Download Reza Madjidzadeh, Quantum Conception of Economic Change

Quantum conception of economic change
By: Reza Madjidzadeh
Abstract:
There are two different approaches to the proposition of time in meta-theoretical
sphere of social science: one falls within the framework of Newtonian paradigm
and the other within the Quantum paradigm. Expanding the meta-theoretical system
of quantum paradigm, this paper attempts to offer an appropriate system with the
objective of providing an analytical framework toward conception economic
change using the “Nested Games” theory.
JEL codes: B41; B52
Keywords: Quantum paradigm, Nested games, economic change and Quantum
nested games.
Introduction
There are two different approaches to the proposition of time in meta-theoretical
sphere of social science. This paper attempts to offer an appropriate system to the
proposition of time which be consistent with quantum approach. Changing
economic analysis metric toward quantum conception is the core problem
orientation of this paper. Static foundations of mainstream economics prevent
tracing economic dynamics. It’s not possible to explain both static and dynamic
features in unit partial theory. Each theory creates its own discourse space in which
we can interpret the world around us, position of phenomena and change the
settings toward our beliefs. Guidelines of theorizing North (2005) suggests a
system based on triple grand theory. The system consists of a theory on institutional
framework, a theory on demographic change, i.e. quantity and quality of human
being and a theory on the stock of human knowledge. Yet, there is no bridge to link
these three partial theories together. In this article it is suggested that incorporating
North’s point of view and Tsebelis’s nested games theory can help us to set up an
appropriate analytical framework to account for dynamics of socio-economic
systems.
Next section is devoted to take a review on the proposition of time in social science.
There are two main approaches dealing with the subject: Newtonian and Quantum.
Second section explains implications of second approach on understanding
economic world. Whether you take a static stance or dynamic stance, conception
will be affected. Conception of economic world is depending on your perception of
world. Third section rearranges economic world according with quantum concepts.
Good deal with this problem, however, is very hard. In section four I’ll contrast
North’s method with Tsebelis’s nested games theory. Then, in section five
incorporating two theoretical systems lead us to suggest appropriate system toward
quantum conception of economic world. Quantum conception isn’t my aim. That’s
a point of view making economics more efficient. Quantum methodology can grow
explanatory value of new theories based on that.
Time in social science
There has been a main stream approach to proposition of time in social science,
affecting ontological, methodological and epistemological aspects of theorizing.
Cartesian foundations of the approach led social scientists to ignore the time in
conceptualization of social world. The central idea of such an approach is the
unification essence of phenomena. Hence a phenomenon in every time (and space)
will be same. More ever, whether is the kind of phenomenon, social scientist’s
mathematical formulation of phenomena identifies them in terms of numbers and
quantities and we can deduct any statement based on numbered identities. If we
treat social order as a timeless phenomenon, in the way time can be measured
without need to account for processes, then abstraction of social realities from time
attitudes won’t deny our statements explanatory value. Moreover we would have a
universal theory.
Mainstream economics and sociology are subject to principles of Newtonian
paradigm, Euclidean point of view and Cartesian epistemology. EuclideanCartesian point of view draws socio-economic world by microscopic identities. In
this manner, conception of socio-economic reality relies on a linear space
imagination-without any gravity and friction. So, we have to focus on behavior
rather than action and praxis. We treat people as material. We abstract socioeconomic reality from time and space dimensions. We decompose that into
separated components. Hence the whole socio-economic system would realize as
the simple summation of the numbers (individuals). There is an explicit assumption
in mainstream economics which have important implications on knowledge transfer
and universalization of theories: Acceleration of different coordinate systems is
equal. According to the assumption in all of socio-economic systems any process of
feedback and adaptation take place in same duration. So any casual relation
observed in A would be truth in B. In other word reactions to any event are same in
all of the systems.
Therefore change is simply defined as transfer from one point to another. The
process of change and transfer of knowledge is subject to Lorentz transformation.
