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English for Religious Studies ENGLISH FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES Edmund Ryden SJ September 2008 – June 2009 Temporary schedule. Dates correct except for 4 May which is ambiguous in university calendar. Purpose: To enable students to consult material in English in the field of religious studies, with a focus on four areas: comparative religion, Buddhism, Christianity and Daoism. The course will involve reading key texts in English from the religions and also in reading articles about the said religions. To help learning to read there will also be demands on writing English, however the course will not teach conversation or listening. Assessment: By final exam at the end of each semester. Students will also be expected to prepare each week’s reading before class and will be examined on their preparation. Semester 1: Buddhism & Comparative Religion BUDDHISM 1 15 Sept An introduction to English grammar and etymology 2 2 22 Sept Buddhist terminology: Sanskrit and Pali 4 3 29 Sept A Buddha’s Qualification for Teaching (The Lohicca Sutta) 6 4 06 Oct The Recorded Conversations of Zen Master Yi Xuan 9 5 13 Oct Dadosky, Merton and Zen 12 6 20 Oct Dadosky, Christian-Buddhist Dialogue 15 7 27 Oct Takemura, Zen Enlightenment 1 18 8 3 Nov Takemura, Zen Enlightenment 2 21 COMPARATIVE RELIGION 9 10 Nov Angelo Amato, “Christian Truth spreads by Conviction” 24 10 17 Nov Pope Benedict XVI, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite” 27 11 24 Nov Hugo Meynell, “A Letter to Professor Dawkins” 30 12 1 Dec David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.1 Experience and language 13 15 Dec David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.2 Two Sources of Theology 14 22 Dec David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.3 Phenomenology 15 29 Dec David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.4 Hermeneutics 16 5 Jan David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.5 Transcendental Method Exam 12 Jan 1 English for Religious Studies 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR AND ETYMOLOGY Grammar English grammar is best when it is simple. The basic construction is Subject-VerbObject. Mary loves Peter. (S-V-O) Only in imperative sentences (orders, eg. Come!, Go!), is the subject omitted. Every verb must have a subject. *loves Peter (*=incorrect grammar): Mary loves Peter. The word which marks the subject of a verb can never be the object of another verb. *Mary loves Peter loves cats. : Mary loves Peter, who loves cats. Active, transitive verbs have a direct object. Mary loves Peter. (S-V-O) Intransitive verbs have no object. Mary dreams. (S-V) The verb ‘to be’ has a complement. Mary is pretty. (S-V-C) Sentences may be joined together in various ways giving rise to Main Clauses and Subordinate Clauses. Each clause has its own subject, verb and (when necessary) object or complement. Main clause S V O Mary loves Peter, Subordinate Clause S V O who loves cats. Main clause Subordinate Clause1 Clause2 S V C S V Life is not only a fight for survival, where one part only wins Subordinate S V if the other part loses. Main Clause S V C The encounter of faith with scientific discovery is not a new experience for the church. A phrase does not have a verb but it can have a noun formed from a verb (often ending in –ing) and this verbal noun can have an object, eg more and more intelligent babies is the object of the verbal noun ‘producing’ but altogether the phrase describes ‘price’ and so is part of the subject of the main verb ‘was’: The price of producing more and more intelligent babies was (and is) the pain of squeezing their heads through a birth canal that leads, for historical reasons, through a rigid pelvis. 2 English for Religious Studies English is a Germanic language that has been heavily influenced by Romance (French and Latin) languages. There are also traces of Celtic and Nordic languages. English also borrows many new words from all over the world, including from Taiwanese: tea. Germanic words express the simple ideas: The cat came into the house. Romance (Latin words that come via French) words express more high class ideas: The student entered the university. Words borrowed into English directly from Latin and Greek are used only for abstract ideas eg The thoughts of the wise gladden the heart. (All Germanic words). The reflections of the sages are a delight for the spirit. (French words in italics). The cogitations of the philosophers are ambrosia for the psyche. (Greek and Latin words.) These three sentences all mean exactly the same thing. The first is the easiest to understand; the second is not too difficult, but the third is very difficult. Therefore, when writing English try always to use Germanic words. Unfortunately, many religious books like to use Greek and Latin, which makes them much more difficult to understand. Here is an example of a theological text and below is a translation into Germanic English: The temporary estrangement between the sciences and theology is now over. It began when the sciences emancipated themselves from cosmology and reduced it to a personal belief in the divinity as Creator. The two disciplines established their own identities on either side of accepted demarcation lines and achieved a peaceful coexistence based on mutual irrelevance. The brief hostility between the sciences and theology is now over. It began when the sciences freed themselves from cosmology and reduced it to a personal belief in God as Creator. The two fields of learning grounded themselves on either side of accepted borders and stayed peacefully side by side whilst not bothering about each other. The words in italics are difficult to replace with Germanic words. The Germanic text is much easier to understand. However, it perhaps goes too far in cutting out all romance words. English still likes to use some romance words for abstract ideas. Nordic words are also Germanic but sometimes differ. They also express everyday ideas often of a violent nature: die, start, stare. Eg 開始 in English=commencement (French), beginning (German), start (Norse) Please use a dictionary that indicates the etymology of a word. Germanic words: Anglo-Saxon (AS), Old English (OE), Middle English (ME) Germanic words from Old Norse (ON) are found in Middle English or in AngloSaxon Romance words may come in via Middle English, or later from French or Latin. 3 English for Religious Studies 2 BUDDHIST TERMINOLOGY: SANSKRIT AND PALI Chinese Sanskrit Pali English Siddhartha Name of Gautama Buddha 悉達多 The sage of the Sakya Clan 釋迦牟尼 Sakyamuni Tathāgata Thus come OR Thus gone 如來 Buddhism 佛教 Bhiksu Bhikkhu Buddhist monk 比丘 Bhiksuni Bhikkhunī Buddhist nun Sramana Buddhist monk, ascetic 沙門 Buddha, Dharma, Samgha Three Jewels 三寶 Dukkha Suffering Dukkha-dukkha Physical and mental suffering Viparināma-dukkha Suffering produced by change Samkhāra-dukkha Suffering produced by contingencies 5 khandas 5 aggregates Rūpa Form Vedanā Sensations Sannā Perceptions Samkhāra Mental formations vinnāna Consciousness Anattā / Anātmavāda Non-susbstance / doctrine of no soul Anicca Impermanence Samudaya Arising Pratiya samutpāda Paticcasamuppāda Nexus of conditioned origination Avidyā Avijjā Ignorance Samkhāra Volitional activities Nāma-rūpa Name and form Trsnā Tanhā Thirst Upādāna Clinging Bhava Becoming Jāti Birth Jarā-marana Decay,death, lamentation Nirodha Cessation Ariya-Atthangika Magga The Noble Eightfold Path Sammā ditthi Right understanding Sammā sankappa Right thought Sammā vācā Right speech Sammā kammanta Right action Sammā ājīva Right living Sammā vāyāma Right effort Sammā sati Right mindfulness Sammā samādhi Right concentration / meditation Pannā Wisdom Sīlā Morality Stupa Pagoda (Tibetan: dagoba) 塔 Ānanda Disciple of Sakyamuni Buddha 阿難陀 Kāsyapa Kāssapa Disciple of Sakyamuni Buddha 迦葉波 4 English for Religious Studies Mahāyāna 大乘 Hinayāna 小乘 Dhyana 禪那 禪宗 Tantrayana 密宗 淨土宗 西方淨土 蓮花宗 法華經，妙法蓮花經 Saddharma-pundarikasutra 阿彌陀佛 Amitabha 菩堤薩埵 Bodhisattva 阿羅漢 觀音菩薩 Arhat Avalokitesvara 蓮花手 文殊菩薩 維摩詰 普賢菩薩 Padmapani Manjusri Vimalakirti Samantabhadra 地藏菩薩 菩提達摩 涅槃 彌勒佛 手印 施無畏 與願 轉法輪 尋 觸地 Ksitigarbha Bodhidharma Nirvana Maitreya Mudrā Abhaya Vara Dharmacakrapravatana Dharmadhatudhyana Vitarka Bhumisparsa 合掌 Anjali 菩提樹 本生 曼荼羅 空 Bodhi Jataka Mandala Sunyā 法界定 Great Vehicle OR Greater Vehicle Little Vehicle OR Lesser Vehicle Meditation Zen School (also Chan School) Esoteric Buddhism Pure Land Sect Pure Land of the West Lotus Sect = Pure Land Sect Lotus Sutra Buddha of Immeasurable Splendour One who vows to save all sentient beings Buddhist saint (Hinayana) The Bodhisattva who hears the cries The Jewel in the Lotus = Guanyin Bodhisattva of Wisdom (on a lion) Bodhisattva of Benevolence (elephant) Bodhisattva who frees from hell First Patriarch of Zen School Blowing-out Future Buddha Position of the hand: Assurance from fear (hands lifted) Bestowing (Hand dropped, open) Turning the wheel of the law (Hands touching) Meditation (Hands open on lap) Nibbana Inquiry (Thumbs touching) Touching earth (arm pointing down) Adoration (Hands joined in prayer) The bodhi tree Story about earlier Buddhas Mandala Empty NB: Sanskrit and Pali names are not necessarily accurately transcribed. 5 English for Religious Studies 3 A Buddha’s Qualification for Teaching (The Lohicca Sutta) There are three sorts of teachers in the world, Lohicca, who are worthy of blame. And whoever blames such teachers would be justified in doing so for his rebuke would be in accord with the facts and the truth. What are the three? In the first place, Lohicca, there is the teacher who has not himself attained the aim of becoming a samanna, in pursuit of which he left home and adopted the homeless life. Without himself having attained to it he teaches a doctrine to his hearers, saying, “This is good for you, this will make you happy.” The those hearers of his do not listen to him, they pay no attention to his words, and they are in no way changed by what they hear; they go their own way, regardless of his teaching. Such a teacher is open to the criticism of being like a man who continually makes advances to a woman who keeps repulsing him, or who embraces a woman who keeps turning her face away from him. To go on posing as a teacher of men, when no one heeds, since they do not trust you, that is, in the same way, a matter of greed. For what, then, can one man do for another? This, Lohicca, is the first sort of teacher in the world worthy of blame. And whoever blames such a teacher would be justified in doing so for his rebuke would be in accord with the facts and the truth. In the second place, Lohicca, there is a sort of teacher who has not attained his aim of becoming a samanna, in the pursuit of which he left home and adopted the homeless life. Without having himself attained to it he teaches a doctrine to his hearers, saying, “This is good for you, this will make you happy.” His disciples listen to him; they pay attention to his words; they become strengthened by their understanding and they never depart from the teaching of the master, or follow their own way. Such a teacher may be criticized for being like a man who, neglecting his own field, is concerned to weed his neighbour’s field. To go on teaching others when you have not taught yourself, that too is a matter of greed. For what, then, can one man do for another? This, Lohicca, is the second sort of teacher in the world worthy of blame. And whoever blames such a teacher would be justified in doing so for his rebuke would be in accord with the facts and the truth. And again, Lohicca, in the third place, there is a sort of teacher who has himself attained the aim of becoming a samanna, in the pursuit of which he left home 6 English for Religious Studies and adopted the homeless life. Having attained it, he teaches the doctrine to his hearers, saying, “This is for your good for you, this will make you happy.” But those hearers of his neither listen to him, nor pay attention to his words, nor are they strengthened through their understanding of his doctrine; they go their own way, apart from the teaching of the master. Such a teacher may indeed be criticized for being like a man who, having broken through an old bond, entangles himself in a new one. To go on teaching when you have not trained yourself to teach, that is a matter of greed. For what, then, can one man do for another? This, Lohicca, is the third sort of teacher in the world worthy of blame. And whoever blames such a teacher would be justified, in accord with the facts and the truth. These, Lohicca, are the three sorts of teachers of which I spoke.” And when he had thus spoken, Lohicca the Brahman said to the Master, “But is there, Gotama, any sort of teacher not worthy of blame in the world?” “Yes, Lohicca, there is a teacher not worthy of blame.” “And what sort of a teacher, Gotama, is that?” Suppose there appears in the world a Tathāgata, an arahat, a fully awakened one, complete in wisdom and goodness, happy, one who knows all worlds, incomparable as a guide to those who are willing to be led, a teacher for gods and mortals, a revered Master, a Buddha. From his own experience he knows and sees this universe, including the upper worlds of the gods, the Brahmas and the Maras, and the lower world with its ascetics and brahmans, its princes and peoples—and having understood it he makes his knowledge known to others. He teaches the Truth he knows, beautiful in its origin, beautiful in its progress, beautiful in its fulfilment. He teaches it both in the spirit and in the letter; he makes known the higher life in all its fullness and all its purity. A householder, or one of his children, or someone of lesser status, hearing that Truth, trusts the Tathāgata, and having such confidence in what he has heard, reasons within himself as follows: “The life of a householder is full of hindrances; it is a dusty, defiling path to tread. The homeless wanderer lives an uncluttered life. It is difficult for the householder to live the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity, in all its perfection. So let me shave off my hair and beard, and put on the yellow robes and leave the household life and become a homeless wanderer. Then, before long, forsaking his share of wealth, whether great or small, and forsaking his circle of 7 English for Religious Studies relatives, whether many or few, he cuts off his hair and beard, puts on the yellow robes and leaves household life for that of the homeless wanderer. When he has thus become an ascetic he lives by the rule of life proper to an ascetic. Scrupulous in matters of behaviour