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Author: Anttonen, Saila Maarit Title: The learning processes of morality, the social justice and the recognition (Die moralische Lernprozesse, die soziale Gerechtigkeit und die Anerkennung) Abstract: This article discusses the ambivalent encounters between cultures as a post modern situation. The purpose of this article is to analyse contemporary social and cultural trends on the basis of ambivalent theses on the multicultural society and education. The values and ethics must be examined as part of the social and cultural context which is shaped for instance by the socioeconomic status, the gender and the ethnic identity. The formation of values and ethics is not just a moral question, as it is to a very large extent also a social and economic problem. Also, this is a question of the social justice and the recognition of values and morality of different groups. The problem will be analysed by examining the moral theories which use both the universal and the relativistic approaches. A third road is sought to surpass these antitheses by analysing the discourse ethics introduced by Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault's ethics of transgression, "the ethics of crossing the boundaries", too. Finally, the effects of the education and the ethical education on society and culture are analysed. The alternatives for the social processes of moral learning will be outlined. Document type and origin: An English version of conference paper (in German) will presented in EERA-conference. Network 24 “Open network”. Hamburg 18th September 2003. Suggested key terms: morality, learning, social justice, recognition, postmodernity, multicultural education and society, Foucault, Habermas, feminism Version Number: English version of German paper, which is not direct translation 1 The learning processes of morality, the social justice and the recognition (Die moralische Lernprozesse, die soziale Gerechtigkeit und die Anerkennung) Saila Anttonen University of Lapland Finland 1. Introduction: a void of values or a flood of values in multicultural society? Thesis 1. We are living simultaneously in an increasingly monistic and pluralistic postmodern culture. The monistic tendency of values is caused by the fact that the diminished significance of the fixed collective values of the rural society is making room for the large-scale appearance of commercial values. At the same time, the loosening of collective norms makes a more pluralistic culture possible. The ambivalent tendencies of the postmodern society produce the impression of a void of values. The impression of the void is just a fancy which emerges from the erosion of traditional values produced by the process of modernization. In the minds of people it generates the impression that values which are different from the traditional values are not values at all, as we live in a void of values. The impression is particularly strong at times when very rapid changes are taking place. The increasingly pluralistic culture is a clearer fact in the ambivalent swells of the l990s caused by the quickly changed economic and political situation. In the cultural turmoil the remains of the integrated culture typical of the rural society can still be seen, but their significance is decreasing. Similar erosion has also affected the working-class culture and labour movement which aim at active change and social action. Marx’s “Capital” and “the Bible” have been losing their significance as the basis for people’s sets of values (see e.g. Lyotard, 1985). The changes from the working-class culture and partly also from the middle-class way of living towards an unemployment culture can be seen in an increasingly drastic way in the Finnish society. The problem in the emergence of this postmodern dispersion of values and the superficial yuppie culture is above all the fact that collectiveness and collective consciousness directed to active action have lost part of their significance. From the viewpoint of collective consciousness and action, the idea of a “void of values” is quite justifiable. Subcultures aiming at active influence and action still exist as cultural relics, with the obvious aim of presenting their dissenting opinion 2 when late capitalism is dashing into the life-world of different social groupings, causing a turmoil of values there (see and cf. e.g. Venkula & Raustevaara, 1993.) Examples of such social movements include the feminist movement and the environmental activists. In the broader context this is not about an absolute void of values, as the things which were previously valued are replaced in the life-world of human beings by new objects of valuation. But it is difficult any more to speak about values in their connection, if we assume that there are certain intrinsic values, which are characterized by stability and reasonable permanence. They have been replaced by a postmodern superficiality, in which transient valuation has replaced permanent values. The valuations in the postmodern or late capitalist society are shaped increasingly by the thoroughly commercialised way of living and consumption (see Jameson, 1989). This trend tends to standardize valuations. It forces its way to the consciousness and way of living of all social and cultural groups. It is obvious that all groups do not meet with this commercialism and orientation towards consumption in the same way. This is a consequence of the fact that the late capitalist