Here we can treat information in social science as light in physics. According to
Piotrowski and Sladkowski, “although the effective market hypothesis assumes
immediate price reaction to new information concerning the market, the
information flow rate is limited by physical laws such us the constancy of the speed
of light” (Piotrowski and Sladkowski 2004: 4). Hence we can’t assume similar
adaptation rate for different socio-economic systems. Hodgson (2001) points out
this problem as “historical specificity in social science”. When the speed of
information flow and reactions (consciousness, cognition, mental models, decision
and choice) stays constant in any coordinate system, we can ignore the effects of
praxis and institutions as social constraints to behavior. Then, there is need to
replace behavior by action. In other word, we must set a system to account for
social gravities along with human choices.
There have been alternative points of view emphasizing historical evolution and
economic dynamics on the base of non-Euclidean-Cartesian worldview. Metatheoretical foundations of some alternative views are consistent with quantum
physics epistemological implications and Darwinian organic ontology. Having
focused on dynamic nature of social reality, these point alternatives prohibited
abstracting time from socio-economic phenomena. In one hand an organic being is
related to its past, and in other, time is not dependent from matter (organism or nonorganism) and movements of matter define time. Knowing specificities and
properties of phenomena requires tracking continual changes in interacting organs.
So history matters in a sense of path dependency (Hodgson, 2001: 3).
Therefore change is occurred by continual sequences. A sequence is consisting of
five factors: event, information flow, mental process, decision, and action (social or
individual). Yet, we don’t have a coherent analytical system to explain change in
this manner. Action aims toward change, so there is now reason to impose static
models on that. Action is a dynamic process.
During two centuries, Marxists, historians and institutional economists have been
investigated for such a coherent system. Importance of history and social and
political aspects of socio-economic system are their most fundamental
achievements toward establishing new paradigm. However conception of soioeconomic world into new language to capture dynamic aspects of four dimension
space requires regression to paradigm level issues. Very failures or incompleteness
of current analytical systems lead us to revise our meta-theoretical models.
Quantum physics meta-theoretical implications have a great potential to expand
such a system. Next section is devoted to illustrate quantum physics metatheoretical implications, toward “quantum paradigm”.
Quantum Paradigm
Paradigm is the common sphere of established epistemology, ontology and
methodology. Different theoretical disciplines share their explanation rules in
paradigm discourse space. In other word, meta-level of reduction take theoretical
terms into paradigm sphere. We identify events and phenomena in terms of
reduced conception channels. Our worldview directs our identification methods.
Any reorientation in channeling conception directions affects both discourse space
of theorizing and meta-theoretical sphere of shared principles. Social sciences have
been affected by revolutions in physics and biology. Both classical physics and
Darwinian evolutionary biology have inspired social scientists in explaining socioeconomic world. Concepts such as equilibrium, evolution and natural order are
samples of the affection. Now we can reorient social science by focus on
conception channels and methodological foundation of quantum physics and
relativity theory.
Non-Euclidean geometry, Minkowsky space, relativity theory and inconstant speed
of light are contents of quantum paradigm. Non-Euclidean geometry defines a
curved space in which Euclidean rules don’t matter. Einstein illustrated that as
replacing analytical geometry by experimental geometry. The key of difference is
Gravitation. Gravitation affects space-time position of mass. Deviations from
expected directions or results in large scale are explained by gravity. We can
translate gravity into socio-economic language as praxis, and structure of social
action. Such translation is incomplete without introducing a concept showing
gravitation fields which are origins of deviation from pure rational behavior.
Gravitation among social phenomena would prevent us to abstract human action
from its space-time specificities. So we live in world of events. Space and time
transform to event in the light of relativity (Russell, 1925: 199-230). Social reality
is the combination of phenomena such as social interaction and technological
matters related to human factor. Then ontological aspects of that must be treated in
a dynamic manner (Lawson, 2003: 16).
Accepting this ontological stance, epistemological relativism will be recognized as
consistent with dynamic ontological view. Therefore knowledge is accessible
provided that historical and context-based descriptions of social reality. Context
contains observer. In 18th and 19th century, Historical evolution was introduced. The
meta-theoretical foundations of this view are consistent with Darwinism and
Quantum revolution. Yet, these revolutions didn’t adequately affect social science.
Although there is some theoretical school in the subject, meta-theoretical
implications of the two events have not been completely accounted for.
