Download Le cas - cuts ccier

Le droit et la politique de concurrence
face à la crise économique et
financière: Le cas des pays de
l’Afrique sub-saharienne
Frederic Jenny
Professeur d’Economie, ESSEC
Juge, Cour de cassation, France
Président du Comité de la concurrence de
l’OCDE
Conference on Strengthening Constitutencies for Effective Competition
Regimes in Selected West African countries
Interim Review Meeting
29-30 Juillet 2009
Banjul, Gambie
1
Pre-crisis growth of developing countries
As a group, the developing economies had entered the decade
(that began in 2000) in much better shape (macroeconomically
and otherwise) than had been the case during the previous two
decades, for example with lower inflation and more sustainable
fiscal situations.
These conditions would likely have predisposed the developing
world to more rapid growth, and also better equip developing
countries to deal with exogenous shocks in the current crisis.
Between 2002 and 2007, the developing world found its growth
stoked further by increased export revenues and higher
commodity prices, a surge in foreign direct investment, and
increased remittances from abroad.
Justin Yifu Lin , The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries
Chief Economist, The World Bank, Africa ,Seoul October 31, 2008
2
Pre-crisis growth of developing countries
Exports increased as a share of developing countries’ GDP
from 29 percent in 2000 to 39 percent in 2007.
Also, the flow of foreign direct investment to developing
countries soared, as investors sought higher returns than they
could earn domestically in a period of low yields in mature
economies. In 2007 alone, net private capital flows to
developing countries increased by $269 billion, to a record $1
trillion.
Remittances from workers in foreign countries also increased
sharply, to a total of about $240 billion in 2007.
(…) These transfers were a particularly important source of
finance for some labor-abundant, resource-poor countries.
Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries,
3
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31,
The direct and indirect effects of the
financial and economic crisis on
developing countries
As the financial sector in low-income countries is less
integrated into global financial markets, the direct effect on it
will be significant only in countries with a high foreign bank
presence.
The largely indirect impact in other countries will be felt
through
secondary
transmission
channels:
slower
investments, reduced remittances, reduced tourism receipts,
reduced availability of credit, such as trade finance, falling
terms of trade, contraction of private-sector activity and
slower export growth.
Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries,
4
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31,
The direct effects of the financial and
economic crisis on sub-saharan African
countries
Stock market volatility has increased since the onset of the crisis and
wealth losses have been observed in the major stock exchanges. In
Egypt and Nigeria, stock market indexes declined by about 67
percent between March 2008 and March 2009. Significant losses
have also been observed in Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and
Botswana.
There is growing evidence that it has a negative effect on bank
balance sheets and that non-performing loans in the banking sector
are likely to increase. In Ghana, the ratio of non-performing loans to
gross loans increased from 7.9 per cent to 8.7 per cent between 2006
and the third quarter of 2008. In Lesotho, it increased from 2 per
cent to 3.5 per cent over the same period (IMF 2009).
1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5
5
June 2009
The direct effects of the financial and
economic crisis on sub-saharan African
countries
Most African banks do not have any significant exposure to the subprime mortgage market and asset-backed securities.
They are, however, vulnerable to contagion effects arising from the
high rate of foreign ownership of banks in several countries in the
region. To the extent that foreign-owned banks reduce their support
of local banks or sell their assets, it will have serious negative
consequences for the financial sector in Africa. The countries that
are highly susceptible to contagion from this source include
Botswana, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho and Zambia. In these countries
foreign ownership of banks is quite high.
1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5
6
June 2009
The direct effects of the financial and
economic crisis on sub-saharan African
countries
The financial crisis has also increased the risk premiums that
African countries have to pay in international capital markets.
There is evidence that several countries in the region have difficulty
obtaining funds from international capital markets. For example,
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda have cancelled plans to raise
funds in these markets. The drying-up of this source of external
finance is a serious setback for development in the region because
the money raised would have been used to finance infrastructure
development and boost growth. The private sector is also facing
challenges in raising funds in international capital markets.
1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5
7
June 2009
The indirect effects of the crisis on subsaharan African countries:Exports
One effect will be a substantial reduction in their exports.(…) The
IMF recently projected growth in world trade volumes of just 4.1
percent in 2009, down from 9.3 percent as recently as 2006; in the
recent World Bank projections, the deceleration is much more
rapid and could in fact lead trade volumes to fall in 2009.
Example Visitor arrivals (and revenues) to Kenya fell 30% over the
first 9 months of 2008.
Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries,
8
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31,
The indirect effects of the crisis on subsaharan African countries:Exports
There has been a significant decline in the prices of key
commodities exported by African countries since the second half of
2008. (…) There has been a downward trend in prices of these
commodity groups since the second half of 2008. The most affected
commodity has been crude oil, which experienced price declines of
more than 50 per cent between February 2008 and February 2009.
The prices of copper, coffee, cotton and sugar also declined by
more than 20 per cent over the same period.
Examples:
In Cote d’Ivoire earnings are expected to decline from US$ 10.4
billion in 2008 to US$ 7.7 billion in 2009.
Zambia has been affected with the price of copper falling by 40%
9
since July 2009.
The indirect effects of the crisis on sub-saharan
African countries: Investment
All of the main external sources of funds for investment are
likely to drop off sharply in the first round of effects. Portfolio
investment will fall, as greater risk aversion keeps capital closer
to home. While FDI is historically more resilient to shocks, it too
is expected to decline.
In addition, developing countries that are able to gain access to
capital will pay higher interest rates, because of the flight to
safety and greater risk aversion of lenders.
And as labor markets slacken, foreign workers are likely to
suffer disproportionate impacts on their earnings, which will
reduce remittances.
Justin Yifu Lin The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries,
10
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank, Seoul October 31,
The indirect effects of the crisis on developing
countries: Investment
The World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies
foresees a 15% drop in FDI 20091.
Examples:
FDI to Turkey has already fallen 40% over the last year and
FDI to India dropped by 40% in the first six months of 2008.
FDI to China was $6.6 billion in September 2008, 20% down
from the monthly average in year 2008 so far, and mining
investments in South Africa and Zambia have been put on hold.
11
The indirect effect of the crisis on subsaharan African countries: Remittances
Remittances were estimated to amount to US$ 251 billion
worldwide in 2007, twice the amount of international aid. If
remittances via informal channels are added, the number is 50%
greater, according to the World Bank. The World Bank predicts
that the financial crisis will reduce remittance inflows to subSaharan Africa by US$ 1 to 2 billion in 2009 compared to 2008.
Liberia, Lesotho, the Gambia, are highly vulnerable because
remittance inflows represent more than 10% of their GDP.
Remittances to Kenya (which also depend on the US economy)
have been hit hard, with the Central Bank estimating a 38% year12
to-year drop in August 2008.
The indirect effects of the crisis on developing
countries: Overall appraisal
Our latest research based on current updates and forecasts as well
as on evidence of what happened in previous slowdowns and in
the absence of policy responses, suggests that net financial flows to
developing countries may fall by as much as $300 billion over a
two year period, equivalent to a 25% drop.
The World Bank forecasts a drop of around $4-500 billion over
the next two years.
Some countries, including successful African countries, are more
vulnerable than others.
1)Dirk Willeem te Velde Effects of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries and
Emerging Markets, ODI, Dec 8 2008
13
The indirect effects of the crisis on subsaharan African countries: Overall appraisal
Given the heterogeneity of African countries, the crisis is certainly
going to affect some countries much more than others. For
example, the decline in economic growth expected in 2009 will be
more severe in Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Equatorial
Guinea and the Sudan, which are expected to lose more than 4
percentage points in growth. In Egypt, Kenya, Cape Verde,
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone,
Lesotho, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
growth is expected to decline by between 2 and 3 percentage
points in 2009.
1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
14
COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5
The indirect effect of the crisis on developing
countries: Country studies
The Overseas Development Institute monitoring study:
Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia.
−Increased tightening of credit conditions for bank lending in
Cambodia, Ghana and Zambia.
- Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been affected less, but this
varies from one country to another.
− Export values are falling.
− Growth predictions have had to be revised significantly in all ten
countries.
− There are significant job losses. Ex: Zambia lost 8,100 (25%) of
its 30,000 mining jobs in 2008.
15
Macroeconomic responses to the crisis in
a sample of African Countries
Oil-exporting countries in the region have more fiscal space to
conduct counter-cyclical policies because they accumulated huge
foreign reserves during the recent oil price hikes.
In non-oil economies, however, the ability to adopt countercyclical policies is severely limited and so the use of fiscal stimulus
measures is not widespread in these economies.
Measures include interest rate reductions, recapitalization of
financial institutions, increasing liquidity to banks and firms,
fiscal stimulus packages, trade policy changes.
Some countries have set up task forces or committees to monitor
the financial crisis and advise the Government how to respond :
Rwanda, Kenya, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo
1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
16
COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5
Are fiscal stimulus program an adequate
response to the crisis for African
Countries ?
