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48 Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseach Luther’s Doctrine of Imputation: Nominalism vs. Aristotelian Realism Joshua Price History & Bible Major The theology of German reformer Martin Luther has had a profound impact on Christian history. His doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer is no different. This study examines the philosophic underpinnings that support and inform Luther’s doctrine and describes the extent to which Luther is influenced by medieval Nominalism. This study then proposes two methods by which Luther’s doctrine of imputation might be reconciled with a philosophic commitment to metaphysical Realism. Since the Reformation, scholars of Martin Luther have debated the extent to which his philosophy was influenced by Nominalism. Certain of his doctrines seem inherently nominalist—such as consubstantiation and the hidden God—and others are opposed to Nominalism, such as Luther’s doctrine of human will. With some doctrines, it is more difficult to ascertain the extent to which Luther’s beliefs reflect a Nominalist influence. One such example is Luther’s doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. In this paper, I will explore the extent to which Luther’s doctrine of imputation was influenced by Nominalism. Next, I will explore the methods by which an Aristotelian Realist might reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Realism. I argue that Luther’s doctrine of imputation represents a break from the traditional Nominalist doctrine. I further argue that the best way to reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Aristotelian Realism is by understanding it as a forensic act that provides the grounds for the justification of the believer before God. Before delving into the argument, it will be useful to define Nominalism and Aristotelian Realism and explain the significance of these positions for the doctrine of imputation. Aristotelian Realism refers to the metaphysical position that everything that exists is a composite of form and www.jbu.edu/academics/journal matter. Aristotle argued in Book VII Chapter 17 of his Metaphysics that the form or substance of a thing guides and forms the matter.1 Thus, universals such as redness exist in nature in individual red things, and these individual things are red because they possess the form of redness. This is significant for the debate concerning imputed righteousness because Realism holds that righteousness is a universal that can be recognized by the accidents that inhere in righteousness. Nominalism is the philosophic position opposed to Realism. William of Ockham, a proponent of Nominalism, asserted in Epistemological Problems that universals do not actually exist in nature, but are merely concepts that the mind invents to describe individual objects.2 To give an example, the Nominalist sees a dog as a dog not because it has the characteristics of “dog-ness;” instead, he thinks a dog is merely an individual thing to which the human mind ascribes a name. This is significant for imputed righteousness because it means that, for the Nominalist, one could conceivably possess the accidents of sinfulness and yet, at the same time, be considered righteous. So, a philosophic commitment to Realism or Nominalism has an important effect on one’s doctrine of imputation. Luther was clearly influenced by Nominalism in some significant ways, and it affected his understanding of imputation. One manifestation of this influence is found in his belief concerning the nature of the divine will. In Bondage of the Will, Luther defended a voluntaristic conception of God’s will, arguing that no cause or ground determines His will, but that His will is the self-determining rule for all things.3 Thomas Aquinas, an Aristotelian Realist, believed that God’s will proceeds directly from God’s nature, which is used to explain why God cannot sin. Luther, contra Aquinas, argued that the goodness of God’s actions is not determined by the inherent goodness of His nature, but out of His declaration that His actions are good.4 For Luther, goodness proceeds out of God’s will rather than His nature, so that the divine will is separated from the divine nature. In other words, God’s will determines what the term “goodness” means rather than his nature being consistent with a particular conception of goodness. In Bondage of the Will, Luther wrote that because power is part of God’s nature, His will cannot be impeded.5 In this sense, God can do whatever he wants—even if it appears to be evil to humans—because His will is supreme. This voluntaristic conception of the divine will is seen clearly in the tradition of Nominalism, which is associated 49 with William of Ockham. According to Heiko Oberman, an historian who specialized in the Reformation, Luther’s voluntaristic conception of God stems directly from this Nominalist tradition.6 In The Two Reformations, Oberman points out the medieval distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata as evidence of Luther’s connection to