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The Sunnis and The Shiites
a homily by Sheila T. Harty
News of conflicts between Sunni and Shiite Muslims falls on deaf Judeo-Christian ears.
We don’t understand the difference between Sunnis and Shiites. Then there’s Sufis. How come they all
have two syllable names beginning with S? We can’t distinguish these words far less the beliefs.
I can’t provide an analysis of the current conflicts. For that, you’ll need to read scholars in the field.
I can, however, provide the origin of the schism that created Shiism and a summary of the history of
the conflict, which will at least provide a foundation to better understand what you’re reading.
T
o understand the Sunnis and the Shiites as two sects of Islam would be misleading. The name Sunni
comes from the Arabic word sunnah, which refers to the teachings, sayings, and doings of the Prophet
Mohammed.1 Sunni, then, are Muslims who follow the orthodox tradition. They constitute 85 to 90
percent of Muslims worldwide. Yet they are not just the majority; Sunni Muslims are the base of Islam.
The Shiites are a break-away sect from orthodox Islam. The schism occurred about two generations
after the Islamic community was established in Medina, Saudi Arabia. At only 10 to 15 percent
worldwide, Shiites are centralized in Iran and Iraq, also in Pakistan and Indonesia, as well as in Lebanon,
Yemen, Azerbijan, and Bahrain. Although they are a majority in Iraq, they were a suppressed majority
under Sadaam Husain, who is Sunni in name only (and, for the record, Osama bin Laden is also Sunni, as
most Saudis are).
The schism that produced the Shiite sect—the first, but now one among many sects—was a conflict
over succession. The Arabic word Shi’a means “partisans”; the Shiites were Partisans of Ali, the cousin of
Mohammed who was also his son-in-law. Many thought he
should have succeeded Mohammed as head of the Islamic
community. Ali and his son Hussain are the key figures in
Shiism.
The death of Mohammed in 632—only 10 years after the
Islamic community was established2—was the first great crisis
of the Islamic community, a sort of constitutional crisis.3
Neither Mohammed nor the Qu’ran had provided for
succession.4 Mohammed’s first wife had died as had their only
son; Muhammad’s successive wives bore him no children. Nor
had he created a council of tribal leaders who might exercise
authority in his absence.
THE 1ST SUCCESSOR—ABU BAKR
pon Mohammed’s death, a privy council of three
companions chose a successor among themselves. They
chose Abu Bakr, Mohammed’s father-in-law, who was
U
The ENDNOTES reflect a reliance on two respected but Western scholars: Bernard Lewis, Professor of Near East Studies at
Princeton University, whose respected early scholarship from which I draw is eclipsed by his new book, Muslim Rage, from
which I do not draw; and Karen Armstrong, ex-Catholic nun, current lecturer in Judaism, published author in Islamic studies, and
1999 winner of the Muslim Public Affairs Council Media Award. I have tried to balance this Western slant with research and
readings of Arab and Muslim scholars who are also cited.
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The Sunnis and the Shiites
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respected for his piety. He was given the title caliph or “deputy” of the Prophet. The choice of Abu Bakr
was an indication that merit would be the basis of leadership within the Islamic community, not heredity,
especially not in a polygamous society.5 The role of caliph was neither a priest nor a theologian; the role
was political with government and military power. Abu Bakr did not claim authority to interpret
revelation or arbitrate disagreement on matters of faith, leaving that authority in the Qur’an and in the
sunnah of the Prophet.
Mohammad’s cousin Ali had many supporters who thought he should have been successor. Ali was
not only related to the Prophet by blood but also by marriage to Mohammed’s daughter, Fatima. Ali was
also the first male convert to Islamsecond only to Mohammed’s wife Khadijah. But Ali was only 30.
Arab respect for age favored Abu Bakr.
By the time of Mohammed’s death, almost all Arab tribes had joined the Islamic Confederacy as
converted Muslims.6 Through Islam, Mohammed had brought unity to the fiercely independent Arab
tribes. His death put this feat in jeopardy. Abu Bakr’s first task demanded both government and military
power.7 He had to counter the refusal of the Arab tribes to recognize the succession.8 The death of
Mohammed terminated the tribes’ political contract with him; they felt in no way bound to Abu Bakr as
they had taken no part in his election.9 As a result, the tribes suspended both monetary tribute and treaty
relations; to reestablish both, Abu Bakr had to make new treaties with those who would and subjugate by
military force those who wouldn’t.10 Two years later, Abu Bakr died.
