Download Introduction

Document related concepts

Schools of Islamic theology wikipedia , lookup

Islamic democracy wikipedia , lookup

Muslim world wikipedia , lookup

Islam and violence wikipedia , lookup

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan wikipedia , lookup

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Iran wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Somalia wikipedia , lookup

Salafi jihadism wikipedia , lookup

Islamofascism wikipedia , lookup

History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1939–54) wikipedia , lookup

Islamic socialism wikipedia , lookup

Islamic terrorism wikipedia , lookup

Terrorism in Egypt wikipedia , lookup

Liberalism and progressivism within Islam wikipedia , lookup

War against Islam wikipedia , lookup

Political aspects of Islam wikipedia , lookup

Censorship in Islamic societies wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Afghanistan wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Bangladesh wikipedia , lookup

History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt wikipedia , lookup

Criticism of Islamism wikipedia , lookup

Islam and other religions wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Indonesia wikipedia , lookup

Islamic culture wikipedia , lookup

Al-Nahda wikipedia , lookup

History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1928–38) wikipedia , lookup

Islamic schools and branches wikipedia , lookup

Islamism wikipedia , lookup

Islam and secularism wikipedia , lookup

Islam and modernity wikipedia , lookup

Transcript
Charities, and Political Islam
Chapter 12 of R&W – “Solidarism and its Enemies”
Chapter 14 of R&W - “Is Islam the Solution?”
(this has been significantly revised from 2nd edition)
Readings: Clark, Bayat
Link to syllabus
Link to Canvas
Charities - Islamic Social Welfare Organizations
Other names: NGOs, Private Voluntary Organizations. Islamic Charities
What: Medical clinics, schools, trade skill centers, banks, day care centers
supermarkets, clubs (mostly urban)
Are essential to providing services to poor and to many middle class citize
Regulated separately from other civil or religious institutions in Egypt, by
the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Why? Islam has a tradition of charitable foundations, and
mosques have often provided basic social services.
Why successful? Smaller is better; local is more legitimate. Less
bureaucratic. Extensive use of volunteer workers.
Parallels in other regions: NGOs, ”Thousand Points of Light,” YMCA,
religious schools, hospitals, charities, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations.
Christian Science Monitor. “Christian Base Communities.”
From Clark: “Islamic Social Welfare Organizations” [Egypt]
“Contrary to the views expressed in much of the prevailing
literature, this paper argues that Islamic clinics are neither a
reflection of nor a primary cause of a growth in political
Islam. Preliminary research shows that they are locally
organized charitable associations deriving from a strong
Islamic tradition which emphasizes individual charity, and
from a perceived need to supplement the overloaded and
inadequate government clinics. These clinics demonstrate
the good intentions, community awareness, and religious
devotion of their sponsors, who tend to be independent
local elites. In sum, these clinics and their sponsors, while
part of an Islamic religious tradition, tend to be apolitical.”
Examples suggesting Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood
“Charities” actually cater to the Middle Class
States that the public
Al-Bashir Hospital,
charges 18 dinar
Exchange rate was US$ 1.4 = 1 Jordanian Dinar
Source: Clark, Islam, Charity and Activism. P. 101
Number of Welfare PVOs in Cairo, by Category. 1990
Field of Work
Social Assistance
Maternity & Child
Care
Num.
3,002
235
Field of Work
Num.
Religious,
Scientific &
Cultural
Family
Welfare
2,457
150
Prison Inmates’
Welfare
15
Old Age
Welfare
45
Family Planning
41
Literacy
31
150
Multiple
Activities
Handicapped
Welfare
3,316
Source: Saad E. Ibrahim et al. (1996) An Assessment of Grass Roots Participation
in the Development of Egypt p. 66
Study of 40 Egyptian PVOs in 1990, by Saad Ibrahim et al
Distribution of PVOs
According to Leading
Source of Revenues
Distribution by Number
of Beneficiaries
Returns and fees
17
< 300
14
Gov’t Aid
8
300-1,000
15
Donations
7
1,000-10,000
9
Other private