society has drawn the circles of inequality with increased sharpness, and they determine as such how different social groups can take part in this feast of abundant consumption. Meanwhile this causes a different kind of development. The various cultural groupings and sets of values are differentiated further from each other, because there is more inequality. At the same time, a situation is generated which aggravates the relations of different groups. I will next examine two alternative approaches by means of which it is possible to study the problem of the debate on values and ethical education in the multicultural postmodern society. The approaches built on the theories of morality and ethics presented by Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault are debating at the same time along the dimension between moral universalism and moral relativism. In their own ways, they are both searching for a third way in which this dichotomy could be surpassed. Finally, I will examine the potential trends of moral learning which are opened up by multiculturalization. 3 2. Universal or relativistic morality in multicultural society: from Lawrence Kohlberg to Jürgen Habermas Thesis 2. The examination of questions related to values and ethics in terms of an individual’s free choices or as ethical principles formed in a group is not an adequate starting-point for an analysis of the problem. The values and ethics must be examined as part of the social and cultural context which is shaped for instance by the socio-economic status, gender and ethnic identity. The shaping of values and ethics is not just a moral question, as it is to a very large extent also a social and economic matter. The values and changes in them are not determined directly by economic factors, though, but the economic context is manifesting itself in the sets of values and consciousness of different cultural groups. 2.1. Kohlberg’s monologic universalism and its limits Lawrence Kohlberg and Robert A. Ryncarz (1 990a) reject cultural relativism, according to which every culture has different moral conceptions and basic values. According to the relativist view, values, norms and morality are accepted in certain subcultures, cultures or societies only. They make a distinction between culturally bound rules and the universal principles which are to be found in all cultures and represent universal moral values. Universal principles like these which are to be found in all cultures include those of the respect of human dignity, equality and justice. In criticism of the universality emphasized by Kohlberg et al. we can say that there is not a single culture in which these principles have not been violated, so the violation of these principles can be thought of as a universal phenomenon. On the other hand, they have been required in most cultures, not always universally but within one’s own group. As a concrete example of such a procedure we can mention the National Socialist doctrine and its requirement of the purity of the Aryan race. This was possible because they were not given human dignity, whereby this principle did not apply to them. The conflict between reality and ideals is shown in a very pointed way in Kohlberg’s theory of morality, as the theory does not necessary require the construction of communication between different cultural groups. Only the construction of such a relationship could bring out the problems and limits of universal moral principles. 4 The problem has a marginal position in the theory of Kohlberg & Ryncarz (1990a), because they think that the development of the individuals’ morality follows the same general regularities irrespective of the cultural environment. In terms of her/his moral views, the human being develops in all societies in such a way that s/he moves from preconventional, selfish and egocentric ways of thinking through conventional ways of thinking which respect collective lines of action to judgements and principles which emphasize universality. Acting in accordance with the conventional level means that the contracts and conventions prevailing in society are renewed, which does not, at least in the situation of the modern society, promote the realization of the principle of universal equality. On the postconventional levels, the judgements which emphasize universality begin to act as a yardstick also when the moral views of one’s own community and society are assessed. The criteria for the assessment are human dignity and universal justice. If the laws or the rules of the community conflict with the principles of justice, equality, reciprocity and human rights, the human being who has reached this kind of moral consciousness will act against them. In their theory Kohlberg & Ryncarz (1990a) also develop a cosmic level of moral development on which the individual speculates on the essence of morality. The individual speculates why on the whole it is worth the while to be moral. Why should one act in a moral way? Why should one act in a just way in an unjust world? The human being feels that s/he is part of the great universe and understands that the idea of right and wrong is based on the basic logic of this whole and its preservation. The basis of moral rules is not in the principles which have emerged from social contracts, but in the universal principles which manifest the order of nature. The cosmic law also determines the limits of social life. Ethical action means that we act in such a way that the