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Review: Paying the Price of Failure: Reconstructing Failed and Collapsed States in Africa and
Central Asia
Author(s): John R. Heilbrunn
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 135-150
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Review Essay
the
Price
of
Failure:
Paying
and
Failed
Reconstructing
States
in
Africa
and
Central
Collapsed
Asia
John R. Heilbrunn
Eurasiain ComBeissinger,MarkR. and CrawfordYoung,eds. BeyondStateCrisis?Postcolonial
Africaand Post-Soviet
parativePerspective
(Washington,D.C.: The WoodrowWilson CenterPress,2002).
in Authorityand Control(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Lessons
Herbst,Jeffrey.StatesandPowerin Africa:Comparative
Press,2000).
Luong, PaulineJones.InstitutionalChangeand PoliticalContinuityin PostSovietCentralAsia (New York:Cambridge
UniversityPress,2002).
PoliticsandAfricanStates(Boulder:LynneRiennerPublishers,Inc., 1998).
Reno, William. Warlord
in a Timeof Terror(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution
Rotberg,RobertI., ed. StateFailureand StateWeakness
Press,2003).
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004).
Rotberg,RobertI., ed. WhenStatesFail: Causesand Consequences
Introduction
rchitectsof stateshavepuzzledoverthedilemmaof
balancinggroup interestsin orderto protectminority rightsand preventa dictatorshipof the majority.
If the architects fail in this regard, unresolved conflicts
may undermine political stability and lead to authoritarian rule or violence. JamesMadison brilliantlyframesthis
problem in "Federalist10" when he cautions that it is
criticalto "breakand control the violence of faction."1An
inability to strike a balance and control the impulse of
factions to dominate political processesrisks tyranny or
conflict as groups seek other means to redresstheir grievances. Despite the relativesuccessof most political leaders
in their efforts to balance factional interests, some have
failed and the states they governhave collapsedinto anar-
John R. Heilbrunnis AssistantProfessorin the Graduate
at
Programin InternationalPoliticalEconomyof Resources
the ColoradoSchoolofMines. Heilbrunnhaspublications
on democracyin Africa, corruptionin France,and is currentlywritinga bookanalyzinginstitutionalchangeamong
Africaspetroleumeconomies.Theauthorgratefullyacknowledgeshelpfulcommentsfrom VincentFoucher,Phil
Keefer,Nic van de Walle,and the anonymousreviewersof
Perspectiveson Politics.
chy. The unfortunatepeople who live in these countries
suffer war, dictatorship,warlords, criminal leaders, and
constant threatsto their physicalwell-being. After a cessation of violence, however,politiciansand citizensundertake the daunting challengeof reconstructingthe state.
This paper arguesthat afterviolent conflict and political collapse,people demand basicpublic servicesthat only
statescan supply.Reconstructionof a state,howeverflawed
the process and outcome, is inevitable after conflict and
collapse. The essay suggests that state reconstruction is
nonethelessa complex processthat requiressequencingof
reformsto enable the resumption of essentialpublic services. How to achieve reconstructionis the central challenge that the leadersof post-conflictstatesmust overcome.
To make its argument,the essay reviewssix exemplary
contributions to a growing literature on state construction, failure, and collapse. The question of state
construction is the central puzzle explored in the three
single-authormonographsand three edited volumes this
essayreviews.William Reno's WarlordPoliticsand African
Statesbuilds on his earlierargumentsthat a shadow state
emergesin circumstanceswhere the formalstate is unable
to fulfill its obligations. In Statesand Powerin Africa,Jeffrey Herbst suggeststhat Africahas sufferedfrom imperfect state construction, low population densities, and a
lack of integration into the world economy. The crucial
implicationof StatesandPowerin Africais that a tragically
March2006 l Vol. 4/No. 1 135
Review Essay I Payingthe Priceof Failure
dysfunctionalstatesystemhas evolvedin Africathat denies
citizens a political space in which they can mediate their
interests.As a result, conditions of anarchyand state collapse have become common. By contrast, Pauline Jones
Luong's InstitutionalChangeand Political Continuityin
PostSovietCentralAsiashows how CentralAsian political
leadersnegotiatedarrangementsthat shapedthe statesthat
they governed after the collapse of Russian colonialism.
However, as much as CentralAsian rulersenjoy political
stability, Luong presents a milieu in which neopatrimonialismand nepotismhavebecome increasinglyentrenched
in the polities. The developments in Central Asia bear
disturbingsimilaritiesto post-independenceAfrica.
The threeedited volumes contributerich case materials
and conceptualessayson state failureand collapse.Beyond
State Crisisis an excellent volume that compares experiences in Central Asia and Africa. While it may initially
seem a most different comparative exercise, the editors
assembleessaysthatformpairedcomparisonsof two regions
that bear many similarities.Although conceptuallymore
in a Timeof Terror
narrow,StateFailureand StateWeakness
that
case
materials
complement the conceptual
presents
in
When
States Fail. Together these
chapters assembled
three volumes present theoreticalessays and case studies
that are useful for students and practitioners.
weakenedstates
This literaturesuggeststhatprogressively
in Africaand CentralAsia have providedlimited security,
public services,and economic predictability.Democratic
institutions characterizedby a "matrixof embedded civil
liberties"areabsent in failed states.2Some stateshave collapsed altogether;their citizens live in a Hobbesianworld
of povertyandviolence.Suchconditionshavebeen inflicted
on people in countriesas diverseas Congo, Liberia,Sierra
Leone, Sudan, and parts of Armenia, Russia,and Uzbekistan, to provide just a few examples.The persistenceof
unrepresentative government, poor economic performance, and dangerousliving conditions has led some analysts to question whether the state is a viable organization
in low income countries. However, without a deep consideration of alternativesto which the authors obliquely
allude,it is unclearwhat arrangementsareproposedbeyond
warlords and anarchy.This failure to consider concrete
alternativesis perhapsthe criticalomission in these books.
The argument
This essayproposesa contributionto theoreticalapproaches
to state construction with a focus on Africa and Central
Asia. It questions the validity of argumentsthat a small
number of failed states in Africaand CentralAsia constitutes sufficientevidence to assertthat a new type of organization has emerged. First, weak states persist in both
these areas.The most common scenariois that politicians
enact policies that are determined by distressinglevels of
poverty.Only a very small subset of countrieshas experi136
Perspectives on Politics
enced state failureand collapse.Second, argumentsto the
effect that after violent conflicts, fragmentedcommunities in low income countriescreatesustainablealternatives
to states fail to recognize that many public services are
subject to scale economies. Warlordrule is typicallyfor a
short period and is therefore unsustainable.It provides
neither freedom from violence nor the basic servicesthat
populations need after conflicts. This essay suggests that
regardlessof academicdebates, after conflicts, people act
collectivelyto establisha statethat suppliesessentialservices.
States inevitably re-emergein post-conflict countries.
When conflicts end, people return to their homes and
delegate responsibilitiesto political leadersto rebuild the
agencies that provide education, health care, police, and
road construction, etc. The resulting complex organization, a state, is thereforean inevitableoutcome. To assert
that people accept non-state options is to imply that citizens arepassivepolicy takersafterconflicts. Such passivity
may occur in the face of continuing violence, but when
given choices aboutwhat organizationto reconstruct,people are active in their efforts to construct agencies and
associationsthat have functional goals and, when assembled together,compose a state.
Both internal and externalpressuresaccount for state
reconstruction.First,the state is a complex political organization that people collectivelyestablishto provideessential services. When citizens delegate responsibilities to
politicians,they demand familiarorganizationsto provide
security,conflictmediation,rulesto selectleaders,and basic
civil liberties.With few exceptions,politiciansreconstruct
administrativeentitiesfromearlierexperiences;rarearethe
leaderswho undertakenovel political solutions to reconstructstateswith new institutionalarrangements.Second,
aspeopleresumetheireconomiclivelihoods,theycreaterecognizable associationsand join political partiesto articulatetheireconomicandsocialinterests.Third,a resumption
of economic activitiesbinds many individualsto the land.
