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The Athenian Embassies to Sardis and Cleomenes' Invasion of Attica Author(s): Richard M. Berthold Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 51, No. 3, (3rd Qtr., 2002), pp. 259-267 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436657 Accessed: 18/08/2008 09:56 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=fsv. 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For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org THE ATHENIAN EMBASSIESTO SARDIS AND CLEOMENES' INVASIONOF ATTICA Sometimeduringthe archonyear 508/7 king Cleomenes of Spartawas summonedbackto Athensby a beleagueredIsagoras,whose politicalposition was crumblingbeforethe reformtacticsof Cleisthenes.Failingin theirattempt to establisha narrowoligarchy,the two men and theirsupporterswere driven out of the city, and Cleomenesbegan organizinga three-prongedinvasionof Attica, invitingarmiesfrom Chalcisand Boeotia in from the north,while he gatheredthe Peloponnesianlevy in the south.In apparentresponseto this threat the Atheniansdispatchedan embassyto Sardis,perhapsin the springof 507, to seek an alliance from the PersiansatrapArtaphernes,who demandedof the Atheniansthe usualtokensof submissionto the empire,earthand water."On theirown responsibility"the envoys providedthe tokensand returnedto Athens, wherethey "themselveswereblamedgreatly"for this act., While the intentionof this mission is perfectlyclear - an alliance with Persia- virtuallyeverythingelse aboutit has been the subjectof debate.It can hardlybe doubtedthatCleisthenes,just recalledto Athensaftertheexpulsionof IsagorasandCleomenes,was responsiblefor sendingthe embassy,2andits goal is clearlystatedby Herodotus:to concludean alliancewithPersia.WhyPersia? Because no potentialally of any significancewas available.The Peisistratid Herod. 5.70.1-74.2: 2 ic'taqpwv ai)tiCovIak6gevot; wrUT6v aidia; "ydXa; eiXov (73.3); as C. Hignett,A Historyof the AthenianConstitutionto the Endof the Fifth CenturyB.C. (Oxford1952) 178 notes, Herodotusdoes not actuallysay the submissionwas disavowed. The events leading to the embassycan be no laterthanthe end of the archonyear in late Juneor early July and were probablyearlierin the spring;see pp. 262-265. Actually, it has been doubtedby M.F. McGregor,"ThePro-PersianPartyat Athens,"in AthenianStudiesPresentedto W.S.Ferguson(Cambridge1940) 77-78, followed by R.J. Buck, "The Reforms of 487 B.C. in the Selection of Archons," CP 60 (1965) 99. McGregor'ssuggestion that the Atheniansrecalled Cleisthenesand sent the embassy at the same time perhaps"does no violence to the tenses of Herodotus,"but the Greek certainlyimplies a sequence:Avhva^iot8i jeta fai'a KXAtoaOvea ... gieaxeai6WEvot 1ic4uouat d6yygXoo ?; dp8t; (5.73.1). McGregor's objection that Persian alliance meantthe restorationof Hippiasis nonsense;thereis no evidence of Sardisadoptingthat policy before Cleomenes' second failure to install Isagoras, and the fact is that ArtaphernesacceptedAtheniansubmissionwith no mentionof Hippias.His second objection, that it would have been political suicide to propose submissionto Persia, is an entirely subjectiveconclusion drawnfrom the reactionof the Athenianswhen the embassy did return. Historia,Band LI/3 (2002) i) FranzSteinerVerlag WiesbadenGmbH,Sitz Stuttgart 260 RICHARDM. BERTHOLD alliance with Thessaly had likely rested on a personal relationship, and in any case it is improbable that the Thessalian cavalry could have provided decisive support against armies of hoplites.3 The Thessalians may well have been thirsting for revenge against the Spartans, but, burned once already, they were not about to rush to the aid of a city whose prospects must have seemed very dim. Athens' failure to approachArgos, the naturalally of any enemy of Sparta, is best explained by the existence of a peace treaty between Argos and Sparta and the Argives' remarkableconsistency in adhering to such agreements.4 As has long been recognized, the appeal to Persia was born of desperation. The threat from Sparta was real and imminent, and with nowhere else to turn Cleisthenes followed the lines of his family's old connections to Sardis and sought help from the superpower across the Aegean.5 It is simply inconceivable that Cleisthenes did not know that any relationship with the Persian empire began with an unqualified recognition of Persian superioritythroughthe surrender of the tokens of earth and water. In addition to Alcmaeonid connections in Asia Minor there is the fact that the Asian Greeks, including