Egyptian
organizations
8
> 10,000
2
Source: An Analysis of Grass Roots Participation in the Development of Egypt
Saad Eddin Ibrahim
1939Joint US and Egyptian citizenship.
Professor of Sociology at American
University of Cairo, and founder of
Ibn Khaldoun Center
Imprisoned by Egyptian government
Released after 19 months. Had
received significant support from
US, and is said to suffer a neurological
disorder.
Taught Mrs. Mubarak at AUC, & their
children subsequently.
Web-interviews: PBS (2005), The Connection (2003),
Financing Terrorism
Source: Burr and Collins (2006) Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World
Link to article about Hakeem Olajuwon
Olajuwon
Political Islam
Terms
• Islam – the name of the religion
• Moslem (Muslim) follower of Islam
• Islamists, Islamic Party: “seek to bring all elements of economic
and political life into harmony with what its adherents believe is
‘true Islam’… Minimally, they call for the application of shari’a
(Islamic Law).” (R&W 3rd edition p. 363)
• A similar term often used is Political Islam
• It is debatable if the majority of Muslims are Islamists in the
sense indicated here.
Two other terms are frequently used, not consistently:
Fundamentalist: term with unhelpful American Christian overtones.
Radical/Jihadi: often applied to those who would use violence.
Arguably, most Islamists do not espouse violence. Certainly
most Muslims do not espouse violence.
mt’s comments:
These terms – Political Islam, Islamists, etc. were created and applied by
outsiders, not by those who practice it.
Many Muslim countries are officially hostile towards Political Islam,
so some groups that are Islamist are forced to deny having an
Islamist identity.
Most western scholars analyze Political Islam as a political movement,
which has adopted a religious identity to help it achieve political goals.
R&W argue that a defining characteristic of Islamic parties
is that they are hostile to Israel and, by extension, to the US.
Centuries ago there was close identification of political and religious
authority in the Caliphate.
Sunni/Shi’a differences are not important on this topic.
Don’t forget that Islam does not have a central authority (e.g. Vatican).
Persecution of Islamists
Algeria
1990s
Egypt
1949
1950s
1960s
Post-1981
Pre-2011
1970s
1990
Iran
Jordan
Lebanon
Saudi
Arabia
Syria
1976
1982
Tunisia
Turkey
1997
One component of the Algerian civil war was the issue of an islamist agenda.
Other components were the incompetence/ corruption of military (FLN)
rulers, ethnic splits along Berber/Arab lines, dominance of exports by foreign
firms
Hasan Al Banna is assassinated, presumably by Farouk’s men
The Muslim Brotherhood is banned by Free Officers/Nasser.
Nasser repressed banks organized on Islamic lines.
State of emergency after death of Sadat; numerous arrests
MB is banned but tolerated. Other Islamists are quite violent
Ayatollah Khomeini emerges as key challenger to Shah, and was exiled
King Hussein dissolved the Parliament, in which Muslim Brethren had strong
leverage
The civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990) represented a direct clash along
religious lines (but not obviously ‘Islamist’ lines).
For generations, the house of Saud has worked with the Wahabbis (sect of
Islam), and it is natural to expect a greater Islamic influence in this country,
although no parties—Islamist or otherwise-- are permitted.
Syria backs Christians against Muslims in Lebanon’s Civil War, in what
many see as an indirect attack on Lebanese Islamists (Hizbullah).
Repression of Muslim Brotherhood/Islamists by Hafez al Assad; said to lead
to 10,000 – 40,000 deaths in Hama.
At independence, country was a secular democracy, which evolved into a one
party state, with no room for Islamists.
Erbakan (rather like an Islamist) deposed by military.
Who are the Islamists?
Islamist movements are loose coalitions of three elements:
1) Counter-elite of businessmen and professionals
2) Frustrated intellectuals and under-employed university graduates
3) Mass base of young semi-educated unemployed. (Core of the
movement)
R&W p. 366.
One implication is that there is weak coordination among these
groups; often small cells composed of friends and relatives.
There is often sharp hostility among them. Government policies
towards them are similarly diverse. Saudis are very hostile to MB.
Islamists harbor deep grievances against the old order, which made
