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Extended Essay: History
Strategic Value of the Confederate Ironclad Virginia in the American Civil War
Minnie Mouse
Candidate Number 001796-000
Supervisor: Mr. Ezekiel Mouse
International School of Latvia
May 2013 Session
Word Count: 3412
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Abstract
The Confederacy’s first ironclad, the Virginia, was built to compensate for the
Confederacy’s lack of a navy. During the American Civil War, both the Union and
Confederate governments considered the Virginia as a dangerous machine of war that
was capable of drastically affecting the course of the war. However, modern
interpretations suggest that the Virginia‘s impact on the American Civil War was
negligible. In order to study the Virginia‘s significance to the war in an in-depth
manner, this essay will examine the question: to what extent did the
ironclad Virginia benefit the Confederacy by achieving strategic goals?
Answering this question requires a thorough examination of the Confederacy’s
vital strategic goals: the destruction of the Union blockade, the collapse of the
Peninsular Campaign and the defence of the naval shipyard at Norfolk. Primary
sources, such as the United States government’s official records of the war, are used
to discover how the Virginia was originally perceived during wartime. Moreover,
secondary sources are examined critically to study interpretations about the Virginia‘s
strategic role. The research focuses primarily on the Virginia‘s operational phase
during the year of 1862, which includes the historically significant Battle of Hampton
Roads.
Thorough analysis and evaluation of the strategic goals mentioned previously
shows that the Virginia was unable to accomplish any of the goals outlined to any
satisfactory extent. The Union blockade was not broken, the Peninsular Campaign
still happened, and Norfolk was surrendered to the Union. Although the ironclad
attempted to accomplish the aforementioned strategic goals, she was continually
thwarted by the Union and rendered ineffective. The unsatisfactory performance of
the Virginia allowed the Union to maintain its naval advantage, which continued to
affect the Confederate war effort adversely. In essence, the ironclad was of negligible
strategic value to the Confederacy.
Word Count: 293
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Table of Contents
Abstract.................................................................................................................. 2
1. Introduction........................................................................................................ 4
2. The Blockade..................................................................................................... 5
2.1 The Battle of Hampton Roads.............................................................. 6
2.2 Strategic Analysis................................................................................. 8
3. The Peninsular Campaign................................................................................ 10
4. The Defence of Norfolk....................................................................................12
5. Conclusion.........................................................................................................14
Works Cited...........................................................................................................16
Appendix 1 – Map of the Area Around Hampton Roads......................................18
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1. Introduction
On April 12th, 1861, the American Civil War began when Confederate forces
fired on Fort Sumter. This war would eventually produce “more carnage than any
other war in American history, before or since” (Brinkley 399). In this bloody
conflict, the sea soon became a contested area, primarily because the Union quickly
blockaded Confederate ports. However, both the United States of America and the
Confederate States of America struggled to create wartime navies at the beginning of
the conflict. The Union Navy had only twelve vessels available for immediate use,
whereas the Confederacy had virtually none (Commager 796). To combat this
disadvantage, Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory developed an
audacious plan.
His radical plan involved the construction of powerful armoured warships,
known as ironclads. Soon after Fort Sumter, he wrote:
I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first
necessity. Such a vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the
United States, prevent all blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of
success, their entire navy . . . But inequality of numbers may be
compensated by invulnerability; and thus not only does economy but
naval success dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron
against wood. (qtd. in Beringer 145-46)
Mallory believed that it would be a strategic move to build a small fleet of
ironclads instead of a navy of wooden ships because of the invulnerable nature of the
ironclad. Shortly after Mallory’s remarks, the Confederates enacted this plan by
converting the Merrimack, a captured Union vessel, into the ironclad Virginia at the
Gosport Navy Yard in Norfolk, Virginia (“Lincoln and His Admirals” 132).
The Virginia was evidently a critical naval strategic asset for the Confederate war
effort, and thus had many expectations. These expectations naturally took the form of
important Confederate strategic goals. This leads to the question: to what extent did
the ironclad Virginia benefit the Confederacy by achieving strategic goals?
