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EŠolutionary Social Psychology
human beings as it has been to the study of all other
living species.
See also: Comparative Psychology; Gender Differences in Personality and Social Behavior; Genes and
Behavior: Animal Models; Primate Socioecology;
Primates, Social Behavior of; Social Psychology:
Research Methods; Sociality, Evolution of; Writing,
Evolution of
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D. T. Kenrick
Evolutionary Theory and Education
1. Introduction
In recent years, Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution
has guided the theoretical and empirical research of an
increasing number of social and behavioral scientists,
an approach that is often called evolutionary
psychology. The goals here are to consider how
evolutionary theory and research in evolutionary psychology can be used to understand children’s academic
development and to explore related educational
issues. Before these issues can be fully appreciated, an
overview of the evolutionary approach to cognition
and development is needed.
2. EŠolution and Cognition
One basic assumption of evolutionary psychologists is
that natural selection has resulted in the evolution of
cognitive competencies that facilitated the survival
EŠolutionary Theory and Education
and reproduction of our ancestors (Cosmides and
Tooby 1994). It is further assumed that most of these
competencies are modular and domain specific, that is,
they are supported by neural and cognitive systems
that are designed to process only certain types of
information. For example, there are dedicated neural
and cognitive systems that process basic language
sounds (e.g., ‘ba,’ ‘pa’) and different systems that
process other types of information, such as the
visuospatial information involved in navigating in the
environment. There are, of course, more general
cognitive systems that coordinate and integrate the
workings of these specialized systems (Smith and
Jonides 1999), but research in evolutionary psychology
tends to be focused on domain-specific cognitive
modules, such as those associated with language.
The issues of modularity, domain specificity, and
the number and organization of any associated cognitive systems are currently debated. Nonetheless, it is
clear that there is some degree of inherent and modular
structure to the human brain and mind, in keeping
with evolutionary theory. The associated neural and
cognitive systems appear to be designed to process
information corresponding to the domains of folk
psychology, folk biology, and intuitive physics (Geary
1998), although there are other modules as well (e.g.,
for basic numerical abilities; Geary 1995). The cognitive modules associated with folk psychology include
language, theory of mind (e.g., being able to make
inferences about the intentions of other people), and
competencies that allow people to interpret the body
language and facial expressions of other people. These
skills allow people to monitor and regulate dyadic
social interactions and to establish and maintain social
relationships. The competencies associated with folk
biology include the ability to classify flora and fauna in
the local ecology, and learn about the associated
growth and behavioral patterns (Atran 1998, Keil
1992). This folk biological knowledge allows people in
preindustrial cultures to classify and categorize local
species, hunt some of these species, and use plants as
medicines, for food and social rituals. Intuitive physics
refers to the neural and cognitive systems that engage
the physical world, and enable people to navigate in 3dimensional space; remember the location of objects
in the environment, and use objects (e.g., stones) to
make tools (Shepard 1994).
The inherent structure and functioning of these
modules appears to be skeletal in nature (Gelman
1990). Early in life, the associated neural and cognitive
systems direct attention to and the initial processing of
domain-specific information, but the normal development of these systems requires input from the
environment. Environmental input, in turn, shapes the
development of these cognitive modules so that they
are adapted, during childhood, to local conditions—
nature provides the skeletal structure of evolved
cognitive domains and this structure is fleshed out
with experience. For example, it appears that children
in all cultures are biologically prepared to process and
respond to the sounds of all human languages, but the
language that eventually emerges is the specific language to which they are exposed (Kuhl et al. 1997). In
other words, the neural and cognitive systems that
respond to language sounds—and later enable the
comprehension and production of human language—
are inherent, but the normal development and functioning of these systems requires exposure to language.
3. EŠolution and DeŠelopment
A long period of development, as is found in humans,
has a clear risk—death before the age of reproduction—and thus would only evolve if there were benefits
that outweighed this risk. Comparative studies suggest
that one purpose, and an important adaptive benefit,
of delayed maturation is the accompanying ability to
refine the physical, social and cognitive competencies
that support survival and reproduction. As an example, a long developmental period is found in all
social mammals and the length of this period increases
with the increases in the complexity of the species’
social system (Joffe 1997). These patterns suggest that
one purpose of childhood is to practice and refine
sociocognitive competencies, such as language and
other social skills. In short, delayed maturation allows
children to practice and refine the physical, social, and
cognitive skills associated with the survival (e.g.,
hunting) and reproduction (e.g., parenting skills) of
our ancestors.