grandiose promises, but squalid performance since independence
Muslim countries not following “Islamist” Principles:
Indonesia: country praised by R&W for sound economics
Malaysia: also has a strong economy; Premier Mahathir
often “played the Islamic card” to his people.
Pakistan and Bangladesh do not now have strong economies.
Many MENA countries, with obvious influence of Islam,
many of whose rulers are themselves observant Muslims, have
had their regimes questioned by Islamists:
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Libya
Egypt
Algeria
Morocco Syria
Turkey (pre-AKP)
Who Are We Talking About?
Iran is an example of a country consciously being run
according to principles of the Shari’a since 1979, reversing
the secularist orientation from the Pahlavi dynasty.
Many Saudis would describe their country as being run
according to principles of the Shari’a, and many Muslims
would probably reject this.
Turkey is currently ruled by a party with very strong
religious influence—Islamic not Islamist?
Afghanistan under the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Sudan have been
said to be Islamist: not helpful classification, due to special
circumstances in those cases.
Important cases
Egypt
Turkey
Tunisia
Morocco
West Bank and Gaza
Lebanon
Iraq
Muslim Brotherhood
Ikhwan
The important precedent of the Muslim
Brotherhood, started in Egypt in the 1920s; a nonelite civil organization working for the
strengthening of the religion in society.
Most MENA countries have groups influenced by
the example of the Muslim Brotherhood. Most of
these groups have suffered political repression.
Hassan Al-Banna
1905-1949
Muslim Brotherhood Presidential Candidates in 2012
Mohamed al-Forsi
(1951)
Professor
Head of the Freedom
and Justice Party,
which is the MB’s
political party. Backup for el-Shater.
Kheirat el-Shater
1950
Businessman,
#2 in MB
12 years in jail, which
may lead to disqualification
Abul al-Fotouh
1951
Engineer, strong
support among
youth. Expelled
from MB in 2011
Muslim Brotherhood presidential
nominee Khairat al-Shater said
Tuesday that the application of
Sharia is his ultimate goal.
Al Masry Al-Youm 4-4-2012
• “I will rely on people of experience to help Parliament achieve that goal,” Shater said
during a meeting of the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation, a
moderate body of Islamic scholars, according to the group’s website, which quoted
his remarks in a statement.
• Shater, however, did not elaborate on the methods he would adopt to apply Islamic
legislation. The statement said the four-hour meeting was the candidate’s first since
the Brotherhood announced his nomination.
• Shater denied suggestions that his nomination was the result of a deal with the ruling
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. As for the system of government he would
establish, he said he prefers a semi-presidential system, but said he would have no
problem if existing political parties opt for a parliamentary system.
Muslim Brotherhood to
launch chain store
Al-Masry Al-Youm April 14, 2012
Investors affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood
plan to launch a chain store in two months,
which they expect to acquire a great share of the
retail market in Egypt.
Brotherhood sources told Al-Masry Al-Youm
that the chain supermarket would be named Zad,
adding that presidential hopeful Khairat alShater is a prominent shareholder in the project,
in addition to other Brotherhood leaders as well
as investors who have links to the group.
The sources, which asked to remain anonymous,
said Shater registered his share under the name
of his son-in-law after he announced his
presidential run. The sources added that the store
bears a trademark similar to the Turkish Zad and
expected that the Turkish Zad might have a
share, as well, in the project.
Popular Egypt TV
religious figure
raises his sights
L.A. Times, April 12, 2011
Amr Khaled returns to
Egypt, hints at forming
a party.
Facebook make him one of the site's 75 most popular people. His television show
borrows from Donald Trump's. When he appears before thousands of adoring fans, he
wears Hugo Boss suits and applies a little black makeup to his scalp to hide the gaps in
his thinning hair. Amr Khaled is the Arab world's most successful televangelist, a
charismatic guide for millions of Muslims.
His TV programs, audiotapes and DVDs have long been ubiquitous. Now, Egyptians