and food, realizing the danger which lies in the avoidance of small faults, he adopts certain principles of good bodily action and speech. He leads a wholesome life, observing fully the moral precepts; he guards the door of his senses; he is alert and self-aware, and rich in contentment. The bhikkhu holds himself aloof from causing injury to seeds, or plants. He takes but one meal a day, not eating at night, refraining from food after midday. He refrains from being a spectator at shows at fairs, with nautch dances, singing and music. He abstains from wearing, adorning or ornamenting himself with garlands, scents and ungents. He abstains from the use of large and lofty beds. He abstains from accepting silver or gold. He abstains from accepting uncooked grain. He abstains from accepting raw meat. He abstains from accepting women or girls. He abstains from accepting bondmen or bondswomen. He abstains from accepting sheep and goats. He abstains from accepting fowls or swine. He abstains from accepting elephants, cattle, horses and mares. He abstains from accepting cultivated fields or waste. He abstains from acting as a go-between or messenger. He abstains from buying or selling. He abstains from cheating with scales or coins or measures. He abstains from the crooked ways of bribery, cheating and fraud. He abstains from maiming, murder, putting in bonds, highway robbery, dacoity and violence. When the Master had thus spoken, Lohicca the Brahman said, “Gotama, it is just as if a man had caught hold another man, falling over the precipitous edge of purgatory, by the hair of his head, and had lifted him up safe back onto the firm land—just so have I, on the point of falling into purgatory, been lifted back onto the land by the venerable Gotama. Most excellent, Gotama, are your words, most excellent! Just as if a man were to set up what has been thrown away, or were to reveal what has been hidden away, or were to point out the right road to him who has gone astray, or were to bring a light into the darkness so that those who had eyes could see external forms—just even so has the Truth been made known to me, in many a figure, by the venerable Gotama. And I, even I, betake myself to the venerable Gotama as my guide, to the Doctrine and to the Community. May the venerable Gotama accept me as a disciple; as one who, from this day forth as long as life endures, has taken him as his guide.” 8 English for Religious Studies 4 The Recorded Conversations of Zen Master Yi Xuan The Prefect, Policy Advisor Wang, and other officials requested the Master to lecture. The master ascended the hall and said, “Today it is only because I, a humble monk, reluctantly accommodate human feelings that I sit on this chair. If one is restricted to one’s heritage in expounding the fundamental understanding [of salvation], one really cannot say anything and would have nothing to stand on. However, because of the honourable general advisor’s strong request today, how can the fundamental doctrines be concealed? Are there any talented men or fighting generals to hurl their banners and unfold their strategy right now? Show it to the group!” A monk asked, “What is the basic idea of the Law preached by the Buddha?” Thereupon the Master shouted at him. The monk paid reverence. The Master said, “The Master and the monk can argue all right.” Question: “Master, whose tune are you singing? Whose tradition are you perpetuating?” The Master said, “When I was a disciple of Huang-bo, I asked him three times and I was beaten three times.” As the monk hesitated about what to say, the Master shouted at him and then beat him, saying, “Don’t nail a stick into empty space.” The Master ascended the hall and said, “Over a lump of reddish flesh there sits a pure man who transcends and is no longer attached to any class of Buddhas or sentient beings. He comes in and out of your sense organs all the time. If you are not yet clear about it, look, look!” At that point a monk came forward and asked, “What is a pure man who does not belong to any class of Buddhas or sentient beings?” The Master came right down from his chair and, taking hold of the monk, exclaimed, “Speak! Speak!” As the monk deliberated what to say, the Master let him go, saying, “What dried human excrementremoving stick is the pure man who does not belong to any class of Buddhas or sentient beings!” Thereupon he returned to his room. The Master ascended the hall. A monk asked, “What is the basic idea of the Law preached by the Buddha?” The Master lifted up his swatter. The monk shouted, and the Master beat him. The monk asked again, “What is the basic idea of the Law preached by the Buddha?” The Master again lifted up his swatter. The monk shouted, 9 English for Religious Studies and the Master shouted also. As the monk hesitated about what to say, the Master beat him. Thereupon the Master said, “Listen, men. Those who pursue after the Law will not escape from death. I was in my late Master Huang-bo’s place for twenty years. Three times I asked him about the basic idea of the Law preached by the Buddha and three times he bestowed upon me the staff. I felt I was struck only by a dried stalk. Now I wish to have a real beating. Who can do it for me?” One monk came out of the group and said, “I can do it.” The Master picked up the staff to give him. As he was about to take it over, the master beat him. The Master ascended the hall and said, “A man stands on top of a cliff, with no possibility of rising any further. Another man stands at the crossroad, neither facing nor backing anything. Who is in the front and who is in the back? Don’t be like Vimalakīrti (who was famous for his purity), and don’t be like Great Gentleman Fu. [Fu Xuanfeng (b. 28 CE) put the fish he caught in a basket and submerged it under water so the fish which wished to escape could do so. He and his wife worked in the farm for others.] Take care of yourselves.” The Master told the congregation: “Seekers of the Way, in Buddhism no effort is necessary. All one has to do is to do nothing, except to move his bowels, urinate, put on his clothing, eat his meals, and lie down if he is tired. The stupid will laugh at him, but the wise one will understand. An ancient person [Zen Master Ming-zan (fl. 788)] said, ‘One who makes effort is surely a fool’.” Question: “What is meant by the mind’s not being different at different times?” The Master answered, “As you deliberated to ask the question, your mind has already become different. Therefore, the nature and character of dharmas have become differentiated. Seekers of the Way, do not make any mistake. All mundane and supramundane dharmas have no nature of their own. Nor have they the nature to be produced [by causes]. They have only the name ‘Emptiness’, but even the name is empty. Why do you take this useless name as real? You are greatly mistaken!... If you seek after the Buddha, you will be taken over by the devil of the Buddha, and if you seek after the patriarch, you will be taken over by the devil of the patriarch. If you seek after anything, you will always suffer. It is better not to do anything. Some unworthy priests tell their disciples that the Buddha is the ultimate, and that he went through three infinitely long periods, fulfilled his practice, and then 10 English for Religious Studies achieved Buddhahood. Seekers of the Way, if you say that the Buddha is the ultimate, why did he die lying down sideways in the forest in Kuśinagara after having lived for eighty years? Where is he now?... Those who truly seek after the Law will have no use for the Buddha. They will have no use for any excellence in the Three Worlds (of desires, matter, and pure spirit). They will be distinctly free and not bound by material things. Heaven and earth may turn upside down but I shall have no more uncertainty. The Buddhas of the ten cardinal directions may appear before me and I shall not feel happy for a single moment. Why? Because I know that all dharmas are devoid of characters. They exist when there is transformation [in the mind] and cease to exist when there is no transformation. The Three Worlds are but the mind, and all dharmas are consciousness only. Therefore [they are all] dreams, illusions and flowers in the air. What is the use of grasping and seizing them?... Seekers of the Way, if you want to achieve the understanding according to the Law, don’t be deceived by others and turn to [your thoughts] internally or [objects] externally. Kill anything that you happen on. Kill the Buddha if you happen to meet him. Kill a patriarch or an arhat if you happen to meet him. Kill your 0parents or relatives if you happen to meet them. Only then can you be free, not bound by material things, and absolutely free and at ease… I have no trick to give people. I merely cure disease and set people free… My views are few. I merely put on clothing and eat meals as usual, and pass my time without doing anything. You people coming from the various directions have all made up your minds to seek the Buddha, seek the Law, seek emancipation, and seek to leave the Three Worlds. Crazy people! If you want to leave the Three Worlds, where can you go? ‘Buddha’ and ‘patriarch’ are terms of praise and also bondage. Do you want to know where the Three Worlds are? They are right in your mind which is now listening to the Law.” … The Master asked a monk: “Sometimes a shout is like the sacred sword of the Diamond King. Sometimes a shout is like a golden-haired lion squatting on the ground. Sometimes a shout is like a rod or a piece of grass [used to attract fish]. And sometimes a shout is like one which does not function as a shout at all. How do you know which one to use?” As the monk was deliberating what to say, the Master shouted. 11 English for Religious Studies 5 Dadosky, “Merton and Zen” Fu Jen International Religious Studies 2.1 From 1959 to 1966 Merton carried on a rich and substantial dialogue with a prominent authority on Japanese Zen, Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki 鈴木大拙. The dialogue was unique and pioneering because both scholars were purported experts in their own traditions and each had an intense interest in the other’s tradition. A formal dialogue between the two took place in print in Merton’s Zen and the Birds of Appetite. Later, Merton writes an article entitled “A Zen Revival” that prompted Suzuki to declare after reading it that Merton had the best grasp of any Westerner he has ever met. Merton also considered Suzuki an authority and refers to his work as “certainly without question the most complete and most authentic presentation of an Asian tradition and experience by any one man in terms accessible to the West”. Granted, this essay is written in the form of a eulogy which Merton writes in honour of the man he greatly admired. However, Merton’s laudatory comments are tempered by the words, “in terms accessible to the West.” Suzuki was a communicator and popularizer of Zen due in part to his exceptional command of English and his fascination with Western culture. Many scholars now criticize Suzuki because they disagree with his interpretation of Zen and because his success as a popularizer has led to misconceptions by Western scholars. These critics not only believe Suzuki misrepresents Zen, but they believe he ignores the various complex lineages of various schools and the doctrinal aspects as well. Keenan’s critique of Merton flows from this context of post-Suzuki criticism. To summarize: Based as his works are on D.T. Suzuki’s Zen teachings, I think we must recognize that we cannot look to Merton for any adequate understanding of Buddhism. Because of the limitation of sources available to him in his time, his understanding of Zen Buddhism as presented, for example in Zen and the Birds of Appetite and in Mystics and Zen Masters, was imperfect and incomplete. It is not enough—as Merton learned to do from Suzuki—to appeal to a simple, nondiscriminative experience of truth and reality as if that were the core experience behind all our varied and sorry words and doctrines. There are some points to be made about Keenan’s passage. First, Merton does recognize that Zen has very complex doctrines, but he admits that having had limited time with Suzuki, he wanted to use the time more wisely to discuss matters of more 12 English for Religious Studies immediate interest. Not only is Merton aware that there is a complex system of doctrines in Zen, he is also aware that his knowledge is incomplete, and perhaps always will be. Second, while there may be some truth in Keenan’s critique, I wonder why he generalizes this to Merton’s understanding of Buddhism, as for example, in the Tibetan tradition which Merton also delved into. It may seem like I am quibbling here, but consider that Merton’s contemplative lifestyle may have predisposed him to grasp certain elements of Buddhism more readily than others, and as such, he may not have been as reliant on ‘book knowledge’. It is worth considering the comment by the Tibetan monk Chadral Rinpoche, who after having a stimulating dialogue with Merton, called him a rangjung, a naturally arisen Buddha. Perhaps Chadral was being polite, but if there is such a thing as a ‘naturally arisen Buddha’ then it would seem that there is the possibility of grasping essential aspects of a tradition without a formal apprehension of them. Having said all of this, I would concede that Keenan may be correct when he says that we should not rely on Merton for an adequate understanding of Buddhism, and if Merton were alive today he would probably agree. So while his knowledge of Buddhism may have been pioneering for its time, and in some ways it might be now passé, what is truly going forward in Merton’s engagement with Buddhism is his success at interreligious dialogue. It is a method that seems to have taken the magisterium of the Catholic Church 50 years to accept. Despite the achievements of Vatican II Merton was ahead of his time. Roger Corless raised the initial questions concerning the genuine integrity of Suzuki’s grasp of Christianity and Merton’s grasp of Zen. Keenan is in agreement with Corless and relies heavily on him to support his own argument. In his article “In Search of a Context for the Merton-Suzuki Dialogue,” Corless criticizes Suzuki’s understanding of Christianity along with the latter’s preferences and biases pertaining to Zen as well as his assumptions about what is distinctively ‘Japanese’. The tone of Corless’ article is iconoclastic and sweeping, so much so that after reading it one wonders if there is anything worth salvaging in Suzuki’s work. Nevertheless, Corless’ critique is probably legitimate to some extent, especially with respect to Suzuki’s knowledge of Christianity. Most significantly, it highlights Suzuki’s neglect of the importance of the symbol and theology of the Cross within Christian theology. 