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Entangle Empires and Informal Imperialism: The Rise of the US in the Mid-Twentieth Century Julian Go Boston University 1 I. In 1940, Adolph Berle, the undersecretary in the US Department State, penned a prescient passage in his diary. “I have been saying to myself and other people, that the only possible effect of this war would be that the United States would emerge with an imperial power greater than the world had ever seen.”1 It is unclear what Berle meant exactly by “imperial power.” But many scholars today would claim Berle’s statement to be a portent. The United States did rise from the great war as the world’s leading economic and military power.2 And scholars since have implicitly or explicitly narrated the rise as an exceptional imperial transition. Intolerant of old-style colonialism, the United States pushed the old European empires to dismantle and inaugurated a new global order of open trade, national sovereignty and freedom. Matching its high morals to its new economic and industrial power, the United States became a new "anti-imperial" liberal empire. At the very least, America’s rise to power meant the formation of a new type of empire; a new “informal” empire. By this new “American way of empire,” as Thomas Bender has called it, indirect rule and influence replaced colonialism; military bases, client states and financial aid replaced pith helmets, jodhpurs, and rajas.3 Magdoff initially called this “imperialism without colonies.”4 More recently, others have relabeled it “empire by remote control” or “nonterritorial imperialism.”5 1Quoted in Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After (Baltimore, 1995)., p. 33. 2 Ibid., p. 47. 3 Thomas Bender, "The American Way of Empire," World Policy Journal XXIII (2006), Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History (New York, 2006).. 4 Harry Magdoff, "Imperialism without Colonies," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London, 1972).. 5 Engseng Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat," Comparative Studies in Society and History 46 (2004).; George Steinmetz, "Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective," Sociological Theory 23 (2005).. 2 This narrative of transition now begs reconsideration. The rise of the new US empire did not happen as neatly as these common tales would suggest; nor did the fall of the older empires occur so simply by America’s hand. As opposed to a simple “transition” from dying European empires to a new American empire, there was an entangled web of inter-imperial relations, forces, and networks between them.6 And when this enchained network of empires began to breakdown, the transition to America’s informal imperium indeed occurred. But it was not by the valiant agency of the United States alone. It was rather effected by the agency of the very peripheral peoples that the empires, both older and new, sought to subdue. II. It is unsurprising that World War II has been taken as a momental turning point; a grand shift away from away from Europe as the center of global power based upon colonial empires and towards the rise of a new American imperium based instead upon nationstatism. The Great War indeed weakened the old order. It devastated Europe’s economies, unsettled colonial institutions, and thus contributed to the decolonization of long-standing colonies such as India and Indonesia. Still, the colonial empires did not just disappear. As late as 1951, the colonies and trusteeships of the five major European powers – Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom – 6 Louis and Robinson have intimated some of these relations, but the relations were probably more extensive than even they uncovered. See William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22 (1994).. 3 numbered 85 separate units. Those units covered 8.9 million square miles and held more than 170 million peoples.7 Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. We have been told that the US – intrinsically anti-imperial given its exceptional history of anti-colonial revolution and democratic development – pushed European powers to decolonize their empires. After all, Sumner Welles in 1942 declared that “the age of imperialism had ended.” Around the same time FDR was articulating lofty anticolonial principles and spoke of a new world order portending the United Nations. We have also been told that the US likewise pushed for a new world order based upon open trade rather than imperial blocs; part and parcel of its anti-colonial posture. And, to be sure, politicians, some sectors of the business community, and policy-makers worring about postwar access to new markets and raw materials spoke valiantly of opening up global trade.8 Yet part of the reason for why the colonial empires were still alive and well in 1951 was because of US support rather in spite of it. In fact, realizing the economic goals of expanded markets and materials through open trade went hand in hand with the persistence of the European colonial empires, not their dissolution. As the business sector and policy-makers repeatedly stressed, the best way for the US to get new markets and materials was not by dismantling the existing imperial systems but sustaining them and tapping into them directly. In the eyes of policy-makers and business elites, the colonial world was critical for supplying the ever-increasing demand for various raw materials.9 Analysts noted in 7 John E. Orchard, "ECA and the Dependent Territories," Geographical Review 41 (1951)., p. 66. For a good discussion, see Phillip Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870-1970 (New Haven, 1987)., pp. 194-207. 