are seeing him in the flesh once again after his return from eight years of exile in
Britain.
The hall was filled with hundreds of young middle-class strivers, his core following.
Egypt's revolution had lifted the yoke of hopelessness and apathy, and he had more
good news for them: Vodafone was giving millions of dollars to the volunteer arm of his
More Egyptian Headlines
Ahram Online: April 4
One sure thing: A pro-market
Egyptian constitution
The make-up of the assembly
writing Egypt's new constitution
may be bitterly contested, but the
body's economists are likely to
agree on putting business
interests and growth ahead of
social justice
Al-Masry Al-Youm April 9, 2012
Trade union federation declines
Shater's request for support,
sources say
The Egyptian Trade Union
Federation has declined a request
by Muslim Brotherhood
presidential candidate Khairat alShater for support, federation
sources said.
The sources [said] that most of the
federation's members lean toward
supporting a non-Islamist
presidential candidate.
Current Lessons from Egypt
Mubarak was correct when he said that after him, the M. Brotherhood.
Initially, the Brotherhood showed great skill in playing the political game
Although the military appeared to allow fair elections, within a few
months they threw out Morsi and jailed top MB leadership.
While in office, the Brotherhood continued to espouse a neo-liberal
economic line.
The revolutionary ideals of the initial Tahrir movements were lost.
Indeed, liberal/secularists have failed rotundly.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Born: 1954
Prime Minister March 2003-
Born in a town in northern Turkey,
into a lower middle class family.
Previously mayor of Istanbul,
where he had a reputation for
honesty. Head of AK Party, which
Is often described as Islamist.
Fethullah Gülen
Born in a small village in Turkey; his
father was a preacher in the local mosque.
A preacher, author, educator, and Muslim
scholar living in self-imposed exile in a
compound in Pennsylvania.
Gülen teaches an Anatolian version of
traditional mainstream Islam, derived
from Said Nursi's teachings and
modernizing them. (Wikipedia)
His “Community” has 2,000 schools in 52 countries, and is especially
active in Central Asia, where there are many Turkish speakers. Also has a
media empire, Asya Finans, and competes with Müsiad.
He is not mentioned in R&W, but evidently is an example of the
combination of religion, politics, and big business.
Graft Inquiry Intensifies Turkish Political
Rivalry
ISTANBUL — At dawn on Tuesday the police raided the offices of several
businessmen with close ties to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as part of a
wide-ranging corruption investigation, immediately raising the stakes of an
unfolding political contest of wills here between two men who have long held
sway over the country’s Muslim masses: an ailing and aging Turkish preacher who
lives on a sprawling compound in the Poconos, and Mr. Erdogan.
The investigation also threatens to shake Turkey’s political establishment ahead of
a series of elections that will determine the future of the country’s Islamist
governing party, in power now for more than a decade. But it also figures in the
personal battle going on between Mr. Erdogan and the charismatic preacher,
Fethullah Gulen.
The preacher left Turkey in 1999 for exile in America after he was accused of
trying to establish an Islamic state. He presides over a global following in the
millions, some of whom have come to fill the ranks of Turkey’s police and
judiciary, including a prosecutor said to be leading the latest corruption
investigation.
NY Times Dec. 18, 2013
Alcohol ban
Source : Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Report: October 4, 2009.
Elif Izberk-Bilgin Journal of Consumer Research (2012) 39:1-25
(She’s a prof in UM-D’s College of Business)
Infidel Brands: Unveiling Alternative Meanings of Global Brands at the
Nexus of Globalization, Consumer Culture and Islamism
mt’s initial understanding. Study of how Islamism (the re-articulation of Islamic
teachings for ideological purposes) affects consumption among informants in
gecekondu around Istanbul. The author’s contribution is identifying three strains of
Islamist discourse that regards ‘global brands’ as threats to Islam, and thus ‘infidel
brands.’ Much broader than mere rejection of pork and liquor, informants’ identifying
considerations are modesty (anti-consumerism; make-up, fancy weddings),