Play, social interactions, and exploration of the
environment and objects appear to be the mechanisms
through which these emerging competencies are practiced and refined during development. Child-initiated
social play, exploration, and so forth are intimately
linked to cognitive and neural development, in that
these activities provide experiences with the social,
biological, and physical world. These experiences, in
turn, interact with the inherent, but skeletal structure
of cognitive modules and ensure their normal development and adaptation to local conditions. In this
view, children are biologically prepared to learn about
other people, and the biological and physical world
and are inherently motivated to seek out experiences
that will facilitate this learning.
4. Implications for Education
A basic assumption of evolutionary psychology is that
modern humans evolved domain-specific cognitive
abilities and behavioral strategies to deal with conditions in the environments of our ancestors, but these
abilities and strategies may not always be well-suited
to contemporary conditions. In fact, much formal
education is ‘unnatural’ in that much of what children
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EŠolutionary Theory and Education
are expected to learn in school involves tasks never
encountered by our ancestors (Geary 1995, Rozin
1976). The basic goals of schools and schooling are
thus to organize the activities of children so that they
acquire competencies, such as the ability to read, that
are important in the wider culture but have no
evolutionary history. There follows discussion on
some of the basic issues that arise from this perspective
of education.
4.1 EŠolution and Academic DeŠelopment
Geary (1995) referred to language and other evolved
forms of cognition as biologically primary abilities,
and skills that build upon these primary abilities but
are principally cultural inventions (e.g., reading) as
biologically secondary abilities. The mechanisms by
which evolved systems are adapted to produce secondary competencies are not yet fully understood, but
appear to involve the co-optation of primary systems
for secondary learning and access to knowledge
implicit in these primary systems (Geary 1995, Rozin
1976).
As an example of the former, consider the relation
between language, a primary ability, and reading, a
secondary ability. The acquisition of reading-related
abilities (e.g., word decoding) appears to involve the
co-option of primary language and language-related
systems, among others (e.g., visual scanning; Rozin
1976). Wagner et al. (1994), reported that individual
differences in the fidelity of kindergarten children’s
phonological processing systems, which are basic
features of the language domain, are strongly predictive of the ease with which basic reading skills (e.g.,
word decoding) are acquired in first grade. In other
words, the evolutionary pressures that are selected for
phonological processing systems, such as the ability to
segment language sounds, were unrelated to reading,
but these systems are used, or co-opted, when children
learn how to read.
As an example of the latter, consider that the
development of geometry may have been initially
based on access to knowledge implicit in the primary
systems that support navigation in the physical world.
In the development of the basic principles of classical
geometry, Euclid apparently ‘started with what he
thought were self-evident truths and then proceeded to
prove all the rest by logic’ (West et al. 1982, p. 220). For
example, the implicit understanding that the fastest
way to get from one place to another is to go ‘as the
crow flies,’ was made explicit in the formal Euclidean
postulate, ‘a line can be drawn from any point to any
point (In Euclidean geometry, a line is a straight line)’
(West et al. 1982, p. 221). From an evolutionary
perspective, the former reflects an implicit understanding of how to quickly get from one place to
another and is knowledge that is built into the neural
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and cognitive systems that support navigation. The
latter was discovered, that is, made explicit, by Euclid.
Once explicit, this knowledge was integrated into the
formal discipline of geometry and became socially
transmittable and teachable.
4.2 MotiŠation to Learn
One very important implication of the evolutionary
perspective is that the motivation to acquire schooltaught secondary abilities is based on the requirements
of the larger society and not on the inherent interests
of children. Given the relatively recent advent of near
universal schooling in contemporary societies, there is
no reason to believe that the skills that are taught in
school are inherently interesting or enjoyable for
children to learn. In other words, one important
difference between primary and secondary cognitive
abilities is the level and source of motivation to engage
in the activities that are necessary for their acquisition. This does not, however, preclude the selfmotivated engagement in some secondary activities.