Their mobility is thereforelimited. This limited mobility
alsoreinforcesincentivesto mediatepoliticalarrangements
with competitorsand form associationswith like-minded
peopleformutualgain.Finally,statescompriseagenciesthat
representtheir countries internationallyand are the basis
forcooperationand development.Followingconflict,every
governmentrequiresan organizationto representits intereststo internationaldonorsanddiplomaticmissions.Hence,
state reconstructionis all but inevitable.
To separateexperiencesof contemporaryAfrican and
CentralAsianstatesas uniquefailuresignoresthat throughout history, states have failed, collapsed, and reformed.
Failuremayoccurwhen politiciansbreakmediatedarrangements because their constituents perceive that bargains
are no longer respected.In these circumstances,communities atomizeand people compete for scarcepublic goods.
Recent researchhas demonstratedthat this competition
is aggravatedin countries like SierraLeone that possess
abundantnaturalresources;violent actorshave incentives
to loot diamonds to financetheirwar.3However,it is only
a small subset of statesthat sufferthe emergenceof violent
non-state actors, a breakdown of community, and state
collapse.When conflicts end, this essayproposes,political
leadersmobilizeavailableresourcesto reconstructthe state
and furnish essentialpublic goods.
The most elementarypublic good is security;without
security,stateconstructionis impossible.It was the increasing capacity of Europe'skings to provide security from
brigandsduring the late Middle Ages that contributedto
the growth of trade.4 Since the seventeenth century, a
crucialevolutionhas been "theincreasingtendencyof states
to monitor, control, and monopolize the effective means
of violence."5 Control over the means of violence is a
defining characteristicof the state. In exchangefor security, citizens pay taxes, compromisewith others, contribute to civic life, participatein government, and concede
to majorityrule.To question whether the state as an organization is still relevantfor Africa and Central Asia ultimately requires a systematic assessment of sustainable
alternatives.Such a systematic analysisneeds to consider
how people would receive the services they demand following state failureif not from a state.
A failed state has a minimal bureaucracythat imperfectly deliverspublic goods; its citizensmust providesecurity and mediate conflicts on an ad hoc or informalbasis,
and social services are partiallydelivered. In a collapsed
state, by contrast, citizens have no channels to mediate
conflicts, public servicesare unavailable,and in the worst
cases, they are subject to random violence. Warlordsand
militia contest the state's monopoly over the means of
violence and administrative,economic, political,and social
organizationsfragment into smaller units. A weak state
fails when it inadequatelydeliversservicesthroughout its
territoryand is incapableof mediating factionalinterests;
a failedstate collapseswhen its bureaucracyceasesto function, public servicesareunavailable,and violence becomes
commonplace.
To structureits argument,the essaypresentsthis introduction and then considersin the firstsection, some antecedents of state failure in Africa and CentralAsia. These
antecedentsarefound in colonialism, noteworthyfor partial state construction evident in a routine use of violence
and a failure to administer the entire territoryunder its
jurisdiction.This failurewas compounded by the partial
imposition of Europeanadministrativemodels on African
and CentralAsian populations that neglected to create a
political arenawhereinfolk could articulatetheir demands
and compromise on policy. In the second section, the
essayexaminessome elements of state failure.It notes that
afterindependence,statesin Africaand CentralAsia Were
progressivelycapturedby illegitimate and corrupt political leaders.Although these states have stumbled along as
semi-democracies and authoritarian regimes, few con-
structedan efficient, sustainablepolity. The lack of legitimate government was compounded by problems of
economic mismanagement.In section three,the essaysuggests that state construction depends on the definition of
the rule of law, effectiveelectoralrules,and guaranteesfor
an active civil society.It concludes that afterwar and civil
conflict,politicalleadersreconstructstatesto mediateinterests, deliverfundamentalpublic services,and reconstruct
political space.
Common themes
The books under reviewhere sharea number of common
themes. First, the authorsaccept the Weberiandefinition
of a state as a complex organization that administersa
defined territoryand has a monopoly over the means of
violence. Here, the common unit of analysisis the state
as a political organization that is a historic product of
mediatedinterests.The Weberiandefinition of the state is
crucialsince path dependentargumentssuggestthat institutionalfailureis a resultof partialstateconstructionunder
colonial rule.A second common theme in this literatureis
how colonial administrationsaffected state construction
in Africa and Central Asia. The editors of BeyondState
Crisispresentan analyticcomparisonof differentcolonial
experiencesof Africaand CentralAsia.They assertthat in
both regions the "territorialgrids of authority imposed
over these populations"have shapedadministrativestructures and contributedto the "conflictualcharacterof cultural politics after independence".6 Many populations
experiencedthe partialstate construction of colonialism,
yet only a few have failed, much less collapsed.Hence, the
causes of state failure must be sought in variablesother
than colonialism alone.
Colonial administrationsleft deeply flawed states by
selectivelyincluding some groups while excluding others
from the political arena.For instance,the size of an ethnic
group in a country relativeto othershad a distinct impact
on its post-colonial influence. Some groups evolved into
"veto players"whose agreement with particularpolicies
was essential for any shift from the status quo.7 Others
were transformedinto permanent minorities unable to
affect any policy outcomes. Recent researchhas shown
that the methods by which post-colonial authoritiescreated "individualpolitical ideals, opinions, identities, and
preferences"have a strong effect on state building.8As a
consequence, some people were excluded from the arena
that evolvedout of imperfectstateconstruction.This exclusion has prompted attention to the inherent problems
present in the nation-stateas it was transferredto Africa.
Clapham, for instance,has arguedthat "neitherthe international system of states as we came to know it in the
second half of the twentieth century,nor most of the individual stateswithin it have any plausibleclaim to permanence."9His critiqueraisesa heuristicquestionof whether
March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 137
Review Essay I Payingthe Priceof Failure
the state is an appropriateorganizationto deliver public
servicesin Africaand CentralAsia during the twenty-first
century.
A thirdcommon theme is the transformativeroleof violence,whetherperpetratedby stateor non-stateactors.Violence in developingcountrieshas been depictedas nothing
less than development in reverse.10Civil wars and incidentsof organizedviolenceperpetratedby militiaand criminal networksindicate a breakdownin the state'scapacity
to enforce laws and provide security.The growing attention to stateweakness,war,and failed and collapsedstates
recognizesthat violence imposes huge costs on development; it undermineseffectivebureaucracies,the ruleof law,
electoralrules, and stable propertyrights. For the people
who inhabitthese countries,fashioningnew arrangements
that allow them to resumepursuit of their economic and
socialinterestsis foremostamong theirgoals.However,it is
through the state that they channel their interests.
A final common theme is the relationshipbetween state
weaknessand neopatrimonialauthorityin Africaand Central Asia. Although the pernicious effects of neopatrimonialism have long been observed in African political
development, this authority pattern is only now being
recognizedas a factorin the formerSoviet Union.11 First,
it is conceivable that Central Asian states may suffer the
pattern of neopatrimonialrule, systemic corruption, and
economic decline that retardedAfrica'spost-independence
development.Second,such statesmay encouragethe emergence of autonomous nodes that profit from the inattention of corruptneopatrimonialleaders.Reno arguesthat a
personalizationof rule in Africa accounts for the emergence of "shadowstates"that challenge the formal state's
hegemony.12Neopatrimonial leadership,whether predatory or benign, encouragesalternativeauthoritystructures
that undermine the state'scapacity to rule. This conceptualizationof how power relationshave evolved in developing countriesis the basisfor fundamentaldoubts about
the state'sviability.
The Antecedents of State Failure
in Central Asia and Africa
At least three causes of state failure are evident in Africa
and CentralAsia. First,the enduringeffectsof partialstate
constructionthat resultedfromcolonialpracticeshavecontributedto deeply flawedstatesin Africaand CentralAsia.
Second,violence,havingbecome a routinepracticein colonial states, continued after independence. Initially,European powersconqueredvast territories,establishedcolonial
empires, and levied taxes on subjectswho were powerless
to demand the concessionsthat merchantsin Europehad
wrought from their kings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.The criticalaccountabilitythat taxpayers
imposed on European monarchs was absent in colonial
states. Colonial subjectspaid taxes, but they had no voice
138
Perspectives on Politics
to demandhow they were used. Finally,partialstatebuilding meant that only a portion of the territorysupposedly
under colonial rule was actuallyadministered.As a result,
vast expanses were beyond the administrative purview
therebyunderminingthe colonial state'slegitimacy.These
three legacies constitute policy failures that continue to
haunt contemporarypost-colonial states.