High dependence on export of a few commodities, small domestic
markets to rely on, a large informal economy, high propensity to
import, low tax base, lack of safety nets - all these African specific
characteristics suggest that expansionary fiscal plans similar to
those being applied in other regions are unlikely to be effective in
Africa
Fiscal stimulus can work more effectively and quickly through
commodity exporting sectors that have large multipliers effects,
whenever they exist.
17
Responses to the crisis in African
Countries: Fiscal stimulus packages
Fiscal stimulus packages, with a view to cushioning the effects of
the crisis and boosting growth, have been adopted in Cape Verde,
Egypt, Gabon, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and
Principe, South Africa and Tunisia.
In most of these packages, infrastructure development has been
emphasized. The South African stimulus plan, announced in
February 2009, is quite broad and has four aspects: a $69.4
million three-year public investment programme; expansion of
public sector employment opportunities; increase in social
spending; and assistance to the private sector. The stimulus plan
adopted by Morocco includes measures to improve access to
credit, tax incentives, vocational training for workers, and
reducing red tape and corruption.
1) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
18
COUNCIL ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA and AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION Cairo, Egypt,2-5
Adequate responses to the crisis for
African Countries
Investments in infrastructure and reforms that improve the
investment climate will be effective in improving economic growth
in the medium term and set the stage for a more rewarding and
rapid recovery.
If the global recession continues, governments will have to
introduce policies to protect vulnerable groups from likely
increases in prices of food and fuel due to exchange rate
depreciation.
19
What kind of Fiscal Stimulus for Africa ? Joege Saba Arbache, Office of the Chief
Economist Africa Region, The World Bank, March 31st 2009
Responses to the crisis in African
Countries: Trade measures
African exports have been impaired by protectionist responses to
the financial and economic crisis abroad.
But it does not seem that African countries have engaged in large
scale protectionist trade policies themselves ( although they may
have engaged in such policies on some occasions ).
20
Trade responses to the crisis and their impact
on sub-saharan African countries
Export subsidy
Ex: the Minister of Commerce and Industry of India announced
that the exports of leather and textile goods would be given
incentives of $US 87 million starting in April 2009.
Affected trading partners : Botswana, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia
21
Source : Global Trade Alert
Trade responses to the crisis and their impact
on sub-saharan African countries
Surcharges on Imports
Ex: In early 2009, Ukraine notified the WTO of its intention to
introduce a temporary (six month) surcharge to improve its
balance of payments. Specific reference was made in the
notification to the financial crisis as the motivating factor.
Affected trading partners: Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, South Africa,
Tunisia, Uganda.
22
Source : Global Trade Alert
Trade responses to the crisis and their
impact on sub-saharan African countries
Tariff measures
On 28 May 2009 The Zambian government increased the import duty
on finished petroleum products from 5 to 25%. Deputy minister for
Energy and Water Develoment, Lameck Chibombamilimo, said the
move was aimed at saving two local firms from collapse.
Affected countries : Zimbabwe, Tanzania
23
Trade responses to the crisis and their
impact on sub-saharan countries
Strategic use of public procurement
The Framework for South Africa’s Response to the
International Economic crisis includes measures such as :
-increase of tariffs;
-use of administrative measures to minimize imports;
-use of preference price system and preferential margin for
domestic firms in government procurement
-Source : Global Trade Alert 9 April 2009
24
Competition issues raised by the crisis in
sub-saharan African countries
1) Changes in the competitive environment due to the crisis
- decrease in demand
- decrease international trade (i.e., both in export opportunities
and in potential competition)
- failing firms (i.e., increase in market concentration)
- scarcity of available funds for investment (decrease in
potential competition)
2) Possible threats to competition due to policy responses
- protectionnist policies
- discriminatory fiscal stimulus packages
- strategic use of public procurement ( risk for competition and
corruption)
- temptation to establish price controls
3) Growing importance of pro-poor policies (emphasis 25 on
Conséquences pour les autorités de
concurrence: hiérarchiser les priorités
La situation de crise économique et financière est susceptible de
réduire les ressources des autorités de concurrence dans les pays
ou l’autorité de concurrence est financée sur fonds publics en
raison de la diminution des recettes de l’impôt en période de
récession économique.
Les autorités de concurrence vont devoir, plus que par le passé,
hiérarchiser leurs priorités et définir leur politique de saisine pour
allouer leurs ressources déclinantes au mieux de leurs objectifs.