Although she was a remarkable vessel, the Virginia was ultimately
unsuccessful in her quest to benefit the Confederacy strategically. She failed to
achieve three vital strategic goals: the destruction of the suffocating Union blockade,
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the suspension of McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign, and the defence of the Gosport
Navy Yard at Norfolk. Despite her efforts, the blockade fleet still remained at
Hampton Roads, McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign still occurred, and the Union still
managed to capture the shipyard at Norfolk. In essence, this ironclad was unable to
make any significant difference in the war. Because she was unable to achieve the
aforementioned strategic goals, the Virginia was of little strategic use to the
Confederacy.
2. The Blockade
The destruction of the blockade quickly became a vital strategic goal for the
Confederacy. The Union Navy’s blockade of Confederate ports had the potential to
devastate the Confederate war effort. During the spring of 1861, General-in-Chief
Winfield Scott developed a plan to slowly suffocate the Confederate States through a
naval blockade, which would later be known as the “Anaconda Plan” (J. McPherson
334). On April 19th, 1861, one week after Fort Sumter, the Anaconda Plan was
partially adopted by the Union when President Abraham Lincoln officially blockaded
all ports in the Confederate States (E. McPherson 149). This theoretically prevented
the Confederacy from importing or exporting any goods, which allowed the Union to
exploit its advantage in industrialization.
The South was far behind the North in terms of industrialization. In terms of
manufacturing establishments, the South possessed a mere 18,026, while New York
State alone possessed 23,236 (Blair 25). The Union factories were also more efficient
than their Confederate counterparts; the factories in New York State alone produced
about four times more manufactured products than the entire Confederacy (Paludan
105). The disparity between Union and Confederate factories in terms of quantities
and efficiency naturally limited the amount of weapons that the South could produce.
One county in Connecticut, for example, produced more firearms than the entire
Confederacy (Paludan 105). Compared to the North, the South evidently lacked the
necessary infrastructure to conduct warfare in an effective manner. Therefore, the
Confederacy needed to trade with foreign countries to counter the Union advantage in
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industrialization. Hence the destruction of the blockade was a vital objective for the
South.
In order to achieve this goal, the Confederacy turned to the Virginia. As
mentioned in the introduction, Secretary Mallory believed that an ironclad could
“prevent all blockades” (qtd. in Beringer 145-46). To accomplish this goal,
the Virginia started by attacking the Union blockade fleet at Hampton Roads, which
was fairly close to the Virginia‘s home base at Norfolk (see Appendix 1 for a map). In
essence, Hampton Roads was a trial for the Virginia, since the outcome of the battle
would demonstrate the power of ironclad ships. Despite Secretary Mallory’s faith in
ironclad ships, the Virginia failed to achieve the strategic goal of the destruction of
the blockade; she did not succeed at the Battle of Hampton Roads.
2.1 The Battle of Hampton Roads
Hampton Roads was home to a Union blockade fleet (Simpson 58), which
made it extremely attractive for the Virginia to attack. Before the Virginia steamed
towards Hampton Roads, Captain Franklin Buchanan sent a message to Secretary
Mallory that read:
“I contemplate leaving here to appear before the Enemy’s Ships . . . I feel
confident that the acts of theVirginia will give proof of the desire of her
officers and crew to meet the views of the Department as far as
practicable.” (qtd. in Konstam 137)
Evidently, the goal of the Virginia‘s attack on the ships at Hampton Roads was
to demonstrate her potential by destroying the Union blockade fleet there, which
would meet the expectations of the Department of the Navy. Although
the Virginia initially experienced success at the Battle of Hampton Roads, she was
ultimately unable to achieve the strategic goal of the destruction of the blockade; the
strategic situation remained unchanged in the end.
On March 8th, 1862, the Virginia steamed towards the Union fleet anchored in
Hampton Roads. A telegram from John Wool, a Union general in the region, to
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton succinctly described the grim events of that day:
The Merrimack [the Union designation for the Virginia] came down from Norfolk today, and about 2 o’clock attacked the Cumberland and Congress. She sunk
the Cumberland, and the Congress surrendered. The Minnesota is aground and
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attacked . . . the St. Lawrence just arrived and going to assist . . . Probably both will be
taken . . . It is thought the Merrimack . . . will pass the fort to-night.