development of humanity can continue. This requires a universal perspective on moral questions which surpasses the basic sets of values of different cultural groups and the conflicts between them. The monologic nature of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, which leans ultimately on the individual’s development, is seen very clearly when it is compared to the discourse ethics of Habermas which emphasizes intersubjectivity and collectiveness. It does not take into account the intersubjective, discursive context and society in which the moral development of individuals takes place. There are no grounds for arguing that individuals develop on a large scale to postconventional levels in their moral views in Western societies, whose principles of action for the most part and increasingly follow preconventional moral principles. It is not possible to surpass these social contexts, if moral questions are examined only as questions related to the development of individuals. 5 Must note, however, that a strong collective aspect is to be found in the theory of Kohlberg & Ryncarz (1 990a). It is a problem, however, how such a perspective can be constructed. Critical observations could also be presented against the emphasis of morality on developmental theory. Morality does not develop according to some built-in logic of an individual’s development, as it is learned in social interaction. It is always learned in a certain society and culture, whereby the existing unjust context of society and cultural hegemony shapes what is actually learned as morality and as being a moral thing. Sometimes a critical viewpoint can also be learned, through which it is observed that there is a glaring conflict between moral universalism and the real social situation. Gilligan, Murphy & Tappan (1990) criticize Kohlberg’s ethics of universal principles, maintaining that there is no single correct ethical way to act and think, as the ways of action which are ethically right are very much bound to the situation. Gilligan et al. (1990) criticize Kohlberg’s ethics of principles because there is not always any sense in acting on individual inflexible moral principles, as there can often be several correct moral principles in the moral problem situations arising from everyday conflicts. According to them, the emphasis on universality can even serve injustice and inequality on the level of everyday life, which is also proved by the example which I presented above about the teacher who is unconsciously marketing middle-class values as if they were universal values. Gilligan et al. represent a more relativistic view. According to them, no absolutely reliable, universally valid truths or values exist for solving the moral problems which emerge in human interaction. Does Gilligan’s criticism based on the relativism of two moralities warrant rejection of universal moral principles or their reformulation? The basis for the criticism is provided by the idea that the moral orientation which leans on justice is a masculine one, while women’s moral orientation is characterized by caring to others and orientation based on situational moral problems. (also see Nunner-Winkler, 1990; Peltonen 1993). These critical observations do not unambiguously give occasion to the rejection of universal principles, even though the warning based on the cultural bounds about their misuse must be taken seriously. Rather it gives cause to search for a third path in between the dichotomies of moral relativism and universalism. The perspectives are not mutually exclusive but mutually necessary, which I will try to prove next by examining Jürgen Habermas discourse ethics first and in the next chapter Michel Foucault’s “ethics of breaking the bounds”, the ethics of transgression. 2.2. Habermas’ discourse ethics — universal ethical argumentation 6 I will next describe shortly the criticism which Habermas (1990) presents against the theory of moral development by Kohlberg et al. (1990b) and how he develops Kohlberg’s approach into discourse ethics. Discourse ethics holds to the principles of universal justice and equality, but it also takes into account the cultural and value-related variety in the modern society. Its goal is to overcome the rigid controversy between universalism and relativism. Habermas (1990) criticizes the theory of Kohlberg et al. (1 990b) for remaining an activity which is monologic, private and realized in isolation despite its emphasis on taking a universal (or everyone else’s) perspective. Habermas’ own goal is to make this principle into a public event which is put into effect by all people together. The goal of this kind of universal, intersubjective discourse is to overcome the local priorities of things and traditional (conventional) arrangements. Rational and common formation of will and decision-making can only be realized in discursive communication which is characterized by taking into account all the other viewpoints and the ability to criticize the moral views which have been subjected to discussion. However, carrying out such discourses requires that they are reflective argumentation or argumentative debate, in which different arguments and interests are subjected to discussion. A prerequisite is that the argumentation changes previous attitudes, local contracts and views which are bound to one’s own interests. This enables argumentation in which it is possible to go beyond prevailing circumstances and to construct a morality which is universally