THE 2ND SUCCESSOR--UMAR
O
n the death of Abu Bakr, Umar (one of the three privy council members) was nominated without
serious opposition to succeed as caliph. Umar imposed order. The energies that the tribes had previously expended in raiding each other, which was now prohibited under Islam, had to be diverted.11
Umar set them upon nonMuslim communities in neighboring countries. Compared with previous
barbarian invasions, the organized Arab forces imposed some advantages: for one, Muslims were tolerant
of Christians and Jews.12 Thus, unity was preserved while enhancing the caliph’s authority and gaining
territory.
Greatly expanding the Islamic empire, Umar remained caliph for ten years. Then, he was murdered in
a private vengeance.13 As Umar lay dying, he appointed a council of six most likely candidates for
succession and told them to choose among themselves.14 Ali was offered the caliphate on condition that
he abide by the precedents set by Abu Bakr. Ali refused and I don’t have any information as to why. So
Uthman was chosen as third caliph.
THE 3RD SUCCESSOR--UTHMAN
thman was a member of a leading family in Mecca. The city’s urban wealth had created an
aristocracy whose style contrasted with the nomadic life of most Arabs.15 Thus, Uthman’s
appointment represented a victory of the ruling merchant class who had more readily accepted the profits
of the new religion then its Prophet.16 Uthman soon fell under the influence of the Meccans and appointed
many to high positions.17 This nepotism brought him resentment.18 Uthman also alienated the rich
families of Medina, Mohammed’s capital, who still considered themselves closest to the Prophet.19
U
Uthman alienated his soldiers as well, who only a decade earlier had been nomads in the desert.20
Inevitably perhaps, Uthman was assassinated by his own Arab soldiers,21 which included the son of Abu
Bakr.22 This mutiny against Uthman reflected a pre-Islamic tendency of Arabs toward government by
consent. The nomadic view held private judgment as supreme. Obedience to authority was regarded as
voluntary; since Uthman failed to inspire it, they felt free to withhold it.23
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The murder of Uthman was a turning point in Islamic history.24 Most Arab tribes that had joined the
Islamic Confederacy had little interest in Mohammed’s religion.25 Yet, the slaying of a caliph by Muslims
set a precedent that weakened the religious prestige of the caliphate as well as the bond of moral unity
among Muslims, which was a major achievement of Mohammed’s.26
THE 4TH SUCCESSOR--ALI
li’s role in Uthman’s death is unclear.27 He had opposed the policies of both Umar and Uthman,28
who had emphasized central authority. Although he seemed not to bear any direct responsibility for
the murder, Ali's failure to use his prestige to prevent it gave his enemies ammunition.29 Nevertheless,
having been passed over three times, Ali was the obvious candidate to succeed Uthman. Indeed, Ali was
acclaimed the new caliph.
A
Ali had grown up with Mohammed’s household and promoted the same ideals; he was considered an
inspiring military leader and a compassionate ruler.30 He had the support of the families of Medina as well
as the nomadic tribes, especially those in Iraq.31 Nevertheless, Mohammed’s favorite wife, Aisha, the
daughter of Abu Bakr,32 along with her kinsmen, attacked Ali for not punishing Uthman’s murderers.33 Ali’s
supporters insisted that Uthman deserved death because he had not ruled justly according to the Quranic
ideal.34 Ali could not disown his supporters, so he took refuge among them in Iraq where Ali made his
capital.35 Ali and his soldiers defeated the rebels at what became known as the Battle of the Camel, because
Aisha astride her camel rode with her troops but watched the battle from afar.36 Still, Ali did not condemn
Uthman’s assassination, so his rule was not secure.
Ali had also not been accepted in Syria, whose governor was Muawiyyah, successor to his uncle
Uthman as the head of the Meccan clan.37 Muawiyyah demanded vengeance in accord with Arab custom,
so the Syrian army and Ali’s army confronted each other.38 Both sides knew such conflicts were contrary
to the Mohammed’s mission to promote unity among the tribes, so they tried to negotiate but failed.