A cet égard il est nécessaire qu’elles prennent en compte la défense
des segments les plus vulnérables de la population,
particulièrement touchées par la crise économique (par exemple, la
distribution alimentaire, les transports, les services locaux, la
26
distribution des engrais etc…)
What competition authorities in
developing countries can and should do
in a period of crisis: set priorities
The situation of economic and financial crisis is liable to diminish
the resources of competition agencies. This implies that the
competition authorities will, more than in the past, have to order
their priorities and define their referral policy in order to allocate
their declining resources to best meet their objectives
But competition authorities must also keep in mind that the
economic and financial crisis will require paying particular
attention to the poorest segments of society. Thus competition
authorities must be particularly open to cases which are of great
importance for the poor (such as food distribution, transportation,
27
water and local services, distribution of fertilizers etc…)
Conséquence pour les autorités de
concurrence:Participer au débat sur la
régulation
Les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent jouer un rôle utile,
en coopération avec l’exécutif ou les autorités sectorielles, dans le
débat sur les nouvelles formes de régulation de façon à s’assurer
que celles-ci ne comportent pas de restrictions à la concurrence
non strictement nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs
économiques ou non économiques qui les justifient et pour
favoriser un environnement favorable à l’investissement.
28
What competition authorities in
developing countries can and should do
in a period of crisis: advocacy
They can and should play a useful role, in cooperation with the
executive branch and the sectoral authorities, in discussing new
types of regulations, to ensure that they do not contain restrictions
on competition that are not strictly necessary for attaining the
economic or non-economic objectives that justify these regulations.
They should also play a role in advocating measures which will
improve the investment climate.
29
Conséquence pour les autorités de
concurrence: participer au débat sur les
plans d’aide
Les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent également
participer à la mise au point des plans d’aide ou de sauvetage des
entreprises ou des secteurs en difficulté pour veiller à ce que ces
plans ne créent pas des distorsions de concurrence sur les marchés
qui en facilitant des situations de rente réduiraient l’efficacité
globale des entreprises et rendraient problématique le
redémarrage de l’économie réelle.
30
What competition authorities in
developing countries can and should do
in a period of crisis: advocacy
Competition authorities can and should play a useful role, in
cooperation with the executive branch and the sector authorities,
in participating in the formulation of assistance or rescue plans for
struggling firms or sectors to ensure that these plans do not create
distortions of competition in the markets which, by facilitating
rent-seeking, would reduce the firms’ overall efficiency and
complicate efforts to get the real economy moving again.
31
Conséquence pour les autorités de
concurrence: préserver l’intégrité des
marchés publics
Les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent constituer un
rempart contre l’utilisation stratégique et anticoncurrentielle des
procédures de marchés publics. Ceci est d’autant plus important
que, comme nous l’avons vu, les plans d’aide et de sauvetage
comprennent fréquemment un plan de développement des
infrastructures.
De la même façon, les autorités de concurrence devraient s’allier,
lorsque celà est possible, avec les organismes anti-corruption dans
la mesure où les pratiques anti-concurrentielles sur les marchés
publics accompagnent fréquemment des pratiques de corruption
(voir à ce sujet l’expérience de l’Indonésie).
32
What competition authorities in
developing countries can and should do
in a period of crisis: advocacy
Competition authorities can and should be a bulwark against uses
of public procurements to foster protectionism or to severely
distort competition. This is particularly important since, as seen
before, stimulus packages will often have an important component
aimed at the development of infrastructures.
Equally, they could and should join forces whenever possible with
anti-corruption bodies since anti-competitive practices on
procurement markets often go hand in hand with corruption (see
the interesting example of Indonesia).
33
Ce que les autorités de concurrence peuvent
et devraient faire en période de crise:
prévenir la montée du protectionnisme
Enfin les autorités de concurrence peuvent et doivent constituer un
rempart contre la montée des mesures protectionnistes (dont nous
avons vu qu’elles peuvent être tentantes pour les gouvernements
des pays d’Afrique sub-saharienne).
34
What competition authorities in
developing countries can and should do
in a period of crisis: advocacy
Competition authorities can and should be a bulwark against the
temptation to use protectionist trade measures which could distort
of competition. This is important as we have seenthat African
countries may occasionally be tempted to use protectionist trade
policies.
35
La capacité institutionnelle de promouvoir la
concurrence en Afrique Sub-saharienne
Mais encore faut-il que les cadres institutionnels dans lesquels elles
opèrent leur permettent d’intervenir au bon endroit, au bon
moment et avec la force de conviction nécessaire.
