Metaphysical Dependence and Set Theory
... conception, in general, things that are members of sets do not metaphysically depend on the sets
that they are members of. When it comes to sets and their members, metaphysical dependence is
in most cases asymmetric.
The claim that sets metaphysically depend on their members may strike you as odd. I ...
just what is vagueness?
... definitions on offer. Most of these, however, presuppose some
kind of gappiness. For example, it is often claimed that a borderline case is one to which the predicate in question neither applies
nor does its complement. Notice that on this account, if a is a
borderline case of adult, say, then ‘a is ...
Reading the Identity of Dramatis Personae Through the
... the same time, in different historical periods and for related cognitive reasons,
the degree of accessibility varies. (Elam 107).
The semantics of possible worlds adheres to its principle that fictional
worlds are not reproductions or representations of the real (realia) but dominant
kingdoms of the ...
Pascal`s Wager is a Lie: An Epistemic Interpretation of the
... In entertaining and evaluating all of these objections scholars treat
the Wager as an isolated, mathematical proposition and subject it to the
logical and mathematical rigor associated with modern mathematics and
rationality. However, this is not how Pascal intended the passage to be
treated. As Jam ...
The Logic of Logical Revision
... the case that P,’ (P) to, ‘It is possible that it is not the case that P,’ (<>P) is
equivalent to saying that if it is not the case that for every possible world w, P is true in w,
then it is the case that there exists a world w, such that P is not true in w. But the form of
this inference (fro ...
Getting Priority Straight
... Priority theory opposes ontological radicals, who deny (MODESTY). Radicals reject (MODESTY) on the basis of a wide variety of disparate arguments.14
On the basis of one or another of these arguments, they think it would be better
if our ontology weren’t so crowded. For instance, some radicals sugges ...
A unified account of causal relata
... Secondly, just as there may be several definite descriptions standing for
the same physical object, so there may be several definite descriptions standing
for the same event. To take one of Davidson's early examples (1963, p.
4), my flipping the switch, my turning on the light, my illuminating the
Scepticism with regard to Reason* David Owen, University of
... demonstrative argument, not just that it might be unsound, but that it actually turns into a
probable argument. Fogelin (Fogelin 1993) argues that this is a consequence of Hume’s claim
that “knowledge degenerates into probability”. Against Hume, Fogelin argues that “the fact that
there may be some c ...
COMPOSITION, IDENTITY, AND EMERGENCE
... The three parts considered collectively are the kingdom, the kingdom
just is them2 . When he gives them away, he gives it away, as the Fool
actually seems to imply. McDaniel  argues against CAI on the
grounds that it is incompatible with emergent properties. The argument
has been criticized in ...
Two Interpretations of Two Stoic Conditionals
... and always will be the case that p materially implies q’. This omits
the fact that p D q should also include ‘and it has always been the
case that p materially implies q’. Prior has translated D(p ⊃ q);
however, as we have already remarked, the Diodorean conditional is
stronger than the necessitat ...
An Argument For A Neutral Free Logic
... The argument I consider appears in Vagueness (New York, Routledge, 1994): 188.
For example, Graham Priest mentions it in An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (New York, Cambridge, 2001):
Ruinous Arguments: Escalation of disagreement and the dangers of
... costs steadily increase as a function of argument duration: the more we argue, the more
resources we have to commit to it. The benefits of arguing, however, often do not have
the same dynamics. Take persuasion as a case in point: if I stand to gain something from
persuading you, whatever benefit I h ...
penultimate draft - U
... make these distinctions is to say that things are some way or another — to hang
different rubber bands on the pegs, as it were. But as an ontological pluralist, I
hold that thinking of reality as having a single ontological structure — a single
pegboard — is a mistake, as is thinking of ontological ...
Dennett and Phenomenology - Center for Subjectivity Research
... subjects’ expressed beliefs, and he argues that this maneuver amounts to a third-person version of Husserl’s
famous epoché (Dennett 2003, 22).
Why is the neutrality required? Dennett provides different reasons. Occasionally, he compares the
neutrality in question with the neutrality that is required ...
SI L56 (upload) - Amitabha Buddhist Centre
... The AMWS and the CMWS differ in what constitutes the object of
negation. Because of this difference, while the AMWS divides conventionalities into real conventionalities and unreal conventionalities,
the CMWS does not make such a distinction.
The Position of the AMWS
According to the AMWS, the objec ...
Persons in time - The Open University
... If this argument works, it excludes both the eirenic and the inclusive responses by
showing that not all facts are equally “deep”, and that the facts that are deepest are the ones that
the reductionist appeals to.
However, the argument does not work. One obvious problem with it is the almost
Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism
... Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the
mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986),
and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theor ...
Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt`s Agonistic
... actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process"
(Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the
heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient
Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public
exposure" (175-7 ...
The Evidence of the Senses
... Driving in Barn Façade County . . . I am directly aware of the barn, its location, the colour of
its roof, its approximate dimensions, and so on . . . Yet . . . I [don’t] know that there is a barn
up the road, of such-and-such approximate dimensions, and with such-and-such a colour
of roof . . . Dir ...
RETRANSMITTABILITY AND EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS
... sense experience and a proposition which is to count as genuine
knowledge must be derivable from basic or atomic propositions
whose truth is guaranteed by sense experience. Anti-justificationists, by contrast, do not attempt to give a precise and exact
definition of knowledge. Unlike justificationis ...
Intentional psychologism - California State University, Los Angeles
... responsible for its expressing the proposition it does. That is, I held that a thought’s
phenomenal content—viz., its intrinsic phenomenal features—determines its
intentional content—which proposition it expresses. (I did not attempt to explain
how phenomenal content determines propositional content ...
James Hill`s `Descartes` Dreaming Argument and why we might be
... Thomas Hobbes thought that one distinguishing mark of dreams was the absence of a
sense of the absurd. In dreaming, he claimed, we take in all kinds of bizarre
happenings without batting an eyelid. It does not occur to us that what we are
experiencing is so crazy that it can only be an illusion. In ...
Reid`s defense of common sense - Scholars Archive
... Understood in this way, Reid’s position is that common sense is justified because it reliably leads to true belief. Common sense would be
justified regardless of whether or why we accepted it, but there is this
further question: Why should we believe that common sense is justified? It is justified i ...
Jani Hakkarainen. Hume`s Scepticism and Realism: His Two
... belief that its food is in the bag; the ostrich that hides its head when it does not
want to be seen is not a Relativist about perception.
If a “two Hume” view is to present us with an account that makes him a
consistent thinker, the “everyday” Hume (anti-skeptical on both Hakkarainen’s
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience. For example, a philosophical zombie could be poked with a sharp object, and not feel any pain sensation, but yet, behave exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ""ouch"" and recoil from the stimulus, or say that it is in intense pain).The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in thought experiments intended to support arguments (often called ""zombie arguments"") against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. Physicalism is the idea that all aspects of human nature can be explained by physical means: specifically, all aspects of human nature and perception can be explained from a neurobiological standpoint. Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, argue that since a zombie is defined as physiologically indistinguishable from human beings, even its logical possibility would be a sound refutation of physicalism. However, physicalists like Daniel Dennett counter that Chalmers's physiological zombies are logically incoherent and thus impossible.