9 Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World. United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980 (New York, 1988)., p. 54-55 8 4 1941 that the “United States is the greatest ultimate consumer of colonial products.”10 In 1950 the State Department produced memos stressing how important Africa was for providing raw materials and, in general, as a site for American “trade, investment, and transportation interests.”11 Various investigative commissions under the Truman administration demonstrated how important minerals, metals, tin, rubber and other strategic materials were coming from colonies.12 Another analysis stressed in 1952, “existing and potential production in colonial territories are vital to meeting these needs of Western industrial countries.”13 The conclusion of these and other reports was that, to keep the supply incoming and in hopes of finding markets for American products, the US should support European colonial structures. European rule, stressed a State Department report in 1950, offered “political and economic stability.” As long as American capital was afforded “equal treatment”, America’s “economic goals…should be achieved through coordination and cooperation with the colonial powers.”14 The scholar Rupert Emerson explained in 1947 that “American interest and interests, narrowly interpreted, would be served more adequately by the maintenance of the old-time colonial set-up than by ventures into the uncharted waters of autonomy and independence,” not least because the “old-time colonial set up” rather than a world of independent nation-states could better serve to meet America’s need for raw materials and markets.15 In 1953, Under-Secretary of State 10 Arthur N. Holcombe, Dependent Areas in the Post-War World (Boston, 1941)., p. 76 FRUS 1950 p. 1527 12 Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870-1970., p. 205 13 Philip W. Bell, "Colonialism as a Problem in American Foreign Policy," World Politics 5 (1952)., p. 97 14 FRUS 1950 p. 1527 15 Rupert Emerson, "American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies," Pacific Affairs 20 (1947)., p. 270. 11 5 Byroade added that supporting Europe’s empires would also serve to maintain Europe’s economy (and so ultimately America’s economy too): …the granting of complete freedom to those who were not yet ready for it would serve the best interests neither of the US nor the free world as a whole…Let us be frank in recognizing our stake in the strength and stability of certain European nations which exercise influence in the dependent areas. They are our allies. A sudden break in economic relations might seriously injure the European economy upon which our Atlantic defence system depends, and at the same time prove equally injurious to the dependent territories themselves.16 These were not idle words. By the time Byroade made his speech, the American state had already put its strategy of supporting the European empires into action. Decidedly retreating from any anti-imperial or anti-colonial rhetoric during the early days of World War II, the US state pushed the European empires to open their doors to North American interests and in exchange offered to help keep those empires intact by providing financial aid. Such aid was sorely needed due to the devastation of the war. Without funds, Europe’s empires would collapse. And the American state decided to provide them.17 Undoubtedly, the Marshall Plan was aimed at helping Europe recover from the devastation of the war. But parts of that Plan, carried out the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), were also aimed at helping the European empires reassert themselves. In fact, a large chunk of the ECA’s work was directed towards supporting Europe’s colonies. In the 1950s, the ECA sent approximately 7.5 billion dollars to European empires, with the French and British colonial empires receiving approximately 16 17 The Times, London 2 November 1953, p. 6 FRUS 1950: V, 1527, 1535; Louis and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization.". 