Les pays d’Afrique Sub-saharienne ont de ce point de vue deux
atouts:
-En premier lieu il y a dans beaucoup de pays une direction de la
concurrence rattachée au Ministère du Commerce ou au Ministère
de l’Economie. Cette direction est l’interlocuteur privilégié des
autres ministères pour la défense de la concurrence.
-Dans certains pays, par exemple dans le cadre de l’UEMOA,
l’autorité qui met en oeuvre le droit de la concurrence dispose de
pouvoirs pour sanctionner les aides d’Etat anticoncurrentielles.
Ces moyens peuvent être utilisés pour contrôler les plans d’aide36 ou
de sauvetage des entreprises.
The institutional capacity to promote
competition in sub-saharan Africa
This implies, however, that the institutional frameworks in which
these authorities operate allow them to intervene in the right place,
at the right time, and with the requisite strength of conviction.
Sub-saharan African countries have two advantages in this
respect:
-First in many countries there is a Competition Directorate in the
Commerce or Economic Affairs Ministry. This directorate is in a
position to interact with other ministries for the promotion of
competition.
-Second, in some countries, such as in WAEMU, the competition
authority has the power to fight and sanction anticompetitive State
37
Aids.
Le rôle des autorités de concurrence en
période de crise: Le Traité de l’UEMOA
Aux termes de l’article 88, alinéa c, du Traité de l’UEMOA, sont
interdites de plein droit les aides publiques susceptibles de fausser
la concurrence en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines
productions, sous réserve d’exceptions limitées pouvant être
prévues par le Conseil des ministres en vertu de l’article 89 du
même traité.
Aux termes du règlement n°04/2002/CM/UEMOA, la notion
d’aide publique doit être entendue de la façon la plus large, aussi
bien en ce qui concerne la forme de l’aide que la personne
publique qui fournit l’aide. Constitue une aide publique toute
mesure qui entraîne un coût direct ou indirect, ou une diminution
des recettes pour l'État, ses démembrements ou pour tout
organisme public ou privé que l'État institue ou désigne en vue de
38
gérer l’aide, et confère ainsi un avantage sur certaines entreprises
Le rôle des autorités de concurrence en
période de crise: Le Traité de l’UEMOA
Les exemptions :
Six catégories d’aides sont considérées comme compatibles avec le
marché commun, sans qu’un examen préalable par la Commission
ne soit nécessaire, notamment :
Les aides destinées à promouvoir la réalisation d’un projet
important d’intérêt communautaire ou à remédier à une
perturbation grave de l’économie d’un État membre ;
39
Exemple d’intervention de l’UEMOA dans le
contrôle des aides d’état
L’Uemoa condamne l’Etat du Sénégal, dimanche 4 mai 2008.
Par lettre en date du 12 juillet 2007, Yves Crémieux, directeur
général de la société ‘Rufsac’, avait saisi la Commission de
l’Uemoa, pour faire examiner le fonctionnement du marché des
sacs de ciment en papier au Sénégal. Le responsable de cette
entreprise, ayant son siège à Rufisque, s’était plaint de distorsions
de concurrence dues aux exonérations dont bénéficient les
importations de produits concurrents de ceux que son usine
produit.
L’Uemoa demande à l’Etat du Sénégal de mettre un terme aux
exonérations qu’il a accordées aux deux cimenteries importatrices
d’emballages en papier que sont la Sococim et les Ciments du
Sahel. Elle considère que ces importations sont à l’origine de
40
distorsions de concurrence au détriment des emballages fabriqués
Conséquences pour les autorités de
concurrence: Mesures provisoires
En période de crise économique une proportion de saisines plus
importante que par le passé proviendra d’opérateurs économiques
en difficulté et leurs saisines seront accompagnées de demandes de
mesures conservatoires.
Ainsi, les autorités de concurrence seront conduites à s’interroger
pour savoir si elles doivent modifier le curseur qu’elles utilisent
pour apprécier la gravité ou l’immédiateté du danger que fait
courir une pratique éventuellement anticoncurrentielle aux parties
saisissantes, par ailleurs affaiblies en raison d’une conjoncture
économique défavorable.
41
What competition authorities in developing
countries can and should do in a period of
crisis: provisional measures
It is probable that a larger share of referrals than in the past will
come from struggling economic agents, and that these referrals will
be accompanied by requests for provisional measures.
