that precededits failureand eventual collapse.69 State reconstructionposed a challengefor SierraLeonian leadersto redefineelectoralrulesthat could guaranteeelectoral proceduresthat would result in representationand legitimacy. Among the relativelysmall number of states at risk of failureor collapse,the legaciesof corruptelectoralsystems are persistentissues that affectpolitical legitimacy.Luong demonstrateshow old Soviet eraelectoralrulesinfluenced stateconstructionin Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,and Uzbekistan. She proposes a bargaininggame that models how politicians' strategiesstimulated the design of new electoral systems that served to their advantage.Luong notes that elite politiciansnegotiatedover four issues:the structure of parliament,proceduresgoverningthe nomination of candidates,methods to superviseelections, and methods for determiningthe allocationof seats.70She observes that her analysiswould "expecta greaterdegreeof institutional continuity than changeessentiallybecausethe elites designing institutions continue to view politics in much the same manner as they did in the previousinstitutional setting".71What she found confirmed her hypothesis of "pactedstability"wherein elite politiciansused with some minor differences"oldformulasfor making political decisions and resolvingpolitical conflict effectively.... [to] March 2006 1 Vol. 4/No. 1 145 Review Essay I Paying the Price of Failure achieve institutional change through continuity".72It is possible to adducefrom the CentralAsian casesthat political leaders desired the mandate conferred by elections and were willing to manipulateelectoral rules to acquire that legitimacy. Luong'sbargaininggame explainsthe negotiationsthat resulted in post-colonial electoral rules: "individuals engagedin the processof designingnew institutions utilize both the previous institutional setting (or the structuralhistoricalcontext)and presentcircumstances(or the immediate strategiccontext) in order to assess the degree and direction in which their relativepower is changing, and then to develop strategiesof action based on what they expect theirinfluenceoverthe outcometo be vis-a-visother As in Africa,CentralAsian politicalleadersbuilt actors".73 electoralsystems on institutions transferredfrom the former colonial power that ensured regime continuity and constructeda viablestate.The bargaininggame thatshaped the institutionalarrangementsin CentralAsia holds value for explanationsof successor failurein variousreconstruction scenarios. What remains to be shown, however, is whether these institutions may contribute to corruption, misrule, and eventually the breakdownof electoral processes.This analyticgap highlightsthe importanceof oversight that civil society organizations may contribute to state reconstruction. 4. Reconstruct civil society organizations Civil society organizationsare pivotal actorsin the reconstructionof failedand collapsedstatessince theyvoice populardemandsfor oversightand accountability.Civil society organizationsareoften organic;they emergefrom commuof formaland infornal impulsesthatconstitutea "reservoir mal organizationsoutsideof statecontrol".74However,state failureand collapse result in "theatrophy"of civil society organizations, which renders them unable to enforce accountability on elected and appointed officials.75An uncertaintyresultsfromstatecollapsethatblocksthe emergence of civil society organizationsand in such circumstances people fail to join together with like-minded individualsto pursuecommon goals.Without activeorganizations that are independent of the state, citizens lack a meansto act collectivelyand imposeaccountabilityon their delegates.It is thereforeessentialto reconstructcivil society organizationsafter providing security,redefiningthe rule of law, and establishingeffectiveelectoralrules. Experiencesof numerous countries demonstrate that people spontaneously form voluntary associationssometimes to collaborate with political leaders and at other times to oppose or disengagefrom the state. In weak states that are unable to provide a minimum of public goods, civil society organizationsemerge to meet demand. For example, in Benin'sfar-flungnorth "developmentassociations"have hired doctors and teachersand built clinics 146 Perspectives on Politics and schools to satisfyunmet demand for services.In many poor Africanstates,such voluntaryassociationsarecollaboratorsin developmentratherthan independentnetworks runby warlordsor criminals.Only warfareand unrestrained violenceimpedescivilsocietyorganizationalactivity.Hence, in post-conflict states, civil society organizationsattain a critical role since the bureaucracyhas not yet been fully reconstituted;responsibilitiesare therefore delegated to differentassociationsby people who live in the localities. Common practicesin civil