(“Official Records” 4-5)
Although the telegram presents the battle from a Northerner’s perspective, the
telegram appears to be fairly objective. The facts of the battle are presented in a
relatively neutral fashion, which makes it an intriguing piece of historical evidence in
the aftermath of such violence, especially since it was among the first telegrams sent
to the Union government in regards to the devastation at Hampton Roads.
As illustrated by the telegram, the situation was evidently grim: the Virginia routed
Union forces at Hampton Roads on this day. However, the telegram mentions that
the Minnesota was only aground, and not destroyed. Thus, the Virginia would have to
return on the following day to complete her destruction of the Union blockade fleet
stationed at Hampton Roads. Overall, the day appeared to have ended on a strongly
positive note for the Confederacy; the Virginia was one step away from destroying the
Union blockade.
Moreover, the Virginia was barely damaged, which reinforces Secretary
Mallory’s claims that ironclads were invulnerable. Despite the intense battle that had
happened at Hampton Roads, shots fired from Union ships and shore batteries
rebounded “from her iron sides as if they had been of india (sic) rubber” (Rhodes
112). Thus, Secretary Mallory’s dream of ironclads destroying the Union fleet
appeared to be coming true. In fact, only crew exhaustion and the falling tide
prevented the Virginia from finishing off the Minnesota on that day (“Decision at
Sea” 117). The Virginia was ostensibly close to achieving her strategic goal of
decimating the Union blockade at Hampton Roads.
However, the Union also had an ironclad, which had the potential to counter
the Confederacy’s perceived advantage in the aftermath of Hampton Roads.
The Monitor arrived at Hampton Roads around 11 P.M. (Commager 806), just in time
to see the Congress explode (“Decision at Sea” 117). The Union ironclad would
undoubtedly serve to protect the Minnesota and the remaining remnants of the Union
fleet from theVirginia, because the Union could not afford to let the Confederacy
seize a massive strategic victory by annihilating an entire Union blockade base.
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On the following morning, the Virginia returned to Hampton Roads to finish her
mission. She soon found the “queer-looking Monitor guarding the stranded frigate
[Minnesota]” (qtd. in Scharf 167). Despite the presence of the Monitor,
the Virginia still intended to destroy the Minnesota. However, neither ironclad was
able to inflict serious damage on the other. Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon
Welles received the following telegram from his subordinate, G.V. Fox, which
describes the battle in a concise manner:
The Monitor met them at once and opened her fire, when all the enemy’s
vessels retired, excepting theMerrimack. These two ironclad vessels fought part of the
time touching each other, from 8 a.m. to noon, when the Merrimack retired. Whether
she is injured or not it is impossible to say . . . TheMinnesota kept up a continuous fire
and is herself somewhat injured.
She was moved considerably to-day, and will probably be off to-night.
The Monitor is uninjured and ready at any moment to repel another attack.
(“Official Records” 6)
Like the previous telegram, this one is also from a Union perspective, and is
also included in the U.S. government’s official records of the war. However, this
telegram also appears to be a valid historical resource, since the facts given are
consistent with facts mentioned in secondary sources, such as the bookDuel of the
Ironclads. The historical significance of the second day of the Battle of Hampton
Roads is the shattered image of the Virginia’s invulnerability, which casts doubt on
the strategic effectiveness of the ironclad.
In the end, the tactical picture was fairly impressive. The Virginia managed to
destroy the USS Cumberlandand USS Congress, damage the USS Minnesota, and
inflict an estimated 409 Union casualties, according to the Battle Summary page by
the American Battlefield Protection Program. With these losses in mind, the
Virginia remained the cause for the worst day in the history of the United States Navy
until Pearl Harbor in 1941 (qtd. in Holzer and Mulligan 147). However, tactical
success did not necessarily translate into strategic success, since the Union retained
control of the region.
2.2 Strategic Analysis
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The strategic picture was relatively unchanged after the battle.
The Virginia was unable to complete her destruction of the blockade fleet, since
the Minnesota still remained at Hampton Roads, and the arrival of
the Monitor essentially replaced the tactical role of the two Union warships that were
sunk on March 8th. Essentially, the Virginia was unable to destroy the Union blockade
fleet at this important Union base, which meant that she was unable to achieve her
strategic goal. However, there is another historical interpretation of the events that
transpired during this battle.