6 6.5 billion and the Portugese, Belgian, and Netherlands empires receiving the rest.18 In this way, Europe’s postwar economies could be restored through continued colonialism. John Orchard, chairman of the ECA Advisory Committee on Underdeveloped Areas, explained that the program would help to reduce the “dollar gap” while also providing Europe with “increased supplies of essential commodities” and “wider markets for European factories.”19 In other words, the program would help restore the imperial economic relations between Europe and its colonies that had been disrupted by the war. At the same time, the United States would benefit. The United States would gain access to the colonies, which would “supply additional raw materials for our factories and foodstuffs to supplement our agricultural production” and provide markets in the colonial world. It would further increase Europe’s own purchasing power, enabling an economic recovery that would be open to new products from across the Atlantic.20 For these reasons and others, the State Department conceded in 1950: “the colonial relationship [between Europe and its dependencies]…is still in many places useful and necessary.”21 Postwar economics was only one string entangling the United States and the European empires together in mutual support. The other was security and defense, which became increasingly critical after 1947 when the Cold War intensified. One goal here was funding Europe’s empires so that they could be used as defensive bulwarks against rival powers. As a State Department memo in 1952 explained: the United States must “…rely upon the colonial powers of Western Europe to make an addition to American strength sufficient to deter and to hold in check the tremendous military power of the Soviet 18 Orchard, "ECA and the Dependent Territories.", pp. 67-72. Ibid., p. 67 20 Ibid., p. 67. 21 FRUS 1950, V, p. 1527. 19 7 armies.”22 The US therefore supported and gave aid to the French military in Indochina and the Dutch in Indonesia.23 And America’s support of the French military effort in Indochina in the late 1940s, which covered eighty percent of the French military costs by the 1950s, was not only aimed at stopping Vietnamese communists from taking over the country but also at strengthening Britain’s position in Malaysia against the spread of communism.24 Likewise, the mid-1950s, the US relied upon the long-established British presence in key areas like the Middle East as a bulwark not against Soviet expansion, not least against expansion over the region’s vital oil.25 To stop dominos from falling, the American state simply propped up the European empires against them. George Kennan of the State Department’s Policy-Planning Staff later declared: “The dissolution of the [British] empire was not in our interest as there were many things the Commonwealth could do which we could not do and which we wished them to continue doing.”26 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. told the Senate Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty: “we need…these countries to be strong, and they cannot be strong without their colonies.”27 Supporting Europe’s empires was also important for America’s own military base system. Prior to World War II, the US had only a small network of military bases, with overseas bases only its own colonies (e.g. the Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico).28 By the end of war, however, military strategists planned for an extensive world-wide network of 22 FRUS 1952-4, III, 1105 : in 1950 Truman administration begins supporting financially: allocated $10 million in military aid for the Frenchsponsored governments of Indochina and approved ‘in principle’ a programme of economic assistance to them (Rotter “Trinagular Route”, p. 333) 24 Andrew J. Rotter, "The Triangular Route to Vietnam: The United States, Great Britain, and Southeast Asia, 19451950," International History Review 6 (1984). 25 (FRUS 1947: V, 495, 524; Kolko 1988: 20) 26 Louis and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization.", p. 499, fn. 42; orig. Top Secret Meetings of the 7th Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 24 Jan. 1950, FRUS 1950, III, p. 620 27 Quoted in Ibid., p. 468 28 Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy (New York, 1982). 23 8 security. The war had already brought American forces to the far ends of the earth. But how to keep them there? Military advisors and policy-planners in the executive branch landed upon an easy answer: use the territorial domains already established by European colonialism. The strategy had already begun in 1941 when the US lent England war supplies in exchange for ninety-nine year leases establishing military bases in the Britain’s Caribbean colonies. After the war, the process continued: the US gave loans to Britain so that Britain could reestablish its overseas empire after the war; in exchange the US was granted the use of any and all of Britain’s overseas colonies for military bases or transport nodes.29 The US made similar arrangements with the French, especially in France’s northern African colonies. Rather than