13 English for Religious Studies Second, regarding Suzuki’s knowledge of Zen, Corless concurs with the growing tendency to blame Suzuki’s version of Zen for perpetuating caricatures and being too simplistic. Moreover, central to Suzuki’s ideas is the belief that the fundamental aspect of Zen is the ‘transcendental’ experience and it is Corless’ critique of this that I will return to in a subsequent section. Corless focuses his critique of Suzuki on a personal and political context. From a personal context, he suggests that Suzuki’s emphasis on ‘transcendental’ experience may have come from his mother’s adherence to a marginal sect of Shin Buddhism which emphasizes a “direct experience of Amida Buddha”. Corless declares that Suzuki interpreted “the Zen of his father in terms of the experiences of his mother.” While this is intriguing, it seems like a stretch, especially if one considers that other Zen practioners, especially non-Japanese ones, have emphasized the ‘transcendental’ experience of Zen. Moreover, according to Robert Sharf, Nishida Kitaro, the founder of the Kyoto School of Zen, shared this same interest with Suzuki, and Corless does not seem to think the sect of Buddhism that Nishida’s mother followed is relevant, or at least he does not mention it. There is a Zeitgeist among various scholars in Japan and Europe in the early twentieth century which gives an ontological priority to a transcultural experience as the basis of religion, and these scholars included Suzuki and Nishida. Thus, Suzuki was influenced by certain figures in Western scholarship including Friedrich Schleiermacher, Rudolf Otto, and William James (one could even add Mircea Eliade), who distinguish between the fundamental essence of religion as experience on the one hand, and the subsequent cultural mediation of that experience on the other. Corless argues that Suzuki borrowed this distinction from the Western scholars, and this consequently coloured the Zen that he exported to the West. “[I]n fact, a conservative ‘back to bodhi’ reform movement, was ignored in favour of packaging it as a nondoctrinal, pan-human awakening to reality-as-it-really-is.” From this he can speak to Suzuki’s influence on Merton: It was perhaps because Merton accepted Suzuki’s transcendental interpretation of Zen that he felt it might provide the needed stimulus to revive the contemplative tradition in Christianity. What Merton did not seem to realize is that Zen Buddhism is Buddhism, and to practice it sincerely entails, as with any other form of Buddhism, the giving up of belief in the Christian (or any other) God. 14 English for Religious Studies 6 Dadosky, “Christian-Buddhist Dialogue” Fu Jen Internat. Religious Studies 2.1 In the last section of his article Keenan raises an important question about interreligious dialogue. Merton’s lasting contribution is probably going to be in this area rather than in his knowledge of Buddhism. Although the need for dialogue with Buddhism may not seem as urgent as dialogue with some other religions, still relatively little progress has been made in the dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity. The relationship between Christianity and Buddhism has been wrought with suspicion since the arrival of the first Jesuit missionaries. Even the celebrated success of Matteo Ricci in 16th century China in establishing relations with important patriarchs and aristocrats, and in achieving a high social standing in the community, could not claim the same success with the Buddhists he encountered. In fact, Faure argues that Ricci viewed Chan as a rival group and so he was antagonistic towards them. His success lay more with Confucianism. More recently, Pope Benedict has commented: “I repeat with insistence [that] research and interreligious and intercultural dialogue are not an option but a vital necessity for our time.” This indicates that the Catholic Church is still coming to grips with the implications of the unprecedented positive valuation of non-Christian religions in the documents of Vatican II (1962-1965). This Council represented a paradigmatic shift in the Church’s self-understanding and attitude to other religions, but it left in its wake the need for a method of dialogue which the official Church has yet to fully realize. This paradigm shift is represented by a movement from a strictly selfmediating identity that viewed its relationship with the Other in terms of a one-way relationship to a more two-way direction or mutually self-mediating direction. That is, the Vatican II documents represent the official recognition that the Church has mutual relations with the Other. For example, consider the title of the final chapter of Gaudium et Spes “The Church and the World as Mutually Related.” This refers to the Church’s self-understanding as mutually self-mediating as opposed to a strictly selfmediating stance that views the ‘world’ antagonistically and with suspicion. Vatican II is the official recognition that just as the Church has treasures to share with the Other, likewise it recognizes that the Church is also enriched by the treasures it finds in the Other. 15 English for Religious Studies In this way, Keenan is correct that there is a need for a method of interreligious dialogue because the recognition that the Church has mutual relations with the Other has put the Catholic Church in a precarious position. The affirmation of the Other, that is, of other Christian faiths, non-Christian religions, non-European cultures and secular society, runs counter to an ecclesial self-understanding that preceded Vatican II where the distortions of the Church’s self-understanding could lead to triumphalism, clericalism, and juridicism. While a movement beyond these attitudes is a welcome development, it has put the post-Vatican II Church in a kind of ‘identity crisis’ in the face of a vast pluralism. One example of this is the struggle that the Church continues to deal with concerning the question of evangelization/dialogue with respect to other religions. When does the Church evangelize, when does it dialogue with others and how does one avoid dialogue becoming simply a veiled form of evangelization, and how does one remain faithful to the evangelical mission of the Church in the dialogue? Indeed there is a tension between proclamation and dialogue but they need not be mutually opposed. Moreover, dialogue is now considered to be a part of the mission of the Church. How does one keep one’s Christian identity in this dialogue? Consequently, the question of how to relate to the Other comes to the forefront, and this is a question of method. Thomas Merton’s life example gives us a clue as to how dialogue can be successfully carried out. In this way, Merton was significant for two reasons. He was a pioneer by successfully carrying on dialogue before it was fashionable. Secondly, Merton was successful at it, perhaps more successful than any other major Christian thinker. Merton exemplifies the method of mutual self-mediation. Of course, the latter is technical language; the more descriptive language of his methodology could be called friendship. James L. Fredericks argues that friendship is an “invaluable” approach for interreligious dialogue. For example, when the Buddhist and the Christian sit down together for dialogue in a spirit of friendship, this spirit provides the best context for mutual enrichment, for mutual challenge, and for the ‘surprise’ of something new emerging through their respectful sharing and camaraderie. The spirit of friendship provides a context for engaging the different types of differences even contradictory ones: “…Christians will do well to develop deep and abiding friendships with the non-Christian neighbours as a useful way to disagree with honesty and depth”. 16 English for Religious Studies Interreligious friendships enrich the Church’s self-understanding in two ways. On the one hand, it keeps our self-understanding from falling into complacency: “Making new friends requires us to step out of our security and enter into a less comfortable world where the unpredictable replaces the tried and true”. On the other hand, the encounter is enriching in that it offers “new and welcome ways” of understanding oneself. Keenan and Sharf are correct in that we should not ignore or reduce the differences to ‘sameness’. Dialogue should preserve the difference. However, equally important is the ability to recognize the different types of differences— complementary and contradictory. But this does not preclude the possibility of some underlying unity as echoed by Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s description of dialogue as when we discover that ‘we are all talking with each other about us.’ Religious traditions develop dialectically throughout history and undoubtedly this means that our knowledge of Buddhism will continue to develop. Therefore, Keenan’s claim that we cannot rely on Merton for knowledge of Buddhism is not really fair. Any serious student of Buddhism, including Merton himself, recognizes that our knowledge develops and continues to develop so that even the contributions of Sharf and Faure will be checked by subsequent future studies. It may be that Suzuki, Nishida and the others may in fact represent a new movement in the development of Zen although if so history will ultimately determine its significance. It strikes me that Keenan and others are quite influenced by the critiques of post-modernity. While they are quick to point out Suzuki’s reliance on Schleiermacher and James as a liability, they are not as aware of their own philosophical assumptions which stem from a post-modern suspicion of any universal claims to knowledge and normative experiences of transcendence. In fact, the epistemological problems we inherited from modernity are perpetuated rather than resolved by relying solely on the post-modern approach. One cannot build a philosophy on the sand of a hermeneutic of suspicion or viva-la-difference alone. The study of philosophy and religion is not just about criticizing positions or simply the preservation of ‘difference’; it is also about the advance of our understanding of human being’s desire for transcendence, where transcendence includes a horizon beyond that of hopeless suffering. Unfortunately, the post-modern approach too often focuses on reversing the attempts to advance such understanding without providing any sufficient alternatives. 17 English for Religious Studies 7 Takemura, Zen Enlightenment 1 When I hear the word ‘mysticism’ I recall the enlightenment of Buddhism. And when I hear the word ‘enlightenment’ I at once recall the enlightenment of Zen Buddhism. Zen Buddhists maintain that they have handed down the enlightenment of Shakyamuni under the Bodhi-tree from person to person, and even today the word ‘enlightenment’ is often used in their ordinary life. The content of enlightenment experiences has been reported in various ways, but the most typical instance is that of Kyogen 香厳, who achieved enlightenment when he heard the sound of bamboo, or Reiun 霊雲, who became enlightened when, from a mountain road, he looked at peach blossom in a village. In the experiences of these masters we find a self-awareness by which life itself is lived in a way in which subject and object are not separated. In many cases, the enlightenment of Zen monks occurs in the realm of the senses. So what kind of experience was the enlightenment of the founder of Buddhism, Shakyamuni? Among Japanese Buddhist scholars it is often said that Shakyamuni became enlightened about the dependent arising 縁起 or the truth of dependent arising. This is based on a description of the scene in the Mahavagga 大品 from the Vinaya where Shakyamuni achieves his enlightenment and clarifies the twelve links of dependent arising 十 二 縁 起 . However, if we read the description carefully we find that Shakyamuni observed the structure of the twelve links of dependent arising after he had spent a week contemplating the state of liberation. In fact, the Mahavagga says that Shakyamuni first achieved basic enlightenment under the Bodhi tree and then tasted religious joy for a week. It was only after this that he observed the twelve links of dependent arising. In this case, what is basic enlightenment? I think the following sentences in the Ariyapariyesanasutta 聖求経 may help us to understand: “Even though I, myself, was subject to birth, I sought what was also subject to birth. But then I chose to pursue the greatest unborn calmness and nirvana and so I attained the greatest unborn calmness and nirvana. Even though I myself was subject to aging, sickness, death, sorrow, and defilement, I sought what was also subject to aging, sickness, death, sorrow, and defilement. But then I chose to pursue the greatest unaging, unailing, deathless, sorrowless, and undefiled calmness and nirvana, and so I attained the greatest unaging, unailing, deathless, sorrowless, and undefiled calmness and nirvana. 18 English for Religious Studies Then I attained wisdom and insight as follows: my liberation is secured. This life is the final life. I will not be born anywhere any more.” This description informs us that Shakyamuni’s enlightenment about the unborn and undying nirvana was entirely different from his enlightenment about the twelve links of dependent arising. It is an enlightenment detached from all words or discriminations. I think this enlightenment is really the basic enlightenment of Shakyamuni. I regard these sentences from the Ariyapariyesanasutta as most important, because the same enlightenment is expressed among the sutras and articles of Mahayana Buddhism. For instance, in the Saddharmapundarikasutra it is said, that the Tathāgata had the wisdom of enlightenment about unborn and undying truth: “The Tathāgata understands this common world as unborn and undying, not going and not coming, not living and not reaching nirvana, not true and not false, not the same and not different. So the Tathāgata does not understand this common world as ordinary people do. The Tathāgata has clear insight, as shown above, and has never made mistakes.” Likewise, in the refuge verse 歸敬頌 of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamikakarika 龍樹 中論頌, enlightenment about the Middle Path of Eight Negations (八不中道) is presented as follows: “I take refuge in the Buddha as the best Buddha of Buddhas who preaches about the calm and language-vanished truth of a dependent arising that is not dying, not born, not annihilated, not everlasting, not the same, not different, not coming, not going.” This enlightenment is explained by the Yogacara School 瑜伽行派 as the enlightenment of non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jnana 無 分 別 智 ). Nondiscriminative wisdom is described in verse 28 of the Trimsikakarika 唯識三十頌 by Vasubandhu 世親. The verse says that when a practitioner’s consciousness has no object the practitioner dwells on the original nature of consciousness-only, because there there is neither object nor subject. The Jyoyuishikiron 成唯識論 interprets the verse as follows: “When a bodhisattva has no object in his non-discriminative wisdom because he does not focus on any false matter, he can indeed dwell solely on the original nature of the ultimate truth of the world of consciousness-only. There, when he is absolutely detached from the seeing or seen form, both wisdom and original nature become equal.” 