Modal Logic for Open Minds - Institute for Logic, Language and
... in space with their neighbours, etcetera. A particularly helpful geometrical interpretation is in machine diagrams or process graphs, where modal formulas describe possible evolutions starting from the current state of the process, with accessibility arrows for possible transitions. Remark (Poly-mod ...
... in space with their neighbours, etcetera. A particularly helpful geometrical interpretation is in machine diagrams or process graphs, where modal formulas describe possible evolutions starting from the current state of the process, with accessibility arrows for possible transitions. Remark (Poly-mod ...
Supplementary Material: Proof of Theorem 4.1 without
... apply almost verbatim, since in the previous arguments, if θj was not the true type for one or more players, those players j were about to report U anyway. Note that postponing a report of U by one or more periods within a communication phase is suboptimal, since the argument εi from the relevant en ...
... apply almost verbatim, since in the previous arguments, if θj was not the true type for one or more players, those players j were about to report U anyway. Note that postponing a report of U by one or more periods within a communication phase is suboptimal, since the argument εi from the relevant en ...
5 Evolution of Social Conventions
... all payoffs by a positive constant (or add a constant to all payoffs) without altering the game in any essential way. Nevertheless, this payoff structure does reflect both the incentives of the individuals to coordinate on some convention and their indifference over which convention is adopted. To t ...
... all payoffs by a positive constant (or add a constant to all payoffs) without altering the game in any essential way. Nevertheless, this payoff structure does reflect both the incentives of the individuals to coordinate on some convention and their indifference over which convention is adopted. To t ...
P - brassmath
... Jamaal, Ethan, and Alberto are competing with seven other boys to be on their school’s cross-country team. All the boys have an equal chance of winning the trial race. Determine the probability that Jamaal, Ethan, and Alberto will place first, second, and third, in any order. Let’s try again with co ...
... Jamaal, Ethan, and Alberto are competing with seven other boys to be on their school’s cross-country team. All the boys have an equal chance of winning the trial race. Determine the probability that Jamaal, Ethan, and Alberto will place first, second, and third, in any order. Let’s try again with co ...
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
... through creative marketing (creating perceived product differences). It can apply to either competitive or collusive behavior (including cheating on collusive agreements). G. CONSIDER THIS … The Prisoner’s Dilemma In the game in Figure 11.3, both firms realize they would make higher profits if each ...
... through creative marketing (creating perceived product differences). It can apply to either competitive or collusive behavior (including cheating on collusive agreements). G. CONSIDER THIS … The Prisoner’s Dilemma In the game in Figure 11.3, both firms realize they would make higher profits if each ...
Financial Fragility
... is non-stochastic and there is no crisis. In the second type, the equilibrium price p is random and a crisis occurs with positive probability. Both types of equilibria will be shown to exist. Note that there cannot be equilibrium in which a crisis occurs for certain. If banks anticipated low asset p ...
... is non-stochastic and there is no crisis. In the second type, the equilibrium price p is random and a crisis occurs with positive probability. Both types of equilibria will be shown to exist. Note that there cannot be equilibrium in which a crisis occurs for certain. If banks anticipated low asset p ...
Handout - Tamu.edu
... a. Both firms pick SUVs. b. Both firms pick Sedans. c. Firm 1 picks SUV and Firm 2 picks Sedan. d. Firm 2 picks SUV and Firm 1 picks Sedan. e. None of the above ...
... a. Both firms pick SUVs. b. Both firms pick Sedans. c. Firm 1 picks SUV and Firm 2 picks Sedan. d. Firm 2 picks SUV and Firm 1 picks Sedan. e. None of the above ...
Price Competition on Networked Duopolistic Markets
... persistent across large number of products in many industries. Prominent examples include Janssen et al. (2004) on computer hardware, Baye et al. (2004) on large collection of consumer electronics, Barron et al. (2004) on gasoline and Wildenbeest (2009) on supermarket prices. Price dispersion has tw ...