Nominalism.7 The potentia absoluta defines God’s ultimate nature, while the potentia ordinata describes God’s nature as it is revealed in Scripture. In Bondage of the Will, Luther wrote of the importance of distinguishing between the revealed God and the hidden God, as though the two have different characteristics.8 Luther’s distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata is essential for understanding the influence medieval Nominalism had on his conception of God. However, Luther employed the terms differently than did medieval Nominalists. Gordon Rupp, a Luther scholar, points out that Nominalists like Ockham appealed to potentia absoluta to speculate on and explain supernatural occurrences, whereas Luther used the distinction to cut off speculation and focus on God as He has revealed himself in Scripture.9 Rupp argues that Luther rejected the Aristotelian tendency to explain God’s nature with reference to a hierarchy of being.10 Luther viewed the Aristotelian view as a Pelagian fallacy, because he thought it gave too much credit to human reason.11 Instead, as Rupp aptly states, Luther understood God as an entirely unpredictable being.12 Rupp interprets Luther’s attempt to place God beyond human understanding as a reflection of his theocentric approach to theology.13 Despite the semantic distinction, both Luther and the medieval Nominalists used the potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata distinction to support their voluntaristic understanding of God’s will, namely, that His will is distinct from His nature. So, Nominalism’s influence on Luther is apparent in his attempt to insulate God from any rational attempt to comprehend His being. As with Ockham, this resulted in a voluntaristic understanding of God. Despite the influence Nominalism had on Luther’s doctrine of the divine will, he rejected Ockham’s view of the human will in favor of an Augustinian view. As Oberman points out, Ockham—and the Nominalist tradition in the via moderna—asserted the priority of the will over the priority of the intellect.14 In contrast, Augustine argued in Confessions that men are corrupt from birth, and this corruption taints their ability to make decisions.15 In Bondage of the Will, 50 Luther argued that human will is limited by God’s sovereignty and by original sin. Regarding God’s sovereignty, Luther wrote that God not only foreknows all things, but He wills them necessarily and immutably rather than merely contingently.16 Thus, for Luther, humanity’s free will of man cannot limit or impede God’s sovereign will that ordains all things. Regarding original sin, the Book of Concord echoed Luther’s position by stating that original sin refers not to willful acts of sin, but to corrupt human nature, and asserting that sin inheres in the nature, substance, and essence of man.17 The Book of Concord summarizes Luther’s assertion in Bondage of the Will that the human will is so affected by original sin that there is no goodness in humanity whatsoever. Gordon Rupp observes that the scholastic Nominalist theologians of Luther’s day opposed this doctrine.18 The Nominalists appealed to the doctrine of synteresis to oppose original sin, claiming that a small amount of goodness inclined the will slightly towards the good.19 Luther specifically rejected this Nominalist claim in the tenth thesis of his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, contending that the will is wholly unable to pursue any good thing.20 In Bondage of the Will, Luther further argued that free will without God’s grace is not free at all, since it is a prisoner to evil.21 Luther rejected the Nominalist assertion of the primacy of the will—at least with reference to humanity—because he subjected human will to the doctrines of God’s sovereignty and original sin. With these two instances in mind, it becomes apparent that Nominalism did not have a comprehensive effect on Luther’s theology. As discussed, Nominalism’s influence can be seen in Luther’s voluntaristic conception of God’s will. However, he rejected the Nominalist conception of human will, favoring an Augustinian view. This inconsistency is vital for understanding how Luther’s doctrine of imputation relates to his Nominalist influences. The Nominalists held a negative view of imputation; according to Rupp, both Ockham and Scotus appeal to the doctrine of potentia absoluta to explain how God can impute original sin to humans and to defend why God can withhold imputing sin if He so wills.22 As we will see, however, Luther adopted a positive view of imputation, in which God imputes Christ’s righteousness to the sinner in order to justify him, disagreeing with the Nominalist doctrine of a purely negative imputation. Luther agreed with the Nominalist idea of the non-imputation of sin. In Commentary on Galatians, Luther wrote that our Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseach sins are not imputed to us for Christ’s sake.23 However, Luther did not allow—unlike Ockham and Scotus—that this nonimputation of sins was arbitrary. Instead, Luther argued that faith in Christ must be present