Information Aggregation and Large Auctions
... the bid or the report so as to make a gain in the market. The key for the efficiency limit result that we get is an argument that shows that the probability that the individual bid changes the equilibrium price is small. Therefore bidders behave almost as if they were faced with a fixed price and th ...
... the bid or the report so as to make a gain in the market. The key for the efficiency limit result that we get is an argument that shows that the probability that the individual bid changes the equilibrium price is small. Therefore bidders behave almost as if they were faced with a fixed price and th ...
Continuous Time Contests with Private Information
... a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A strategy of a player is a bounded stopping time, i.e., the player has to stop almost surely before some deadline. As long as a player does not stop the process, he incurs flow costs of continuation. The player who stops his process at the highest va ...
... a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A strategy of a player is a bounded stopping time, i.e., the player has to stop almost surely before some deadline. As long as a player does not stop the process, he incurs flow costs of continuation. The player who stops his process at the highest va ...
Some relationships between evolutionary stability
... 39. Given Swinkels (1992) finding that an ESS must be REE, it is easy to see that x then must be REE according to Definition 3. Definition 39 makes clear how the REE and ESS criteria are related. Both criteria imply that for x[ A to pass the respective tests, it must be a best response against itsel ...
... 39. Given Swinkels (1992) finding that an ESS must be REE, it is easy to see that x then must be REE according to Definition 3. Definition 39 makes clear how the REE and ESS criteria are related. Both criteria imply that for x[ A to pass the respective tests, it must be a best response against itsel ...
Game Theory - Department of computing science
... King-cobra males try to push each-other’s heads to the ground rather than biting Stags have roaring matches, walk parallel, and sometimes lock horns and push rather than trying to kill each-other When cats fight they scream more than they actually fight The more dangerous the species, the more ritua ...
... King-cobra males try to push each-other’s heads to the ground rather than biting Stags have roaring matches, walk parallel, and sometimes lock horns and push rather than trying to kill each-other When cats fight they scream more than they actually fight The more dangerous the species, the more ritua ...
... when discontinuities play a central role and cannot be eliminated or smoothed –doubts may arise over the robustness or even the relevance of the results. One way to attenuate such doubts is to provide a sequence of …nite approximating games whose equilibria converge to equilibria of the in…nite game ...
The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium : a survey
... apply, we cannot expect naive behavior. ...
... apply, we cannot expect naive behavior. ...
Natural Monopoly
... Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) • In a natural monopoly, is MES at a very high Q? • One firm achieves a lower cost of production than multiple firms would and MES is not reached. ...
... Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) • In a natural monopoly, is MES at a very high Q? • One firm achieves a lower cost of production than multiple firms would and MES is not reached. ...
Answers to Practice Questions 10
... b) Suppose Ruben and Roberto compete by simultaneously choosing prices and can set either the joint profit maximizing price in part a) or can charge $1 less (let’s say, cheat). What are profits if both Ruben and Roberto decide to charge $1 less? What are the profits if only one of them decided to ch ...
... b) Suppose Ruben and Roberto compete by simultaneously choosing prices and can set either the joint profit maximizing price in part a) or can charge $1 less (let’s say, cheat). What are profits if both Ruben and Roberto decide to charge $1 less? What are the profits if only one of them decided to ch ...
Simulating Normal Random Variables
... for each player) with the property that no player can increase her payoff by choosing a different action, given the other players' actions. ...
... for each player) with the property that no player can increase her payoff by choosing a different action, given the other players' actions. ...
Winners Curse - Application of Game Theory to Insurance Pricing
... • The blue, dashed curves show the optimal loadings for both competitors. Given both insurers have a common estimation error the graph is symmetric • The curves intersect when both insurers apply a loading of £70.71, shown by the green star. The expected profit is £22.10 • The strategy in which both ...
... • The blue, dashed curves show the optimal loadings for both competitors. Given both insurers have a common estimation error the graph is symmetric • The curves intersect when both insurers apply a loading of £70.71, shown by the green star. The expected profit is £22.10 • The strategy in which both ...