E. Merton Coulter, Professor of History at the University of Virginia, asserts
that “the Confederacy gained potential control of [Hampton Roads and the
surrounding] Bay and even theoretical control of the high seas” because
the Virginia was “impervious to the most terrific punishment the Federal wooden
ships could inflict” (306). This interpretation appears to exaggerate some aspects of
the Virginia‘s capabilities. For instance, it claims that one ship—the Virginia—
controlled the area around Hampton Roads because it was essentially invulnerable.
However, this interpretation fails to account for the innate weaknesses of theVirginia.
Lieutenant Jones, a member of the crew, wrote about the Virginia‘s condition prior to
battle:
The lower part of her shield forward was only immersed a few inches instead
of two feet as intended, and there was but one inch of iron on the (lower) hull . . .
The Virginia was unseaworthy; her engines were unreliable, and her draft, over 22
feet, prevented her from going to Washington . . . (qtd. in Konstam 139)
The Virginia was clearly not suited for battle, much less controlling the high seas.
This casts further doubt on the Virginia’s ability to achieve strategic goals. Thus,
Coulter’s interpretation is rather limited for this battle.
In essence, the Virginia was unable to accomplish the strategic goal of
destroying the Union blockade. She attempted to accomplish this goal by attacking
the Union fleet stationed at Hampton Roads, but her attempt ultimately ended in
failure—the Union blockade fleet was still stationed at Hampton Roads when
the Virginia departed. Furthermore, her innate weaknesses, such as her deep draft,
essentially restricted her to Hampton Roads, preventing her from attacking the Union
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blockade at different locations. Therefore, the Virginia was unable to benefit the
Confederacy in this regard.
3. The Peninsular Campaign
Besides the blockade, the Union had another major strategic plan: the Peninsular
Campaign. Led by General George B. McClellan, this plan proposed the capture of
Richmond by moving up the Virginia Peninsula (Linedecker 199). Thus, the
Confederates needed to interfere with this campaign.
Richmond, the Confederate capital, was an important Confederate industrial
city. Important Confederate war industries were established in Richmond, including
the famous Tredegar Iron Works. According to “A Guide to the Tredegar Iron Works
Records” by the University of Virginia, Tredegar was “virtually the sole source of
heavy guns, projectiles, gun carriages . . . wheels and axles for railroad rolling stock,
furnace machinery, and a variety of other products for Confederate munitions
factories and navy yards.” Moreover, this was the same industrial establishment that
produced iron plating for the Virginia since it was the closest foundry to Norfolk. If it
were captured by the Union, the Confederacy would face a weapons production
dilemma and Secretary Mallory’s hopes of creating a small ironclad fleet would be
dashed. Therefore, the protection of Richmond became a strategic objective because
of the city’s industrial and political importance. By extension, the suspension of the
Peninsular Campaign became a strategic goal of the Confederacy.
The principal means by which the Virginia interfered with this campaign was
through intimidation. Lincoln’s government was too focused on the destruction that
had happened on March 8th after General Wool’s telegram arrived on March 9th; in
response to that telegram, President Lincoln met with Secretary of War Stanton,
Secretary of the Navy Welles, Secretary of State William H. Seward, General
McClellan and others in the President’s office (Davis 113). Lincoln’s secretary noted
that Stanton was “fearfully stampeded. He said they would capture our fleet, take Ft.
Monroe, [and] be in Washington before night” (qtd. in Thomas 179). He went on to
say that the Virginia would “destroy every vessel in the service . . . disperse Congress,
destroy the Capitol and public buildings” (qtd. in “Lincoln and His Admirals” 137).
Even President Lincoln occasionally glanced outside, as if he were expecting
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the Virginia to attack Washington at any moment (Davis 133). This clearly highlights
the psychological effect of the Virginia on the upper echelon of the Union
government; these men believed that the Virginia could essentially change the
strategic picture of the war.
Their continued fear of the Virginia is reinforced by the fact that Secretary
Welles sent every usable ship to Hampton Roads to transport the Army of the
Potomac down to Virginia, including ships designed to ram the Virginia (Tucker 175).