Evolutionary point of view don’t allow to abstract time dimension from
phenomenon. Because of interrelations between components of a collection,
understanding its properties requires tracking continual transformations of the
collection and its components. Every organism is subject to its past. Evolution is
based on heritages of past. Therefore historical specificity of phenomenon matters
(Hodgson, 2001: 3). Hence change and time closely are related together, so we
can’t explain dynamics by imposing static tools on observations and showing
simple changes in Cartesian coordination independent from the process.
There are some schools of thought taking into account these points of view.
Nevertheless no coherent analytical system has been suggested. Coherency of
analytical system refers to not also hierarchical ontological consistency but also
internal correspondence between dynamic tools and tracking process of becoming
of the subject- this is motion produces time and time is not dependent from body
movements. During last two centuries, Karl Marx, German Historians, Joseph
Schumpeter and Institutional Economists have tried to provide such a system.
Emphasizing on importance of historical specificity and path-dependency are main
achievements of their attempts.
Nevertheless, these achievements must be completed by regarding meta-theoretical
implications of other scientific disciplines. Quantum revolution in physics has a
great potential of reorienting economic dynamics analysis on the basis of which. I
called such a new system Quantunomics, reorienting economic dynamics theorizing
by attaching paradigm implications of quantum physics to that.
Toward new system
Discarding any ambiguous tale and myth, I will focus on Lorentz transformation,
inconstant speed of light, space-time, different acceleration of coordination systems,
and non-Euclidean geometry. Expanding their implications for economics into
meta-theoretical language, point of view of some social scientists will be attached
to them. Then, a primarily system will be introduced.
Before juxtaposition of above elements, introducing core assumption of the system
is necessary. Special relativity is based on constant speed of light. If P is a point in
empty space and P′ is another point near P- distance between them is equal to ε- and
a light ray propagates from P in time t and get to P in time t+dt then we have:
EMBED PBrush
Where x1, x2 and x3 are space coordination of ε, c is speed of light and x4 is time
coordinate. This formulation shows Euclidean metric. The equation introducing this
metrics is applied to differentials of coordination. In special relativity, the only
permitted change in coordination is in the way that ε2 in new coordination system
will be equal to summation of coordination’s differentials. This is so called Lorentz
transformation implies that universality of observed and alleged causalities is true
under condition of constant speed of light and equal acceleration of coordination
system. In other word causality is necessary but uncertain. We can translate this
theorem into economics by the analytical rules of institutional economics. Since the
process of adaptation of socio-economic systems depends on the speed of
propagation of information in the systems and reaction to that, we witness different
performance in long run. That is gravity fields in economic space makes
information deviated. This is why North (1990) explains economic world by
friction, transaction costs.
If we accept balance among all coordination systems, then, by assuming constant
speed of light and Euclidean metrics, general relativity will be validate, so we have:
EMBED PBrush Where g, μ and ν are functions of x1 … x4. That’s the difference
between these spaces with Euclidean space. Here, distribution and composition of
bodies determine the gravity field, so space forms subject to physical factors and we
witness a deviation from expected Newton-Galilean relativity principle.
To summarize my thesis in economic words, information in economy have a
function same as light in physics. Photons are related to energy. Einstein
formulation of energy contains speed of light as a determinant factor. In economic
world information propagates and makes us to have a reaction. Our actions plan to
change our condition. Our planning is done by information. Information propagates
in physical world and is processed in our mind. So information passes through
gravity fields and lock in frictions. In other world, Lorentz transformation rule
matters whether in propagation of information and adaptation.
It follows that, transformation of socio-economic systems is subject to the way
information propagated and gravity fields of socio-economic organism. Hence, this
is necessary to set up a system encompassing both of microscopic identities and
macroscopic identities interacting with each other. Institution as a transhistorical
concept, containing historical specificity, allows taking the interaction into account.
Yet tracking interaction process requires an analytical system. If we set social
exchange as analytical starting point, then we can account for all non-Euclidean
properties of socio-economic space in the face of game theory.
Since mid of 1990s, game theory have attracted some institutional economists.