halal/haram (e.g. KFC, McDonalds), tyranny (zulm; high profits, anti-Palestinian).
Without being judgmental, the author provides a rich discussion of how the infidel
critique is informed not only by macro-historical factors, as well as micro-cultural
Izberk (ii)
Heading reads: “People, do not participate in tyranny!”
NY Times, Dec. 16, 2013
A Political Deal in a Deeply
Divided Tunisia as Islamists
Agree to Yield Power
Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the
Islamist party Ennahda.
“Compromise has been in short supply since Tunisia sparked the Arab Spring nearly
three years ago. But this small North African nation has once again broken new
ground with a political deal between longtime enemies among the Islamists and the
secular old guard.
The deal, announced over the weekend, promises to put in place an independent
caretaker government until new elections [in 2014], marking the first time Islamists
have agreed in the face of rising public anger to step back from power gained at the
ballot box.”
Sheikh Abdesslam Yassine, (with his daughter Nadia)
Morocco 1928-2012
Leader of the Justice and Charity Group (distinct from Muslim Brotherhoo
In 1974 he wrote a book “Islam or the Deluge” which led to his confineme
for three years.
His ‘islamist’ group is described as rejecting violence as a tool.
What about Iran?
Ayatollah Komeini, with very strong popular backing, installed a regime
after 1979 often described as a (Political Islam) theocracy. Many people
in other Muslim/Arab states use Iran as an example of what they wish
to avoid. K&W basically avoid including Iran in their discussion.
Ahmadinejad’s re-election in 2009 was accompanied by massive protests
against alleged fraud, which in turn were silenced with severe
repression. To the surprise of many, the 2013 elections were allowed to
happen, seemed relatively fair, and were won by a “liberal cleric” who
has changed several aspects of Iran’s external relations.
Although it is easy to find numerous examples of policies followed by
Ahmadinejad that western economists judge injurious, it is also evident
that the sanctions and boycott imposed on Iran by the west have limited
that countries options, providing – to some – a ready alibi for bad
policies.
More comments
Some groups that might describe themselves as Islamists, are
described by others--importantly the US--as “terrorists.” Important
examples are Egyptian MB, Hamas (Palestine) and Hizbullah (Lebanon).
Hamas and Hizbullah have demonstrated enormous popular support, and
recently have achieved (some sort of) military victories over Israel.
It is not my wish to get into: 1) definition of terrorist, and its sub-themes
such as state terrorism, how to label an entire group, some of whose
members engage in violence; nor 2) what should be outsiders’ (e.g. US)
response to groups described as terrorist (think of Irgun, ANC, IRA).
Note the evolution of policy of Arafat/PA, Hamas, Hizbullah. This
argues against use of the term ‘terrorist,’ and argues for considering
these groups as being led by concrete political goals.
mt feels that R&W’s analysis seems oriented toward Egypt and the
Muslim Brotherhood, not more recent contexts like Hizbullah, Pakistan.
Hamas
Established in 1987 during the first Intifada
by Sheikh Yasin and others, although its
heritage extends to earlier Islamist/MB
groups. Current leaders are Khaled Mishal & Ismail Haniya
At least before the elections of 2006, Hamas opposed the Oslo peace
process, did not recognize the right of Israel to exist, and called for a
complete withdrawal of Israelis from pre-1948 Palestine.
The organization has extensive social welfare programs in the West Bank
and Gaza; it has always been stronger in Gaza.
In addition, its military wing has carried out a series
of armed attacks against Israeli targets.
Hamas has been a rival of Arafat’s (and Abbas’s) Fatah.
Haniya
Hamas’s winning the elections of 2006, and subsequent taking
control of Gaza are a key junctures.
Hizbullah. Hizb Allah – the Party of God
Lebanese political organization which coalesced
in 1982, following early leadership from Imam
Musa Sadr (disappeared in Libya in 1978).
Predominantly Shi-a, it is a power in Lebanese
Parliament (w/Amal). Effective military
presence against Israel, and against troops from
US and France. Strongly opposed by certain
Sheikh Nasrallah
sectors of Lebanese society. Receives money and inspiration from