Partial state construction and colonialism
Colonialismtransplantednew administrativepracticesthat
intentionally changed the political dynamics among
populations in the conquered territories.African kings
were militarilyoverthrown,stripped of status, and made
subservientto often corrupt and incompetent European
administrators. Meanwhile, domestic commercial networkswere strippedof theirwealth and replacedby European trading houses. In colonial cities and regions
considered"useful",voluntaryassociationsand tradeunions
became activewhile they were strictlycontrolled in those
territoriesdeemed "useless".Urban centers were favored
thus causing policy distortions that persisted long after
independence.13These inherited asymmetries contributed to legacies of flawed policies that denied postindependence leaders the latitude to adjust to market
conditions because urban populations acted collectively
whenever their interests came under threat. As a consequence, an overwhelming majority of African countries
was under authoritarianrule within a decade of independence. Sometimes these countries were governed by the
national leader Europeanofficialshad identified as most
amenableto honor post-colonial agreements.
The causesof Africa'sshift towardauthoritarianismare
presentin the legaciesleft by colonialism. Europeanpowers conqueredkingdoms, demarcatedborders,established
bureaucracies,imposedcurrencies,collectedtaxes,ascribed
identity, and their agents respondedwith brutalitywhen
the subjugated populations challenged their policies.
Althoughthe Europeanscreatedadministrationswith many
of the attributesof a bureaucraticstate, Young has convincingly shown how the absenceof sovereignty,national
identity,or internationalstandingdiscreditedthe colonial
powers'claims of statehood.14For certain, the European
authorities could have hardly foreseen the extraordinary
challenge posed by a mandate to administerthe vast territoriesthey had conquered in Africa. Herbst comments
on this challenge: "Europeanpracticeswere largelycongruentwith existingpre-colonialpoliticsthat did not stress
15 As a result, populations in far
the control of territory."
received
the servicesprovidedthose
territories
never
flung
and regionsof commerin
cities
colonial
who
lived
people
cial interest.Afterindependence,authoritarianleaderssimilarly focused their attentions on urban centers that
providedthe productivityand revenuesnecessaryto maintain a regime.
A second impact of colonial rule that contributed to
authoritarianismwas an exclusion of substantialportions
of the population from the rights of citizenship.In effect,
a majorityof the people living under colonial rule could
hardly claim citizenship since "the concept of citizen was
intended to be inclusive-to insist that all persons in a
state, and not just some persons (a monarch, aristocrats)
had the right to be included in the process of collective
decision-making in the political arena and the right to
receive the social benefits the state might distribute."16
Colonial powersdenied their subjectscitizenship;instead,
they allowed their administratorsdiscretionto designatea
selectpopulationas "evolved"subjects,and an even smaller
number as citizens. What transpiredin Africa has been
condemned as an incomplete and imperfect process of
state construction that failed to provide subjects experience in interestmediation.17Hence, despitegenuineefforts
to constructa state afterindependence,many countriesin
Africa and CentralAsia lacked an institutional legacy on
which political leaders could construct new rules and
norms.
Partialstate construction was evident in authoritarian
statesthat reflectedhistoricalcontinuitiesof oligarchyand
repression.Colonial authoritiesanointed a small number
of "evolved"individuals for leadership positions. These
individualshad incentivesto limit accessto politicaloffices;
they allocated public goods strategicallyto protect and
extend their tenure in office. In both Africa and Central
Asia, post-colonial leaders similarly restricted electoral
freedoms,hinderedelite recruitmentand circulation,and
selectivelydeliveredpublic goods. As a consequence,neopatrimonial arrangementsreflected the preferencesof a
single leaderwho controlled access to power and wealth.
These patterns of rule have shaped the dismal postcolonial outcomes in Africa and CentralAsia.
In parts of Africa and Central Asia, people excluded
from the centers of power establishedinformal organizations to supply servicesunmet by the state. Countries as
diverseasArmenia,Chad, Chechnya,Liberia,SierraLeone,
and Congo (formerZaire)experienceda steadydeterioration of service delivery outside their administrativecapitals. In the worst cases, paralleldevelopment occurredin
regions where people establishedtheir own service organizations independent of predatory,corrupt politicians.
Luong shows how elite politicians in Central Asia used
their former positions in the Soviet coerciveapparatusto
retain office. In many transitioneconomies, formerpoliticians receivedinsider informationabout plans to privatize state owned enterprises; they used that privileged
information to capture economic assets.18An effect was
that an oligarchic system emerged that rewarded its
members handsomely while blocking real and potential
competitors.
Control of influence and wealth through seizureof the
state was a common strategyamong post-independence
politicians. In Africa,flawedadministrativearrangements
often resultedin a concentrationof power in one individual who ruled with extraordinarydiscretion.This pattern
has been replicated in Central Asia where for example
dynastic nepotism has become a practice in Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan.Indeed, these practicessuggest the neopatrimonialpattern that is evolving in CentralAsia may
be a precursorto the instabilitythat followedAfricanindependence.While this question fallsoutside of most analyses presented by Central Asian specialists,its disturbing
implicationsbode poorly for the region'sdevelopment.
Partial state construction and violence
The links between state construction and warfare,military organization,and taxation have been demonstrated
in Europeandevelopment.19A desireto pursuewarsforced
Europe'smonarchs to make concessions to a rising merchant class.Revenuesthat the monarchsneeded to engage
in war requiredcrediblecommitments to specificpolicies
and progressiveconcessionsto citizens'demands.20Between
1689 and 1714, the commercial freedoms the English
king granted in exchange for revenues encouraged a
politically-motivatedbourgeoisieto negotiate the concessions that set forth the preliminaryinstitutions of parliamentarydemocracy.21This processwherein the monarch
conceded to strongerparliamentaryrule has been absent
in Africa and Central Asia. If the inter-stateconflicts in
Africaand CentralAsiaweremore widespread,they might
be perceivedas the violent throes of nascentnation-states.
However,inter-stateconflicts are relativelyfew in Central
Asia and Africa,while weak states are many.
As much as warfarewas an integralpart of state constructionin Europe,Herbst has trenchantlyobservedthat
"acentralfeatureof colonialismwas violence."22Colonial
wars might have been expected to result in the hierarchy
of military authoritywith its officersand soldiers, meritbased promotion, and routines that Hintze cites as an
explanation for Europe'sbureaucraticstates.23However,
the militaryorganizationthat emergedin Europewas never
replicatedin Africa;after the defeat of Africankingdoms,
the Europeansforced local populations to submit to an
inefficient and partial bureaucraticstate. Imperial rule
demandedtributein the form of taxesthat benefitedurban
centersthatwereprofitablefor metropolitaninterests.Colonial policies visited a harsh brutalityon the daily lives of
colonial subjectsthrough taxes and forced labor policies.
Indigenousand Europeaninstitutions uneasilyco-existed
while administratorsfavoreda small proportion of colonial subjects.24
Peopleexcludedfrom the colonialstatedevelopedinformal networksto pursuetheireconomic and politicalgoals.
After independence,these networkscontinued to operate
as uneasy coalitions that people joined as a response to
uncertaintythat was laterdeepenedby militarycoups and
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Review Essay I Paying the Price of Failure
predatory regimes. In states with abundant natural resources,greedypolitical leaderscapturedlucrativesectors.
These "stationarybandits"seized and consumed the rents
and revenuesavailablefrom national resources.25Individuals excluded from this capture of state resourceswere
able to de-link from the formaleconomy into the parallel,
informal sector. Some createdindependent blocs to seek
aggressivelysome portion of the resourcewealth. Their
compatriots however had little choice but to survive as
best they could under a dysfunctionaland predatorystate.