19 English for Religious Studies This can be interpreted as meaning that, during the bodhisattva’s practice, when he reaches a situation in which he has no object, he will attain the wisdom of enlightenment and in the wisdom both of the subject and the object will become equal. In the Jyoyuishikiron this non-discriminative wisdom is defined as having only a subjective part and no objective part. And yet the wisdom is also aware of original nature (tathata 真如). So it is said that wisdom holds original nature directly and very tightly. I think this means that wisdom and original nature are united as one. As mentioned above, the wisdom of enlightenment means directly knowing one’s original nature. Our original nature is just the world of the Eight Negations, and non-discriminative wisdom becomes united with it directly. So should this enlightenment of the Eight Negations be identified with the enlightenment of Zen monks—that is, the enlightenment of hearing the sound of bamboo or seeing the colour of peach blossoms? I think both enlightenment about the Eight Negations and the enlightenment of Zen monks are one and the same. Original nature—that is, our ultimate nature (paramarthata 勝義実性)—is indeed absolutely free from the path of language and the activity of the mind. However, if we were to regard it as nothingness our views would be in error and nothing more than views based on the discrimination of ordinary people. Actually, it may be realized that a sound or color enters the sensory world of the practitioner by transcending both subject and object when the practitioner has no object at all in his mind. Dogen 道元 (1200-1254), the famous Japanese Zen master and the founder of the Soto Zen School 曹洞宗 in Japan, said: “When a practitioner enters into practice in accordance with the Buddhist teachings, explores his skin, flesh, bone, and marrow, and drops off his skin, flesh, bones, and marrow, then peach blossoms will emerge suddenly from the inside of his eyes, or the sound of bamboo will emerge astonishingly from the inside of his ears.” When a practitioner drops himself off via Zen practice he never falls into nothingness. In this situation he sees the colour of peach blossoms or hears the sound of bamboo, as subject and object are not divided. However, this world cannot be explained by words. When we want to describe this world we can do so only in terms of the Eight Negations. 20 English for Religious Studies 8 Takemura, Zen Enlightenment 2 In fact, the world expressed by the term ‘original nature’ should not be regarded—as we ordinary people suppose—as nothingness. It should be regarded by us as a world of the senses in which there is oneness of subject and object beyond objective cognition. Therefore, Shakyamuni’s enlightenment is said in Zen Buddhism to be to see the morning star. In Zen Buddhism the word ‘kensho’ (seeing one’s nature 見性) is often used as one of the enlightenments. Many people understand the meaning of this word as ‘seeing the original nature or Buddha-nature within human beings’. However, in terms of the wisdom of enlightenment some of this nature may not be objectively visible from outside the person. Therefore SUZUKI Daisetu 鈴木大拙 (1870-1966) says that seeing itself is the seeing person’s nature, and the seeing person’s nature is seeing itself. ‘Seeing itself is the seeing person’s nature, and the seeing person's nature is seeing itself” means achieving self-realization of the truth of the undivided subject– object by entirely becoming the truth itself. In this situation, the seeing (that is, the wisdom) must be established in the individual being, and yet enlightenment is realized under the condition of transcending any objective cognition or ego-consciousness. So the world of enlightenment is the world of the trans-individual. Hence the phrase ‘seeing itself is the seeing person’s nature, and the seeing person's nature is seeing itself’ expresses a situation in which the individual is the trans-individual and the trans-individual is the individual. Dogen’s enlightenment as “Dropping off of body and mind, and body and mind dropped off” also expresses the situation in which the individual is the transindividual and the trans-individual is the individual, because mind and body correspond to the individual and the dropping off corresponds to the trans-individual. Consequently, enlightenment should be understood as realization of the self as the individual of trans-individual. In the experience of enlightenment the individual never vanishes. Of course the ordinary ego—that is, the ego grasped objectively in a situation in which the subject and object are divided—must be transcended, but the individual is revived. Finally, to express the sense of enlightenment logically we should say that the individual of the trans-individual is established in enlightenment but the individual is never dissolved into the trans-individual. If a man or woman 21 English for Religious Studies prefers to be dissolved into the absolute in mysticism in an effort to seek the ultimate truth, then this is very different from the enlightenment handed down in the Buddhist tradition. The phrase ‘the individual of the trans-individual’ was used by Suzuki. For example, Suzuki says in the Thoughts of Zen 禅の思想: “The trans-individual will act only through the individual. This statement does not mean that the trans-individual must rely upon the individual. When the trans-individual relies upon the individual, the trans-individual must rest himself under the individual. This means that the transindividual will become one with the individual. The trans-individual must be just the trans-individual and does not exist outside the individual and also does not exist inside it …” The trans-individual is nothing but the individual and the individual is nothing but the trans-individual. A relationship like this may not be maintained in general logic, but I think logic must be transformed to adapt to this fact because I myself cannot think of another state of fact. Japan’s most famous philosopher, NISHIDA Kitaro 西田幾多郎 (1870-1945), who was a most intimate friend of Suzuki, also says in his religious philosophical article “The Logic of Basho (Place) and the Religious World View” that kensho (seeing one’s nature) is not seeing one’s nature but becoming oneself thoroughly that is based on the trans-self (場所的論理と宗教的世界観). He says: Unlike what many people think, Zen Buddhism is not mysticism. A ken-sho event involves a thorough realization of the root of self. Our self is established through self-denial 自己否定 of the Absolute 絶対者. Our self is established as one of many individual beings that are nothing but the self-denial of the Absolute. Therefore, our self is basically a self-contradictory being. Self-awareness—the concept of self knowing itself—is a self-contradiction. Therefore, our self retains itself absolutely in the Trans-self, which transcends the very depth of the self and affirms itself through self-denial. The process of ken-sho means becoming thoroughly grounded in this selfcontradiction. Dogen draw this self-contradictory fact clearly with the following interesting metaphor in Genjo koan 現成公案 in the Shobogenzo. A fish swims in water that is endless and a bird flies in sky that is limitless. The fish or the bird has never left the water or the sky. When they wish to go far away 22 English for Religious Studies they use a large amount of water or sky, and when they wish to go near they use a little of each. In that way they can go every time and they can go every place. However, if the bird leaves the sky the bird will immediately die, and if the fish leaves the water the fish will die at once. It should be known that water is life itself and the sky is life itself. Or the bird is life and the fish is life. Life must be the bird and the life must be the fish. You can guess the other dimensions. A living thing is like this. A fish or a bird may be regarded as the individual and the water or sky may be regarded as the trans-individual. Life must not be only by the individual and also must not be only by the trans-individual. We should imagine that our life or self is realized absolutely in the way of the individual of the trans-individual. In conclusion, as explained above, we can say that enlightenment in Buddhism is the realization of the Self as the individual of the trans-individual. I think the metaphor of the fish and water or the bird and sky is excellent, because the water or sky helps us to recall the sense of emptiness (sunyata 空性). In Buddhist thought, our individual self does not live in absolute being but in emptiness. In the Heart-Sutra 般 若心經 it is said that matter is emptiness and emptiness is matter, and the emotions, cognitions, will, and intelligence are also emptiness and vice versa. The five elements, matter, emotions, cognitions, will, and intelligence are the actual being of the individual but are only phenomenal, not substantial. So this phrase shows that the individual is established in emptiness. Moreover, this emptiness is to be denied by emptiness itself. In the philosophy of the Huayan School 華嚴宗 it is said that original nature (tathata 真如) does not sustain itself 不守自性. The metaphor of the water or sky shows this fact. Nishida explored exhaustively the logical expression of the absolute. Nishida thought that the mere absolute, which is separated from the relative, is in fact one with the relative and is not, therefore, the true absolute: the absolute is to be found in the relative. How is this possible? In Nishida’s conclusion, the true absolute denies itself absolutely and transforms itself into many relative individuals. The absolute establishes every human being by becoming absolute nothingness. This logic corresponds to the phrase ‘emptiness is matter’ or ‘original nature does not sustain itself’. 23 English for Religious Studies 9 Angelo Amato, “Christian Truth spreads by Conviction” An initial epistemological proposal concerning religious dialogue advises that it be implemented by way of two distinct tracks, since each has a different destination not necessarily linked to the other. On is the dialogue of charity, which endeavours to build a reconciled and peaceful human civilisation. The other is the dialogue of truth, which aims instead to discern the truth in individual religious beliefs. The dialogue of charity can appear first of all in the dialogue of life, through respect for the conversation partner as a member of the same humanity and consequently as entitled to acceptance, esteem and even friendship. Secondly, this dialogue can be put into practice in the dialogue of action. This implies collaboration among world religions in order to achieve peace among the nations, to defend nature and its laws, to protect life, especially that of the weakest, to show solidarity regarding the goods to this earth, to safeguard the freedom of every human being—especially religious freedom—to affirm justice, equality and brotherhood, to overcome the negative aspects of globalisation and to eliminate poverty and hunger in the world. The dialogue of charity visibly opens a horizon as boundless as that of God’s love poured into our hearts. The other aspect of interreligious dialogue is the dialogue of truth, which entails the freedom to confront one’s own convictions with another’s, respecting both the validity of that person’s conscience and the sincerity of his/her beliefs. This dialogue, whose aim is not to achieve a universal religion with a minimum common denominator, is a difficult one, since it presses conversation partners to explain the essential characteristics of their religius beliefs. It should be borne in mind that all great religions, and not only Christianity, put forward their claim to truth and universality. Thus, the dialogue of truth is indispensable for an objective discernment of reality. I shall present several reflections that focus on this dialogue of truth, stating beforehand that they are perfunctory references, since the Church has a long experience of this dialogue. I begin with an affirmation from the Declaration Dominus Jesus which says, “in the practice of dialogue between the Christian faith and other religious traditions as well as in seeking to understand its theoretical basis more deeply, new questions arise that need to be addressed through pursuing new paths of 24 English for Religious Studies research, advancing proposals, and suggesting ways of acting that call for attentive discernment” (n. 3). I believe that now is the time to go beyond the theories of exclusivism, inclusivism and relativism with their further specifications and to focus instead on a dual direction. First of all, it is necessary to steer clear of generic interreligious dialogue that does not take into account the specific identity of each conversation partner. Interreligious dialogue, just as ecumenical dialogue, demands a bilateral confrontation in which the dialogue partners may be considered in their specific originality and may thus express their own ‘truths’. In addition, it is necessary that the interreligious dialogue of truth focus on the essential content of the different beliefs and hence on their vision of God (should they mention it), of the human being and of the cosmos. The dialogue of truth must examine in concrete terms religious, ethical, educational, political and cultural convictions, in a word, the hard core of the interlocutor’s religious identity. Hence it is essential to avoid generic comparisons that are based solely upon superficial phenomenological analyses and to open oneself instead to an open and frank bilateral exchange regarding the respective religions’ perspectives on the truth about God, man and the cosmos. This implies a correct and articulate knowledge of one’s own faith and an equally complete familiarity with the beliefs of the other. The dialogue of truth, then, cannot come about without the risk of trivialising and perhaps even betraying one’s own convictions as well as those of others. Certainly, in a culture such as our postmodern culture in which opinion dominates and the truth seems an evanescent mirage, the dialogue of truth appears as a challenge to go against the tide of opinion. This entails a certain change in the dynamics of interreligious dialogue. Benedict XVI’s lecture in Regensburg can be considered the beginning of a new approach that breaks away from the rigid patterns of a diplomatic dialogue that disregards the consequences of a virtual dialogue cut off from reality, in order to enter into the life of a dialogue of truth and life which brings into play the actual lives of the conversation partners, in the entirety and complexity of their plans for human and religious fulfilment. To respond to those who ask us to account for Christian hope, we must refer to the truth. Indeed St John says, “This is the disciple who is bearing witness to these things, and who has written these things; and we know that his testimony is true” (Jn 21:24). 