Supposedly, Muawiyyah’s soldiers then put copies of the Qu’ran on the tips of their spears and called on
neutral Muslims to arbitrate according to the word of God.39 The arbitration went against Ali and
Muawiyyah deposed him.40 Some of Ali’s more radical supporters refused to accept the arbitration.41 They
felt that Ali had compromised and that the spirit of the Qu’ran had been betrayed. These Kharajites,
which means “seceders,” established themselves as an independent—and extremist—minority that now
posed a separate threat.42 Indeed, two years later, Ali was assassinated by a Kharajite.
But a pattern had been set.43 From time to time, Muslims who protested some behavior of the ruling
caliph would retreat from the community and call upon all true Muslims to join with them in a struggle or
jihad for higher Islamic standards.44 These protests were often over questions of leadership. Should the
leader be the most pious, as Kharajites believed?45 Or a direct descendent of Mohammed, as Shiites
believed?46 Or from the ruling dynasty in order to maintain unity, as Sunnis believed.47
THE 5TH SUCCESSOR—MUAWIYYAH—OR WAS IT HUSEIN?
T
hose who remained loyal to Ali in Iraq acclaimed his son Hasan as caliph, but Hasan deferred the
caliphate to Muawiyyah for a financial settlement and then retired to Medina with no further
involvement in politics.48 Muawiyyah soon hailed himself caliph from his capital in Damascus, Syria.49
Muawiyyah ruled for 19 years and restored unity to the empire through efficient administration over the
provinces.50 The most important province was Iraq where his bastard son Ziyad was governor.51 Even in
the 7th century, Iraq was the most difficult and turbulent of the provinces.52
As Muawiyyah approached his death, he wanted to stabilize the empire by regulating succession.53
The only precedents from Islamic history were election and civil war.54 Hereditary succession was still
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foreign to Arabs.55 Yet, to secure the empire, he departed from Arab tradition and arranged that his other
son Yazid would become the next caliph.56
THE MARTYRDOM OF HUSEIN
he protest against Yazid as caliph was immediate.57 Yazid’s misfortune was that the harsh rule of his
stepbrother Ziyad in Iraq caused a popular uprising among those who were backing Ali’s second son
Husain as the next caliph.58 To join these supporters in Iraq, Husain and a small band of followers with
their wives and children set out from Medina. His supporters, meanwhile, intimidated by the Syrians,
withdrew their support. Nevertheless, Husain continued toward Iraq, thinking that the Prophet’s family
on the march would remind others of Islamic ideals.59
T
On the plain of Karbala outside Kufah in Iraq, the Syrian troops surrounded Husain, his family, and
his followers and massacred them all. The murder of Mohammed’s grandson by the army of the ruling
caliph was another turning point in Islamic history and the instigating event of the Shiite sect. Husain’s
murder is celebrated to this day in Iraq with extreme fervor, including bloody flagellation. After the death
of Husain, his descendents lived secluded devout lives in Medina.60 His supporters were not so pacific.
THE TURNING POINT
T
he dramatic martyrdom of Husain, the hereditary claimant to the caliphate, galvanized Shiites as a
political party.61 They opposed the rule of the caliphs, who were becoming absolute monarchs, which
devout Muslims considered unIslamic.62 They believed that Islamic principles of a just society were more
fully preserved in Mohammed’s family who alone should rule.