valid. This is necessary if we adhere to the idea of universal justice and equality in an unjust and unequal world. The idea of such argumentation in which the viewpoints of all people are represented universally entails the idea of the universal and equal possibility of everyone to take part in the formulation of ethical and moral principles. The principles can claim the position of a universal morality only if they are accepted jointly, i.e. by the imaginary community of the world. (for further details, see Habermas, 1983; Habermas, 1990; Anttonen, l993a.) Analysing the boundaries of his discourse ethics, Habermas (1989, 1990) says that the principle of discourse ethics, according to which all the interested parties must accept a norm before universal validity can be claimed for it, is in principle a purely regulating one in the context of discourses which are being realized. Its realization is unlikely and historically more distant. However, the idea can be used as a tool for criticism and to prove how difficult (if not impossible) it is to build a universal perspective like this in the present world, which Habermas actually considers to be modern on the grounds that it has not fully given up the search for a more equal and rightful world. (also see Anttonen, l993b; Anttonen, 1992.) 7 However, we could criticize that Habermas somehow forgets the prevailing injustice when he develops his discourse ethics. He forgets the inequality which is prevailing there and the unevenly distributed resources, which predetermine the context in which this kind of discourse is carried on. If the cards have already been dealt in such a way that someone has all the aces and another one has all the deuces, it is not enough just to say that money and power, among others, distort communication in reality (see Habermas, l987a). Discourse ethics is functional in the coolly rational academic reasoning, but how durable is it in reality as a tool for solving the value conflicts which break through the postmodern culture and the increasingly ambivalent cultural context in which we are proceeding deeper and deeper in the direction of inequality and, at the same time, injustice, and this situation and trend is even thought to be justifiable. (for more details, see Anttonen, l993b; Anttonen, 1993c; Anttonen, 1994) Habermas (1990) is therefore forced to restrict the use of his discourse ethics to the evaluation of collective action and to questions of justification, leaving questions of application outside his analysis to avoid these problems. According to him, going beyond the state of the conflicts of interests requires, however, also solidarity, in which case the principles of solicitude and justice, which Gilligan considered opposite, are actually matched together. Solidarity with the other members of a community cannot, however, be built according to traditionalist solidarity in such a way that it develops into a solidarity in which the individual is ready to sacrifice herself/himself on behalf of the collective system. Habermas mentions the principles of action of Nazi Germany as an example of this kind of non-discursively formed, compelling solidarity. One must be capable of building such a discursiveness in which the arguments go beyond the limits of particular life-worlds (one’s own group, class, community, race, nationality, gender), so that justice and solidarity can become universal. So, these different life-worlds should be brought into a mutual discourse oriented towards mutual understanding to make it possible to make progress on the way to constructing the universal morality. 3. Michel Foucault: the radical politics of dissimilarity and multiculturalism Thesis 3. Moral theories which lean on uncompromising universalism do not seem plausible in the context of postmodern multiculturalism and dissimilarity. This does not mean, however, that we should abandon the requirements for universal justice and equality. A third way must be found, one which goes beyond the dichotomy of staff universalism and relativism. Could Michel Foucault’s relativistically inclined “ethics of breaking the boundaries” contribute 8 something to the analysis of practical questions of application? At least it does function as a critical voice in relation to the very strong demands for universality. As far as I can see, their applicability in the culture of the postmodern radical dissimilarity in particular should be reassessed. In addition, it brings up more importantly than the approaches analysed previously also the viewpoint of those social groups which have not yet in the present had a share in this universal justice (Foucault, 1976; Foucault, 1977; Anttonen, l993b). This point of view is congruent with the views of expert women involved in ethical discussion. They criticize Habermas’ discourse ethics, among other things, because it represents the moral views of the middle-class European man even in its formulations of the principle of discursiveness despite all its emphasis on discursiveness. (see Benhabib, 1988; Gilligan & al. 1990; Nunner-Winkler, 1990; Richters, 1988.) Foucault’s “ethics of breaking the boundaries” and politics of radical dissimilarity starts from this very strong viewpoint of difference. It is built on the idea that a tremendous amount of disciplining and normalizing power has been used in the history of the project of modernity through ethical and moral universalism, making us both subjects and subordinated people at the same time. This