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Unit 3b- Imperfect Competition • Monopolies • Monopolistic Competition • Oligopolies Monopoly • MR twice slope of D • D=AR • MR = 0 @ TR maximizing Q Using MR to determine the price elasticity of demand Answer Key Answer Key Important! • Average x Q = Total & Total /Q = Average • Total = Marginal • Variable Cost + Fixed Cost = Total Cost • Revenue – Cost = Profit Answer Key • Max. Profit @ Q where MR = MC Monopolies • Pure Monopolies (rare and likely not “pure”) – Public Utilities – Cable TV (in some locations) – Sports Teams? • Near Monopolies – Intel (81%) – Wham-O (90%) – De Beers (55%) Barriers To Entry • Economies of Scale – “Natural Monopoly” • Demand intersects LRATC where LRATC is still declining • LRATC continues to decrease at high levels of output Constructing the LRATC LONG RUN ONLY! The terms Economies/Diseconomies of Scale do NOT apply to the short run ATC Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) • Minimum output at which lowest LRATC is achieved Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) • If there is a natural monopoly, one firm can produce enough to satisfy market demand before achieving MES Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) • In perfect competition, is MES at a low Q? • This allows MANY small firms to produce at competitive output levels Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) • In a natural monopoly, is MES at a very high Q? • One firm achieves a lower cost of production than multiple firms would and MES is not reached. Natural Monopoly- LRATC is downward sloping at intersection with D Barriers To Entry • Legal – Patents/Copyrights – Licenses • • • • FCC Taxis Liquor Licenses Marijuana Dispensary Barriers To Entry • Ownership/Control of Resources – Natural Resources • Inco (90% of known nickel) • Geographic – Diner in a small desert town • Consumer Loyalty • Capital Costs Barriers to Entry • Pricing – Predatory – Economies of Scale • Advertising and Other Practices – Influence consumer tastes – Creates perception of quality Competitive v. Monopolist Price and Output Competitive Consumer/Producer Surplus Monopolist Consumer/Producer Surplus/DWL Is a Monopoly Productively Efficient? Is a Monopoly Allocatively Efficient? Conclusions About Monopolist’s P and Q Welcome to Market Failure Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options What happens if the monopoly is broken? Natural Monopoly- LRATC is downward sloping at intersection with D Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options 1. Unregulated: Price on D above MR = MC 2. Fair Return: P = ATC 3. Social Optimal (Allocatively Efficient) P = MC Monopoly • Monopolists do not face a supply curve • It is the Price Maker Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) • In a natural monopoly, is MES at a low or high Q? Natural Monopoly- LRATC is downward sloping at intersection with D Welcome to Market Failure Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options What happens if the monopoly is broken? Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options 1. Unregulated: Price on D above MR = MC 2. Fair Return: P = ATC 3. Social Optimal (Allocatively Efficient) P = MC PER UNIT V. LUMP SUM *Applies to Tax or Subsidy • PER UNIT – SHIFTS MC – Changes profit-max. Q and P – Variable cost • LUMP SUM – SHIFTS only FC/ATC, THEREFORE, NOT Q – Fixed cost – P and Q same; Profit/Loss Changes Natural Monopoly Regulatory Options Price Discrimination Conditions 1. Market Power 2. Market Segregation 3. No Resale Price Discrimination Types 1. 1st Degree (Perfect) -Each consumer charged maximum willing price -Consumer surplus = 0 2. 2nd Degree -Different Quantities, Different Prices -Reduces, but doesn’t eliminate consumer surplus 3. 3rd Degree - Different groups/times Deadweight Loss • Under allocation – Output less than socially optimal – Area of underproduction where MB > MC – Unregulated monopoly Deadweight Loss • Over allocation – Output greater than socially optimal – Area of overproduction where MC > MB Monopolistic Competition Which go together? • • • • • • • • • Allocatively Efficient Productively Efficient Profit-Max. Fair Return Socially Optimal Min. ATC MR = MC P = ATC P = MC Product Differentiation • Physical Differences • Perceived Differences • Support Services Monopoly v. Monopolistic Competition • Why is it called monopolistic competition? • How will the demand curve differ? • Long Run? (remember- no barriers) Excess Capacity • Q Gap between profit max. and min. ATC Distinguishing Between Monopolistic Competition and Oligopolistic Structures • 4 Firm Concentration • HHI • The Real Test 4 Firm Concentration Ratio • Sum of 4 largest firms’ market share • > 40% = Oligopoly • < 40% = Monopolistic Competition Herfindahl-Hirschman Index • Sum of squared market shares of all firms • s12 + s22 + … • Range of 0 - 10,000 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index • Sum of squared market shares of all firms • (% Share of Firm 1)2 + (% Share of Firm 2)2 … • Range of 0 - 10,000 Natural Oligopoly Dollars LRATCTypical Firm H $200 F E 80 DMarket 0 25,000 100,000 Units per Month 61 Oligopoly- Kinked Demand Horizontal Merger • Two companies in same industry – Red Flag: HHI increase of 100 or more Vertical Merger • Two companies in complimentary industries Potential Competition Merger FTC Denied Antitrust Laws • Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) – Banned predatory and unfair business practices • Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) – Specified unfair practices • • • • Interlocking Directories Price Discrimination Exclusive Dealings and Tying Horizontal Mergers that Destroy Competition • Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – Approves mergers and enforces trade regulations • • • • • • • • Homework List Legibly Applied to Our Simulation Players, Strategies, Payoffs Dominate Strategy Nash Equilibrium Explicit Collusion Tacit Collusion Tit for Tat Cheating Cartel Game Theory • Players, Strategies, and Payoffs • Dominate Strategy – A player has a single best strategy regardless of opponent’s strategy decision • Nash Equilibrium – No player can benefit from a unilateral move • Dominate Strategy Equilibrium – Nash Equilibrium AND both players are playing a dominate strategy Circle Method • Dominate Strategy – Player on Left • Two circles in same row – Player on Top • Two circles in same column • Nash Equilibrium – Two circles in same box • Dominate Strategy Equilibrium – Two Circles in same box and both players have dominate strategy FRQs • #1- Monopoly Graph • #2- Payoff Matrix