Syria & Iran. Provides a range of social, health, and community
services, especially in southern Lebanon and southern Beirut—Shi’a
strongholds. The kidnapping of some Israeli troops in July 2006 led to
the attack by Israel; Hizbullah’s ability to hold them off gained them
much support in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world.
http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/
Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr
1931/5 -1980 influential Iraqi Shi'a cleric,
writer, and founder of the Dawa Party. Is the
father-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr and cousin
of both Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr and Imam
Musa as-Sadr. His father Haydar al-Sadr was
a noted Shi'a cleric. He and his sister ‘Alima
were tortured and killed by Saddam Hussein’s
regime.
mt believes that R&W’s discussion of
‘Political Islam’ misses the importance of
these imams, and the Dawa Party (of Iraq),
because this political movement was led by an important cleric (along
with Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim). The Dawa party was opposed to S.
Hussein, and remains central in current Iraqi politics.
Similarly for Musa as-Sadr in Lebanon.
Islamists in Power: Economic Management
R&W: Islamism as ‘neo-liberalism in an Islamic guise.’
Islamists were critical of Nasser’s nationalization of Egyptian
property, supported by prosperous small business sector. Islamists
seem to favor orthodox economic policy (balanced budget, etc.)
Some imposition of Islamic Banking. Zakat more widespread.
Existing Islamist regimes rest on coalitions: conservative urban
merchants, redistributionist students and youths. These coalitions
weaken effectiveness of pro-market reforms. (e.g. Iran)
Policymaking never conforms to rigorous theory. We must recognize
the importance of the circumstances of Islamist regimes’ coming to
power. Inevitably, there will be differences by country.
mt believes it is difficult to evaluate the economic policies of Islamists,
due to non-religious factors, like boycotts, armed conflict and oil, as
well as the difficulty of identifying appropriate case studies.
Islamists in Power: Cultural (religious?) Policies
(Apparently not touched directly in R&W. Varies by country)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Segregation of sexes at school, businesses, shops
Clothing—veiling for women, some influence on men’s attire.
No liquor, smoking, gambling. Restrictions on popular music, DVDs
Some examples of control of textbooks. Religious open-ness?
Divorce laws: some commentators judge an Islamic position to be
anti-female. The same could be said about women’s voting and
driving, although the significance of these policies is not agreed.
6) Death by beheading & stoning occur in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan.
These are Muslim countries, but these practices are not from the
religion.
Note: a big issue in Turkey today is what sort of cultural/religious policie
will the AKP party adopt? Turkish voters recently passed
constitutional amendments which some assert will result in more
religious control.
Islamists in Power - Politics
Morsi did a lousy job in Egypt.
Iran has had several elections, consistent with their constitution.
Repression after 2009 elections is widely condemned.
In Iran (among some in Iraq, and Hizbullah?) Wilayat al faqih –
highest position is given to a cleric. Sunnis (e.g. Saudis) reject this.
Saudi Arabia is a version of an Islamist government that certainly is
not democratic. The Taliban was an even more extreme example.
There are plenty of examples of democracies in Muslim countries:
Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh. Iran and Pakistan(?).
In 2012, fears of the Tunisian Islamists (An-Nahda) seem mis-placed.
For Egypt, see upcoming slides.
Post-Islamic Movements (i)
A vision, especially espoused by French scholars (and Bayat), that the
movement known as Political Islam is out-of-date; in many countries it
has been surpassed by other trends, if not simply reached a dead end.
Iran: Khomeini’s movement wasn’t an “Islamic” movement. Evidently
there are important mobilization of women’s groups and students,
and also the protests after the 2009 Presidential election.
Turkey: The AKP party has a strong Muslim identity, but was not
elected because it pushed an Islamic platform.
Saudi Arabia: the term Political Islam does not apply here.
Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood has been neutralized – co-opted and
defanged – and surpassed by other democratic political movements,
as well as several violent groups. [ What??]
Post-Islamist Revolutions: Foreign Affairs, 2011 by A Bayat
So far, religious rhetoric has been remarkably absent, even though the participants of
the Middle East’s many uprisings remain overwhelmingly people of faith.
In Egypt the revolution demanded “change, freedom and social justice” and was
broadly secular. In fact, the major religious groups… did not initially back the
revolution.
Sounded good when he wrote it. mt doesn’t agree
Note also the armed conflict between Islamist movements.
Further comments
Islamic movements are growing in influence throughout MENA and in
most other Muslim countries. This challenges US pretensions of
working for the spread of Democracy, while rejecting these important
social groups with widespread local support.
Recall that major movements of the mid twentieth century; Nasserism,
Ba’athism, leaders such as the Shah of Iran, Attaturk, and Bourguiba,
and the Kings of Jordan and Morocco, were secular--sometimes even
strongly anti-religious. The social and economic failure of those
movements contributed to the growing attraction of Political Islam.
Note also that there is a mixture of acceptance of Islamist orientation
amongst the countries of the Arabian Peninsula.
Bibliography of “Post-Islamic” Writing
Asef Bayat (2009) Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and
the Post-Islamic Turn Stanford U. Press
Stacher, Joshua (2002) “Post-Islamic Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence
of the Wasat Party,” Middle East Journal
Henri Lauzière (2005) “Post-Islamism and the Religious Discourse of
Abd Al-Salam Yasin,” Int’l Journal of Middle East Studies
Olivier Roy (1998) “Le post-islamisme,” Revue des mondes musulmans
et de la Méditerranée
Gilles Kepel (2000) Jihad: expansion et déclin de l’islamisme
Amel Boubekeur (2007) “Post-Islamist Culture: A New Form of
Mobilization?” History of Religions
Shia Politics in Iraq (March, 2008)
The senior Shia cleric
in Iraq is Ali al-Sistani,
who rejects this
involvement in
politics and fighting.
The army of Iraq,
under Prime Minister
al-Maliki, fought
the Mahdi Army in
Basra.
Moqtada al-Sadr, 1973
Leads Sadr movement, Mehdi.
Apparently resides in
Qom (Iran).
Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, 1950-2009.
Leader of Dawa party/SIIC,
whose militia is the Badr
Brigade. Met with Pres. Bush.
Succeeded by his son Ammar.
These are religious leaders of political movements; seldom called Islamist
Los Angeles Times
October 30, 2010
Iran's supreme leader demands
support of clerics. Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei warns the leaders of
the Shiite Muslim clergy if they embrace Western ideals or oppose
President Ahmadinejad's hard-line government, the Islamic Republic
could collapse.
-Iran's supreme leader wrapped up an unprecedented 10-day visit to
the Iranian seminary city of Qom on Friday that was widely seen as
an attempt to bolster support among those in a clerical establishment
either indifferent or hostile to his conservative agenda.
In a series of meetings, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned turbaned
leaders of the Shiite Muslim clergy to avoid becoming excessively
enamored of unorthodox, reformist and Western ideas and too
Islamism as a Social Movement (R&W p. 368 ff.)
1.Islamism should be seen as a ‘modern’ movement, people have above
average education, use IT, display awareness of international events, etc
2. Composed of a counter-elite of businessmen excluded from government
favor, frustrated intellectuals, and a mass of unemployed, semi-educated
youth (R&W p. 366)
3. React to humiliation at home and abroad. Defeat of nationalist movemen
of their parents or grandparents. Also, respond positively to the ‘Afghans
who fought the Soviets, as well as recent models such as Hizbollah.
4. R&W also attribute motivation for these movements to the failure
of ISI; broadly in the sense of a weak economy.
How Sanctions Fail to Contain a Saudi Mogul
Glenn R. Simpson. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New
York, N.Y.: Aug 29, 2007. pg. A.
ISTANBUL, Turkey -- Yassin Qadi is a well-known
multimillionaire, founder of a large supermarket chain here and a
close friend of the Turkish premier. "I trust him the same way I