25 English for Religious Studies Dialogue is a literary genre with a long tradition, present in Greek philosophy and also in the Gospels. In interreligious exchange, ancient Christianity was obliged to face certain inter-connected challenges that are still relevant today: the rational justification of faith, the question of its truth and the possibility of its actuation in the practical life of Christians…. A ‘Christian’, in Ignatius of Antioch’s opinion, was someone who lived a life in harmony with his/her faith. Origen maintained that the truth of Christianity was proven by putting it into practice. Christian life, in fact, is not only interiority but is expressed in the conduct and language of the faithful... Criticised by Celsus, who maintained that there was nothing original in Christian morals, Origen refrained from protesting and explained that the presumed lack of newness in Christian ethics depended on the fact that God had desired to provide common ethical criteria for all humanity, to ensure that the verdict of the Last Judgment would be based on criteria that ere truly the same for all. The way in which Christianity serves as an essential completion of ancient thought contains two elements. First of all, the Christian truth is not a truth only for experts but for everyone. It is not only theoretical but is also a practical truth. It is not only a truth for academia but also for practical life. This Christian simplicity is far removed from Gnostic fabrications. Those who helped to spread Christianity were not only scholars but also simple people. The Fathers often called Christians “the true philosophers”. Jerome wondered, “Who reads Aristotle? Who knows Plato or his books or even his name?... On the other hand everyone is talking of our ordinary people and our fishermen; talk of them echoes through the world. Therefore it is necessary to offer them simple words in an equally simple language.” What is more, Christian simplicity is not simple-mindedness or superficiality but docta ignorantia, in analogy with Socratic ignorance. It indicates a loftier knowledge that goes beyond the dialectic of philosophers and rhetoricians and succeeds in reaching all. Christianity’s claim to truth and universality has therefore been inherent in its identity from the outset. This is proven not so much by technical reasoning as by living a visible and exemplary life. And this truth was not spread by coercion but by conviction. At the very foundations of the Christian proclamation lies the principle of freedom. (L’osservatore romano, (weekly edition in English) 30 July 2008, pp 6-7 (extracts) 26 English for Religious Studies 10 Pope Benedict XVI, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite” Today I would like to speak of a rather mysterious figure: a sixth-century theologian whose name is unknown and who wrote under the pseudonym of Dionysius the Areopagite. With this pseudonym he was alluding to the event recounted by St. Luke in chapter 17 of the Acts of the Apostles where he tells how Paul preached in Athens at the Areopagus to an elite group of the important Greek intellectual world. In the end, the majority of his listeners proved not to be interested and went away jeering at him. Yet some approached Paul and opened themselves to the faith. The Evangelist gives us two names: Dionysius, a member of the Areopagus, and a woman named Damaris. If five centuries later the author of these books chose the pseudonym ‘Dionysius the Areopagite’, it means that his intention was to put Greek wisdom at the service of the Gospel, to foster the encounter of Greek culture and intelligence with the proclamation of Christ. He wanted to do what this Dionysius had intended, that is, to make Greek thought converge with St Paul’s proclamation; being a Greek, he wanted to become a disciple of Paul, hence a disciple of Christ… [He choose a pseudonym, partly because] he himself desired to make an act of humility. He did not want to glorify his own name. He did not want to build a monument to himself with his work but rather truly to serve the Gospel, to create an ecclesial theology, neither individual nor based on himself. Actually, he succeeded in elaborating a theology which we can date to the sixth century but cannot attribute to any of the figures of that period. It is a theology which expresses a common thought and language. He said, “I do not wish to spark polemics; I simply speak of the truth; I seek the truth”. And the light of truth by itself causes errors to fall away and makes what is good shine forth. And with this principle he purified Greek thought and related it to the Gospel. This principle is also the expression of a true spirit of dialogue: it is not about seeking the things that separate, but seeking the truth in Truth itself. This then radiates and cause errors to fade away… All Creation speaks of God and is praise of God. Since the creature is praise of God, Pseudo-Dionysius’ theology became a liturgical theology: God is found above all in praising him, not only in reflection; and the liturgy is not something made by us, something invented in order to have a religious experience for a certain period of time; it is singing with the choir of creatures and entering into cosmic reality itself. And in 27 English for Religious Studies this way the liturgy, apparently only ecclesiastical, becomes expansive and great, it becomes our union with the language of all creatures. He says: God cannot be spoken of in an abstract way; speaking of God is always—he says using a Greek word—a ‘(hymnein), singing for God with the great hymn of the creatures which is reflected and made concrete in liturgical praise. Yet, although his theology is cosmic, ecclesial and liturgical, it is also profoundly personal. He created the first great mystical theology. Indeed, with him the word ‘mystic’ acquires a new meaning. Until then for Christians such a word was equivalent to the word ‘sacramental’, that is, what pertains to the (mysterion), to the sacrament. With him the word ‘mystic’ becomes more personal, more intimate: it expresses the soul’s journey toward God. And how can God be found? Here we note once again an important element in his dialogue between Greek philosophy and Christianity, and, in particular biblical faith. Apparently what Plato says and what the great philosophy on God says is far loftier, far truer; the Bible appears somewhat ‘barbaric’, simple or pre-critical one might say today; but he remarks that precisely this is necessary, so that in this way we can understand that the loftiest concepts on God never reach his true grandeur: they always fall short of it. In fact these images enable us to understand that God is above every concept; in the simplicity of the images we find more truth than in great concepts. The Face of God is our inability to express truly what he is. In this way one speaks—and PseudoDionysius himself speaks—of a ‘negative theology’. It is easier for us to say what God is not rather than to say what he truly is. Only through these images can we intuit his true Face. Moreover, this Face of God is very concrete: it is Jesus Christ. And although Dionysius shows us, following Proclus, the harmony of the heavenly choirs in such a way that it seems they all depend on one antoher, it is true that on our journey toward God we are still very far from him. Pseudo-Dionysisu shows that in the end the journey to God is God himself, who makes himself close to us in Jesus Christ. Thus, a great and mysterious theology also becomes very concrete, both in the interpretation of the liturgy and in the discourse on Jesus Christ. With all this, Dionysius the Areopagite exerted a strong influence on all medieval theology and on all mystical theology, both in the East and in the West. He was virtually rediscovered 28 English for Religious Studies in the 13th century, especially by St. Bonaventure, the great Franciscan theologian who in this mystical theology found the conceptual instrument for reinterpreting the heritage—so simple and profound—of St Francis. Together with Dionysius, the Povererello tells us that in the end love sees more than reason. Where the light of love shines the shadows of reason are dispelled; love sees, love is an eye and experience gives us more than reflection. Bonaventure saw in St Francis what this experience is: it is the experience of a very humble, very realistic journey, day by day. It is walking with Christ, accepting his Cross. In this poverty and in this humility, in the humility that is also lived in ecclesiality, is an experience of God which is loftier than that attained by reflection. In it we really touch God’s Heart. Today Dionysius the Areopagite has a new relevance: he appears as a great mediator in the modern dialogue between Christianity and the mystical theologies of Asia, whose characteristic feature is the conviction that it is impossible to say who God is, that only indirect things can be said about him; that God can only be spoken of with the ‘not’, and that it is only possible to reach him by entering into this indirect experience of’not’. And here a similarity can be seen between the thought of the Areopagite and that of Asian religions; he can be a mediator today as he was between the Greek spirit and the Gospel. In this context it can be seen that dialogue does not accept superficiality. It is precisely when one enters into the depths of the encounter with Christ that an ample space for dialogue also opens. When one encounters the light of truth, one realises that it is a light for everyone. Polemics disappear and it is possible to understand one another, or at least to speak to one another, to come closer. The path of dialogue consists precisely in being close to God in Christ, in a deep encounter with him, in the experience of the truth which opens us to the light and helps us reach out to others— with the light of truth, the light of love. And in the end, he tells us: take the path of experience, the humble experience of faith, every day. Then the heart is enlarged and can see and also illumine reason so that it perceives God’s beauty. Let us pray to the Lord to help us today too to place the wisdom of our day at the service of the Gospel, discovering ever anew the beauty of faith, the encounter with God in Christ. (L’osservatore romano, (weekly edition in English) 21 May 2008, p 11 (extracts) 29 English for Religious Studies 11 Hugo Meynell, “A Letter to Professor Dawkins” Heythrop Journal 49.4 The main part of my letter has to do with the rationality of belief in the existence of God. Now there are two types of explanation which we generally take for granted in our dealing with the world: that which appeals to physical causes, and is taken to magnificent lengths in your physical sciences; and that which is in terms of agents acting for reasons. (Gilbert Ryle, the famous philosopher of mind, is said to have been asked on one occasion what was the ultimate furniture of the universe; and to have replied, “Things and chaps”.) Now there is something of a puzzle about how thing-explanation is to be related to chap-explanation. I think you would probably say, as you confessed yourself a materialist monist, that chap-explanation is merely a very complicated sort of thing-explanation (I think this is a necessary corollary of materialism), though chap-explanation would presumably survive as a convenient shorthand, just as we still say, in spite of Copernicus, that the sun rises. But I think— and this is a crucial aspect of my case—that this must be a mistake. What is more, the matter has very important bearings on the very possibility of science, as we shall see. Now I regard the natural sciences as perhaps the supreme spiritual achievement of humankind. That statement is obviously a bit of coat-trailing; what on earth could I mean by it? I would begin with the counter-question: To what are the great achievements of science due, and why do the rest of us believe scientists, and rightly believe them, on the topics in which they specialise? Philosophers of science are as contentious as most sorts of philosophers; but I do not think any of them would disagree with the following summary account. They are due to people having attended to the relevant evidence in experience; having envisaged an adequate number of possibilities or hypotheses to account for that experience; and having preferred in each case the hypothesis which best fits the experience—as opposed, say, to the one that suits their inherited prejudices or the wishes of their paymasters. Let us say summarily that they have been attentive, intelligent and reasonable in relation to the relevant experience—we may say ‘rational’ for short. It seems to me a cardinal point in metaphysics, that the universe which we get to know by being rational in the way I have described, must be intelligible; it amounts to one consistent set of intelligible possibilities; which set, it is the business of reasonableness progressively to determine. 