Avner Grief (1997) called that “game theoretical revolution in historical and
comparative institutional analysis”. Institutions are the rule of games and games
result in new institutions. G, M. Hodgson (2002) in examining agenda of evolution
of institutions suggests taking initial institutions for granted. Language is the initial
condition institution and social interaction is based on. Establishing game
theoretical analysis by treating language as the initial condition will help us
avoiding infinite regress. Game theory is a suitable metric to capture above features.
Although lack of a consensus on the problem of agency and structure, game
theoretical analysis have features taking into account the theorists of agency and
structure problem. Partly, tracking structuration, emerging properties and other
comments on the problem are answered by game theoretical analysis.
Now, what is new in this article? I reshow institutional framework by quantum
concepts, is that enough? Till now, I have extrapolated guidelines to establish new
system. Although it seems that quantum concepts reviewed here have no
contributions to improve our knowledge about economic change, incorporating
some correspondent approaches covering above guidelines will take us near our
expected system.
To summarize, establishing quantum based analytical system will be based on
institutional theory, game theory and a meta-theory to incorporate them.
Quantunomics
Epistemological relativism is the main meta-theoretical implication of quantum
revolution. Building an analytical framework upon that requires an approach not
also taking account for agents’ interactions but tracking the process of the
interaction and emerging properties. In other word, we need both transhistorical
concepts and interaction based approach.
J, S. Coleman (1990) suggested minimal systems analysis to solve aggregation and
decomposition problem in social science. Coleman’s analytical system is based on
minimal systems, i.e. decomposing macrosocial propositions into three microsocial
proposition. Figure (1) shows Coleman’s suggested system.
EMBED PBrush
A proposition provided for the relation between A and B is a macrosocial
proposition. AC shows shifts from structure to agents’ sphere. CD is the realm of
interactions among agents and DB is the direction of aggregation to macro sphere.
This figure is the scheme of socio-economic formation. In position A, information
trickle down to agents and they organize their actions according to processed
information. The social exchanges begin and equilibrium of the exchanges - game
to catch scarce resource and exchanging them-take the socio-economic system to B
(Coleman, 1990: 15-34).
What we call change is a motion from AB to other structure, e.g. A´B´. The motion
creates time. From A to B is being and from AB to A´B´ is becoming. The time for
AB is different from time to ABA´B´, i.e. changing scale of analysis take us to
different time coordination. Therefore, examining individual agents’ behavior has
different time features from the whole structure. Since different adaptation speeds
make variety of accelerations, examining structure is subject to equation (2) and
examining individual agent’s behavior is subject to equation (1). Here examining
socio-economic exchange is subjects to equation (2), so there is correspondent
between structure-based analysis and explanation relying upon game theory.
Tracking motions enables us to explain economic change; however, we must
explore the figure by more details.
Economic historians must explain structure influence on economic performance and
dynamics of the structure (North, 1981:3-7). According to North (1990), agents
organize their actions subject to the incentives of institutional structure. To our
scheme, in position A, information about the nature of position propagate among
agents. Information contains codes of economic resource and trends of them. These
codes produce incentives to motivate agents, so they act to improve themselves to
better position. The movement needs arriving in socio-economic exchange. Now
agents begin to invest in socio-economic transaction. Investment mean planning
strategies toward acquire more resource or better bargaining power. Here we
witness a patterned mass of events and games. North (2005) puts out that:” it is
result of change (1) in the quantity and quality of human beings; (2) in the stock of
human knowledge particularly as applied to the human command over nature; and
(3) in the institutional framework that defines the deliberate incentive structure of a
society”(North, 2005:1). Now, the patterned mass is clearer. So, how can we
incorporate these three fields into an analytical framework? How can we do the
puzzle with these parts?
Understanding the status of reality and its change, the relationship between beliefs
and economic performance and the nature of process are the fundamental questions
(ibid: 4). Though, North describe the fundamental problems and theories necessary
to understand economic change, he didn’t provide a clear way to applying his
suggested system in terms of a unified theoretical system. We are faced with the
concept of non-ergodic world by which North means that averages calculated from
the past observations can be persistently different from the time average of future
outcomes (ibid, 19).