trust my father," Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on
national television last year.
But the Saudi businessman also is a major financier of Islamic
terrorism with close business associates who are members of al
Qaeda, according to the U.S. Treasury and the United Nations
Security Council. At Washington's request, the Security Council
ordered Mr. Qadi's assets frozen a few weeks after the Sept. 11,
2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S.
The asset freeze has largely crippled Mr. Qadi's international
business empire.
Comments relating to recent events (early 2011)
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood emerges from recent events as much more
peaceful and democratic than it had been described. This therefore
represents a loss of credibility for Mubarak, many Israelis officials, and
others who described the MB as terrorists.
It is not known what direction the Muslim Brotherhood will take, as
they have been repressed and persecuted in most countries. For
example, in Egypt they are typically described as led by old men
who are very cautious and basically old-fashioned and out of touch.
Have these movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, etc., been secular or
religious-led?
Egyptian Presidential Candidates, April 2012
Independents/Liberals
Mubarak/NDP/
Military
Islamists: FJP,
Salafi: Al-Nour
Amr Moussa
Ayman Nour (?)
Khalded Ali
Ahmed Shafiq
Omar Suleiman
Abdul Monem Abul
Fotouh
Khairat el-Shater (?)
Selim al-Awa
Hazem Abu Ismail (?)
Not declared, but
NOT: M. Al-Baradei,
with a strong
Nabil Al-Araby, not
Kefaya, nor any serious support group:
candidate from the Tahrir Tantawi
Square movements.
NOT: H. Mubarak
nor G. Mubarak
US reaction, as reported in NY Times (April 1, 2012)
… Mr. Abu Ismail’s surge raises the prospect that the winner might not be a more
secular or liberal figure, but a strident Islamist who opposes the Brotherhood’s
pragmatic focus on stable relations with the United States and Israel and free-market
economics... [Israel is particularly concerned about the 1979 peace treaty]
[I]n a remarkable inversion, American policy makers who once feared a Brotherhood
takeover now appear to see the group as an indispensable ally against Egypt’s
ultraconservatives, exemplified by Mr. Abu Ismail.
On Sunday, speaking on condition of standard diplomatic anonymity, State Department
officials said they were untroubled and even optimistic about the Brotherhood’s reversal
of its pledge not to seek the presidency. The Brotherhood’s candidate, Khairat el-Shater,
a millionaire businessman considered the most formative influence on the group’s
policies, is well known to both American diplomats and [to] their contacts in the
Egyptian military.
Mr. Shater has met with almost all the senior State Department officials and American
lawmakers visiting Cairo. He is in regular contact with the American ambassador, Anne
Patterson …
Egypt’s Election, the MB and Al-Shater
Egypt’s Salafists tell Israel they will
keep the peace
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Muslim Brotherhood works to implement
'renaissance project‘ (FDI)
Publishing Date: Sat, 24/12/2011 - 11:24
Imams Syndicate warns Brotherhood of exploiting mosques
to promote Shater
Publishing Date: Wed, 04/04/2012
Published Thursday, April 5, 2012
The Muslim Brotherhood's candidate for the Egyptian
presidency, Khairat al-Shater, declared that introducing sharia
law would be his "first and final" objective if he wins elections
in May and June….
However, he denied he had struck a deal with the military on
his candidacy, announced last Saturday, even though it may
help candidates close to the old order of ousted President Hosni
Parties Agree on Leader Ahead of Vote in Tunisia
CASABLANCA, Morocco — Tunisia’s political parties agreed on the selection of a
new prime minister late Saturday, breaking months of political deadlock between the
Islamist-led government and secular opposition parties.
The current minister of industry, Mehdi Jomaa, will take over as prime minister and
lead a caretaker government until elections next year. No date for the elections has
been set.
Mr. Jomaa, 50, is an independent technocrat who joined the current government in
March after a career in the private sector. A mechanical engineer, he was a general
manager at Hutchinson Aerospace, a subsidiary of the French company Total,
according to Tunisian news reports.
NY Times December 15, 2013