trading partnersof Athens, had been under Persian rule for a half century. Is it credible that when Cleisthenes and his people discussed whether to turn to Persia, no one asked what the natureof the alliance would be or no one could be found who had any knowledge on the subject? What is known of Cleisthenes does not suggest a man who would take a complete leap into the darkon such an importantissue or fail to give the envoys instructions regarding submission. It is much easier to believe that Herodotus' statement that the envoys were responsible for the decision is a distortion intended to spare the Alcmaeonids a furthercharge of medism, particularlyin view of his later enthusiastic defense of the family after Marathon.6 3 4 5 6 The victoryin 511 was clearlyagainsta small andpossiblydisorganizedforce (it came by sea, was not commandedby a king and seems to have fought immediatelyafterlanding); in contrast,the Thessalianswere easily drivenoff by Cleomenes' army;Herod.5.63.264.2; Arist.Ath. Pol. 19.5. See J. Holladay,"Medismin Athens508-480 B.C.,"G&R25 (1978) 178-79, who points out thatsuch a treatywould also explain Cleomenes' involvementin Argos in 495/4. Herod.6.125.2-5. So G. Busolt, GriechischeGeschichte2(Gotha 1894-1903) 11,441, n. 9; W.W. How & J. Wells, A Commentaryon Herodotus(Oxford 1912) II, 40; E.M. Walker,"Athens.The Reformof Cleisthenes,"CAHIV (Cambridge1926) 157-58; A.R. Burn,Persia and the Greeks. The Defense of the West, c. 546-478 B.C.2 (London 1984) 187-88. G.M.E. Williams, "AthenianPolitics 5087-480 B.C.: A Reappraisal,"Athenaeum60 (1982) 526-27 wondersif the Philaids,enemies of Persiaand the Alcmaeonids,had anythingto do with Cleisthenessendingthe embassyto Sardis,butthis seems extremelyunlikely;the externalthreatto Athens was clearly a more compellingmotivationthansome potential domestic problem.On submissionto Persia see L.L. Orlin, "Athensand Persiaca. 507 B.C.: A NeglectedPerspective,"in L.L. Orlin,ed., MichiganOrientalStudiesin Honorof G.C. Cameron(Ann Arbor 1976) 255-66, who stresses the eternaland cosmic signifi- The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica 261 A more perplexing question is exactly what Cleisthenes expected from the Persian gambit. That the mission was connected to the threat from the Peloponnesus is obvious and accepted by all, but it is not clear how a sudden alliance with Persia, whatever the terms, could thwart that threat. Could Cleisthenes seriously expect that Cleomenes would be scared off by the mere news of an alliance with Persia, a power with no presence west of the Aegean?7 And if he was counting on actual Persian military aid, how could he possibly expect to see it in time, when Cleomenes was already collecting his forces when the embassy was sent? Even assuming Artaphemes could implement a major development in Achaemenid foreign policy without reference to Darius, deploying an effective force to Athens would require a significant amount of time for the collection of ships, troops and supplies and the organization of a fairly complex amphibious operation. News of these preparations was more likely to spur Cleomenes to more aggressive action than to deter him, and he need only employ established mechanisms to summon the Peloponnesian allies.8 If the Persians do decide to send a force, then Cleomenes has every strategic reason to move even more quickly and seize Athens before they can arrive. It seems that Cleisthenes was grasping at Persian straws, and real help from the east, whether in the form of deterrence or actual military force, was at best a long shot. Simply establishing a basis for possible future Persian intervention was the only realistic hope. Herodotussuggests thatupon their returnthe envoys were censured ("blamed greatly") for submitting the tokens to Artaphernes, but he fails to explain exactly why. The passage strongly implies that the people were caught by surprise and displeased, but was it the mission itself or simply the terms it accepted that offended them? A secret embassy, sent only on Cleisthenes' orders, is certainly possible, since Athens was only now departing an age when foreign policy was essentially the preserve of aristocrats,9but Herodotus says it cance of the act; A. Kuhrt,"Earthand Water,"in A. Kuhn & H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, eds., AchaemenidHistoryIII: Methodand Theory(Leiden 1988) 87-99. If the tokenshad literally to be from the submitting state, then the Athenians would have had to know 7 8 9 beforehandwhat the terms would be, but an understandingof the mythopoeticnatureof the tokens suggests thatany earthand waterwould do; see Orlin (as in p. 260 n. 6) 26566. My thanksto Jack Balcer for informationon this. The alliance as a deterrenceis implied by many scholars and stated explicitly by F. Schachermeyr,"Athenals Stadtdes GroBk6nigs,"Graz. Beitr. 