for the remission of sins.24 In fact, Luther specifically opposed the Nominalist appeal to the potentia absoluta to explain imputation in theses 55-56 of Disputation Against Scholastic Theology. Luther wrote against Ockham that even through the absolute power of God, God could not declare a man righteous unless His grace was justifying him.25 Thus, Luther disagreed with the Nominalist tradition regarding the doctrine of imputation by insisting that non-imputation of sin only occurs where faith in Christ is present. This distinction between Luther and Ockham does not by itself necessarily lead to the conclusion that Luther disagreed with the Nominalist understanding of imputation; however, he also had a positive understanding of imputation, namely the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. This aspect of his doctrine demonstrates that Luther disagreed with the Nominalist doctrine of imputation, namely, imputation in the purely negative sense. Indeed, Bruce defines Luther’s doctrine of imputation as God making the sinner righteous by forgiving all of his/her sins for Christ’s sake and imputing the righteousness of Christ to him/her.26 Another distinction between Luther and Ockham’s understandings of imputation is found in Luther’s separation of righteousness into passive and alien righteousness. In Two Kinds of Righteousness, Luther distinguished between proper or active righteousness and alien or passive righteousness. According to Luther, proper righteousness consists in good works and actual moral obedience. Luther defined alien righteousness as the righteousness of someone else, instilled from without.27 This righteousness of Christ justifies believers through faith.28 Luther also argued in the same passage that this righteousness forms the basis of sanctification. Thus, Luther disagreed with the Nominalist belief that the basis of justification is merely God’s declaration that a person is righteous, instead asserting that the imputation of Christ’s righteousness forms the basis for justification as well as the basis for sanctification. It can be concluded that Luther’s doctrine of imputation was not Nominalist. As stated above, he tended to use voluntaristic language when discussing the divine will. This reveals the influence that Nominalist philosophy (especially the via moderna) had on Luther’s beliefs. However, his beliefs www.jbu.edu/academics/journal Nominalist. On the contrary, Luther agreed with Augustine that human will is bound by sin. Augustine was not Nominalist, but was a proponent of Realist philosophy.29 Thus, Luther’s beliefs about God’s will were influenced by Nominalism while his beliefs about human will were influenced by Realism. His theology reflected two diametrically opposed philosophic perspectives. This is what makes his doctrine of imputation difficult to label; it integrates a Nominalist perspective of God’s will with a Realist perspective of human will. Given the conflicting philosophic influences on Luther’s doctrine of imputation, it seems that it would be difficult to integrate his doctrine with Aristotelian Realism. The apparent problem for an Aristotelian Realist is that the doctrine seems to bifurcate a person’s essence from their perceived qualities. In other words, it would seem that a person cannot be essentially righteous and have the accident of sinfulness. Luther’s doctrine of imputation asserts that Christ’s righteousness is imputed to the believer, yet it is obvious that Christians continue to sin. Thus, to an Aristotelian Realist, imputation seems to be an untenable doctrine. However, some Christian Aristotelian Realists may want to affirm Luther’s doctrine of imputation. An Aristotelian Realist can reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Realism by two methods. The first method is an insistence on the metaphysical independence of the substance of righteousness from the accidents of righteous behavior via a supernatural work of God. The second method is to appeal to imputation as a forensic rather than a substantial act (i.e. an act that affects a person’s standing before God as opposed to an act that affects a person’s essence). The first method of reconciliation is to posit that a person can be essentially righteous even while they sin. At first, this seems contrary to Realism, but it has a precedent among Realist philosophers. Thomas Aquinas used such a method to defend transubstantiation. In Summa Theologica, III, q. 75, art. 4, Aquinas argued that in the sacrament of the Eucharist God converts the substance of the bread and wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. The accidental properties of the bread and wine remain, but the essence is the body and blood of Christ. Similarly, an Aristotelian Realist could presumably assert that when God imputes Christ’s righteousness to the believer he changes his substance from sinful to righteous—without changing the accidents of the person. In other words, a person could be essentially righteous while 51 actually sinning. However, not all Aristotelian Realists accept Aquinas’s defense of