Since probability matters by this definition and possible deviations from expected
path are taken for granted, the concept of non-ergodic world is consistent with
quantum view. Looking for a theoretical framework North (2005: 12) suggests that;
time dimension is incorporated as an integral part of analysis. We can do that by
attaching north triple-theories to Coleman’s system. Yet, we don’t have a detailed
plan to tracking change and we have locked in ambiguous concepts. Along North’s
works many fruitful concepts have been provided to understand dynamics of socioeconomic systems. However, we need an order to set them in right places.
In North’s conceptual program human interaction and human environment play a
critical role. Hence every order must be based on human interaction. In other word,
the stock of knowledge, tension between population and resources and institutions
are related to human interactions and human environment.
After propagating, knowledge is developed. Propagating is an interaction-based
factor. Institutions are the rules of the game. People involved in games and compete
with each other. Scarcity of resource in macrosocial view means that tension for
acquiring them will be between human and nature, however, the tension will be
between human and human to.
It follows that; game theory is the suitable system to handle the problem. However,
game theoretical analysis must capture not only triple-theories of North but also
takes “artificially separated frameworks” into account. Recently game theoretical
revolution has been affected institutional historical analysis. Scarcity of resource in
macrosocial view means that tension for acquiring them will be between human and
nature, however, the tension will be between human and human to. It follows that;
game theory is the suitable system to handle the problem. However, game
theoretical analysis must capture not only triple-theories of North but also
takes “artificially separated frameworks”3 into account.
Recently game theoretical revolution has been affected institutional historical
analysis. Aoki (2001), Grief (1997) and Tsebelis (1990) are some theorists applying
game theory to institutional analysis. Though Grief and Aoki are known for
institutional economists, Tsebelis is not very famous. In 1990 He introduced
“nested games theory” to analysis of institutions in political world. He introduced a
game theoretical system for analyzing institutional change and seemingly irrational
choices. Moreover, Tsebelis’s system has great potential to interdisciplinary
explanations and incorporating three separated disciplines. Tsebelis (1990: 5) notes
that:
“The interaction between economics and politics
can also be conceptualized as several different
games played by the same actors.
The study of any one of these games in
isolation may lead to puzzles similar to the Finish
case. Only the study of the whole network of
games in which an actor is involved will reveal
the actor’s motivations and explain his behavior”.
In mainstream game theory, explanation focus is on a single game. Furthermore the
rationality of players is taken for granted. The process of change involves all
aspects of socio-economic life. Narrow focus on a single game raises the
probability of observing irrational choice. In many situations, it seems that actor
make a suboptimal choice. This is because that observer pays her attention to a
single game and she ignores the network of games in which player involved.
According to Tsebelis (1990: 7-8):
“There are two major reasons for disagreement
between actor and observer. First, option Ai is not
optimal because the actor is involved in games in
several different arenas, but the observer focuses
on only one arena.
In the second case, option Ai is not optimal
because the actor “innovate”, that is, takes steps
to increase the number of available options so
that some new option is now better than Ai”.
When the actor is involved in network of related games and equilibrium of each
game is interrelated with other games, we can apply a model to analyze such a
network of games. Tsebelis (1990) suggests nested games theory to deal with the
problem. Nested games theory emphasizes on institutional context of human
interaction. In nested games theory we are faced with two main spheres; multiple
arena and institutional design;
“In the case of games in multiple arenas, the
observer considers the game in the principle arena
without taking contextual factors into account,
whereas the actor perceives that the game is nested
inside a bigger game that defines how contextual
factors… influence his payoffs and those of the
other players.
In the case of institutional design, the game in the
principal arena is nested inside a bigger game
where the rules of the game themselves are
variable; in this game, the set of available options
is considerably larger than in the original one”.
(Tsebelis, 1990:8).
Consequently, in nested games theory some games played toward changing the
rules of the game and increasing number of choices. Thus institutions are involved
in the analytical system. Furthermore, the linkage between CD and AC in figure (1)
is established.
Again, we refer to North’s triple-theories to analyze economic change. There were
three theories on institutions, tension between human being and resources and
stock of knowledge. A theory on institutions must take state, ideology and property
rights into account. States determine property rights and formal institutions, so they
constraint choices. Ideology affects the mental processing of human kind and her
choices. And property rights are the main factor in transforming property to capital
and achieving transaction. Efficient property rights decrease transaction costs. The
lower transaction costs, the higher economic performance.
