The Relevance of Kant's Objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument
... Call property F and property G equivalent iff it is impossible for there to exist an object to which one of F or G, but not the other, applies (Plantinga (1974a), 97). Examples of equivalent properties (if they are indeed distinct properties – we can ignore this question here) are triangularity and t ...
... Call property F and property G equivalent iff it is impossible for there to exist an object to which one of F or G, but not the other, applies (Plantinga (1974a), 97). Examples of equivalent properties (if they are indeed distinct properties – we can ignore this question here) are triangularity and t ...
Moral Supervenience - University of Hull
... The principle is quite weak; it says that we cannot infer that somethinghas a certain moral property from the fact that it has a natural property, even if it is a maximal or total relevant natural property. There will always be an “open question” as to whether it really had the moral property; one c ...
... The principle is quite weak; it says that we cannot infer that somethinghas a certain moral property from the fact that it has a natural property, even if it is a maximal or total relevant natural property. There will always be an “open question” as to whether it really had the moral property; one c ...
Modality Without Possible Worlds
... Of the constructions in which extensionality fails, such as psychological verbs and modals, the least problematic is quotation. In quotation, it is clear that one is talking about words as opposed to what words designate. Thus, of course, it is not substitution of co-referential terms when one subst ...
... Of the constructions in which extensionality fails, such as psychological verbs and modals, the least problematic is quotation. In quotation, it is clear that one is talking about words as opposed to what words designate. Thus, of course, it is not substitution of co-referential terms when one subst ...
reply to JJ Valberg - Keele Research Repository
... phenomenal conception, since it applies to phenomena, can only apply to the sole repository of phenomena: the objective world. Thus in his definitive exposition, he says: ‘The point is not (of course) to deny that there are states, events, processes, etc., that occur or go on “in us” (in our brains ...
... phenomenal conception, since it applies to phenomena, can only apply to the sole repository of phenomena: the objective world. Thus in his definitive exposition, he says: ‘The point is not (of course) to deny that there are states, events, processes, etc., that occur or go on “in us” (in our brains ...
EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
... inconsistent with some theory T, Currie says: But if Popper’s view of the relation between experience and the acceptance and rejection of basic statements is that the relation is wholly causal (and that is what he says) the following is a consequence of his view. …The question of whether it is ratio ...
... inconsistent with some theory T, Currie says: But if Popper’s view of the relation between experience and the acceptance and rejection of basic statements is that the relation is wholly causal (and that is what he says) the following is a consequence of his view. …The question of whether it is ratio ...
"Meat Thinks" Talk Notes
... private conscious self (feelings, emotions, intentions, thoughts) is forever private, since everything is either res extensa or res cogitans and never both. No one can ever feel your pain, for example. And epistemologically, the notion of “opinion” – subject to change and improvement – goes with res ...
... private conscious self (feelings, emotions, intentions, thoughts) is forever private, since everything is either res extensa or res cogitans and never both. No one can ever feel your pain, for example. And epistemologically, the notion of “opinion” – subject to change and improvement – goes with res ...
A Defense of Epiphenomenalism
... while C´ would be mind or consciousness. The known microscopic events like action potentials, neural connections, and synaptic transductions are relating A´ and B´, not C´ and B´. We do not know the connection between B´ and C´ yet; epiphenomenalism insists that C´ is an epiphenomenon of A´, while o ...
... while C´ would be mind or consciousness. The known microscopic events like action potentials, neural connections, and synaptic transductions are relating A´ and B´, not C´ and B´. We do not know the connection between B´ and C´ yet; epiphenomenalism insists that C´ is an epiphenomenon of A´, while o ...
The Hollow of Being. What can we learn from Maurice Merleau
... with consciousness, for instance the discrimination of stimuli, the integration of information, attentional states, and the deliberate control of behavior. Chalmers calls these the easy problems, because even though our current understanding of these phenomena may be deficient in many ways, for all o ...
... with consciousness, for instance the discrimination of stimuli, the integration of information, attentional states, and the deliberate control of behavior. Chalmers calls these the easy problems, because even though our current understanding of these phenomena may be deficient in many ways, for all o ...