transubstantiation. For example, seventeenth century theologian Francis Turretin objected to the separation of substance and accidents in Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Turretin argued that the separation of essence and accidents necessary for transubstantiation is impossible for two reasons. First, it goes against the testimony of the senses. Turretin observed that the senses are used to perceive accidents, and a substance is perceived by the accidents.30 Therefore, if the senses indicate that accidents are present, it necessarily follows that the substance is present. According to Turretin, transubstantiation violates the clear testimony of the senses that the elements in the Eucharist possess the accidents (and therefore essence) of bread and wine. Turretin’s second argument is that transubstantiation is contrary to reason. Turretin noted that the nature of an accident requires that it inhere in a substance. He observed that the formal reason of an accident is to inhere in a substance, so that accidents cannot exist at all, even for a moment, without a substance in which to inhere.31 If, as in transubstantiation, the accidents are supposed to exist without inhering in a substance, they cease to be accidents. Thus, it appears that transubstantiation results in a contradiction. The argument might also be framed in this manner: 1.It is the nature of accidents to inhere in a substance. 2.An accident cannot exist without a substance in which to inhere. 3.In transubstantiation, the accidents of the bread and wine are supposed to exist without a substance in which to inhere; therefore, 4.Transubstantiation is impossible. The two preceding arguments posed by Turretin seem to argue forcefully against the separability of substance and accidents in transubstantiation. The substance of his arguments would apply to our concern with imputed righteousness as well. It seems that if a person is essentially righteous and they continue to sin, the accidents of sinful behavior are bifurcated from the essence of sinfulness and cease to be accidents. Furthermore, if the senses perceive a person sinning then they also perceive the essence of sinfulness in those accidents. Thus, the two arguments seem to prove that Aristotelians cannot reconcile imputed righteousness in this way. In spite of Turretin’s strong argument, modern Aristotelian Essentialist David Oderberg argues for the possibility 52 of transubstantiation. Turretin claimed that accidents cannot be separated from substance or subsist separately from the substance in which they inhere.32 Oderberg counters this argument in his book, Real Essentialism, appealing to the fact that the metaphysical independence of accidents and substance are required for essentialism.33 Oderberg agrees with Turretin that accidents can never exist without a substance in which to inhere in the order of nature. Oderberg appeals to the possibility of transubstantiation by observing that if God suspended the laws of nature in a particular location, an accident could exist while inhering in a substance other than the one in which it normally inheres. Oderberg defends this suspension of the laws of nature by asserting that God can suspend the laws without actually breaking them.34 So, Oderberg would respond to Turretin’s arguments by appealing to a possible circumstance in which God suspends the laws of nature to separate the substance and accidents. Oderberg’s argument seems convincing. However, I think he is mistaken for two reasons. The first reason is that his conclusion seems to destroy the reliability of the senses. If Oderberg is correct, then it is impossible to perceive—at least with certainty—the substance of a thing by perceiving its accidents. If Oderberg is correct, there is no certainty in knowledge of forms and the very concept of substance seems to lose its meaning. The senses become unreliable because there is no necessary connection between accidents and substance. To give a brief example, if the accidents that I perceive to be a book were under God’s suspension of the laws of nature, they could actually inhere to the substance of a cow. Oderberg’s theory undermines the possibility of certainty with respect to knowing the substance of a thing through the perception of its accidents. Second, Oderberg’s argument is invalid because it results in a contradiction. Oderberg defends transubstantiation by appealing to the possibility of God’s miraculous suspension of the laws of nature. Oderberg asserts that a suspension of the laws of nature is distinct from breaking those laws. I think this assertion is false. Oderberg gives the example of a state that has suspended traffic laws for a month (meaning those who “break” the law are unpunished because the law did not apply when the laws were “broken”). However, I think this is an inaccurate analogy. There is nothing in human nature that constrains us to obey human decrees. However, the nature of substance and accidents do constrain them to Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseach behave in ways consistent with their nature. In other