Even though reading is a secondary ability that
involves the co-optation of primary language systems,
many children and adults are motivated to read. The
motivation to read, however, is probably driven by the
content of what is being read rather than by the
process itself. In fact, the content of many stories and
other secondary activities (e.g., video games, television) might reflect evolutionarily relevant themes
that motivate engagement in these activities, such as
social relationships and social competition. Furthermore, the finding that intellectual curiosity is a basic
dimension of human personality (Goldberg 1993)
suggests that there will be a number of intellectually
curious individuals who will pursue secondary activities. Euclid’s investment in formalizing and proving
the principles of geometry is one example. However,
this type of discovery typically reflects the activities
and insights of only a few individuals, and the
associated advances spread through the larger society
only by means of informal (e.g., newspapers) and
formal education. The point is, the motivation to
engage in the activities that will promote the acquisition of secondary abilities is not likely to be
universal.
4.3 Instructional ActiŠities
The basic structure of primary abilities is inherent
(Gelman 1990), that is, the supporting neural and
cognitive systems automatically orient children to
relevant features of the environment (e.g., other
people) and process the associated information (e.g.,
facial expressions or language sounds). As noted
above, children are inherently motivated to seek out
EŠolutionary Theory and Education
experiences, for example, through social play, that
ensure the appropriate development of these primary
systems. In contrast, there is no inherent structure
supporting the acquisition of secondary abilities, nor
are most children inherently motivated to engage in
the activities that are necessary for secondary learning.
While this conclusion might seem self evident, it runs
counter to many assumptions about children’s learning in contemporary education; for example, that
children are inherently motivated to learn secondary
abilities and will do so through activities that involve
play and social discourse.
Thus, from the evolutionary perspective, one essential goal of schooling is to provide content, organization, and structure to the teaching of secondary
abilities, features that have been provided by evolution
to primary abilities. Moreover, it cannot be assumed
that children’s inherent interests, such as social relationships, and preferred learning activities, such as
play, will be sufficient for the acquisition of secondary
abilities, even though they appear to be sufficient for
the fleshing out of primary abilities. Instruction must
therefore involve engaging children in activities that
facilitate the acquisition of secondary abilities,
whether or not children are inherently interested in
engaging in these activities. This does not mean that
play and social activities cannot be used to engage
children in some forms of secondary learning. It does,
however, mean that it is very unlikely that the mastery
of many secondary domains (e.g., reading or algebra)
will occur with only these types of primary activities.
In fact, research in cognitive and educational
psychology indicates that some forms of secondary
learning will require activities that differ from those
associated with the fleshing out of primary abilities
(see Geary 1995, for related discussion). These would
include, among others, direct instruction, where teachers’ provide the goals, organization and structure to
instructional activities and explicitly teach basic competencies, such as how to sound out unfamiliar words
or manipulate algebraic equations. The mastery of
secondary domains also requires extensive exposure to
the material, distributed over many contexts and
oftentimes over many years, as well as extensive
practice in using any associated procedures (e.g., to
solve mathematics problems). Extensive exposure and
practice also appear to be needed for the development
of primary abilities, but this exposure and practice
automatically occur as children engage in social
discourse, play, and exploration. In contrast, most
children will not automatically engage in the practice
needed to master secondary domains, and, as a result,
this practice needs to be built into instructional
activities. For some domains, such as in the biological
and physical sciences, mastery will also require many
‘hands on’ activities, as in conducting experiments,
although more traditional methods will be needed as
well (e.g., learning basic facts and principles, such as
the theory of evolution).
In closing, although not enough is known to draw
firm conclusions about which instructional practices
can most effectively adapt primary cognitive systems
for the secondary learning, the following principles
can be used to guide future educational research. First,
the process of evolution has provided the basic neural
and cognitive structure to primary abilities, such as
language, but for secondary abilities, such as reading,
this basic structure and organization must come from
instructional practices. Second, children are inherently
motivated to engage in the types of activities, such as
social play, that will facilitate the development of
primary abilities, but it is not likely that these same
activities will be sufficient for the acquisition of
secondary abilities. This is because the brain and mind
are inherently designed to be sensitive to and respond
to primary activities, as they are related to the
development of primary abilities. It cannot be assumed
that the brain and mind are equally responsive to the
activities that are needed to master secondary competencies, nor can it be assumed that children are
inherently motivated to engage in these activities.