Explanations of Meaningful Actions
... be more or less dissimilar, but for my argument to hold, it suffices if just one standpoint exists from which such a similarity among nexuses of meaning can be shown. This argument can be best illustrated, I think, with Grünbaum’s engaging example in the following quotation: ...
... be more or less dissimilar, but for my argument to hold, it suffices if just one standpoint exists from which such a similarity among nexuses of meaning can be shown. This argument can be best illustrated, I think, with Grünbaum’s engaging example in the following quotation: ...
Instrumentalism, Semi-Realism and Causality
... Daniel Dennett has developed a theory about intentional states which avoids the threats of eliminativism. According to him the main purpose of intentional states is to predict the behaviour of complex systems. Mental States have an objective reality to be seen in patterns of behaviour but do not hav ...
... Daniel Dennett has developed a theory about intentional states which avoids the threats of eliminativism. According to him the main purpose of intentional states is to predict the behaviour of complex systems. Mental States have an objective reality to be seen in patterns of behaviour but do not hav ...
nothingness.plato.stanford.edu
... worlds is as likely as any other. There have been metaphysical systems that favor less populated worlds Gottfried Leibniz pictured possible things as competing to become actual. The more a thing competes with other things, the more likely that there will be something that stops it from becoming real ...
... worlds is as likely as any other. There have been metaphysical systems that favor less populated worlds Gottfried Leibniz pictured possible things as competing to become actual. The more a thing competes with other things, the more likely that there will be something that stops it from becoming real ...
Intentionality
... Sometimes the name ‘Brentano’s thesis’ is given to certain other views too: for example, to the view that nothing physical is intentional. See Field, ‘Mental Representation’. This view are, however, distinct from the view that all mental phenomena are intentional. For that all mental phenomena are i ...
... Sometimes the name ‘Brentano’s thesis’ is given to certain other views too: for example, to the view that nothing physical is intentional. See Field, ‘Mental Representation’. This view are, however, distinct from the view that all mental phenomena are intentional. For that all mental phenomena are i ...
- Philsci
... reflection, the possibility that I could be infallible in everything I’m inclined to say about my ongoing consciousness – even barring purely linguistic errors, and even assuming I’m being diligent and cautious and restricting myself to simple, purely phenomenal claims arrived at (as far as I can te ...
... reflection, the possibility that I could be infallible in everything I’m inclined to say about my ongoing consciousness – even barring purely linguistic errors, and even assuming I’m being diligent and cautious and restricting myself to simple, purely phenomenal claims arrived at (as far as I can te ...
Précis of Propositions - SHANTI Pages
... that essentially represents things as being a certain way. That is it. This simple account is supported by arguments earlier in this book for the conclusion that propositions really do exist necessarily and really do essentially represent things as being a certain way. And this account is supported ...
... that essentially represents things as being a certain way. That is it. This simple account is supported by arguments earlier in this book for the conclusion that propositions really do exist necessarily and really do essentially represent things as being a certain way. And this account is supported ...
Van de Laar, Tjeerd
... theory and try to decide which parts of the theory are useful and therefore should be retained and which parts should be left behind. One of those crucial aspects in Velmans’ theory is the concept of ‘projection’ on which I am now writing an article. The idea of projection stems from the analogy wit ...
... theory and try to decide which parts of the theory are useful and therefore should be retained and which parts should be left behind. One of those crucial aspects in Velmans’ theory is the concept of ‘projection’ on which I am now writing an article. The idea of projection stems from the analogy wit ...
Against the Idols of the Age
... does she believe that it is cognitively limiting? Why, for no reason in the world, except this one: that it is ours. Everyone really understands, too, that this is the only reason. But since this reason is also generally accepted as a sufficient one, no other is felt to be needed . . . Characteristi ...
... does she believe that it is cognitively limiting? Why, for no reason in the world, except this one: that it is ours. Everyone really understands, too, that this is the only reason. But since this reason is also generally accepted as a sufficient one, no other is felt to be needed . . . Characteristi ...
Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does
... that have been central to debates over the nature of phenomenal consciousness (Haslam et al. 2008; Sytsma and Machery, 2009). Moreover, the classification scheme reported by Gray et al. (2007) treats ‘desire’ as an experiential state while many of the philosophers who are party to these disputes oft ...
