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The concept of projection in theories of phenomenal consciousness
Tjeerd Van de Laar
e-mail: [email protected]
Some time ago I got introduced to the philosophy of mind of Max Velmans1. At first I had a hard time
understanding his so called reflexive monism in which he combines an epistemological dualism with an
ontological (dual-aspect) monism. Soon I got quite enthousiastic about Velmans’ theory, especially
because it seemed to offer a promising way of thinking about phenomenal consciousness that respects our
common sense ideas about it2, while at the same time being consistent with the findings of science. Now
however, I have come to the point at which further research has tempered my enthousiasm about
Velmans’ work. What I am now trying to do is make a stand on several (in my view) crucial aspects of his
theory and try to decide which parts of the theory are useful and therefore should be retained and which
parts should be left behind.
One of those crucial aspects in Velmans’ theory is the concept of ‘projection’ on which I am now writing
an article. The idea of projection stems from the analogy with a projection hologram.3 According to
Velmans much of our phenomenal experiences are projected out there in the world.4 Think for example of
people with phantom limbs who experience pains or itches beyond their body surface at places where
their amputated arm or leg used to be. The pain or itch is not in the brain, but projected out there in the
world, to the phantom limb. Beside projection of pain Velmans discusses perceptual projection, projected
tactile sensations and projected auditory sensations.5 At first sight Velmans’ projection thesis seems very
sensible, but I think there are serious problems with the way Velmans uses the term. I would like to
present my article about these problems on this conference. In the following I will give a quick sketch of
what it is about.
The problem that I want to adress is twofold:
1. What does Velmans’ concept of projection amount to?
2. To what extent is the concept of projection useful in our research of phenomenal consciousness?
1
2
Max Velmans is currently Reader in Psychology at Goldsmiths College, University of London.
In other words, Velmans takes phenomenal consciousness seriously and does not try to ‘hide’ it behind
neurological processes.
3
See Velmans (2000), page 114.
4
See Velmans (2000), page 115: ‘[…] a given holographic image only exists for a given observer, and can only be said
to be located and extended where that observer perceives it to be. S’s [a subject looking at a cat] phenomenal cat is
similarly private and subjective. If she perceives it to be out in phenomenal space beyond the body surface, then,
from her perspective, it is out in phenomenal space beyond the body surface.’
5
See Velmans (2000), chapter 6.
1
My conclusion will be that Velmans’ use of the term ‘projection’ is ambiguous since reading Velmans’ work
seems at some instances to point at a strong sense of the term projection while other instances point at a
weak sense of the term. The distinction between projection in the strong sense en the weak I will call
‘projection as a black-or-white-thing’. Since neither projection in the strong sense nor projection in the
weak sense will satisfy Velmans account of the concept I will also try to formulate a third notion of
projection, which I will call ‘projection as an in-between-thing’. I will argue that the strong sense of the
term projection is unintelligible given our current scientific world picture, whereas projection as an inbetween-thing results in conceptual unclarity in ontological matters. Hence the conclusion will be that
Velmans should opt for projection in the weak sense. I will conclude that projection in the weak sense is
only to a very limited degree useful in our investigation of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of
projection does not yield better understanding of phenomenal consciousness; it does not really explain
anything.
My strategy will be as follows. First, I will give a short introduction into Velmans’ reflexive monism and
indicate what role is played in this theory by the concept of projection. Important categories in Velmans’
reflexive monism are the observer, the observed and the thing itself. I will argue that Velmans isn’t clear about the
reference of the observed which sometimes seems to refer to our phenomenal worlds and sometimes to the
thing itself. I will propose a solution by differentiating between looking and seeing.
Next, I will show that Velmans’ use of the term projection is ambiguous and I will try to clarify
the concept of projection by relating it to the way Hans Dooremalen uses it in his (2003). After this I will
be able to differentiate between a weak, a strong sense and an in-between-sense of projection. I will argue
that only the weak sense of projection6 is intelligible and hence that Velmans is forced to this concept of
projection. Unfortunately, it will turn out that this weak sense of projection is insufficient for Velmans to
uphold his critique of dualism and reductionism which is that ‘[…]they systematically misdescribe the
phenomenology of conscious experience.’ (Velmans 2000, 105)
In conclusion I will argue that projection7 is only to a very limited degree a useful concept for our
investigation of phenomenal consciousness.
References
 Dooremalen, H. (2003), Evolution’s Shorthand. A Presentational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.
 Ramachandran, V.S. & Hirstein W.S. (1998), ‘The perception of phantom limbs: the D.O. Hebb
lecture.’ Brain, nr. 121, vol. 9, page 1603-1630.
 Velmans, M. (2000), Understanding Consciousness, Routledge, London.
6
As Dooremalen uses it in his (2003), chapter 7.
7
In the weak sense, which is, in my view, the only intelligible construal of the term.
2