Competition authorities will be inclined to ask themselves whether
they should change their benchmark for assessing the gravity or
immediacy of the danger that a potentially anticompetitive practice
poses to the referring parties, which are, in addition, weakened by
unfavourable economic conditions.
42
Conséquences pour les autorités de
concurrence: Contrôle de la
concentration
Il est vraisemblable, tout d’abord, que dans un nombre de
concentrations plus important que par le passé, les parties à
l’opération soutiendront que l’opération doit être autorisée par
application de la doctrine de l’entreprise défaillante. Or cette
défense n’a guère fait l’objet de réflexions approfondies par les
autorités de concurrence.
Par ailleurs, l’imposition de conditions structurelles en cas de
concentration anticoncurrentielle, qui impliquent le vente de
certains actifs, peut être difficile, voire impossible en raison de la
crise financière. L’allongement des délais pour que les parties
se séparent de certains actifs n’est pas, contrairement à ce qui
43
pourrait paraître à première vue, une solution facile à
What competition authorities in
developing countries can and should do
in a period of crisis: Merger control
It is likely that in a larger number of mergers than in the past, the
parties to the operation will argue that the operation should be
authorised, invoking the failing firm defence.
Moreover, the fulfillment of structural conditions imposed to allow
otherwise anticompetitive mergers, such as selling some assets in
order to reduce the market share of the merged firms or to allow
viable competitors to emerge, will be difficult if not impossible in a
situation of scarce credit and reduced investment.
44
Conséquences pour les autorités de
concurrence: Cartels
La tentation de partage de marché et de l’entente de prix est plus
forte en période de diminution significative de la demande, lorsque
chacune des entreprises sur le marché est menacée de faillite, qu’en
période d’expansion économique où elles peuvent toutes
simultanément développer leurs chiffres d’affaires.
Du point de vue de la dissuasion, la multiplication attendue du
nombre de cartels, au moins dans un premier temps, appelle une
révision de la politique de poursuite de ces pratiques. Les autorités
de concurrence pourront vouloir intensifier leurs efforts dans ce
domaine et diversifier leurs enquêtes pour maintenir la probabilité
de détection et de sanction des cartels à un niveau comparable
à
45
celui qui prévalait avant la crise.
What competition authorities in
developing countries can and should do
in a period of crisis: Cartels
The temptation of market sharing and price fixing is stronger in a
period of significantly reduced demand, when each firm in the
market is threatened by bankruptcy, than in a period of economic
expansion when all can increase their turnover simultaneously.
Competition authorities may want to step up their efforts in this
area and to diversify their investigations in order to maintain the
probability of detecting and sanctioning cartels at a level
comparable to that which prevailed before the crisis.
46
Conséquences pour les autorités de
concurrence: Relations verticales et abus de
domination
Les restrictions verticales ou les pratiques abusives d’entreprises
ayant une position dominante seront susceptibles d’avoir des effets
d’exclusion anticoncurrentiels plus importants que par le passé.
En effet, en cas de crise financière et économique, le marché du
crédit peine à financer des projets de diversification qui sont
porteurs d’intensification de la concurrence alors que les
dispensateurs de crédit ont une plus grande aversion au risque et
une moins grande visibilité de ce que sera le futur. De même, la
baisse très significative du commerce international est un facteur
d’affaiblissement de la concurrence.
47
What competition authorities in developing
countries can and should do in a period of
crisis: vertical restraints and abuse of
dominance
The anticompetitive effects of exclusion through vertical restraints,
or abuses of dominance by firms, are apt to be greater than in the
past. In a time of economic and financial crisis, the credit market
struggles to finance diversification projects – which have the
potential to intensify competition – while lenders have a greater
aversion to risk and less ability to predict what the future will
bring. Likewise, the very significant fall in international trade is a
factor undermining competition. We can therefore expect that the
number of cases in which such practices are deemed
anticompetitive will be higher than in the past.
48
Conclusion
Loin d’être affaiblies par la crise financière et économique, les
autorités de concurrence ont un rôle de conseil important à
jouer pour aider les gouvernements à adopter des mesures
permettant une reprise durable et rapide de la croissance.
Elles doivent également adapter la mise en œuvre du droit de
la concurrence au nouvel environnement économique sans
compromettre leurs objectifs.
49
Conclusion
Competition authorities have an important role to play
during the financial and economic crisis by helping
governements adopt measures which will allow a fast and
durable return to economic expansion.
They must also adapt their enforcement activities to the new
macroeconomic environment without compromising the goal
of protecting consumer surplus.
50