... persistent across large number of products in many industries. Prominent examples include Janssen et al. (2004) on computer hardware, Baye et al. (2004) on large collection of consumer electronics, Barron et al. (2004) on gasoline and Wildenbeest (2009) on supermarket prices. Price dispersion has tw ...
Epistemic Models of Shallow Depths and Decision
... mean that each i 2 believes that his payoff function is gJ. Here gi is the set of formulae describing payoff function gj, which will be defined in Section 2.1. We need only formulae without nested occurrences of B1(.) and B2(0), to describe the decision making by dominant strategies in the game g'. ...
... mean that each i 2 believes that his payoff function is gJ. Here gi is the set of formulae describing payoff function gj, which will be defined in Section 2.1. We need only formulae without nested occurrences of B1(.) and B2(0), to describe the decision making by dominant strategies in the game g'. ...
chapter
... Prisoners’ dilemma is a game based on two premises: (1) Each player has an incentive to choose an action that benefits him or herself at the other player’s expense. (2) When both players act in this way, both are worse off than if they had chosen different actions. ...
... Prisoners’ dilemma is a game based on two premises: (1) Each player has an incentive to choose an action that benefits him or herself at the other player’s expense. (2) When both players act in this way, both are worse off than if they had chosen different actions. ...
An introduction to game theory
... Today: The fundamentals of game theory, including Nash equilibrium ...
... Today: The fundamentals of game theory, including Nash equilibrium ...
An Exact Solution Method for Binary Equilibrium
... fails once a game includes binary decision variables. The reason is that optimality conditions cannot be directly derived for binary optimization problems. Thus, applied optimization researchers aim to relax these binary problems to derive optimality conditions, or obtain duals to constraints of ind ...
... fails once a game includes binary decision variables. The reason is that optimality conditions cannot be directly derived for binary optimization problems. Thus, applied optimization researchers aim to relax these binary problems to derive optimality conditions, or obtain duals to constraints of ind ...
ppt - UiO
... descriptive (Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2004), meaning that it is more like a metaheuristic than an algorithm (Talbi, 2009; Luke, 2011) ...
... descriptive (Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2004), meaning that it is more like a metaheuristic than an algorithm (Talbi, 2009; Luke, 2011) ...
DESIGNING STABLE MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIC
... We argue in Section III that supermodularity is not an appropriate stability concept for mechanism design in certain contexts. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) prove that if a game is supermodular then any adaptive learning dynamic (which plays undominated strategies against not-too-distant histories) mus ...
... We argue in Section III that supermodularity is not an appropriate stability concept for mechanism design in certain contexts. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) prove that if a game is supermodular then any adaptive learning dynamic (which plays undominated strategies against not-too-distant histories) mus ...
1 Chapter 12 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly (Part 2) Price
... other player uses. We will explain these concepts with the classic example of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Example: Prisoner’s Dilemma The story: Ann and Bob have been caught stealing a car. The police suspect that they have also robbed the bank, a more serious crime. The police has no evidence for the rob ...
... other player uses. We will explain these concepts with the classic example of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Example: Prisoner’s Dilemma The story: Ann and Bob have been caught stealing a car. The police suspect that they have also robbed the bank, a more serious crime. The police has no evidence for the rob ...
Completeness for coalgebraic fixpoint logic
... strictly controlled syntax and semantics via the so-called one-step framework, and second, it allows us to handle traces more explicitly. More in detail, our approach focus on two automata-related games: we will work with the satisfiability game of [3], which comprises a streamlined analogue of the ...
... strictly controlled syntax and semantics via the so-called one-step framework, and second, it allows us to handle traces more explicitly. More in detail, our approach focus on two automata-related games: we will work with the satisfiability game of [3], which comprises a streamlined analogue of the ...
F15 - Tamu.edu
... 29b And the maximin strategies for each firm are that each firm picks Sedan. A maximin strategy chooses the option that makes the lowest payoff one can receive as large as possible. If Firm 1 picks Sedan, the worst payoff it can get is 500 but could get a lower payoff of 400 if picked SUV. Similarly ...