1 (1973) 217. If Herod.5.31.4-32.1 is to be believed, Artaphernesneededroyal approvalfor the assault on Naxos. Persian preparationsfor the Marathonexpedition began the previous year (Herod.6.95.1), whereasSparta,Athens and Plataeawere able to prepareforces and get them to Marathonin a matterof days ratherthanmonths;note also the rapidPeloponnesian mobilizationbeforePlataea(Herod.9.9.1-11.3). On the absolutechronologysee pp. 262-265. F.J. Frost,"Politicsin EarlyAthens,"in G.S. Shrimpton& D.J. McCargar,eds., Classical Contributions. Studies in Honor of M.F. McGregor (Locust Valley, NY 1981) 35. 262 RICHARD M. BERTHOLD was "the Athenians" who sent the mission. Further, if it had been secret, why was it now revealed, only to be condemned? Could Cleisthenes, whose political success had been based on an understandingof the demos, now so thoroughly misjudge them? The dispatch of the embassy, if not the terms it could expect, must have been public knowledge. The condemnation of the embassy clearly resulted from the terms it accepted, which in turn means those terms - submission to Persia - were refused by the Athenians.10 Now, it is possible that upon the envoys' return Cleisthenes was confronted by an unexpected anti-Persian sentiment among the people and simply abandoned the embassy, but such a sudden and politically decisive outburst of anti-Persian feeling seems a bit surprisingfor a state surroundedby serious foes and desperately seeking allies. The rejection of the Persian alliance makes much more sense among a people facing no immediate threatsand with a couple of impressive military victories under their corselets, which would be the case had Cleomenes' invasion already failed when the envoys retumed.'1 With Cleomenes at least temporarily neutralized and morale boosted by the energetic defeat of the Boeotians and Chalcidians the Athenians in their enthusiasm would probably have rejected any deal that even hinted at an inferior status. Unfortunately, Herodotus does not provide a precise chronology for either the embassy or the invasion, but the evidence strongly suggests the summer of 507 for Cleomenes' failed attack.12Both Aristotle and Herodotus place Isagoras' political problems and thus his appeal to Spartain the archon year 508/7,13 which means Cleomenes' failed intervention must have taken place in the same 10 H. Berve,Miltiades.StudienzurGeschichtedes Mannesundseiner Zeit (Berlin 1937)71, n. 1; Schachermeyr(as in n. 7) 213-14; andR. Sealey, "ThePit andthe Well: the Persian Heraldsof 491 B.C.,"CJ 72 (1976/7) 17-18 all believe the alliance was accepted;Berve points to Herodotus'silence and the notionthatwere it rejected,Artapherneswouldhave no legal basis for his later demand to restore Hippias. But Herodotussurely implies rejection (censuringthe envoys, but accepting their deed, is difficult to believe), and Artaphernes,if indeedhe neededany legal basis, wouldconsiderthe submissionunilaterally valid regardlessof the acts of the Athenianassembly;see note 29. 11 So Walker (as in n. 6) 158-59; Burn (as in n. 6) 188; R. Thomsen, The Origins of Ostracism(Copenhagen1972) 125; M. Ostwald,"TheReformof the AthenianState by Cleisthenes,"CAH2IV (Cambridge1988) 308, 338. 12 With two exceptions every author places the invasion in 506, but no one offers the slightest reasonor evidence for doing so. The exceptions are Burn (as in n. 6) 188 and J.M.Cook, ThePersian Empire(London1983) 92, who date it to 507; fourauthorshedge with the date 507/6: D.W. Knight, Some Studies in Athenian Politics in the Fifth Century B.C. (Wiesbaden 1970) 24; R.D. Cromey,"Kleisthenes'Fate,"Hist. 28 (1979) 133; J. Hart,Herodotusand GreekHistory(London 1982) 38, 71; L.H. Jeffery,"Greecebefore the PersianInvasion,"CAH2IV (Cambridge1988) 360. 