30 English for Religious Studies So far as I can see from my reading, some scientists excel in attentiveness, some in intelligence and reasonableness. Tycho Brahe had attended to the positions of the planets as he saw them in the night sky, and recorded them. Both on the Ptolemaic view and on the crude Copernican one, where the planets were supposed to be travelling in circular orbits round the sun, this gave rise to some anomalies which set Kepler wondering about possible explanations. He intelligently (if I remember rightly, C.S. Peirce said that it was one of the supreme intellectual feats in human history) hypothesized that the anomalies would disappear if the planets were thought to be travelling in elliptical orbits within which the sun was one of the foci, and if straight lines from the sun to the any particular planet always swept out equal areas. And when he reasonably considered how well his hypothesis stood up to Brahe’s data as compared with others, this turned out to be correct. Darwin (whose first cousin, by the way, I can’t work out quite how many times removed, I am very proud of being) seems to have excelled in all three capacities. He attended to his Galapagos finches, which raised questions in his mind; why did otherwise very similar species, in these isolated conditions, have thick bills on one island where nuts were readily available, and thin bills on another, where a bird had to prod in crevices for insects? Would this not be very neatly explained by the finches which had thicker bills tending to survive and breed successfully on nutisland, and those with the thinner bills on insect-island? Could not this account be readily extended to the whole biomass, with species developing according to random mutation and natural selection, rather than being brought into existence each by special creation? (As I remember, at one point late in The Origin of Species, Darwin actually suggests that the resulting idea of God, as planning and executing creation as it were in a single sweep, was much nobler than that of God engaging in perpetual petty interferences as would be involved in multitudes of special creations.) I have suggested that agent-explanation is irreducible, on the grounds that, if it were not, science, as involving people believing things because there was really good reason to do so, would be impossible. Now I take it that the idea of God is basically that of a being who intelligently conceives all possible worlds, and wills that which actually exists; in other words, that of an agent. Rather as you can here and now either apply yourself to your next article on the obscurantism and other evils of religion; or have a shave; or do nothing; so God in eternity can decide either to create a universe which has elephants and uranium in it; or to create a universe which doesn’t have 31 English for Religious Studies elephants and uranium in it; or to not create it at all. But why postulate such an agent? To account for the fact the universe is intelligible. And it is intelligible because science is possible. Scientists (here I speak as a fool) are often having reasonably to abandon a hypothesis in the light of the evidence; but they never doubt—or I hope they don’t—that some hypothesis will explain the evidence. God’s intelligence is needed to explain the intelligibility of the world (unless, as poor old Kant thought, we somehow put the intelligibility there ourselves); God’s will to explain that it has the particular intelligibility that it is found to have—in terms of special relativity rather than the luminous aether, in terms of oxygen rather than phlogiston, in terms of the selfish gene rather than whatever alternative someone might think up. “But Mummy, who made God?” Certainly, in invoking God as in some kind of causal relation to the universe, the would-be rational theist is under some obligation to show that the same kind of argument is not needed again, and so ad inifinitum. But, briefly, if God is supposed to be the intelligent will on whose fiat all else depends for its existence, one cannot properly ask, “on what does that depend?” One might protest, “Well, by ‘the universe’ one means ‘all that exists’. What could be neither that as a whole nor a part of it, other than nothing?” The proper question is then, within the universe in the sense of ‘all that exists’, is there good reason to suppose that there is something related to the rest of what exists rather as cause to effect, or agent to product? The odd conspiracy between the structure of our minds and the structure of the universe suggests that there is something in the depths of the universe analogous to our minds. Here we are, on a tiny bit of rock orbiting an insignificant sun on the outskirts of a galaxy of tens of millions of stars, with the galaxy itself one of tens of millions; yet we can compass the depths of space and time with our thought. C.S. Lewis, in considering what he called the popular scientific world-view, said that one central inconsistency ruins it; we are asked to believe at once that nature at large is at bottom a random and fortuitous material process, and reason a completely incidental offshoot of this; and yet we rely on reason, and rightly so, to penetrate the depths of the material universe. What he meant has been developed at length in the work of the greatest Christian philosopher of the twentieth century: the late Bernard Lonergan. His theory of knowledge is based basically on the selfdestructiveness of the notion that we do not apprehend the truth about the world and what is good in action, by being as fully rational as possible. 32 English for Religious Studies 33 English for Religious Studies 12 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Chapter 3 A Revisionist Model for Contemporary Theology In its briefest expression, the revisionist model holds that a contemporary fundamental Christian theology can best be described as philosophical reflection upon the meanings present in common human experience and language, and upon the meanings present in the Christian fact. To explain and defend this model for the task of theology, five these will be proposed which are intended to explicate the principal meanings involved in this model of theology. The structure of the present argument is best grasped by an understanding of the interrelationships of the theses themselves. The first thesis defends the proposition that there are two sources for theology, common human experience and language, and Christian texts. The second thesis argues for the necessity of correlating the results of the investigations of these two sources. The third and fourth theses attempt to specify the most helpful methods of investigation employed for studying these two sources. The fifth and final thesis further specifies the final mode of critical correlation of these investigations as an explicitly metaphysical or transcendental one. At the time of the discussion of this final thesis, one should be able to provide a summary of the meaning and truth-value of the present model proposed for theology, viz., philosophical reflections upon common human experience and language, and upon Christian texts. There are, of course, thorny problems and several alternative views possible not only for the model as a whole, but for each ‘thesis’ in the model. I hope that the lengthier discussions of the later chapters may serve to clarify why those alternative views have not been followed—or perhaps should have been followed. First Thesis: The Two Principal Sources for Theology are Christian Texts and Common Human Experience and Language This thesis seems the least problematic of the five proposed. For it seems obvious that any enterprise called Christian theology will attempt to show the appropriateness of its chosen categories to the meanings of the major expressions and texts of the Christian tradition. This source of the theological task is variously labelled: the message as with Paul Tillich, the kerygma as with Rudolf Bultmann, the Christian witness of faith as with Schubert Ogden, the tradition as with most contemporary Catholic theologians. 34 English for Religious Studies Whatever title is chosen, the recognition of the need for the Christian theologian to show just how and why his conclusions are appropriate to the Christian tradition remains as obvious in its demand as it proves to be difficult in its execution. A subsidiary but no unimportant corollary of this demand is that the scriptures remain the fundamental although not exclusive expression of that Christian faith. Hence a principal task of the theologian will be to find appropriate interpretations of the major motifs of the scriptures and of the relationship of those interpretations to the confessional, doctrinal, symbolic, theological and praxis expressions of the various Christian traditions. Except for those few theologians who would maintain that theology is without remainder a philosophical reflection upon our contemporary experience and language, this commitment to determining the ability of contemporary formulations to state the meanings of Christian texts remains an obvious, albeit difficult task. Even from the limited perspective of this understanding of the nature of a theologian’s responsibility to the tradition, it would also seem that the task of theology involves an attempt to show the adequacy of the major Christian theological categories for all human experience. In fact, insofar as the scriptures claim that the Christian self-understanding does, in fact, express an understanding of authentic human existence as such, the Christian theologian is impelled to test precisely that universalist claim. He will ordinarily do so by developing criteria that generically can be labelled ‘criteria of adequacy’ to common human experience. Whether this source of theological reflection can be called the ‘situation’ as with Paul Tillich, the ‘contemporary scientific world view’ as with Rudolf Bultmann, the contemporary phenomenon of a full-fledged ‘historical consciousness’ as with Bernard Lonergan, or ‘common human experience’ as here, again the task seems a fully necessary one. However, this demand is not forced upon the Christian theologian only by his commitment to the authentic aspects of modernity, much less by a search for contemporary relevance. Rather that task is primarily demanded for inner theological reasons. Rudolf Bultmann, for one, clarifies these reasons by his firm insistence that demythologizing is demanded not only by the contemporary world-view but also by the universalist, existential assumptions of the New Testament self-understanding itself. This commitment to determine methods and criteria which can show the adequacy of Christian self-understanding for all human experience is a task demanded 35 English for Religious Studies by the very logic of the Christian affirmations; more precisely, by the Christian claim to provide the authentic way to understand our common human existence. This insight theologically disallows any attempt to force a strictly traditional inner-theological understanding of the sources of theological reflection. Whether that inner theological self-understanding be explicated through any of the forms of theological orthodoxy or through the kind of neo-orthodoxy represented by Karl Barth in the Church Dogmatics is a relatively minor matter. The major insight remains the insistence present in theological reflection at least since Schleirmacher: the task of a Christian theology intrinsically involves a commitment to investigate critically both the Christian faith in its several expressions and contemporary experience in its several cultural expressions. In this important sense one may continue to find Schleiermacher’s slogan for the task of theology still accurate: “The theses of faith must become the hypotheses of the theologian”. 36 English for Religious Studies 13 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.2 Two Sources of Theology Second Thesis: The Theological Task will involve a Critical Correlation of the Results of the Investigations of the Two Sources of Theology Given the fact of two sources needing investigation, some way of correlating the results of these investigations must be developed. The full dimensions of this task of correlation cannot, of course, be developed until the methods of investigation analysed in the next two theses are clarified. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to clarify the need for some method of correlation. Perhaps the clearest way to clarify the meaning of this thesis will be to compare the method of correlation proposed here with the best known method of correlation in contemporary theology, Paul Tillich’s. This ‘clarification through contrast’ procedure is here a useful one since so many contemporary theologians are justly indebted to Tillich for formulating the task of theology in terms of the general model of a method of correlation. There are, it is true, some significant differences between the Tillichian notions of ‘situation’ and ‘message’ and the present articulation of the two sources of theology as ‘common human experience’ and ‘Christian texts’. Still, the twofold nature of the theologian’s commitment implied by these expressions, as well as the recognition that such a commitment logically involves the need for some kind of correlation, is a shared position. Moreover, one may continue to find Tillich’s articulation of the ideal for contemporary theology to be fundamentally sound. As Tillich expresses it in volume I of the Systematics, the ideal contemporary theological position would provide an Aufhebung of both liberalism and neo-orthodoxy. As Tillich expresses the same ideal in his introduction to volume II, the theologian must attempt to move beyond both classical ‘supernaturalism’ and secular ‘naturalism’ by developing some form of ‘selftranscending naturalism’. In sum, Paul Tillich’s position continues to seem peculiarly helpful: for his expression of the proper ideal of contemporary theology; for his insistence that only an investigation of both ‘situation’ and ‘message’ can hope to fulfil this ideal; and for his articulation of the need for some general model of correlation as the proper response to this need. However, many critics find Tillich’s own formulation of how the method of correlation actually functions neither intrinsically convincing nor consistent with the task of theology which he himself articulates. The fact is that Tillich’s method does 37 English for Religious Studies not call for a critical correlation of the results of one’s investigations of the ‘situation’ and the ‘message’. Rather, his method affirms the need for a correlation of the ‘questions’ expressed in the ‘situation’ with the ‘answers’ provided by the Christian ‘message’. Such a correlation, in fact, is one between ‘questions’ from one source and ‘answers’ from the other. Even on the limited basis of the position defended in the first thesis, one cannot but find unacceptable this formulation of the theological task of correlation. For if the ‘situation’ is to be taken with full seriousness, then its answers to its own questions must also be investigated critically. Tillich’s method cannot really allow this. A classic example of this difficulty can be found in Tillich’s famous dictum, “Existentialism is the good luck of Christian theology”. We are all indebted to Tillich’s brilliant reinterpretation pointing out the heavy debt which existentialist analyses of man’s estranged situation owe to classical Christian anthropology. Yet no one (not even a Christian theologian!) can decide that only the questions articulated by a particular form of contemporary thought are of real theological interest. Correlatively, from the viewpoint of the Christian message itself, the very claim to have an answer applicable to any human situation demands logically that a critical comparison of the Christian ‘answer’ with all other ‘answeres’ be initiated. To return to the existentialist example, why do we not find in Tillich a critical investigation of the claims that either Jean-Paul Sartre’s or Karl Jaspers’ philosophies of existence provide a better ‘answer’ to the question of human estrangement than the Christian ‘answer’ does? In summary, a commitment to two sources for theology does imply the need to formulate a method capable of correlating the principal questions and answers of each source. Yet Tillich’s method of correlation is crucially inadequate. Tillich’s implicit commitment to two sources and his explicit insistence upon a theological ideal which transcends both naturalism and supernaturalism could be successfully executed only by a method which develops critical criteria for correlating the questions and the answers found in both the ‘situation’ and the ‘message’. Any method which attempts less than that cannot really be called a method of correlation. Tillich’s method does not actually correlate; it juxtaposes questions from the ‘situation’ with answers from the ‘message’. Insofar as this critique is true, the contemporary theologian can accept Tillich’s articulation of the need for a method of correlation, but he cannot accept Tillich’s own model for theology as one which actually correlates. 