is why Foucault thinks that the construction of ‘ethics of dissimilarity” is an urgent challenge of our times. The basic problem is how to build ethical bases which do not, in accordance with the moral principles of modernity, any longer carry out any disciplining and punishing function. (Foucault, 1980.) According to him, religion, law or scientific knowledge as such cannot any longer function as the unquestioned basis for new kinds of ethics, for the simple reason that they have lost some of their significance in shaping people’s value sets in the postmodern, multicultural society. (Richters, 1988; also see Anttonen, 1993a; Foucault, 1976; Foucault, 1977.) For this reason the grounds for new kinds of ethics also become problematic. The old grounds are not good enough for Foucaults (1976; 1977) purposes, because they have, according to him, advanced disciplining and normalizing processes of power throughout the history of modern society. The purpose of these processes has been to produce compliance, obedience and uniformity adhering to strict norms among people, suppressing cultural diversity and radical dissimilarity. In this respect Foucault’s philosophical system is quite similar to Habermas’ (1981) thesis of the colonization of the life-world. The colonization of the life-world means the destruction of cultural diversity by colonizing the different cultural forms in accordance with the ideas of the mainstream. In the late capitalist society, this is effected increasingly by the supranational market and bureaucratic administrative system. In this context we can see more clearly the problem which is included in all non-discursive moral starting-points which demand 9 universality. By means of the demands for universality, it is possible to justify the moral views of a given individual cultural group by claiming that they are universal. Foucault’s ethics of change or breaking the boundaries has the- same intentions as Habermas’ (1991) discourse ethics. Foucault thinks, above all, that his ethical explication is a chance to go beyond the limits which have been implanted in us: By taking this view Foucault steps into the shoes of the victims of normalizing moralism and assumes their perspective more clearly than Habermas does. The grounds for Foucault’s ethics, however, remain on a much more relativistic soil than Habermas discourse ethics. Yet his starting-point which puts an emphasis on radical dissimilarity and diversity of ethics seems to be a more plausible analysis of the truth in the present cultural diversity. At the same time the relativistic nature of his ethical grounds and the penetrativeness of his power analysis in particular also call into question the universalism which Habermas links to the principles of justice, solidarity and equality. This basic difference gives rise to the criticism which Habermas (1987b) and those who are close to his thought have presented against Foucault, even accusing him of moral nihilism and of complete rejection of the moral-political theory. It is actually true that Foucault did not give any public attention to ethical questions nor did he attempt to formulate his own ethical ideas until the early 1980s, a little before he died. Yet we must observe that even Foucault’s pure analysis of power contained certain ethical viewpoints, when he, for instance, outlined the perspective of the subordinated ones and victims. Additionally, his own radical activities in favour of the victims of the social control machinery does not support the assumption that he thought in the Nietzschean way that he was fully beyond morality. (see e.g. Habermas, l987b; Anttonen, 1994; D’Amigo, 1990—91; Dews, 1986; Haaparanta, 1985; Nikolinakos, 1990; Michael, 1990; Foucault, 1978; Richters, 1988; Soper, 1990.) Richters (1988) argues that the Foucauldian approach does not lead to moral nihilism, but only to scepticism in relation to the great objectives and universal goals of modernity. The fundamental challenge of combining the views of Habermas and Foucault, is provided by how to do justice both to radical dissimilarity and to commensurability or to the Habermasian principle of orientation towards consensus and understanding each other. Foucault’s ethics of transgression is a significant supplement to Habermas discourse ethics. At the same time their combination reaches beyond the artificial — yet absolutistically presented — boundary in the dichotomy between relativism and universalism. Is there any obstacle to representing universal dissimilarity or universalism which takes into account plurality? Foucault’s ethics of dissimilarity concentrates its attention especially on the change of attitudes, views and starting- 10 points which Habermasian argumentation hopes for. The basic goal of Foucault’s ethics of breaking the boundaries is to make possible revolting against the ways in which we have been defined, classified and categorized in advance. This viewpoint does not lead into Nietzschean nihilism but to a pessimistic activism, in which the starting-point is provided by seeing the radical dissimilarity of the backyards. Seeing it was also realized in Foucault’s own activities — in concrete action for the groups which were subdued. (see Richters 1988; Eribon, 1993.) 