attempting to undo French colonial control, it became US policy to support it financially because, as the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs determined, French control provided “stability, even though such stability is obtained largely through repression.”30 This stability would be important for halting future Soviet aggression and also for allowing the US to maintain its own military presence in the region. An agreement with France in 1950, for instance, enabled the US to construct five new air bases in Morocco for Strategic Air Command while letting France maintain its own flag.31 Even though “imperial of the old school is practiced” in North Africa, concluded the State Department, “there is one favorable factor, that of US strategic interests, since we are in a position to use this area in time of 29 Louis and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization." Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy, C. T. Sandars, America's overseas garrisons: the leasehold empire (Oxford; New York, 2000).. 30 FRUS 1950: V, 1528 31 Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy., p. 50. See also Kolko 1988: 19; FRUS 1950: V, 1573. 9 war.”32 Similarly, the US was allowed to set up an air base in Azores by Portugal, but only if the US supported Portugal’s bid to reassert itself over Timor (that air base, at Lajes, would later stand as the vital ground for U.S. airlift missions to Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973). TABLE 1 HERE [SEE APPENDIX] In the end, the United States was able to create its vast network of global military power by relying upon rather than dismantling European colonialism. Out of the top thirty-nine territories in Central America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and the Pacific wherein the US maintained troops from 1950 to 1960 (measured in terms of # of troops), eight were US colonies (excluding Japan which the US ruled after WWII temporarily) and twenty were colonies or protectorates of European countries. Therefore, close to seventy percent of America’s troop outposts in the peripheral world were in colonies (see Table 1).33 A secret memo in the State Department in 1950 stated: “the security interests of the US at the present time will best be served by a policy of support for the Western Colonial Powers.”34 III. For at least a decade and a half after WWII, the American state did not rise like a phoenix from the flames of the European empires; it rather rode wing-to-wing with them in 32 FRUS 1950: V, 1573 This counts countries that later received independence but were colonies when the US first established troop bases. 34 FRUS 1950-3: III, 1078-9; see also FRUS 1052-4: III, 1081; Fraser 1992: 115. 33 10 mutual support and interaction. But did not the US eventually take an anti-colonial stand and drop its support of the European empires? And did not the US eventually construct its own imperial network of power that took over where Europe’s empires left off? The answer to both question is “yes.” But the reality of why and how these processes unfolded betrays any tale of valiant American anti-colonialism and benevolent American agency. To begin we must recognize the profound shift in the global political climate in the mid-twentieth century. That shift has to do the proliferation of anti-colonial nationalism, and its associated principles of self-determination, around the globe. The earliest stirrings of anti-colonial nationalism in the non-white world were already seen in the Indian National Congress (1885), the Islamic revival movements in the Middle East (beginning in the late nineteenth century), the Philippine Revolution against Spain (1896), and the Pan-African Congress in 1900. The Japanese victory over Russia (1905) and the Xinhai Revolution in China (1911) added fuel to the fire, signifying to the colonial world that non-white peoples could determine their own destinies.35 Seizing upon this global development, V.I. Lenin joined the chorus, articulating anti-imperial rhetoric and calling for self-determination of all peoples.36 It was in fact Lenin’s discourse that compelled Woodrow Wilson to add pronouncements on self-determination in his Fourteen Points. Rather than the originator of anti-colonial nationalism, Wilson was just trying to keep up.37 35 Furedi 1994: 27-8; Grimal 1978: 4-36. Koebner and Schmidt 1964: 282-4 37 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford, 2006)., p. 40-41; cites Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin pp. 329-67; Knock To End All Wars, p. 138 36 11 The period between the World Wars was a critical turning point. Wilson had received for aid from anti-colonial nationalists around the world, but as he did nothing to help, disappointment if not ire resulted.38 And imperial boundaries existing before WWI were reinscribed rather than dismantled in the postwar negotiations, much to the further disappointment of anti-colonial nationalists. In India, Ghandian