13 Herod.5.70.1-2; Arist.Ath. Pol. 20.1-2. Ostwald(as in n. II) 306-8 places the reforms and Isagoras'appealin 507/6, which flies rightin the face of Aristotle. The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica 263 period. The king brought with him only a small "band"of soldiers,14 who were easily overwhelmed, and collecting such a tiny force and marching to Athens could hardly have taken more than a week or two. It is unknown precisely when in the archon year Isagoras' appeal and expulsion took place, but even if they are dated to the very end of the year - and there is no particularreason to believe this so15 - Cleomenes would be back in the Peloponnesus collecting his army by early August at the absolute latest.16It is far more likely, since Aristotle has Cleisthenes undertaking his reforms "during the archonship of Isagoras," that these events were earlier, perhaps in the spring of 507 or even in late 508.17 How long it took to mobilize the forces of the Peloponnesian alliance cannot be determined with any precision and undoubtedly this varied with the scale of the expedition, but numerous examples indicate that it cannot have taken so many months that the expedition would be delayed until the following year. The Spartanarmy could be mobilized virtually overnight, as demonstrated by the lead-up to Plataea in 479, when the Peloponnesian levy appears to have gathered at the Isthmus within weeks of the Spartan decision to march.18 During the great war with Athens the Peloponnesian army regularly invaded Attica in the spring, and while it is true these expeditions were expected and involved no political wrangling, they demonstrate that it was certainly physically possible for the levy to be collected and rushed north in less than a month. And in 507 there appearsto have been little or no diplomatic dithering, since the allies were in the dark about Cleomenes' true aims, suggesting they had simply automatically heeded the call to mobilize. For Thucydides the campaigning season runs from March or April until at least the beginning of November,19 which means that even if Isagoras' ouster is set at the latest possible moment, early July, Cleomenes still had at least four months to collect his troops and march to Eleusis. If this was insufficient time, then it is difficult to understand 14 Herod.5.72.1: ou avv jsey6kqiXEtpi; Arist.Ath. Pol. 20.3: jsei okiywv. 15 A. Andrewes, "Kleisthenes' Reform Bill," CQ 71 (1977) 246-47 suggests that since Isagorasgave his nameto the archonyear he must have served most of his term.Even if this suppositionis true, which is not at all clear, Isagorascould still have been out of office in the early spring. 16 In theory the first monthof the Athenianyear, Hecatombaeon,began with the first new moon afterthe summersolstice, so an archon'stermcould begin anywherefromlate June to very earlyAugust.It cannotbe calculatedexactly whenthe year507/6 began,but it was very probablyin mid or late July; see W.B. Dinsmoor,The AthenianArchonList in the Light of Recent Discoveries (NY 1939) 205-10. 17 Arist.Ath.Pol. 21.1: en!i 'Iaay6pou dpxovto;. The relativeorderof Cleisthenes'reform proposalsandIsagoras'appealis unimportanthere,but see Knight(as in n. 12) 13-24 for a reasonablechronology;puttingthe reformsinto practice,which must take some time, shouldbe distinguishedfrom simply voting for them. 18 Herod.9.9.1-11.3; some troopswere alreadythereworkingon the wall. 19 See A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides III (Oxford 1956) 699-715. 264 RICHARD M. BERTHOLD how much of fifth and fourth century military history could have happened as it did. Of course, just because something could be done in a certain period of time does not mean it was, especially in the typically plodding world of politics and diplomacy. But there are good reasons to believe Cleomenes acted as expeditiously as possible. First, there is the king himself, by any account a headstrong and supremely energetic individual, not given to caution and hesitation.20 A man willing to bribe Delphi and play fast and loose with Sparta's constitutional practices to obtain his ends was not likely to dawdle, especially when the issue was not just political, but very personal. Besieged on the acropolis and forced to retire, Cleomenes had been personally humiliated by the Athenians, and what is known of his career strongly suggests an individual particularly eager to take action when so injured.2' Second, even a more cautious man would have compelling reasons to move promptly. The longer the delay, especially into the next year, the more the military and political situation would from his point of view deteriorate. Cleomenes, having already been involved with Athens and now presumably accompanied by Isagoras, must have been aware of the sorry state of Athenian hoplite forces in the wake of the tyranny,22and he could hardly have failed to conclude that the less time Athens had to preparethe easier his job would be. The longer he delayed, the longer his client's enemies, the Alcmaeonids, would also have to solidify