Finally, primary abilities are universal, but secondary
abilities are culturally derived. Thus, educational
research must be an on-going process designed to
determine the most effective means of instruction for
the ever-changing array of secondary competencies
needed to function in contemporary society.
See also: Cognitive Development: Child Education;
Cultural Evolution: Overview; Developmental Behavioral Genetics and Education; Evolutionary Theory,
Structure of; Human Cognition, Evolution of; Lifespan Development: Evolutionary Perspectives; Modularity versus Interactive Processing, Psychology of;
Psychological Development: Ethological and Evolutionary Approaches
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EŠolutionary Theory and Education
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D. C. Geary
Evolutionary Theory, Structure of
1. The Structure of EŠolutionary Models
Much of evolutionary theory is represented at the
beginning of the twenty-first century through mathematical models, especially through the models of
population genetics, of the evolution of states of a
given system, both in isolation and interaction,
through time. This is done by conceiving of the model
as capable of a certain set of states—these states are
represented by elements of a certain mathematical
space, the state space. (Generally speaking, ‘models’
and ‘systems’ always refer to ideal systems; when the
actual biological systems are being discussed, they are
called ‘empirical’ or ‘natural’ systems.) The variables
used in each mathematical model represent distinct
measurable or potentially quantifiable, physical magnitudes. Classically, any particular configuration of
values for these variables is a ‘state’ of the system, the
‘state space’ being the collection of all possible
configurations of the variables.
The theory itself represents the behavior of the
system in terms of its states: the rules or laws of the
theory (i.e., laws of coexistence, succession, or interaction) can delineate various configurations and
trajectories on the state space. A description of the
structure of the theory itself therefore only involves
the description of the set of models, which make up the
theory.
Construction of a model within the theory involves
assignment of a location in the state space of the
theory to a system of the kind defined by the theory.
Potentially, there are many kinds of systems that a
given theory can be used to describe—limitations
come from the dynamical sufficiency (whether it can
be used to describe the system accurately and completely) and the accuracy and effectiveness of the laws
used to describe the system and its changes. Thus,
there are two main aspects to defining a model. First,
the state space must be defined—this involves choosing
the variables and parameters with which the system
will be described; second, coexistence laws, which
describe the structure of the system and laws of
succession, which describe changes in its structure,
must be defined.
Defining the state space involves defining the set of
all the states the system could possibly exhibit. Certain
mathematical entities—in the case of many evolutionary models, these are vectors—are chosen to represent
these states. The collection of all the possible values
for each variable assigned a place in the vector is the
state space of the system. The system and its states can
have a geometrical interpretation: the variables used in
the state description (i.e., state variables) can be
conceived as the axes of a Cartesian space. The state of
the system at any time may be represented as a point in
that space, located by projection on the various axes.
The family of measurable physical magnitudes, in
terms of which a given system is defined, also includes
a set of parameters. Parameters are values that are not
themselves a function of the state of the system. Thus,
a parameter can be understood as a fixed value of a
variable in the state space—topologically, setting a
parameter amounts to limiting the number of possible
structures in the state space by reducing the dimensionality of the model.
Laws, used to describe the behavior of the system in
question, must also be defined in a description of a
model or set of models. Laws have various forms: in
general, coexistence laws describe the possible states of
the system, while laws of succession describe changes
in the state of the system.
Let us discuss in more detail the description of the
evolutionary models that make up evolutionary theory. The main items needed for this description are the
definition of a state space, state variables, parameters,
and a set of laws of succession and coexistence for the
system. Choosing a ‘state space’ (and thereby, a set of
state variables) for the representation of genetic states
and changes in a population is a crucial part of
population genetics theory.
Paul Thompson suggests that the state space for
population genetics would include the physically
possible states of populations in terms of genotype
frequencies. The state space would be ‘a Cartesian n-
5028
Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
ISBN: 0-08-043076-7