Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction

... Both first-price and second-price auctions are used in the industry. There are a number of other design questions, as well, including whether reserve prices, entry fees, or other modifications to a basic auction should be considered. Our analysis begins to address these questions by focusing on comp ...

... Both first-price and second-price auctions are used in the industry. There are a number of other design questions, as well, including whether reserve prices, entry fees, or other modifications to a basic auction should be considered. Our analysis begins to address these questions by focusing on comp ...

Let me suggest, then, that a theory of justice may be - Philsci

... cooperation, if the aggregate pay-off from this pair of choices is (by some relevant measure) greater than the pay-off from (defect, defect). These differences illustrate how reciprocity as a motive is distinguished both from self-interest (conceived as a concern only with material benefits to self) ...

... cooperation, if the aggregate pay-off from this pair of choices is (by some relevant measure) greater than the pay-off from (defect, defect). These differences illustrate how reciprocity as a motive is distinguished both from self-interest (conceived as a concern only with material benefits to self) ...

Simultaneous games with continuous strategies

... strategy – it raises your rival’s profit as well as your profit • So it changes the game. But how do we make it credible? • Cannot just ‘promise to raise price’ • Can offer a ‘most favoured customer’ agreement to clients at high price today. This means that if you lower your price in the future, you ...

... strategy – it raises your rival’s profit as well as your profit • So it changes the game. But how do we make it credible? • Cannot just ‘promise to raise price’ • Can offer a ‘most favoured customer’ agreement to clients at high price today. This means that if you lower your price in the future, you ...

Fairness, Justice and an Individual Basis for Public Policy

... It is not Jones and Baumgartner’s focus on the limited attention span of human beings that is of interest to me, though. Rather, I wish to point out that emotion is another trait affecting human decision-making and thus, it is likely to affect the policy process. Jones and Baumgartner do briefly dis ...

... It is not Jones and Baumgartner’s focus on the limited attention span of human beings that is of interest to me, though. Rather, I wish to point out that emotion is another trait affecting human decision-making and thus, it is likely to affect the policy process. Jones and Baumgartner do briefly dis ...

ELECTIONS AND DIVISIVENESS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

... when she comes up for re-election. As voter preferences may shift over time, this means that the strongest electoral pressures emerge when the next election is most imminent. With a sufficiently strong re-election motive, there is a pooling equilibrium in which all politicians posture by focusing on ...

... when she comes up for re-election. As voter preferences may shift over time, this means that the strongest electoral pressures emerge when the next election is most imminent. With a sufficiently strong re-election motive, there is a pooling equilibrium in which all politicians posture by focusing on ...

Bertrand and Cournot competition under asymmetric costs: number

... a seemingly less favorable price because of other factors. There are N possible price-quantity pairs and each firm has its own inverse or direct demand function depending on the mode of competition. However, across these functions, firms are distinguished only by the price or quantity they set. For ...

... a seemingly less favorable price because of other factors. There are N possible price-quantity pairs and each firm has its own inverse or direct demand function depending on the mode of competition. However, across these functions, firms are distinguished only by the price or quantity they set. For ...

An Infinitely Farsighted Stable Set

... subset of an IFSS. In fact, that is indeed so if a vNM stable set, like an IFSS, also contains a stable set of deviations. But, as an example shows, a vNM stable set may not always contain a stable set of deviations and, thus, may not necessarily be a subset of an IFSS. Every IFSS of a transferable ...

... subset of an IFSS. In fact, that is indeed so if a vNM stable set, like an IFSS, also contains a stable set of deviations. But, as an example shows, a vNM stable set may not always contain a stable set of deviations and, thus, may not necessarily be a subset of an IFSS. Every IFSS of a transferable ...

Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints

... constraints and would yield strictly higher ex ante utility than (x^ 1g , x^ 2g , x^ 1b , x^ 2b ) because utility is strictly concave. Consider the net trade (x 1g , x 2g , x 1b , x 2b )=((1&%) x^ 1g +%x~ 1g , (1&%) x^ 2g +%x~ 2g , (1&%) x^ 1b +%x~ 1b , (1&%) x^ 2b +%x~ 2b ). If % is small enough, t ...

... constraints and would yield strictly higher ex ante utility than (x^ 1g , x^ 2g , x^ 1b , x^ 2b ) because utility is strictly concave. Consider the net trade (x 1g , x 2g , x 1b , x 2b )=((1&%) x^ 1g +%x~ 1g , (1&%) x^ 2g +%x~ 2g , (1&%) x^ 1b +%x~ 1b , (1&%) x^ 2b +%x~ 2b ). If % is small enough, t ...

Overdetermined causation cases, contribution and the Shapley value

... Causation is one of the most intricate and complex issues in the law. As Wright stated "in all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive as the causation requirement".1 Among the issues raised by causation requirement, over-determination is, at least conceptually, ...

... Causation is one of the most intricate and complex issues in the law. As Wright stated "in all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive as the causation requirement".1 Among the issues raised by causation requirement, over-determination is, at least conceptually, ...

Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

... compensation is linked to either the stock price or the dividends. The ﬁrm initially experiences high growth in investment opportunities and the CEO must invest intensively to exploit the growth options. The key feature of our model is that at a random point in time the rate of growth of the ﬁrm’s ...

... compensation is linked to either the stock price or the dividends. The ﬁrm initially experiences high growth in investment opportunities and the CEO must invest intensively to exploit the growth options. The key feature of our model is that at a random point in time the rate of growth of the ﬁrm’s ...