When states in Africa and Central Asia collapsed,
warlordsand their militia profitedfrom the disintegration
of order to amassrelativefortunes through the captureof
naturalresources.These violent entrepreneursused criminal practicesreminiscent of a mafia without any of the
stabilizing effects on property rights that Gambetta
describesin Italy.26Volkovrecognizeshow violence affects
criminalincentivesin his study of" 'violent entrepreneurship' [that] can be defined as a set of organizationalsolutions and action strategies enabling the conversion of
organizedforce(or organizedviolence)into money or other
marketresourceson a permanentbasis."27Reno similarly
analyzeshow violent entrepreneursuse war to captureand
exploit naturalresources.28His studieshighlightthe shortterm strategiesthat criminalsassembledin militias use to
capturenaturalresourcesthat they exportthroughunscrupulousmiddlemenrepresentingWesterncorporations.This
work shows how unorganizedviolence may be as much an
entrepreneurialactivity in Africa as it is an organizing
principle in the privatearmiesof CentralAsia. However,
it is advisableto avoid over generalizingabout the mayhem that is described in a small number of African and
CentralAsian states.
Partial state construction and service delivery
A willingness to extend political freedoms in the respective colonial territorieswas idiosyncraticand dependedon
assessmentof any risksnationalistsubeachadministrator's
jects might pose to the empire. In some colonies, colonial
authorities pitted regional leaders against each other to
compete for political office. The effect was to divide the
territory politically. In other colonies, selected national
politicianscollaboratedwith Europeanadministratorsand
excluded all competition. These collaborators'incentives
were to protect their parochialinterests.In Indochina, for
example, an armed indigenous militia collaboratedwith
the Frenchto protect colonial assetsthat had been expropriated from indigenous merchants.29This militia protectedVietnameseadministrators,manyof whom belonged
to the Cao Dai sect that sought to build a national identity apart from French colonialism.30These administrators made the "brutalpolitical calculationsabout how it is
possible to extend power within individual states" that
Herbst has suggestedessentialto the developmentof state
140
Perspectives on Politics
systems.31Such brutal calculations in colonial societies
led elite politicians to restrict competitors from voicing
their political interests and pursuing autonomous economic goals.
Colonial authoritiesascribedidentity to Africanpopulations accordingto their assessmentof economic utility.
"Practitionersof Britishand Frenchcolonialismwere well
aware,often to the point of obsession, of just how meekly
they had penetrated the vast parts of Africa they had
suddenly committed themselvesto ruling."32An undercurrentof potential violence buttressedthe weak administration'scapacity to exercisepower. After colonial rule,
people in distant regions were ignored by politicians living in the capital cities. It was only when the size of an
ethnic group attained a certain threshold relative to the
political arenathat ethnicity gained salience in domestic
politics.33However,for the most part,colonialismin Africa
providedneithera nationalidentity for its inhabitantsnor
an administrativestructurethat could legitimatethe emerging state. These administrativeand political failurescontinue to vex the continent.
By contrast, identity was used in CentralAsia "asconscious investments that Central Asian elites and masses
alike made in responseto the structuralincentivescreated
under Soviet rule".34A capacity to deliver education as
evidencedby high levels of literacyindicatesan awareness
of the political utility of a national identity.The development of a distinct nationalidentity explainsthe outcomes
that followed the Soviet Union's disintegrationwherein
states retained their colonial borders and administrative
integrity. For example, Soviet rule in Uzbekistan reproduced precolonialrelations:"institutionsand policiestransformed, reinforced,and politicized pre-existingidentities
basedon territoryratherthanwholly constructingthem".35
Despite insurgencies and violence in Central Asia, the
statesthat governtheseterritorieshaveencouragednational
identity as a strategyto retain control over their colonial
boundaries.
Partial state construction and territorialpenetration
After independence,legaciesof incomplete state construction in Africawere reflectedin fiscalshortagesthat denied
remote locations basic public services. Fiscal shortages
prevented administrations from projecting their power
throughoutthe territoriesunder theirjurisdiction.Herbst
writes that "statesare only viable if they are able to control the territorydefined by their borders."36Yet,African
states have typicallyfailed in this elementaryfunction. It
is therefore reasonable to conclude that some African
states have entered a cycle of violence, failure, anarchy,
collapse, and partial reconstructionas a consequence of
their inability to administerthe territory.Contemporary
conflicts in Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and other Central
Asian states raise questions as to whether an inability to
project power within their borders might auger poorly
for state construction.
Colonial bordersin Africahave enduredsince independence. Whereas colonial laws ended propertyrights over
people (slavery), European administratorsimposed new
economic institutions of contract law and private property through administrativeunits (bureaucracy)that were
establishedfor the convenience of colonial authorities.37
Weak administrations partially governed the territories
under their jurisdiction. It has been suggested that "state
consolidation in Africa can be understood by examining
threebasicdynamics:the assessmentof the costs of expansion by individual leaders; the nature of buffer mechanismsestablishedby the state;and the natureof the regional
statesystem".38
Leadersof independentAfricanstatesinherited these imperfect administrationsand had few incentives to correct the state's inherent weaknesses. As a
consequence, weak African states evolved into juridical
shells that interactedwith the internationalcommunity,
but provided few services to their citizens.39 Perhaps
Herbst'sgreatestcontribution is not in an explanationof
the few failed and collapsed states in Africa, but rathera
considerationof the many states that persistdespite weak
administrations, systemic corruption, and dismal economic performance.
As implied above, the failureof some Africanand CentralAsian statesto extend administrativecontrol overtheir
territorycounts among the causesof state failureand collapse. Mbembe argues that a lack of territorialdomination by the African state has fragmentedboundariesand
contributedto "sovereigntyoutside the state ... basedon
a confusion betweenpowerand fact, betweenpublic affairs
and privategovernment."40This perspectivesuggeststhat
the emergenceof violent non-state actorsis a logical result
of an imperfect control over the means of violence. Reno
assertsthat "shadowstates"are indicative of a new "relationship between corruptionand politics"in a conceptual
space between "formalstate institutions and privatesyndicates."41His argument that new political systems have
emerged from the ruins of failed regimesin SierraLeone,
Liberia,Congo-Kinshasa,and Chechnya implies that an
untested path exists for some developing countries.Tragically,this new path is traveledby warlords,child soldiers,
AIDS, impoverishedvictims, and anarchy.The picture is
quite bleak.
Elements of State Failure
Multiple elements converge to cause state failure. First, a
malaise afflicts the political system; citizens reject their
political leaderswho have little or no legitimacy.A delegitimation of the state prompts individualsto avoid predatoryofficialsin bureaucraticpositions.They de-link from
the formal state and make informal arrangementsto satisfy their essential needs. Second, the sense of ownership
that is crucial for nationalist sentiments is absent from
popularattitudesabout the state.Inhabitantsof an ignored
regionmay accepttheirnationalidentitywithout an acceptance of the state'slegitimacy. Finally, a key element of
weak states is mismanagementof the political economy.
In Africanand CentralAsian economies, political leaders
sometimes lack the basic technical skills to understand
complex policies. Therefore,they enact decreesand laws
that deepen fiscal crises and dismal economic circumstances. When combined with exogenous shocks, deeply
flawed policies may cause weak states to fail and, in the
worst cases, collapse.
Delegitimation and state failure
The frameworkin the two Rotbergvolumes uses a familiar dichotomy that distinguishesstates as weak or strong.
A strong stateprojectsan administrativeregimethat guaranteesthe rule of law,definesefficientpropertyrights,and
providesequitablesecurity.By contrast,a weakstateimperfectly enforcesadministrativerules beyond its core cities.
This frameworkrecallsMigdal'sanalyticcontributionsof
weak states and strong societies in which he depicts state
strength as a function of "capacitiesto penetratesociety,
regulatesocial relationships,extractresources,and appropriate or use resourcesin determined ways."42A state's
strength is therefore indicative of its ability to provide
citizens with security,public services,a regulatoryframework, and prosperity.
Rotbergsuggeststhat stateweaknessmay be a predictor
of failure. However,a proposition that weaknesspredicts
failure and potential collapse neglects to analyze why a
state is weak. For example,an unwillingnessor incapacity
to establishpolitical space in which social groups articulate their interestsmay indicatea weak state. However,the
absenceof such a spacemay equallyreflectpersistentpoverty that prevents genuine efforts to create an arena in
which citizens may deliberatepolicies and articulatetheir
interests. Factions and individuals excluded from policy
deliberationsmay deny the legitimacyof laws that benefit
only a small fraction of the population aligned with the
centers of power. Whereas the causes of state weakness
may lie in poor policy choices and fiscaluncertainty,state
failureresultsfrom political de-linkagefrom society and a
delegitimationof political processes.