societyorganizationsinclude electionswherebymembersarticulatetheir preferencesby selectingleaders.Associationsmay therebyhavea rolesimilar to business coalitions; they introduce norms of democratic processes into society. Unfortunately,many civil society organizationsoperate as nascent political parties establishedby politicianswho use the associationsto promote their particularagendas.These organizationsoften function through the logic of patron-client relations wherein politicians provide employment for individuals who serve as their supporters.As a consequence, many civil society organizationsoperate under complex mandates that obscure political agendas and efforts to influence policy outcomes. This ambiguous mandate affects the impact that civil society organizationsmay have on democratizationand the state'sefficiency. To counterinefficientand corruptadministrations,some donors have encouraged the establishment of voluntary associationsand communityleveldevelopment.The ostensible goal has been to renderlocal officialsmore accountable by improving the collective means to accumulate informationabout appropriationsand policies. However, in extremelypoor countries,these strategieshave achieved mixed resultssince communities are often atomized and voluntary organizations operate as patron-client networks. As a consequence, the idea that African civil society organizationsare capable of leading social action has been stronglycriticized;some observersdoubt that voluntary associationscan be viable in the absenceof a middle class that differentiatesbetween public and private sectors.76Similarly,it has been questionedwhethercivil society organizationscan mediate interests in society when ethnicity is the primarysocial cleavage.77Indeed, in the absenceof securityand the stabilitycreatedby the rule of law, civil society organizations cannot operate at all.78 Hence, the effectivenessof civil society organizationsis contingent on the other conditions of security,the rule of law, and efficient electoralprocedures. Despite the doubts expressedabove, it is an empirical fact that voluntaryassociationshave a lengthy traditionin Africa and Central Asia. Examples of such associations include trade unions, religiouscongregations,employers' syndicates,business associations,marketwomen's associations, ruraldevelopment groups, informal rotating savings and credit associations, and single-issue advocacy groups that work for women's or human rights. What is criticalto acknowledgeis that such organizationsareindispensable actors in representingcommunity interestsand articulatingdemands for services. Conclusion: The Price of Failure This essaydisputesargumentsthat a new type of political organizationis emerging in the post-conflict countriesof Central Asia and Africa. It rejects the proposition that people in post-conflict countries passivelyaccept shadow states run by warlordsand thugs who corruptlyconsume economic resourceswithout any doing anythingto develop the economy. Although poverty surely constrains the choices availableto citizens and policymakers,and may even facilitatethe emergenceof neopatrimonialleaders,it hardly condemns a society to anarchy.African and CentralAsian people desireservicesand the good life as much as other regions. Hence, the essay agreeswith the observation that in Africa, "state-making,civil institutionalization, economic reforms,and incipientdemocratizationcan coexist with and sometimes prevailover disorderand proliferationof informalmarkets".79Citizens make decisions to construct a state and establishagencies that guarantee peace and security.Their demands for public sector services contribute to a willingness to pay taxesand improve political institutions that might "pullthe continent into a virtuous cycle of reneweddevelopment".80How to bring about these changes is thereforethe criticalchallenge for the architectsof states. This essay has argued that when conflicts end people want security,a means to resolveconflicts without resorting to violence, freedom to choose political leaders,and freedom to associatewith like-minded individualsin civil society organizations.After conflicts, individuals reconstructthe agenciesand bureaucraciesthat providedat least a minimum of public services. The scale economies of these services require complex organizations or states. Indeed, researchhas shown that citizens areawareof their circumstancesand in some Africanstates,they "hingetheir judgments about the extent of democraticregimeson the performanceof the economy, the performanceof the president, the delivery of political rights, and trust in state institutions."81This consciousnessabout the attributesof rule is a fundamental attribute of citizens and political actors alike in reconstructingstates. State reconstruction is complicated and its success is measuredby avoidanceof furtherfailureand collapse.Significant