their domestic political position, renderinghis political task that much harder.Further,that he was apparentlytaken by surpriseby the last minute defection of Damaratus and the Corinthians suggests - but only that - an operationthrown together with some haste. Finally, whether Cleomenes knew of the Athenian embassy to Sardis is unknown, but if he did, this might be another, if minor, spurto action, since though he might suspect it would take some time to get the ponderous Persian military machine moving, he could not be sure. All the evidence, circumstantial though it may be, thus points to the summer of 507 for Cleomenes' invasion of Attica. The failed attack could conse20 So much so that many in antiquityand in the presenthave thoughthim insane; see A. Griffiths, "Was Cleomenes Mad?," in A. Powell, ed., Classical Sparta. Techniques BehindHer Success (Norman,Okl. 1988) 51-78. 21 Herod.5.72.1-4; Arist.Ath.Pol. 20.3. Herod.5.74.1 in fact speaksof Cleomenes'actions in terms of insult and personal revenge: KkeogvIq be icrcxatdevo;ireptuppia0cat xicetat Kai epyOWati6 A0A"vaiov ... reiacaa0ai Te s0eowv T6v 8i,ov t6v'AOivaxiv. Cleomenes' subsequent proposal to restore Hippias (Herod. 5.90.1-91.3; Plut. Mor. 860f.) certainlysuggests a man willing to go to any lengthsto gain revenge. 22 Athensapparentlyhad not employeda citizen armyfor almostforty years,and Peisistratus may well have disarmedthe populace,seemingly relyingexclusively on mercenaries; Arist.Ath. Pol. 15.3-4 (Thuc. 6.58.1-2 hardlyseems evidence for Hippiasdisarmingall the hoplites,thoughthatmay have followed); see most recentlyF.J.Frost,"TheAthenian MilitaryBefore Cleisthenes,"Hist. 33 (1984) 283-94. The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica 265 quentlyeasily precedethe returnof the envoys, especiallyif as representatives of a low statusstatethey were keptcooling theirheels in Sardisby the satrap. And since Cleomenes'failureand the Athenianvictoriesin the northprovide the only compelling explanationfor the sudden repudiationof the Persian alliance,it must be concludedthatthe embassydid in fact returnafterAthens was saved. Cleisthenesdisappearsfromhistoryaboutthis time, andsome have linked thatdisappearanceto the embassy,suggestingthathe fell frompower,ruined by his connectionwith the unpopularmission.23This is difficult to support, especially if one acceptsthatthe embassyretumedafterthe crisis had passed. Granted,the demoswouldlaterbe veryfickle in the treatmentof its leaders,but it is veryhardto believethatin the flushof militaryvictorythe popularityof the manrecognizedas the architectof the governmentresponsiblefor the triumph wouldbe unableto weatheran associationwiththe discreditedembassy.In any case, his biastowardsthe Alcmaeonidsnotwithstanding, even Herodotuswould have troubleglossing over what would have been a very dramaticfall from power.Theembassywouldlaterreturnto hauntthe Alcmaeonids,butit certainly does not providea reliablebasisfor removingCleisthenesor his familyfrom the centerstage in Athenianpolitics.The most likely explanation,particularly in view of the factthatHerodotustypicallydoes not recorduneventfuldeaths,is thatas a relativelyold man,he simplydied or retiredin the yearsfollowingthe reforms.24 The firstembassyto Sardishas beenseen as an act of medismon the partof the "pro-Persian" Alcmaeonids,25but this conclusionis based in parton the mistakenassumptionthatthereexistedin Athensdefinablepartieswithconsistent policies. Instead,politics remainedat the turnof the centurya timocratic gameof individualaristocratsoperatingwithina networkof familyconnections and competingfor temporaryadvantagein power and prestige,all of which conspiredagainstthe emergenceof partiesandlong-termpoliticalprograms.26 It is thus impossibleto draw any conclusionsabout the official Alcmaeonid positionregardingPersiaor whether,for thatmatter,they even had one. That 23 How & Wells (as in n. 6) 11,40; Walker(as in n. 6) 167-68; C.W. Fornara& L.J. Samons HI,Athensfrom Cleisthenesto Pericles (Berkeley/LosAngeles 1991) 10, n. 38. 24 McGregor(as in n. 2) 79, n. 3; J.K. Davies, AthenianPropertiedFamilies 600-300 B.C. (Oxford 1971) 375; amongothers.The objectionsof Cromey(as in n. 12) 133-47 make absolutely no sense, and his argumentthat Cleisthenes went into voluntary exile is ingeniousbut unconvincing.Cleisthenesis the second child of parentsmarriedsometime before 570; see Davies (as in n. 24) 372. 25 Walker (as in n. 6) 158, 168; Hignett (as in n. 1) 180; C.A. Robinson,Jr., "Athenian Politics 510-486 B.C.,"AJP 66 (1945) 247-48 seems to imply this. 26 See esp. F.J.Frost,"TribalPolitics andthe Civic State,"AJAH1 (1976) 66-75 (as in n. 9) Class. Contr. 