The murderous injustice to Husain became the Shiite focus. For Shiites, Husain is eternal; miracles
were ascribed to him even before his birth.63 Shiism accrued messianic overtones of martyrdom and sacrifice,
betrayal and persecution.64 The saga of the martyrs is the potent core of the Shiite faith.65 Thus, Shiites regard
opposition to tyranny and injustice as a religious duty, which we currently see in the backlash in Iraq.66
The Shiite transfer of Husain and Karbala from history to ideology to legend may be understood from
the Shiites’ minority position in Muslim society.67 By remembering an event of extreme injustice, the
ideology of martyrdom helps them maintain solidarity against the dominance of the Sunnis.68 To Sunni
Muslims, support for succession of the caliphs under Ali was the chief offense of the Shiites, because it
repudiated the first three caliphs, who were the most revered companions of Mohammad.69
Still, significant theological differences evolved between Sunnis and Shiites. Shiites amended the
traditional call to prayer: “God is great. There is only one God. Muhammad is the messenger of God,” to
which the Shiites added “and Ali is the friend of God.”70 Shiites call their leader “imam,” not caliph, and
ascribe miraculous spiritual power to the imam in addition to political power. One extreme Shiite sect even
considers the imam divine,71 which is more than Mohammad even claimed for himself. This enhanced
importance of the imam in Shiism is another offense against orthodox Sunnis who believe that no
intercession is needed between God and man. 72
Another element of discord between Sunnis and Shiites was over the fifth of the spoils of war, which
was traditionally allocated to Mohammed. Sunnis did not consider this inherited by Mohammed’s
descendants.73 Shiites, however, believed that the right to the fifth as a tithe was still due their imam, who
could empower deputies to collect it. Such financial support has enabled a powerful Shiite network to
evolve independent of government, which has led to clerical rule.74 The evolution of the imam as an
infallible hierarchical spiritual authority is suggestive of Roman Catholicism; whereas, Sunni Islam more
closely resembles the independent churches of American Protestantism.75
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THE FIVERS, SEVENERS, AND TWELVERS
A
s Islam spread, diverse elements merged with Muslim culture, and theology became less orthodox.
Wealthy Arabs disposed vast sums of money, which created a new underclass of nonArabs Muslim.76
Their opposition to these Arab aristocrats, who were Sunni, found religious expression among the Shiites.77
Thus, Shiism became further entrenched as an opposition sect to Sunnism.78
The schism of the Shiites from the Sunnis fragmented the political and theological authority of Islam.
The Protestant Reformation might be a useful, though imperfect, analogy. The shift of the capital to
Damascus from Medina was another loss to orthodox Islam.79 Ali’s transfer of his capital from Medina to
Kufa brought Shiism support from local Iraqis.80 Ironically, many of the more extreme Shiites were
converts.81 They brought religious ideas to Shiism from their Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian
heritage.82
A branch of Shiism, known as the Fivers, diverged from other Shiites upon the death of the 4th imam
in the 8th century.83 Today, the Fivers—also known as the Zaydis—are the most moderate Shiites, closest
to the Sunnis.84 The country of Yemen is predominantly Zaydi Muslims.
Another branch of Shiites, known as the Seveners, believed that Ali’s descendents ended with Ismail,
the 7th imam.85 Seveners, also called Ismailis, believed that faith was worthless unless combined with
political activism.86 In fact, the Assassins were a 12th century sect of Seveners in Iran during a time of
extreme militancy against unjust regimes. The hereditary line of the Aga Kahn is also from a branch of
Ismailis, the Nizaris.
The dominant branch of Shiites and the major branch in Iraq is known as the Twelvers. This breakaway sect originated in the 9th century when the ruling caliph placed the ruling imam under house arrest,
wanting no descendent of Mohammed to threaten his rule.87 When the 11th imam died, the son he was
alleged to have was said to have gone into hiding as a child. Twelve-Imam Shiites claim that this 12th
imam was “occulted” (or miraculously concealed by God) and would return to inaugurate an era of peace
and justice and take vengeance on the enemies of God.88
The significance of such an interpretation is obvious; otherwise, the line of Mohammed through Ali
and Fatima would be extinct.89 However, the myth of the Hidden Imam, rather than a literal belief, was a
mystical doctrine, symbolizing the impossibility of implementing religious principles in the real world.90
Indeed, by the 9th and 10th centuries, militant Shiites were leading armed revolts, far evolved from their
original piety as a spiritual elite.91
UNITY DESPITE SECTARIAN CONFLICTS
T
hese sectarian differences had varying implications for the nature of government. Some branches of
Shiites92 withdrew from Islamic society, rejecting the rule of unjust government, and lived under their
own interpretation of religious law.93 However, Twelvers and Ismailis wanted—though each in its own
way—an authority that could both uphold the law and maintain order.94
In my research and reading, I ran across an online Fatwa Bank where the question was asked: “Is
Shi’ah part of Islam?” A group of muftis95 replied: “not everything that goes under the name of Shi’ah is
considered Islamic...the Shi’ah have belief and dogma that we condemn as heresy but this doesn’t make
them nonMuslim.” 96
Paradoxically, within Islam, holding different beliefs is acceptable. Beliefs and doctrines are not as
important in Islam as in Christianity.97 In 1959, the head of Al-Azhar University in Cairo issued a fatwa,
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clarifying that “Islam does not require a Muslim to follow a particular school of thought.”98 Like
Judaism, Islam is a religion that requires people to live in a certain way—orthopraxy rather than
orthodoxy.99 Anyone who performs the five pillars of Islam100 is a Muslim, as both Sunnis and Shiites
do.101 What draws these diverse sects and branches together is their reverence for the Prophet
Mohammed, the Qur’an, the Sunnah, the Hadiths,102 the Shar’iah,103 and the first four “rightly guided
caliphs.”104
Nevertheless, the Shiites have developed distinctions that justify their existence apart from the
majority. As sectarians, they use religion as a mobilizing tool and brandish their version of history as a
defensive weapon.105 So Shiism, which began and failed as a political party over succession to the
caliphate, eventually found expression and endurance as a religious sect.106 However, for the integrity of
Islam, one must note that the existence of sects contradicts the Qur’an: “And be ye not among those who
join gods with Allah—those who split up their religion and become mere sects—each party rejoicing in
that which is with itself!”107
© Copyright, Sheila Harty, 2004.