38 English for Religious Studies 14 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.3 Phenomenology Third Thesis: The Principal Method of Investigation of the Source ‘Common Human Experience and Language’ can be described as a Phenomenology of the ‘Religious Dimension’ present in everyday and scientific Experience and Language. The principal intention of this thesis is to clarify the method needed to investigate the first source of theology. It should be emphasized at once, however, that the present thesis does not involve a determination of the truth-value of the meanings uncovered. Rather this thesis merely attempts to analyze what method will best allow those meanings to be explicated as accurately as possible. A widely accepted dictum of contemporary theological thought holds that all theological statements involve an existential dimension, indeed a dimension which includes a claim to universal existential relevance. On that basis it seems fair to conclude that the theologian is obliged to explicate how and why the existential meanings proper to Christian self-understanding are present in common human experience. As long as one’s understanding of the concept experience is not confined to Humean sense-data but involves a recognition of the pre-reflective, pre-conceptual, pre-thematic realm of the everyday, then the task of theology in this moment of its enterprise seems clear. That task is the need to explicate a pre-conceptual dimension to our common shared experience that can legitimately be described as religious. Historically, that task is best represented by the liberal theological tradition’s search for a method capable of explicating an ultimate or final horizon of meaning to our common everyday life and language, and to our scientific and ethical reflection which can properly be described as both ultimate and religious. One way of formulating this task is to suggest that contemporary phenomenological method is the method best suited for it. The reasons for the choice of the title ‘phenomenology’ at this point are basically twofold. First, several major figures in the phenomenological tradition from Max Scheler through the recent work of Langdon Gilkey have demonstrated the effectiveness of phenomenological reflection in explicating that final or ultimate horizon precisely as a religious one. Second, the history of phenomenological reflection on the nature of the method itself has developed ever more sophisticated ways to formulate the full dimensions of any phenomenological investigation. Indeed, phenomenological method has undergone several important transformations from the earlier ‘eidetic’ 39 English for Religious Studies formulations of Husserl and the Göttingen circle through the existential phenomenology of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Scheler, and the early Heidegger to the hermeneutic phenomenology of Gadamer, the later Heidegger, and Paul Ricoeur. Each of these redefinitions of the nature of phenomenology has been impelled by the inability of an earlier method to explicate the full dimensions of the phenomena uncovered by earlier reflection. If the most recent formulations of phenomenology’s task (the hermeneutic) be sound, then it seems reasonable to suggest that theologians might employ such a method to analyze those symbols and gestures present to our everyday life and language that may legitimately manifest a religious dimension to our lives. To be sure, the present position does not argue that only phenomenological method can succeed in this analysis. It does argue that a recognition of the real possibilities of that method promises a new surety to the several attempts to explicate the religious dimension of our common experience and language. As one example of phenomenology’s relative adequacy for theology’s task, consider the crucial question of the linguistic and symbolic character of our experience. On that question, it seems clear that so-called ‘hermeneutic phenomenology’ is far better prepared than either the ‘reformed subjectivist principle’ of the Whiteheadians or the earlier ‘critical phenomenology’ of Pual Tillich to explicate the linguistic (usually symbolic) character of everyday experience; this holds as well for the properly linguistic and symbolic dimensions of the final and ultimate horizon of that world as religious. Not a plea for exclusive rights, the argument for phenomenology takes the form of suggesting its relative adequacy for uncovering the full dimensions of the common task. Thus far in this third thesis the emphasis has been upon the kind of method needed for this common theological task. Hopefully, such an emphasis does not obscure the nature of the task itself: the continued search in most contemporary theology for an adequate expression of the religious dimension of our common experience and language. To repeat, that task seems demanded both by the universalist claim of Christian self-understanding and by the otherwise inexplicable character of our shared experience itself. In fact, so complex does this aspect of theology’s contemporary task become that only a phenomenology in continued conversation with those human sciences which investigate the religious dimension in human existence, and in conversation 40 English for Religious Studies with other philosophical methods can really hope to succeed. As an example of such collaboration, it may prove helpful to close this thesis with mention of a few conversation partners available at the moment. The work of Paul Tillich on this question (viz., his analysis of the religious ‘ultimate concern’ involved in the human ‘situation’) has, in fact, been continued and refined by the work of such diverse interpreters of Tillich as Langdon Gilkey, Tom Driver, Nathan Scott and David Kelsey. The work of Bernard Lonergan on the religious dimension in human cognition and action is presently being advanced both by Lonergan himself, in his more recent work, and by Lonergan interpreters such as John Dunne, David Burrell, and Michael Novak. Enterprises like these are, I believe, central to any serious contemporary attempt at fundamental theology. 41 English for Religious Studies 15 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.4 Hermeneutics Fourth Thesis: The Principal Method of Investigation of the Source ‘The Christian Tradition’ can be described as an Historical and Hermeneutical Investigation of Classical Christian Texts. This thesis begins with a truism: if the Christian theologian must articulate the meaning of the phenomenon variously called the ‘Christian fact’, ‘witness’, ‘message’, or ‘tradition’, then he is obliged to enter into the discussion of the nature of the disciplines of history and hermeneutics. This thesis does not pretend to resolve the many problems encompassed by historical and hermeneutical knowledge. Rather, it attempts only to outline the particular understandings of the historical and hermeneutical methods that may prove helpful for this aspect of the theological task. The theological need for history and hermenutics concerns us first. If the phenomenon labelled the ‘Christian fact’ includes the significant gestures, symbols and actions of the various Christian traditions, then the theologian must learn those historical methods capable of determining exactly what facts can be affirmed as probable. For the present investigation of texts, he must also learn historical methods in order to allow for the historical reconstruction of the basic texts of Christian selfunderstanding. On that historical basis of reconstruction, the theologian must then find a hermeneutic method capable of discerning at least the central meanings of the principal textual expressions of Christianity (viz., the scriptural). The general need for historical method articulated here is a modest one. It does not imply that the theologian employ a specific category like ‘salvation-history’ as a useful theological one. The call for historical method does imply that the theologian as historian pay heed to those historical reconstructions of Christian events and texts which modern historical scholarship has made available. The argument for historical method implied by the first three theses, then, is a limited but important aspect of the theologian’s larger task. If one were to define Christian theology as simply a philosophy of religion, then historical method need not be employed. But if Christian theology is adequately defined only as a philosophical reflection upon both common human experience and language and upon Christian texts, then a historical reconstruction of the central texts of that tradition is imperative. Perhaps the exact nature of the historical task of the theologian might best be understood by recalling a familiar instance of its exercise. That instance is the common Christian affirmation “Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ”. That exercise is the 42 English for Religious Studies attempt to determine what historical and hermeneutical methods can best aid the contemporary theologian to understand what Christians have actually meant by this familiar affirmation. Rather than spelling out at length an understanding of historical and hermeneutic methods, in the remainder of this thesis I shall risk the belief that these crucial theological tasks are best grasped by examining their emergence in a specific theological problem. That problem is the primary existential meanings of Christological texts. The first questions to be addressed to the affirmation that “Jesus is the Christ” are ordinarily historical ones. The historian does want to know what conclusions historical inquiry can reach about the person Jesus of Nazareth and about the belief of the Christian community that Jesus was the Christ. On these historical questions it seems fair to state that, short of a position like J.M. Allegro’s at least, the accumulation of historical evidence on the existence of Jesus of Nazareth seems secure, even if the range of interpretations of his significance is wide indeed. Yet whatever interpretation of the ‘historical Jesus’ is accepted as most probable by various historians through old and new ‘quests’, the principal factor demanding theological clarification is the religious existential meaning expressed in the New Testament Christological texts as those texts are reconstructed by contemporary historical scholarship. If the historian can reconstruct the texts in question, then the next problem becomes the need to discover what discipline will allow one to determine the meanings of those metaphors, symbols, and ‘images’ used in the New Testament texts to express the religious significance of the proclamation that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ. Much of the language of the New Testament is metaphorical, symbolic, and parabolic as distinct from conceptual; the principal meaning expressed by the texts is one which manifests or represents what can be properly labelled a religious meaning, a religious way of being-in-the-world. These two factors can be discerned by various combinations of historical and linguistic methods. Yet to determine with greater exactness the full meaning of the ‘images’ demands a more explicit formulation of the hermeneutic, as distinct from the historical task. The present discussion of that hermeneutical task does not pretend to provide an exhaustive analysis. Indeed, the history of reflection on the nature of that notoriously complex discipline makes one justifiably wary of any exhaustive claims. For the moment, I will simply advance certain contemporary refinements of the 43 English for Religious Studies hermeneutic tradition which seem applicable to the problem of discerning the meanings embedded in any written text—and only such developments in recent hermeneutic theory which seem particularly apt for illustrating the nature of the theologian’s hermeneutic commitment. The first development with which we are concerned is the process of linguistic ‘distanciation’ expressed, for example, in the character of written as distinct from spoken language. Summarily stated, this recent development in contemporary linguistic and hermeneutic theory allows the prospective interpreter to understand that a written text, precisely as written, is distanced both from the original intention of the author and from its original reception by its first addressees. If this be correct, the hermeneutic circle as it is ordinarily formulated by theologians needs reformulation. For the task of interpretation is not best understood in terms of the interpreter’s own subjectivity attempting to grasp the subjectivity either of the author’s intentions or of the original addressee’s reception of its meaning. Neither should the interpreter, as his principal concern, attempt to uncover the subjectivity of the historical person (here, Jesus of Nazareth) described in certain images and symbols (e.g., ‘Son of Man’, ‘the Christ’, ‘Prophet’) which seemed especially germane for representing the existential significance of this person. If this be the case, it does not seem to be of major theological import to engage in old and new quests for the historical Jesus as something distinct from finding a hermeneutic method capable of explicating the meanings of those Christological texts referring both to Jesus and to a certain Christian mode-of-being-in-the-world. A second major development in contemporary hermeneutic and linguistic theory should allow one to approach that latter task with greater surety. That development is the insistence that the contemporary interpreter must distinguish clearly between the ‘sense’ and the ‘referents’ of the text and hence between the methods needed to explicate each. The ‘sense’ of the text means the internal structure and meaning of the text as that structure can be determined through the ordinary methods of semantic and literary –critical inquiries. The ‘referents’ of the text do not pertain to the meaning ‘behind’ the text (e.g., the author’s real intention or the sociocultural situation of the text). Rather, to shift metaphors, ‘referent’ basically manifests the meaning ‘in front of’ the text, i.e., that way of perceiving reality, that mode of being-in-the-world which the text opens up for the intelligent reader. 