4. Tendencies of moral learning in multicultural society Thesis 4. The crosscurrents caused by the dissimilarity of the life-worlds of different cultural groups are manifested as attempts winged by many kinds of interests to solve the problem of the dispersion of collective identity. The attempts to solve it can also be considered as alternative courses of development for the processes of moral learning. In postmodern culture, crosscurrents are caused by the attempt to restore premodern moralism, modern normalization, modern discursiveness, postmodern plurality and postmodern nihilism. I will finally summarize the various elements of my paper and I will also outline possible tendencies of moral learning from the viewpoint of the problem of recognition. At the same time it faces questions related to values, ethics, morality, justice and equality. The problem of recognition is an ethical problem, because at the same time as we are taking a stand on whether we are to approach these questions from the viewpoint of ethical universalism or relativism, among others, we are also promoting different processes of moral learning. The learning processes are spread through education, shaping the limits within which individuals are developing into subjects and members of society who realize certain ethical principles. At the same time, processes of social learning are realized which are in accordance with the acquired ethical ideas, and these processes can naturally be directed in highly different ways according to the ideas and principles which have been adopted as the basis for the construction of a subject's own action and of common action in particular. On the basis of my previous examinations I will outline a few trends for the processes of moral learning which also direct the development of Western societies for their part — a development which has also been called the project of modernity. Or would it perhaps be more up-to-date to speak about the project of postmodernity? (also see Anttonen, 1992; Anttonen, 1993a.) 11 1. Premodern moralism Premodern moralism represents an attempt at normalizing cultural dissimilarity to restore traditionalist values to power. It is characteristic of premodern moralism that it directs its disapproving attention to everyday action, forgetting at the same time the basic questions of social morality, such as the question of justice. The tendency is functional for the late capitalist social development which is based on the advancement of economic growth, as it also promotes puritanical ethics of obligation and conventions in emphasizing traditional values (also see Weber, 1980). At the same time, these principles support unintentionally such a set of values of postmodern nihilism that make possible the rise of attitudes and values which discriminate other cultural groups. From a setup of an unquestioned set of values it is not possible to build tolerance of other cultural groups and their values. Premodern moralism can be thought of as an attempt to resist the dispersion of common moral consciousness. A return to discipline and order is needed. These attempts at restoration pave the way for the disciplining project of modernity, working for a return to the values of the past, to a solid community and mythical cosmology. It is a project of inequality which also feeds various extremist phenomena, such as racism or sexual discrimination, as it reinforces the boundary of one’s own community and gives its views and actions priority over other groups and cultures. 2. Modern normalization According to Richters (1988), the moral views which have been demanding universality, such as the Western project of modernity which demanded enlightenment of people, have not really represented universality but have rather wished they were universal. The European project of the Enlightenment, for instance, has succumbed to moral imperialism, when it has ignored heterogeneity, otherness and dissimilarity while appealing to universal humanity and human character. To guarantee the credibility of cultural power system, there is an increasingly sore need for a disciplining education in values and standards, a normalization which can in principle accept safe multiculturalism — a multiculturalism which is distant enough from everyday life or whose deviations from “normality” are small enough or the business of sufficiently small groups. It is actually not dangerous to the mainstream culture or to the middleclass machinery of normalization. It is also characteristic of the ethics which produces normalization, as well as of premodern 12 moralism, that an attempt is made to formulate the ethical principles in dichotomies between the ethical and unethical and the more moral and less moral. The application of this starting-point to concrete value problems usually effects only the middle-class orientation of values, which claims or thinks it represents ethical universalism. By means of their seeming universalism, its representatives justify the normalization processes. The capitalist, supranational economic system and the value systems built by it will make sure even in the future that the “void of values” which may develop in transition periods is filled up. 3. Modern discourse ethics and postmodern plurality Habermas’ attempt to build an approach based on discourse ethics and at the same time to reform the basis of moral theories oriented towards universality is significant. It is a proposed solution to resist the dispersed collective consciousness and increased monism in the capitalist society. Its goal is to assemble collective action from the fragments of pluralistic consciousness by looking for new ways to communicate. The problem is that it is difficult