Sheila Harty is a published and award-winning writer with a BA and MA in Theology. Her major was in Catholicism, her minor in
Islam, and her thesis in scriptural Judaism. Harty employed her theology degrees in the political arena as “applied ethics,” working
for 20 years in Washington DC as a public interest policy advocate, including ten years with Ralph Nader. On sabbatical from
Nader, she taught “Business Ethics” at University College Cork, Ireland. In DC, she also worked for U.S. Attorney General Ramsey
Clark, former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, the World Bank, the United Nations University, the Congressional Budget
Office, and the American Assn for the Advancement of Science. She was a consultant with the Centre for Applied Studies in
International Negotiations in Geneva, the National Adult Education Assn in Dublin, and the International Organization of Consumers
Unions in The Hague. Her first book, Hucksters in the Classroom, won the 1980 George Orwell Award for Honesty & Clarity in
Public Language. She moved to St. Augustine, Florida, in 1996 to care for her aging parents, where she also works as a freelance
writer and editor. She can be reached by phone at 904 / 826-0563 or by e-mail at s t h a r t y @ b e l l s o u t h . n e t . Her website is
http:www.sheila-t-harty.com
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ENDNOTES
1
Islam: Its Meaning, Objectives, and Legislative System by Dr. Abdullah Muhammad Khouj (Arlington VA: Saudi Arabian Television
in the USA, 1994), pg. 198-199.
2
The hijra or migration from Mecca to Medina is the starting point of the Islamic calendar.
3
The Arabs in History by Bernard Lewis (New York NY: Harper, 1966), pg. 50.
4
Ibid.
5
“Islam: Sunnis and Shiites” by Muhammad Hanif, Professor of Education, University of Louisville KY, Social Education (National
Council of the Social Studies, 1994), pg. 339-344.
6
Islam by Karen Armstrong (New York NY: Modern Library, 2000), pg. 23.
7
A History of the Arab Peoples by Albert Hourani (New York NY: Time-Warner Books, 1991), pg. 23.
8
Lewis, pg. 52.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Armstrong, pg. 27.
12
Hourani, pg. 25.
13
Ibid.
14
Lewis, pg. 59.
15
“Literature” by Mounah A. Khouri, Professor of Arabic Language and Literature, University of California, Berkeley, quoted from The
Genius of Arab Civilization: Source of Renaissance, 2nd edition (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1983), pg. 25.
16
Lewis, pg. 59.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Armstrong, pg. 32.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., pg. 33.
22
The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam edited by Cyril Glasse (San Francisco CA: Harper & Row, 1989), pg. 457.
23
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Lewis, pg. 61.
25
Armstrong, pg. 26.
26
Lewis, pg. 61.
27
Armstrong, pg. 33.
28
Ibid.
29
Lewis, pg. 60.
30
Armstrong, pg. 33.
31
Ibid.
32
Women in Islam: Tradition and Transition in the Middle East by Naila Minai (New York NY: Seaview Books, 1981), pg. 18.