populism during the 1920s and, given a new global press and literate colonized elites, Ghandi’s anti-colonial stance received widespread attention in the colonial world.39 At the Fifth Pan-American Conference at Santiago Chile in 1923, Latin Americans joined the chorus, in this case charging the US with imperialism for intervening into the Dominican Republic and Haiti.40 The 1930s depression then laid the socioeconomic conditions for protests across Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. World War II helped hasten the trend. It weakened colonial structures, armed colonized peoples, and raised questions about the strength of European empires and their future viability.41 After the war, anti-colonial nationalism continued to spread. In 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations offered a palpable marker for the end of the imperial age. It voted to for a review of the UN system of territorial administration of mandates and for a statement to be inserted into Convenants that “all peoples shall have the right of self-determination” (the US delegate voted against this).42 38 Ibid. Stewart C. Easton, The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism (New York, 1964). 40 Koebner, Richard, and Helmut Dan Schmidt. Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 18401960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964, p. 299 41 On the development of anti-colonial nationalism in the early 20th century through WWII, see R.F. Holland, European Decolonization, 1918-1981 (New York, 1985). pp. 1-12 andFrank Furedi, Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London, 1994)., pp. 10-27. 42 Julius William Pratt, "Anticolonialism in United States Policy," in The Idea of Colonialism, ed. Robert Strauz-Hupé and Harry W. Hazard (New York, 1958)., p. 141-2 39 12 The emergence and proliferation of anti-colonialism significantly altered the global landscape, Foremost, it became a powerful mobilizing device, making possible new coalitions and political formations. As a symbol, anti-colonial nationalism and its principle of universal self-determination mobilized disparate groups within and across imperial space. Tribes or religious sectarians could unite on national grounds whereas they may not have before. And colonized peoples from different countries could find common cause. Italy’s attempt to recolonize Ethiopia in 1935, for instance, was met with protests around the world – from Harlem to British Guiana – prompting one scholar to call it the “first of instance of a Third World-wide reaction to an instance of Western intervention.”43 The spread of anti-colonial nationalism is critical for our story. To be sure, it did not go unnoticed by the imperial powers. In 1952, the British Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on ‘The Problem of Nationalism” circulated in Winston Churchill’s cabinet. The memo warned of the “dangers inherent in the present upsurge of nationalism” around the world and in Britain’s colonies, and was especially concerned about the “intersections” of “Asian nationalism” and nationalism in “the Near East and Africa.”44 Such nationalism thus became a potent tool by which to accrue political support and thereby shifted the cultural terrain of geopolitical competition. The USSR, for instance, tried to use it as symbolic capital. This had begun during the First World War with Lenins’ anti-imperial rhetoric, prompting Wilson, as mentioned earlier, to declare support for self-determination. But as anti-colonialists mobilized further during 43 (Furedi 1994: 23). “The Problem of Nationalism”, prepared in the foreign office in mid-1952: CO 936/217/1, with covering letter by Sir William Strang (Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office) dated 21 June 1952, FO 936-217, PRO 44 13 and after WWII, and as the Cold War heightened between 1947 and 1951, officials in Washington became increasingly worried that the Soviet Union would penetrate anticolonial nationalist movements and use the new powerful discourse for their own ends. A 1950 policy paper from the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs assessed the situation in Africa: While Communism has made very little headway in most of Africa, European nations and the United States have become alert to the danger of militant Communism penetrating the area. The USSR has sought within the United Nations and outside to play the role of the champion of the colonial peoples of the world. While the greater portion of the areas of Africa have as yet no firm nationalist aspirations, there are certain areas such as French North Africa and British West Africa where the spirit of nationalism is increasing. The USSR has sought to gain the sympathy of nationalist elements.45 Due to the proliferation and dominance of anti-colonial nationalism, the American state reconsidered its initial strategy of imperial outsourcing. When and where nationalism was perceived as relatively well developed, the US came to dissuade the continuance of European colonialism. This approach was most clearly articulated in a series of policy papers in the State Department that reconsidered policy towards dependent areas of the world. The conclusion was that continued support of European powers would be fruitless, for strong anti-colonial nationalist movements would effectively overthrow them and create instability and disorder.46 More worrisome, it would damage America’s 45 (FRUS 1950: V, 1525). On the reconsideration of policy see John Kent, "The United States and the Decolonization of Black Africa, 194563," in The United States and Decolonization, ed. David Ryan and Victor Pungong (New York, 2000)., p. 171-4. 