... 29b And the maximin strategies for each firm are that each firm picks Sedan. A maximin strategy chooses the option that makes the lowest payoff one can receive as large as possible. If Firm 1 picks Sedan, the worst payoff it can get is 500 but could get a lower payoff of 400 if picked SUV. Similarly ...
Collective bounded rationality
... Subjects are randomly partitioned to groups of size n. (three phases: n = 5, 9, 19) Each group faces a box either blue or yellow with probability 1/2, but the color is unknown to the subjects. Each box contains 100 cards either blue or yellow. 60 cards have the same color as the box, 40 the other. A ...
... Subjects are randomly partitioned to groups of size n. (three phases: n = 5, 9, 19) Each group faces a box either blue or yellow with probability 1/2, but the color is unknown to the subjects. Each box contains 100 cards either blue or yellow. 60 cards have the same color as the box, 40 the other. A ...
A Brinkmanship Game Theory Model of Terrorism
... UN Secretary General could point to the credible threat of U.S. retaliation and its policy of preemption in the war against terror. The UN Secretary General could issue the following warning: “Acquire WMD and all bets are off.” Specifically, the UN Secretary General could warn that if it is discove ...
... UN Secretary General could point to the credible threat of U.S. retaliation and its policy of preemption in the war against terror. The UN Secretary General could issue the following warning: “Acquire WMD and all bets are off.” Specifically, the UN Secretary General could warn that if it is discove ...
Chapter 1
... 1) In a simultaneous game where both players prefer doing the opposite of what the opponent does, a Nash equilibrium does not exist. Answer: False. There are two Nash equilibria. In each, the two players are doing the opposite of one another. The problem is, it is difficult to know which equilibrium ...
... 1) In a simultaneous game where both players prefer doing the opposite of what the opponent does, a Nash equilibrium does not exist. Answer: False. There are two Nash equilibria. In each, the two players are doing the opposite of one another. The problem is, it is difficult to know which equilibrium ...
Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries
... points in the underlying commodity space. Each consumer spreads extrinsic probability over points in the commodity space so as to maximize his exante expected utility subject to incentive and other constraints as well as affordability. 8 In an LE world, a given bundle delivered with a given probabil ...
... points in the underlying commodity space. Each consumer spreads extrinsic probability over points in the commodity space so as to maximize his exante expected utility subject to incentive and other constraints as well as affordability. 8 In an LE world, a given bundle delivered with a given probabil ...
average equilibrium points
... This intuitive motivation is essential for taking the equilibrium point concept as fundamental in game theory. However several authors explain as a second important aspect, the stability fact. This is explained as follows: Assuming that all the decide to play σ = (σ1 , . . . , σn ) and this point is ...
... This intuitive motivation is essential for taking the equilibrium point concept as fundamental in game theory. However several authors explain as a second important aspect, the stability fact. This is explained as follows: Assuming that all the decide to play σ = (σ1 , . . . , σn ) and this point is ...
Axiomatizing complex algebras by games
... L. If instead of all subsets of L we take as carrier of the algebra some non-empty collection of subsets of L that is closed under the Boolean operations and under the lifted operations, we get an arbitrary complex algebra over L; formulated more concisely, a complex algebra over L is any subalgebra ...
... L. If instead of all subsets of L we take as carrier of the algebra some non-empty collection of subsets of L that is closed under the Boolean operations and under the lifted operations, we get an arbitrary complex algebra over L; formulated more concisely, a complex algebra over L is any subalgebra ...
Context$Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning
... ask for more— we will ask that Ann strongly believes the event “Bob is rational and Bob strongly believes I am rational,” etc. . . Return to Figure 1.1 and append to the game the epistemic type structure described in Section 1.1. Let us understand forward induction reasoning within this structure. ...
... ask for more— we will ask that Ann strongly believes the event “Bob is rational and Bob strongly believes I am rational,” etc. . . Return to Figure 1.1 and append to the game the epistemic type structure described in Section 1.1. Let us understand forward induction reasoning within this structure. ...