33
Armstrong, pg. 33.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid., pg. 34.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
“If anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his heir authority to demand qisas (retaliation) or to forgive.” Surah 17:33 from The
Meaning of the Holy Qur’an by Abdullah Yusif Ali (Beltsville MD: Amana Publications, 1995).
39
Armstrong, pg. 35.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., pg. 36.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid., pg. 46.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Lewis, pg. 63.
50
Armstrong, pg. 41.
51
Lewis, pg. 65.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid., pg. 66.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid., pg. 50.
56
Armstrong, pg. 41.
57
Ibid.
58
Lewis, pg. 67.
59
Armstrong, pg. 41.
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The Sunnis and the Shiites
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Ibid., pg. 56.
Lewis, pg. 67.
62
Armstrong, pg. 52.
63
The Imam and Martyr in History and Ideology: Shiite Martyr vs. Sunni Hero by Dr. Salwa al-Amd, Department of Near East Studies,
Lenanese University, quoted from a book review by Hussam Tamam, editor, IslamOnline.net, Mar. 18, 2004, pg. 2.
64
Shiite Islam by Allamah Tabatabai (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1975), pg. 232.
65
“Iraq’s Oppressed Majority” by Andrew Cockburn, Smithsonian Magazine, December 2003, pp. 98-105.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Islam: Great Religions of the World edited by John Alden Williams, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal (New
York NY: Washington Square Press, 1969), pg. 80.
70
“The Origins of the Sunni/Shia Split in Islam” by Hussein Abdulwaheed Amin, editor of IslamForToday.com, 2001.
71
Islam by Fazlur Rahman (London UK: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1966), pg. 174.
72
Shiism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality by Seyyed Hossein Nasr et al. (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1988), pg. 75.
73
“Towards an Understanding of the Shiite Authoritative Sources” by Dr. Mohamed al-Saeed Abdul Mo’men, Professor of Iranian
Studies, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt, translated by Abdelazim R. Abdelazim, IslamOnline.net, Oct. 9, 2003.
74
Ibid.
75
Amin.
76
Called Mawali.
77
Lewis., pg. 71.
78
Ibid.
79
Lewis, pg. 64, and Armstrong, pg. 36.
80
Lewis, pg. 71.
81
Armstrong, pg. 52.
82
Ibid.
83
Ali Zahn al-Abidin, 713 CE. The Fivers follow his son Zayd, instead of his older brother, and take up resistance in Yemen.
Encyclopedia, pg. 432.
84
Lewis.
85
Although he had been chosen to succeed, he died before his father the 6 th imam. This son who died was not the same 7th imam
recognized by the Twelvers and other Shiites, who instead recognized the remaining son of the 6th imam as the succeeding 7th imam.
Ibid., pg. 354, and Armstrong, pp. 69-70.
86
Armstrong, pp. 69-70.
87
Ibid., pg. 68.
88
Encyclopedia, pg. 156.
89
Amin.
90
Armstrong, pg. 68.
91
Ibid., pg. 63.
92
The Ibadis (a schism from the Kharajites) and the Zaydis (the Fivers) as branches of Shiism, Hourani, pg. 62.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
A legal expert empowered to make decisions of religious import or fatwas.
96
“Shi’ites and Sunnis: Time for Unity” a fatwa answered by a group of muftis on IslamOnline.net, April 6, 2004.
97
Armstrong, pp. 65-67.
98
Shaikh Mahmood Shaltoot quoted in Inquiries About Islam by Muhammad Jawad Chirri (Detroit MI: Islamic Center of America,
1986).
99
Ibid.
100
The Five Pillars of Islam are: 1. The declaration of faith (shahadah); 2. prayer five times a day (salah); 3. fasting in the month of
Ramadan (sawm); 4. almsgiving (zakah); and 5. pilgrimage to Mecca (haj).
101
Armstrong, pp. 65-67.
102
The tradition or accounts of the actions or words of the Prophet Mohammed.
103
The canonical law of Islam as prescribed by the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
104
“Rashidun” (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali), Hourani, pg. 25.
105
“The Emergence of Nationalism in the Modern Middle East” by Rashid Khalidi, Professor History, University of Chicago, Fathom:
the Search for Learning Online, Fathom Knowledge Network, 2002.
106
Lewis, pg. 71.
107
Surah 30:31-32, The Qur’an.
61