46 14 “reputation” and push nationalist forces to the USSR. Of particular concern was Soviet “propaganda” in the colonial world that played upon anti-colonial sentiment: this would portray the US as an imperialist and win over nationalists to the Soviets. Strategists in Washington therefore insisted that the US would have to disavow its alliance with the European empires.47 This strategy was clearly stated in a famous 1952 State Department paper identifying the “General Objectives of US Policy Toward Colonial Areas.”48 It stated that America’s main objective was to “favour the progressive development of all dependent peoples toward the goal of self-government.”49 The reason was that: …substantial advocates toward self-government have been made in a number of territories and more than 500 million people have achieved independence. Nationalist movements are gaining strength in non-self-governing territories throughout the world. US policy must be based on the general assumption that nationalism in colonial areas is a force which cannot be stopped but may, with wisdom, be guided. […] It is clearly in the interest of the US to give appropriate encouragement to those movements which are non-communist and democratic in character. [This would] contribute toward the building of colonial areas into bulwarks against the spread of communism. The very fact of a demonstrated US in democratic nationalist movements will strengthen the hand of these groups against their communist counterparts.50 US policy, therefore, should “seek the alignment with the democratic world of dependent peoples and those achieving self-government or independence; in particular to maintain 47 Darby 1975: 175; FRUS 1950-53, III, 1078-9) FRUS 1952-4: III, 1082-87. 49 FRUS 1952-4: III, 1082. 50 FRUS 1952-4: III, 1084-5. 48 15 and strengthen their friendship and respect for the US. The importance of this objective is clear in view of the Soviet Union’s obvious bid for the sympathies of colonial peoples.”51 The fear of nationalist outpouring leading to communism was clear in the Eisenhower administration’s response to the Suez crisis in 1956. The administration condemned the Anglo-French invasion against General Nasser in Egypt exactly because it feared that the invasion would summon a nationalist and communist blowback throughout the region and across the colonial world.52 We see this same concern throughout the period after World War II. It is first seen in areas where nationalism developed earliest and was the most potent. For those areas, like India and Malaysia, the US encouraged European powers to make concrete and well publicized steps towards self-government. Similarly, the Kennedy administration later pressured Portugal to decolonize its African colonies in the hopes that this would take some of the fire away from the communist movement (even though it would reverse its position as the importance of the American base in the Azores made itself more clear in the wake of the Berlin crisis).53 The US also stopped supporting French suppression of colonial nationalists in Vietnam and Dutch rule in Indonesia, but only when anti-colonial forces had proven far too resistant to repression and when anti-colonial movement waved antiSoviet banners.54 One State Department official summarized the strategy for Vietnam simply enough. Suggesting that the US stop its support of French rule given the 51 1087. See especially Scott Lucas, "The Limits of Ideology: US Foreign Policy and Arab Nationalism in the Early Cold War," in The United States and Decolonization, ed. David Ryan and Victor Pungong (London: MacMillan Press, 2000)., pp. 147-154 and William Roger Louis, "American anti-colonialism and the dissolution of the British Empire," International Affairs 61 (1985)., pp. 413-417 53 Cary Fraser, "Understanding American Policy Towards the Decolonization of European Empires, 1945-64," Diplomacy & Statecraft 3 (1992)., p. 119 54 (Fraser 1992: 116-17). Robert J. McMahon, "Toward a post-colonial order: Truman administration policies toward South and Southeast Asia," in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge, 1989)., p. 351 52 16 outpouring of anti-colonial sentiment, he asked rhetorically: ”Whether the French like it or not, independence is