Tsebelis’s system can help us to explain institutional change and tension
between resources and population. In figure (1) CD sphere describes the tension
and institutional design. The equilibria of games in CD take socio-economic system
to B. Here population has established the institutional framework, bargaining
power of social classes redistributed or established and the knowledge about the
kinds of outcomes of different institutions accumulate. The knowledge can
transform preferences over policies and personal procedures for life (Tsebelis,
1990:98-100).
Then, B plays the role of A in change. Again information propagates to the level of
CD. Information contains incentives of institutional framework and knowledge
areas suitable for this framework. However, from A to B institutions may changes
or not.
We can place state in CD. States are players. According to North (1990), state looks
for benefits of political body. So, every player has three games in her/him life; a
game on social status, a game on political power (or bargaining power) and a game
on economic interactions. In political games each player tries to establish or replace
institutions to acquire more benefit or payoff. Though bargaining power distributed
in first conditions, i.e. after revolution or immigration to new land or war, every
player will attempt to improve that.
Information propagated, games of CD level will begin. Here Tsebelis (1990: 55)
use subgame concepts to explain networked games. Subgame is a game between
two or more players that can be completely isolated from the games around it and
can be solved on its own. Tracking economic change means focus on economic
games and placed other level as subgame.
Whether economy develops or not is depend on the influence of the games on each
other. Equal bargaining power is responsible for efficiency of the games rules and
games directions. Otherwise the effect of non-economic games deviate results from
expected path and transaction costs increase economic performance.
Though nested games theory provides a suitable analytical system to explain
economic change, there is a problem in determining contextual conditions.
According to Hodgson (2002) assuming an established institution, i.e. language,
will help us to avoid form infinite regress. Indeed, there is now complete and
adequate theoretical system. Every suggested system has its own defects. This is the
nature of science and science is separated from philosophy in this point.
My quantum conception is elementary and it needs more and more corrections to be
better than its current status.
5- Conclusion
Because of having static tools, current economic approach to the proposition of
time and change must improve. Meta-theoretical implications of quantum physics
have a great potential to accomplish economics by dynamic tools and concepts.
This will be done in paradigm level. Paradigm is the sphere of sharing
methodological, epistemological and ontological compartments of all sciences.
Lorentz transformation, non-Euclidean geometry and inconstant speed of light are
the main concepts helping in find dynamic tools. By customizing these concepts in
socioeconomic theoretical system we get to game theory, institutional analytical
system and a linkage between them.
North’s triple-theories are correspondent with game theoretical based conceptual
system and Tsebelis’ nested games theory have to dimension, one describe
institutional design and the other explains tension between resources and
population’s wants. Coleman’s minimal system analysis is a suitable base to
analyze interactions of players. Moreover Coleman’s system, partly, provide an
answer to the problem of agency and structure.
Thus, my final conclusion is that information propagates in structure. Signals
emanated motivate actors to play game and to provide resource and benefit. They
not only invest in resource but also try to change institutional framework. Often
they are unable to change the structure and the path-dependency locks them in an
unchanged structure. State is also a player. Ideology determine the reflexivity of
path-dependency and state by specifying property rights determines the quantity of
properties transformed to capital and lead to growth. The final equilibrium is the
first step to shift from agent’s level to structure. Again information will propagate
and knowledge will be accumulate correspond with the incentives structure
according to payoffs.
Whether economy develops or not is depend on the influence of the games on each
other. Equal bargaining power is responsible for efficiency of the games rules and
games directions. Otherwise the effect of non-economic games deviate results from
expected path and transaction costs increase economic performance.
However, my suggested system is elementary. Yet, there are unsolved problems.
This is the nature of science and there is one way to deal with the problem, i.e.
experimental studies.
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- [email protected]
- Einstein introduced Lorentz invariance. An invariance principle is a statement about constancy of
physical laws. According to invariance principle all laws remains unchanged for one particular
change of conditions (Ford, 2002, 157-158).
- Discrete disciplines; economics, politics and sociology. See North (2005: 11).
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