33-39. 266 RICHARDM. BERTHOLD the mission was clearly undertaken in response to an external crisis also undermines any conclusions about domestic politics; are Roosevelt and the American Congress to be considered "pro-Communist"because they made an alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War? Moreover, an unqualified accusation of medism is at this date completely inaccurate, since it is only after the Ionian Revolt and Marathon and especially after Xerxes' invasion that dealings with Persia take on the aura of treason and betrayal generally associated with the term.27 Sometime close to the end of the century the Athenians sent a second embassy to Sardis, this time to deal with the problem of Hippias.28 When Cleomenes' bizarre scheme to restore him to power fell through, Hippias had headed for the satrapalcourt, which almost certainlytook up his cause because of Athens' repudiationof the alliance of 507. From the Persian point of view that submission to Ahura-Mazdaand the GreatKing was permanent,and Artaphemes was inclined to support whatever Athenian government - in this case the exiled tyrant- endorsed this arrangement.29While Herodotus states that the purpose of the embassy was to dissuade Artaphernesfrom supportingHippias, it cannothave had even the least expectation of success, since the satrap was hardly likely to preferthe defiant republicto the compliant tyrant.The mission must be viewed as a diplomatic statement, an assertion to the Persians and anyone else (including opponents in Athens itself) of the legitimacy of the new government.30Flush with confidence in the wake of their military victories, the Athenians shrugged off Artaphernes'threatsand accepted Persian hostility as the price of independence. 27 See esp. Holladay(as in n. 4) 174-91; also A.W. Gomme,"AthenianNotes. 1. Athenian Politics 510-483 B.C.," AJP 65 (1944) 321-22 (= More Essays in Greek History and Hlist.22 (1973) 3-5. Literature[Oxford1962] 19-20); J. Wolski, "MT8tcsa6q," 28 Herod.5.96.2. For no apparentreason(it appearsto go back to R.W. Macan,Herodotus. TheFourth,FifthandSixthBooks[London18951I, 245) c. 504 is thedatemostoftengiven for theembassy(e.g., Walker[as in n. 6]) 163, n. 2; Thomsen[as in n. 11] 126;Ostwald[as , i1T' catpCo6 MtAoto; 'Aptaray6p...) in n. 111338), but Herod. 5.97.1 (ev co-i6u suggests a date closer to 498; could it be that the new threatcontributedto the military reformof 501/0? 29 Herod. 5.96.1. On the permanenceof submission see Orlin (as in n. 6) 257-65; by supportingHippiasArtapherneswas not attemptingto createa new alliancewith Athens, but was simply interferingin the affairs of a state alreadyconsidereda vassal. On the Persianrelationshipwith tyrannysee esp. D.F. Graf, "GreekTyrantsand Achaemenid Politics," in J.W. Eadie & J. Ober,eds., The Craftof the Historian.Essays in Honor of C.G. Starr(Lanham,MD 1985) 79-123. 30 Thomsen(as in n. I 1) 126 andOstwald(as in n. I 1) 338 see the purposeof the embassyas counteringHippias,but only Walker(as in n. 6) 168 recognizesthe hopelessnessof this, wrongly concluding, however, that there is a problem with Herodotus'account. The Alcmaeonidswould certainlysupportthe embassy as a way to counteractany negative publicityfrom the previousmission. The AthenianEmbassiesto Sardisand Cleomenes' Invasionof Attica 267 The second embassy and Artaphernes' acceptance of the tyrant's claim mark something of a turning point in the domestic affairs of Athens. Henceforth, any suggestion of rapprochementwith Persia meant supporting a restoration of the tyranny, a development that could only make medizing politically unacceptable to all but a handful who might benefit from Hippias' return.31 Conversely, tyranny, whose popular support was undoubtedly already rapidly evaporating with the successes of the new government, was now furthertainted by its clear association with submission to a foreign power. Whatever the details of Athenian domestic politics in this period, Persian support of Hippias makes it extremely difficult to accept the presence in the city of any sizable or influential group of either medizers or tyrannists. Stepping on to the shore at Marathon a decade later, Hippias might believe there was such a faction, but Miltiades would know otherwise. University of New Mexico, Albuquerque 31 Richard M. Berthold Walker (as in n. 6) 168 recognizes this, but incorrectly believes in the continued existence of a "party of Hippias" in Athens.