Failedstatesare unable to deliversecurityefficiently.In
his introduction to When StatesFail, Rotberg proposes
that "failedstates are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous,
and bitterly contested",43while collapsed states are at an
extremewhere security is provided by strength, and violence is the defining social behavior.Rotberg'sspectrum
analysisis seductivefor its easein assigningposition. However,the analysismight be improvedby stipulatinga threshold at which a state under stressmight be expectedto fail.
Instead, a problematic circularityexists in its argument
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that weak states fail because they are weak. This circular
argument is unable to account for the numerous weak
states in Africaand CentralAsia that continue to provide
their citizens minimal servicesin spite of numbing poverty and shortagesof bureaucraticcapacity.In many weak
states, non-state actors assume official functions to provide services through clans, fictive clan ties, and ethnic
affiliations.44
Evidently,more than stateweaknessis needed
to explain failureand collapse.
A delegitimationof politics is a structuralflaw of states
that suffer failure and collapse. In WarlordPolitics and
African States, Reno defines state collapse as "the total
absence of bureaucraticstate institutions"wherein nonstate actors "takeon a wider range of political roles conventionallyreservedfor stateinstitutions,such as providing
internal security for rulersand diplomatic relationswith
other outsiders".45He presentsa persuasiveargumentthat
"thefailureof state institutions allows non-state organizations to take advantageof economic opportunity and create new political alliances.The disorderof collapsingelite
accommodationsopens new, unorthodoxvectorsfor accumulation".46For Reno, it is "theproliferationof alternative meansto accumulateresources[that]holds a powerful
attractionfor strongmen and for rulerswho face internal
securitywoes. Thus, the presenceof associatednetworks
can significantlyinfluence the political choices of rulersin
modestly successfulbut strugglingstates".47The "shadow
state"builds on patronagenetworksthat erode the state's
authority and ultimately, its legitimacy.For Reno, a delegitimation of the state is thereforemanifest in dysfunctional networksand associations.
Despite the evidence that Reno presents, it is unclear
why networks and associations are so dysfunctional in
one set of circumstancesand not in others. Individuals
join with other people to form voluntary associations
and pursue mutually desirableoutcomes. Factions composed of violent actors only emerge in unusual cases of
social conflict and state failure. However,when societies
commence the reconstructionof a collapsed state, various factions find that voluntary associations provide a
means to express their interests. These factions participate in reconstructinga collapsed state, a process that is
all but inevitable.Indeed, Reno'sanalysisof Abacha'sNigeria leaves unansweredquestions of how the country succeeded in makinga democratictransitionto the Obasanjo
administration.48Without question, the strong tradition
of associational activity in Nigeria contributed to that
country's transition from a relatively short period of
extreme authoritarianismto a more democratic form of
government.Nigeria is hardlya case where factions cause
dictatorships;possibly because of its numerous associations the country avoided an entrenchment of authoritarianleadership.From this perspective,Reno'sargument
concerning dysfunctional networks ignores the positive
effects of associationalactivity.
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Perspectives on Politics
Nationalism and state failure
Nationalism unifies the sentiments of diversegroups and
maydirectthose sentimentstowardstateconstruction.Few
Africanneopatrimonialleadersbuilt consciouslynationalist movements.To the contrary,thesedictatorsreducedpolitical space and distributed benefits to a select circle of
supporters.A lack of nationalismhas prompted Clapham
to observethat "thecentraldomestic problemsof stateformation in much of tropicalAfricahave thus been ones of
politicalcultureand notablythe difficultyof adaptingculturesdeeplyattunedto theirown environmentsto the very
differentchallengesinvolvedin managingstatesof the kind
that were imposed on the continent through colonialism."49Indeed,a cultureofwhat J.P.Nettl hascalled"stateness"is absentin manyAfricancountriesto an extent that
their counterparts in Central Asia do not share.50This
absenceof "stateness"supportsargumentsthat partialrule
has been endemic in manyAfricancountriesand accounts
for the barriersto successfulstate construction.
Experiencesshow that nationalismmay build an identity that legitimatespolitical systems and their leaders.It
is preciselythis processof building nationalismand legitimacy that Luong tracesin her study of electoralrules in
Central Asia. The presidentsof Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Kazakhstanmanipulated concepts of national identity to shapeelectoraloutcomes, hold office, and deny real
and potentialrivalsany influence.Althoughsimilarmanipulations occurredamong the Africanpost-colonial politicians who manipulatedtheir constitutions to consolidate
neopatrimonialregimes,nationalistsentimentswere minimized by populist leaderswho governed through nepotism and routine violence. It is plausiblethat the populist
neopatrimonialregimesin CentralAsia may followAfrica's
tragic experience of instability, coups, and progressive
impoverishmentof the population.
Politicalstabilitycharacterizedby effectiveelectoralrules
is among severalvariablesthat might preventCentralAsia
frommimickingAfrica'snepotisticneopatrimonialism.The
noteworthy stability among Central Asian states has
reflectedimportantcontinuities in electoralruleswherein
"the persistence of old formulas produced new institutions".51Although democratizationwas far more problematic in Central Asia, Luong found that "while the
establishmentof electoral systems did not launch a full
fledged transition to democracy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,and Uzbekistan,both the processby which these
new electoralsystems were designed and the outcome of
that processprovideseveralcrucialinsights into the nature
of power and political change in CentralAsia after independence"52.Hence, nationalist pride that finds expression in electionsmay encouragepoliticalparticipationeven
while post-colonial leaders are entrenching practices of
nepotismand neopatrimonialism.However,eventsin 2005
in Kyrgystansuggestthat a farless stable futureawaitsthe
states that Luong examines.
Economic mismanagement and state failure
Economic mismanagementis a common problem in low
income countries. Its causesare found in the shortagesof
capablepeople in the bureaucracyand economy. Second,
the waves of military coups in Africa brought rulerswho
governed through practicesof neopatrimonialism,nepotism, and corruption.Where systemic corruptioncharacterizesofficialbehavior,citizenshave few incentivesto pay
taxes or participatein government. The effect in Africa
was a progressivedegradationof economic performance,
and by the 1990s, a majorityof African stateswas under
the tutelage of multilateralbanks. Constraintson malfeasance have been exercised by international donors who
impose normsof due diligenceand accountabilityon funds
they disbursein developingcountries.However,these policies could not reverseyearsof economic mismanagement
even when the multilateralbanks imposed strict austerity
programsand fiscal discipline.
Citizensgovernedby failedstatescommonly lived under
a policy environmentcharacterizedby economic mismanagement and systemic corruption. Leadersof these states
often lacked the skills or training that might have prepared them for the complex tasks of managing national
economies. As a result, the country's economic performance declined. An absenceof talented leadershipis poignantly illustratedby Reno in his discussion of military
officers who took power in Liberia (Doe), SierraLeone
(Strasser),and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kabila).53These leaders consistently demonstrated a lack of
knowledge or comprehensionof economics that contributed to a cycle of inept policy formulation, poor implementation, and political instability as their economies
experiencedcrisisaftercrisis.54Their policies reflectedthe
fact that a ruler'sprimary motivation was to hold onto
power.These leadersthereforeevaluatedanypolicyin terms
of its impact on their own personalsecurity.Despite the
insolvency of their governments,such incompetent leadersdivertedscarcerevenuesto an innercircleof supporters.
Inexperienceand poor preparationleft many African
leaders dependent on advice provided by representatives
of donor organizations.The World Bank and IMF have
been paying increasing attention to post-conflict countries and the challengesof state reconstruction.55Despite
the best of intentions, internationalfinancialinstitutions'
policies often resultin harmfuloutcomes.56For example,
in EasternEuropeand CentralAsia "theassistanceregime
that lay at the core of the effortsof internationalfinancial
institutions (IFIs) and Western governmentsto facilitate
economic and political reform actually had the reverse
effect-helping to underminestatecapacityand stunt legitimate economic performance".57Collier has argued that
an increasing reliance on international donor assistance
has "worsened the credibility problem African governments now face:investorsdo not believethat policy change
has been internalizedby Africangovernments."58Hence,
internationalinvestorsand other donors look for signaling in the form of acceptanceof conditionality included
in IFI programs.In the worst cases, governmentofficials
simply lack the technicalcapacityto evaluatecriticallyIFI
programsthat leavethe stateindebtedwhetherthe projects
succeed or fail.