words, an accident can only be an accident insofar as it behaves as an accident—inhering in a substance. Thus, a suspension of the laws of nature is very different than a suspension of human traffic laws. A suspension of the laws that constrain accidents and substance would necessarily involve a contradiction. The nature of an accident is to inhere in a substance. If, as Oderberg argues, an accident can be present in the order of nature without a substance in which to inhere, it is no longer an accident, since accidents are defined as such by their inherence in a substance. Due to the law of noncontradiction, we see that it is impossible for an accident ever to exist without a substance in which to inhere. Thus, Oderberg’s argument for transubstantiation is invalid. With these arguments in mind, it is apparent that the first option for accepting imputed righteousness fails. An Aristotelian Realist cannot reconcile imputed righteousness by an appeal to the separability of a substance and its accidents; the essence of righteousness cannot be present in a person along with the accidents of sinfulness. The second option available for an Aristotelian Realist is to adopt an understanding of imputation as a forensic act that serves as the foundation for justification. In order to explain how imputation might be understood in this way, it will be necessary to prove two things. First, that justification should be understood in a forensic sense, and secondly, that imputation is the meritorious cause for this justification. Scripture clearly teaches that justification is a forensic act. In Romans 3:24-26 Paul explained, “they are now justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as a sacrifice of atonement by his blood, effective through faith. He did this to show his righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over the sins previously committed” (NRSV). Here Paul specifically appealed to justification as a forensic act in which God deals with sin as worthy of punishment. Perhaps even more persuasive is Paul’s statement to the Romans in 8:3. Paul wrote, “For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do: by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and to deal with sin, he condemned sin in the flesh.” Paul observed that God punished sin in Christ in order that sinful men might be justified because the law could not justify men. Turretin further points out that if justification is not a forensic act, but rather a moral and substantial act—as the Roman Catholic Church claimed—it is indistinguishable www.jbu.edu/academics/journal from sanctification.35 Furthermore, Turretin argued, a person cannot be justified on the basis of his inherent righteousness for two reasons. First, inherent righteousness is imperfect, and cannot satisfy God’s requirement for perfect obedience to the law.36 Second, justification consists in the remission of sins and the removal of guilt. Since inherent righteousness cannot remove guilt or the offense to God, it cannot be the basis of the remission of sins (and thus, justification).37 So, justification cannot be based on inherent righteousness, but must be a forensic act. Given this understanding of justification, it is apparent that sinners are in need of a perfect righteousness by which they can be declared righteous before God. The imputation of Christ’s righteousness serves this very purpose. Luther argued for an understanding of imputation that was substantive in nature. Turretin modified Luther’s doctrine, asserting that imputation can be understood in two ways. He stated that Christ’s righteousness serves a twofold purpose, namely, as a forensic imputation that acts as the grounds for justification and as a moral infusion that forms the basis of sanctification.38 Second Corinthians 5:21 represents the understanding of imputation as a forensic act: “For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God.” This understanding of imputation is actually necessary for an Aristotelian Realist. An Aristotelian conceives God’s nature as being perfectly unified. This means that every act of God must be consistent with all his attributes. So, in justification, God must be both merciful and just. Thus, God demands a perfect righteousness that can only be fulfilled by Christ’s perfect obedience. Turretin explained how this obedience is reckoned as the possession of the Christian. He argued that no one could stand before the rigor of God’s court by his/her own works. However, the perfect obedience of Christ is reckoned as the believer’s, and it is by his righteousness that believers are forgiven and counted righteous.39 Thus, the conception of imputation that is most faithful to Aristotelian Realism is that of imputation as a forensic act that justifies the sinner before God rather than a substantive act that changes a sinner’s essence. A person justified by Christ’s imputed righteousness remains essentially a sinful person, but his/her standing before God has changed. To summarize, it is apparent that Martin Luther’s theology was influenced by Nominalism. This influence manifests