challengesarepresentin the policies that causeda state to fail and collapse. For example, systemic corruption indicatesthat the politicalleadershipis separatedfrom the citizenry and is unaccountable for its actions. This absence of accountabilityis common in neopatrimonial regimes with limited means for interest articulationand conflict resolution.When abundant naturalresourcesare added to this mix, a volatile situation emerges. In Sierra Leone, for example,an inabilityto demobilizeand disarm the RevolutionaryUnited Front'ssoldiersallowed the war to resumewhen negotiationsover the distributionof cabinet positionsstalled.It has thus been suggestedthat emergence from state collapse requiresprioritizingreformsto begin with the provision of security, most importantly that the stateregaina monopolyoverthe meansof violence. It has been proposedhere that these challengescan only be overcome by sequencing reformsto build on achievements and avoid pitfalls.Without a clearconsiderationof sequenced reformsthat lead from one step to the next, a post-conflict country risks a return to the circumstances that precededfailureand collapse.Afterdemobilizing,disarming, and reintegratingbelligerentsinto the political economy, it is critical to reconstructthe institutions for conflict mediationand the rule of law.Without the rule of law, the essay has asserted that electoral rules remain undefined,and civil societyorganizationsatomized.While certain opportunitiesto define institutions of democracy arenewly present,otherdangersconfrontthe fragilepolity. Directions for future researchmight be to explain better the relationshipbetween conflict and state construction in Africa and Central Asia. Although criticisms are that the nation-state "is still assumed to be the only possible unit of political organizationdespite significantevidence that it sometimes does not work",82an alternative organizationhas yet to emergethat is capableof providing essentialpublic goods. Despite the collapseof some states, the organizationsthat emerge from such circumstances have returnedto the model of a state as a complex organization with jurisdiction over a defined territoryand a monopoly overthe meansof violence.No one would argue that anarchyis sustainable.States continue to re-emerge from the ashes of war and to fulfill particularfunctions, albeit in many casesimperfectly.A considerationof viable alternativesrequiresa depiction of a new global political economy that can provide the security,rule of law, political representation,and protections of property that are characteristicof states.Such a model has yet to evolve and the snapshot depictions of violent entrepreneurs and shadow statescapturea glimpse of tragicdevelopmentsin the political historiesof CentralAsia and Africa. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Madison 1987, 42. Brattonet al. 2005, 15. Collier et al. 2003. Spufford2002, 221. Tilly 1990, 68. Beissingerand Young 2002b, 30. Tsebelis2002, 2. Miguel 2004, 331. Clapham 2004, 77. Collier et al. 2003, 13-32. March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 147 Review Essay I Payingthe Priceof Failure 11 Shevtsova2002, 234. On neopatrimonialism,see J.-E Medard 1982, van de Walle 2001. 12 Reno 1998, 6. 13 Bates 1981. 14 Young 1994, 43. 15 Herbst 2000, 64. 16 Wallerstein2003, 651. 17 Mamdani 1996, 285-86. 18 Hellman 1998. 19 Bates 2001, Hintze 1975, Tilly, 1990. 20 North and Weingast 1989, 803. 21 Stasavage2003, 76-77. 22 Herbst 2000, 90. 23 Hintze 1975. 24 Mamdani 1996, 157. 25 Olson 2000, 6-8. 26 Gambetta 1993. 27 Volkov 2002, 83. 28 Reno 2002, 116. 29 Brocheuxand Hemery 2001, 79. 30 Popkin 1979, 195. 31 Herbst 2000, 261. 32 Ibid., 81. 33 Posner2004b, 529. 34 Luong 2002, 63. 35 Ibid., 82-83. 36 Herbst 2000, 3. 37 Robinson 2002, 513. 38 Herbst 2000, 23. 39 Ibid., 307. Herbst'spoint recallsthe familiarargument by Jacksonand Rosberg 1982. 40 Mbembe 2002, 54. 41 Reno 2002, 107. 42 Migdal 1988, 4, emphasisin original. 43 Rotberg2004, 5. 44 Collins 2004. 45 Reno 1998, 1-2. 46 Ibid., 27. 47 Ibid., 68. 48 Ibid., 194-204. 49 Clapham 2004, 85. 50 J.P.Nettle 1968 quoted in van de Walle 2004, 98. 51 Luong 2002, 3. 52 Ibid., 7. 53 Reno 1998. 54 van de Walle 2004, 105. 55 Collier et al. 2003. 56 Easterly2001. 57 Stavrakis2002, 264. 58 Collier 1999, 315. 59 van de Walle 2004, 109. 60 Greif and Laitin 2004, 638. 61 Lemarchand2003, 29-30. 62 Collier et al. 2003, 145. 63 Colletta et al. 2004, 170. 148 Perspectives on Politics 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 Brautigamet al. 2002 Rose-Ackerman2004, 182. Acemoglu et al. 2003, 84. Widner 2004, 222. Perssonand Tabellini2003, 16-20. Reno 2003, 78-89. Luong 2002, 8. Ibid., 12. Ibid., 253, 254. Ibid., 14. Posner2004a, 237. Ibid., 238. Otayek 2000, 122. Ndegwa 1997, 559. Posner2004a, 247. 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