An unanticipatedeffectof multilaterallending,whether
for projects or structuraladjustmentcredits, has been to
maintain the political status quo, even in the absence of
development.59Aid packages that support neopatrimonial regimescreateincentivesfor political leadersto freeze
institutionaldevelopmentand fostera dependenceon internationaldonor support.This outcome resultsfrom multilateraldevelopmentbanks'articlesof agreementthatrequire
lending decisionstake only economic factorsinto account
when contemplatingeligibilityfor loans. Hence, multilateral donors have provided credits to ruthless dictators,
corruptoligarchs,and authoritariancabalsthat systematically divert funds for their personal enrichment. Some
regimeshave receivedsubstantialsums that have enabled
them to consolidatetheir rule and avoid either state construction or economic development.The effect has been
both a delegitimationof politicalrule and economic instability since donor exigencies add a volatility to revenue
flows in the poorest countries.
Avenues Out of Chaos: The Policy
Implications of State Reconstruction
Violent conflict causesan institutionalvacuum characterized by bureaucraticcollapse; rules and norms cease to
constrainpoliticiansand non-stateactors.However,when
conflicts end and political leadersbegin to reconstructthe
state, they recreatea bureaucracybasedon what had functioned in former governments.Conceivably the component agencies are ineffective and may contribute to the
re-emergenceof a weak state prone to failure. However,
informationis limited for statearchitects;they select organizational models that recall the administrationsof former states.60In francophoneAfrica, for instance, cabinet
ministriesarebasedon Frenchconstitutionalmodels. Similarly, British administrativestructuresinform many of
the agencies in their former colonies. Interestingdeviations frompath-dependentstateconstructionincludeNigerian federalismand accommodativedemocracyin South
Africa. Whereas South Africa avoided violence and collapse by successfully implementing a system that protected factional rights, private property,and the rule of
law, the Nigerian state failed during Abacha'styrannical
rule. However,its leaderswere able to reconstructthe polity without succumbing to the anarchypredicted in the
failed states literature.
Rather than building institutional arrangementsthat
contribute to fiscal stability and representativegovernment, violent conflictshave reverseddevelopment,and by
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implication, state construction. In some countries, the
entrepreneurialactivitiesof militia leadersand their criminal henchmen have brought about state collapse. However, the rise of warlordsoften reflectspolitical failure to
delivernecessarypublic sectorservicesmore than warlords'
greed or desiresfor self-aggrandizement.For example, in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, legacies of venal,
incompetent politicians encouragedinternationaladventurismthat causedthe stateto collapse.61The Congo Wars
depleted leadership capacity;people fled the country as
refugees,or for the lucky talented few, for betteropportunities in Western Europe and North America. The case
studies in StateFailureand StateWeakness
and BeyondState
Crisisconfirm similarly dismal circumstancesin several
countries. How these countries might reversethe brain
drain and heavy costs to reputationis among the primary
challengesfor their leaders.
State reconstructionis hardlya science, and its practice
needs to acknowledge the influence of primaryand secondary agents. In this respect, a crucial contribution of
the failedstateperspectiveis that it callsfor an understanding of how actors in economic, social, and political organizationsadaptto crises.First,afterfailureand collapse,it
is necessaryto reconstructsecuritythrough the demobilization,disarmament,and reintegrationof belligerents.Only
then can politicalleadersrebuildthe institutionsthat guarantee the rule of law and increasepredictabilityin orderto
attract business investments.Third, electoral rules determine proceduresfor selecting political representativesand
delegatingpowersto agenciesthat distributepublic goods.
Finally, after conflicts end, people establish civil society
organizationsin their communities that impose checkson
state actions and bring about crucialaccountability.How
policymakerssequence reformshas a determinantimpact
on the sustainabilityof peace and in post-conflict state
reconstruction.
1. Reconstruct security
Without security,economic growth and political stability
remain elusive. The absence of security reduces interactions among actors in a given territoryto a function of
strength.Hence, the re-establishmentof securityis a necessary precondition to state reconstruction. Few would
deny that without a demilitarizationof combatants,conflicts will continue. For example, in September 1995, the
AbujaAccordsto end the Liberianconflict began the task
of disarmingapproximately50,000 combatants,of whom
30-40% were youngerthan 15. However,unemployment
and opportunities to use their "skills"in other conflicts
has contributed to the spreadof war to SierraLeone and
Cote d'Ivoire.The intimidating problem of disarmament
and demobilizationof belligerentsreceivesrelativelylittle
attention in the failed-statesliterature.This inattention
perhapsreflectsthe extraordinarydifficultyof makingcon144
Perspectives on Politics
crete proposalsor conceiving sustainableresponsesto the
problems of demobilization and demilitarizationof collapsed states.
Among the obstaclesfacing demobilizationand demilitarizationis the establishmentof a crediblecommitment
to peace. Once groupsdemobilizeand turn in their weapons, their bargainingleverageis significantlycurtailed.62
Yet, as experiencehas shown, a demilitarizationof a postconflict country is a necessaryfirst step to begin the process of state reconstruction.63Challenges that confound
efforts to reconstructpeace include the nature of conflict
and the economic reintegrationof belligerents.The provision of jobs is an essentialelement of reintegration;without work, demobilizedsoldiersturn to crimeor mercenary
employment.This requirementthat people find some livelihood demonstratesthat economic growth is absolutely
crucial for state reconstruction.In order to foster conditions that improve economic performance,interventions
are necessaryto reestablishthe rule of law, redefineelectoral rules, and encourage civil society organizationsto
operate.
2. Reconstruct modes of conflict mediation
and the rule of law
After the re-establishmentof peace and security,any effort
to reconstructthe state demands the effectivemethods of
conflict resolution and the rule of law. Business actors
respondnegativelyto high levels of uncertaintycausedby
an absence of the rule of law. In many African societies,
for example,businessactorscreate"growthcoalitions"that
minimize transactioncosts by sharinginformationamong
themselves about other merchants and market conditions.64 Such coalitions are essential building blocks of
democracy.Businessgroups are crucialactors in an effort
to reconstruct post-conflict states; they form coalitions
thatcontributeto employment-generating
investmentsthat
enable a country to escape a cycle of failureand collapse.
These conditions obtain when the rule of law minimizes
opportunism;it protectsprivateproperty,contracts,investments, and economic institutions.
The rule of law is among the most important institutional arrangementsto be reconstructedin a post-conflict
state. Beyond the benefit of reducinguncertainty,the rule
of law imposes rules and norms that form a foundation
for economic growth. Without the rule of law, transactions lack predictability,which drivesup their costs. RoseAckermanemphasizesthe positiveeffectsof legalguarantees
on political, economic, and social actors.65Her perspective is that the rule of law preventscorruptionand abuses
of power.What Rose-Ackermanfails to emphasizeis the
centrality of an independentjudiciary that limits discretion and imposes accountabilityon elected and appointed
officials.While her essay recognizesthat the reconstruction of judicial bodies including audit agencies, financial
inspectorates,and courts is absolutely necessaryfor predictable contract law and efficient propertyrights, it fails
to note that without independence, a judiciaryis vulnerable to the capricesof authoritarianrule.
An independent judiciary is a critical enabling condition for economic growth since it constrains executive
discretion;it thereby preventsthe emergence of a predatory state and defines stable propertyrights.The work of
Acemoglu et al. on Botswanaconfirmsthat institutionsof
privateproperty"protectthe propertyrightsof actualand
potential investors, provide political stability,and ensure
that the political elites are constrained by the political
system and the participationof a broad cross-sectionof
the society."66While Acemoglu et al. emphasizethe crucial natureof stable economic institutions, they miss that
a fundamentalpart of Botswana'ssuccess is judicial independence. Rules that provide for an autonomous judicial
branch also protect privateproperty,the rule of law, and
an independentjudiciarywhose decisionslegitimatethose
institutions.