coming to Indochina. Why, therefore, do we tie ourselves to the tail of their battered kite?”55 Because of anti-colonialism nationalisms’ power, not only did the American state reconsider imperial outsourcing. It likewise shifted its imperial tactics towards informal modes of influence. A famous National Security Council report stated it boldly. Noting the staggering development of nationalist consciousness in Southeast Asia, the Council concluded simply: “19th century imperialism is no longer a practicable system in SEA [Southeast Asia]…”.56 In other words, to replace colonialism in an age of anti-colonial urgency and competing Soviet bids for sympathy, the most the American state could do is turn to hidden tactics of informal empire – propping up clients or covertly manipulating outcomes – for now nominally independent nations. A memo by the US Consul General at Leopoldville, Congo, in 1957 is suggestive. First, he wrote that the US should stop supporting European colonialism lest Africans turn to the Soviets. “Now that the issue of ‘colonialism” is being moved front and center by the Soviets the essential thing it seems to me is that we free ourselves from the vice…. The US should stand for freedom from all forms of oppression, for self-government, and for independence based upon selfdetermination.”57 Second, he suggested that the US should maintain influence in the region not through the colonial powers but through financial aid. In other words, rather than arouse the indignation of anti-colonial nationalists, the US should 55 Date unknown; quoted from Lloyd C. Gardner, "How We 'Lost' Vietnam, 1940-1954," in The United States and Decolonization, ed. David Ryan and Victor Pungong (New York, 2000)., p. 133; org. Williams et al. America in Vietnam p. 91 56 Quoted in Westad 2005: 113; orig. from NSC 51, US policy towards Southeast Asia, 1 July 1949, Declassified Documents Reference Service, on www.ddrs.psmedia.com) 57 (FRUS 1955-57, XVIII: 27; see also 1951: VI, pt. 1, p. 8-9). 17 “…maneuver….by abolishing the vestiges of the ‘older’ imperialism’” and replacing them with new forms of influence like direct economic support.58 Only a few years later, such a “maneuver” was indeed made in the Congo, but it did not only involve economic support, nor was it a peaceful process. It involved the CIA, bribery, and a coup: in effect, the US stopped supporting the Belgians but only to replace them with a man named Joseph Mobutu. This would be a pattern repeated throughout the disintegrating colonial world: the US turned away from the colonial empires only to deploy in their place new mechanisms of power. Since European colonial rule was no longer tenable, and since a new round of colonization by the US would face the ire of nationalists, the US was constrained to outsource imperial functions locally, thereby creating a vast new imperial network based upon clients, bribes, and bases rather than colonies. This was indeed an imperial transition. It was a succession from colonialism to informal rule, from European metropoles to Washington, D.C.. But this was not always if ever an easy process brought about by valiant US agency. Nor was it a reflection of America’s ostensibly essential democratic national character. It was an often violent process that was unleashed as a pragmatic American state sought to contain and channel the power of anti-colonial nationalism around the world. 58 FRUS 1955-7: XVIII, 27. 18 Table 1 US Troop Stations, 1950-1960 Top Thirty-Nine Non-Western Countries according to Number of Troops COUNTRY Japan Republic of Korea Hawaiian Islands Alaska Philippines Guam Puerto Rico Morocco Taiwan Libya Turkey Bermuda Marshall Islands Lebanon Saudi Arabia Midway Hong Kong Vietnam Eritrea Algeria West Indies Federation Bahamas Malta Iran Haiti Johnston Island Volcano Islands Thailand Bahrain Pakistan Trinidad Australia New Zealand Jamaica Malaysia Egypt Antigua Ecuador India TOTAL NO. OF TROOPS 1,687,509 1,573,585 456,264 442,863 153,324 152,246 142,486 110,811 52,144 47,168 40,700 36,393 25,963 18,105 12,848 12,408 11,343 9,311 8,724 7,043 6,432 5,404 5,122 4,271 4,031 3,749 3,562 2,720 2,341 2,276 1,396 1,374 1,082 1,016 953 828 638 525 499 DEPENDENCY STATUS OF COUNTRY (a) Independent Independent US US US US US France China UK-France Independent UK US Independent Independent US UK France UK France UK UK UK Independent Independent US US Independent UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK Independent Independent (1950) (a) Refers to status at time of US basing agreement or initial station; includes colonies, protectorates, or (for US) “outlying territories” Sources: Dependency status, Statesman’s Yearbook; Troops, US Department of Defense, Statistical Information Analysis Division, “Military Personnel Historical Reports” (http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/309hist.htm. Accessed Jan. 2006) 19 REFERENCES Bell, Philip W. 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