* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download Capital Flows and Accelerating Mechanism: An Alternative
Survey
Document related concepts
Pensions crisis wikipedia , lookup
Securitization wikipedia , lookup
History of the Federal Reserve System wikipedia , lookup
Present value wikipedia , lookup
Life settlement wikipedia , lookup
Interest rate swap wikipedia , lookup
Quantitative easing wikipedia , lookup
Global financial system wikipedia , lookup
International monetary systems wikipedia , lookup
Financialization wikipedia , lookup
Credit card interest wikipedia , lookup
Global saving glut wikipedia , lookup
Transcript
Outline 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. What does the paper do? Main contributions Appraisal Can this model be used for policy advice to EMEs? On the choice of alternative policy frameworks RR as a policy tool Shock robustness 2 Motivation, main question, and findings Motivated by the post-Lehman behavior of EMEs (Brasil, Turkey, Colombia, Peru) Main Question: What is the appropriate mix of monetary and macroprudential policies when changes in world interest rate is the dominating shock? Answer: Using a macroprudential instrument (such as RR) improves welfare significantly compared to IT regime. Each instrument (policy rate and RR) should be paired with the objective on which it has the most influence. (Immediate thought: do we really need a 45 equation model to make these conclusions?) 3 Methodology and Execution Set up a model with financial friction and nominal rigidity • Enhanced financial accelerator, price stickiness Simulate the model with a foreign interest rate path similar to the one observed in post-Lehman period. Rank the welfare under various policy frameworks • Strict inflation targeting (IT) (inflation always hits the target) • Taylor rule • Strict IT with a macroprudential rule (reserve requirements) 4 Main Contributions of the paper Modeling: RR’s under financial and nominal frictions Policy: Simulating a specific type of policy problem which is very relevant for many EMEs. • How to respond to capital flow cycles driven by extraordinary movements in global interest rates? Foreign Interest Rate 5 Appraisal Very relevant and timely question Sophisticated, state of the art modeling with plenty of useful policy implications Well-executed (more intuition may be helpful) 6 Easy to beat strict IT or Taylor Rule IT or Taylor rule is not optimal (and not used in practice) Why not do your best with a single tool, i.e., use an optimal rule? Choose the parameters 𝜓𝑅 , 𝜓𝜋 , and 𝜓𝑦 in the reaction function 𝐼𝐵 𝑅𝑡𝐼𝐵 𝑅𝑡−1 log = 𝜓𝑅 log + (1 − 𝜓𝑅 ) 𝜓𝜋 log 1 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜓𝑦 log 𝑦𝑡 1+𝑟 1+𝑟 which minimizes the loss function 𝑇 𝑡 𝑡=1 𝛽 ln ℎ(𝑖)𝑡 1+𝜎𝐿 𝑐(𝑖)𝑡 − 𝛾ℎ 1+𝜎𝐿 Then assess if the following alternatives improve the welfare: • An augmented version with a direct response to credit • Using a macroprudential instrument 7 Is this an emerging economy model? Involves financial accelerator, rather than sudden stop: Agency problem (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999) + fire sales (Choi and Cook 2012) Acceleration mechanism is not specific to emerging economies The paper includes an extended version with dollarization but share of external credit is fixed, only valuation effects: i*↓ , rer↑ , net worth↑ , less need for borrowing Credit is mostly determined by the demand side? The evidence shows that capital flows and credit cycles are mainly driven by supply (leverage behavior) of global banks. 8 Capital Flows and Accelerating Mechanism: An Alternative View Lower Global Interest Rates Capital Inflows Currency appreciation and improved networth Easing colleteral constraints 9 Capital Flows and Accelerating Mechanism: An Alternative View Lower Global Interest Rates Capital Inflows Currency appreciation and improved networth Increased supply of external credit Easing colleteral constraints 10 Implications for the Welfare Function The welfare metric used in the model: 𝑇 𝛽𝑡 ln 𝑐(𝑖)𝑡 − 𝛾ℎ 𝑊(𝑖) = 𝑡=1 ℎ(𝑖)𝑡 1+𝜎𝐿 1 + 𝜎𝐿 may not reflect the objective of the EME policy makers EME central banks may have an incentive to smooth credit and exchange rate cycles directly for reasons such as: • Inefficient composition of the output • Overborrowing (due to pecuniary externalities) • Probability of a sudden stop (relevant in finite sample) 11 Conclusion on Turkish Monetary Policy: How fair is it? «In particular, while the “natural” interest rate of this economy declines with the world rate, the policy rate may indeed need to be increased to accommodate reserve requirements—in contrast to the Turkey experience.» This conclusion reflects model specific dynamics. The results would have possibly changed if: • the credit were driven by the leverage cycles of global banks (as evidenced by Bruno and Shin 2013) • the objective of the policy had incorporated financial stability (reducing the probability of a sudden stop and/or BoP crisis). 12 Reserve Requirements as a Macroprudential Tool In the model RR affects credit through two channels Cost channel : 𝑅𝑡𝐼𝐵 −𝑅𝑡𝐷 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑡𝑀𝐴 ) Liquidity Channel: What if the CB directly participates in the interbank market? • Would liquidity channel still work? May be to a lesser extent. 13 Robustness: what about «pull factors»? The paper considers a specific (foreign interest rate) shock, yet draws broader conclusions regarding the policy mix. How would the results change if the capital flows were driven by pull factors rather than foreign interest rates? A fall in country credit risk Productivity shock 14 16 Capital Flows, Credit , and Exchange Rate Cycles (HP filtered, standardized) 2 Loans (t) REER (t+2) Inflows (t+2) 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 2013Q2 2012Q4 2012Q2 2011Q4 2011Q2 2010Q4 2010Q2 2009Q4 2009Q2 2008Q4 2008Q2 2007Q4 2007Q2 2006Q4 2006Q2 2005Q4 2005Q2 2004Q4 2004Q2 -2 Source: CBRT. 17