Third Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities

... settlement. Thus altering the expected outcome of war can increase the likelihood of war, but with a neutral third party it need not. The second mechanism, reducing the costs of war, is of course the main goal of the pro-intervention school. This has the beneficial eﬀect of reducing the level of atr ...

... settlement. Thus altering the expected outcome of war can increase the likelihood of war, but with a neutral third party it need not. The second mechanism, reducing the costs of war, is of course the main goal of the pro-intervention school. This has the beneficial eﬀect of reducing the level of atr ...

MLLunch-kdd04

... It will not modify example if: classifier’s prediction is negative, or transformation is to costly Naïve algorithm: for all positive examples and find probability they are modified ...

... It will not modify example if: classifier’s prediction is negative, or transformation is to costly Naïve algorithm: for all positive examples and find probability they are modified ...

An Introduction to Alternating-time Temporal Logic

... [ϕ] denotes the desired set of states, we write [true] for the set of all states, and [false] for the empty set of states. The function Sub, when given an ATL formula ϕ, returns a queue of syntactic subformulas of ϕ such that if ϕ1 is a subformula of ϕ and ϕ2 is a subformula of ϕ1 , then ϕ2 precedes ...

... [ϕ] denotes the desired set of states, we write [true] for the set of all states, and [false] for the empty set of states. The function Sub, when given an ATL formula ϕ, returns a queue of syntactic subformulas of ϕ such that if ϕ1 is a subformula of ϕ and ϕ2 is a subformula of ϕ1 , then ϕ2 precedes ...

Walrasian Lemons Markets

... The more common approach to study trade in markets with adverse selection is to model the market as a game where the details of the trading process are completely specified and characterize the equilibria of this game. A drawback of this approach is that the outcome of the trading process is in gene ...

... The more common approach to study trade in markets with adverse selection is to model the market as a game where the details of the trading process are completely specified and characterize the equilibria of this game. A drawback of this approach is that the outcome of the trading process is in gene ...

Spatial Price Competition Between Cooperatives Under Hotelling

... mizing members’ welfare, charging market prices for inputs and refunding surplus, minimizing (maximizing) member prices for inputs (outputs). Both in the EU and the in USA the agricultural cooperatives contribute substantial parts of the added value in the production, transformation and commercializ ...

... mizing members’ welfare, charging market prices for inputs and refunding surplus, minimizing (maximizing) member prices for inputs (outputs). Both in the EU and the in USA the agricultural cooperatives contribute substantial parts of the added value in the production, transformation and commercializ ...

coalitions

... A heuristic approach to the Shapley value • Partners have to negotiate about the sharing of v(N). • Players agree on three points: – Each partner must be remunerated at the level of her contribution (her incremental value). – Problem: this incremental value depends on the group the player joins. We ...

... A heuristic approach to the Shapley value • Partners have to negotiate about the sharing of v(N). • Players agree on three points: – Each partner must be remunerated at the level of her contribution (her incremental value). – Problem: this incremental value depends on the group the player joins. We ...

Chap 13 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly These questions

... B) entry and exit push economic profits toward zero. C) firms produce where marginal cost equals the marginal benefit to the consumers. D) there is no diversity of products. 44) In long-run equilibrium, a firm in monopolistic competition earns A) a normal profit. B) an economic profit but the econom ...

... B) entry and exit push economic profits toward zero. C) firms produce where marginal cost equals the marginal benefit to the consumers. D) there is no diversity of products. 44) In long-run equilibrium, a firm in monopolistic competition earns A) a normal profit. B) an economic profit but the econom ...

... logic follows; a formal proof is given in Appendix A. As the cost of effort goes to zero the set of optimal relative payoffs at each cost converges to the set of optimal relative payoffs when the cost of effort is exactly zero. If the latter set contains a unique optimum, then the optima converge to ...

Dynamic Limit Pricing - Athens University of Economics and Business

... focusing on somewhat di¤erent issues. In particular, she does not select between equilibria and focuses on the least cost separating equilibrium which allows the informed party to smooth costly signaling intertemporally.4 In unpublished work, Saloner (1984) extends the Matthews and Mirman (1983) set ...

... focusing on somewhat di¤erent issues. In particular, she does not select between equilibria and focuses on the least cost separating equilibrium which allows the informed party to smooth costly signaling intertemporally.4 In unpublished work, Saloner (1984) extends the Matthews and Mirman (1983) set ...

Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common

... group members costlessly monitor each other’s efforts. We extend Nitzan’s original insight and show its implications for the common property and cartel problems. The case we examine is isomorphic to a rent-seeking contest where the prize is a strictly increasing function of aggregate outlays and whe ...

... group members costlessly monitor each other’s efforts. We extend Nitzan’s original insight and show its implications for the common property and cartel problems. The case we examine is isomorphic to a rent-seeking contest where the prize is a strictly increasing function of aggregate outlays and whe ...

Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

... Common belief of doxastic substantive rationality implies backward induction. We now turn to doxastic material rationality. As we show in Example 2 below, common belief of this rationality does not imply backward induction in the centipede game. A weaker version of this claim still holds when belief ...

... Common belief of doxastic substantive rationality implies backward induction. We now turn to doxastic material rationality. As we show in Example 2 below, common belief of this rationality does not imply backward induction in the centipede game. A weaker version of this claim still holds when belief ...

Potential Games

... in the context of wireless communications and networking in order to illustrate the ideas. ...

... in the context of wireless communications and networking in order to illustrate the ideas. ...