Download the Meta-Ethics whizz through PowerPoint

Key Words to be happy with
 meta-ethics – behind ethics, theories of meaning
 ‘analytic’ – necessarily true statements
 ‘synthetic’ – statements that could be true or false
 universalisability – moral statements apply to everyone
 emotivism – moral statements are expressions of
emotion
 intuitionism – moral statements are expressions of
intuition
 prescriptivism – moral statements prescribe (strongly
commend) actions
 naturalistic fallacy – you can’t derive an ‘ought’ from an
‘is’
Key issues:
 Is “goodness” a natural feature of the world?
 Is “goodness” knowable by reason?
 What do I mean when I say “stealing is wrong” or
“generosity is good”?
 Is moral language like any other language, or is it a
special type of language?
 Are there such things as “moral facts”? Or is morality
only about beliefs and feelings?
The naturalistic argument
 Moral facts exist as features of actions, they are
observable features of an action.
 Utilitarians argue that pain and pleasure can be
observed and experienced as a posteriori truth.
 Virtue ethicists like MacIntyre argue that goodness
exists as an a posteriori feature of flourishing.
 Natural Law theorists like Aquinas argue that
goodness is a natural feature of action defined by the
ends we naturally pursue as rational beings.
These three are forms of naturalism open to accusation
of committing the naturalistic fallacy.
Hume’s fork: a logical problem
 Hume argued that statments about the real world were
either analytic or synthetic.
 An analytic statement is true by definition: all dwarfs
are small, all bachelors are unmarried.
 So you cannot ask an open question like “John’s a
bachelor, but is he married?”
 A synthetic statement can be true or false. It makes
sense to ask: is John a bachelor?
 Moral statements are neither analytic nor synthetic
and so are expressions of feeling (subjective).
Ways out of the fallacy
 If you want to be a naturalist, there are ways of
escaping the fallacy.
1. Hume’s fork is itself a fallacy as it restricts the
options. Moral language is a third type of language,
which has prescriptive meaning. Poetic language is a
fourth type, which has metaphorical meaning.
2. John Searle (1964) argues that the logical sequence
described in the next slide is what we do all the time
when saying “this is good/bad”.
John Searle’s escape route
 Tricia says, “Brian, I promise to pay you £500” (a fact).
 So Tricia has promised to pay Brian £500.
 So Tricia has put herself under an obligation to pay
Brian. (Obligation is a logical feature of promising).
 So Tricia is obliged to pay Brian £500.
 So “Tricia ought to pay Brian £500” (an ought or
value). We’ve just derived an ought (value) from an is
(fact)!
Note: either obligation is a logical feature of promising as
RM Hare suggests, or a natural feature, because Tricia has
agreed to join the institution where promise = obliged. This
“promising institution” may, of course, be culturally relative.
A map of the territory
Some terms
 Cognitivists believe moral facts can be known
objectively.
 Non-cognitivists believe moral facts cannot be known.
 Naturalists believe these facts are natural features of
the world (pain, pleasure, flourishing, happiness).
 Non-naturalists believe these moral facts are not
reducible to external facts, but known by intuition.
Remember...if you are a naturalist you commit the
naturalistic fallacy...which itself may be a fallacy!!
GE Moore’s intuitionism
 Good is like “yellow”.
 Good is a simple, unanalysable, property.
 Although a utilitarian, Moore is a non-naturalistic
utilitarian.
 Goodness is a “simple notion”: just as I say “that’s
yellow” so I point to an action and say “that’s good”.
 I know this by intuition.
WD Ross: intuitionism as
deontological relativism
 WD Ross argues that we know our prima facie (at first
sight) duties by intuition.
 He gave some examples (here are four):
- duties of fidelity (eg promise keeping)
- duties of reparation (eg righting a wrong)
- duties of justice (eg treating people equally)
- duties of beneficence (eg helping an old lady)
 The duties may conflict...then I decide in the situation
what is the right thing to do (so, not absolute duties).
NB A big advantage of Ross’ theory: it can solve dilemmas
AJ Ayer’s emotivism
 Ayer (1910-1989) starts with Hume’s fork (see back).
 Moral statements cannot be verified true or false.
 There are no facts we can refer to in the real world on
which to make a judgement.
 Boo/hurrah theory: in saying “murder is wrong” we are
saying “boo to murder” (expressing a feeling).
 “It’s as if I said, “You stole that money” in a peculiar
tone of horror...Ethical terms do not serve only to
express feelings, but are calculated also to arouse
feeling, and so stimulate action”.
Language, Truth & Logic
Problems with emotivism
 May be based on a fallacious view of language. This
view reduces language to something less than it is.
 We may be referring to a fact in the real world, like
pain. If most people are doing this, how can it be
ruled out by definition, as in Hume’s fork?
 It cannot arbitrate between the statement “genocide is
wrong” and “genocide is fine”.
 The verification principle is itself neither analytic or
synthetic, so presumably, must also be meaningless (!).
RM Hare’s prescriptivism
 RM Hare (1919-2002) is a modern utilitarian who
argues that moral language is of a certain type.
 Moral language has three properties:
- Universalisable: when I say “killing is
wrong” I mean “no-one should kill”.
- Prescriptive: I also mean “you shouldn’t
kill”, and create imperatives “don’t kill!”.
- Overriding: the moral “good” is the
strongest and overrides any other, eg “that’s
a good picture” is a different, weaker meaning.
Evaluating Hare
 Does give moral language a stronger meaning, closer to
what we think we are doing when we say something’s
wrong..... BUT
 Hare admits in Freedom and Reason that it doesn’t stop
the fanatic like the suicide bomber saying “bombing is
good” meaning, “I think I should bomb, and so should
you!”.
 Universalisable prescriptions are not truth claims:
Hare is not an objectivist (despite being a preference
utilitarian!).
Discuss
 “Moral statements are merely matters of opinion”
Discuss.
 Are the realists or the anti-realists right? Is morality
objective or subjective?
 In meaning “X is universalisable” (prescriptivism) I
don’t mean “morality is universal” (as Aquinas argued
it is). Discuss.
 What do you think you’re doing when you say
“genocide is wrong”? Does this make you a naturalist
or non-naturalist?