to start building communication, if the economic and socio-political context is not taken more clearly into account. Despite all the emphasis on equality, there is the danger of representing the universalism of white, middle-class men. Habermas really represents academically cool discourse ethics, the realization of which is quite unlikely in the multiculturality of the backyards of streets and schools. The postmodern radical dissimilarity reminds us of the difficulties involved in the realization of discourse ethics which assumes equal conditions for discussion. Lyotard’s (1985) description of postmodernity, for instance, is thought provoking. Increased lack of confidence is directed to the great stories, which results in their fragmentation into local stories and cultural language games, which of course makes the construction of communication more difficult. Postmodernity swears by dissimilarity and disagreement. This kind of trend would actually mean that cultures and different subcultures gradually start to disappear as solid entities, changing into more superficial formations, in which the important thing is to play with, for instance, styles, roles and consumption habits. The basic problem in this superficial and seemingly diverse culture is that the social subject and the actor oriented towards active change is fragmented in postmodernity. A good point in it is that in principle the cultural freedom of people to choose their own identity and form of life grows. An interesting question is if this state of cultural dispersion will realize a fragmentation into partial cultures and subcultures, in which the rights of the minorities are violated even more, or if the diversity will give rise to communication and processes of learning which aim at an equal society and in which dissimilarity is not only tolerated but also encouraged? 13 4. Postmodern nihilism Foucault’s ethics of transgression could also be important in the realization of the project described above, especially as the postmodern culture is in danger of turning to moral nihilism, which reveals best that the plurality of postmodernity is apparent. The late capitalist economic system has already drawn the boundaries of pluralism, which only seem to be more flexible than before. At the same time the increasingly strained meritocracy also producers losers with their own subcultures and sets of values. The danger of the relativism of values and moral views is in a collective and social slip from scepticism to moral nihilism. In fact it is already manifesting itself in the form of walking nihilism, which has slipped into a state of valuelessness and indifference after the dispersion of the earlier collectiveness and the solid system of values (McLaren, 1993). The trend of thorough capitalization in our culture supports this situation by building the conditions for inequality which close the trap. Meanwhile moral nihilism prevents those who would have the greatest reasons to demand equality from orienting towards active social action. They flee or are edged outside of it. The possibilities are still open for all of these trends, because tendencies which are parallel to them are still living in contemporary dialectically constructed culture which is becoming both more monistic and pluralistic simultaneously. The encrisement of the monistic system is gnawing at its own foundations and causing a resistance which rises from the life-world of people, which in turn rises from the effects of the encrisement of the system and problems with credibility, forcing different cultural groups to look for a way to communicate (also see Habermas, 1973; Anttonen, l993c). But is finding a way to communicate a real alternative, as no support can be found any longer in any single and uniform collective consciousness? Foucault’s ethics of change and breaking the boundaries could be useful in this context as well, because its specific goal is to add to the capacity to tolerate dissimilarity, which is needed to construct communication between quite different systems of values. Even the Habermasian project of communication could have a place in its realization as a force which provides for communication and mutual solidarity. Could the search for a way to communicate between different groups also act as the key to solving the problem that such a starting-point for universal communication cannot any longer 14 enter the service of disciplining and normalizing power? It opens up perspectives for efforts to construct an even greater equality — an equality which does not, however, suppress the value systems of different cultures but gives them the chance to act from each and everyone’s own starting-points. It is only then that true moral universalism is realized. The combination of Habermas’ discourse ethics and Foucault’s ethics of breaking the boundaries open up new horizons and potentials. Finally, we can note in the spirit of the critical theory of Max Horkheimer (1977) that, even though we were pessimists in our theoretical analyses, we are not left with any other possibilities than to be practical optimists, if we wish to act in favour of a better future and in particular if we wish to take seriously the challenge issued to educators by Theodor W. Adorno (1966): to act as educators for an ethical education which guarantees that Auschwitz never happens again. This is indeed the problem of recognition and education for tolerance. 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