Reconstructionof the rule of law in Africaconfronts a
historyof stuntedjudicialdevelopment.ContemporaryAfricanjudiciariessufferfromfinancialdistressthathasresulted
in significantdelaysand widespreadcorruption.Ensuring
the rule of law is an essentialelement of what Widner calls
a condition "tofosterthe attitudesand behavioressentialto
The
compromiseand cooperationin the politicalrealm".67
criticalquestion for Widner is to build trust and community as preconditionsfor statereconstruction.She proposes
a list of interventionsand caveatsthat is impressivefor its
breadth;however,it leavesuntreatedthe crucialproblems
of sequencing and prioritizationfor each policy area.The
resultis that where to startand how to proceedis left outsideof heranalysis.Hence,whileWidneracknowledgesthat
reconstructingthe judiciaryis absolutelyessential,how to
enactthesereformsis identifiedonly asa problemthatpostconflict statesmust confront.
Although it is impossible to ensure the rule of law in
conflict circumstances,it is a necessaryfirst step in the
reconstructionof legitimacy.When judicial decisions are
deemed legitimate,businesstransactionsgain predictability. With that predictability,investments for longer term
capital formation are more probable. Any policymaker
recognizesthat investmentsand a reversalof capitalflight
are conditions necessaryto rebuildingfiscal stability.The
challengeis to foster consensusamong politicalveto players in governmentas well as actorsin businessassociations
and other civil society organizations.Reforms that foster
widespread consensus contribute to the political legitimacy that results from electoral rules crucial for reconstruction of the polity. Legitimacy is enhanced by the
enactment of guaranteesfor judicial independence,judicial processesthat areimpartialand fair,and the introduction of free and fairelections predicatedon widely agreedupon electoralrules.
3. Reconstruct electoral rules
An undercurrentin this literatureis the problem of legitimacy for politicians who abuse their offices and enact
self-servingpolicies. The absence of political legitimacy
causesbusinessesto evadetaxes,peopleto avoidstateoffices,
and citizens to fail to vote or participatein electoralcontests.When political arrangementslack legitimacy,people
have few reasons to participate in policy deliberations
whereinthey can mediate their interests.A cycle ensuesof
fiscal crises that lead to an expanding informal sector,
declining tax revenues, and an absence of participation
that together contribute to failure and collapse. Hence,
state reconstructiondepends largelyon the establishment
of inclusive electoralsystems that build political efficacy.
The reconstructionof electoral institutions in failed or
collapsed states is therefore the third critical step to be
undertakento mediateinterestsand createa sense of ownership among citizens.
Electoral rules have a direct impact on policy outcomes, and ultimately,the distribution of economic and
political power.68Yet,a strikingomission in this literature
has been a considerationof the origins of differentelectoral rules in pre-conflictstates. Conceivably,flawedelectoralrulescontributedto the emergenceofneopatrimonial,
authoritarianregimes.Althoughauthoritarianism
need not
alwaysresultin state failure,much less collapse,a number
of African states experiencedlengthy periods of authoritarianrulewith a perversionof electoralrulesthat ensured
a dictator'slongevity in office. Reno shows how Sierra
Leone was unable to overcome the legaciesof authoritarian rule that precededits failureand eventual collapse.69
State reconstructionposed a challengefor SierraLeonian
leadersto redefineelectoralrulesthat could guaranteeelectoral proceduresthat would result in representationand
legitimacy.
Among the relativelysmall number of states at risk of
failureor collapse,the legaciesof corruptelectoralsystems
are persistentissues that affectpolitical legitimacy.Luong
demonstrateshow old Soviet eraelectoralrulesinfluenced
stateconstructionin Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,and Uzbekistan. She proposes a bargaininggame that models how
politicians' strategiesstimulated the design of new electoral systems that served to their advantage.Luong notes
that elite politiciansnegotiatedover four issues:the structure of parliament,proceduresgoverningthe nomination
of candidates,methods to superviseelections, and methods for determiningthe allocationof seats.70She observes
that her analysiswould "expecta greaterdegreeof institutional continuity than changeessentiallybecausethe elites
designing institutions continue to view politics in much
the same manner as they did in the previousinstitutional
setting".71What she found confirmed her hypothesis of
"pactedstability"wherein elite politiciansused with some
minor differences"oldformulasfor making political decisions and resolvingpolitical conflict effectively.... [to]
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Review Essay I Paying the Price of Failure
achieve institutional change through continuity".72It is
possible to adducefrom the CentralAsian casesthat political leaders desired the mandate conferred by elections
and were willing to manipulateelectoral rules to acquire
that legitimacy.
Luong'sbargaininggame explainsthe negotiationsthat
resulted in post-colonial electoral rules: "individuals
engagedin the processof designingnew institutions utilize
both the previous institutional setting (or the structuralhistoricalcontext)and presentcircumstances(or the immediate strategiccontext) in order to assess the degree and
direction in which their relativepower is changing, and
then to develop strategiesof action based on what they
expect theirinfluenceoverthe outcometo be vis-a-visother
As in Africa,CentralAsian politicalleadersbuilt
actors".73
electoralsystems on institutions transferredfrom the former colonial power that ensured regime continuity and
constructeda viablestate.The bargaininggame thatshaped
the institutionalarrangementsin CentralAsia holds value
for explanationsof successor failurein variousreconstruction scenarios. What remains to be shown, however, is
whether these institutions may contribute to corruption,
misrule, and eventually the breakdownof electoral processes.This analyticgap highlightsthe importanceof oversight that civil society organizations may contribute to
state reconstruction.
4. Reconstruct civil society organizations
Civil society organizationsare pivotal actorsin the reconstructionof failedand collapsedstatessince theyvoice populardemandsfor oversightand accountability.Civil society
organizationsareoften organic;they emergefrom commuof formaland infornal impulsesthatconstitutea "reservoir
mal organizationsoutsideof statecontrol".74However,state
failureand collapse result in "theatrophy"of civil society
organizations, which renders them unable to enforce
accountability on elected and appointed officials.75An
uncertaintyresultsfromstatecollapsethatblocksthe emergence of civil society organizationsand in such circumstances people fail to join together with like-minded
individualsto pursuecommon goals.Without activeorganizations that are independent of the state, citizens lack a
meansto act collectivelyand imposeaccountabilityon their
delegates.It is thereforeessentialto reconstructcivil society
organizationsafter providing security,redefiningthe rule
of law, and establishingeffectiveelectoralrules.
Experiencesof numerous countries demonstrate that
people spontaneously form voluntary associationssometimes to collaborate with political leaders and at other
times to oppose or disengagefrom the state. In weak states
that are unable to provide a minimum of public goods,
civil society organizationsemerge to meet demand. For
example, in Benin'sfar-flungnorth "developmentassociations"have hired doctors and teachersand built clinics
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Perspectives on Politics
and schools to satisfyunmet demand for services.In many
poor Africanstates,such voluntaryassociationsarecollaboratorsin developmentratherthan independentnetworks
runby warlordsor criminals.Only warfareand unrestrained
violenceimpedescivilsocietyorganizationalactivity.Hence,
in post-conflict states, civil society organizationsattain a
critical role since the bureaucracyhas not yet been fully
reconstituted;responsibilitiesare therefore delegated to
differentassociationsby people who live in the localities.
Common practicesin civil societyorganizationsinclude
electionswherebymembersarticulatetheir preferencesby
selectingleaders.Associationsmay therebyhavea rolesimilar to business coalitions; they introduce norms of democratic processes into society. Unfortunately,many civil
society organizationsoperate as nascent political parties
establishedby politicianswho use the associationsto promote their particularagendas.These organizationsoften
function through the logic of patron-client relations
wherein politicians provide employment for individuals
who serve as their supporters.As a consequence, many
civil society organizationsoperate under complex mandates that obscure political agendas and efforts to influence policy outcomes. This ambiguous mandate affects
the impact that civil society organizationsmay have on
democratizationand the state'sefficiency.