44 English for Religious Studies Although this understanding of ‘referent’ is not divorced from either prior historical or semantic investigations, still ‘referent’ here is clearly distinct from those prior factors. Further, the referents of the text, on this understanding, are the factors demanding a properly hermeneutical as distinct from wither an historical or a semantic exercise. To show why this understanding of the hermeneutic task of the theologian seems sound, once can concretize the discussion by applying it to the task of understanding the existential referent of the New Testament affirmation that “Jesus is the Christ”. At least four related methods are needed for this task: the historical method, semantics, literary-critical methods, and finally, the explicitly hermeneutical. First, the historian, by a full application of his methods of historical inquiry, can reconstruct the christological texts, i.e., both those texts of Jesus and about Jesus. Semantics can then help the interpreter to determine the linguistic structure of the images and symbols involved in the text. With literary-critical methods, the interpreter can determine the particular character of the literary genres by means of which the images, metaphors and symbols are structured, codified and transformed. Still the meaning of major import to the theologian remains a concern that can be formulated by a question like the following: what is the mode-of-being-in-theworld referred to by the text? That question is not really answered until an explicitly hermeneutic enterprise is advanced. On this understanding, hermeneutics is the discipline capable of explicating the referent as distinct from either the sense of the text or the historical reconstruction of the text. [Cut paragraph on Herbert Braun.] Such a determination of a religious referent would, in fact, complete the explicitly hermeneutic task of the theologian. The further question of the truth-status of the referent explicated by hermeneutics remains. For that question, a distinct mode of reflection is needed. Even if his hermeneutic enterprise were successful, the theologian must still face the further task of correlating the results of his hermeneutic reflections with the results of his reflections upon contemporary experience and language. To achieve this correlation he must ask what further reflective discipline will allow him to determine whether his earlier conclusions can legitimately be described not only as accurate meanings but also as true. It will be the purpose of the fifth and final thesis to articulate one understanding of what discipline can undertake this. 45 English for Religious Studies 16 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, Ch. 3.5 Transcendental Method Fifth Thesis: To determine the Truth-Status of the Results of one’s Investigations into the Meaning of both Common Human Experience and Christian Texts the Theologian should employ an explicitly Transcendental or Metaphysical Mode of Reflection. This final thesis on the task of fundamental theology is probably the least commonly accepted position of those argued for thus far. For that reason, I will concern myself here with the attempt to show only the need for and the basic nature of the metaphysical reflection involved in the task of theology. The word ‘need’ is used advisedly since the proposed argument for metaphysical inquiry is not posed as one alternative way of doing theology. Rather the present claim is that, if the argument of the first four theses is sound, then one cannot but recognize an exigence for metaphysical or transcendental reflection. Indeed, by recalling the conclusions of these earlier theses we should also be able to show the need for the metaphysical reflection suggested here. Summarily stated, the argument has had the following structure: there are two sources for theology (common human experience and language, and Christian texts); those two sources are to be investigated by a hermeneutic phenomenology of the religious dimension in common human experience and language and by historical and hermeneutic investigations of the meanings referred to by Christian texts; the results of these investigations should be correlated to determine their significant similarities and differences and their truth-value. The kind of correlation needed depends, of course, primarily upon the nature of the phenomena manifested in the prior investigation of the two sources. Thus far, the argument has been principally for the formal methods of investigation needed as distinct from the material conclusions reached by such methods. Yet in order to show the need for metaphysical inquiry it will be necessary to advance the earlier discussion by suggesting what conclusions may be reached by contemporary investigations of the type outlined above. In the case of a phenomenology of ordinary experience and language, several contemporary thinkers have tried to show how a religious dimension is present to our cognitive, moral, and everyday experience and language. [Cut] As a first example, let us recall the existentialist analysis of the manifestation of No-thing (i.e., no object in the world alongside other objects) in an analysis of the phenomenon of anxiety as distinct from the phenomenon of fear. That analysis has provided an occasion not only to show the meaning an possibility of metaphysics (as 46 English for Religious Studies for Heidegger), but also to show the meaning and possibility of a ‘negative’ entry point to a final, ultimate, and properly religious horizon to our everyday lives. As a second example, the process philosopher’s analysis of the phenomenon of that fundamental confidence or trust in existence continually re-presented in the self-conscious faith of our everyday, our scientific, and our moral activities has also provided a way of rendering meaningful the basic ‘faith’ operative in our secular lives. As a third example, Paul Tillich’s analysis of the inevitable presence of an ultimate (as distinct from a finite) concern in all human activity (however ‘demonic’ the forms of such ultimacy may become) has rendered intelligible the ontological status of an authentically religious dimension. As a final example, Bernard Lonergans’s analysis of the ‘formally unconditioned’ factor presupposed by scientific and moral inquiry as well as his more recent analysis of explicitly religious experience as “a being-in-love-withoutqualification” manifests a similar explication of the kinds of meanings present in either the implicitly religious dimensions of our secular lives or the explicitly religious language of the Christian tradition. Moreover, in an intellectual context where a religious dimension to everyday experience and language has been rendered intelligible, the question of God can be formulated anew as the question of the necessary referent (or object) of such a religious or ‘basic faith’ dimension. This theistic question, to be sure, involves further and extensive reflection insofar as it is the case that even some explicitly religious persons (e.g., some Buddhist and lately some Christian theologians) are also nontheistic. However, the theistic question itself seems both logically unavoidable and… capable of receiving a positive answer once an authentically religious dimension is admitted and explicated. Correlatively, if one accepts the notion of ‘referent’ articulated in the previous thesis, then religious and theistic meanings can also emerge from properly hermeneutic investigations of Christian texts. From the viewpoint of historical investigation, a secure conclusion would seem to be that whatever else Christianity has been it has also been (and ordinarily understood itself to be) a theistic religion. From the viewpoint of the kind of hermeneutic enterprise suggested above, the referent of the classical texts of the Christian tradition can be described as a religious way of being-in-the-world which understands itself in explicitly theistic terms. It is 47 English for Religious Studies true, of course, that the further specifications of that Christian way of being-in-theworld can be and will continue to be variously described. [Cut] If the interpretation of both contemporary experience and language and of Christian texts could legitimately reach such similar conclusions, then the first moment of critical correlation—the comparative moment—would be accomplished. For the results of one’s investigations into both major sources of theology would conclude to an identical insight: the fundamentally religious and theistic selfunderstanding presupposed by common way human experience and language and explicitly referred to in representative Christian texts. But even this moment of correlation does not complete the theological task. Comparative analysis may allow one to know the basic religious referents of Christian texts and the fundamental meaningfulness of religious and theistic categories for common experience and language. Such analysis does not of and by itself resolve the question of the truthstatus of such meanings. For that we must ask what reflective discipline can adequately investigate the truth-claims of the religious and theistic meanings manifested by the prior investigations. The exact nature of that discipline is admittedly difficult to determine. However, certain characteristics of the discipline seem clear. First, the discipline will have to be a reflective one capable of articulating conceptual and not merely symbolic categories. Otherwise, the theologian can never be sure that he has avoided either incoherence or vagueness in determining the cognitive character of religious and theistic claims. Second, the discipline must be able to explicate its criteria for precisely those cognitive claims. It seems fair to affirm that such criteria will involve at least such widely accepted criteria as the following: there must be a necessary and a sufficient ground in our common human experience for such claims; any such claims must have a coherence both internally and with other essential categories of our knowledge and belief. If such criteria are in fact the criteria widely accepted for any cognitive claims, it becomes imperative for the theologian to specify how such criteria might function in theology since theology too makes cognitive claims about the nature of experience. Yet the dimension of meaning in question for theology (the religious) is not simply a meaning coordinate with other meanings like the scientific, the aesthetic, or the ethical. Rather the religious dimension precisely as such can be phenomenologically 48 English for Religious Studies described as an ultimate or grounding dimension or horizon to all meaningful human activities. The reflective discipline needed to decide upon the cognitive claims of religion and theism will itself have to be able to account not merely for some particular dimension of experience but for all experience as such. Indeed, precisely this latter insight is required to show why the theologian cannot resolve the religious and theistic cognitive claims of theology by any ordinary criteria of verification or falsification. Rather the very nature of the cognitive claim involve in religious and theistic statements demands a metaphysical or transcendental mediation. As Antony Flew quite properly insists, an investigation of the cognitive claims of religion and theism demands that one seek to answer two fundamental questions: (1) the ground in our common human experience for having any notions of religion and God at all; (2) how these notions may be conceptually explicated to avoid both vagueness and incoherence. But as it has been argued that Antony Flew fails to see, only a reflective discipline capable of explicating criteria for the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of all experience could really resolve the question of the meaning and truth of authentically religious and theistic claims. One clear way of articulating the nature of the reflective discipline capable of such inquiry is to describe it as ‘transcendental’ in its modern formulation or ‘metaphysical’ in its more traditional expression. As transcendental, such reflection attempts the explicit mediation of the basic presuppositions (or ‘beliefs’) that are the conditions of the possibility of our existing or understanding at all. Metaphysical reflection means essentially the same thing: the philosophical validation of the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘God’ as necessarily affirmed or necessarily denied by all our basic beliefs and understanding. We seem to be unavoidably led to the conclusion that the task of fundamental theology can only be successfully resolved when the theologian fully and frankly develops an explicitly metaphysical study of the cognitive claims of religion and theism as an integral moment in his larger task. [Cut final two paragraphs] 49