It is interesting to note that the expedition occurred when the Virginia was undergoing
repairs. Tucker also notes that McClellan requested that Flag Officer Goldsborough
use his warships at Hampton Roads to attack Confederate defences, but naturally he
declined: the Virginia could make an appearance at any time, and weakening his force
would put his other ships in danger (176). Clearly, the Virginia‘s mere presence in the
area negatively impacted the Union campaign.
However, the strategy of intimidation could not last forever. On April 11,
1862, the Virginia was finally ready for battle after spending weeks in dry dock for
repairs, and Mallory ordered the Virginia to interfere with the Peninsular Campaign
by attacking Union transport ships (Tucker 176). Once again, the Virginiasteamed
towards Hampton Roads. This time, Union forces did not challenge
the Virginia because it could jeopardize the Peninsular Campaign. If
the Virginia gained control of the area, then the Union’s Army of the Potomac would
be cut off from its primary supply line. The Union therefore shifted to a strategy of
avoidance because the North could not afford to lose valuable ships to the Virginia,
such as the Monitor. This strategy essentially neutralized the Virginia.
The Virginia had an average speed of 5 knots (Konstam 48), which meant that
virtually any Union ship in the region could outrun her. Furthermore, she could not
attack ships that were under the protection of the guns at the local fort, such as
the Monitor (Tucker 176). In fact, a crewman on the Monitor stated that “I believe the
Department [of the Navy] is going to build us a big glass case to put us in for fear of
harm coming to us” (Konstam 182). By altering its strategy, the Union effectively
prevented the Virginia from achieving the strategic goal of interrupting the Peninsular
Campaign.
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Since the Virginia was unable to attack any ship, she was therefore unable to
interfere with the Peninsular Campaign. Therefore, there was very little for
the Virginia to do, since she failed to break the blockade and delay the Peninsular
Campaign. There was only one vital strategic goal remaining: the defence of Norfolk.
4. The Defence of Norfolk
Throughout this tumultuous time period, the city of Norfolk was home to one
of the Confederacy’s most valuable naval assets: the Gosport Navy Yard. Besides its
role as the Virginia‘s home port, Norfolk was also important to the Confederacy in
other ways. The shipyard was the one of the largest naval construction and repair
facilities in the entire country (J. McPherson 279). It was located close to the
industrial centre of Richmond, which allowed quick transport of manufactured goods
from Richmond to the shipyard. Furthermore, Gosport was one of only two shipyards
located in the entire Confederacy; the other being New Orleans (Konstam 2). If
Norfolk fell, then the Confederates would not have a major shipyard along their entire
Atlantic coastline. Norfolk was clearly an important part of the Confederate war
effort, and needed to be defended. Thus, the defence of Norfolk was an important
strategic goal for the Confederacy. To this end, the Confederates enlisted
the Virginia as a part of their defence plan, but she failed to defend the ship yard from
being captured by the Union.
During the spring of 1862, the Peninsular Campaign did not make significant
progress, as previously mentioned. McClellan managed to land his troops on
Confederate soil while the Virginia was being repaired, but he was held up at
Yorktown. From Lincoln’s view point, the Union had forgotten about the menace that
was the Virginia (Oates 326). The only logical way to defeat the Virginia with
minimal direct contact would be to attack the city of Norfolk, which, as mentioned
above, contained the Gosport Navy Yard. Capturing the shipyard would deprive the
ironclad of a home. However, the Virginia was unable to prevent this disaster for the
Confederacy.
The Virginia had the potential to stop an attack. When Union forces began to
attack locations near Norfolk not long after the Battle of Hampton Roads, the mere
appearance of the Virginia caused the U.S. fleet attacking Sewell’s point (see
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Appendix 1 for map of area) to move away quickly (“Lincoln and His Admirals”
151). This is another clear example of the Virginia‘s psychological capability. While
defending Norfolk, theVirginia‘s psychological effect had more power than it did
during her attempt to thwart McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign; the Union could not
simply run away if it wanted to attack Norfolk. Thus, theVirginia had the ability to
defend the city of Norfolk from a naval assault through her psychological effect.