To counterinefficientand corruptadministrations,some
donors have encouraged the establishment of voluntary
associationsand communityleveldevelopment.The ostensible goal has been to renderlocal officialsmore accountable by improving the collective means to accumulate
informationabout appropriationsand policies. However,
in extremelypoor countries,these strategieshave achieved
mixed resultssince communities are often atomized and
voluntary organizations operate as patron-client networks. As a consequence, the idea that African civil society organizationsare capable of leading social action has
been stronglycriticized;some observersdoubt that voluntary associationscan be viable in the absenceof a middle
class that differentiatesbetween public and private sectors.76Similarly,it has been questionedwhethercivil society organizationscan mediate interests in society when
ethnicity is the primarysocial cleavage.77Indeed, in the
absenceof securityand the stabilitycreatedby the rule of
law, civil society organizations cannot operate at all.78
Hence, the effectivenessof civil society organizationsis
contingent on the other conditions of security,the rule of
law, and efficient electoralprocedures.
Despite the doubts expressedabove, it is an empirical
fact that voluntaryassociationshave a lengthy traditionin
Africa and Central Asia. Examples of such associations
include trade unions, religiouscongregations,employers'
syndicates,business associations,marketwomen's associations, ruraldevelopment groups, informal rotating savings and credit associations, and single-issue advocacy
groups that work for women's or human rights. What is
criticalto acknowledgeis that such organizationsareindispensable actors in representingcommunity interestsand
articulatingdemands for services.
Conclusion: The Price of Failure
This essaydisputesargumentsthat a new type of political
organizationis emerging in the post-conflict countriesof
Central Asia and Africa. It rejects the proposition that
people in post-conflict countries passivelyaccept shadow
states run by warlordsand thugs who corruptlyconsume
economic resourceswithout any doing anythingto develop
the economy. Although poverty surely constrains the
choices availableto citizens and policymakers,and may
even facilitatethe emergenceof neopatrimonialleaders,it
hardly condemns a society to anarchy.African and CentralAsian people desireservicesand the good life as much
as other regions. Hence, the essay agreeswith the observation that in Africa, "state-making,civil institutionalization, economic reforms,and incipientdemocratizationcan
coexist with and sometimes prevailover disorderand proliferationof informalmarkets".79Citizens make decisions
to construct a state and establishagencies that guarantee
peace and security.Their demands for public sector services contribute to a willingness to pay taxesand improve
political institutions that might "pullthe continent into a
virtuous cycle of reneweddevelopment".80How to bring
about these changes is thereforethe criticalchallenge for
the architectsof states.
This essay has argued that when conflicts end people
want security,a means to resolveconflicts without resorting to violence, freedom to choose political leaders,and
freedom to associatewith like-minded individualsin civil
society organizations.After conflicts, individuals reconstructthe agenciesand bureaucraciesthat providedat least
a minimum of public services. The scale economies of
these services require complex organizations or states.
Indeed, researchhas shown that citizens areawareof their
circumstancesand in some Africanstates,they "hingetheir
judgments about the extent of democraticregimeson the
performanceof the economy, the performanceof the president, the delivery of political rights, and trust in state
institutions."81This consciousnessabout the attributesof
rule is a fundamental attribute of citizens and political
actors alike in reconstructingstates.
State reconstruction is complicated and its success is
measuredby avoidanceof furtherfailureand collapse.Significant challengesarepresentin the policies that causeda
state to fail and collapse. For example, systemic corruption indicatesthat the politicalleadershipis separatedfrom
the citizenry and is unaccountable for its actions. This
absence of accountabilityis common in neopatrimonial
regimes with limited means for interest articulationand
conflict resolution.When abundant naturalresourcesare
added to this mix, a volatile situation emerges. In Sierra
Leone, for example,an inabilityto demobilizeand disarm
the RevolutionaryUnited Front'ssoldiersallowed the war
to resumewhen negotiationsover the distributionof cabinet positionsstalled.It has thus been suggestedthat emergence from state collapse requiresprioritizingreformsto
begin with the provision of security, most importantly
that the stateregaina monopolyoverthe meansof violence.
It has been proposedhere that these challengescan only
be overcome by sequencing reformsto build on achievements and avoid pitfalls.Without a clearconsiderationof
sequenced reformsthat lead from one step to the next, a
post-conflict country risks a return to the circumstances
that precededfailureand collapse.Afterdemobilizing,disarming, and reintegratingbelligerentsinto the political
economy, it is critical to reconstructthe institutions for
conflict mediationand the rule of law.Without the rule of
law, the essay has asserted that electoral rules remain
undefined,and civil societyorganizationsatomized.While
certain opportunitiesto define institutions of democracy
arenewly present,otherdangersconfrontthe fragilepolity.
Directions for future researchmight be to explain better the relationshipbetween conflict and state construction in Africa and Central Asia. Although criticisms are
that the nation-state "is still assumed to be the only possible unit of political organizationdespite significantevidence that it sometimes does not work",82an alternative
organizationhas yet to emergethat is capableof providing
essentialpublic goods. Despite the collapseof some states,
the organizationsthat emerge from such circumstances
have returnedto the model of a state as a complex organization with jurisdiction over a defined territoryand a
monopoly overthe meansof violence.No one would argue
that anarchyis sustainable.States continue to re-emerge
from the ashes of war and to fulfill particularfunctions,
albeit in many casesimperfectly.A considerationof viable
alternativesrequiresa depiction of a new global political
economy that can provide the security,rule of law, political representation,and protections of property that are
characteristicof states.Such a model has yet to evolve and
the snapshot depictions of violent entrepreneurs and
shadow statescapturea glimpse of tragicdevelopmentsin
the political historiesof CentralAsia and Africa.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Madison 1987, 42.
Brattonet al. 2005, 15.
Collier et al. 2003.
Spufford2002, 221.
Tilly 1990, 68.
Beissingerand Young 2002b, 30.
Tsebelis2002, 2.
Miguel 2004, 331.
Clapham 2004, 77.
Collier et al. 2003, 13-32.
March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 147
Review Essay I Payingthe Priceof Failure
11 Shevtsova2002, 234. On neopatrimonialism,see
J.-E Medard 1982, van de Walle 2001.
12 Reno 1998, 6.
13 Bates 1981.
14 Young 1994, 43.
15 Herbst 2000, 64.
16 Wallerstein2003, 651.
17 Mamdani 1996, 285-86.
18 Hellman 1998.
19 Bates 2001, Hintze 1975, Tilly, 1990.
20 North and Weingast 1989, 803.
21 Stasavage2003, 76-77.
22 Herbst 2000, 90.
23 Hintze 1975.
24 Mamdani 1996, 157.
25 Olson 2000, 6-8.
26 Gambetta 1993.
27 Volkov 2002, 83.
28 Reno 2002, 116.
29 Brocheuxand Hemery 2001, 79.
30 Popkin 1979, 195.
31 Herbst 2000, 261.
32 Ibid., 81.
33 Posner2004b, 529.
34 Luong 2002, 63.
35 Ibid., 82-83.
36 Herbst 2000, 3.
37 Robinson 2002, 513.
38 Herbst 2000, 23.
39 Ibid., 307. Herbst'spoint recallsthe familiarargument by Jacksonand Rosberg 1982.
40 Mbembe 2002, 54.
41 Reno 2002, 107.
42 Migdal 1988, 4, emphasisin original.
43 Rotberg2004, 5.
44 Collins 2004.
45 Reno 1998, 1-2.
46 Ibid., 27.
47 Ibid., 68.
48 Ibid., 194-204.
49 Clapham 2004, 85.
50 J.P.Nettle 1968 quoted in van de Walle 2004, 98.
51 Luong 2002, 3.
52 Ibid., 7.
53 Reno 1998.
54 van de Walle 2004, 105.
55 Collier et al. 2003.
56 Easterly2001.
57 Stavrakis2002, 264.
58 Collier 1999, 315.
59 van de Walle 2004, 109.
60 Greif and Laitin 2004, 638.
61 Lemarchand2003, 29-30.
62 Collier et al. 2003, 145.
63 Colletta et al. 2004, 170.
148
Perspectives on Politics
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
Brautigamet al. 2002
Rose-Ackerman2004, 182.
Acemoglu et al. 2003, 84.
Widner 2004, 222.
Perssonand Tabellini2003, 16-20.
Reno 2003, 78-89.
Luong 2002, 8.
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 253, 254.
Ibid., 14.
Posner2004a, 237.
Ibid., 238.
Otayek 2000, 122.
Ndegwa 1997, 559.
Posner2004a, 247.
Joseph 2002, 251.
Ibid., 260.
Brattonet al. 2005, 287.
Herbst 2004, 308.
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