... that have been central to debates over the nature of phenomenal consciousness (Haslam et al. 2008; Sytsma and Machery, 2009). Moreover, the classification scheme reported by Gray et al. (2007) treats ‘desire’ as an experiential state while many of the philosophers who are party to these disputes oft ...
Paper titles and abstracts Dan Arnold: "Perception and the
... precisely contrary thesis about the priority of language, that linguistic and conceptual ability pervades perceptual experience. Even a person who is absorbed in walking across a meadow, he says, and I will return to his example in the next section, will be sufficiently aware of the grass and the cl ...
... precisely contrary thesis about the priority of language, that linguistic and conceptual ability pervades perceptual experience. Even a person who is absorbed in walking across a meadow, he says, and I will return to his example in the next section, will be sufficiently aware of the grass and the cl ...
Postscript - Shamik Dasgupta
... idler, yet the consensus is that the cost is worth it. Analogously, if I need extra logical primitives to dispense with other idlers, I’ll take them. Are the cases really analogous? It seems so to me, but there is room to disagree and no room to make my case. So I’ll finish by emphasizing how much i ...
... idler, yet the consensus is that the cost is worth it. Analogously, if I need extra logical primitives to dispense with other idlers, I’ll take them. Are the cases really analogous? It seems so to me, but there is room to disagree and no room to make my case. So I’ll finish by emphasizing how much i ...
Memento`s Revenge: The Extended Mind
... “YOU know? What do YOU know. YOU don’t know anything. In 10 minutes time YOU won’t even know you had this conversation” Leonard, however, believes that he does, day by day, come to know new things. But only courtesy of those photos, tattoos, tricks and ploys. Who is right? ...
... “YOU know? What do YOU know. YOU don’t know anything. In 10 minutes time YOU won’t even know you had this conversation” Leonard, however, believes that he does, day by day, come to know new things. But only courtesy of those photos, tattoos, tricks and ploys. Who is right? ...
The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism
... things different from x only if x has had interactions with things different from x. Thus (4) if x has a first-person perspective, then x has had interactions with things different from x. Baker represents (3) as the critical premise. The rationale for it is entirely naturalistic: any viable theory ...
... things different from x only if x has had interactions with things different from x. Thus (4) if x has a first-person perspective, then x has had interactions with things different from x. Baker represents (3) as the critical premise. The rationale for it is entirely naturalistic: any viable theory ...
Kant`s Critique of the Ontological Argument: FAIL
... existence is not a predicate or a property in the case of God. 10 According to Kant, the notion of existence adds nothing to the concept of a thing by way of increased meaning or information. Thus, the substantive content of my concept of a hundred thalers (which I am imagining to exist in my pocket ...
... existence is not a predicate or a property in the case of God. 10 According to Kant, the notion of existence adds nothing to the concept of a thing by way of increased meaning or information. Thus, the substantive content of my concept of a hundred thalers (which I am imagining to exist in my pocket ...
John Francis Nieto - Thomas Aquinas College
... qualities and quantities, can never grasp the nature of a substance. Another power, the intellect, must do this. For these differences in the. objects demand a corresponding difference in the powers that know them. This difference, according to perennial philosophy, is nothing other than the differe ...
... qualities and quantities, can never grasp the nature of a substance. Another power, the intellect, must do this. For these differences in the. objects demand a corresponding difference in the powers that know them. This difference, according to perennial philosophy, is nothing other than the differe ...
Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism, and Possible Worlds
... of certain sets. (Since in many contexts we do not take possible-worlds talk literally, it can be hard to hear this reading of (7).) That’s what (7) says; and what (7) says is false on this theory of possible worlds. Two sets that contain all the same qualitative sentences may fail to be qualitative ...
... of certain sets. (Since in many contexts we do not take possible-worlds talk literally, it can be hard to hear this reading of (7).) That’s what (7) says; and what (7) says is false on this theory of possible worlds. Two sets that contain all the same qualitative sentences may fail to be qualitative ...
Why ethics is hard: or some of the reasons why
... when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on.… What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and o ...
... when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on.… What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and o ...