At around the same time, McClellan began to march up the Virginia Peninsula, and
engaged Confederate forces at Yorktown. After being surrounded by an
overwhelming number of Union troops, Confederate forces were strategically
redeployed to Richmond on May 4th; this left Norfolk isolated (Oates 326). President
Lincoln decided to visit the front lines and found out that no one had tried to attack
Norfolk, home of the infamous ironclad. With this in mind, he soon led an
amphibious assault on Norfolk, which was not obstructed in any shape by
the Virginia. In fact, there was no Confederate response to the beach landing.
Evidently, the Virginia, with all her potential, did not stop the Union force.
According to Professor Craig L. Symonds of the U.S. Naval Academy, the lack of
response was due to a simple reason: the Confederates “had planned to abandon
Norfolk in any case once the Confederate army had evacuated the Yorktown line”
(“Lincoln and His Admirals” 155). This interpretation highlights the idea that the
Confederates decided that the Virginia was ultimately less powerful than the
Confederate Army. This illustrates the Virginia‘s slow decline; she was originally
designed as a major strategic weapon, but by May 1862, she was just another ship that
could not even defend her home. Thus, Symonds’ interpretation of the events at
Norfolk appears to have merit.
In essence, the Virginia theoretically had the capability to defend Norfolk, but
she was ultimately disregarded. This line of thought likely stemmed from her inability
to break the blockade and delay McClellan’s campaign. Therefore, the Virginia‘s past
ineffectiveness prevented the Confederates from considering her as an integral part of
Norfolk’s defence, which prevented her from achieving this strategic goal. Granted,
the odds of an overland attack were extremely high, but the Virginia may have had the
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potential to assist Norfolk. In the end, she failed to accomplish any of her strategic
goals.
5. Conclusion
The story of the Virginia is indeed a most riveting one. Her journey began at a
captured Union shipyard in Norfolk, and this journey reached its climax at the
engrossing Battle of Hampton Roads. However, her adventure came to an end when
she was destroyed by Confederate troops after the fall of Norfolk.
At one point, Secretary Mallory considered her to be a powerful strategic weapon. He
claimed that after she attacked New York City, “peace would inevitably follow.
Bankers would withdraw their capital from the city. The Brooklyn navy yard and its
magazines and all the lower part of the city would be destroyed, and such an event, by
a single ship, would do more to achieve our immediate independence than would the
results of many campaigns” (Davis 78). This quote illustrates the Virginia‘s initial
expectations.
However, she ultimately failed to accomplish any of the strategic goals
outlined in the introduction. Each of these goals was of vital importance to the
Confederacy. She initially attacked the Union fleet at Hampton Roads, and finished
the day with some measure of success, but she was ultimately prevented by
theMonitor from completely destroying the blockade in that region. Afterwards,
the Virginia attempted to halt McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign which threatened the
Confederate capital. To avoid destruction, Union ships merely avoided her or outran
her. Once again, she failed to accomplish a strategic goal. When all else failed, she
attempted to defend her home base at Norfolk, but her disappointing performance in
the past caused the Confederates not to consider her as a serious contender for the
defence of Norfolk.
In all these events, the Virginia may have made a difference, but it was not to
the extent that the Confederacy expected. After all, strategic goals have the potential
to benefit one side significantly and potentially alter the course of a war. This brings
Secretary Mallory’s statement in the introduction to mind yet again; however,
the Virginia was unable to fulfill any of the expectations he outlined in his statement.
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In fact, the Virginia may have detrimentally affected the Confederate war effort.
Historian John Elwood Clark viewed the ironclad program as an expensive failure. He
claims that the Confederacy foolishly “diverted one-quarter of . . . [its] iron
production” (66), since the ironclads were “often underpowered . . . struggled to make
headway against tidal or river currents . . . design flaws rendered many unseaworthy .
. . only half saw action” (67). Even though the Virginia was unable to benefit the
Confederacy in a meaningful fashion, the fact that multiple interpretations still exist a
century and a half after the Virginia‘s birth suggests that this topic is worthy of
continued exploration.
Word Count: 3412
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Works Cited
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Scharf, John Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy from Its Organization
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Appendix 1 – Map of the Area Around Hampton Roads
Battle of Hampton Roads, VA. Digital image. Civil War Preservation Trust. 28 Nov.
2009 <http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/hampton-roads/maps/hampton-
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roads.jpg>.
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