itself particularly in his voluntaristic conception of the divine 53 will. However, Luther disagreed with the Nominalist tradition in his doctrine of human will and imputation of Christ’s righteousness. Luther understood the imputation of Christ’s righteousness in the positive sense, rather than in the negative sense described by Nominalists. In this way, his doctrine is rescued from the accusation of Nominalism. An Aristotelian Realist can reconcile Luther’s doctrine of imputation in one of two ways. The attempt to reconcile it by appealing to a separation of substance and accidents is infeasible because it is contradictory and undermines the testimony of the senses. The other option is to adopt a conception of imputation and justification as forensic acts that alter the believer’s standing before God rather than his/her essence. This is the view advocated by Francis Turretin and the Reformed tradition, and it is the best way to reconcile Aristotelian Realism with Luther’s doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. 54 EndNotes 1 Aristotle. “Metaphysics,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), 810-811. 2 William of Ockham. “Epistemological Problems,” in Readings in the History of Philosophy, ed. Michael Strantz and Maureen Staudt, (Mason, Ohio: Cengage, 2009), 205-207. 3 Luther, Martin. “The Bondage of the Will,” in Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger, (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 196. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., 181. 6 Oberman, Heiko. The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World. Ed. Donald Weinstein. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, 24. 7 Ibid. 8 Bondage of the Will, 191. 9 Rupp, Gordon. The Righteousness of God. Cambridge: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953, 91. 10 Ibid., 30. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Rupp, 248-9. 14 Oberman, 29. 15 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 197. 16 Bondage of the Will, 184. 17 Bruce, Gustav Marius. Luther as an Educator. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963, 117. 18 Rupp, 152. 19 Ibid. 20 Luther, Martin. “Disputation Against Scholastic Theology,” in Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. James Atkinson, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), 267. 21 Bondage of the Will, 187. 22 Rupp, 90. 23 Luther, Martin. “Commentary on Galatians,” in Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger, (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 111. 24 Ibid. 25 Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, 270. 26 Bruce, 119. 27 Luther, Martin. “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” in Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseach Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger, (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 86-88. 28 Ibid. 29 Augustine was a proponent of Platonic Realism rather than Aristotelian Realism, but the distinction between the two systems of thought is not germane to the present discussion. 30 Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. Vol. 3. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1997, 490. 31 Ibid., 491. 32 Ibid. 33 Oderberg, David. Real Essentialism. New York: Routledge, 2007, 155. 34 Ibid., 148. 35 Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. Vol. 2. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1997, 635. 36 Ibid., 643. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 647. 39 Ibid., 648. www.jbu.edu/academics/journal 55 Hebrew Exogesis: Hebrews 4:14-5:10: Jesus, The Great High Priest Patton Shinall Theology Major This paper attempts to answer what the author of Hebrews offered to teach in Hebrews 4:14-5:10. Through exegetical hermeneutics this paper shows what the message of this passage is and how Christians are to live in light of this Scripture. I n Hebrews chapter 4, verse 14 through chapter 5, verse 10, Jesus is exalted as the great high priest of the Church. Within this text are some of the most important truths regarding Christ’s office as the exalted priestly intercessor on behalf of Christians as well as his atoning work accomplished through his ministry. As a result, this passage truly is a treasure within the Book of Hebrews and the New Testament as a whole, and because of this persistent dedication should be implemented in order to understand God’s holy and transcendent will and grace spoken within this text. Historical Context. One cannot begin to understand the interpretation of any biblical text without first under- standing the historical context of the book in question. Donald A. Hagner, author of Encountering the Book of Hebrews writes: Given the central importance of grammatico-historical interpretation, the starting point for the interpretation of any book of the Bible is the determination of its situation in history: its author, approximate date, and place of origin, its addressees and their back ground, its intended purpose, its dependence upon literary and oral sources, and so on (Hauger, 20).